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Xinjiang: increasing pain in the heart ofChina's borderlandYufan Hao & Weihua Liu

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Xinjiang: increasing pain in the heart ofChina’s borderlandYUFAN HAO* and WEIHUA LIU

The 5 July event in Urumqi inspired rethinking about Beijing’s policy towards Xinjiang. This

paper will examine Beijing’s interests in Xinjiang from historical, political, economic and

security perspectives, and the challenges Beijing faces in pursuing and protecting its

interests. By examining the tensions between the Han and ethnic minorities, especially the

Uyghurs in Xinjiang, the paper argues that the Xinjiang issue involves China’s core interests

and the most serious challenge Beijing faces is how to cope with ethnic tension in a highly

sensitive region surrounded by big powers.

On 5 July 2009, a riot by some Uyghurs took place in Urumqi, the capital of the XinjiangUyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Duringseveral hours of violence, more than 3,000 rioters went on the rampage, smashing busesand overturning police barricades, killing at least 197 people and injuring 1,721 others.1

It was the most violent turbulence that had occurred in Xinjiang since 1949. Xinjiangsuddenly attracted world attention as a locus of China’s internal troubles.

In fact, the 5 July incident was only the continuation of a series of incidents thathad happened in Xinjiang. Tensions between the Uyghur and the Han have intensifiedin the region since the early 1990s. Beijing was obviously shocked by the scale of theriot on 5 July, and regarded Rabiya Kadira as the black hand behind the riots, viewingher as the representative of the ‘three forces’—Ethnic Separatism, ReligiousExtremism and International Terrorism—aiming to sabotage the regional stability.

Although the government tried to downplay the implications of the event, viewingit as the result of the manipulation of ‘a handful of people’ (Yi Xiaocuo Ren inChinese), no one can ignore the serious discontent exemplified by the large-scaleparticipation of Uyghurs. How could just ‘a handful of people’ so easily motivate somany Uyghurs to participate in the riot, even though many Uyghurs did not evenknow who Rabiya Kadira was before the coverage of the riots by the state media?

* Yufan Hao is Professor of Political Science and Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities,University of Macau. Weihua Liu is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Universityof Macau, and Lecturer at Xi’an International Studies University. The authors can be reached by email atyhao@umac.mo.

1. Jane Macartney, ‘China in deadly crackdown after Uighurs go on the rampage’, Times Online, (5 July 2009),available at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6644574.ece; Yan Hao, Geng Ruibin and YuanYe, ‘Xinjiang riot hits regional anti-terror nerve’, Xinhua Net, (18 July 2009), available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-07/18/content_11727782.htm; ‘Jinri Wulumuqi’ [‘Urumqi today’], People Daily, (17 July 2009).

Journal of Contemporary China (2012), 21(74), March, 205–225

ISSN 1067-0564 print/ 1469-9400 online/12/740205–21 q 2012 Taylor & Francishttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2012.635927

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Central government has invested heavily in the region in the last few decades, andthe local economy has developed rapidly. According to the State Council, from 1950to 2008, the central government invested 386.23 billion yuan in Xinjiang, accountingfor 25.7% of the total investment in the region; and from the establishment of XUARin 1955 up to 2008, Xinjiang received a total of 375.202 billion yuan in subsidiesfrom the central budget. From 1978 to 2008, the per capita GDP in Xinjiang grew28 times, and was ranked number 15 among the 31 provincial level units in China in2008.2 With such significant economic growth and the large amounts of financialsupport from the center, why are so many local Uyghurs still not content?

Xinjiang issues have become a serious challenge to Beijing’s leadership. What arethe issues? What is the nature of the Xinjiang problem? How is Xinjiang viewed bythe Beijing leadership in China’s national strategy? What policy might Beijing takewith regard to Xinjiang? This paper will examine Beijing’s interests in Xinjiang fromhistorical, political, economic and security perspectives, and the challenges Beijingfaces in pursuing and protecting its interests. By examining the tensions between theHan and ethnic minorities, especially the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, the paper argues thatthe Xinjiang issue involves China’s core interests and the most serious challengeBeijing currently faces is how to cope with ethnic tension in a highly sensitive regionsurrounded by big powers.

I. Background

Xinjiang is China’s only autonomous region with all four administrative levels: oneautonomous region of Uyghurs, five autonomous prefectures for four ethnic groups,six autonomous counties for five ethnic groups and 43 ethnic townships.3 Accordingto the fifth national census in 2000, Xinjiang was inhabited by all of China’s 56 ethnicgroups except the Jino.4 In 2008, Xinjiang’s total population was 21.308 million, withthe Uyghur (9.832 million), Han (8.363 million) and Kazak (1.510 million) as thethree largest ethnic groups. Other ethnic groups with populations between a hundredthousand and a million are the Hui, Kirgiz and Mongolian.5 Being the largest ethnicgroup, the majority of the Uyghurs live in southern Xinjiang, while northern Xinjiangis mainly inhabited by Han and Kazak peoples.6 The population of almost everyethnic group in Xinjiang is increasing, yet the traditional way of life has changed withthe decreasing percentage of the population from each minority in their traditionalsettlements. For example, the ratio of Uyghurs in southern Xinjiang’s threeprefectures, namely, Kashgar, Hotan and Aksu, to the total Uyghur population inXinjiang fell from 84.6% in 1944 to 71.5% in 2007.7

2. The Information Office of the State Council, Development and Progress in Xinjiang, White Paper, (21September 2009). Li, Yuhui: ‘Notes on the Chinese Government’s Handling of the Urumqi Riot in Xinjiang’, Chinaand Eurasia Forum Quarterly 7(4), (2009).

3. Ibid.4. Ibid.5. Bureau of Statistics of Xinjiang Autonomous Region, Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2009 (Beijing: China

Statistics Press, 2010).6. The Information Office of the State Council, Development and Progress in Xinjiang.7. Ibid.

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Xinjiang was called ‘Xiyu’ (Western Region) in Ancient China. In 104 BC, theWestern Han Dynasty occupied the region, and made it part of China for the firsttime. In the 1750s, the Qing Dynasty of the Manchu defeated the Dzungaria rebellion,and the rebellion of the Khoja Brothers, and Xinjiang was reunified in 1759. Afterthat, the Qing government increased administrative control by setting up the IliGeneral in Charge of the administration over the areas north and south of theTianshan Mountains in 1762. In 1844, the Xinjiang Province was set up and formallyincorporated into the Qing Empire. After the reunification of Xinjiang and before theestablishment of the Republic of China, violent conflicts in this region burst outalmost every other year. During the Republic Era, Xinjiang was largely controlled bythe warlords, with little administrative control from the center. In 1933, and during1944–1949, two short-lived East Turkistan Republics existed in Xinjiang.

In 1949, the People’s Liberation Army entered Xinjiang under the leadership ofGeneral Wang Zhen, and Xinjiang formally became a province of the newlyestablished People’s Republic of China (PRC). On 1 October 1955, the XinjiangUyghur Autonomous Region was established. For the first four decades of the PRC,Xinjiang was relatively quiet, even though there was some discontent among the localpeople, especially during the Cultural Revolution, when religious and culturalactivities were restricted. Influential riots, hooliganism or sabotage included theHotan rising of 1954, the Ili and Tacheng disturbance and the Kazakh exodus in 1962,the activities of the East Turkistan People’s Revolutionary Party from 1967 to the endof the Cultural Revolution, etc.8

In 1978, Deng Xiaoping launched the Reform and Open-up Policy, which createdmore opportunities for communication between the local people and foreigners.Some religious activities resumed, and Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism rose onceagain. The influential unrests in Xinjiang in the 1980s included the Kashgar riots in1980 and 1981, and the Urumqi demonstrations in 1985, 1988 and 1989.9

In 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of independentstates in Central Asia, such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan andTurkmenistan, ignited the hope of Eastern Turkistan again. In the 1990s, the ‘EasternTurkistan Movement’ initiated several terrorist activities in Xinjiang. According toincomplete statistics, from 1990 to 2001 the ‘East Turkistan’ forces both inside andoutside China created more than 200 bloody incidents of terror and violence inXinjiang, by means of explosions, assassinations of government officials, poisoning,arson, attacking government buildings, riots and assaults. The influential activitiesincluded the Baren riot in 1990, the Yining disturbances in 1995, the Hotan event in1995, the Aksu incidents in 1996, the Yining insurrection in 1997, and the Urumqidisturbances in 1999.10 As a result, 162 citizens, including people of variousethnicities, cadres at the grassroots level and religious personnel, lost their lives, andover 440 were wounded.11

8. Michael Dillon, Xinjiang—China’s Muslim Far Northwest (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 49–59.9. Ibid., pp. 59–71, 84–130.

10. Ibid., pp. 59–71, 84–130.11. The Information Office of the State Council, ‘East Turkistan’ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with

Impunity, (21 January 2002).

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Following the attack on the Twin Towers in New York in 2001, China began to payattention to terrorism intended for separatism. Terrorism began to be reported moreand more in Chinese media. International cooperation against terrorism has been puton China’s diplomatic agenda. After the USA’s invasion of Afghanistan, Xinjiangwas relatively quiet for several years, but in 2008, the separatists initiated a series ofactivities to disrupt the Beijing Olympic Games in Urumqi, Kashgar and Kucha. On 5July 2009, the most serious violent riots erupted in Urumqi, causing huge losses oflives and property of the people of various ethnic groups. By 17 July 2009, 197people had died and over 1,700 were injured, with 331 shops and 1,325 motorvehicles destroyed or burned, and many public facilities damaged.12

Besides engaging in terrorist violence within China’s borders, the ‘East Turkistan’terrorist forces have also been involved in violent incidents beyond the borders. InMarch 1997, ‘East Turkistan’ terrorists opened fire at the Chinese embassy in Turkey,and attacked the Chinese consulate-general in Istanbul. In March 2000, NighmetBosakof, president of the Kyrgyzstan ‘Uygur Youth Alliance’, was shot dead in frontof his house by members of a terrorist organization named the ‘East TurkistanLiberation Organization’ because he had refused to cooperate with them. In May2000, members of the ‘Uygur Liberation Organization’ beyond the boundariesextorted US$100,000 as ransom after kidnapping a Xinjiang businessman, murderedhis nephew, and set the Bishkek Market of Chinese Commodities on fire.13 In July,Chinese workers were attacked in Pakistan by radical Islamic militants in revenge forthe handing over of a number of senior Muslim leaders captured in Kashmir in 2002,including the Uyghur leader Ismail Kadir.14

In 2002, the United Nations Security Council added the ‘East Turkistan IslamicMovement’ (ETIM) to its sanction list of terrorist groups. The East Turkistanorganizations now include: the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the EastTurkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO), the World Uyghur Youth Congress(WUYC) and the East Turkistan Information Center (ETIC). In 2004, the ‘EastTurkistan’ forces patched together the World Uyghur Congress (WUC).

On the other hand, people’s living standard in Xinjiang has improved remarkably.In 2008, the per capita net income of famers in Xinjiang was 3,503 yuan, which is 28times more than that of 1978 and 1.2 times more than that of 2000 when the westerndevelopment campaign was launched. The Engle coefficient (the proportion of foodconsumption in total consumption) for rural residents was 60.8% in 1978, 50.0% in2001 and 42.4% in 2008; while for urban residents it was 57.3% in 1980, 36.4% in2001 and 37.3% in 2008.15

However, in spite of the great achievement of economic development andimprovement of life, some local people in Xinjiang are still not satisfied with thecurrent regime, and want more autonomous rights, or even independence from China.

12. The Information Office of the State Council, Development and Progress in Xinjiang.13. The Information Office of the State Council, ‘East Turkistan’ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with

Impunity.14. Zahid Hussain and Jane Macartney, ‘Suicide bomb attack jolts China into realising the risks of global

ambition’, The Times, (20 July 2007).15. The Information Office of the State Council, Development and Progress in Xinjiang.

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This seems to have broken the belief that economic development and prosperity mayhelp to diminish ethnic discontent.

II. Beijing’s interests in Xinjiang

Due to its large size and political–geographical location, Xinjiang is critical toChina’s national strategic security and its economic growth. XUAR is China’slargest administrative division and spans over 1,660,001 square kilometers,16

accounting for about one sixth of China’s land territory, with immense energy andresources. Located at the center of the Eurasian continent,17 Xinjiang possesses asignificant geopolitical status, and is an important passageway on the new Eurasiancontinental bridge and the nexus with the countries along the Silk Route and theIslamic circle.

II.a. Political and security interest

Xinjiang borders eight countries (the most among all administrative divisions inChina that has 15 neighbors) with an almost 5,600 km long borderline (the longestland border among all frontier provinces and autonomous regions in China),constituting a quarter of China’s total land border of about 22,000 km (the longest inthe world). Through Xinjiang, China shares borders of almost 3,200 km with theformer USSR to the north-west: 56 km with Russia, 1,718 km with Kazakhstan,980 km with Kyrgyzstan and 450 with Tajikistan. The other countries neighboringXinjiang include Mongolia (1,435 km border) to the north-east, and Afghanistan(80 km), Pakistan (530 km) and India (about 350 km) to the south.18

Xinjiang is located at the center of the Eurasian continent. The British geographerSir Halford J. Mackinder was among the first to call attention to the centralimportance of Central Asia, calling the region the ‘geographical pivot of history’, or‘heartland’. In Mackinder’s framework, Xinjiang is included in the pivot area.19

Owen Lattimore, in 1950, also portrayed Xinjiang in a pivotal position, a ‘new centreof gravity’ in Asia between the great powers of China, the Soviet Union, India and theMuslim Middle East.20 Zbigniew K. Brzezinski also emphasized the significance ofthe Eurasian centrality in the analysis of the post-Cold War geostrategy of the USA.21

In geopolitical terms, Xinjiang and Central Asia is the center of the New Great Gameof the big powers such as China, Russia, India, the USA, North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) countries.22 Inthe North, Russia is striving to defend its declining world power status, and its

16. ‘Xinjiang’, Wikipedia, available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xinjiang (accessed 26 April 2010).17. The geographical center of the Eurasian continent is at Baojiacaozi Village, Yongfeng Town of Urumqi.18. Witt Raczka, ‘Xinjiang and its Central Asian borderlands’, Central Asian Survey 17(3), 1998.19. Halford Mackinder, ‘The geographical pivot of history’, Geographical Journal 20(4), (1904).20. Owen Lattimore, Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia (Boston, MA:

Little Brown, 1950).21. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New

York: Basic Books, 1997).22. Mathew Edwards, ‘The new great game and the new great gamers: disciples of Kipling and Mackinder’,

Central Asian Survey 22(1), (March 2003).

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influence in its backyard in Central Asia. In the West, NATO never gives up its easternexpansion. In the South, India and Pakistan are lagged in ongoing conflicts, and Indiawants to become a world power. In the East, the largest developing country andascendant power, China, is on the path to ‘immense national rejuvenation’ and tries tojoin in the making of new world rules. The USA, although quite far away, also wantsmore influence in this region due to its energy security and the anti-terrorism campaign.

In the name of anti-terrorism, after September 11, the USA projected its influenceinto Central Asia, and formed a part of the “encirclement of China” de facto. StephenBlank, a professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College,stated that ‘China is the big loser in the war on terrorism in Central Asia. Virtuallyevery plank of its strategic policy for enhancing its influence and lessening Americaninfluence has failed . . . ’.23 Driven by the USA, NATO has stepped up its presence inCentral Asia. Under the auspices of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) program,the Central Asian Battalion (CentrazBat)—the joint peacekeeping force ofKazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan—was established in 1995. Since 1996,these three countries have also conducted annual military maneuvers with theAmerican army. As a result, ‘Central Asian states will have less need toaccommodate Chinese demands than before, or use China to balance Russia to gain agreater degree of independence’.24 Within a month after the September 11 attacks,the USA army’s 10th Mountain Division was already deploying to Khanbad Air Basein Uzbekistan, which was the first major deployment of US forces to the territory ofthe former Soviet Union. Now American and European forces have been grantedsemi-permanent basing rights in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.25 In 2001and 2002, all of the central Asian states except Turkmenistan signed cooperation andbase access agreements with the USA, as well as receiving economic assistance.26

On the other hand, this region is also at the intersection of different culturalplates—the Slavic Orthodox civilization to the North, the Hindu civilization to theSouth, the Islamic civilization to the West, and the Confucian and Buddhistcivilizations to the East. The collision of different cultures may be transferred to theconflicts between different countries, and even different ethnic groups in the samecountry; and the penetration and expansion of religious extremism and ethnicseparatism have become severe threats to national security in this region.

The cultural–political fault line is also often an area of instability andconfrontation. The Sino-Indian territorial dispute has not been resolved; India hasclaimed sovereignty over Aksai Chin in Hotan since 1962. In addition, Pakistan,China and India are mired in conflicts in Kashmir. The contradiction betweenUzbekistan with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in Ferghana Valley is volatile. Nine yearsafter the invasion of Afghanistan by the USA, peace has not returned to thisprecarious land, and the USA is reluctant to withdraw its troops.

23. Stephen Blank, ‘China’s defeats in Central Asia’, Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, (14 August 2002).24. Chien-peng Chung, ‘The Shanghai Co-Operation Organization: China’s changing influence in Central Asia’,

The China Quarterly, (2004).25. Fuller, Graham and Jonathan Lipam: “Islam in Xinjiang”, in S. Frederick Starr (Ed), Xinjiang: China’s

Muslim Borderland, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004.26. Rumer, Boris: ‘The Powers in Central Asia’, Survival 44(3), (Autumn 2002).

Clarke, Michael: ‘China, Xinjiang and the Internationalisation of the Uyghur Issue’, Global Change, Peace &Security 22(2), (2010).

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The direct international threat to Xinjiang is Pan-Turkism along with Pan-Islamism, which are promoted by the newly independent Central Asian nations andTurkey explicitly or implicitly. Turkey is the center of Pan-Turkism, and also a keybase for Pan-Islamism. It was the first state to recognize the independence of theSoviet Central Asian republics, and the first state to open embassies in thosecountries. In October 1992, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the firstTurkic summit in Ankara was attended by the leaders of Turkey, Azerbaijan,Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.27 Historically, Central Asiawas called ‘West Turkistan’, and Xinjiang was called ‘East Turkistan’ by the Westerncolonists. The newly independent states in Central Asia strove to enhance the nationalTurkic and Islamic spirits to differentiate them from the Russian influence, which alsoprovided the ideological base for the Uyghur intention of gaining independence. Thecountries in Central Asia share a Sunni Islamic culture, and speak Turki except for inTajikistan. Most of the ethnic groups in Xinjiang are also Muslim and practice SunniIslam. The Tajik in Xinjiang and most people in Tajikistan speak Persian and havecultural ties with Iran, while the Tajik people in Xinjiang practice Shia Islam, which isalso the dominant religion in Iran. The historical and cultural links between theTurkish countries provide support to the national separatist movements in Xinjiang.

Influenced by the turbulent neighboring international environment and its ownhistorical experiences, Xinjiang is crucial to China’s national security andterritorial integrity. Xinjiang is not a barren desert land, but the soft belly of China.If Xinjiang becomes the focus of competition by the big powers, as it did around1900, China’s territorial integrity would face a fatal threat, and China’s status inEurasia and the world might return to that of the later Qing Dynasty. The unstableXinjiang may cut down the Eurasian continental bridge, and impede China’scommunication and cooperation with the Central Asian countries. If Xinjiang wereindependent, Tibet and Inner Mongolia might follow, China would lose more thanone half of its territory, and the flames of wars in western China might be fanned.China proper—the central area of the Chinese civilization—would be directlyexposed to foreign countries and the surviving space of the Chinese would becompressed greatly.

II.b. Energy and material interests

Xinjiang is the most important energy base in China. In 2008, Xinjiang ranked secondin China in oil production, generating 27.22 million tons of crude oil; and it rankedfirst in the production of natural gas, producing 24 billion cubic meters. By 2008,Xinjiang had a network of pipelines for transporting oil and gas to Eastern China withtotal length exceeding 4,000 km, crossing southern, northern and eastern Xinjiang.28

In addition, Xinjiang contains 115 of 147 raw materials found in China.29 It is themajor industrial base for cotton, live stock and nonferrous metals. As the largest baseof commercial cotton, Xinjiang produced 3.02 million tons of cotton in 2008, rankingfirst in China in terms of total output, per unit output and per capita output. It is also

27. Russell Ong, ‘China’s security interests in Central Asia’, Central Asian Survey 24(4), (December 2005).28. The Information Office of the State Council, Development and Progress in Xinjiang.29. Stephen Blank, ‘Xinjiang and China’s security’, Global Economic Review 32(4), (2003).

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the largest tomato processing and export base in China and the largest productionbase of beet sugar in China, with an annual output of 600,000 tons.30

However, China’s dependence on foreign oil has risen from 6.3% in 1993 to 30%in 2000, and to 46% in 2004.31 China has become a net importer of crude oil since1996,32 and it became the second largest global importer of oil in 2003.33 Two majorareas of oil production in the world that China can resort to are Central Asia, withgeographical links to Xinjiang, and the Middle East, with cultural links to Xinjiang.

Central Asia is a region of vast mineral wealth and is second only to the Gulf in termsof oil resources.34 Proven petroleum reserves in the region are estimated at between16.9 billion barrels and 33.4 billion barrels, exceeding those in the United States andthe North Sea; possible reserves could yield as much as 233 billion barrels. Provennatural gas reserves are estimated at between 177 and 182 trillion cubic feet, makingTurkmenistan (with 101 trillion cubic feet) and Kazakhstan (65–70 trillion cubic feet)two of the twenty most well-endowed gas depositories in the world.35

China and Kazakhstan have built a jointly owned pipeline from Atyrau throughKenkiyak, Kumkol and Atasau to the Ala Mountain Pass on the Xinjiang border, whichcame online in December 2005. The China National Petroleum Corporation, China’slargest state petroleum corporation, owns a controlling interest in Aktobemunaigaz, aproduction company in Western Kazakhstan. The Chinese also negotiated withTurkmenistan to purchase oil and natural gas, and to build a pipeline to transport themfrom there through Kazakhstan to Xinjiang; and they have arranged to purchasehydroelectric power from Kyrgyzstan.36

About 35% of China’s crude oil imports now originate in the six states of the GulfCooperation Council, among which, 20% is from Saudi Arabia and 13% from Iran.37

Saudi Arabia and Iran are China’s first and third largest suppliers of crude oil,respectively.38 However, the imported oil from the Middle East needs to be shippedthrough the Straits of Malacca, whose security depends on the most populous Islamiccountry—Indonesia—and the US Navy, which makes China’s energy supplyvulnerable in the event of Sino-US conflict or Sino-Indonesian tension. As a result,China wants to diversify its sources of energy supply by developing relations withCentral Asian states.

II.c. Trade interests

Xinjiang has two potential roles in China’s Reform and Open-up Policy. It notonly provides energy and raw materials to the coastal region, but also works as

30. The Information Office of the State Council, Development and Progress in Xinjiang.31. Yi-Chong Xu, ‘China’s energy security’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 60(2), (June 2006).32. Ong, ‘China’s security interests in Central Asia’.33. Peter Wonacott, Janne Whalen and Bhushan Bahree, ‘China’s growing thirst for oil remakes the world

market’, Wall Street Journal, (3 December 2003).34. Ong, ‘China’s security interests in Central Asia’.35. Michael Fredholm, ‘Russia and Central Asian security’, in Birgit N. Schlyter, ed., Prospects for Democracy in

Central Asia (Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul), Transactions 15, (2005).36. Kang Wu, ‘China’s energy interests and the quest for energy security’, in Elizabeth van Wie Davis and

Rouben Azizian, eds, Islam, Oil and Geopolitics (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).37. Andrew England, ‘China and the Gulf take steps along a new silk road’, Financial Times, (28 April 2010).38. Paul J. Smith, ‘China’s economic and political rise: implications for global terrorism and US–China

cooperation’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32, (2009), pp. 627–645.

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the economic nexus with the countries along the Silk Route and the Islamiccircle.39

As the development of international trade and economic cooperation increasedafter the Open-up Policy, Xinjiang became a major commercial hub in Central Asiaand the bridgehead for opening-up to Central Asian countries in Western China. NowXinjiang has 17 Grade-I ports approved by the state along the long frontiers withMongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, Russia and Afghanistan,and at the international airports of Urumqi and Kashgar, and 12 Grade-II portsapproved by itself.40 The Euro-Asian Continental Bridge through Xinjiang linksChina with Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and even Western Europe. Two-thirds ofthe trade between Central Asia and China actually takes place with Xinjiang. Morethan 70% of the commercial air cargo in Urumqi is so-called ‘return’ freightpurchased locally by Central Asian and Russian businessmen.41

Further, the Muslim Middle East, with a similar religious culture to Xinjiang, isalso a quite important economic partner for China. In 2008, China overtook the USAas the largest exporter to the Middle East, with Chinese goods coming into the regionvalued at about US$60 billion at the end of 2009—up from US$4.6 billion at the turnof the century, according to the Royal Bank of Scotland.42

III. Causes of ethnic tension: challenges to local stability

The reasons for the tension between the Uyghur separatists and the Chinesegovernment are both historical and existential, involving both internal and externalfactors.

III.a. Historical factors

The ethnic tensions in Xinjiang have a long history, in which control of this region bythe central government was not quite consolidated until the establishment of the PRCin 1949, because of the frequent riots and invasions by other countries.

‘Altogether, out of more than 2,000 years of inter-state relations in Central Asia,formal Chinese control of the region has extended, until today, for about 500years.’43 Since 104 BC, when the Western Han Dynasty occupied the region andmade it part of China for the first time, Xinjiang has been largely a part of theChinese dynasties, but central administrative control has been mostly loose ornon-existent at times.

After the establishment of Xinjiang Province by the Qing Empire, and before theestablishment of the Republic of China, violent conflicts emerged in this regionalmost every other year. There were various types of revolts in the region from 1844onwards. First, there was the insurrection of the Khojas, their descendants or the

39. Gaye Christofferson, ‘Xinjiang and the Great Islamic Circle: the impact of transnational forces on Chineseregional economic planning’, The China Quarterly, (1993).

40. The Information Office of the State Council, Development and Progress in Xinjiang.41. Sebastien Peyrouse, ‘The new “aerial Silk Road” between Central Asia and China’, Central Asia-Caucasus

Institute Analyst, (1 October 2008).42. England, ‘China and the Gulf take steps along a new silk road’.43. Raczka, ‘Xinjiang and its Central Asian borderlands’.

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maharajas, who wanted to be Khan of the region and sought independence. Thesecond was the invasion of the Kokand Khanate and Tsarist Russia. The two not onlyinvaded China directly, but also supported the secessionist forces together withBritain. The Commander-in-Chief of the Kokand Khanate Yakub Beg set up YattaShahar (the State of Seven Cities) in 1865, which became the most influentialsecessionist regime in Xinjiang before the first East Turkistan Republic. The thirdwas the uprising against the Qing Government or the Tsarist Russian invaders by theUyghur, Hui or Han peasants for economic reasons, but the leadership was usuallysnatched by the feudal lords or religious heads, who would establish their separatistregimes and the war between the regimes would continue. The fourth was therebellion by the revolutionaries at the end of the Qing Dynasty.

During the Republic Era, Xinjiang was largely controlled by the warlords, withlittle administrative control from the center. On 12 November 1933, the short-livedself-proclaimed East Turkistan Islamic Republic was declared by the Amirs of Hotanin Kashgar with British support, and soon was eliminated by the forces of theJapanese-supported Hui warlord Ma Zhongying in the following year. From 1944 to1949, a second East Turkistan Republic created by the ‘Three Districts Revolution’existed in Ili with the support of the Soviet Union. The ‘East Turkistan’ forcesshouted slogans like ‘killing the Han and annihilating the Hui’ and ‘opposing andexpelling the Han’, creating many disturbances and even cruelly slaughteringinnocent people in their attempt to split the motherland and set up an illegal regime.

The historic ethnic conflicts and separatist movements buried the seeds of hatredamong different ethnic groups in Xinjiang, especially between the Uyghurs, Han andHui. The separatist regimes in history have also provided the historical source fortoday’s East Turkistan Movement.

III.b. The economic grievance

Although the unrest in Xinjiang seems to be related to the Islamic religion, somescholars believe that ‘Islam in Xinjiang should not be considered as a source of unrestbut rather as a vehicle for the expression of increased social and politicalfrustrations’.44

It was often noted that ‘poverty is the root for terrorism’. The first reason for thediscontent of the Uyghurs is the sense of relative deprivation, which comes from theinequality of economic distribution. The Uyghur agreed that Xinjiang had developed,but the Han were the main beneficiaries of this economic growth. The figures show thatthe economic inequality is quite large among different ethnic groups and regions inXinjiang. Some Uyghurs think they are economically disadvantaged. The per capitaGDP of cities or prefectures in Xinjiang is negatively related to the ratio of minorities inthe population, with a Pearson coefficient of correlation of 2 0.585 in 2008 (seeFigure 1). Hotan, Kisilsu and Kashgar are at the bottom of the economic status, andtheir portions of minorities are the biggest. On the other hand, Karamay (Han 75.36%),Urumqi (Han 73.01%) and Shihezi (Han 94.49%) are at the top of the per capita GDPlist and are also the cities with the highest concentrations of Han population. The

44. Nicolas Becquelin, ‘Xinjiang in the nineties’, The China Journal no. 44, (July 2000).

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Bortala Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture showed a good economic performance in2008, but its Uyghurs only accounted for 33.31% of the total population.45 The riotsand other separatist activities mainly originated in Hotan and Kashgar where theUyghurs account for 96.28% and 91.24% of the population, respectively. Aksu comesthird, both in terms of largest concentration of Uyghurs and in having the lowest GDPper capita, while Turpan, whose GDP is near that of Urumqi because of its famous fruitagriculture and tourism industry, is relatively peaceful, although 70.55% of itspopulation is Uyghurs.46

From 1993, the difference in urban-rural income ratios between Xinjiang and thenational average in China was larger and larger.47More terribly, the level ofurbanization is negatively related to the ratio of Uyghurs in the population, or theratio of Uyghur population is positively correlated with the ratio of agriculturalpopulation, with the Pearson coefficient of correlation of 0.726 in 2008 (see Figure 2).Hotan, Kashgar, Aksu and Turpan are the four regions with the highest Uyghurconcentrations, and also the four regions highest in agricultural population ratio.

Per capita GDP (Yuan)

120000.00

100000.00

80000.00

60000.00

40000.00

20000.00

0.000.00 0.20

Shihezi Hami

Bortala Altay

Bayangol

Urumqi

Karamay

Aksu

Turpan

Kizilsu Hotan

Kashgar

0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00

Ratio of minorities

ObservedLinear

Figure 1.

45. Bureau of Statistics of Xinjiang Autonomous Region, Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2009.46. Ibid.47. Cao, Huhua: Urban-Rural Income Disparity and Urbanization: What Is the Role of Spacial Distribution of

Ethnic Groups? A Case Study of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in Western China’, Regional Studies 44(8),(October 2010).

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Generally speaking, religious enthusiasm in rural areas is higher than in urban areas,which makes sense due to the fact that religious extremism is more serious in theUyghur concentrated Hotan and Kashgar.

Furthermore, the occupational stratification by ethnicity in Xinjiang is also moreapparent (see Table 1). According to the population census in 2000, 80.51% ofUyghur labor forces are agricultural workers, more than the average ratio (61.60%) inthe whole of Xinjiang, and much more than the corresponding figure for Han(36.77%). On the other hand, the proportion of Uyghurs who are ‘professional and

Table 1. Ethnic labor force structure of Xinjiang in 2000 (%)

Han Uyghur Xinjiang

Managers and administrators 3.99 0.83 2.29Professional and technical workers 11.12 5.35 8.16Clerical workers 6.10 1.93 3.86Sales and service workers 17.20 5.41 10.57Agricultural workers 36.77 80.51 61.10Manufacturing and transportation workers 24.73 5.84 13.91Other 0.08 0.13 0.11

Source: Population Census Office of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Tabulation on the 2000Population Census of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (Urumqi: Xinjiang People’s PublishingHouse, 2002).

1.00

0.80

0.60

0.40

0.20

0.000.00 0.20

KaramayWujiaqu

ShiheziUrumqi

Hami

Bayangol

Tumxuk

AksuTurpan

Kizilsu

Hotan

Kashgar

Aral

Bortala

Altay

0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00

Ratio of uygh population

Ratio of agricultural population

ObservedLinear

Figure 2.

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technical workers’ (5.35%) with relatively high salaries is smaller than that of all thepeople in Xinjiang (8.16%), and much smaller than that of Han people (11.12%).Within the Uyghur Autonomous Region, only 0.83% of the Uyghur labor force aremanagers or administrators, and in fact, the proportion is the lowest among that of themost populous 11 ethnic groups in Xinjiang, not to mention the ratio of managers andadministrators among Han laborers (3.99%). The socio-economic and politicalstratification along ethnic lines has brought some Uyghurs to view themselves as alower-grade community, separate from the central community (Han) whichdominates the economic and political system and the allocation of resources.48

Although living standard for must Uyghurs has been improved, some still do notthink they have benefited from the ‘Reform and Open-up Policy’ or ‘WestDevelopment Campaign’, which they feel is just aimed at transferring the oil and gasfrom the Uyghur region to the Han region. They believe that the jobs created by newinvestment in Xinjiang are reserved for Han immigrant workers from China proper.Some Uyghur view Han migration into Xinjiang negatively, asserting that the Hantake the best jobs, and the Han disrespect the Uyghur and their culture.49 On the otherhand, some Han businessmen believe that the people of minorities or local people areless intelligent and less hardworking than the Han, so they are reluctant to hire peoplefrom minority ethnic groups. Because of their limited education and closed livingenvironment, many Uyghurs cannot speak fluent Mandarin, which is often aprerequisite for a good job. Hence it is not surprising that not many Uyghurs areprofessional workers or administrators.

III.c. Problems in implementing the ethnic autonomous policies

Regional autonomy of ethnic minorities is one basic item in the PRC’s politicalsystem. The Constitution and the Law on Regional National Autonomy are twofundamental laws concerning ethnic autonomy, which stipulate how to set up ethnicautonomous regions and the autonomous organs, the content of autonomy and theobligations of the upper state organs. However, the implementation of the ethnicautonomous policy disappointed some people without satisfying political autonomy,freedom of religion and the respect of local customs. According to some Westernscholars, autonomy in China is limited, for most powers of local government mustreceive approval from, or are subject to, supervision by the central government, andBeijing reserves absolute discretion in the implementation of autonomy.50

According to the law, the heads of the autonomous region, autonomous prefecturesand autonomous counties, as well as the heads of the standing committees of localpeople’s congresses, are citizens from the ethnic group(s) exercising regionalautonomy in the areas concerned; but the above officials are not in fact chosen locallybut by the committee of the CPC at the immediately higher level, and quite a few from

48. Remi Castets, ‘La Nationalisme Ouıghur au Xinjiang: Expressions Identitaires et Politiques d’un Mal-Etre’,Perspectives Chinoises 78, (July–August 2003).

49. Blaine Kaltman, Under the Heel of Dragon: Islam, Racism, Crime, and the Uighur in China (Athens, OH:Ohio University Press, 2007).

50. Hurst Hannum and Richard B. Lillich, ‘The concept of autonomy in international law’, The American Journalof International Law 74, (1980); Mathew Moneyhon, ‘Controlling Xinjiang: autonomy on China’s “new frontier”’,Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 3, (2002).

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the minority ethnic group have been appointed to be the secretary of the committee ofthe CPC—the de facto highest leader in any region of China. In addition, accordingto the White Paper of the Information Office of the State Council, the number ofXinjiang’s cadres from minority ethnic groups was 363,000 in 2008, accounting for51.25% of the total number of cadres in Xinjiang,51 less than the proportion of ethnicminorities in the total population (60.75%).52

Freedom of religious belief is also stipulated in the Constitution of China and the‘Regulations on Religious Affairs’ promulgated by the State Council as ‘Citizensenjoy freedom of religious belief’. ‘No state organ, public organization or individual. . . may . . . discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, anyreligion.’ ‘Citizens who believe in religions and those who don’t shall respect each otherand coexist in harmony, as shall citizens who believe in different religions.’ Someimportant religious leaders in Xinjiang not only accept salaries from the government butalso serve as members of the CPC. For instance, Bughraxan, the first Chairman ofXinjiang Province of the People’s Republic of China, was selected to be the Chairman ofthe Islamic Association of China, but was given the title ‘the sincere communist soldier’after his death. In fact such practices contradicted the spirits of the regulations of theCPC. In 1991, the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee issued the‘Notice on Proper Settlement of the Issue of Party Members’ Religious Belief’, in whichthe members of the party are not allowed to practice religions, nor to participate inreligious activities. On the other hand, the rule restricted the amount of CPC membersfrom minor ethnic groups, hence their opportunities of career success in public sectors.53

There were also some patent or latent meticulous rules concerning religiouspractices. On a board in the Etkal Mosque in Keriya, ‘Six Prohibitions’ and ‘ThreeRestrictions’ are written.54 The first prohibition is that ‘Cadres in government,students and youths under 18 years old are not allowed to take part in any activityin the Mosque’. The first restriction is that ‘the Djumah on Friday is not allowed tobe longer than half an hour’. In a middle school in Kucha, ‘23 behaviors of illegalreligious activity’ are listed on a row of boards for propaganda; these behaviorsinclude ‘Conducting marriage ceremonies in traditional methods’, ‘Interferingwith social life by implementing traditional practices’, ‘Going on non-government-sponsored pilgrimages’, ‘Disseminating speech inconsistent withthe official version’, etc.55 The coexistence of such detailed regulations and thestate law regarding ‘freedom of religious beliefs’ confuses many people. The closelink between Islam and Uyghur identity also has made the regulation of religiouspractice a cause of resentment of the Uyghurs and is often considered as anattempt to weaken Uyghur identy.56 Some Muslims and ethnic minorities are

51. The Information Office of the State Council, Development and Progress in Xinjiang.52. Bureau of Statistics of Xinjiang Autonomous Region, Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2008 (Beijing: China

Statistics Press, 2009).53. Chou, Bill K.P.: ‘Linking China’S Borderlands with Its Foreign Relations’, Journal of Contemporary China

21(74), (forthcoming 2012).54. Wang Lixiong, Wo de Xiyu, Ni de Dongtu [My West Land, Your East Country ] (Taipei: Locus Publishing

House, 2007), p. 159.55. Ibid., p. 232.56. Clarke, Michael: ‘China, Xinjiang and the Internationalisation of the Uyghur Issue’, Global Change, Peace &

Security 22(2), (June 2010).

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reported to be under pressure in some public spheres. One informant reported thatmale schoolteachers have been forbidden to grow their mustaches, an importantsign of manhood for Uyghurs.57

III.d. The international factors

Since the liberalization of religion and international economic interaction in the early1980s, the Muslims have re-established contact with other Islamic countries, andcommunication has increased along with international trade with Turkic and Arabicstates. Religious extremism and Pan-Turkism have also penetrated into China. Theintervention of other great powers has made the situation in Xinjiang morecomplicated.

Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism provide the ideological base for separatism inXinjiang. The new independent Central Asian countries wanted to promotenationalism by escaping the influence of Russia, and therefore encouraged thestruggle for Xinjiang’s independence indirectly. The separatists in Xinjiang hope togain support from the newly independent Central Asian countries, Turkey and Iran,because of their ethnic and religious ties.

In 1991, Turkish Prime Minister Demirel was reported to have said that he would‘not allow the Chinese to assimilate their ethnic brothers in Eastern Turkestan’ andwould make representations to the United Nations.58 In 1992, the Turkish PresidentOzal was reported to have said,

I declare that I have taken delivery of the Eastern Turkistan cause. The Turkic republicsunder former Soviet rule have all declared their independence. Now it is EasternTurkestan’s turn. It is our desire to see the ancient homeland of the Turkic peoples a freecountry.59

After the 5 July event, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan evencriticized China by saying ‘These incidents in China are as if they are genocide. Weask the Chinese government not to remain a spectator to these incidents. There isclearly a savagery here’.60 He stated that Turkey would grant a visa to the exiledUyghur leader Rebiya Kadeer if she applied. The Trade and Industry Minister NihatErgun also called for a boycott of Chinese goods as a protest against the events inXinjiang.61

In fact, some of the Turkic countries have offered asylum to the refugees of ‘EastTurkistan’. The Uyghur separatist groups operating in Central Asian states includethe ‘Nozugum’ Foundation, Kazakhstan Regional Uyghur Organization, KazakhUyghur Unity (Ittipak) Association, Uyghurstan Freedom Association, UyghurYouth Union, Uyghurstan Liberation Organization and United Revolutionary Frontof Eastern Turkistan headed by Yusupbek Mukhlisi, all based in Kazakhstan’s

57. Fuller and Lipam, ‘Islam in Xinjiang’.58. Eastern Turkestan Information 1(4), (November 1991).59. Eastern Turkestan Information 1(2), (March 1992).60. ‘Turkish PM compares violence in China to genocide’, The Associate Press, (10 July 2009), available at:

http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id¼8053288.61. ‘Turkish minister calls for China boycott over unrest’, Agence France Presse, (10 July 2009), available at:

http://www.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne%2BNews/World/Story/A1Story20090710-153902.html.

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Almatay; and the Kyrgyz Uyghur Unity (Ittipak) Association and Bishkek HumanRights Centre, both based in Kyrgyzstan’s Bishkek.62

The ‘East Turkistan’ terrorists are also supported by international terrorist forces.The ‘East Turkistan’ terrorist organization based in South Asia not only receivesunstinting support from Osama Bin Laden, but has also become an important partof his terrorist forces. Some Uyghurs fought alongside the Taliban or the late JumaNamangani’s Afghanistan-based Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), whileothers joined the Chechen mujahidin during the early years of the secondRussian/Chechen war that began in 1999.63 The ETIM headed by Hasan Mahsum issupported in finance and materials, and directed by Bin Laden. The terrorist forces ledby Bin Laden have given much financial and material aid to the ‘East Turkistan’terrorists. In early 1999, Bin Laden met with the ringleader of the ETIM, asking himto ‘coordinate every move with the “Uzbekistan Islamic Liberation Movement” andthe Taliban’, while promising financial aid. In February 2001, the Bin Ladenterrorists and Taliban leaders met at Kandahar to discuss the training of ‘EastTurkistan’ terrorists. They decided to allocate a large sum of money for training the‘East Turkistan’ terrorists and promised to bear the cost of their operations in 2001.Moreover, the Bin Laden terrorists, the Taliban and the ‘Uzbekistan IslamicLiberation Movement’ have offered a great deal of arms and ammunition, means oftransportation and telecommunication equipment to the ‘East Turkistan’ terrorists.Bin Laden’s group also directly trained personnel for the ‘East Turkistan’ forces.Hasan Mahsum chose some criminals, religious extremists and national separatistsboth from home and abroad for training at Bin Laden’s terrorists training camps inAfghanistan, at Kandahar, Mazari Sharif and other places.64 After the 5 July riot,Al-Qaeda even vowed vengeance against Chinese workers in Africa for the death ofthe Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang.65

Further, for the strategic significance of Central Asia, the big powers arecompeting to project influence into this region, which may also harm the stability ofChina’s northwestern borderlands. The Revolution of Three Districts and the SecondEast Turkistan was directly supported by the former Soviet Union in the RepublicEra. Again, between May and July 1962, approximately 60,000 people from Ili wereincited to leave Xinjiang by Moscow.

Although the USA government seemingly supports China’s anti-terrorism, it isreluctant to equate the fight against terrorism with China’s domestic crackdownsagainst separatism; rather, Washington has made it clear to the Chinese thatnonviolent separatist activities cannot be classified as terrorism.66 Indeed, some ofthe USA government-funded NGOs have provided financial support to the East

62. Chung, ‘The Shanghai Co-Operation Organization: China’s changing influence in Central Asia’.63. Andrew McGregor, ‘Chinese counter-terrorist strike in Xinjiang’, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst,

(7 March 2007).64. The Information Office of the State Council, ‘East Turkistan’ Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with

Impunity.65. Malcolm Moore, ‘Al-Qaeda vows revenge on China over Uighur deaths’, The Telegraph, (14 July 2009),

available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/5822791/Al-Qaeda-vows-revenge-on-China-over-Uighur-deaths.html.

66. Chien-peng Chung, ‘China’s “war on terror”: September 11 and Uighur separatism’, Foreign Affairs,(July/August 2002).

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Turkistan movement in the name of human rights and freedom. The NationalEndowment for Democracy (NED) in the USA granted financial support ofUS$731,306 for Uyghur human rights and prodemocracy organizations, such as theWorld Uyghur Congress (US$186, 000), Uyghur American Association (US$249,000), International Uyghur Human Rights and Democracy Foundation (US$226,804) and International Uyghur PEN Club (US$69,502), for advancing human rightsand democracy of the Uyghur.67 The NED is claimed as a private, non-government,non-profit foundation,68 but it receives a yearly appropriation from the USACongress.69

Further more, Radio Free Asia (RFA) in the USA began to provide broadcastingservices through the Uyghur language from December 1998, and its Uyghur website inArabic, Latin and Cyrillic writing systems from September 2004. The radio oftenbroadcasts breaking stories unreported by China’s state-run media or foreign newsagencies, including issues such as democratic development in Central Asia, humanrights, religious freedom, official corruption, the environment, Internet control inChina, and interviews with human rights activists and Chinese or Uyghur dissidents.70

IV. Implications for China’s response

In order to maintain stability in Xinjiang and the integrity of national sovereignty,Beijing has adjusted its domestic and foreign policies. The latter has been tuned withthe foundation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the September11 event; while domestic policy was modulated after the 5 July event in 2009. Thechanging of the Secretary of the CPC in Xinjiang in April 2010 and the Central WorkConference on Xinjiang in May 2010 may be new signals of such adjustments.

IV.a. The new secretary and the Central Work Conference on Xinjiang

After 5 July 2009, many Han people as well as the Uyghur people in Xinjiang becamedissatisfied with the performance of the former Secretary Wang Lequan. On 24 April2010, Wang was replaced by Zhang Chunxian as the Secretary of the CPC in Xinjiang,who has a more amiable, open style and responsive attitude. Usually the replacement ofthe party head at the provincial level in China is announced by the deputy chief of theOrganization Department of the CPC Central Committee, but the replacement of theXinjiang party chief was announced by the chief of the Organization Department LiYuanchao. A standing member of the Politbureau of the CPC Xi Jinping, who maybecome the next secretary of the CPC, was also present at the announcement, whichreflected the high attention that the central government was paying to Xinjiang.

67. National Endowment for Democracy, NED Support for Uyghur Human Rights and Prodemocracy Groups inExile, Factsheet, (21 October 2009).

68. National Endowment for Democracy, About NED, available at: http://www.ned.org/about. Yufan Hao,Dilemma and Decision: An Organizational Perspective on American China Policy Making (Berkeley, CA: Universityof California Institute of East Asian Studies, 1997).

69. F. William Engdahl, ‘Washington is playing a deeper game with China’, Global Research, (11 July 2009).70. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State, USA, Country Reports on Terrorism

2008, (April 2009).

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Zhang Chunxian was the former CPC secretary of Hunan Province, and becamepopular in the limelight of the media and with netizens during the meeting session ofthe National People’s Congress in 2010 for his openness to criticism from both themedia and netizens. He has been referred to as ‘the most open party secretary’ bysome netizens. Xi Jinping said of him that he held ‘liberated ideas, a clear-thinkingmind and a spirit of creative thought’. Zhang is a pragmatic official, who was once thehead of the Ministry of Communication and was honored as ‘the Person of the Year’in 2006 by the International Road Federation. Considering Zhang’s experience, it canbe predicted that he may emphasize economic development, building infrastructureand the construction of a harmonious society in Xinjiang. He may also help toimprove the image of the Chinese government in the Western media with hishandling of Xinjiang affairs.

On 23 April 2010, just one day before the nomination of Zhang, the Politbureau ofthe CPC decided that economic and social improvements should be given priority inXinjiang, departing from Wang Lequan’s formula of ‘Stability Above All Else’, andshowing a tendency towards the new philosophy that ‘Both Stability andDevelopment are Important Equally’. After that, the leaders of 19 eastern provincesvisited Xinjiang for the next round of partnership assistance to Xinjiang.

One month after Zhang’s appointment, the first Central Work Conference onXinjiang in history was held in Beijing on 17–19 May 2010. Although the content ofthe conference was quite comprehensive, several points aroused public interest. First,Xinjiang would try to achieve a ‘leapfrog’ development with the support of thecentral government and eastern provinces. By 2015, per capita GDP in Xinjiangshould have caught up with the country’s average level. Xinjiang should be able tofulfill the goal of achieving a moderately prosperous society in all aspects by 2020 bypromoting a coordinated regional development. Second, Xinjiang will be the firstregion in China to start reform of resource taxes with a shift to taxing crude oil andnatural gases by price rather than by volume, and the local proportion in revenue fromnatural resources will definitely increase. Third, it was stressed that the first andforemost goal of the policies was to ‘ensure and improve the well-being of the peoplein Xinjiang’, while the old saying ‘Stability Above All Else’ did not appear in any ofthe reports from the conference.71

Over the years, the central government and the governments of the coastalprovinces have supported Xinjiang to construct infrastructure and agricultural andmodern industrial systems. According to the Central Work Conference on Xinjiang,XUAR will receive total financial support of more than 10 billion yuan from 19provinces and municipalities in 2011. It seems that Beijing is copying what it did incoastal China from 1989, believing that economic well-being may ease socialdiscontent. If the new development plan is successful, it will help ease potentialunrest and boost long-term stability in Xinjiang.

However, the issue of social disparity has also received attention from Beijing.Although the amount of financial assistance to Xinjiang will be much larger thanbefore, if the development strategy follows the old route—Investment !

71. Xinhua News Agency, ‘Chinese central authorities outline roadmap for Xinjiang’s leapfrog development,lasting stability’, Xinhua Net, (20 May 2010), available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-05/20/c_13306534.htm.

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Construction ! Employment of Han people and transferring resources fromXinjiang to East China—the income disparity in Xinjiang and between Xinjiang andthe eastern provinces would not decline, and the sense of relative deprivation of thepeople of minority ethnic groups may grow further. Beijing seems to have realizedthat the key for the construction of a harmonious society and harmonious ethnicrelations is to let the minorities share the fruits of development at a fairer ratio.

In addition, rule of law can also play an import role in dealing with the religiousaffairs and the relationships between different ethnic groups. Beijing has begunto realize the importance of treating people of different ethnic groups equally.The officials and government should respect the religious beliefs and customs ofthe minorities, reduce the illegal interference in such affairs and promotecommunication between people from different ethnic groups. Following the CentralWork Conference on Xinjiang, some liberal intellectuals have criticized the lack ofpolitical reform in Xinjiang, believing that democracy and respect for human rightsshould be regarded as a guarantee for this region’s long-term stability.72

IV.b. International cooperation

Ethnic separatism in Xinjiang has been conflated with religious extremism andinternational terrorism. As a result, it is necessary to cooperate with other countriesagainst terrorism through bilateral treaties, multilateral treaties and internationalorganizations.

On 26 April 1996, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistansigned ‘the Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions’ in Shanghai,which signified the creation of the Shanghai Five Grouping. On 15 June 2001, thefive countries and Uzbekistan signed the ‘Shanghai Convention on CombatingTerrorism, Separatism, and Extremism’ and formed the Shanghai CooperationOrganization (SCO). In addition, India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan have beenobserver states of the SCO. The “Regional Anti-Terrorism” centre was open inTashkent of Uzbekistan in 2003.73 At the same year, the most significant terroristorganizations in Central Asia and South Asia, such as the ETIM, may becomepublic enemies of these countries. Through cooperation within the frameworkof the SCO and the relevant countries in Central Asia, China can cooperate withthe members to weed out the separatist activities in Central Asia, and it will alsobe able to expand its influence in this region, and provide a peaceful and stableneighboring environment for the development of Xinjiang and NorthwesternChina. Furthermore, China can counter the USA’s influence in this region withRussia and change the US-led international order for a multi-polar new order.

72. ‘Conference on Xinjiang development in China highlights poverty-alleviation and people’s livelihood-improvement’, BBC, (20 May 2010), available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/trad/china/2010/05/100520_china_xinjiang.shtml?sourceid¼navclient&hl¼zh-TW&ie ¼ UTF-8&rlz¼1T4GGLL_zh-TWMO357MO357&q¼%e6%96%b0%e7%96%86%e5%8f%91%e5%b1%95%e4%bc%9a%e8%ae%ae%e5%bc%ba%e8%b0%83%e6%89%b6%e8%b4%ab%e6%94%b9%e5%96%84%e6%b0%91%e7%94%9f.

73. Albion, Adam: Tashkent’s New Balancing Act After The SCO Summit, Raido Free Europe/Radio LibertyCentral Asia Report, (12 September 2003).

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The new independent Central Asian countries also hope to view China as acounterweight or counterbalance to Russia.

After the September 11 event, both China and the USA recognized the importanceof international cooperation for the fight against terrorism. Facing the same, related orsimilar enemies, the two countries have come together. During the war in Afghanistan,China has shared some intelligence with the US government, and provided Pakistanwith economic aid and reassurances of Islamabad’s support for the USA.74 InDecember 2001, Washington established a Federal Bureau of Investigation office inBeijing to facilitate coordination against terrorism. Beijing also set up a Ministry ofPublic Security office in Washington. On 27 August 2002, the United Statesdesignated the ETIM as a terrorist organization after pressure from China and a pledgeby China to restrict missile technology transfers to countries like Iran, following a visitto China of Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage.75

The September 11 event prompted some countries to view terrorism as a globalproblem. Immediately following the September 11 attacks, China, along with othermembers of the UN Security Council, endorsed UN resolution 1373 (2001); and theETIM was added by the UN1267 Committee to ‘the Consolidated List Establishedand Maintained by the 1267 Committee with Respect to Al-Qaida, Osama Bin Laden,and the Taliban and other Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities Associatedwith them’ on 11 September 2002. Furthermore, China approved or acceded to 11international conventions and protocols against terrorism from 1978 to 2006.76

The Chinese government often refers to the UN resolution 1373 as a guarantee ofthe legitimacy of its campaign against extremism and terrorism, and the hedgeagainst other countries’ assistance to the separatists. Through fighting againstterrorism with cooperation with other countries, China can also improve its image inthe international community as a responsible country working to advance worldwidestability and peace.77

V. Conclusion

Since 5 July 2009, Xinjiang has become the pain in Beijing’s borderland strategy.The unprecedented riots in Xinjiang inspired rethinking about Beijing’s interests inXinjiang, the challenges in maintaining stability in this region, and the policiestowards Xinjiang with regards to ethnic tensions.

The geopolitical position and resources reserves in Xinjiang make it quite crucialto Beijing’s national interests. Xinjiang is vital to China’s territorial integrity andnational security. XUAR is located in the heartland of the Eurasian continent facingseveral major powers directly. Xinjiang is the most important energy and rawmaterial base in China, and also the gateway to the Silk Route and the Islamic Circle,

74. Ong, ‘China’s security interests in Central Asia’.75. McGregor, ‘Chinese counter-terrorist strike in Xinjiang’; Yufan Hao, Sino-American Relations: Challenges

Ahead (London: Ashgate, 2010); Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror(Brassey’s Firm, 2004).

76. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2008.77. Yoram Evron, ‘China’s anti-terrorism policy’, Strategic Assessment 10(3), (December 2007).

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through which China not only exports to Central Asia and the Middle East, but alsoimports oil and gas for its economic development.

The most critical challenge to local stability is the ethnic tension in Xinjiang.Historical ethnic conflicts have buried the seeds of hatred among different ethnics.The distinct economic–social stratification by ethnicity makes many Uyghurs feeldeprived by the Han people; and due to some problems in the implementation ofethnic autonomous policy, some ethnic minorities do not feel that they get enoughrespect in political, religious and customs terms. Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism,along with implicit support from some countries, penetrates into Xinjiang fromabroad, which makes Xinjiang affairs more complicated.

Facing the challenges in Xinjiang, Beijing has begun to adjust its domestic andforeign policies concerning Xinjiang. The change of the party chief in Xinjiang andthe Central Work Conference on Xinjiang both demonstrated that Beijing has begunto adopt a new approach ‘Emphasizing Both Stability and Development’ instead of‘Stability Above All Else’. Whether this new strategy will work, we will have to waitand see. The old approach failed because it did not pay enough attention to the deep-rooted social economic ethnic issues. The government has begun to pay moreattention to the economic imparity and the well-being of the local people, particularlythe Uyghurs. In addition, the Xinjiang issue has its international implications. Beijinghas to cooperate with other neighboring countries, not only to fight against terrorismin the region through bilateral treaties, multilateral treaties and internationalorganizations, but also to cope with ethnic tensions that may involve ethnic groupsbeyond China’s borders. Beijing has to handle the Xinjiang issue delicately with extracare, trying to make sure it does not turn into a time bomb for regional stability andChina’s energy safety.

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