Work in progress, No. 68

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Alternative title Work In Progress

Author/Creator University of Witwatersrand (Johannesburg)

Publisher University of Witwatersrand (Johannesburg)

Date 1990-08

Resource type Journals (Periodicals)

Language English

Subject

Coverage (spatial) South Africa

Coverage (temporal) 1990

Source Digital Imaging South Africa (DISA)

Rights By kind permission of Hein Marais, Julian May, andthe Southern Africa Report.

Format extent(length/size)

48 page(s)

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WORK IN PROGRESS WIP 68 August 1990A South African communist speaks

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Southern Sun/Holiday InnSouth AfricaSaccawu6 0003 JulySouthern Sun and Holiday Inn workers around the countrYwent on strike after negotiations onwages and working conditionsdeadlocked with management offering anacross-the-board increase of 8100 or 15% monthly andSaccawu demanding 8160 across theboard and a monthlyminimum 8800. Other demands include allowing casual workers to belong tothe union, reinstatement ofdismissedworkers and that management should not use sub-contractors. Following disputes overpicketing, managementobtainedSupreme Court orders restricting workers from entering the premises at all of the 41 strike-hithotels. Workersat Durban'sMalibu Hotel joined the strike despite the fact that their union, the Natal Liquor and CateringTradeEmployees' Union, hadearlier struck a wage deal. Malibu's management obtained a Supreme Court order obligingtheworkers to resume work. Cosatuthreatened a consumer boycott against Southern Sun and HolidaY Inns and threeother SABsubsidiaries - OK Bazaar Afcol andEdgars.Trador Cash 'n CarrySouth AfricaSaccawu2 40010 July12 July5000 ~ 2 JulyWine & SPirit EmployersSouth AfricaWorkers in 30 Trador stores struck after the company offered anacross-the-board increase of8160 in response to their demandfor a pay hike of 8200. The strike ended two days laterwith workers agreeing to accept 8160across the board and managementundertaking not to retrench or close anystores for 18 months - a settlement Saccawu said was asignificant step forward inits job security campaign. MD AlbertKooPman, proponent of 'participative management', earnedthe union's praise for thecompany's `non-hostile' handlingof the strike. Trador closed all 30 stores to preventviolence. Strikers were allowed tosteep in the canteens and werecatered for. TheY were also allowed to picket and move freely.NuwsawWine and sPirit workers at 83 Plants nationallyembarked on a legal go slow after theindustry's emptoYer associationrejected their demand for a R40across-the-board increase offering R33 instead. Another demandwas for workers with morethan 10 year's service toreceive 20 days leave annually. Four days later the emptoYer imposeda lock out. Police arrestedworkers in PortElizabeth and Stellenbosch for Picketing. On 16 July the employers announcedthat 1 400 workers had acceptedtheR33 offer. On 18 July Nuwsaw and the emPtoYers agreed on a code of conduct for the strikein which theYdenouncedintimidation, violence and harrassment. Nuwsaw has threatened to call a consumer boycott.

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WIP subscriptionsRates for 8 issuesSouth Africa USA, Canada, Australasia Please send subscriptions forSouthIndividuals, trade unions and Individuals, trade unions and Africa, Southern Africa, USA, Newcommunityorganisations R33 community organisations $50 Zealand, Canada and Australia to;Companies, libraries andCompanies, libraries and Southern African Research Serviceinstitutions R90 institutions $100 PO Box 32716Donorsubscriptions , , R90 Donor subscriptions $100 Braamfontein2017Southern Africa UK and Western EuropeJohannesburgIndividuals, trade unions and Individuals, trade unions andcommunity organisations R43 communityorganisations X 20 Please send subscriptions forCompanies, libraries and Companies, libraries and United Kingdomand Westerninstitutions R100 institutions , ,x'40 Europe to:Donor subscriptions , 8100 Donor subscriptions j'40 CentralBooksAtt: Bill Norris---'------"--------'----'-"- 14The leathermarketEnclosed find payment of for 8 issues of WIP LondonSE 13ERNAMECheques should be--crossed andADDRESS' made payable to;Southern African ResearchService.Enclose payment with order.Subscriptions begin with currentissue unless otherwise specified.

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WORK IN PROGRESS~00.:4990.:.N0-`%68:-`-., Publ.Wi by tieSOUth Atr~Cmvaes~ SerYicePO:BOX3Z71Braafcterfiv~:~ 2417uth Affta :.EAuckland a`n'd'H'-**"-i coo SM0wd 0lccardStreetsBrdarnfpMeinX17,lohcnnssbuwgyPhone; 1 1 do3= 19 12Fax: (011l 4034112534PROGRESSA South Africancommunist speaks-i-----w EXCLUSIVE:Chris Dlarninidiscusses5t his membership ofthe new SACP InternalLeadership GroupKastils on therole ofurtw,nonto o SuweJordan on Ih! flrteor the SACo_Jvac Theorthe errvt) handA Soi^African .communistspeaks;As the SACpprem.Edla~ ff, s 29 July legallaunch, Cosatuvice-prewenf:Chris Dlaminitorly acknov. Ieg' hismen.rsh~pyp~ fhe partythe fir'st'loco` to do go in 40years. scussed thetICCttIC?r1S Of hi5membership and theSACP'sfuture,Picture: Anna Zi"nskiith the next round of talks between the government and theAfrican NationalCongress just a week away as WIP goeson sale, the process towards negotiations has been hit byianother bout ofhiccups. This time the issue is the arrest ofup to loo ANC members, the crackng by police of whatappears to havebeen a major underground network, andthe seizure of a substantial quantity of arms.The low-key nature of the ANC'sresponses so far suggest that much of whathas been claimed regarding the background to many of the arrests iscorrect:that they arc linked to the existence of underground ANC structures; thati they involve elements of Umkhontowe Sirwe; and that, in the case of theweapons at least, many have been brought into the country recently.The factshave since been used as justification for a barrage against theANCon the basis that the movement is either notcommitted to the peace process,or that it is attempting to scuttle it.Ignoring for the moment the question of just howsensible the ANC's actionmay have been, several issues of logic arise.The ANC and Nelson Mandela in particularhave stressed repeatedly sincethe movement's 2 February legalisation that its armed struggle will continueuntil aformal suspension of hostilities is agreed - very possibly at thenexttalks, beginning on August 6. It has also said, againalmost to the point ofboredom, that it is reining in its Umkhonto fighters as a contribution tothecreation of a climate fornegotiations.To these positions there have been two responses: government outrage thatthe ANC should be talking ofarmed hostilities at all; and, from the mediainparticular, the apparently-informed assessment that all this wassimplyrhetoric, a face-saver to allow the ANC to stop fighting without alienatingitsmilitant constituency.The arrests andapparent destruction of the underground network fairlyconvincingly disprove the latter assessment: it is now clear thatthe ANCwas telling the truth, and that what those arrested were doing was providingthemselves with both theinfrastructure and means to continue the ANC'sarmed struggle. But because the movcrnent had ordered an easing-uponattacks, the weapons had not yet been used.Since the arrests, however, it is precisely those media whichknowinglyreported that the ANC's statements on armed struggle were no more thanrhetoric which arc now haranguingthe movement for doing exactly what itsaid it was doing. The fault lies not with the ANC, but with thosewhodidn'tbelieve it.And there is a second question of logic involved: even if there had been aceasefire, internationallaw accepts that unless it is specifically writtenintothe agreement, a ceasefire bars neither side in any conflictfromreplenishingits forces or its weaponry.Suggestions that the ANC's actions could precipitate a collapse ofthenegotiation process arc little more than ill-informed.The ANC's statements that it was continuing with its armedstruggle havenot previously blocked talks. Now that it has been demonstrated not to belying, there is no reason whythat should change.Anyway, the ANC view is that it has had little choice in the matter.While substantial progress hasclearly been made since the Groote Schuurtalks on what it views as obstacles to negotiations - thecontinueddetentionof political prisoners, political exiles anti security force action -little hasactually been delivered inthe form of freed prisoners, returning exiles andan end to violent security force repression.At the same time,international pressure on FW do Klcrk's government hascased substantially since February.Against this background,the ANC believes it has had little choice but toensure that the only remaining alternative route to democracy remainsopen,by building its military capacity.Whether this was the wisest choice, the months ahead will demonstrate.What ithas already demonstrated, however, is that peace might be in sight,but it is not yet achieved. Nor will it be until suchtime as thenegotiationprocess begins to deliver the goods.

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ARMED STRUGGLEtheir fear of being killed, or simply because they refused, aswas increasingly becoming the case,to defend a rotten system... a moral revulsion for apartheid, which was affecting largenumbers of citizen forcepersonnel, white troopies.In a situation where the crisis is so great, the politicalpressures arc so great, conscriptarmies can be neutralised -decomposed from within - that's very much a possibility. Thesituation would affect verylarge percentages of conscripttroops and, of course, black police and soldiers.The bottom line is numbers. TheAchilles heel of whitesupremacy is that to maintain white power, they need whiteunity. And we have seen how whiteunity has gone through ashredding machine over the past years. So if you do yourarithmetic: the ruling power canmobilise 500 coo whitesoldiers. Of that, 40l0 - 200 000 - might prove unreliable at apoint of crisis. And the black units -in the police they make uphalf the force - would be affected.In some countries this clement, from within theenemyforces, can become a major factor. It did in the Bolshevikrevolution, for instance.In South Africa, given thesocial composition of the SADF,this has offered less obvious possibilities. Perhaps, for our part,it was neglected fortoo long.But the successes of the End Conscription Campaign, theimpact of the civil and political struggle on theconsciousnessof the conscripted troops showed the tremendous potential toreach their minds and neutralise a highproportion.This would be the model available to study as an alternativeto that of the army of the bush.It is clearly amodel more relevant to an insurrectionarystrategy.What does all this say about negotiations?Firstly, we don't have adouble agenda; we are genuine in ourdeep hope that negotiations succeed.But the responsibility for that successdepends on De Klerk.Just as the founding manifesto of Umkhonto says the govern-ment was responsible for forcingus to resort to armed struggle,so too now with De Klerk.Fie has recognised that his government cannot go on intheold way... he is far more advanced than his predecessors. Antihe understands if he is tardy about this process, ifhe's unrea-sonable about democratic change, it is he and his governmentwho will create the possibility for renewedrevolutionaryoffensive, because they will have frustrated the aspirations ofthe masses by their stubborness andintractability.So the choice is theirs: We are still to see exactly what theiragenda is.Although I must stress that we donot have a double agenda,it is clear to me as a student of history that the struggle hasdeveloped to such a level herethat it can't be diverted ordistracted. The people will not accept half-measures, half' aloaf.What we demand is simple,basic democratic rights.If Dc Klcrk seeks to negate that, the tide will rise to sweephim and the obstacles away.Themasses will do that. In terms of the options which wehold - and we have ours, as he has his - our other option isourorganised strength and capacity, which we must continue tobuild and strengthen.There is no moratorium on this.We would never accept amoratorium on building our strength, organising our people todefend thernsclves anddevel;)ping the means to assist inPage 10 WI P 68achieving democratic objectives.But an actual insurrection, as JoeSlovo has pointed outmany times - it appears in the The path to power, the partyprogramme - depends on a specificmoment in time. And thatmoment is not simply man-made. It depends on the mood of themasses, and the crises of aparticular time, the role of thevanguard movement and, very crucially, on the actions of theruling power.We can'tforesee when - or even whether - such a momentmight occur. But we would reserve our right to take thedecision toact if we find that the regime, at such a moment, isblocking the path to democracy, is seeking to turn the clockbackand is resorting to repression.That is what the ruling power attempted in Russia from Julyto October 1917. Lenin'sApril Thesis in 1917 actually spelledout that the peaceful way was possible - until the July reactionand terror whichdrove the Bolsheviks underground. TheBolsheviks then exercised their option in October, seizing themoment andcalling for an uprising.We would prefer the peaceful way because it is the easier,less painful way.So the idea of aninsurrection is still in the air?There appears to have been a clear scaling down of Umkhontooperations since 2February - this is our contribution to creatinga climate conducive to negotiations.But - and here I'm again speaking asan analyst, not an asadvocate - we should note that insurrections don't usually takeplace when movements arc deeplyunderground. They usuallytake place when there is more space, when there arc openingscreated by the enforcedretreat of the ruling power.In these conditions, where the semi-legal and even legalpossibilities of developing combatand defence units by themasses have increased substantially, there is tremendous scope.Consider what happened inFebruary and October 1917 - thescope for insurrection opened up tremendously after February.In that situation, if aruling power attempts to turn back torepression, an acute crisis can emerge providing the momentfor an uprising.Thisis why I keep saying the responsibility is on De Klerk:there won't be a need for an uprising - the moment won't arise- ifthe negotiation process stays on course and he shows he'sserious about it.Thc situation since 2 February has openedupenormous energy and possibilities for the strengthening of theliberation movement. And there is a very volatilesituation inthis country, it is explosive: the impoverishment of the massesis reaching unbearable levels.As an exilewho has just returned home, I'm absolutelyshocked at how material conditions have declined in areas likeAlexandra,in Wintcrvcldt, in Inanda and the valleys of Natal.The impoverishment is acute and we sec militant localstrugglestaking place everywhere - and attacks by police on the people.The combustible elements, the insurrectionaryelements...the mood is there. If the government is incapable of addressinggrievances, and this process provesincapable of dealing withthe aspirations, then insurrectionary possibilities arc on thecards.The wave now rising will beirresistible.Inherent in the logic of his choice, De Klerk has to move fastto stay ahead of what the ruling power (carsmost, the masses.The ruling power is haunted by the '83-'86 uprisings. If DeKlcrk fails to allow for a negotiatedsolution then, and speakingstrictly as a student of history, one foresees the whole issuebeing settled in the streets.

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SOCIALISMJordan onthe PartyPallo Jordan responds to SACPgeneral-secretary Joe Slovo'sdiscussion paper `HasSocialismFailed?' This is an edited version ofJordan's response; his paper, `TheCrisis of Conscience in the SACP',ispublished in full in the latestedition of Transformationmagazine.Jordan is a member of the ANCnational executivecommitteeThe most refreshing aspect of Joe Slovo's discussionpaper is the candour and honesty with which many ofithe problems of `existing socialism' arc examined. Afew years ago, no-one in the South African CommunistParty(SACP) would have dared to cast such a critical light onthe socialist countries. `Anti-Soviet', `anti-communist',or`anti-Party' were the dismissive epithets reserved for thosewho did. We can but hope the publication of thediscussionpaper spells the end of such practices.It is clear too that much of the heart-searching that requiredSlovo toput pen to paper was prompted by the harrowingevents of the past 12 months, which culminated in the Roma-nianmasses - in scenes reminiscent of the storming of theWinter Palace - storming the headquarters of theCommunistParty of Romania.We may expect that, just as in 1956 and 1968, there willflow from many pens essays ofdisillusionment and despairwritten by ex-communists who have recently discovered thesterling qualities of latecapitalism.Slovo remains a communist, convinced that the future ofhumankind lies in the socialist development ofsociety and thesocial ownership of property. This is a creed he has lived by allhis adult life, and he therefore feelscompelled to explain whatcould have gone so terribly wrong as to bring about the eventswe witnessed in Romania.Iread and re-read Slovo's paper in the hope of finding suchan explanation, but it proved well-nigh impossible todiscovera coherent account of what had gone wrong. Reducing thearguments advanced in his discussion paper totheir barestminimum we arc left with a handful of causes which beg anumber of questions rather than answerthem.Slovo points to the backwardness of a war-weary Russia,forced to build socialism in one country because theEuropeanrevolutions it had hoped for failed to materialise. He alsoattributes a degree of blame to the necessitiesimposed upon theBolsheviks by the intervention of capitalist powers in 1918. Hediscerns, too, a rather mechanicaldismissal of the virtues ofbourgeois democracy by Lenin in l'he ,State and Revolution,and detects some responsibilityattaching to the non-existenceof `democratic traditions' in Tsarist Russia.Lastly, he faults all the ruling communistParties for institu-tionalising their role as `vanguard' through law rather than onthe basis of popular endorsement bythe working class and themajority of society.The combination of these factors acting on each other, bySlovo'saccount, led to the one-party dictatorship over theproletariat and society. To sum up, he offers one major objec-tivefactor (economic backwardness in the context of war-weariness coupled with political isolation) plus foursubjectivefactors.Slovo acknowledges that there were terrible abuses of po-litical, civil and human rights in allcountries in thesocialist bloc. He admits also that during the days of theComintern (and perhaps even after) theinterests of otherparties and peoples were often subordinated to the perceivedinterests of the Soviet Union. He doesnot dispute the mountingi evidence of corruption and moral degeneration among the CPleaders in many of thesecountries - leading to the scandalouscharges of graft, money-laundering and skimming off the top!WIP 68 Page 11

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SOCIALISMHe has identified the symptoms of the illness but not its basiccauses. He has, perhaps, also provided uswith evidence that ina particular economic and social climate the viruses that giverise to the illness may thrive andprove more lethal, but weremain with the illness itself undiagnosed.Marxism prides itself in its ability to uncover thereality thatlies hidden behind appearances. Marxists therefore cannot becontent with expressions of shock, horror andcondemnation.It is our task to explain what has led to the atrocities wecondemn! This is the missing element inSlovo's otherwiseuseful discussion paper.Among the Marxist-Leninist parties that once constitutedthe worldcommunist movement, attempts to come to gripswith the problems of socialist construction are extremely rareandhave for decades been muted if not actively suppressed.This is as true of the South African Communist Party(perhapsmore so) as it is of the communist parties that have achievedpower and of the others. The exceptions to thispattern were theChinese Communist Party (CCP) in the immediate aftermathof the uprising in Poland and Hungaryduring 1966; and theItalian Communist Party, after the death of Togliatti, when itbegan to define a new identity foritself.Previous to this, the only other attempts were undertaken inthe ranks of the Communist Party of the SovietUnion itself, bythe two oppositions associated with Trotsky -Zinoviev andBukharin. This tradition has been almosttotally suppressed inthe communist movement and despite the political rehabilita-tion of Bukharin and the judicialrehabilitation of Trotsky,Zinoviev and the other left oppositionists, is still largelyforgotten.Latter-day Marxistoppositionists have been branded as`counter-revolutionaries', `spies' and `provocateurs' by the ,Communist Party inmuch the same way as their predecessors(Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, etc) were so labelled in their iframe-up trials ofthe 1930s. Their works have consequentlybeen ignored, only to be taken up by the real counterrevolu-tionaries, spiesand provocateurs, as sticks to beat the left ingeneral.The concept, `the dictatorship of the proletariat', whichowesmore to French revolutionary practice than toMarx and Engels, may have to bear some blame for thehorrorsperpetrated in its name. It was precisely this that theCCP attempted to examine in 1957 in a short pamphlet titledOnthe Ili.storicalExperience of the Dictatorship of the Prole-tariat.In analyzing the previous 40 years (1917-1957) theChinesecommunists drew analogies between the socialist revolutionand the bourgeois democratic revolution. Theycorrectly assertthat for the first 100 years of its existence bourgeois democracywas in fact precisely that - democracyfor the bourgeoisie - asonly the property owners had the vote.The pamphlet went on to argue that while theproletariandictatorship was imperfect and deformed in many ways, mostof these distortions were attributable to thesecurity considera-tions imposed by capitalist encirclement and active hostility.Its basic character, however, wassound because of its commit-ment to the creation of a classless society.In what was then an amazing departure fromconventionalorthodoxies, the CCP argued that the dictatorship of the prole-tariat had already given rise to a variety ofinstitutional forms.Among those it enumerated the Yugoslav system of worker'scouncils, the Chinese `People'sDemocratic Dictatorship', etc.Page 12 9 WI P 68This was among the first official CP documents to suggestthe Sovietmodel was not universally applicable.The Italian communists in many respects followed a linesimilar to the Chineseuntil the mid-1980s, when EnricoBerlinguer castigated the Soviet model as a failure whichshould be abandoned.During the 1970s, a whole range of otherparties also took the plunge but most of their writing wasunoriginal, repeatingthe formulation of others.The class character of the Soviet model (which was appliedin most socialist countries) hasbeen precisely the central focusamong Marxists who take their inspiration from the Bolshevikoppositionists and otherEast European critics of Stalinism. Intheir polemics against Stalin and Stalinism, both Trotsky andBukharin makereference to the class character of Sovietsociety at the time. The same is true of the Yugoslav opposi-tionist, MilovanDjilas, in his The New Class; Modzelewskiand Kuron, two Polish oppOsitionisr<s from the 1960s, alsopoint to theclass roots of the degeneration of the socialistcountries, as does Bahro, the most recent left critic of Stalinismfrominside a ruling Communist Party in his The Alternative inEastern Europe.While Slovo recognises that the socialistcountries degener-ated into police states, with their administrative and repressiveorgans possessed of inordinatepowers, he never seems tobroach the rather obvious questions: what gave rise to the needfor such practices? Was itnot to contain and suppress afundamentally explosive contradiction in these societies thatthe ruling partiesconstructed such formidable armouries ofpolice powers?The most famous critic of Stalinism was doubtlesslyLeonTrotsky. Setting aside our opinion of him and hispolitical career, we can nonetheless agree that, employ-ing themethod of historical materialism, he provided oneof themost original critiques of the Soviet system. It wasTrotsky'scontention that the backwardness of Russia, the depredationsof the War of Intervention followed by thefamine, and thefailure of the European revolution, conspired to so isolate theyoung Soviet republic that it wascompelled to fall back on itsown meagre resources in order to survive.The price exacted was that a bureaucraticcaste, drawn fromthe working class leadership itself, was able to usurp powerfrom the proletariat, which required theirexpertise and skill tomaintain the state. This caste, having developed from withinthe working class and ensconced inits party, employing thelanguage of socialism and forced to defend the gains of October(on which its very existencedepended) was nonetheless aparasitic layer battening onto the surplus produced by theworking class.According tothis account, a unique relationship developed- it was not exploitative in the true sense, since the bureaucracydid notown the means of production; yet it was exploitative inthe sense that the bureaucracy was above the class ofdirectproducers and consumed the surplus. According to Trotsky,the dictatorship of Stalin was the political expressionof thisfraught internal contradiction.While Bukharin would have parted company with Trotskyas regards hisconclusions, he nonetheless sought to employ thesame method, historical materialism, to explain the problemsofSoviet society. Bukharin stressed the social character of thealliance between the proletariat and the peasantry,whichunderlay Soviet power. According to him, the problems aroseas a result of the abandonment of the NewEconomic Pro-

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The SACP: Members should re-examine the meaning of socialismgramme (NEP) in favour of the five year plans. Allthese,Bukharin charged, were premised on the accumulation ofcapital at the expense of the peasantry and werebound torupture the alliance. Having ruptured the peasant-worker alli-ance, the Soviet state lost the support of thevast majority of thepopulation and was consequently tempted to act no differentlythan the Tsarist state before it - in adictatorial manner.Bukharin and Trotsky concurred that Stalin had become theleader of this omnipotent state andepitomised its cruelty andcallousness.Most subsequent oppositional writings, with the exceptionof the Chinese andthe Italians, derive from these two mainsources or at any rate regard them as their baseline. MilovanDjilas, forexample, contended the process of socialist con-struction had brought into being a `new class', unknown totheMarxist classics and to the experience of bourgeois sociology.Its power derived from its control over the means ofproduction(rather than ownership) and its capacity to command thelabour-power of others.The locus of this `newclass', Djilas argued, was the leader-ship of the Communist Party.Rudolph Bahro, an erstwhile member of theSocialist UnityParty of the GDR, holds that Stalinism was inevitable in thecontext of a backward Russia that stillawaited the capitalistdevelopment of the productive forces. `Despotic industrialisa-tion' was the necessary outcome ofthe drive to transform anagrarian into an urban industrial society. Stalinism, by hisaccount, had outlived its historicallynecessary role once anindustrial base had been established. However, because thebureaucracy created to managethis earlier phase had acquireda vested interest in the prerequisites of power, it resisted changeto the point ofviolence, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968.This bureaucracy, he argued, behaved like a class in that itis able toreproduce itself, through easier access to bettereducation; favoured treatment for its members and their fami-lies;special status in all spheres of public life.These explanations apart, it is true that Stalin's approachwas actuallysupported by the overwhelming majority ofSoviet communists in the 1920sand 1930s. Both theTrotskyistsand theBukharinists were outvoted in the Party congresses. Itwas precisely because he had such support that Stalin founditpossible to perpetrate the abuses of the the late 1930s and1940s.The only anti-Stalinist who accepts and has soughttoexplain the pro-Stalin consensus in the CPSU is Isaac Deutscher,who asserts that by a skillful combination ofMarxist rhetoricand appeal to Russian nationalism Stalin was able to weldtogether an alliance among the partyapparatus and the basi-cally conservative bureaucracy-at the expenseof the CPSU'srevolutionary traditions.Whetherone accepts it or not, this oppositional intellectualtradition must be taken into account by a Marxist who wishestounderstand the `socialist countries'.0ne question we have to ask is: could a new class of bu-reaucrats, who haveacquired an identity and interestsapart from the rest of society, possibly have come intoexistence?Historicalmaterialism teaches that the basis of class lies insocial productive relations, and not in the real or apparentrelativeinfluence of individuals. To answer this question leadsus straight back to the classic Marxian definition of thedicta-torship of the proletariat, which Friedrich Engels discerned inthe institutions of the Paris Commune of 1871.Apartfrom democratising the state, the Paris Communeattempted to create a legislature and administration thatwouldremain close to the working people. This was institutionalisedin the law that no law-maker or civil servant shouldearn asalary higher than that of a skilled workman: intended in thefirst instance, to discourage those who sawgovernment serviceas a means of self-enrichment; and to contain the tendency forthe legislators to become alienatedfrom their constituencies. Asecond provision, linked to the first, subjected all legislators toimmediate recall by theelectors, imposing on them greateraccountability to the voters.One would be very hard put to find a single socialistcountrythat has adopted these sound principles as the basis for govern-ment. If the evidence of recent events is to bebelieved, it seemsclear that they were honoured in blatant breach. The huntinglodges, the exclusive suburbs andornate palaces of the `prole-tarian dictators', indicate gross violation of the intent of themodel handed down by theParis Commune. If one were toWIP 68 9 Page 13

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Everyone mustenjoyhuman rightsPage 14 WI P 68

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SOCIALISMjudge by the evidence of this alone one could indeed bepersuaded that we had witnessed the emergenceof a new class.What, then, were the social productive relations in theexisting socialisms?It is clear that a number ofmodes of production existed sideby side in the socialist countries and that among them one couldpoint to a variety ofsocial productive relations. While this istrue, we can also refer to a dominant mode, based on state-owned property.The Stalin model, whose roots lie in thespecifics of Soviet history, shall for purposes of this paperserve as theuniversal model.The Stalin model had its origins in the defeat of the left andright oppositionists to Stalin during the1920s and the 1930s. Itinvolved a dramatic reversal of all the policies pursued duringthe NEP and the near total`statisation' of the economy. Thetask of the state as understood by the pro-Stalin majority in theCPSU was to set inmotion the processes of primitive socialistaccumulation. The techniques employed to achieve this werenot altogetherdifferent from those related to the early phasesof capitalism. Coercion and extra-legal methods became theorder ofthe day. These in turn created their own dynamic. The.egalitarian ethos, which had been the hallmark of thecommu-nists during the period of War Communism, was replaced bya strongly anti-egalitarian ethic, decreed from thetopmostleadership of the CPSU. The rationale for these steps waselementary - there was no way of enforcing workdiscipline.other than the methods which served capitalism so well.The impact of the war and the famine haddrasticallytransformed the Bolshevik Party since 1917. At the end of theCivil War, it had become a party ofcommitteemen, profes-sional revolutionaries, administrators and state functionariesrather than a party of workingclass militants rooted in theirfactories and their neighbourhoods. It was less and less theworking class, but thecommitteemen, the cadres and function-aries who served in these capacities, who framed policy.The extent to whichthis was true is evident from the censusof party membership published by the central control commis-sion of theCPSU in 1927:Workers engaged in industry and transport: 430 (X)0Agricultural workers: 15 700Peasants:151500Government officials of peasant origins: 1515(X)Other government officials: 462 000The disproportionaterepresentation of state officials wasperhaps unavoidable in the light of the demands of the moment,but it has to beadmitted that it changed very fundamentally thecharacter of the CPS U.s early as 1921, the `Workers Opposition'grouping complained bitterlyabout the introduction of one per-son management in all the factories. The relegationofthe Committees for Workers' Control at factory and plantlevel, though important for efficiency, stripped theworkingclass of a most fundamental conquest of the October revolution- the power to determine the character and therythym of thelabour process. The soviets too saw their power diminished byappointments made by the apparatus. TheBolsheviks har-vested the bitter fruits of these developments when the sailorsof the Kronstadt garrison, known fromthe days of October andthrough the War of Intervention for their heroism and revolu-tionary zeal, mutinied in March1921, denouncing the Sovietgovernment as a new tyranny. The Temporary RevolutionaryCommittee of Kronstadtdeclared: `The most hateful andcriminal thing the communists have created is moral servitude:they laid their handseven on the inner life of the toilers andcompelled them to think only in the communist way...With theaid of militarizedtrade unions they have bound the workers totheir benches and have made labour not into a joy but into anewslavery.'In both his works, From NEP to .Socialism and 7'he NewEconomics written during the 1920s, the leftoppositionistEugene Preobrazhensky makes clear that in the absence ofmassive capital inflows from advancedcountries, the SovietUnion would have no option but to construct its industrial baseat the expense of the peasantry. Itwas his contention also thatthe proletariat would have to submit itself to the most rigourouswork discipline in order tobuild at breakneck speed.By 1934, Lazar Kaganovich, one of Stalin's leading hench-men, could remark that `the earthshould tremble when thedirector is entering the factory'. This new style `socialist'director was conceived of as a pettytyrant on his own patch andall other structures in the factory - such as the trade union -existed not to obstruct orcontain his power but rather to assistit in realising its objectives.The demands of constructing an industrial society incondi-tions of economic backwardness in a huge territory surroundedby extremely hostile enemies, placed enormousstrains on thepolitical institutions of the young Soviet republic. The Bolshe-viks had never been a mass party, even ofthe working class,before or after the October revolution. The party had won theconfidence and support of millions ofworkers and soldiers.Land reforms also earned them support among the peasants,and the nationalities programmegained them the confidence ofthe Asiatic peoples formerly oppressed by Tsarism.It was only at the end of that warthat one can properly saythe Bolsheviks began to rule. Though they had fought to defendthe conquests of therevolution - especially land - the peasantsin fact had not become solid supporters of the Bolshevik party.The dispersalof the urban proletariat, as the factoriesground to a halt and mass starvation threatened the cities,meant that theBolsheviks also lost their anchor in the workingclass. Taking fright at these developments, the Tenth PartyCongress,in March 1921, instituted the most fateful reforms ofthe party statutes, outlawing factions. The sixth thesis of thetheresolution on party unity explicitly prescribed expulsion foranyone who did not observe this new rule. More fatefulwerethe Resolutions on the Syndicalist and Anarchist Deviation inour Party adopted at the same congress. For thefirst time in thehistory of the communist movement, a `deviation' was de-clared as treason to the working class. Therelevant sectionstates: `Hence, the views of the "workers opposition" and oflike-minded elements arc not only wrongin theory, but inpractice, and an expression of petty bourgeois anarchist waver-ing, in practice weaken theconsistcncyof the leading line of theCommunist Party, and help the class enemies of the proletarianrevolution'.The result of thesereforms was the reversal of long-standingBolshevik practice, which had permitted like-minded mem-bers of the partyto combine and present a common platform tothe party for debate anti resolution. A few weeks before theTenth PartyCongress such a debate, nn the `Trade UnionQuestion', had just been concluded. During the course of thedebate,Pravda had published a series of articles representingdifferent viewpoints among the CPS U leadership, and atleastthree public debates had been held in Moscow and Leningrad,at which the various viewpoints were aired beforean audienceWIP 68 Page 15

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of party militants and the public.Many who voted for the resolutions of the Tenth PartyAs yet struggle was aimed atthe incorrect ideas -the sin, soto speak, but not the sinner. However, the malignancy had beenplanted in the body ofthe party and all it required was anewenvironment, provided by the death of Lenin, for it to becomedangerous.JustasZinoviev and Trotsky supported theoutlaw-ing of ideas of the `Workers Opposition' in 1921, so too didBukharin,in 1927, support the outlawing of those of the RightOpposition. Each of these successive layers prepared thegroundfor their own demise by compromising the intellectualclimate in the party and its traditions of debate andideologicalcontestation. Thus once the CPSU succumbed to the impera-tives of primitive socialist accumulation, therewas no mocha- f Slovo'sdiscussion paper is to serve any useful purpose, itnism to break out of the logic of this grimcycle. Once caught must at thevery least assist communists in coming to termson this treadmill, the party leadershipeither keptgoingor went i with thehistory of their movement. This requires that theybegin to settle accounts with theoppositicmistAs, left and right,The regime this system imposed in the factories, plants and who have stoodupcourageously against the degradation of thefields was as authoritarian as it was rigid. The concept `aliens- idealsofcommunism. South African communists would dolion' employed by the young Marx to describe the plight of the iwell toturn to the works of anti-Stalinist Marxists and commu-worker in capitalist industry has been borrowed in thisinstance 1 nists torediscover the true meaning of this vision which hasby Slovo to explain the profound scepticism (ifnot cynicism) ; persuadedthousands of militants to lay down their lives; whichof the Soviet workers about theiremployers - the `socialist' has inspiredthousands with courage to storm the citadels ofstate. In the capitalist countries,the attitude of workers is de- ~powcreven when the oddsappcarecl insuperable; which movedtermined by theirage-old recognition that no matter how much , greatartists to create magnificent works. The SACP owes it totheirimmediate conditions might improve, the relationship ~ itself and tothe cause it espouses that it boldly grasp thisnettle.circumstances. To speak with the Karl Marx of The EighteenthBrumaire of Louis Bomparte: `Men make theirown history,Congress and subsequently became oppositionists had these but they do notmake it as they please; theydo not make it underfateful words flung back at them in later years. But whilewiser circumstances chosen bythemselves, but under circumstancescounsels prevailed in the Politburo of the CPSU no party directlyencountered,given and transmitted from the past'.member needed to fear his/her safety. The congress resolved Necessity,Marxtells us, plays itself out in the shape of`...to wage an unswerving and systematic ideological struggle accidents.Inthis regard one may say that. it was an accident thatagainst these ideas'. Lenin died al. a time when his leadershipqualitiesmight haveprevented the tensions he detected within the CPSU fromspilling over into splits. Equally, it may becounted as anaccident that the man who became general secretary of theCPSU was a ruthless Georgian defrockedpriest. Yet anotheraccident was the murder of Kirov immediately after the 1935`Congress of the Victors'. But it was allthese accidents thatj conspires with given circumstances and those created by theCPSU's own choices, to placeinordinate power in the hands of~ Stalin and his henchmen. It is this uncanny synchronisation ofchance and causalitythat constitutes necessity.under.with their employers remains exploitative.One cannot accept at face value Slcwo'sprotestations aboutThere appears to be s similar feeling in the Soviet Union, ; the SACP'snon-Stalinist credentials.Firstly, there is too muchfuelled no doubt also by the regime of lies and falsehood that ~ evidenceto the contrary. Anyregular reader of SACP publica-the logic of monolithism compelled the CPSU to embrace. If I lions canpoint to apersistent pattern ol'praise and support forideological deviation equals class enemy ideology, was it not everyviolationof freedom perpetrated by the Soviet lcadcr-logical that the bearer of that ideology was also a class enemy's ship,bothbefore and after the death of Stalin. It is all too easyThus did the wheel come full circle - since the Party felt it i inthecontext of Soviet criticisms of this past for Slovo tocould no longerrely on the working class, it fell back on its own iboldlycome forward. Secondly, the political culture nurturedresources and instituted a system of control essentially noby the SACP'sleadership over the years has produced a spiritdifferent from that of the capitalists; but having chosenthat ' ofintolerance, petty intellectual thuggery and political dissem-option it left itself no means to reconquer workingclass bling among itsmembership which regularly emerges in theconfidence and, though ruling in that class's name,both it and ' pages ofboth thcAfrican Communist and Umsebenai. If we arcthe working class knew that this was a lie,eroding further the ~ to bepersuaded that the party had indeed embraced the spirit ofworking class's confidence in theparty.But was it inevitable, given the complex of circum-stances and the historical legacy of Tsarist Russia, thatthefirst socialist state should evolve in this direction?honesty and opencss expected of Marxists, it has an obligationtodemonstrate this by a number of visible measures.As a token of the SACP's commitment to a new path andpoliticalpractice, Slovo's discussion paper could serve as theopening sally in a dialogue among South Africansocialists,Related to this question is a second: did Stalinism and its including everypersuasion, to re-examine themeaning ofhorrors flow logically from Leninism and Marxist theory? ~ socialism andthe implications of its distortions inthe socialistThroughout this paper I have sought to show that the Soviet ; countries. Anunsparing interrogation of thispast can help toleadership facedarangeofalternativesatallthecrucialturning ~ salvagesomething from the tragedyofcxisting socialism.points in its history. Inevitability is therefore not part of the To drawan analogy with the bourgeoisrevolution, it rc-question. I am persuaded that a number of circumstances - ; quired theimperial tyranny of Napoleon,the restoration of theamong which we cannot exclude personality - conspired to bias Bourbons, thefarcical empire ofthe younger Napoleon andtheir choices in particular directions. ; defeat at the hands of Prussiafor the Frenchbourgeoisie to fullyHaving chosen those specific options, the Soviet leadership, ~ appreciatethe greatness of the menof 1789-95. Perhapsby that action, foreclosed others. Rather than inevitability, socialism hashad to pass through asimilar painful infancy andwhat we arc dealing with is necessity. This implies an element 'adolescence for communiststo recognise the true stature ofof choice, but not an unlimited choice, for the alternatives j those whoopposed Stalin,his henchmen and their successorsthemselves are structured by previous choices and inheritedPage 16 WIP 68in

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Eastern Europe.

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PACAfter almost 30 years inthe political twilight zone,the PAC has undergone asignificant revival. Gary vanStadenexamines the movement'soptions on negotiations Allan Hirsch looks atthe PAC's economicdocument RobynRafel reports onthe tensions betweenNactu's Africanist and BCadherents A WIP correspondentfocuses on the jointANC-PAC peace initiative inthe Eastern CapeThe way ofthe empty handWIP 68 Page 17

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With South Africa's political tem-perature high and rising, forpure heating power few ques-tions can match that whichasks: Whatabout the Pan-Africanist Congress?Five years ago few would have both-ered. That alone says much abouttherevival of Africanism in the late 1980s.The issue is no longer whether thePAC has emerged from thepoliticaltwilight it occupied for nearly threedecades. That is established fact.The questions which now arise are: Whatis the extent of the revival -bothorganisationally and in terms of popularsupport? Can the organisation escape itsun-happy past? And does it represent a threat to thenear-hegemonic position of the AfricanNational Congress?Beforeaddressing these questions,several points should be noted.The first is that despite some of therhetoric currentlyemanating from itssupporters - `one settler, one bullet' beingthe most contentious - despite its blackexclusivist history,and despite its ambi-guity towards `white liberals', the PACis no longer a racist orexclusivist organi-sation.Secondly,any attempt to accuratelymeasure levels of PAC support againstthose of the ANC or any other competi-tors canachieve little conclusive.It clearly does not draw as many sup-porters to its public gatherings - witnessthis year's June16 meetings. And itsopposition to the joint ANC-Congress ofSouth African Trade Unions-UnitedDemocratic Frontstayaway on 2 Julymet with limited success.But the only true test of popular sup-port is at the polls, when all adultSouthAfricans are given the chance to demo-cratically elect their representatives.That said, three points can bemadewith safety: The PAC is not the largest politicalorganisation in South Africa; The ANC currently appears toenjoymajority support; The PAC, however, is a significantcomponent of the South African bodypolitic.In attempting toanswer the specificquestions outlined earlier, it is necessarytoexaminesomeof the factors contribut-ing to the revival ofAfricanism.These include an improvement in theduality of the organisation's leadership;the resumption ofPAC-inspired insur-gency; a substantial increase in externalPage 18 WI P 68r~;: waning onsown ti~htroueThe PAC'srevival is nov established. Blot it is not yetclear that the organisation can retain or build on its new-found influence.Gary van Staden reportssupport and its international representa-tion (the number of missions abroad hastripled in thepast five yeas, and nowexceeds that of the South African gov-ernment); and a perception that the ANCfailed to takefull advantage uf favour-able conditions existing from late-19h4to mid-198b.n additional factor has since henadded:the ANC's readiness toseek a negotiated end to apaUt-hcid.For the PAC itself, the issue of ncgo-tiations is not willroutrisk, and themovement's response will provide a cru-cial test of its leadership.While the PAC may gain in theshort-term from dissatisfaction over the ANC'swillingness to sit down with PresidentFW de Klerk, its current stancecould putit in clangcrof being ruled outof the gamec~ntircly.The attitude the PAC currently adoptsis that it will havenothing to do withnegotiations while they remain in thepreliminary or pre-bargaining stage.This enables it to politically`outbid'the ANC - retaining a political puritywhich allows it to give its constituents amessage it believes they want tohear.Once negotiations begin addressingsubstantive issues - once they begin toaddress the issue and distribution ofstate

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power - the PAC has two options: It can stay out and hope to preventimplementation of any agreement whichmayemerge - much as the Patriotic Frontdid in Zimbabwe over the Ian Smith-Abel Muzorewa accord; or it can join theprocess in the hope ofnegotiating a slice of the political powercake.But the first option requires of thePAC sufficientpolitical strength on theground to block implementation ofwhatever is agreed. And while no con-clusive data may yetbe available on themovement's strength, it can safely beassumed that it does not command ma-jority support.It musttherefore fall back on the sec-ond option: joining the process. But thiswould mean losing whatever advantageitscurrent `outbidding' position hasgained it.An additional complicating factor isthat the PAC seems to have beenunableto reap the potential profits of its `outbid-ding' position.At least part of the reason for this is thecontinuedabsence of its exiled leader-ship. Because of its current stance onnegotiations, and its public position that`what hasnot been won on the battlefieldcannot be won at the negotiating table',the movement's exiled leaders cannotreturnwithout losing face.An additional concern for the organi-sation is the potentially damaging possi-bility that a return ofthe PAC's exiledleadership would not generate the samelevel of public response as that of return-ing ANCleaders.There may, however, be advantagesto an early return. The presence insidethe country of the major figures ofitsexiled leadership - Johnson Mlambo,Gora Ebrahim, Joe Mkwanazi and Lc-saoana Makhanda - wouldsubstantiallyboost its media and political profile andadd- to its local leadership corps.The PAC is thus at a crossroads.Andthere is not a great deal of time to choosewhich path to take - its `outbidding'option is unlikely to last beyond thefirstquarter of next year, when substantivenegotiations are 1 ikely to start.And it may be a case of now or never.Two ofthe answers to the specificquestions posed above may well dependon the PAC's decision.The PAC's revival,whatever its ex-tent to date, has already begun to run outof steam and needs a decisive injection tokeep it going.Asregards the threat it could pose to- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -., aJd f r ~14 4, **411PAC's Barney Desai addressing a rally. Athis lest is the contentiousslogan, One settler, one bulletthe ANC's dominant position, this de- Under thesecircumstances, the PACponds largely on how the PAC uses its ~ is demanding, before it willcontemplatevariousadvantages. But even if it uses ~ participation, the removal of thePopula-them al! to maximum effect it is unlikely , lionRegistration Act, the LandAct, thethat it could emerge as a real threat, al- ~ Constitution Act (establishingthetri-though it bears repeating that this will cameral parliament), the BantuEduca-only be demonstrated on election day.~ lion Act and the acts establishingthebantustans.n the interim there arc signs that thePAC is shifting position slightlyonnegotiations.While it remains adamant that thetime is not yet ripe to enter the negotia-tion process, it has not ruledout thepossibility in the future.Current PAC thinking holds that DeKlerk's government is trying to buy it-self time ratherthan seriously contem-plating handing over power.The route to possible future participa-tion is thus open. And therearc severalfactors nudging the movement down it -primarily the inviability of its positedalternatives: armed struggleand interna-tional pressure on De Klerk.The PAC clearly commands greaterinfluence today than at any time sincetheSharpcvillc uprising. The organisation'sown actions will demonstrate whether itcan maintain or improve thatinfluence.WIP 68 9 Page 19

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PACForced to come to terms with its shrinking membership, Nactu now also facestensions between its A fricanist andBC adherents. Robyn Raf el reportsNACTU:A little bit of thisand a little bit of thatUnlikc its larger counterpart,theCongress of South African TradeUnions (Cosatu) -- which haspinned its flag to the Charterist banner-,the. NationalCouncil of Trade Unions(Nactu) has never adopted a party-politi-cal position.Yet it is common cause that justasCosatu has its workcrists and populists,so Nactu has its Africanists and blackconsciousness adherents. And, asformergeneral secretary Phiroshaw Camay wasoften quick to point out, there are someCharterists and Trotskyists inthe mix as iwell.It is difficult to quantify the preciseeffect that the unbanning of the PAC, andthe mobilisation that hastaken place inAfricanist ranks since then, has had onNactu. But at least two observations canbe made: despitedenials by Nactu officials, theideological war between Africanists andBC supporters continues; there is a big questionmark over thelikelihood of further co-operation be-tween Nactu and Cosatu on anythingother than the campaignagainst theLabour Relations Act. And now that thegovernment is getting in on the act -through a working groupestablished afterthe two federations and the SA Co-ordi-nating Committee on Labour (Saccola)n -iet president FW deKlerk - even that isno longer certain, given Nactu's anti-collaborationist position.With the benefit of hindsight itseemsPage 20 WI P 68clear that Nactu's problems must havebegun at the federation's birth in October1986, whenthe Council of Unions ofSouth Africa (Cusa) merged with theAzanian Confederation of Trade Unions(Azactu). Bothhad pulled out of the talksthat led to the formation of Cosatu inDecember 1985, the issue being theirinsistence thatonly blacks should holdleadership positions in unions. Cusa hadparticipated in those talks from the start- indeedCamay always maintained thatthe unity talks began at its initiative.Azactu's involvement came ata late stageand,given its BC bent, was never some-thing to be taken seriously.Cusa organised along industrial linesand, unlike theso-called `communityunions' which adopted a Charterist posi-tion and became affiliates of the UDF,elected not tobecome affiliated to anypolitical grouping. And it was commoncause that the dominant strains withinCusa were thoseof BC and Africanism,and that the Federation of South AfricanTrade Unions (Fosatu) had workeristandpopulist/Charterist elements.The federation was initially known a5Cusa-Azactu and said it had 420 000signed-upmembers in 23 affiliated un-ions, of whom 284 000 were paid-up.Cusa was by far the larger partner: theonly sizeableAzactu affiliate was the.Black Allied Mining & ConstructionWorkers' Union (Bamcwu), whichwaged a highly successfulanti-asbestoscampaign in the mid-1980x.At Nactu's August 1988 congress, ina development that was symptomaticofthe changes that had occured in the fed-eration since its formation, BC-hardlinerPandelani Nefolovhodwe wasousted asfirst assistant general secretary and re-placed by Cunningham Ngcukana, anAfricanist.Africanists alsocaptured other keypositions: James Mndaweni, who hadalso been president of Cusa, was re-elected president. He isan Africanist. Sois Patricia de Lille, who was elected vice-presidcnt - the first woman to serve onNactu's NEC. De Lillewas assigned theforeign affairs portfolio of the Pan-Afri-canist Movement (PAM) when that or-ganisation, now theinternal Pan-Afri-canist Congress (PAC), was formed on 2December last year. Africanists alsooccupy pivotal positionsin many affili-ates.The congress also revealed thatNactu's fortunes had undergone a drasticdecline - membership hadplummeted to150 000. Three unions accounted for themajority of these members: the SAChemical Workers Union(Sacwu) with32 000 members; the 22 000-strongBuilding, Construction & Allied Work-ers' Union (BCAWU); and theFood,Beverage Workers' Union (FBWU) with17 000 members.Bamcwu's membership had plungedto 3100; theTransport & Allied Work-ors' Union (Tawu) membership hadhalved, from 10 000 members to 5 000;

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The shaky alliance: joint Cosatu/Nactu protests against the LRA last yearthe Steel, Engineering & Allied Work-ers'Union (Seawusa), which had 27 000members in October 1986, had only SSo0 members by 1988. Membership oftheVukani Black Guards' and AlliedWorkers' Union had fallen from 8 900 to2 U()0. The Black Domestic Workers'Unionand the Textile Workers' Unioneach had less than 400 members.t fast the rise of the Africanistswas seen as a signthat greatercooperation between Nactu andCosatu might be possible. This was basedon the perception thatAfricanists wouldbe more prepared to engage in joint ac-tion on matters of common concern tothe working class thanthe black con-sciousness elements in Nactu. This wasprimarily because of the Africanistgroup's formal acceptancethat whiteswho identify with Africa have a legiti-mate place in South Africa.A congress resolution that Nactushouldestablish a working relationshipwith Cosatu - even though it would corr-tinuc its policy of non-affiliation to po-liticalparties to avoid ideological divi-sions among workers - lent weight to thisi ntcrprctation.Developments in the monthsprccccd-ing the congress had also pointed to this.In line with a resolution adopted at itsfounding congress to `strive tounite allgroups that have a contradiction with thewhite minority regime', a Nactu delega-tion held meetings outside thecountrywith the PAC, the Black ConsciousnessMovement of Azania (BCMA) and theAfrican National Congress(ANC).It is not clear what happened at thediscussions with the PAC and the BCM.But after meeting the ANC in May,thetwo organisations surprised everyonewhen they announced they were in agree-ment that `it was imperative for thela-boor movement inside the country tostrive towards unity with the eventuali objective of a single labourfederation'.The fact that Nactu did not subscribe tothe Freedom Charter was not seen as anobstacle.Confirming this,South African Con-, gross of Trade Unions (Sactu) generalsecretary John Nkadimeng said at thetime: `Certain peoplethink it is a pre-requisite that anyone who wants to join anew united front must support the Frcc-Born Charter. We saythat is incorrect...(A united front) is something that bringspeople together to fact a common en-emy. They do not haveto agree 100l0with cash other'.The meeting with the ANC took placewhile delegations from both Cosatu andNactuwere in Harare for a seminar ar-ranged by the International Labour Or-ganisation and followed an offer bytheOrganisation of African Trade UnionUnity, to which both federations are af-filiatcd, to host unity talks betweenthem.;Later that month, at a special con-gress, Cosatu resolved to appoint acommittee to investigate theestablish-ment of a broad front that would includebodies like Nactu and the AzanianPeoples' Organisation (Azapo).Cosatualso wrote to Nactu calling for a merger.Although there was no real prospect ofthat happening in the shortterm, therewas still hope that the federations couldact together on issues affecting themboth.Nactu's decision to joinforces withCosatu in the highly-successful three-day stayaway in 1988 against proposedamendments to the LabourRelations Actwas one of the fruits of these develop-ments. The campaign against the Act, asis well known, was aproject into whichboth federations continued to pour greateffort.Despite this, it was when Nactu pulledout of the firstWorkers Summit in Marchlast year that it became clear that theinitial conceptions about the direction inwhich the newAfricanist leadershipwould steer the federation were totallyoff the mark. With a few bumps here andthere it is Nactu'sBC adherents - and notthe Africanists - who have demonstratedthey arc more amenable tointer-union1cooperation.The summit was Nactu's idea. Yet, inthe days leading up to it, the federationcontactedCosatu and asked for an in-definite postponement to give its mem-bers more time to discuss unity. Therequest wastotally unexpected andCosatu insisted that arrangements weretoo far advanced to stop. Nactu thenWIP 68 9 Page 21

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announced it would not attend. Some-thing was obviously amiss.Just how much dissent this issue cre-ated was madeclear when 11 Nactuunions - mainly those with BC sympa-thies - defied the federation's ruling andparticipated in thesummit.Afterwards they explained they haddone so because the `growing repres-siveness of the state and thearrogantattitude of capital can be effectivelychallenged by the black working classonly if it is united'. However, eventhoughthey felt the federation's decision hadnot been in the interests of the workingclass, there was no question abouttheircommitment to Nactu. Despite theseattempts to placate, it is known thatMndaweni's branch of FBWU triedtoexpel an organiser who went to thesummit.In the months that followed furtherevidence of strains between the BCandAfricanist elements came to light. Nactuhas a programme to merge all unionsoperating in the same sector.YetSeawusa, for example, refused to act inconcert with four other unions operatingin the metal sector in May 1989whenthey merged to form the 69 000-strongMetal & Engineering Workers' Union(Mewusa). Mewusa is regarded asamiddle-of-the-road union politically.General secretary Tommy Oliphant wasgeneral secretary of the biggest unioninthe merger, the Electrical & AlliedWorkers' Union, a former Trade UnionCouncil of South Africa (Tucsa)parallelunion. Its assistant general secretary, G SZithulele, is a BC supporter. Seawusa'sleadership, on the otherhand, has beenpredominantly Africanist since Septem-ber 1988 when Khotso Kodisang replacedJane Hlongwane asgeneral secretary. In-siders say Seawusa's decision wasprompted by leaders' fears that theywould not be able toretain their power inthe new union. The two unions are nowsaid to be rivals.After this bad start, the secondWork-ers'Summit, which was called to formu-late responses to the 1989 election andthe campaign against the LRA,was os-tensibly a completely different affair.Differences were seemingly buried.Nactu not only attended but alsocom-mitted itself to building working classunity. It agreed that unions organisingthe same sectors should meet at localandregional level to discuss unity and that anational coordinating committee be es-tablished to set objectives anddeadlinesand to collate the responses in prepara-Page 22 WI P 68Nactu's Ngcukana:Replaced CamayNactu'sMndaweni:Re-elected presidentlion for a further summit.After the summit there was someconflictbctwccnBCelcmcntsandCosatuover precisely which days had been ear-marked for stayaways. The formerwantedstayaways on 6 September (election day)and 12 September (the anniversary ofSteve Biko's death). The latteropted forstayways on S and 6 September. Never-theless, when the MDM began to stagepeace marches after theelection, theywere supported by the BCM and theCape Action League.On 2 December the PAM/internal PACwasformed. Counting in De Lille, al-most half the positions on its executivecommittee arc filled by Nactu people.PACgeneral secretary Benny Alexanderis a former organiser with Food Bever-age. Nactu second assistantgeneralsecretary Mike Matsobanc is the PAC'streasurer. Sacwu national organiserMancnc Samela - one of thekingpins inthe federation - is its labour secretary.PAC health secretary Nana Moabi is aNactu staff member, as isJoyce Sedibiwho is in charge of the PAC's projectsand developmentportfolio. And SA BlackMunicpality & AlliedWorkers' Uniongeneral secretary Philip Dlamini is theexecutive member for legal affairs.Later in December, Nactuannouncedit would not be participating in the Con-ference for a Democratic Future (CDF),citing as its reasons theinclusion ofbantustan leaders - `collaborators' - andthe way the CDF organising committeehad handled itself, chargingthat it had apre-set agenda regarding the HarareDeclaration.The excuse didn't quite ring true.Nactu had decided toattend the CDF at anational council meeting in Novemberand was represented on the organisingcommittee. As such itmust have beenaware of all decisions made.And proof that not all in Nactu agreedwith the federation's decision waspro-vided when eight unions - again mostlywith BC leanings - showed up on the dayof the conference. Camay alsoattended,although he was careful to tell reportershe was not there as a union representativebut to represent aneducational organisa-tion.Newspapers reported that week thatrepresentatives of six unions met withNgcukana thenight before the Nactuannouncement was made. Ngcukanaapparently refused to entertain any dis-cussion - evenwhen they pointed out thatofficials had no right to take decisions onmatters which require consultation withworkers.BC delegates told newspapersthey did not agree that Nactu's principleof non-collaboration had been compro-mised.Bantustan leaders were not pre-scribing to the liberation forces but align-ing themselves with them, theyargued.Ngcukana's response to all of this wasthat BC unions represented no more than25% of Nactu'smembership,and thosethat had attended were guilty of `blatantopportunism'.Camay quit Nactu on 31December,having handed in his resignation at aspecial central committee meeting be-forehand where Ngcukana waselectedto succeed him. Nactu accountantFlorence Thinane also walked out.Camay later disclosed that it wasthefiasco around the first Workers' Summitand the CDF which finally forced him actas he did: `I realised I had verylittleimpact on decisions regarding workerunity. Primarily, decisions were not beingmade within Nactu forums - theywerebeing made in political caucuses. Andthe will and decisions of these caucuseswere being imposed on the Nactustruc-lures.'When he was asked if he could haveensured greater worker unity if he had

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PACremained in Nactu, he said on the con-trary he felt that `this fundamental prin-ciple was being eroded'. Camayrefusedto identify the `political caucuses' hewas talking about; but the inference wasobvious.Whatever his failings,one thingCamay cannot be accused of is of usinghis position to impose his own politicalbeliefs. It is acknowledgedthat he al-ways strictly adhered to worker man-dates.When the news of Camay's res-ignation broke, Ngcukanawasquick to deny that a split inNactu was imminent. He now claimsthere is greater unity in the federation,and that it isgoing from strength tostrength.But there are a number of pointerswhich suggest this is not the case. Sev-eral keypeople have left Nactu since thebeginning of the year. Dale Tifflin,Nactu's information officer, has left andjoinedCamay and Thinane at an educa-tional co-op. So has Kessie Moodley,Nactu's legal coordinator in Natal.Brushes &Cleaners Workers' Uniongeneral secretary Mary NGseke, an old-style unionist, is reportedly beingsqueezed out of herunion by Africanists.Fay Mandy, general secretary of theNational Union of Wine & Spirit Work-ers, faces similarpressures.Poaching is also said to be occuring -both within the federation and acrosssectors. In April Cosatu'sChemicalWorkers' Industrial Union (CWIU) ob-tained an urgent Supreme Court orderagainst Sacwu president WilsonThulaneand two shop stewards interdicting themfrom assaulting or threatening to assaultCWIU members at AECI'sModderfon-tein plant. According to CWIU, therehave been several incidents of violencebetween members of the twounions inthe past two years.Well-placed sources say Sacwu stillretains its long-standing majority atModderfontein, butthat CWIU is mak-ing inroads because of thuggery and in-timidation by members of the Nactu af-filiate.Workers at anSAB plant in Witbankrecently defected wholesale from FoodBeverage to Cosatu's Food & AlliedWorkers' Union(Fawu) - apparentlybecause the town is now regarded asANC territory. On the other hand, SAB'sChamdor brewery,where the Nactu un-ion's long-standing majority dropped tobelow SO% during last year's strike by' Fawu members, isonce again a FoodBeverage plant.The PAC, Nactu and Azapo did notsupport the 2 July stayawaY called bYtheCosatu-UDF-ANC alliance in an effortto get the state to take decisive action toend the Natal violence. NgcukanatoldWIP Nactu has no doubt that these or-ganisations are genuinely trying to find asolution to the problems there, butit wasnot consulted about the stayaway. A morej important consideration, he says, was thewelfare of the ordinarypeople in Natal:`We felt a stayaway would make Inkathamore intransigent.'Azapo publicity secretary StriniMoodleysays Azapo condemned thestayaway because it thought the alliancewas intent on a display of politicalone-upmanship. `But we do not actively goand encourage conflict by mobilisingagainst it. We simply stated apositionthat we believe is a reflection of feelingsin the black community as a whole. Blackpeople are tired of beingmanipulated,they are tired of violence and meaning-less boycotts and stayaways. They wantto see somethingnew.'Asked for comment on the' ideologi-cal war' in Nactu, Moodlcy told WIP:`On the little information I have Icannotdeny that this conflict is continuing. Thereis deep concern about indications of acampaign to try to wish awaythe BCgrouping, to try to deny that our move-; ment has played a crucial role in devel-i oping the kind of politicalconsciousnessthat exists in our country today.`We believe the union movement mustbe independent and that workersmust begiven the opportunity to recognise thatthey all have a democratic right to sup-port the political organisation oftheirchoice. And we will continue to try tocorrect the imbalances, first of all, and tore-educate the misdirected. We arecon-fident that there are sufficient peoplewithin Nactu who do not want to see itdestroyed'.But the one thing thatmitigates againstthis is the fact that without Nactu neitherthe PAC nor Azapo will have a unionbase. Bamcwu generalsecretary MotsumiMokhine articulated this concern soonafter the CDF and Camay's resignationwhen he told areporter that the BC un-ions would not be able to find a home inCosatu.Mokhine added that he was surethedifferences between the two groups wouldbe accommodated. Nactu's congress inSeptember will demonstratewhether heis right.A peace pact- but forhow long?Although it has been unableto compete with the ANC'sability todraw largenumbers to rallies, the PACstill has a political presencein the Eastern Cape. A WIPCorrespondentreportsUitenhage's KwaNobuhle townshiplies at the centre of the Pan-Afri-canist Congress' presence in theEasternCape - in particular, the homeof former Robben Islander TimothyJantjie, regional PAC organiser and theman whoheads a group called `AmaAf-rika'.Dubbed `vigilantes' by some, AmaAf-rika members had been at war withUnitedDemocratic Front supporters in the re-gion for over two years, until a peace pactwas signed in February.Thejoint ANC-PAC initiative, moni-tored by peace committees, appears tohave kept thingscalm; peace committeesmeetfrequently to discuss how the ac-cord is holding, and to investigate al-leged violations.Peace was preached inshebeens, atrallies and at sports fixtures, and copiesof the accord were printed and distrib-uted throughout the area.Committeemembers and clergy visited every schoolin the area, explaining the document andits implications.The PACseemed to be going out of itsway to keep the peace on course. At leastone high school, reportedly peacefulanddemocratic student representative coun-cil elections saw representatives of bothideological leanings elected ontotheSRC.People who had fled to an Africaniststronghold at the height of the conflicthave been able to return - withoutharass-ment - to their homes, after consultationwith the relevant street and area commit-tees.Jantjie, who signed theaccord onbehalf of the Africanists, expressed hisWIP 68 Page 23

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.II'i I n0a~~y rI0sLtr f~.I . A v Iaw II Iy1a ~ iPt l r~R 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .... .....WNIA.~r4 I,YR..y I.. .a ~ .w~y l ,y7n . IPAC supporters: According to the UDf,they've started protecting EasternCape councillorsdelight about both groups' adherence tothe treaty. He emergedfrom the peacetalks looking far more compromisingand conciliatory than UDF activistsexpected, saying he believecooperationat a leadership level served as an ex-ample to the community.I low much the feuding was the resultofintense ideological differences, andhow much the work of police `agentsprovocateur', is impossible to establish.Thepolice had allegedly taken sides inthe feuding, and seined up suspicionswhen the peace initiative startedgainingmonienturn.`From the start. before the pact wassigned, (the police were against peace,'says a UDF activist.`We would takethem injured people and they'd say theywould invcstigatc, but no arrests wererr1ade'.PAC.' membersadd that the securitypolice warned them that attempts to forgepeace were tricks by the UDF to lurethem into loweringtheir guard.Local police had allegedly said that ifPAC signed an accord, known Africanistculprits of a 1957 attack onUDF prop-crty would be arrested and thrown intojail. There they would suffer, `becausethere are many UDF people(in prison)'.Jantjie, too, questions the role of thepolice: `Although the people of Uiten-hage wanted peace long ago,the policeenjoy the fighting', he said.A number of claims and affidavits onPage 24 9 WI P 68alleged partisanbehaviour by police weresubmitted to Law and Order MinisterAdriaan VIA when he visited Uitenhagcrecently.After thesigning of the peace pact, the Asked about the relationship betweenAmaAfrika kept a low profile for several the PACand the towncouncillors,Jantjiemonths. said his organisation merely sympathisedThen, in June, in the small Karootownof Graaff-Reinet (birthplace of PACfounder Robert Sobukwe),PAC-inclinedmayor Roko Pase -- faced withmount-ing community pressure to resign -called in the Africanist faction.Residents of Masizakhe township saytwominibuses off-loaded a group ofAmaAfrika men, led by Jantjic, at coun-cillors' houses, and that they wereseenpatrolling the township in pairs. Severalresidents said one of the minibuses hadbeen a pc)lice vehicle - a claimdismissedby Eastern Cape police spokespersonMajor Bill Dennis as 'absolutelyridiculous'.The arrival of AmaAfrikafollowedon the council to resign, and had sentthem a letter to that effect. 'We said wewill never resign until there isone mu-nicipality', he said.increasing violence in the township,culminating in the burning of five coun-cillors' houses.Outlining thchackgroundto his invitation to the Africanists, Pastsaid that after a mass rally on RepublicDay, there hadbeen stone-throwing inthe township, followed the next day bythe petrol-bombing of his and four othercouncillors'homes. One resident wasreportedly shot dead and anotherwounded.Past said residents had been callingwith them`as African people'.He reiterated that the PAC was firmlyagainst the government, claiming that insix months it wouldhave as members themajority of South Africans. The energyof township youth was being misspent,he said. Ratherthan burn down the housesof count illors, they should `kill the hocrs'who installed the councillors, and burndown theoffices of the regional servicescouncils.In another small Eastern Cape town,Cathcart, embattled mayor Mxolisi Silihasalso reached out to the PAC. Amidcalls for his resignation, the unpopularKatikati township mayor claimedmem-bership of the organisation. The PAC,however, has denied knowledge of thin.A recent violent incident inKirkwoodraised (cars of a new outbreak of conflictalong ideological lines. The house ofPAC area organiser Kolla Bakewasstoned and petrol-bombed, allegedly byUDF supporters. Jantjic suggests that theyouth, tired of `hunting'policemen andcouncillors, turned their attentions to-ward the PAC. His gloomy predictionsof fresh violence have notyet been real-ised, however. -- PE News

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PACPACeconomicpolicy:Socialismof aspecialtype?Alan Hirsch analyses thePAC's recently-releasedworking paper oneconomicpolicyAt present the Pan-Africanist Con-gress does not have a fully formu-lated economic policy. This init-self is not remarkable; the African Na-tional Congress and Cosatu are still in theprocess of formulating theirs - thedocu-ment which came out of an ANC-Cosatumeeting in Harare in April was verymuch a preliminary workingpaper.The PAC also has a working paper,although it is called `An Exploratory,Diagnostic, and ContingencyExposi-tion' .This document has been discussed insome PAC forums, such as the recent`Conference of theOppressed' convenedby the PAC in Johannesburg.PAC leaders insist that the documentremains no more than aposition paperwhich will be debated in the organisa-tion's branches around the country be-fore economic policy isfinalised at acongress in October.Its significance lies in the fact that, asfar as can be ascertained, it remains theonlypaper on economic policy currentlyunder discussion by the PAC.It covers much more than economicpolicy in itsthirteen-and-a-quarter pages,so it does not cover any aspect of eco-nomic policy in great detail, but a clearandreasonably consistent position doesemerge.In short, it proposes a mixed economy(for the foreseeable future) in whichthestate would intervene in various ways toensure the redistribution of economicpower away from the `Europeanset-Hers', towards `Africans in Azania', whilenoting that Africans are defined in sub-jective terms, not simply by colour,eth- ;nicity, or place of birth.Curiously, the structure, if not thecontent, of the early part of the paperresembles nothingso much as a businessschool strategy plan, with a `missionposition', an `environmental analysis'and so on. The onlything missing is the`critical path'.The PAC mission position outlined inthe economic document is very broad:theeconomy in a PAC society will repre-sent the economic and political interestsof all Africans in Azania; and `thepro-duction and distribution relations withinthis political economy must be non-ex-ploitative', although the documentnever jspells out what exploitation means.The South African capitalist econ-omy is not only exploitative insomegeneral sense, argues the document, butit is destroying itself. The economy'stwo central features arc that it isdomi-nated by `oligopolism and generallymonopoly capitalist structures', and thatit has `developed without and inspite ofthe majority of the African people'.The oligopolies - the small number offirms that dominate sectors of theecon-omy - have responded to the economiccrisis since 1984 by restricting output,investment, and job creation. Anecon-omy dominated by oligopolistic struc-tures, the paper argues, lacks the built-inmechanisms `to put the economyon abetter track again'. The discriminationagainst Africans has led to the absence ofessential skills, and of growingmarkets.The document then points, quiteconcisely and accurately, to a series of`structural and process weaknesses'inthe South African economy. Much of thedata in this section is meticulously attrib-uted to the Financial Mail, andincludes: dependence on the export of gold andother metals and minerals; the growing weakness of theimport-substitution policy; dependence on foreign investmentand loans; and the slow growth of the economy inrecentyears relative to the high rate ofblack population growth and the veryrapid rate of urbanisation.Two major themes runthrough thepolicy itself: a high degree of stateintervention in the economy topromote growth; and the redistributionofwealth and income cowards `the Afri-can people' .Overall a mixed economy is called forbecause `market forces areincapable ontheir own of bringing out the economicconditions spelt out by the PAC's politi-cal and economic mission'.But con-versely, `the PAC does not want to pro-mote an illusion that the state can alonedevelop the economy or startnew eco-nomic organisations'.Redistribution is planned not only from`settlers to Africans', but also from for-eigners tolocals. As many of the eco-nomic resources of the country as pos-sible arc to be `localised' under the PACproposedpolicy, in other words trans-ferred from foreign hands to local own-ership, in order `to minimise the role ofinternationalfinancial capital'.This position echoes the economicposture adopted by several African gov-ernments under thebanner of `Africansocialism' in the late 1960s, but longsince abandoned.In a similar vein, the state would pro-mote theeconomic position of AfricansWIP 68 Page 25

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PACthrough a range of mechanisms includ-ing boosting training and education formanagement, and `ensuring thepromo-tion of Africans to managerial positionsin all sectors of the economy' .This was called Africanisation northof theZambezi in the 1960s.The state would also be responsiblefor `the massive promotion of businessfirms that will beowned individually andas cooperatives by the indigenous Afri-can people'.The PAC has always claimed to haveadistinctive land policy. The documentindicates that the PAC would redistrib-ute the land `for use by all Azanians',afterhaving `dccommoditised' the land,which presumably means that land wouldnot longer be bought or sold onprivatemarkets.The alienation of land would becompensated through payments in theform of interest-bearinggovernmentbonds. Beyond this, the land policy isvery vague, and the document does notenter into a discussion of theforms ofownership that would be promoted in thecountryside.n another part of the document, `sclf-sufficicncy in foodproduction' iscited as an important goal, but thepossible contradiction between this goaland the radical redistributionof land isnot discussed. Incidentally, this possiblecontradiction was a point of contentionat the ANC-Cosatu economicdelibera-tions in Harare.The position of the PAC on the role ofworker organisation as represented inthe document ispotentially highly con-troversial. The paper refers to the promo-tion of a strong politically autonomousworkersmovement, and that a PACgovernment would assist workers inobtaining shares in the companies inwhich theyworked.But it also says that `efficiency will behighly enforced' and that the nation mustbe `highly disciplined'economically.Moreover, apparently contradicting itsposition on the autonomy of workersorganisations, the documentindicates that`for the next five to ten years an Africanand nationalist movement is consideredthe best vehicle in theimplementation ofthe economic policy of the PAC', andthis cntailsthc `affiliation' of `sub-move-mcnes' like the workers'movement, tothe PAC.Again, this is reminiscent of `Africansocialism'. At least one African socialistPage 26 WI P68PAC economic policy: Now there's debate within the organisationon whether it follows `African socialism' or`scientific socialism' -with some saying it is too moderate in many respectsgovernment in the late 1 96()s arguedthatstrikes could be made illegal bccuuSeAfrican workers had gained politicalcontrol over the economy.If thedocument must he 1)i geon-hc)leci.it is undoubtedly strongly influenced bythe kind of African socialism thathadcurrency in countries hke Tanzania andUganda in the late 196()wncl early 1970s,though somewhat adapted for amoreindustrialised economy, and containinga few modem touches like employeeshare ownership. It is not dogmatic;cmthe question of public; ownership, but itverges on dogmatism on the 1s111c ofincligcniwUion.The document'sstance has provokedo debate within the PAC on whether theorganisation follows `African socialism'or `scientificsocialism', and it appearsthat significant sections within the PACregard it as too moderate in many re-shccts. OnePAC official, who is also atrade unionist, was adamant that the or-ganisation had not abandoned `scientificSocialism',and that the process of for-mulating an economic policy for the PACwould extend well beyond thepresent'Exploratory, Diagnostic and Contin-gcncy Exposition'.

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REPRESSIONSmall town rebellionTalk of reform means littleto embattled residents of therural areas to theEasternCape, where rising politicalexpectations have met withincreased repression. MikeKenyon, fieldworker withtheGrahamstown RuralCommittee, and FranzKruger, editor of theEastern Cape News AgencY~,look at the situation intheregionA Imost unnoticed amid the politicalattention focused on South Af-rica's cities, rising expectationsare fuellinga wave of revolt in smalltowns and rural areas of the Eastern Cape.It is essentially the same revolt as thatwhichtoppled Ciskei president LennoxScbc in February. But while the militarycoup in the homeland has largely de-fused therebellion there, the rest of theEastern Cape has seen no such break. Onthe contrary, hard-line responses by lo-calwhite authorities have helped esca-late protest into confrontation, and oftenviolence.A key demand in almost allcommuni-ties has been for a radical change to thesystem of local government, with dis-credited communitycouncillors comingunder increasing pressure to resign. ByMay this year, provincial officials ac-knowledged that half ofall positions oncouncils in the Eastern Cape were empty.The impact of the protests - in particu-lar, objections to thesystem of localgovernment - has already been felt farbeyond the region. It is partly as a resultof the collapse of blacklocal authoritiesin the Eastern Cape that the governmenthas begun looking at alternativemodels.Thegovernmcnthasalsoquictlydroppcdthe Tribal and Community AuthoritiesBill after opposition from affectedcom-munities.The revolt started with the casing ofpolitical repression last year, which sawSmall town, giant step: Aprotest march in the Border townof Queenstown last year, at the height of the nationwidedefiance campaignaresurgence of political activity in theregion.Several conimunitics in the Ciskei ledthe way, demonstrating that it waspos-sible to stand up to Sebc. East Peelton,which had been resisting Ciskei rule sincethe village was forciblyincorporated intothe bantustan in August 1988, erupted inOctober last year. It was soon joined byat least three otherCiskei communitiesin a growing national campaign againstforced incorporation.Residents of' the Border andCiskeiresponded to September's white parlia-mentary election with a successful stay-away. A week later residents ofStuttcr-heim began a consumer boycott. And asa nationwide defiance campaign gotunderway, residents throughoutthe re-gion threw their weight behind it, march-ing in most of the small towns dotting theregion.The small towns haveseen an ex-tremely harsh white reaction to what iscorrectly perceived as a mass revoltagainst white rule. Whitebusinessmen,local authorities and the security estab-lishment are responding to communitydemands withrepression.In these small towns, talk of reformseems a long way off. Nelson Mandela'srelease anti the first contactsbetween thegovernment and the African NationalCongress (ANC) quickly heightened theexpectations of blackcommunities; butlocal whites saw little reason to changepast habits, or even acknowledge thepassing of the state ofemergency.Police, business and white civic lead-ership structures remain inextricablyintertwined, and the sameindividualsregularly feature in each.eports abound of communities em-barking on consumer boycotts, onlyIRto findlocal shopkeepers staffingroadblocks in their capacity as policereservists.Similarly, when residents of Stuttcr-heimapplied for permission for a protestmarch, they had to do so to a magistratewho, two months earlier, had appearedona National Party political platform.Not surprisingly, he referred the decisionj to the police and AfrikaanseSakekamerwho, equally unsurprisingly, turned itdown.In Barkly East magistrate's court,policemen double asprosecutor and in-terpreter. Until June, there was no mag-ist.rate at all, and police frequently askedthe clerk of thecourt to stand in.Residents of the town say ANC sup-' porters arc threatened with arrest onWIP 68 Page 27

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REPRESSIONAllwalNorth BarklyEastBORDERSomerset East Port Elizabeth East;London icharges of treason amid aseries of clashesin the town since the legalisation of theANC.The months since then have seen ayouth shot dead bypolice in Elliot; ababy dying after being teargassed inJamestown; and a kitskonstabcl killed byyouths in Indwe after hepointed his gunat them.By contrast, the region's larger townsand cities have not seen nearly as muchturmoil. Amongthe explanations for thisare a combination of unchanged anddesperately poor conditions in the ruralL0 0iving ontheedge of the swordThe temperatures outside - and inside - the rusty corrugated iron shacksthatmake up half thehomes in Nkululeko, Barkly East's black township, drop be-low freezing most winter nights.No new homes have beenbuilt in Nkululc.ko for four years, and even thoselucky enough to have houses are not sure whether they have boughtthem orarerenting them. They have no papers and get no receipts for the R25 a montheachhousehold must pay -even those living in shacks.The township has one or two taps in each street and the bucket system isstillin generaluse. Nkululeko has just one school, which only went up toStandard7 until residents recently won permission tointroduce a Standard 8 class -oncondition they provided the funds for teachers and books.With few jobs outside ofdomestic and farm labour, the average wage of anNkululcko resident is blow R 1()() a month.And when residents tookto the streets on February 2 to celebrate thelegali-sation of the ANC, police teargasscd them without warning.Threedays later residents launched a selective consumer boycott - with themayor's shop one. of those targeted. Two daysinto the boycott, communitycouncillor WilliamThethelwaforced several youths at gunpoint into one of theboycottedshops. When crowds gathered outside his home to protest, he openedfire, wounding a protestor. The crowdresponded by torching his house..Soon afterwards, as the toyi-toying crowd made its way through the town-ship, apoliceman opened fire, killing two youths.Since then the political temperature has continued to rise. At least60peoplehave been arrested, held for 48 hours and charged, generally either withpublicviolence or participating in anillegal gathering. Their cases have beenrepeat-edly postponed and although many have been granted bail, this hasusuallybeen set at between R 150 and 8300 - beyond the reach of most.No local lawyer has yet agreed to defend`unrest' cases, and white BarklyEast is almost universally behind the police - black residents tell ofwhite ci-vilianssitting in police vans during action in the township. And whenmembersof one white fami ly wrote. to Law and OrderMinister Adria a n Vlok tocomplainabout the harshness of police action, the response of the local securitypolicewas tosubpoena there to reveal the names of their sources, and investigate.charges of defeating the ends of justice andpublishing untrue statementsaboutthe police.Even medically, the gulf between white and black Barkly East is hugeandgrowing: A local doctor has refused to treat black people hurt in `unrest'orpolitical activities - arguing that theycannot pay him.Page 28 WI P 68areas with little change in the level of po-litical repression, as well as massivelyraisedexpectations linked to politicalreforms.In the small towns and farming areasthere arc almost no jobs; the few therearepay appalling wages. Social services,such as housing and education, arc in astate of extreme neglect.In addition,many communities havehad to live under permanent insecurityover their homes and land. The 20 0()0blackinhabitants of Stutterhcim havebeen living with hardly any services andunder threat of forced removal for thepast fourdecades.Education is almost at a standstill,with a dire shortage of furniture, booksand facilities. Some classes of ROpupilshave to share a single textbook, othershave none at all. In 1,esscyton, nearQueenstown, classes are held underatree because the school building is insuch poor condition.In some communities, tentative stepstowards localnegotiations have beentaken. In Cathcart and Stuucrhcim, thewhite establishment and communitygroups have beguntalks based on anacknowledgement that upgrading of thetownship is a priority.But if progress has been madeinCathcart and Stuttcrhcim, the north east-ern Cape is still living in dark and repres-sive times.The challenge to all,from the ANC toIvW de Klerk, is to ensure that the au-thorities in these places arc brought totheir senses or thrownout.The long-term challenges posed bythese rural communities arc substantial.These small towns have, at best, averysmall and fragile economic base, and thisis unlikely to change quickly under a newand democraticgovernment.They arc likely to remain dependenton the central government for financesfor in frastructuraldevelopment. The costof financing the backlog in developmentacross the country is enormous and un-likely to be metto the satisfaction of all.The inequalities of wealth are particu-larly severe, and it will be no small taskto address thedemands and expectationsof small town communities.This is a problem which is more realfor the ANC than it is forthe De Klcrkgovernment. Nobody seriously expectsthe Nationalist government to addressrural poverty. But there arcvery realexpectations on the ANC to deliver anew and better South Africa.

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REPRESSIONAllwalNorth BarklyEastBORDERSomerset East Port Elizabeth East; London icharges of treason amida series of clashes in the town since the legalisation of the ANC.The months since then have seen a youth shot deadby police in Elliot; a baby dying after being teargassed in Jamestown; and a kitskonstabcl killed by youths in Indweafter he pointed his gun at them.By contrast, the region's larger towns and cities have not seen nearly as muchturmoil. Among the explanations for this are a combination of unchanged and desperately poor conditions in theruralL0 0iving on theedge of the swordThe temperatures outside - and inside - the rusty corrugated iron shacks thatmake up half the homes in Nkululeko, Barkly East's black township, drop below freezing most winter nights.No newhomes have been built in Nkululc.ko for four years, and even those lucky enough to have houses are not surewhether they have bought them or are renting them. They have no papers and get no receipts for the R25 a montheach household must pay - even those living in shacks.The township has one or two taps in each street and thebucket system is still in general use. Nkululeko has just one school, which only went up to Standard 7 until residentsrecently won permission to introduce a Standard 8 class - on condition they provided the funds for teachers andbooks.With few jobs outside of domestic and farm labour, the average wage of an Nkululcko resident is blow R 1()() amonth.And when residents took to the streets on February 2 to celebrate the legalisation of the ANC, policeteargasscd them without warning.Three days later residents launched a selective consumer boycott - with the mayor'sshop one. of those targeted. Two days into the boycott, community councillor WilliamThethelwaforced several youthsat gunpoint into one of the boycotted shops. When crowds gathered outside his home to protest, he opened fire,wounding a protestor. The crowd responded by torching his house..Soon afterwards, as the toyi-toying crowd madeits way through the township, a policeman opened fire, killing two youths.Since then the political temperature hascontinued to rise. At least 60 people have been arrested, held for 48 hours and charged, generally either with publicviolence or participating in an illegal gathering. Their cases have been repeatedly postponed and although many havebeen granted bail, this has usually been set at between R 150 and 8300 - beyond the reach of most.No local lawyerhas yet agreed to defend `unrest' cases, and white Barkly East is almost universally behind the police - blackresidents tell of white civilians sitting in police vans during action in the township. And when members of one whitefami ly wrote. to Law and Order Minister Adria a n Vlok to complain about the harshness of police action, the responseof the local security police was to subpoena there to reveal the names of their sources, and investigate. charges ofdefeating the ends of justice and publishing untrue statements about the police.Even medically, the gulf betweenwhite and black Barkly East is huge and growing: A local doctor has refused to treat black people hurt in `unrest' orpolitical activities - arguing that they cannot pay him.Page 28 WI P 68areas with little change in the level of politicalrepression, as well as massively raised expectations linked to political reforms.In the small towns and farming areasthere arc almost no jobs; the few there are pay appalling wages. Social services, such as housing and education, arcin a state of extreme neglect.In addition, many communities have had to live under permanent insecurity over theirhomes and land. The 20 0()0 black inhabitants of Stutterhcim have been living with hardly any services and underthreat of forced removal for the past four decades.Education is almost at a standstill, with a dire shortage of furniture,books and facilities. Some classes of RO pupils have to share a single textbook, others have none at all. In1,esscyton, near Queenstown, classes are held under a tree because the school building is in such poor condition.Insome communities, tentative steps towards local negotiations have been taken. In Cathcart and Stuucrhcim, the whiteestablishment and community groups have begun talks based on an acknowledgement that upgrading of the townshipis a priority.But if progress has been made in Cathcart and Stuttcrhcim, the north eastern Cape is still living in darkand repressive times.The challenge to all, from the ANC to IvW de Klerk, is to ensure that the authorities in theseplaces arc brought to their senses or thrown out.The long-term challenges posed by these rural communities arcsubstantial. These small towns have, at best, a very small and fragile economic base, and this is unlikely to changequickly under a new and democratic government.They arc likely to remain dependent on the central government forfinances for in frastructural development. The cost of financing the backlog in development across the country isenormous and unlikely to be met to the satisfaction of all.The inequalities of wealth are particularly severe, and it willbe no small task to address the demands and expectations of small town communities.This is a problem which ismore real for the ANC than it is for the De Klcrk government. Nobody seriously expects the Nationalist government toaddress rural poverty. But there arc very real expectations on the ANC to deliver a new and better South Africa.

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HOUSINGPullingthe plugontownshipcouncilsThe rent boycott campaign has takers a new turn with theTransvaalProvincialAdministration's decision to cut off subsidies to bankrupt townshipcouncils. Inga Molten andAlanMabin look at the implications for rent boycotters and for thetownship councilsAt first glance, the Transvaal Pro-vincialAdministration decision tostop subsidising bankrupt blacklocal authorities (BLAB) looks like imajor victory for rcptboycott campaign-ers.But the TPA decision - which endsyears of subsidies to local authoritieshardest-hit by rent andservice chargeboycotts - raises several challenges forthe civics which have spearheaded thosecampaigns.Not least ofthese is the need for anurban development programme whichcan overcome the decay caused by thelocal authorities'lack of funds: Becauseof the duration of the boycott campaigns,development in many townships hascome to astandstill. Even with enormoussubsidies, bankrupt BLAB have barelybeen able to meet their debts, never mindraiseadditional funds for new services,maintenance and infrastructural devel-opment.The extent of the debt isawesome:According to official figures, 47 blacktown councils in the Transvaal owe about8787-million in rent andservice pay-ments accumulated since 1956, and about8350-m in loans provided by the prov-ince during 1959 and1990.In June, they were told by the TPAthat these bridging funds would be cut,with effect from July 1.`We simplycannot supply the de-mand', explained TPA spokesman Janvan der Walt. `And there arc indicationsthat further fundsfrom central govcrn-ment will not be forthcoming'.At present rates, he explained, theTPA's funds for the entirefinancial yearwould be exhausted within three to fourmonths, with theresult that bulk suppliesof services such aselectricity would notbe paid for. Financial assistance hadincreased to 835,5-m in April, 860,5-min May and even morein June, he said -and there was only R26-m available asbridging finance each month.Planning and Provincial AffairsMin-ister Hernus Kricl gave the lint fromcentral government: `No government cansubsidise millions of people withrent,electricity, water, refuse removal andother municipal services. We have totake steps to balance the books.Citizenshave to play their part, we cannot con-tinue pumping in money ad infinitum'.Kriel warned of tough actionagainstresidents, with services being stoppedfor those who `allow themselves to beused for political ends' or whopartici-pate in the `political boycott'. This isdespite warnings by community leaders,such as Sowcto Civic Association(SCA)publicity secretary Pat Lcphunya, whowarned that power cuts `could lead toviolence ... which may plunge thecoup-try into the dark days of'' 86 and 'S7'.lso at issue is the future of theA BLAs. Introduced at the height ofthecommunity rebellions in themid-80s, they have gained even lesssupport than their predecessors, such asthe UrbanBantu Councils.BLAB have been characterised by lowpolls and high expense accounts, andhave becomesynonymous with highrentals, corruption, poor living condi-tions and serious housing shortages.The rcpt boycottersarc demandingimproved facilities, the transfer of own-crship to those who have paid rent for ageneration, and theabolition of separateblack local authorities.The boycott has tended to cripple thealready inefficient administration ofthetownships, especially in the Transvaaland the cistern Cape. The result has beenWIP 68 Page 29

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HOUSINGto place civic ace cv~c associations ina strongposition in relation to those who haveparticipated in the blacklocal authoritystructures.The black local authorities have, ofcourse, tried to respond, employing vari-ous strategiesranging from appeals tooutright threats of eviction:Their tactics include: Attempts to break the boycott by low-eringmunicipal service charges, such asin Tsakane on the East Rand. Attempts to increase income by othercouncils. whichcalled on those residentswho were paying municipal levies to payeven more. In Duduza, the council threat-ened todiscontinue services such as elec-tricity and water, the provision of gravesand health services, and the maintenanceofsewerage and roads if residents did notpay the increased levies. Offering residents the oPlion of payinggtheir rentaloutside the township.Diepmeadow council, forexample, hiredattorneys in an attempt to recover morethan R37-mowed by residents. Resi-dents received notices in June to paytheir arrears and R 12,50 legal recoveryfees within 14days to avoid being sum-monsed. The letters stated that debts couldbe paid directly to the Florida-basedlawfirmAttcridgcville residents were giventhe option of paying their arrears at aPretoria branch of Standard Bank afterarent boycott caused lost the council Ra-m between April and June. The At-teridgeville/SaulsvillcResidcnts'Organi-sation urged the bank to close the ac-count because the boycott was in protestagainst corruption andmismanagementof funds. Trying public relations exercises: wa-ter and electricity tariff increases weredeferred inTembisa from March untilJuly to enable the council to inform resi-dents about the increases. Threatening to evictresidents of theVa a 1 tow nshipsof Sharpeville, Sebokeng,Bophclong, Boipatong and Zamdclawhen tariff increasesof about R40 wereintroduced in January - even thoughmost residents had been boycotting rentfor more than threeyears.SCA deputy-president Sam Pholothobelieves the provincial authority is pass-ing the buck to councillors, `gettingthemto pressurise residents. But it won't workbecause we won't pay' .The civic says the arrears should bewritten offaltogether-- a point on whichthe Soweto Council and the DemocraticPage 30 WI P 68nu:~*h'evi sParty caucus in theJohannesburg citycouncil agree.But the TPA stance towards the BLABis unconciliatory: Gel your houses inorder orface the consequences.Events in Mamelodi recently showthe stark contrast between the possibili-ties if debts can bedisposed of, and theprobabilities which will follow a hard-line approach.On June 20, agreement was reachedbetweenthe Mamclodi People's Dclcga-tion and TPA officials that residentswould not have to pay rent arrears, inreturn forwhich the civic would rccom-mend an end to the rent boycott. But themass meeting called to discuss thisrec-ommendation was broken up by policeon July 9, resulting in hundreds of inju-ries. In the anger which followed,resi-j dents agreed not only to continue theirrent boycott, but to extend it to include aconsumer boycott of Pretoriabusinesses.Failure resolve to the crisis 0ftheBLAs will undoubtedly lead to renewedpolitical activity, which will againtendto paralyse development in the town-ships.As a result, negotiations to resolve therent and servicechargeboycottmay haveto be tackled at a national rather thanlocal level. If the TPA (and other provin-cial administrations)were, for example,to write off debts or make bridging fi-nance available to new joint (and per-haps even non-racial)local authorities,this could increase the possibility ofcommunity acceptance of the govern-ment's reform intentions.AIready, various local negotiatinginitiatives which affect the futureof local government structure andfinance arc underway: Residents of the East Rand township ofDaveyton resolved in March to tempo-rarily suspend their rent boycottpendinga meeting scheduled between theDaveyton People's Delegation and TPAofficials. The residents aredemandingthe resignation of all councillors; thesetting up of a commission of inquiry tolcxok into the administration,manage-ment and financial matters of the coun-cil; and the reduction of tariffs. In June, a watershed agreementbe-tween the civic association of Brakpan'sTsakane township and administrator JimVinning proposed an end to thefive-month-long rent boycott by reducingrentals, establishing standard rates andsetting up joint committeescomprisingcommunity representatives and admini-stration officials to address residents'grievances. Provision to makeland avail-able to squatters, to electrify more housesin the township and to investigate allega-tions of corruption wereincluded in thepac t.A vital question concerns the impactof the TPA's decision to cut bridgingfinance on these localnegotiations. It,may prove to be a clumsily-wielded stickwith tragic consequences; it may turn outto he a noisydiversion; or it may be partof a complex stick-and-carrot game whichmay draw increasing numbers of civicsintoparticipation in deciding the futureof local government.If it flocs turn out to do so, strong ci-vics may be able to makeenormous gainsfor participation by residents in decidingthe future of their cities. But the dangerexists that weakercivics may lose theirautonomy in return for empty gains.

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HOUSINGPlanning an urban policy.V1 W~a . Ina.Dan Smt*t and Jeff MeCarthy of the Urban Foundation look at futureurbanpolicy. Thearticle is a response to Mark Swilling's contributions in WlP 66 and 67he articles on urban policyraisesome important issues for thosecommitted to the realisation ofpost-apartheid urban futures.The first article offersan analysis ofwhat Swilling sees as `the state and capi-tal's' new urban policy framework.The second provides hisview of the ~strategic approach that should be adoptedby the MDM in response to that frame-work. Both articles areprovocative and ,have stimulated us to further develop ourthoughts about the nature of post-apart-heid urbandevelopment policy.We share Swilling's dedication torealising a democratic, post-apartheidurban order. However, wediffer withhim when it comes to analysis of contem-porary urban policy issues, and certainaspects of his strategicproposals. Wehave no difficulty with his proposal inthe second of the two articles, that new,critical insights need to bedeveloped bythe MDM in its engagement with urbanPolicy frameworksbeingdevclopedclse-whcre. However, if thoseinsights are to ,be developed on the basis of his particu-lar analysis of contemporary urban pol-icy debates, (the firstarticle), we believesome important errors of judgement willresult.The basic methodological problem inSwilling'sanalysis is that he takes asmall clutch of articles or documentspublished by disparate individuals ororganisations, andthen shoehorns theaspects of these that appear to be relevantto him into an undifferentiated concep-tion of astate/capital versus popularclasses contradiction.We would have thought that, quiteapart from the social scientificreserva-tions this might give rise to, the currentpolitical climate hardly corresponds.Against the background of rapidlyshift-ing political re-alignments, it can servelittle purpose to reproduce outdatedconcepts and frameworks inheritedfromthe mid-1980s.Swilling mixes apples and oranges in ihis analysis of the allegedly coherentstrategies of `the stateand capital'. If, asis commonly the cake in popular opposi-tion circles, the notion of a mixed econ-omy is held up asthe broad objective fora post-apartheid political economy,surely it is necessary to move away fromsimplistic,homogeneous state-capital al-liance theories?Is it not realistic, under such circum-stances, to distinguish betweentenden-cies or fractions within both the state andcapital with whom common post-apart-heid alliance strategies eithercan orcannot be forged?The assumption, for example, thatthere is a commonality of purpose be-tween FW do Klerk'sgovernment, theUrban Foundation and the DevelopmentBank of Southern Africa in matters ofurban policy, is one that- in our view -would probably come as a surprise tothose in these institutions.This is not to say that there isnoconvergence of thinking on certain as-pect,.s of urban policy. But to elevatesome intersecting ideas to the status ofafull-blown plot, and to ignore substantialWIP 68 Page 31

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HOUSINGInformal housing: Urban policies need to deal with this issuetensions and differences, is not only badsocialscience but is strategically fool-hardy.Moreover, the notion that market-ori-cntcd solutions to the housingchallenge`will result in an urban restructuringprocess that could displace people on ascale similar to the forcedremovals ofthe 1950s and 19bOs', strikes us as botha grotesque exaggeration and scientifi-cally absurdproposition.Some of Swilling's practical sugges-tions in the second article are not withoutmerit, but we can see littlepotential forthem if they arc to be situated within theanalysis of society offered in the firstarticle. The concept ofCommunityDevelopment CorPporations (CDCs) forexample, may well be a viable one in theSouth African context, butto counter-posc these against the allegedly machi-avellian intent of all of `financial capi-t<rl', would scan to be rathercrude andlacking in an appropriate sense of scale.In a recent paper, respected tradeunionist Alec Erwin noted thatdevelop-merits both in South Africa and Europedemand a new approach to analysis andpolitics. More specifically heargues asfollows: `...we will have to learn to con-front the issues and not the ideologicalparadigms. This is not toabandon analy-sis or to deny very real differences.However, we have to be quite clear whatthose differences are, andto what extentnegotiation will narrow them. Our futureis far too important to everyone to allowPage 32 WI P 68it to beleft in the realm of a war ofslogans...'We could not agree more. Moreoverwe believe that in his recent articlesSwillingis guilty, at least in part, of thekind of sloganeering that Erwin suggestswe should be avoiding. Consider, forexample,Swilling's rejection of supply-side subsidies. He rejects this form ofsubsidy on the grounds that it involvesthe use oftaxpayer's money to promotethe profit-making capacities of privatecapital. Since Swilling provides no fur-therjustification for his position on sub-sidies, we must presume he believes therationale of his argument isself-evident.But is it? The notion of a mixed econ-omy, for example, concedes to capital-ism the notion that there areefficiencygains in organising production and con-sumption through markets. Likewise itconcedes to socialism that theunfetteredoperation of the market will not result inan equitable distribution of the goodsand services produced. Nor willit neces-sarily ensure that certain goods requiredby low-income people will in fact bedelivered.Thus, while there aremany conccp-11tions of the nature of a mixed economy,many support a version of it in which themarket issubordinated to parameters setthrough democratic processes (this iscertainly the version we support). Nowit is quitecommon in such mixed econo-mies for the state to provide incentives toprivate producers to ensure the produc-tion ofdesired goods or to ensure greaterequity. Examples include the use of`prescribed assets' to encouragecertaininvestment patterns and incentive pack-ages targeted at industrial-location-deci-sions. Particularly effectiveforms ofsupply-side subsidies are those whichare paid only after the delivery of tar-geted goods.The use of one-timecapital subsidiesto encourage private sector productionof low-income site-and-service schemesis simply anotherexample of the use of`after-delivery' incentives to direct pri-vate investments and production activ-ity.In fact it ispossible that the mecha-nism may offer major societal advan-tages by, for example, targeting the verypoor; boostingthe rate and scale of pro-duction; ensuring efficient productionby promoting competition; and reducingtheadministrative machinery needed toadminister subsidy schemes.We are not, however, starry-eyed aboutsupply-sidesubsidies or market-orientedapproaches to housing supply. Nor isoursupport of the different kinds of coopera-tive orcollective housing delivery sys-tems unqualified. Housing co-opera-tives, like markets, only work ifcertainpreconditions are met (for example,housing co-operatives have a far betterchance of working if the membersare1 iterate and have developed managementand budgeting skills).It seems obvious to us that in structur-ing apost-apartheid South Africa, therelative merits and problems of differentapproaches to development issues(e.g.housing delivery systems) must be sub-jected to debate and negotiation - bothbetween different socialconstituenciesand within them. Democracy can acceptnothing less. Certain approaches, suchas supplyside-subsidies, should not bedismissed out of hand. The issues arccomplex and require serious rather thanfleetingengagement.Swilling' s proposals for a democraticurban polity do not reflect sufficientlyserious engagement with theframeworksand ideas proposed by others. Insteadthey appear to be based almost entirelyon ideologicalpredisposition.While such predisposition is impor-tant, since it may reflect real materialinterests, it can never be thesole basis onwhich urbanpolicyshouldbcmade. Whatis needed are polity proposals which arcthought through in detail- and whichcan actually work. In short, a new prag-matism is required.

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WORK INIM) OGRE,goWe need an editor to start work as soon as possible.The editor's major responsibility will be tooversee andmanage the editorial process. Other responsibilities includeliaising with contributors, co-ordinating theediting andproduction of WW, and developing the publication's profile.General ManagerWe need a skilled generalmanager, with experience inrunning an organisation, to start work as soon as possible.Responsibilities include:Overall management of the organisation Supervision of our administrative and distribution staff Generating advertisingrevenue for WIP Liaison with editorial staffSalaries for both posts are negotiable.We also offer medical aid and 5weeks' leave a year.Apply in writing, with CV and two references, to:Southern African Research ServicePO Box32716, Braamfontei 2017Closing date for applications: 15 August 1990WIP 68 Page 33

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CONSTITUTIONSCapitalising ona new constitutionThe South African Chamberof Commerce recentlypublished itscontributionto the debate on apost-apartheid constitution.Sammy Adelman arguesthat big business'objective is tomaintain`neo-apartheid', ratherthan to bring about trueeconomic. liberationA former Wits UniversitySRC president,Adelmanwas banned in 1981 andwent into exile in 1982.He is currently lecturingin law at WarwickUniversity,EnglandPage 34 WI P 68n 1988, Albie Sachs argued in a draftdiscussion paper, Towards a hill ofrights in ademocratic South Africa,that a bill of rights should riot lxregarded as a means of protecting grouprights, but rather `asan instrument forenlarging the freedom of' the oppressedmajority, thereby creating a South Africain which equal rightsbecomes the realityand in which the whole population, irre-spCctive of colour or origin, can live inpeace and withdignity'.Since then the. political landscape hasbeen transformed.Apartheid has failed, due. to a combi-nation ofinternal resistance and interna-tional sanctions. The economy is besetby deep structural contradictions whichmitigateagainst successful short-termsolutions. And the government has bccTiforced to unbars the ,African NationalCongress,the South African CommunistParty, the Pan-Africanist Congress, andmany other organisations, and to releaseANCleader Nelson Mandela.The end of apartheid is nigh. But isliberation as close as many would like tobelieve`.'Theremoval of the formal legal struc-tures of apartheid alone will not guaran-tee the full political. economic andsocialemancipation of the oppressed majority.White power is so deeply entrcnclwd thatSouth Africa needs far morethan thecosmetic repeal ol~ apartheid legislation.Constitutional negotiations are immi-nent because the governmenthas cometo accept what big business has so longbeen arguing: thatanyseniblanceol'whitewealth and privilege can besalvagedonly in a democratic political system.But no ruling class in llistory hasvoluntarily abdicated. And whiteSouthAfrica is no exception.The central question which confrontsprogressive forces is whether a newconstitution willmark true liberation, carthe emergence ol~ a system of nco-apart-hcid in which there is black majority rulebutcontinued white (I'conomIC hegem-ony.As constitutional proposals emergefrom all points of the political spectrumit isclear that neo-apartheid is the goal ofboth the government and big business,and that a bill of rights is regarded asaway of protecting the minority's privi-leges rather than enlarging the freedomsof the majority.`Reform' has so farbeen all abouttrying to foster neo-apartheid withoutconceding political power.If the crick is to be pulled off, thesleightof hand will take the form of aliberal majority-rule constitution.Liberal constitutional models arecharacterised by theiremphasis onlimited and ostensibly accountablegovernment and individuals rights.On these two pillars, otherstructuresarc ercc;tcd, such as: periodic elections a separation of powers the rule of law an impartial and independentjudiciary procedural rights commonly enunci-ated in a bill of rights.At face value such a conception isdesirable,embodying as it does many ofthe freedoms underpinning the recentrevolutions in Eastern Europe.But, as Engelsnoted and history hasproved, it is the bourgeois democraticform of state which is most likely tothrottle progressiveaspirations, for `it isprecisely the democratic republic whichis the logical form of bourgeois rule'.The rule of law, forexample, is predi-cated on the ostensible neutrality of thestate in conflicts between classes, inter-est groups andindividuals. Power mustbe achieved in a constitutional mannerand must be employed neutrally; eco-nomic might orclaims of privilege mustbe ignored.The laws, among which the constitu-tion is pre-eminent, thus determine whoshouldhold political power and how itcan be exercised.A constitution will specify proceduresfor tile. creation of all other laws,which

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CONSTITUTIONSof law, a separation of powers and a billof rights - primary among those rightsbeing that to privateproperty.The charter is one of the first majorassaults in the ideological battle nowjoined over its form and content.In astatement accompanying thepublication of its charter, Sacob assertsthat it `is in business to create a climate ofopinionin this country in which compa-nies can operate efficiently and profita-bly for the benefit of all' - apparentlyforgettingcapital's historic failure tomitigate the grossest inequalities of apart-heid.Obviously a response to the influenceof theFreedom Charter, Sacob's docu-ment signals monopoly capital's inten-tion of influencing constitutional nego-tiationsthrough the formulation of whatis essentially a bill of rights.Essentially bourgeois in form, it isdesigned to perpetuateminority powersby de-emphasising race- while intensi-fying existing class distinctions arisingfrom apartheid.TheSacob charter reflects the stand-points of the Associated Chamber ofCommerce (Assocom) and the Feder-atedChamber of Industry (FCI), cham-bers of commerce and individual busi-nessmen. But above all it reflectsthecorporate views of Anglo American, themain exploiterof black labourpowerandthe most significant progenitorofconstitutional proposals in the businesscommunity.In the recently published AngloAmerica, its associates and SouthAf-rica, the corporation argues that SouthAfrica `must move towards being a pros-perous, non-racial, multi-partydemoc-racy' and that `a high degree of individ-ual economic freedom is characteristicof prosperous societies. This ismostclearly expressed in the freedom to ac-quire private property. Other featuresinclude a broadly-based andnon-puni-tive tax system, sound fiscal policy,i prudent management of the money sup-, ply and proper recognition ofthe power'and place of the market in allocatingeconom is resources'.This is not so much a call for theretention of thestatus quo, which hasbecome increasingly contradictory forcapital, but rather for a market systemwhich reducesinterventions of the stateto an absolute minimum.The major conflict which will domi-nate negotiations over apost-apartheidAnglo's Bobby Godselh `Group rights provide an adequate solution'must be public, capable of beingreadilyunderstood, and enforced according to Itheir obvious meaning.No person may arrogate to her/him-self thepower to ignore them or to dis-pense with due process. Indeed, the ruleof law insists that the legal proceduresbefollowed even when this inconveniencesthe dominant class. Citizens must be ableto exercise their rights with theconfi-dence that the courts will uphold themAt face value this is unexceptional,and the commitment of big businesstobourgeois legality is reflected by thenewly formed South African Chamberof Business (Sacob) in itsrecently-pub-lished Charter for economic, social andpolitical rights.In section 22 of this charter, Sacobdemands that`the institutions of demo-cratic government and in particular theseparation of state powers, the independ-ence of thejudiciary and the supremacyof the law, the freedom of the press andthe free formation of political partiesshall be thefoundation of South Africanstatehood' .But the problem with bourgeois law,and the rule of law in particular, is that itismore concerned with form than withsubstance. It privileges individualism atthe expense of the collective, and itfet-ishes law. While the formal equality ofbourgeois law would certainly be animprovement on the apartheid legalsys-tem, a dcracialised post-apartheid con-stitution could ultimately form the basisfor a more subtle form of claysdomina-tion.By refusing to take substantive issuesv into consideration, bourgeois legal sys-tems are able to pull thevital trick ofgranting protection to private property,and therefore to capitalist social relationsas a whole.And it is thebourgeois legal formupon which capital's constitutional pro-posals arc based.Drawing on the lessons of Zim-babwe,capital's strategy appearsto involve accepting the incvita-bility of having to cede political power tothe black majority inthe knowledge thatwhite skills, capital and confidence willbe essential to future economic develop-ment.The key isthus a constitution whichentrenches the free enterprise system,capitalist relations ol'production, the ruleWIP 68 Page35

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CONSTITUTIONSconstitution is the demand of the major-ity contained in the Freedom Charter that`the people shallgovern' (meaning one-person, one-vote in a unitary state) on theone hand; and, on the other, attempts bythe stateand capital to develop neo-aparthcid through federalism, confedcr-alism, `group rights' or someconstitutionalmechanisms which effec-tively give whites a veto.There has long been a contradiction instate policy ondecentralisation. Sepa-rate development was premised on the`decentralisation' of political power tothe bantustans,and attempts to promoteeconomic activity in the `border areas'.The former failed because it was bothillogical andgenocidal; the latter be-cause it confounded the logic of themarket.`Total strategy', PW Botha's versionof `reform',also had dual and contradic-tory goals. On the one hand it aimed toincorporate black people into more ef-fective localgovernment organs, in anattempt to foster the development of ablack buffer middle class, thereby de-flecting politicaldemands away from thecentre. On the other hand it involvedmassive centralisation of power in thehands of thecentral state through theState Security Council system and stateof emergency powers.While Sacob and thegovernment maynot agree completely on these issues,there are numerous points common totheir positions.Government thinking ona new constitution has so far stipulatedthe need for regular elections, a ban onone-party ruleimposed by `unsophisti-cated majority vote', a free market econ-omy, jobs in government for minorityleaders, andguarantees that people willbe able to live in their own communities.There should be state funding forracially-exclusiveschools and no expro-priation of property without compensa-tion.The government wants to promotestrong, relativelysmall, local govern-ment units, controlling their own schools,police and other municipal services.Whites would not onlyrun their ownlocal affairs on the basis of `group rights',but would command resources, from aninfinitely wealthier taxbase, that wouldenable them to maintain their separateand privileged way of life.In this way the Group Areas ActandBantu education would be perpetuated inother forms.Page 36 9 WIP 68The dangers of neo-apartheid arere-flected in Sections 19 and 20 of Sacob'scharter, which fleshes out its call fori minority and cultural rights to bepro-tected:19. The form of any new constitution,shall be the ,subject of negotiation be-tween interested parties, and itis essen-tial that any future political system inSouth Africa provides:19.1 the necessary checks and balances;19.2 thesafeguard of basic human rights;19.3 protection for minorities againstdomination.20. The state shall not be above thelawbut shall, through decentralisation anddevolution of state powers, (author'semphasis) be close to the peopleandresponsive to their needs.The Sacob charter is silent as to whatform the protections provided forminorities shouldtake. But giventhe historic relationship between Angloand the Democratic Party and its prede-cessors, we mayassume that some formof federalism or confederalism is envis-aged in contrast to the government's`canton-like'structures.In the Anglo American document re-ferred to above, the corporation claimsthat `it is not the role of businessin gen-eral, or Anglo in particular, to write con-stitutions or to create political processes'.` 1t then proceeds tocelebrate the role ofAnglo director Bobby Godsell in pro-; ducing a booklet published by Angloand6dedShapingthefuture:aeitizen'sguideto constitution making in which the cor-poration's response to the issue of`grouprights' takes the form of a discussion ofdecentralised political power.Godsell argues that in a centralisedsystemof government, power is concen-trated in a few institutions and althoughj some functions of government maybedelegated. `the authority of the centralinstitutions remains supreme and subjectto very few restraints. In adecentralisedi system ... power is divided and devolvedto a range of local or regional institutionswhich exercise full orpartial authorityover their respective areas. In this way,they act as a check on one another.'Godsell implicitly arguesthat `grouprights' can provide an adequate basis fora solution because although `group rightshave been used (as inSouth Africa) tosecure and maintain minority domina-tion, more commonly their purpose isquite the reverse. Othersocieties haveused the concept either to protect minor-ity rights or to prevent discrimination; orto accommodate orameliorate inter-group conflict'. To argue, in South Af-rica, that the concept of `group rights' isconsistent withdemocratic politics, thatit enhances citizen's rights and is de-signed to be inclusive rather than exclu-sive is at bestdisingenuous - and, atworst, dangerous.Logically there can be no possibilityof apartheid disappearing under anycon-stitution which seeks to incorporate suchinherently undemocratic mechanisms.The rest of Sacob's charter isunex-ceptional but limited. The preamble statesthe organisation's belief that `the opti-mal wealth creation for thebenefit of allis best achieved through a market econ-omy', while elsewhere it call for en-trenchment of `economicfreedom andthe private enterprise ethic' in any newconstitution.Despite its preoccupation with the freemarket,individual rights and privateproperty (`everyone has the right to ownproperty' and cannot be deprived of it`without dueprocess of law and compen-sation'), the charter does not confineitself to representing the essentiallybourgeois rightsderived from the Frenchand American revolutions and containedin the 1966 UN covenant on civil andpoliticalrights.Acknowledging some of the realitiesof apartheid and belatedly reflecting at willingness to drag South Africa intothe20th century as the rest of the worldprepares for the 21st, the charter alsodraws upon the UN covenant oneco-nomic, social and cultural rights, largelyinspired by the Russian revolution.Part 1 consists of a statement ofeco-nomic rights and principles and providesthat there shall be equal work opportuni-ties, free choice of employmentand fairremuneration, freedom of contract andequal pay for equal work, as well as theright to form and join tradeunions.But the charter omits the right to strikeI provided in the UN covenant, and doesnot contemplate a right towork.The social and cultural rights envis-aged in the charter are respect for privateand family life, freedom ofthought,conscience and religion, and rights toequal education, freedom of languageand to participate in the culturallife ofthe nation.Another right accepted by the charter,that of `a person belonging to an ethnic,

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CONSTITUTIONSOne person one vote: Not quite the bottom line for big businesssuch a positionreligious or culturalgrouping' to `use his ' The final and briefest part ofthe char- Namibia's.own language' would, on face value, ter coverspersonal and public responsi-! Like so much else in the struggleappear to be unexceptionable; indeed the i bilities.against apartheid, themaking of a newANC has indicated its agreement with i It includes the right of the state totakeconstitution is likely to be a contradic-action in accordance with the law to tory process.This provision can beinterpreted ei- defend itself during times of publicemer- I After the ravages of apartheid and thether altruistically, as agenuine attempt at gency. This ominous-soundingprovision lessons of eastern Europe, we must bepromoting amulti-ethnic non-racial so- is a common constitutionalmechanism prepared to acknowledge that many ofciety, or morecynically, as an attempt I -appearing, for example, inNamibia's I the slogans of the struggle can be dis-curry favourwith the present regime. constitution. ' tilled into the demandfor the rule of law.While there can be no disagreement in jAt face value, then, much of thechar- While much of what is contained inSacob's charter constitutes anacknow-ledgement by business of the majority'sdemand for basic human rights, the rheto-ric of liberalism and freeenterprise hastoo often masked the realities of exploi-tation and oppression.Similarly, the rhetoric of liberalcon-stitutional ism may disguise an attempt toIn other words the aim of monopoly ' perpetuate apartheid in anotherform.capital is primarily to entrench existing As the ANC states in its 1988disparities in economic power and toreduceto an absolute minimum theamount of state-directed restructuring.The realities of South Africa's politi-peacefulassembly. Incitement of racial, cal economy and the balance of classnational and religious hatred shall beprohibitedby law.principle in protecting the right of peopleto use their own language, it is preciselysuch a clause which mightpotentiallyprovide the basis for neo-apartheid in theform of exclusively white schools withAfrikaans as a medium ofinstruction.The Sacob charter also lays down theorganisation's desired civil and politicalrights, which provide that allshall beequal before the law and prohibits arbi-trary arrest, detention without trial, tor-ture, slavery and servitude. Itcalls forfreedom of movement, opinion and ex-pression, freedom of association andter is unexceptionable. Indeed it iscon-sistent with many of the demands of theANC and the mass democratic move-ment.But it is important toemphasise thatthe predominant thrust of the Sacob char-ter is in favour of individual rather thancollective rights.forcesindicate that the first post-apart-hcid constitution may be as liberal asconstitutional guidelines, `steps must betaken toensure that apartheid ideas andpractices are not permitted to appear inold forms or new' and the concept of`grouprights' must be rejected because itmeans the majority would continue to beconstitutionally underprivileged.WIP 68Page 37

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LABOUR TRENDSid-year is normally a time oftension in the labour arena.rV1 This is partly as a result of themanywage negotiationswhich take place during this period -the most important of which are the mineand metal talks.But itis also a time of protest. There isalways a stayaway on 16 June - whetheror not companies agree to grant the dayas apaid holiday.Last year Cosatu and Nactu called thehighly successful three-day stayawayfrom 4-6 June in protestagainst theLabour Relations Act (LRA). This year,the LRA is still an issue - but it is onlyone of scores that workershave raised inthe surge of militancy that has accompa-nied the unbanning of the ANC, SACPand the PAC. The Natalviolence is alsonow on the national agenda after 3-mil-lion people heeded the stayaway calledon 2 July by Cosatu,the UDF and theANC.Double-figure inflation is continuallyeroding any pay gains the unions make.As a result wagebargaining has increas-ingly come to assume life-and-deathproportions.Saccawu members have taken onlargesectors of the retail and hotel trades. Andworkers in the public sector and munici-palities arc finally achievingsome oftheir aims as the authorities slowly cometo terms with dealing with militant tradeunions - in much the sameway astheir private sector counterparts starteddoing from the early 1980s.`It feels like 1987', was one strike-watcher'scomment. The analogy is notinappropriate. After two relatively quietyears, strike levels arc now comparablewith thoseof 1987. There have also beenmajor strikes against some of the sameemployers who expcriencedbitterstrikestwoyears ago - of which the bruisingstrikes at Transnct (formerly SA Trans-port Services) and OK Bazaars arc themostgraphic examples.There is also a very real prospect of astrike in the engineering sector by Numsamembers. The 1987Numsa strike wasadmittedly a rather tame affair after thepublication of the metal industrial coun-cil main agreementmade the legality ofthe whole thing questionable, taking theinitiative away from the union.This year, however, thesituation isquite dil'fcrcnt. Numsa is now the major-ity union on the council and there can bethe Johannesburg Sundispute: 'It's like 1987 all over againMid-yearmilitance on thefactory floorPage 38 WI P 68

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LABOUR TRENDSthe winter of discontent: Police photograph a protestor detained during ademonstration outsidetheEdgars head office in Juneno agreement without its approval. Theunion announced on 18 July that a strikeballotwill be held in the first ten days ofAugust after the metal council failed toresolve the dispute it declared on 26June.Numsa had earlier indicated toemployers that it was in a position tosettle provided adequate progress wasmade onwages, hours of work, mater-nity and child-care leave, and 21 Marchas a paid holiday. There is also a fairlystrongpossibility of Numsa members inthe auto assembly and tyre and rubbersectors downing tools.The final wage offeradvanced by theSteel & Engineering Industries Federa-tion of SA (Seifsa) at the metal councilwas an extra 67c anhour for labourers (a19% increase which would bring theminimum hour wage up to 84,18 anhour) and R 1,29 forartisans (15,5 % up,to give a minimum of 88,50 an hour).Numsa is demanding an across-the-boardincrease of 82,00an hour. Seifsa alsooffered to specify in the agreement thatseverance pay must be paid in the eventof retrenchment -and that 21 days'notice of such action must be given, andto improve provisions for maternity leaveand institute freepap smears. Scifsa didnot offer to reduce the present 45-hourweek. Numsa had said it would consideraphasedreduction after initially demand-ing a 40-hour week initially.Seifsa had earlier agreed to: negotiate a job creationprogramme forthe industry;' include some categories of workerspreviously excluded from the industrialcouncilagreement; withdraw its demand for small busi-nesses to be excluded from the agree- ,mcnt;~ withdraw support fortraining institu-tions which practice discrimination and '.~, negotiate guidelines for the industry to ''end discrimination inthe selection ofemployees for training; restructure the council to provide for 'iproportional representation; an improvedleave bonus; enter into talks to merge the two majorprovident/pension funds in the industry; Ij extend the agreementto the homelandsj when this becomes possible.n 1987 Num and Anglo American hadtheir showdown on the goldmines.' This ycarthcunionsculcdfora 14,50to 17% wage increase for the gold mineson 5 July. But it continues to be indisputewith the Chamber of Mines over wages'~ atcollicrics. At the time of going to press,GFSA, Lonhro, JCI andRand Mines hadbaulked at going any higher than the goldoffer. Amcoal was offering increases ofbetween 16,4% and18% and Trans-Natal(Gencor) increases of between 14,5%and 28%. A strike cannot be ruled out.The OK Bazaarsand Southern Sun/Holiday Inn strikes were characterisedby a great deal of police intervention andhigh levels ofviolence. The OK strikeshowed that the company and Saccawuhad unfinished business from the 1987strike. This wasconfirmed at the settle-ment talks when the company admittedthat `management attitudinal problemsdo exist, arcsevere and must be ad-dressed'. Both parties have now commit-ted themselves to a process of negotia-tion to identifyand provide solutions todifficulties. Saccawu is planning a `Na-tional Hour of Action' on July 27 to focuson allegedrightwing harrassment andthe arrest of picketers during the strike.According to the SA Chamber ofBusiness, the 2July stayaway cost theeconomy an estimated 8750-million inlost production. The action stemmed fromtheCosatu-UDF-ANC alliance's con-viction that only the state can bring anend to the Natal violence. The alliancehasdemanded the arrest of Inkatha`warlords', that the KwaZulu police forcebe disbanded and that Gatsha Buthelczibestripped of his position as KwaZululaw and order minister. It also called forWIP 68 Page 39

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LABOUR TRENDSMarching miners: Unlike in previous years, Num and the Chamber of Mineshave already settledonwage increases for members working on gold minesthe establishment of a judicial inquiryinto the role of the policeand for the stateof emergency in the province to he liftedas it provides a cover for the activities ofthe `warlords' andthe security forces. Anational peace conference is to be con-vened on 4 and S August to evaluate thegovernment'sresponse to the demands.The campaign against the LRA hasentered a new phase since the meetingbetween Cosatu,Saccola and presidentFw' do Klerk on 2bJunc. A joint workingparty has been established to examineways of resolvingthe crisis engenderedby government's refusal to enact theCosatu-Nactu-Saccola accord during theparliamentarysession that ended on 22June. The group's first meeting on 11July was attended by representatives fromPage 40 9WIP 68the Manpower I:cpartrncnt, Ccnatu andSaccola. Nactu did not attend. The fcd-eration'sgcncral secretary,C'unninghamNgcukana, told WlP Nactu has not de-cided whether it will particiI I a ipate.Cosatu has used theestablishment ofthe working group as an opportunity tointroduce some new demands. Theseinclude: extending basicworker rights tocover all public sector workers; that nofuture legislation be promulgated with-out support from itself,Nactu and Sac-cola; and the drafting of a second interimbill to extend the LRA to all workers andfor thecrcationofa`proper' labourappcalcourt system. In the interim it wantsSaccola to agree to measures which wouldgive effect to theaccord, Cosatu has alsoindicated that its continued participationin the working group is dependent onthree factors:that the group shouldcomplete its work within :i0 days, thatthe discussions are not secret in any way,and that anysettlement should be consid-ered by all labour constituencies. It haswarned that major industrial conflictwillfollow if itsdemands arc not met.Says Cosatu's Geoff Schreiner: `Themanpower department interpreted thegroup's brief as ameans to facilitatefurther consultation on the bill. We sayall the consultation that was necessaryhas already takenplace.'The working group's second meetingwas scheduled for 26 July. It was agreedthat the National ManpowerCommis-sion and the Commission for Admini-stration would be invited to attend.

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STRIKES AND DISPUTES 1 June to 20 July 1990TransvaalCompany Union No. Date EventABI Fawu 800 10 JulyCoca Cola workers at Amalgamated leverage Industries inBenrose went on strike after three workers were disciplinedforBenrose refusing to make deliveries at OK Bazaars and Checkers in solidaritywith strikers there and at SouthernSun/Holiday Inn. Allthree companies are SAB subsidiaries.Amdo Dek Nunsa 140 21 June Workers at Amdo Dek wenton strike demandingrecognition of Nunsa. They returned to work after management agreed tonegotiateJohannesburg22 June with the union.Arta Fina Ltd Cawu 53 9 July Ten Cawu members were hospitalised after a policebatoncharge at the start of this strike. The workers downed tools becauseSprings 10 July management reneged on signinga recognition agreement it hadnegotiated with the union. The parties met next morning and theagreement wassigned.Bosal Afrika Numsa 450 14 June Workers went on strike in protest against thepresence of a labour consultantat wage negotiations. Management acceded tothePretoria 18 June demand.Cobra Watertech Numsa 4 000 4 JulyWorkers at Cobra Watertech went on strikedemanding a wage increase of R2 an hour across the board after rejectingaKrugersdorp 9 July management offer of 64c an hour. They returned to workafter the resumption of talks betweenthe company and Numsa.G & W Base CWIU 250 8 June Workers at the company's Brakpan and Wadevilleplantswent on a legal strike after rejecting a management offer of a 70canWadeville hour across-the-board increase inresponse to their demand for81c. The company instituted a lock out on 13 June.BrakpanJ G Strydom HospitalNehawu 300 19 July General workers went on strikeprotesting against various alleged racist practices at the hospital.Theyreturned to workJohannesburg 20 July after talks between NO- and the TPA.John Moffat & Trollock CWIU 50 4June Workers staged a work stoppage demandinga wage increase and recognition of CWIU. They returned to workafter thecompanyRobertsham 4 June agreed in principle to the demands.Kwikot Numsa 300 5 July Workers struckwhen management retrenched some of theirworkmates without consulting Numsa. They resumed work afterBenoni11 July management agreed to union proposals for job alternation.Lascon Lighting Numsa 43 26 June Workersstaged a work stoppage in support ofNumsa's demand for an across-the-board increase of R2 an hour at themetalLangelaagte ~ ~ industrial council wage negotiations.27 JunePutco TGWU 750 13 June This dispute aroseduring wage negotiations for theTransvaal between Putco, Cosatu's TGWU and Nactu's Tawu whenmanagementBoll,16 June and Tawu objected to the presence of TGWU shop stewards from theHomelands depotoutside Pretoria because the Cosatu unionRoodepoort was not the majority union at the depot. The 2akheni Transport&Allied Workers' Union, a Tawu breakaway which merged withPretoria TGWU in December last year, was themajority union at the depotbetween 1986 and 1989. According to TGWU, the onlywhyMamelodi rea':enrieit lost itsmajority was because management deliberately transferred Twumembers to the depot to 'ttrhe:' its hold. In asKwaNdebele of protest actions, TGWU members from Boksburg drove their busesto the wrong depot and workersaLea Glenn(Roodepoort), Dennitton (KwaNdebele), Mamelodi and Homelands depots downedtools. The dispute wassettled when managementagreed to transfer all Tawu members at Homelands to Shoshanguve which meantthatTGWU was once again the majority union atthe depot.

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Reckitt & Coleman CWIU 400 28 May Workers at the Elandsfontein plant of thisBritish multinational went on a legalstrike in an effort to force thecompany toElandsfontein participate in the Chemical Industries National ProvidentFund.During the strike CWIU accused the company of fanning racialconflict by hiring white, coloured and Indian scabs. Inmid-June over 160strikers were arrested and later dimissed afterignoring a court order to leave the premises. Thecompany threatened theothers with dismissal if they did not call off thestrike by 29 June.S A Casters Numsa 140 20June Workers struck for one day demanding recognitionof Numsa. Work resumed after management agreed tonegotiate.Johanneburg 21 JuneSA Phillips Numsa 150 11 June Management locked workers out because theyworkeda shortened week of 40 hours in support of Numsa's demand for a 40 hourMar tindale 21 June week withoutloss of pay in the metal industrial councilnegotiations.Short-lifts Numsa 34 18 June Workers worked short hours fortwo days in ademonstration in support of Numsa's demand for a 40-hour working week intheJohannesburg 20 Junemetal industrial council negotiations.Steiner Services TGWU 360 18 June Workers at Steiner plants in AbodeandPretoria went on strike demanding that management recognise TGWU andarrange stopAbode 19 June orderfacilities. The company indicated it would accede to thedemands provided the union proves it has majorityPretoriarepresentation.Trident Steel Numsa 700 28 June Workers struck after management issued awarning to a worker.They returned to work on 4 July after arrangementswere madeTransvaal 4 July for talks between the company andNu.;a.Valco latex CWIU 230 13 June Workers staged a work stoppage when a shop stewardwas suspended.Management agreed to a reinstatement.Industria 13 JuneVerwoedburg municipality Samwu 840 20 June Some 750Samwu and 90 Nupsawmember:tiw:nr:. dismissed after staging a sit in when the council rejectedtheir demand for aR30Verwoedburg 20 July attendance allowance in wage negotiAfter talks withSamwu, the council announced that 500of its members would bere-employed.W J M Construction Numsa 400 14 June Workers downed tools in protestagainstcompany plans to retrench and segregated facilities. They were alldismissed.West randBellvillemunicipalityBellvilleCape Town City CouncilCape TownSam-Samwu1 2005 0005 July8 July13 June26 JuneWorkerswent on a two-day strike when the council responded to their demandfor a monthly minimum wage of 8800 by offeringaminimum of 8455. In talks after the strikers resumed work the councilraised its offer by R10.Workers downed tootsafter they rejected the City Council's offer of aminimum monthly wage of 8813 and a 13,5 increase forhigher paid,unskilled workers and semi-skilled workers earning up to R23000 a year. Workers also demanded a 40-hour weekwithn:mw loss of pay, a housing allowance, !6 June as a paid holiday and:.ns:nd to casual employment. The dispute wassettledwhen Su accepted an offer for a monthly minimum of 8845 and a 14Y incrforhigher paid unskilled workersandsemi-skilled employees. The council also made an undertaking to negotiate areduction in working hours and tostart a processof employing temporary workers on a full-time basis. Regarding 16 June, theCouncil agreed to grant anextra day's leave.

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Coin Security TGWU 40 1 June Security guards at Coin Security were dismissedafter they joined a march organisedby the Transport & General WorkersUnionCape Town to demand higher wages and improved working conditions.Thedemands included a reduction in working hours from 60 hours aweek to 40, a minimum monthly wage of R1 000,an end to part-time work andthe repeal of the Security Officers' Act.Delta Numsa 3 000 4 July Workers at Delta wenton strike demang that thecompany participate in the national bargaining forum in the Auto AssemblytdoinPortElizabeth 9 July work after four days in anticipation of negotiationswith management. Numsa insistsIndustry.However, workers returnedDelta must conduct negotiations at national level.Grapnel Silencers Numsa 400 20 JuneWorkers went on strike after managementoffered a 14% pay increase in response to their demand for R2 anhouracross theAtlantis 6 July board, the equivalent of increases between 22X and 48% forvarious categories. Strikersreturned to work after they won a16.5% for those earning more than R1 000 a month and 14.5% for thoseearning lesswith more than one year's experience. AtLeast 21 strikers were injured in clashes with police on the weekend of 7and8 July, after failing to heed a court interdictordering them to vacate the premises.Kohler xactics CW1U 180 22 JuneWorkers went on strike after managementretrenched 35 of their workmates without consulting CWIU. All thestrikerswereCape Town dismissed on 35 June.Livi ngstone Hospital Nehawu 2 July General workers and nurses atLivingstoneHospital went on strike when 39 nurses who had been hired on a temporarybasis inDora Nginza Hospital10 July 1988 were told their contracts would not berenewed. The strikers demanded action to deal with critical staffshortagesatD':r.P E Provincial Hospital black hospitals. Another demand was for blackpatients to be admitted toempty beds at white hospitals. Workers at theKwazakhele Hospital strikersNginza Hospital, the PE Provincial Hospitaland Kwazakhele Hospital downedtools in solidarity. Thereturned to work after management reinstated 16 of the 39nurses andpromised the rest would be accommodated in the same wayin a phased operation.P E municipality Samwu3 000 3 July Municipal workers went on strike afterrejecting the council's offer of a 12% wage increase. Workers haddemandeda 8300Port Elizabeth 18 July across-the-board and a minimum monthly wage of 8750.The disputedeveloped into a stalemate with rikrefusing to give int:two r:r~funtil the municipality made an offer on the minimumwage and the councilinsisting on a returnore that couldhappen. On 18 July the parties announced that they hadbroken the impasse.Workers would resume their duties and negotiationson the wage dispute would begin as soon aspossible.Peninsula Beverage Fawu 80 29 May Workers at Peninsula Beverage staged aweek-long strike demandinga wage increase of 96% . The workers hadreceived a 19,2%Cape Town 5 June increase in January and the companysaid it would onlynegotiate a further increase in January next year. Negotiations on thewage dispute resumed after areturn to work. The two parties agreed thatworkers would be paid for the public holiday on 31May.SKF Numsa 300 5June Workers at SKF's Uitenhage plant downed tools aftermanagement dismissed a black worker who becameinvolved in a fight withUitenhage 8 June an alleged AWB member. The ri.ghtwinger was only given averbal warning.The strikers staged a sit-in demanding that the manalso be dismissed. Management responded with a lock-out. Anarbitratorsubsequently ruled that the dismissed worker bereinstated.United SA Brush CWIU 500 10 Workers at SABrush Manufacturing went on strikedemanding to be backdated from 1 July and one day additional bonus.eellvilleringLivih

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Harmony Gold mineVirginiaOwaQwa governmentwitsieshoekNum 3 000 6 July20 JulyNehawu 15 000 10 May11JuneNum was not recognised at Rand Mines' Harmony Gold mine when wagesnegotiations between Nun and theChamber of Mines begansome months ago. Early this month, however, it signed up the majority ofthe labourforce. On6 July the workers downed toolsdemanding recognition of Num, a demand to which management acceded.Theparties due to meet on 27 July to negotiate on anoffer of a 13% wage increase. On 18 July, after the 14,5% to 17Xsettlementfor gold mines at the chamber, negotiate members struckagain, demanding the immediate implementationof the same wage rates. Thestrike ended after management agreed to startnegotiations on 23 July.Virtually all publicsector workers in awaowa downed tools demanding tradeunion and collective bargaining rights, a minimunmonthlywage of 8600, and an end to segregated jobs. They resumed workafter homeland authorities and a Cosaturepresentativeagreed to the formation of a joint working cortmittee 'to settle allgrievances'. ~waQwa authorities alsoconceded that theworkers had the right to join unions and undertook to make representationsto central government tomake extra fundsavailable for wages.TranskeiMagwa Tea Corporation '-Port St Johnscorkers went on strikedemanding a wage of 82.70 a day. A Fawu spokesmansaid some earn as little as 8200 a month.Saccawu 9 000 6July19 JulySactwu 10 000 11 JuneSaccawu 7 000 4 June25 JulyCheckersSouth AfricaConsolidated CottonCorpDurban, Lady.. ith, EastLondonMore than 9 500 Saccawu members at 170 Checkers' stores nationallyembarkedon a legal strike after rejecting the company'soffer of a 8135 across-the-board increase from 1 July withanother R5 inJanuary next year and a monthly minimum wage of8800. The strikers demanded an across-the-boardincrease of 8165, a minimummonthly wage of 8830, staff discounts, March 21as a paid holiday and a 13th cheque.After mediation the strikers accepteda 8140 across-the-board wage hike and a monthlyminimum of 8770 and a 12%discount on purchases to a value of 8375. Pay forone week during the strike was, however, still amatter ofdispute.Workers went on strike after management rejected their demand for a R40 aweek increase from 1 July and afurther R40 inJanuary 1991. The management rejected their demand, offering R13 for theentire 12 months. On 13July 63 Sactwu members werearrested outside the company's Pinetown complex. They were charged withattendingan illegal gathering and released on bail.Saccawu members embarked o, a legal strike demanding a 8160 amonthacross-the-board increase, a minimum monthly wage of 8800and other service improvements after OK, citingpoor performance, offered amini murn of 8710 a month after one year's service.Both management and the strikershad prepared for a long and bitterstruggle. At its peak, the strike, which received strongcommunity support, involved 7000 workers at 131 stores. The strike wascharacterised by high levels of violence. At least213 strikers were arrestedfor picketing, infringing municipal by-laws,trespassing, attending illegal gatherings, assaultand intimidation.Management on three occasions tried to get courtinterdicts against picketers. All three matters weresettled out ofcourt. Saccawu also went to court; it made an unsuccessfulapplication to the industrial court for a rulingdeclaring thatOK's decision not to allow strikers access to canteens orco-nication with union officials constituted anUIP. During thestrike management also threatened to close down stores.Settlement uas reached in mediation whensaccawuaccepted OK's offer of across-the-board increases of between 8125 and 8145,with a further R10 from 1991.OK also withdrewits threat to retrench 587 workers, although it reserved the right to raisethe matter again in thefuture.

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CONTENTS BRIEFSMobilising the Right capitalistsCloser to an Angolan ceasefireFrelimo meets MNR2 AN SACOMMUNIST SPEAKS 4Two hats and the party's future KASRILS ON UMKHONTO 7Ronnie on revolution PALLOON THE PARTY'Petty intellectual thuggery' PAN-AFRICANIST CONGRESS 17Walking its own tightropeNactu:Africanist-BC tensionEconomic policyPeace pact in PE SMALL TOWN REBELLIONS 27The Eastern Cape eruptsTPA PULLS THE PLUG 29Starving the councils to death THE NEW PRAGMATISM 31Assessing Swilling CAPITAL'SCONSTITUTIONS 34Big business eyes neo-apartheid LABOUR TRENDS 38Mid-year militanceStrikes &disputesPicture CreditsAfrapix: Pages 4, 9,17,18,19, 20,22, 24, 26, 27, 35 & 40Dynamic Images: Page 7,11The Star:Pages 6, 36, 38 & 39Crisis in conscience for the SACPPallo Jordan responds to Slovo's Has socialism failed?,arguing that theSACP needs to demonstrate that it has shed its Stalinist past. Anedited version taken fromTransformation magazine.Page 11Umkhonto: Past, present and futureFormer Umkhonto we Sizwe intelligence chiefRonnie Kasrils discussesthe force's past and present, as a primarily defensive force, a ruralguerrilla army of the bush,and the core of a mainly-urban people's army- and looks to its future as an element of a national army.Page7Unravelling `Upalma'After almost three decades, the PAC has movedout of the political twilight. In four reports,WIPexamines whether it can stay in the limelight, itseconomic policy, its influence in Nactu and aPAC-ANC peacepact.Page 17

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LABOURMobilisingthe RightcRalistsapiRIGHTWINGERS haveestablished a new employerorganisation, FcderasievanWcrkgewcrsorganisasics enWcrkgcwcrs van Suid-Afrika (Federation ofEmployers' Organisationsand Employers ofSouthAfrica) whose primary aimis to support employersagainst `radical tradeunions'.The organisation recentlymadereprcsnntations to thegovernment not to enact theaccord on the LabourRelations Act reached by theCongress of'South AfricanTrade Unions (Cosatu), theNational Council of TradeUnions (Nactu) and the SAEmployers'ConsultativeCommittee on LabourAffairs (Saccola).The formation of thefederation is a dirc;;~challenge to theAfrikaanscHandelsinstituut (AHI), theAfrikaans businesscommunity's equivalent ofthe SA Chamber ofBusiness, andSacolla, towhich the AHI is affiliated.The federation is thebrainchild of theArbcidsbgting (ABS), anorganisation said tohavebeen founded some five orsix years ago to promote theinterests of employers. Itsexecutive chairman isLeonSmith, deputy chairman ofthe Regional DevelopmentAdvisory Committee for thePWV. He is a former mayorofRoodepoort and was theConservative Party (CP)candidate for the town inlast September's generalelection. Itsdirector, Heinvan der Walt, is the founderof the Arbcidstigting. He isan advocate and formerlegal adviser to theAHI.Notice of the federation'sPage 2 WIP 68formation was given at anABS conference at Eskom'sMegawatt Parkheadquarterson 22 June. The conferencewas closed to the press.Minister for Administrationand Privatisation WimdeVilliers was to havedelivered the openingaddress, but was forced tocancel because of theclosing of parliament.Vander Walt has claimedthat the federation'smembership consists of`some employerorganisations and S(H)individualemployers' with acombined workforce of twomillion - a figure observersthink is a gross over-exaggeration. Hehasrefused to name any of theorganisations or individualswho arc members of thefederation as they maybecometargets for industrialaction by unions. The onlyaffiliate that has beenidentified is theWitwatersrand MasterBuilders'Association(MBA) whose director, ZLPrctorius, is a known CPsupporter. The MBA is pertof the BuildingIndustryFederation of SA (Bifsa)which is also a member ofSaccola.According to an ABSnewsletter, the federationhasidentified several pointsin the Labour Relations Actthat require attention. Forone, unions' 'misuse' ofstrikes had to bestopped;stakes should only bepermitted if they involvedisputes of a serious nature.Unions should also be morestrictlycontrolled. Theyshould, for example, fallunder the discipline of aprofessional body in thesame way as lawyersandestate agents, and should inaddition contribute to a trustfund which employers coulddraw on in the event ofillegalunion activity.Workers who lose their jobsas a result of unlawfulactions by unions shouldalso be able to draw on it.Thefederation also intendsestablishing a databank of`surrogate workers' - scabsto assist employers duringstrikes and astrike fund forany damages incurred inillegal strikes. Membershipof the federation alsoentitles members to makeuseof the ABS's 24-houremergency advice hotline,get guidance from a labourconsultant at a speciallyreduced rate, andreceive itspublications.Although it is too early totell what impact theformation of the federationwill have on the AHI,thepossibility that it couldcause divisions cannot beruled out. According toinsiders, there have beentensionsbetweenConservatives and NationalParty supporters in the AHIever since the CP wasestablished in 1981. `If asplitdevelops, it wouldprobably occur between theCP and National Partysupporters', an employersource told WIP,`althoughthe organisation has thus farsucceeded in maintainingunity by emphasising itsmembers' commoninterests'. -Robyn RafelANGOLAMovingcloser toa ceasefireANGOLA is expressingofficial confidence that aceasefire to end 15years ofcivil will be agreed withUnits rebels at forthcomingpeace talks in Portugal.But private doubts arebeingexpressed by other Angolansources.The two sides arc still farapart on several issues,including the time-tableforgeneral elections and a shifttowards political pluralism,according to the sources.But they did not rule outanagreement in principleleading to a ceasefire, whichcould be reached at the nextAngola-Units meeting.`We don'tthink the fewdifferences that still existwill prevent the signing of aceasefire', Foreign MinisterPetro do Castro vanDuncmsaid in Harare late lastmonth.At the same time Unitsleader Jonas Savimbi hasbeen visiting long-timeallyMorocco for pre-talksdiscussions. He arrived therein mid-July and isunderstood to have heldtalks with Morocco'sKingHassan and Portugueseforeign affairs secretary JoseManuel Durao Barroso.Durao Barroso has hostedtworounds of exploratorycontacts between Uniea andthe Angolan government inPortugal since April.Units has doubledthe sizeof its delegation to these,and Units officials say theyare prepared to sign aceasfirc at their nextmeeting.VanDuncm was equallyoptimistic, saying thatdespite heavy fighting innorthern Angola `allindications are thattheconditions for a ceasefire arethere' .He said the army hadrepelled an attack by Unitsrebels m the north.`Units hastransferred mostof its troops to the north.The aim was obviously totake Luanda, or at the veryleast to make lifedifficultfor the people so they wouldwant to rise up against thegovernment', he said.This initiative has theendorsementof US militaryadvisers now operatinginside Angola with Units,Van Duncm added.Advisors are now basedboth at Unitsheadquarters atJambs in southern Angolaand with rebel forces in thenorth, he said, `not only togive tactical andoperationaladvice but also to operatesophisticated equipment'.

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This equipment includesStinger and other anti-aircraft missiles - some ofthem with a range of IOkm.This is the firsttime theAngolan government hasaccused the US military oftaking a direct operationalpart in the civil war,althoughthere were reportsof CIA operatives in Jambain 1987.Earlier, Van Dunem had castdoubts on Unita's abilitytosabotage electricity andwater supplies to Luanda -as it has done repeatedly inrecent months - withoutoutsidehelp.And he dismissed claimsthat Luanda is surrounded,saying: `The pressure is offthe capital'.But the Angolanmilitaryreports a flare-up in fightingelsewhere in the north.Against this background,Brazilian officersresponsible forverifying thewithdrawal of Cuban troopssay a total of 35 457 havenow left the country.The next and final phase ofthepull-out begins inOctober and is scheduled toend with the last Cubantroops leaving Angolan soilnext June.At thesame time, however,the US Congress' HouseIntelligence OversightCommittee has endorsed asubstantial increase inUSfunding for Unita -increasing the total annualallocation to the rebels byR70-million, according tosome sources.Thiswill push US aid toUnita to almost R200-million.The aid forms part of theCIA budget which, onceapproved by thecommittee,will be voted on byCongress sight unseen.The committee wasestablished in 1975 inresponse to massivecovertCIA aid to Unita, but criticsclaim it no longer serves asa watchdog on covert CIAaid. Instead of functioningas anoversight committee,they say, it does little morethan cheer on CIA activities.This year, while opponentsof the Bushadministration'spolicy towards Angola aremounting a sustainedchallenge to the funding,they say prospectsforstopping the aid are slim.Too many Senate andcongressionalrepresentatives regard it as`an anti-communist,anti-Cuban issue', they say. -SourhSean FeaturesMOZAMBIQUEj Frelimoi meetsiMNRTHE first direct talksbetweenrepresentatives ofthe Mozambicangovernment and the MNRrebels took place in Romebetween 8 to 10 July.TheCatholic Church, as inthe past, appeared to play amajor mediating role,according to Mozambique'sAIM newsagency.A joint communique saidthat the two delegationsi `recognising each other ascompatriots and members ofthegreat Mozambicanfamily expressedsatisfaction and pleasure atthis direct, open and frankmeeting, the firstbetweenthe two sides'.The meeting surprised manyobservers in Maputo. Italy,the country's main Westerntradingpartner, had not beennamed either side as apossible venue.The Mozambican side to thetalks was led byTransportMinister Armando Gucbusa,also a member of the 12-man politburo of theFrelimo party. Also ontheMozambican delegationwere InformaUon MinisterTeodato Hunguana, LabourMinister Agular Manila andthediplomatic advisor inBRIEFSPresident JoachimChissano's office, FranciscoMadeira.Leading the Renamodelegationwas RaulDomingos, head of therebel's foreign affairsdepartment.He was accompanied by thehead of theRenamoinformation departmentVicente Ululu and by amember of the Rcnamopresidential office, JoaoAlmirantc.Themeeting took place inthe headquarters of theCatholic Church-linkedcharitable body the SantoEgidio Communitywithwhich Frclimo had a longassociation.Present as observers at themeeting were two membersof the SantoEgidioCommunity, Andres Ricardoand Mattco Zuppi, as well asthe Catholic archbishop ofthe central Mozambicancityof Beira, Jaime Goncalvcs,and a representative of theItalian goverment, MarioRaffaclli.The Church has ledmovestowards talks with therebels, meeting them anumber of times in Nairobi.Raffaelli, a former secretaryof state inthe Italianministry with reponsibilityfor Africa, has been deeplyinvolved in Italiancooperation withMozambique.He waslast in Maputo inMay when he took part in aninternational conferencetitled Rethinking strategicsfor SouthernAfrica.The three-day meeting inRome took place withoutany publicity, and theMozambican side was notaccompaniedby anyjournalists.This contrasts with theabortive talks last month inMalawi that were announcedin advance and wherealarge number of journalistsaccompanied theMozambican delgation.There is now doubt inMaputo as to the accuracyofreports, initially by AIM,and stemming from officialsources, that rebel leaderAlfonso Dhlakama waspresent at thetime and thathe was accompanied by asenior Kenyan advisor.After the talks scheduled for12 June in Malawihadfailed to take place, theMozambican, Malawian andZimbabwean delegationspresent issued a statementwhich saidthat efforts werecontinuing `to set a new datein the near future for theprocess to begin in Malawi'.Presidents Danielarap Moiof Kenya and RobertMugabe of Zimbabwe hadbeen acting as mediators inthe conflict, but there arenoreports that either sent adelegation to the Romemeeting.Meanwhile, the emergencysituation in Mozambiqueisworsening, according toAIM.Mozambique's needs arcnow considerably greaterthan those estimated intheemergency appeal documentplaced before a UNsponsored donors'conference in New York inApril.The nationaldirector ofMozambique's relief bodythe Disasters Control Office(DPCCN), SalomaoMambo, says the numberofdisplaced people who couldnow be reached by reliefefforts has increasedsubstantiallly due to recentMozambicanmilitarysuccesses against the MNRrebels in the centre of thecountry. - SouthsranFeaturesWIP 68 Page 3

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SACPIn this exclusive interview with WIP, Cosatu'sChris Dlamini discusses his membership of theSouth AfricanCommunist Party, the implications ofwearing two hats, and the SACP's relationship withCosatu and the ANC. DavidNiddrie reportsPage 4 9 WIP 68A SouthAfricancommunistspeaksAs a member of the South AfricanCommunist Party'sinternal leader-ship group (ILG), Chris Dlamini isthe first internally-based South Africancommunist in 40 years to havepubliclyidentified himself as such.Vice-president of the Congress of SouthAfrican Trade Unions (Cosatu) andpresi-dent of its Food and Allied Workers' Union(Fawu) affiliate, Dlamini is one of about adozen `locals' on the ILG.This group is re-sponsible for the party's day-to-day runningin the year between its formal legal launchon 29 July andits next congress, scheduledfor July next year.Dlamini has worked as what was thenformally designated a `store-boy'and invarious other jobs since leaving school at18,aftcrcomplcting Standard Eightin 1962.Since 1977 he has beenemployed at Kel-logg's Springs plant where, as shop stew-ards' committee chairman, he was instru-mental in winningthe first formal recogni-tion agreement in the Transvaal for Fosatu'sSweet, Food and Allied Workers' Union.Presidentof Fosatu from 1982 until theformation of Cosatu three years later, Dlam-ini has held the post of first Cosatuvice-president since then. With the merger ofCosatu's food sector affiliates into Fawu in1986, Dlamini was electedpresident of theunion.Shortly before the launch of the legalSACP - at which he and other members ofthe party'sinternal leadership were publiclyidentified for the first time - he gave thisinterview to V'lP.Why and under whatcircumstances didyou join the SACP?I have been a worker most of my life. And asa worker, I realised that apartheidis morethan racial oppression: it is used as a coverfor capitalist exploitation - the majority of

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SACPSouth Africans do not enjoy the wealth they themselves havecreated.They are economically exploited, sociallydegraded and po-litically oppressed.And in the struggle for equality and justice, the SACP hasbeen one of the leadingorganisations, and the leading organi-sation struggling to end exploitation.That's why I joined. As to how, I joined: Iwas recruited bymembers of the party, but I can't give you details yet.What are your duties as a member of theILG?We will run the party internally until the party congress in July1991, when full democratic elections for thenational leader-ship will take place. In the meanwhile, branches and districtswill be established with fullydemocratically elected leader-ships, ideally before *the congress. That depends on how soonwe can develop anefficient administration.You are now a senior member of the SACP, vice-presidentof Cosatu and president of one ofits affiliates. Is that not aconflict of interest?The issue is not always clear in people's minds: It is not aquestion ofwearing two - or even three - hats, and trying todecide on where my loyalties lie.Firstly I am not an elected officebearer in the SACP, but inthe union and the federation I am. I preform my duties in thoseorganisations as arepresentative of the organisations, not of theSACP.Within the unions I am bound by the democracy andprocesses ofthe unions.My party work involves conscientising people, as an advo-cate of equality - arguing for a humane approachto life, makingpeople realise they do have rights, the right to earn a living, theright to a house, to education, forexample.It is not a conspiratorial thing.There is a comparison to be found in the civics. Many of ourmembers - Cosatumembers - are members of the civic associa-tions in the communities in which they live, discussing issueslike rentand electricity. Many hold senior positions andrepresent their communities in meetings with the authorities.Thisdoesn't affect the democratic functioning of the civics- it doesn't mean Cosatu controls them. But it usually meansthey(Cosatu members) advocate perspectives they have foundin the trade unions - recognition that people have rights,andthat united they can achieve them.Cosatu has recently been formally allied to the ANC andSACP in what is beingcalled `a fighting alliance'. Whatimpact will this have on Cosatu, and more generally, whatimpact is a legal communistparty going to have in SouthAfrica?Each of the three formations will retain their independence inthe tripartite alliance,that's important. They will also havetheir own constituencies and be answerable to them.And at the level of thealliance, we will take decisions byconsensus - all decisions will be in the interests of all three. 'IISo we do not foreseedomination.But I do expect that the existence of the alliance will sharpenthe political position of Cosatu; it will solidifyand clarifyCosatu's objectives.At a certain level, all three members of the alliance want thesame thing. They have thesame immediate objective in seek-ing to end apartheid and replace it with a democratic, non-racialsystem andgovernment.But the party goes further, recognising that under such asystem the needs of the working class will notnecessarily befully met.Politically it has set an agenda intended to meet the needs ofthe majority who have beeneconomically exploited and politi-cally oppressed for a long time.We have always said that the immediate task of theparty andall democrats is to build the ANC. We still say that. But it doesnot mean we suspend building the party.In theimmediate future, the party will draw together social-ists to enable them to make a combinai contribution to debates,toputting up ideas both on what is to be done to achieve our,the alliance's, common objectives and to fully explorethecommon objectives.Very specifically we have a contribution to make to debateson how the economy should to berestructured.In the short term, we are obviously hoping that the powerfulanti-communism from the authorities andfrom other quarterswill fade now that the SACP is legal.The Gorbachev-Bush talks have produced a formal end tothecold war international ly. We believe that should help getcommunists accepted here by the authorities, and that theywillstop regarding communists as animals as they did after theparty's banning.And the impact of a trade union alliancewith politicalparties? Can you see the unions, fur instance, strikingagainst an alliance partner that has become therulingparty?We expect to see the right to strike constitutionally enshrined,if not in the constitution itself then in anaddendum, a workers'charter binding on the government.Both the SACP and the ANC arc committed to tradeunionindependence and to the unrestrained right of workers to strike.So we could see a situation in which workers instate-controlledindustries go on strike after apartheid. But they would not bestriking politically against ademocratically-elected govern-ment. They'd be striking against an employer.The SACP sees its immediate task asbuilding the ANC, andshares with the ANC common short-term objectives -ending apartheid and establishing; anon-racial, demo-cratic society. WhatwilldistinguishSACPmembers,SACPstructures, from their ANCcounterparts?Firstly, as I've said, to ensure a socialist voice in the alliance.But for the ANC the objective is to endapartheid, to correct thewrongs of apartheid and to destroy apartheid legislation andapparatuses.In doing so, and as anational movement and government, itwill have to accommodate all shades of opinion - even those ofbigbusiness.The party will speak purely for the working class.It wig l encourage the ANC - as an ally - to take account oftheimmediate demands and needs of the working class. It will doso now and once the ANC has become thegovernment of thecountry.But the alliance may not exist for ever. As a government theANC will have to accommodatethe interests, perspectives anddemands ofcu,,ploycrs.And these arc different from the interests of the workers,whoseinterests the SACP is committed to defending andpromoting.WIP 68 Page 5

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SACPWhat level of support do you see in the unions and else-where for the SACP? What do you expect itsmembershipto be?The socio-economic order the workers arc demanding is so-cialism, so we can already see highlevels of support.This has not come about because of agitation, but because ofthe conditions under which they liveand work - their experi-ences of apartheid.We have also seen massive support among the youth for theSACP. Thiswas clear from 1984-85 when, at the funerals ofcomrades killed by the regime, you saw the party flag raisedalongsidethat of the ANC over the grave. They were preparedto ignore the risks to demonstrate their support for the party.As faras actual card-carrying membership goes, if the partysimply invited applications for membership, we could expectareally massive party, 20 000-30 000 at least.But we arc talking of a party of activists, what (generalsecretary Joe)Slovo has called a party of quality and calibre,so we will not necessarily accept just anyone.In the past we havemanaged this by recruitment andprobation. This is going to change as the party becomes moreopen. But we will haveto watch that it does not become a partyof paper membership. We will have to introduce ways ofensuring thatmembers continually prove their eligibility.Page 6 WIP 68I am sure, though, that the party will retain its blackmajority,its working class majority.Administratively, though, there may be problems with therapid growth of the party. I'm notsure we yet have theresources to immediately build a big party, a mass party.But our ability to do so depends onpeople actually joining- on our transforming the strong emotional on-the-groundsupport into organisedmembership.And to achieve that it is important not to intimidate peoplewith the idea of `quality and calibre'. What wemean is a strong,active commitment and participation by members - active par-; ticipation in party life, in building theANC, in building Cosatuand in building other democratic formations: in other wordsactive participation in the strugglefor democracy.What is your attitude to other socialist formations?We would obviously like to see all socialists in theparty. Butwe arc open for discussions with all groups saying they aresocialist.And it is through these discussions anddebates that webelieve people will realise which group is advocating - andcapable of achieving - the kind of socialismthey are lookingfor. So we will encourage all those who support socialism todebate their positions openly.

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ARMED STRUGGLEKasrils on UmkhontoGiven the legalisation of the African National Congress,the South AfricanCommunist Party and Umkhuntc~ wE'Sizwe itself on February ?, is there any need for theliberation alliance to retainits military capacity, to keepMK alive?Without adoubt. We arc hopeful about the poasibilitics openedup for a peacefulway. We have always been attracted by thepeaceful option. It minimises the loss of life, the bloodshed.But we aredealing with reality, with an ongoing struggle.Simply because we arc talking of the possibilities of a negoti-ated pathdoesn't mean we arc going to dissolve Umhhonto.Even after apartheid, Umkhonto will be necessary - simplyfrom thepoint of view of establishing a defence force for SouthAfrica if and when a negotiated settlement cakes place.But priorto that we need to keep our options open. There isno guarantee at this stage that negotiations will succeed, thattherewill not be a retreat to repression. MK is one of ourguarantors.Take, for example, the state's National CoordinatingMcc:ha-nism (which has replaced the National Security ManagementSystem, or NSMS): It's an extremely sinisterdevelopment.I'm not satisfied with (president FW) Dc Klcrk's explanationsthat it is a peaceful mechanism to help tosolve the people'sRonnie Ka.srils,,former head o fmilitary intelligence for theAftiean National Congress,discusses thearmed struggle inSouth Africa - past, present andpo,ssihlc', f uturc~. A member ofllmkhanto we Si.-Zvve sinceitsf-mation *n, 1961 - initiallyo 1 1deployed with its Natalcommand - Ka.sril.s .served ashead ~~f MKmilitaryintelligence until his co-option<07 to the ANC nationalexecutive committee in 1987problems on the ground. Itlooks like a disguised form of PWBotha's NS MS. Whatever it is, it shows Dc Klcrk is keeping his'options open. So wehave both a right anti a duty to do the same.For us, it is one thing to talk of a suspension of armedhostilities - the kindof ceasefire spelt out in the Harare Decla-ration to facilitate or encourage the negotiation process. Butthat doesn'tmean we give up our army anti disband our army.In international law, a ceasefire clots not prevent the beliger-entsfrom building their forces, replenishing their arsenals andrecruiting and training.Ending our armed struggle can onlyhappen once a solutionis reached, when we have the basis fur a democratic, non-racialSouth Africa.At that point therewill be a termination of hostilities - apermanent thing. That's when we say the chapter of armedstruggle for ademocratic South Africa is closed.But even then we don't dissolve Llmkhonto, because wethen begin looking at thecreation of a new delcnce force.At what point does the actual termination crf' hostilities takeplace?When a state busedon racial domination no longer exists. If theprocess was in a colonial country, it would be when theWIP 68 Page 7

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ARMED STRUGGLEdocuments of independence are signed. In our case, possiblywhen an interim governmentmoves in and the old governmentresigns, when a new force is emerging which can guarantee thesovereignty and anew constitution.The SADF couldn't do that?Certainly not. It is a racial force, a creature of race domination.We can'tconceive of the SADF becoming an apparently non-political force, just because they are beginning to lecturetheirofficers on the need to be non-political.On MK itself: Many within the ANC characterise the forceas an essentiallydefensive force, established to protect thepeople against state violence. Is that right?Looking at MK historically, itsfounding manifesto indi-cates clearly that it was perceived as a defence mechanism - theexact words are: `Therecomes a time in the life of any nationwhen there remain only two choices: submit or fight... we shallnot submit andhave no choice but to hit back by all means...in defence of our people', and later `Umkhonto will be in thefront line ofthe people's defence'.There was also a more assertive element: the manifestorefers to the impossibility of attaining`the well-being of thepeople ... without the overthrow of the Nationalist govern-ment'.But the decision to launchUmkhonto was taken primarilybecause the people needed to be defended against increasing iviolence by the state -the manifesto refers to the choice being ;forced on the liberation movement by the apartheid regimebecause it`answered every peaceable demand with force andyet more force'.All avenues of peaceful struggle had been blocked,so the ihistory-making decision was taken.It was a pragmatic one rather than a theoretical one.There are revolutionarymovements which, at their founda-tion, addressed the question of seizing state power. These im-mediatelyrecognised and analysed the use of state power andthe need to develop a force to seize state power. With us thatwasnot the ethos.So the blows of Umkhonto in the early period were directed iat reinforcing mass struggle and securingrights, rather than atseizing state power. Then, in a short time, there was the Rivoniasetback and our movement wasnearly extinguished inside thecountry. We had the armed struggle being planned and devel-oped abroad in exile.Inthat period we became very taken up with successfulmodels ... Cuba, Algeria, Vietnam, and later Angola,Mozam-bique and Guinea Bissau. We began to develop the idea ofguerrilla war, bush war. At the time it seemed theonly possi-bility, particularly as our political base inside the country hadbeen so weakened.We were looking at aguerrilla army of thebush, such as the one led by Samora Machel in conditions inwhich, as Samora put it, the politicalorganisation would comeout of the bush - the guerrillas would create it.You see in our documents of the time, at theMorogoroConference, Strategy and Tactics, and our propaganda, ourthinking was very much towards a protractedguerrilla war bywhich the masses would be inspired in struggle, organisationscreated, and the regime increasinglyparalysed, bled white, itsresources drained.Has that perspective changed?It was really only in the 1953-56 period, theuprisings in thePage 8 WIP 68townships, that we began to sec the prospect of a much shorterpath to power.The wavethat swept the country in the '80s was recognisedas insurrection knocking on the door ... excited debate tookplace inthe ANC, Umkhonto itself anti the Party. This wasreflected in the ANC and SACP journals and certainly in theSACPprogramme of 1959, which for the first tune elaborateda thesis on insurrection. So by 1969, at the Morogoroconfer-ence, we had moved away from the idea of force as a primarilydefensive mechanism and hod recognised it asa means ofoverthrowing the ruling power - although still, at the time, withprotracted guerrilla war as the method. The'S3-'S6 periodshowed us there was an alternative method. The 1976 uprisingscould have taught us that, but mypersonal view is that thetremendous pressure on us during and after 1976 to dcmon-strate to the people that we couldhit back militarily consumedall our energies.You talk about concentrating on bush war but, at least inthe 1970s and1980s, most actions tcx)k place in the urbanareas.Although in our minds we were locked into) the idea of ruralguerrillawarfare, the situation was one in which we wereinevitably drawn into the urban battlegrounds.We were neverexclusive - we never said armed actionsshould only tike place in the countryside. We saw the necessityto come to thedefence ol'our people in the urban theatre of waras well.And we saw that armed propaganda actions in theurbanareas had far greater impact than in the rural areas where manyactions did take place, but without the samelevels of publicity.Nevertheless our perspective was that if we could developbases in the rural areas, our guerrillaforces would be able togrow and become stronger than in the urban areas where therewas less chance of survival.~So the rural focus was a mistake''No, I wouldn't say a mistake under the conditions prevailing atthe time.Firstlybecause the need to develop in the countryside isvital, even in terms oFan insurrectionary scenario in which thejurban masses of the working class and the youth are obviouslycrucial.But that specific; period, following thehanningsand Rivonia,was one of political recession ... what one might call a deeppolitical trough.The metaphor of thewaves and troughs of struggle is veryapposite. Many revolutionary theorists refer to the ebb and'i flow, the waves andtroughs, the currents of political struggle... it's very close to what actually takes place in mass struggle.One of the keyfactors is the mood ()f the masses, affected bysocio-economic conditions anti so on.The masses arc alwaysstruggling, spontaneously or led inprotest against their conditions in an exploitative society,whatever thesocio-economic formation might be.Obviously on its own, there will he no culmination, nooverthrow. For that you needa vanguard organisation ormovement with its programme, strategy anti tactics, forces andmeans of struggle.Look atSouth African history from the '4Us, when massstruggle real ly began t() increase after a pcriocl of comparativecivicpeace, as momentum began to grow as a result of changedobjective conditions ... industrialisation, the war years,eco-

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nomic deprivation, the post-war anti-colonial upsurge.You'd sec a wave of struggle - the 1946 miners' strike,forexample - build up and reach a peak, and then recede.The next peak, in 1953 with the defiance campaign, isevenh igher and the subsequent trough both shallower and of shorterduration. And so on ... the 1960 resistanceculminating inSharpcville followed by a deep and, comparatively lengthytrough. Then the spontaneous strikesof 1973,followed quicklyby 1976, almost a tidal wave by comparison with the past.By 1983 the troughs were getting shallowerand far shorter.The waves, by contrast, dwarfed anything that came before.Following a similar rhythm - or attemptingto do so - is thesubjective element, the vanguard movement: where the organ-isational efforts of activists synchronisewith the energy of themasses, the wave becomes much more powerful, as with the'46 miners' strike.But at times - thedefiance campaign, the early period ofUmkhonto - you see the vanguard movement's progress aheadof the massmood.At others, the early period of the 1983-1986 mass wave forexample, you see spontaneous mass action leapingahead.But to return to the early MK period, the early to mid-196(h:it was one of the deeper troughs, a period ofrelative politicalvacuum. And to an extent our thinking re-flected chat.How did MK fit into this shift towardsaninsurrectionary perspective?With the development of popular politicalorganisation in the 1980s, our movementbeganto perceive the insurrectionary potential.I'm not saying this has been resolved todate ... my own view is thatUmkhonto is apeople's army and as such not simply a di-vorced military entity. We havcalwaysthoughtin terms of athesis of people's war; that whatis primarily needed is the involvement of themasses, the arming of the masses, thedevel-opmcntof self-defence units within the masses,underground combat units, guerrilla units, thevarious formationsof a people's army.In ourcountry, we arc looking ata situationin which there is a tradition of popular massorganisation.And although we went throughthe post-Rivonia period, by the 1980s one ofthe subjective elements, massorganisation,had really developed.And in order to develop our armed struggleanti concept of the people's army wehad toconsider how to involve workers, youth, themasses of our people, who had actually dem-onstrated theirpropensity to do battle with thesecurity forces in a spontaneous way.Those detachments, those fighting contin-gents,were there. It was an cxcitang develop-mcnt and it posed a challenge to those of usinstrumental in developingUmkhonto.There is a model, known to students ofarmed struggle, somewhat different to that ofthe guerrilla in thebush. This takes up thequestion of the revolutionary army, thepeople's army. It is based on three key ele-ments.theprofessional trained guerrillas, in our case The core areUmkhonto. Around this is the army of the masses, the mostadvancedactivists who man the barricades, who take on the securityforces mainly with homemade weapons andexplosives.These arc the most advanced elements, ready to take up armsand be organised into self-defence units,rural, factory andcommunity-based.One has seen the people's militia in El Salvador and Nica-ragua. 1n E1 Salvadorthis has been developed to a very highdegree. Of course the guerril la core leads, trains and guides theactivities ofthe people's militia and recruits from its ranks.These arc the two key elements on the side of the people. The third keyclement arc those elements of the enemysecurity forces which arc won over to the side of the revolutionat crucialtimes, who refuse to carry out the orders of theirofficers anti of the ruling power.We've seen very interestingdevelopments taking place inthe past five years - the mutiny of the troops in Bophuthat-swana, the big change in theTranskei, black policemen on theRand who arc refusing to serve, going on strike, the Rockmanepisode...We've alsoseen many whites neutralised, either because ofWIP 68 Page 9

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