when unfairness matters most: supervisory violations of electronic monitoring practices

When unfairness matters most: supervisory

violations of electronic monitoring practices

David Zweig and Kristyn Scott, Department of Management, Universityof Toronto at ScarboroughHuman Resource Management Journal, Vol 17, no 3, 2007, pages 227–247

This study examined the effects of different sources of monitoring information,quality of treatment and quality of decision-making manipulations on perceptionsof fairness and satisfaction with monitoring. Drawing on Blader and Tyler’sfour-component model of fairness, participants were asked to rate their perceptionsof fairness, satisfaction and intentions to comply with electronic performance-monitoring policies that originated from formal organisational policies or from theirdirect supervisors. Results indicated that procedural justice violations originatingfrom the supervisor (vs. formal organisational policy) led to lower perceptions offairness and satisfaction with monitoring. Furthermore, the effect of proceduraljustice violations on compliance with monitoring was mediated by perceptions offairness and satisfaction with monitoring. The present research has theoretical andpractical implications for the design, implementation and communication oforganisational electronic monitoring practices.Contact: David Zweig, Department of Management, University of Toronto atScarborough, 1265 Military Trail, Toronto, Ontario M1C 1A4, Canada. Email:[email protected]

INTRODUCTION

For three decades, researchers have been asking whether or not organisationsshould be monitoring the activities of their employees electronically.Proponents of electronic performance monitoring (EPM) suggest that practices

such as listening in on phone calls with customers or counting keystrokes ensuresaccuracy and removes bias when assessing employee performance (e.g. Grant andHiggins, 1991). Detractors point to the negative consequences of electronicmonitoring such as increased stress and lower quality performance (e.g. Davidsonand Henderson, 2000). Between these two poles, researchers that are caught amid theneed to help organisations enhance their effectiveness and the desire to respectemployee rights have identified fairness and privacy as necessary conditions forlimiting negative reactions while allowing organisations to benefit from monitoringefforts (e.g. Eddy et al., 1999; Ambrose and Alder, 2000). Given that an estimated 76per cent of companies in the United States engage in regular electronic monitoringof their employees (American Management Association, 2005), the need tounderstand how monitoring policies influence employee reactions becomesincreasingly important.

Recent investigations have found support for the dual roles played by privacy andfairness in predicting reactions to electronic monitoring (e.g. Alge, 2001; Zweig and

HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, VOL 17 NO 3, 2007 227

© 2007 The Authors.

Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4

2DQ, UK and 350 Main St, Malden, MA, 02148, USA.

mailto:[email protected]

Webster, 2002). However, few investigations have examined the source of monitoringinformation (e.g. the supervisor vs. formal organisational policies) in predictingreactions to EPM. Rather, previous studies have either presented information onEPM procedures as originating explicitly from the organisation or have confoundedthe source of these procedures as being determined by the organisation andadministered via an agent of the organisation (e.g. Alge and Ballinger, 2001;Hovorka-Mead et al., 2002).

Emerging evidence in the justice literature suggests that the source of justiceinformation is important (e.g. Blader and Tyler, 2003a,b). The same could be true ina monitoring context (Alder and Ambrose, 2005a). The source of monitoringinformation, when coupled with monitoring practices that either respect or violateperceptions of fairness, could result in different reactions to monitoring. For example,being told by your supervisor that it is up to him/her to decide how monitoring willtake place or that you have no opportunity to appeal any decisions based onmonitoring data might elicit stronger reactions than being informed in writing thatformal organisational monitoring policies prohibit appeals to performance-appraisaldecisions.

The primary purpose of this investigation was to examine the effects of differentsources of monitoring information on perceptions of fairness, satisfaction andcompliance with monitoring. Drawing on Blader and Tyler’s (2003a) four-componentmodel of procedural justice, which suggests that people are influenced by the typeof procedure (quality of decision making, quality of treatment) they receive fromformal (organisational policies) and informal (supervisory) sources, we investigatedsource differences in the context of procedural manipulations to monitoringpractices. Specifically, in this study, participants received information indicating (1)the source of monitoring-practice information (formal organisational policies vs.supervisors); (2) the type of procedure (quality of decision making vs. quality oftreatment),1 and (3) the fairness of procedure (fair vs. unfair). In addition, weinvestigated the effects of monitoring-source information, type of monitoringprocedures, and the fairness of treatment on intentions to comply with monitoring,as mediated by fairness and satisfaction perceptions.

In this article, we first discuss Blader and Tyler’s (2003a) four-component modelof procedural justice, specifically as it applies to monitoring. We then discuss howthe various components of the model may interact to predict perceptions ofmonitoring. Finally we present a study that offers a preliminary examination of therole that source of monitoring information may play in examining reactions toelectronic monitoring.

Source distinctions

Blader and Tyler (2003a) suggest that procedural fairness evaluations emerge fromtwo sources – formal influences on fairness (official organisational rules andprocedures), and informal influences on fairness (supervisory actions). Drawingfrom research uncovering differences found in perceived organisational versussupervisory support (Hutchinson, 1997), and citizenship behaviour directed at theorganisation versus the supervisor (Williams and Andersen, 1991), Blader and Tyler(2003a) suggest that employees can form related but distinct perceptions of fairnessdepending on the source of treatment. In other words, an employee can experience

Supervisory violations of monitoring practices

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Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

negative reactions to an unfair supervisor but still perceive the organisation’sprocedures to be fair. However, early conceptualisations of procedural justicefocused on the influence of formal rules and policies (e.g. Thibault and Walker, 1978).One noteworthy exception to this is Cobb et al. (1997), who found that employeeperceptions of procedural justice are determined independently and jointly by bothformal policy and supervisors. With the exception of Cobb et al. and a few studies(e.g. Bies, 2001; Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002), most subsequent procedural justiceresearch has continued to examine fairness perceptions through the lens of formalpolicies and procedures.

Research examining antecedents of and reactions to EPM has also continued toemphasise formal organisational policies, especially when focusing on perceptions offairness. For example, Ambrose and Alder’s (2000) fairness-based model of EPMdoes not identify the source of monitoring information as a key variable in predictingreactions to monitoring. Although Alder and Ambrose (2005a,b) do propose andexamine the source of monitoring information as an important determinant ofreactions, more recent investigations continue to present monitoring practices asoriginating from formal organisational policies or do not clearly distinguish theentity responsible for determining how monitoring will take place. Alge andBallinger (2001) presented participants with an employee orientation briefing formthat described the monitoring practices as originating from the institution, andHovorka-Mead et al. (2002) portrayed the supervisor as the agent of formalorganisational monitoring policies. In practice, however, it is likely that bothsituations exist. In some organisations, monitoring practices might be explicitlyproscribed in formal organisational policies. Other organisations might implement amonitoring framework, but leave the day-to-day administration of the programmeup to the discretion of individual supervisors. Either scenario might lead monitoredemployees to form different perceptions of fairness and satisfaction. Indeed, Bladerand Tyler (2003b) found that informal sources of information (e.g. the supervisor)elicited strong fairness effects. In other words, procedures were judged to be morefair or unfair if implemented by the supervisor.

Procedural distinctions

Apart from source distinctions, the procedures used in an organisation arerecognised as a key determinant of reactions to EPM (e.g. Ambrose and Alder, 2000).Mirroring fairness research in general, voice or the ability to provide input into thedecision-making process (Thibault and Walker, 1975), continues to be one of the mostfrequently studied procedural variables in EPM research (e.g. Alge, 2001; Hovorka-Mead et al., 2002). Indeed, allowing people to have input into the implementation ofthe monitoring system enhances perceptions of fairness (e.g. Hovorka-Mead et al.,2002). Yet, as suggested in a recent meta-analysis of fairness research (Cohen-Charashand Spector, 2001, p. 308), although we have enough data on voice, we do not knowenough about other aspects of organisational practices, indicating a need to examineprocedures more broadly.

In practice, most new employees must accept organisational policies that arealready in place. Employees entering an electronically monitored environment willnot be offered opportunities to voice their opinions about the previously establishedprocedures for monitoring. Thus, it might be more important to ensure that

David Zweig and Kristyn Scott




procedures are in place to allow for appeals of decisions based on monitoring data.Consistent with this assertion, correctability, or the principle that procedures shouldcontain some provision for correcting bad decisions (Leventhal, 1980), might be amore important concern than voice for employees. Accordingly Ambrose and Alder(2000) proposed that giving employees an opportunity to challenge the computer-monitoring system would lead to greater perceptions of fairness.

Providing people with justifications for monitoring has also led to morefavourable fairness perceptions (Stanton, 2000; Hovorka-Mead et al., 2002; Zweig andWebster, 2002). Yet, other procedural concerns related to the quality of treatmentoffered to employees merit attention. Monitoring systems designed to enhance thequality of treatment employees receive are proposed to result in more favourableperceptions of fairness (Alder and Ambrose, 2005a). This is because silent EPM, orbeing unaware of when you are being monitored, is viewed as tantamount to spying(Picard, 1994). As an example, people might make inferences about the quality oftreatment based on how the monitoring system is designed. For instance, systemsthat are designed to provide employees with information about when they will bemonitored may lead to more favourable perceptions about the quality of treatmentoffered by the organisation. Indeed, Carayon (1993) found that when participantswere aware of when they were being monitored, they reported feeling less stress,and Stanton and Barnes-Farrell (1996) found that participants who knew exactlywhen they were being monitored expressed higher feelings of personal control.Furthermore, Hovorka-Mead et al. (2002) found that giving people advance notice ofmonitoring led to greater perceptions of fairness.

In sum, evidence suggests that giving people voice, offering justifications andimplementing monitoring practices that enhance both quality of treatment anddecision making leads to greater perceptions of fairness. However, little empiricalsupport exists to suggest that one fairness element is more critical than another ininfluencing fairness perceptions. One notable exception is Blader and Tyler (2003b),who found larger effects for quality of treatment (e.g. respecting employee rights)manipulations than for quality of decision-making manipulations (e.g. consistency,appeals) on perceptions of fairness. Fairness heuristic theory (e.g. van den Bos et al.,2001) suggests that people seek information about their inclusion or exclusion fromtheir social unit. Procedures that provide information on the quality of treatmentoffered to employees might be more salient and more interpretable to people thanconcerns about appealing decisions based on monitoring data. This is because theelectronic monitoring practices signal the overall level of respect the organisationprovides employees, not just whether appeals are permitted. For example, if thecharacteristics of the monitoring system do not convey respect by prohibiting peoplefrom providing consent prior to being monitored, this may also signal to theemployee that the decisions made with that data may also be biased. As such, wepropose that, although quality of decision making is important, quality of treatmentconcerns may trigger further questions about decision making, thus makingtreatment a more proximal determinant of fairness and satisfaction.2

Beyond fairness and satisfaction perceptions, another important outcome oforganisational monitoring is compliance (Bennett and Robinson, 2003). Inestablishing a direct relationship between organisational practices and complianceintentions, Spitzmueller and Stanton (2006) found that employees attempt to actively





resist organisational monitoring practices. Furthermore, it has been demonstratedthat non-compliance, or deviance (Bennett and Robinson, 1995), is influenced byperceptions of fairness. For example, Greenberg (1993) found that proceduralinjustice impacts behaviours such as theft among employees. Therefore, we proposethat the type of monitoring procedure and the fairness of that procedure might alsoinfluence employee motivation to comply with monitoring. As such, we propose atwo-way interaction between type of procedure (quality of decision making vs.quality of treatment) and fairness of procedure (fair vs. unfair) on perceptions offairness, satisfaction and compliance with monitoring as follows:

Hypothesis 1: EPM will be perceived as more fair, and will lead to greaterperceptions of satisfaction and more compliance when people are permitted toconsent to monitoring (fair quality of treatment) as opposed to when they areprovided opportunities to appeal decisions based on monitoring information(fair quality of decision making) or are not provided with an opportunity toconsent or appeal.

The interactive effects of source, type of procedure and fairness of procedure

As stated earlier, Blader and Tyler (2003b) found support for a four-componentmodel of procedural fairness that distinguishes between the quality of decisionmaking and quality of treatment, and between formal (organisational) and informal(supervisor) sources of fairness information. Although Alder and Ambrose (2005a)proposed that the source of feedback would influence reactions to monitoring, noprevious research has examined the interaction of source, type of procedure andfairness of the procedure in the electronic-monitoring context. Accordingly, wehypothesise that these components will interact to influence perceptions of fairness,satisfaction and compliance. Support for this proposition comes from fairnessheuristic theory (e.g. van den Bos et al., 2001), which suggests that, in the absence ofoutcome information, people will look to the procedures to determine the fairness oforganisational policies. Further, fair procedures are related to organisational-leveloutcomes (e.g. satisfaction with organisation: van den Bos et al. (1998); and sabotage:Ambrose et al. (2002). As such, compared to supervisory statements, fair institu-tionalised policies should provide stronger evidence that organisational proceduresare fair. Conversely, fairness perceptions should be lowest when procedures areviolated via the decision-making practices of supervisors. This is because thesupervisor is using his or her own discretion as both an agent of the organisation,and is acting as a source of information about the quality of decision making andtreatment accorded to employees by the supervisor him or herself. Based on theevidence presented previously, we hypothesise that:

Hypothesis 2: Source of monitoring information will moderate the relationshipbetween type of procedure and fairness of procedure such that perceptions offairness, satisfaction and intentions to comply with monitoring will be lowerwhen supervisors convey unfair decision-making procedures.

The mediating effects of fairness and satisfaction on compliance

The relationships between organisational activities and compliance, and theinfluence of fairness perceptions on theft have been well established (e.g. Greenberg,





1993; Spitzmueller and Stanton, 2006). However, Bennett and Robinson (2003)suggest that researchers need to investigate the impact of procedural injustice ondeviant behaviours other than theft. Because non-compliance with organisationalpolicies can be construed as deviance (Bennett and Robinson, 2003), we propose thatperceptions of fairness and satisfaction will mediate the relationship between source,type of monitoring procedures, fairness of the procedure and intentions to complywith monitoring. Although research has not examined this possibility directly, Zweigand Webster (2002) found that perceptions of fairness mediated the relationshipbetween monitoring system characteristics and outcomes such as attitudes towardsmonitoring. It is therefore reasonable to expect that unfair organisational monitoringpractices enacted by supervisors might lead to greater intentions to resist monitoringefforts because they are perceived to be unfair. As such, we hypothesise thefollowing:

Hypothesis 3: Perceptions of fairness and satisfaction will be positivelyassociated with compliance in monitoring and will mediate the relationshipsbetween source, type of procedure, fairness of procedure and compliance withmonitoring.

Drawing upon Blader and Tyler (2003a,b) and Alder and Ambrose (2005a,b), thiscurrent study adds to the literature on EPM and fairness by incorporating the sourceof the monitoring-policy information to understand reactions to EPM policies.Furthermore, we are responding to the call of justice researchers (e.g. Cohen-Charashand Spector, 2001) by examining reactions to procedural criteria other than voice.

METHOD

Participants

A total of 111 senior undergraduate students enrolled in three different upper-yearmanagement courses completed the study. The average age of the participants was21 years (SD = 1.71) and females comprised 64 per cent of the sample. Forty-one percent of the participants were enrolled in a co-operative education programme.Approximately one third of the participants (32 per cent) reported experienceworking in an electronically monitored environment, and of this group, 13 per centreported between one and five years of experience working in a monitoredenvironment.

Procedure

The study design was a 2 (source: organisation vs. supervisor) ¥ 2 (type of procedure:quality of decision making vs. quality of treatment) ¥ 2 (fairness of procedure: fair vs.unfair) between-subjects factorial design. Participants randomly received one ofeight scenarios in which they were asked to assume the role of a customer servicerepresentative working in an electronically monitored environment. The source ofmonitoring-policy information, the procedures with which they were monitored andwhether the procedure was fair or unfair, varied by scenario. For example, in thesupervisor as source, quality of decision making, unfair procedure condition,participants read the following:





Your direct supervisor has decided to use the data gathered viaelectronic monitoring to assess your performance. According to yoursupervisor, you will not have the opportunity to review anyperformance data collected via electronic monitoring, nor add yourinput into the performance appraisal. You cannot appeal or challengeany decision made by your direct supervisor based on the monitoringdata.

In contrast, participants in the organisation as source, quality of decision making,fair procedure condition read the following (see Appendix 1 for a full description ofthe manipulations):

According to the organisation’s policies, the data gathered via electronicmonitoring will be used to assess your performance. Also, the policiesstate that you will have the opportunity to review any performance datacollected via electronic monitoring, and you can add your input into theperformance appraisal. The organisation’s policies state that employeescan appeal or challenge any decision based on the monitoring data.

Dependent variables

Fairness perceptions Two items assessing fairness were adapted from Alge (1999),(e.g. ‘How fair are the methods used to monitor and assess your performance?’). Therating scale ranged from ‘Not at all Fair’ (1) to ‘Extremely Fair’ (7). Internalconsistency reliability for these two items was 0.75, and the items were collapsed tocreate an average measure of fairness.

Satisfaction with monitoring methods and outcomes Two items assessedsatisfaction with monitoring. However, internal consistency reliability for these itemswas relatively low (a = 0.60) and an examination of the item wordings suggested adifference in focus. For example, one item, ‘How satisfied would you be with themethods used to monitor your performance?’, assessed satisfaction with monitoringmethods. Another item, ‘To what extent would you be satisfied with yourperformance appraisals if they were to be based on electronically monitored data?’assessed satisfaction with monitoring outcomes. Satisfaction is often broken downinto specific facets (e.g. satisfaction with supervision, pay; Nagy, 2002 andThorsteinson, 2003) that correlate with multi-item measures of overall jobsatisfaction. Therefore, a decision was made post hoc to split the items to assesssatisfaction with methods and satisfaction with outcomes and to conduct separateanalyses on each.

Compliance with monitoring Three items assessing compliance were adapted fromSpitzmueller and Stanton (2006), (e.g. ‘I would accept electronic monitoring andmake no efforts to try and prevent my activities from being monitored’). The ratingscale ranged from ‘Strongly Disagree’ (1) to ‘Strongly Agree’ (7). Internal consistencyreliability for these three items was 0.68, and the items were collapsed to create anaverage measure of compliance.





RESULTS

Manipulation checks

For each of the three independent variables, there were two manipulation checksasking respondents about the information given in the scenarios. For example, the‘source’ manipulation checks asked participants to indicate whether or not theinformation came from the organisation or the supervisor. The ‘quality of decisionmaking’ manipulation check asked participants to identify whether or not they hadthe opportunity to appeal any decisions based on monitoring data. The manipulationwas considered successful when the correct item for each independent variable wasidentified. On average, participants correctly responded to the manipulation checkitems 83 per cent of the time. Furthermore, there were no notable differences betweenthe scenarios or independent variables in the likelihood of incorrect responses.Analyses excluding cases where manipulation checks were incorrect did not changethe pattern of the results to be presented later. Thus, all participants were includedin the analysis to maintain equivalent sample sizes between the conditions.

Analyses

Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted on all the dependentmeasures. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of fairness, F (5, 96) = 4.43,p < 0.01, a significant two-way interaction between procedure and fairness, F (5,96) = 2.98, p < 0.01, and a significant three-way interaction between source, procedureand fairness, F (5, 96) = 2.66, p < 0.05. Given that the MANOVA indicated significantdifferences across the study conditions, univariate analyses of variance (ANOVA)were conducted on all of the dependent variables with a Bonferroni corrected alpha(a = 0.04; see Table 1).

Fairness perceptions

Hypothesis 1 predicted a two-way interaction between type of procedure andfairness. A significant main effect was found for fairness, F (1, 103) = 11.15, p < 0.01,such that fair procedures were perceived to be significantly more fair than unfairprocedures. Furthermore, a significant two-way interaction was found betweenfairness and type of procedure, F (1, 103) = 5.10, p < 0.05. However, contrary to thehypothesis, participants in the unfair condition who were given information aboutthe quality of decision making perceived the monitoring system to be significantlyless fair (M = 2.90) than those in the other three conditions (treatment ¥ fair, M =3.91; treatment ¥ unfair, M = 3.69; decision making ¥ fair, M = 4.07, respectively).Supporting Hypothesis 2, these results were qualified by a marginally significantthree-way interaction found for source, type of procedure and fairness, F (1,103) = 3.19, p = 0.077. Breaking down the three-way interaction into its componenttwo-way interactions reveals that there were no appreciable differences in the meansfor participants receiving fairness information from the organisation; participants inthis condition viewed the system as being similarly fair or unfair for both proceduralmanipulations. However, there was a significant two-way interaction for participantsreceiving fairness information from a supervisor, F (1, 48) = 8.86, p < 0.01, such thatparticipants in the unfair condition who received the information about decision





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making from a supervisor (M = 2.38), perceived the monitoring system to be less fairthan those in the other three conditions (treatment ¥ fair, M = 3.80; treatment ¥ unfair,M = 3.83; decision making ¥ fair, M = 4.03, respectively: see Figure 1).

Satisfaction with monitoring methods and outcomes

A significant main effect for type of procedure was found for satisfaction withmonitoring methods, F (1, 103) = 4.28, p < 0.05, such that participants were moresatisfied with monitoring procedures when provided information about quality oftreatment. A significant main effect for fairness was also found, F (1, 103) = 10.04,p < 0.01, suggesting that fair procedures led to more satisfaction with monitoringmethods than unfair procedures.

Satisfaction with monitoring outcomes yielded different results. A significant maineffect was found for fairness, F (1, 102) = 4.39, p < 0.05, such that fair procedures leadto significantly more satisfaction with monitoring outcomes than unfair procedures.A significant two-way interaction was also found between fairness and type ofprocedure, F (1, 102) = 4.49, p < 0.05, such that participants in the unfair conditionwho received information about decision making were significantly less satisfiedwith monitoring outcomes (M = 2.63) than those in the other three conditions

FIGURE 1 Interaction of source of procedure, type of procedure, and fairness of procedureon fairness perceptions

Source: Organisation

3

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quality of treatment

Source: Supervisor

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(treatment ¥ fair, M = 3.44; treatment ¥ unfair, M = 3.44; decision making ¥ fair,M = 3.72, respectively). These results were qualified by a significant three-wayinteraction between source, type of procedure and fairness, F (1, 102) = 6.42, p < 0.05.An examination of the means suggests that, similar to the results found forperceptions of fairness, participants in the unfair condition who received theinformation about decision making from a supervisor (F (1, 48) = 8.12, p < 0.01;M = 2.42) were significantly less satisfied with monitoring outcomes than those in theother three conditions (treatment ¥ fair, M = 2.80; treatment ¥ unfair, M = 3.66;decision making ¥ fair, M = 3.93: see Figure 2).

Compliance with monitoring

A significant main effect was found for fairness F (1, 103) = 5.85, p < 0.05, such thatfair procedures were rated as leading to significantly greater intentions to complywith monitoring than unfair procedures. Further, a significant main effect was foundfor type of procedure, F (1, 103) = 5.94, p < 0.05, such that compliance withmonitoring was greater when participants were provided information about qualityof treatment. These results were qualified by a two-way interaction between fairness

FIGURE 2 Interaction of source of procedure, type of procedure and fairness of procedure onsatisfaction with monitoring outcomes

Source: Organisation

2

2.5

3

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4

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fair unfair

sati

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Source: Supervisor

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and type of procedure, F (1, 103) = 5.22, p < 0.05, such that participants in the unfaircondition who received information about the quality of decision making weresignificantly less likely to comply with monitoring outcomes (M = 2.84) than those inthe other three conditions (treatment ¥ fair, M = 3.94; treatment ¥ unfair, M = 3.90;decision making ¥ fair, M = 3.90: see Figure 3).

Mediation analyses

To test Hypothesis 3, we conducted a series of regression analyses, as outlined byBaron and Kenny (1986), to explore whether the relationships between the predictorsand compliance with monitoring were mediated by perceptions of fairness andsatisfaction. However, as indicated previously, the source of monitoring informationwas not significantly related to compliance, violating a necessary precondition formediation analysis. Therefore, we did not include the source manipulation in ouranalysis.

As shown in Figure 4, the results indicate that the relationship between fairnessof the procedure and compliance with monitoring is mediated by participants’perceptions of fairness, satisfaction with monitoring methods and satisfaction withmonitoring outcomes. That is, whereas the effect between fairness and compliancewith monitoring was significant (b = –0.23, p = 0.01), the effect is no longer significantwhen fairness perceptions (b = –0.04, p > 0.05), satisfaction with monitoring methods(b = –0.05, p > 0.05) and satisfaction with monitoring outcomes (b = -0.14, p > 0.05) arecontrolled. Tests of the significance of the reduction between the indirect and directeffects (Sobel, 1982) revealed significant decreases in the effect sizes (z = 3.54,p < 0.001 for fairness; z = 2.79, p < 0.05 for satisfaction with monitoring methods;z = 2.04, p < 0.05, for satisfaction with monitoring outcomes, respectively). Weconducted a similar analysis with type of procedure. However, the effect of type ofprocedure on compliance did not differ statistically before and after the fairness andsatisfaction variables were controlled.

FIGURE 3 Interaction of type of procedure, and fairness of procedure on compliance withmonitoring.

2

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4

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ance

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g







DISCUSSION

The goal of this study was to examine the effects of different sources of monitoringinformation on perceptions of fairness, satisfaction and compliance with monitoring.Our results suggest that the source of electronic-monitoring information is important.Specifically, receiving information about monitoring policies from the organisation or

FIGURE 4 Path analysis depicting the mediating role of a) fairness, b) satisfaction withmonitoring methods, and c) satisfaction with monitoring outcomes in the link betweenfairness of procedure and compliance with monitoring

a)

b)

c)

fairness of procedure

compliance with monitoring

fairness perceptions

(–.23*) –.04

**85. **23.–



satisfaction w/monitoring methods

(–.23*) –.05

**06. **92.–



satisfaction w/monitoring outcomes

(–.23*) –.14

**34. *12.–

(Note: Numbers on paths are betas. Fairness of procedure: 0 = fair, 1 = unfair. The total effect between thepredictor and criterion (i.e. before controlling for the mediator) is given inside the parentheses; the directeffect (i.e. after controlling for the mediator) is given outside the parentheses. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.001.)





the supervisor can lead to different perceptions of fairness and satisfaction withmonitoring. When participants were told that the supervisor would not permitappeals of decisions, perceptions of fairness were lower and participants were lesssatisfied with monitoring compared to participants who received information aboutappeals via formal organisational policies.

These findings provide support for Blader and Tyler’s (2003a) four-componentmodel of fairness, and provide additional support to Alder and Ambrose (2005b)who found that supervisor-mediated feedback enhanced the perceived fairness ofboth destructive and constructive feedback. Further, by investigating proceduralfairness issues other than voice, we are responding to calls for more research intoother important procedural issues (e.g. Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001). Thisextends both the justice literature in general and the EPM literature in particular. Wediscovered that quality of decision making (specifically in terms of appeals) isimportant to people’s perceptions of fairness. If people do not have the opportunityto appeal decisions based on monitoring data, they will not perceive the EPM systemto be fair. This effect is even more pronounced when the source of unfairnessinformation is the supervisor.

Our results also suggest that people will convey intentions to resist monitoringwhen monitoring practices are construed as unfair. Further, the effect of unfairprocedures on compliance with monitoring was mediated by perceptions of fairness.Satisfaction with monitoring methods and outcomes are also related to people’sintentions to resist monitoring when treatment is unfair. These results add to theexisting literatures on procedural justice and deviance (e.g. Greenberg, 1993), andcompliance in monitoring contexts (e.g. Spitzmueller and Stanton, 2006) byidentifying unfair treatment as a trigger for resistance and lowered intentions tocomply with monitoring.

Drawing on Blader and Tyler (2003b), who found larger effects for proceduralmanipulations that violated quality of treatment (e.g. employee rights), we proposedthat concerns about giving consent to electronic monitoring would be more salientthan concerns about appealing decisions based on monitoring data. However, in amonitoring context, our participants indicated quality of decision making wasimportant when forming their perceptions towards monitoring. Fairness heuristictheory (e.g. van den Bos et al., 2001) offers a potential explanation for these results.Being denied the opportunity to appeal monitoring decisions conveys moreinformation about the potential favourability of the outcome than does being deniedconsent over when monitoring will take place. For example, not having the right toappeal decisions based on monitoring data confirms that there is no recourse in theevent of a negative outcome. In contrast, not having the right to consent tomonitoring does not guarantee that the outcome will be unfavourable. Consequently,a lack of opportunity for appeals and the corresponding belief that outcomes arelikely to be negative, might lead to less positive perceptions of fairness andsatisfaction. These differences, combined with our results, point to the need forfuture research to investigate the direct effects assigned to procedural justice criteriain different contexts.

Along with the relative importance of different procedural justice criteria, wewere also interested in investigating whether violations of facets of proceduraljustice (e.g. treatment concerns) would influence other procedural justice criteria





(e.g. decision making) that were not directly manipulated. As such, we examinedan item in the questionnaire completed by participants in order to assess overallperceptions of respect. Contrary to expectations, we found that perceptions ofrespect, while generally low across all conditions, were lowest when thesupervisor prohibited appeals. In other words, although participants perceived thelevel of respect accorded by the monitoring system to be low (regardless ofcondition), participants perceived the system to demonstrate very low levels ofrespect when the supervisor compromised the quality of decision making bydenying the right to appeal. One potential explanation for this is that supervisoryviolations of fairness might not only convey that decision making is unfair, butthat this perception may also extend to the treatment they receive from thesupervisor and the organisation. As stated earlier, this suggests a spillover effectfrom quality of decision making to quality of treatment – even in the absence ofinformation about quality of treatment. Although not the primary purpose of thisinvestigation, future research should consider that perceptions of specific justicecriteria may not operate orthogonally and examine the interactive effects ofdifferent types of procedural violations.

The theoretical and practical implications of this study must be weighed againstits limitations. First, we used scenarios to conduct research on this sensitive topic.However, the scenario method can be particularly informative where the goal is tounderstand sensitive psychological processes such as privacy (Greenberg and Eskew,1993). Furthermore, we followed Greenberg and Eskew’s recommendations toenhance the realism of the scenarios. Although scenarios offered us control over thevariables of interest, we do not know if perceptions would be different had ourparticipants experienced a real employee-monitoring system. However, we wouldexpect the results to be even more pronounced in field settings where thepsychological effects of being monitored are more salient. Second, we used upper-year management students as participants in this study. However, generalisabilityand external validity concerns are partially mitigated by the fact that over 40 per centof our participants were enrolled in a co-operative education programme and onethird of our participants have or were currently working in electronically monitoredenvironments. Although not all of our participants had direct experience working inan electronically monitored environment, this situation likely mirrors real-worldconditions in that most employees entering a monitored work environment haveprobably never worked in one before.

Finally, although unintentional, the reliance on single-item measures ofsatisfaction with monitoring methods and outcomes could raise a concern aboutthe validity of our findings. However, Wanous et al. (1997) suggest that single-itemmeasures are adequate if the construct being measured is sufficiently narrow or isunambiguous to respondents. Further, Nagy (2002) found that single-itemmeasures of facet job satisfaction were significantly correlated with multi-itemmeasures of the same constructs. Gardner et al. (1998) also found that traditionalmulti-item scales did not outperform single-item scales. Thus, we believe that oursingle measures of the two satisfaction variables are sufficiently straightforward tocapture perceptions of satisfaction with EPM methods and outcomes. Nevertheless,where appropriate, future studies should develop multiple items for thesevariables. Finally, we did not allow our participants to respond to every possible





combination of conditions. Although we found significant differences among theconditions, a policy capturing design would further elucidate the relationshipsbetween the study variables.

Future research should continue to investigate the source of monitoring-policyinformation as a key moderator of fairness and satisfaction perceptions of EPM. Wechose only two specific fairness variables for this initial examination; otherprocedural antecedents of fairness perceptions must also be investigated in thiscontext. For example, receiving fairness information from the supervisor might raiseissues around the consistency of treatment across employees. Inconsistent treatmentcould result in even lower perceptions of the quality of decision making and thequality of treatment. Future research examining the additive and interactive effectsof multiple fairness violations would also add to our understanding of how differentprocedural antecedents interact to predict outcomes. Furthermore, potentialmediators of source effects such as perceptions of organisational support andleader–member exchange (e.g. Masterson et al., 2001) must also be examined in theelectronic-monitoring context.

The present study offers some new directions for research on electronicmonitoring. This study provides empirical support for some elements of Ambroseand Alder’s (2000) justice-based model of EPM and Alder and Ambrose’s (2005a)integrative model of reactions to computer performance monitoring. Specifically,people will perceive the opportunity to appeal decisions based on monitoring dataand the opportunity to provide consent to be monitored as more fair. Furthermore,supporting Alder and Ambrose (2005b) and Blader and Tyler (2003a,b), this researchconfirms that the source of fairness information is an important moderator of fairnessperceptions.

Given the rapid rise in workplace electronic monitoring (American ManagementAssociation, 2005), employees must expect that they will be electronicallymonitored. Thus, it becomes increasingly important to consider how organisationalmonitoring policies are communicated to employees. Our results suggest that it isparamount for HR practitioners to consider the following. First, employees shouldhave the opportunity to voice their opinions in reference to the monitoring system(e.g. Alge, 2001). For example, in an organisation about to implement such asystem, this may take the form of an organisation-wide survey allowing employeesto provide their input into the system design. In addition, organisations with thesesystems in place may do well to consider building in a procedure for employeesto appeal decisions made on the basis of monitoring. Our research suggests thismight be more important than voice and might increase compliance with fairmonitoring practices. Further, as demonstrated by research on advance notice (e.g.Hovorka-Mead et al., 2002), it is important to let employees know when they willbe monitored. However, our research suggests that beyond advance notice ofmonitoring, employees should be offered the opportunity to consent to monitoringbefore it takes place to enhance quality of treatment perceptions. Finally, it isimportant to formalise monitoring practices in organisational policies andcommunicate the policies to employees. If the supervisor acts as the agent of theorganisation in communicating monitoring policies, unfair practices might not onlyconvey that decision-making procedures are unfair, but also that employees are notvalued by the organisation.





Acknowledgements

The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council provided financial support forthis research. We would like to thank Jane Webster for her comments on earlier draftsof this article.

Notes

1. There does exist some disagreement in the justice literature in terms ofwhether justice is best conceptualised as a two-, three-, or four-factor model (e.g.Colquitt et al., 2001). Indeed, many justice researchers consider quality oftreatment concerns to fall under the construct of interactional justice (e.g. Bies andMoag, 1986; Bies, 2001). Because this article uses Blader and Tyler’s (2003a) modelas a framework, we adopt their structure and consider quality of treatment to bea subset of procedural justice.2. Although it has been suggested, and demonstrated, that satisfaction ispredicted by distributive justice (e.g. Greenberg, 1994), Masterson et al. (2001)found that satisfaction was related to both procedural and interactional justice.Other researchers have found similar results for the relationship betweenprocedural justice and satisfaction (e.g. Cropanzano et al., 2002; Irving et al., 2005).In addition, a recent examination of the effects of distributive and proceduraljustice on satisfaction indicated that procedural justice was a stronger predictorthan was distributive justice (Clay-Warner et al., 2005).

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APPENDIX 1

ScenariosQuality of Treatment Conditions:Imagine that you are a Customer Service Representative working in the call center

of a large computer manufacturing firm. You work with 40 other customer servicerepresentatives taking service and support calls from clients.

Recently, the organisation announced that it will be instituting an electronicmonitoring system to record the quality and length of Customer ServiceRepresentative telephone conversations and to monitor your proficiency in handlingcustomer complaints and addressing customer needs. In other words, theorganisation will monitor your conversations with customers, record the time spenton customer calls and monitor the time you spend off task (not taking customercalls).

Fair Treatment, Organisation:According to the organisation’s policies, you will be monitored at pre-determined

times throughout the day. However, the organisation’s policies also state that yourconsent to be monitored is required. Monitoring will take place only with yourknowledge or prior consent. The organisation will use the data gathered viaelectronic monitoring to assess your performance.

Unfair Treatment, Organisation:According to the organisation’s policies, you will be monitored at pre-determined

times throughout the day. The organisation’s policies also state that your consent tobe monitored is not required. Monitoring will take place at any time throughout theday without your knowledge or prior consent. The organisation will use the datagathered via electronic monitoring to assess your performance.

Fair Treatment, Supervisor:According to your supervisor, you will be monitored at pre-determined times

throughout the day. Your direct supervisor does need to ask you for your consent tobe monitored. Monitoring will only take place with your knowledge and priorconsent given to your supervisor. Your direct supervisor will use the data gatheredvia electronic monitoring to assess your performance.

Unfair Treatment, Supervisor:According to your supervisor, you will be monitored at pre-determined times

throughout the day. Your direct supervisor does not need to ask you for your consentto be monitored. Monitoring will take place at any time throughout the day at thediscretion of your supervisor without your knowledge or prior consent. Your directsupervisor will use the data gathered via electronic monitoring to assess yourperformance.





Quality of Decision-Making Conditions:Imagine that you are a Customer Service Representative working in the call center

of a large computer manufacturing firm. You work with 40 other customer servicerepresentatives taking service and support calls from clients.

Recently, the organisation announced that it will be instituting an electronicmonitoring system to record the quality and length of Customer ServiceRepresentative telephone conversations and to monitor your proficiency in handlingcustomer complaints and addressing customer needs. In other words, yourconversations with customers, the time spent on customer calls and the time youspend off task (not taking customer calls) could be monitored.

Fair Treatment, Organisation:According to the organisation’s policies, the data gathered via electronic

monitoring will be used to assess your performance. Also, the policies state that youwill have the opportunity to review any performance data collected via electronicmonitoring, and you can add your input into the performance appraisal. Theorganisation’s policies state that employees can appeal or challenge any decisionbased on the monitoring data.

Unfair Treatment, Organisation:According to the organisation’s policies, the data gathered via electronic

monitoring will be used to assess your performance. Also, the policies state that youwill not have the opportunity to review any performance data collected via electronicmonitoring, nor add your input into the performance appraisal. The organisation’spolicies state that employees cannot appeal or challenge any decision based on themonitoring data.

Fair Treatment, Supervisor:Your direct supervisor has decided to use the data gathered via electronic

monitoring to assess your performance. According to your supervisor, you will havethe opportunity to review any performance data collected via electronic monitoring,and add your input into the performance appraisal. You can appeal or challenge anydecision made by your direct supervisor based on the monitoring data.

Unfair Treatment, Supervisor:Your direct supervisor has decided to use the data gathered via electronic

monitoring to assess your performance. According to your supervisor, you will nothave the opportunity to review any performance data collected via electronicmonitoring, nor add your input into the performance appraisal. You cannot appealor challenge any decision made by your direct supervisor based on the monitoringdata.





when unfairness matters most: supervisory violations of electronic monitoring practices

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