when teams agree while disagreeing: reflexion and reflection in shared cognition

WHEN TEAMS AGREE WHILE DISAGREEING: REFLEXION

AND REFLECTION IN SHARED COGNITION

Journal: Academy of Management Review

Manuscript ID: AMR-2013-0154-Original.R3

Manuscript Type: Original Manuscript

Keywords: Cognition (Managerial), Groups/Teams, Group Behavior, Social Cognition,

Teamwork activities (coordination, conflict, cooperation, etc.)

Academy of Management Review

1

WHEN TEAMS AGREE WHILE DISAGREEING: REFLEXION AND REFLECTION

IN SHARED COGNITION

MARK P. HEALEY

University of Manchester

[email protected]

TIMO VUORI

Aalto University

[email protected]

GERARD P. HODGKINSON

University of Warwick

[email protected]

_______________________________

We thank Associate Editor Neal Ashkanasy, three anonymous AMR reviewers, Martin Kilduff,

Tomi Laamanen and Natalia Vuori for their helpful comments and guidance on earlier versions

of this article. The article also benefited from the helpful comments and suggestions of three

anonymous reviewers of the Managerial and Organizational Cognition Division at the 2011

Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management (San Antonio, Texas). We are also grateful to

the Centre for Organizational Strategy, Learning and Change at the University of Leeds for

supporting the development of this work. Timo Vuori acknowledges the support of the

Foundation for Economic Education, Finland; the Finnish Work Environment Fund (110026);

and the Finnish Funding Agency for Innovation (EV-ACTE).

Page 1 of 53 Academy of Management Review

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ABSTRACT

Drawing on dual-systems theory, we propose a new typology for analyzing shared

cognition in work groups and teams that differentiates reflective (i.e. C-system) mental models

formed through reasoning and deliberation from reflexive (i.e. X-system) representations that are

more automatic, intuitive, and affective in nature. Our analysis demonstrates how team

members’ X-system representations pertaining to the team’s task and its members can compete

with shared C-system mental models of the task and team in terms of their respective effects on

team functioning. We highlight the consequences for intra-team coordination when: (i) team

members have similar C-system mental models but dissimilar X-system representations (illusory

concordance) and (ii) team members have similar X-system representations but dissimilar C-

system mental models (surface discordance). Finally, we consider the implications of our

arguments for extending current team cognition theory predicated on reflective cognition and

suggest new directions for research on group cognition in organizations more generally.

KEYWORDS: dual-process; group cognition; implicit cognition; implicit attitudes; implicit

stereotypes; shared mental models; subconscious goals; team cognition; team coordination; team

mental models.

Page 2 of 53Academy of Management Review

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In the past two decades there has been an explosion of interest in the cognitive

mechanisms that drive the processes and outcomes of work groups and teams (DeChurch &

Mesmer-Magnus, 2010a; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008; Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006; Salas & Fiore,

2004). However, this literature focuses on deliberative, conscious cognition and tends to

overlook several important types of less mindful cognition, including implicit attitudes

(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), subconscious goals (Latham, Stajkovic, & Locke, 2010), and

implicit stereotypes (Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993).

This oversight is particularly noticeable in the literature concerning shared cognition in

teams. A construct that occupies an increasingly central position in this literature is shared

mental models. Much research assumes that when team members possess shared (i.e. similar)

mental models of their tasks and the team’s attributes they coordinate their activities more

effectively (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2001; Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993; Marks,

Sabella, Burke, & Zaccaro, 2002; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000).

However, as observed by Mohammed, Ferzandi, and Hamilton (2010: 902) “mixed and

contradictory findings have plagued research” on shared mental models in teams.

One explanation for these shortcomings is that by focusing on mental models that are

conscious and deliberative, teams research has assumed that cognitive sharedness is unimodal,

i.e. it operates at a single level of deliberative cognition. In this article, we develop an alternative

approach to conceptualizing shared team cognition based on dual-systems theories of cognition

(Epstein, 1994; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Specifically, we posit that

cognitive sharedness reflects processes operating at two distinct levels, namely, X-system (i.e.

reflexive) and C-system (i.e. reflective) levels. Following advances in social cognitive

neuroscience (Lieberman, 2007), we use the term X-system processes to refer to implicit


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cognitive processes that are automatic, spontaneous and occur without conscious awareness. The

X-system is distinct from the C-system, which is responsible for cognitive processes that are

reflective; that is, controlled, deliberative and conscious. Our argument is consistent with basic

evidence showing that X-system processes drive a great deal of social interaction (Bargh &

Chartrand, 1999) and that much of the information people bring to bear upon tasks is encoded in

knowledge that is not available to conscious introspection (Sloman, 1996).

We argue that even when team members have similar C-system mental models, X-system

representations will not necessarily be similar across team members because the X-system

representations individuals bring to a given task can contradict their corresponding C-system

representations (i.e. conflict within the person). Hence, teams will often obtain the putative

coordination benefits of shared cognition only when individuals’ X-system representations are

aligned with their C-system counterparts, while misalignment within and thus across team

members yields the contradictory effects observed in the extant literature.

Despite growing appreciation in organizational research of X-system processes at the

individual level (Ashkanasy & Humphrey, 2011; Dane & Pratt, 2007; Hodgkinson & Healey,

2011), teams research has not kept pace with these developments. We propose that incorporating

the basic distinction between X-system and C-system cognition provides a more complete

understanding of shared cognition and its influence on team processes and outcomes. Moreover,

our analysis extends team cognition theory to include X-system processes that are more visceral

and affective in nature. Such ‘hot’ cognition is integral to human interaction but often

overlooked in research on teams (Barsade & Gibson, 2007).

We begin by reviewing briefly the literature on shared mental models because they are

increasingly posited as the main cognitive coordination mechanisms underpinning the


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performance of work groups and teams (DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus, 2010a, b; Mohammed et

al., 2010). Next, we argue the case for distinguishing between X-system representations and C-

system mental models at the individual level. We then move up to the group level to outline a

new taxonomy for understanding configurations of X-system and C-system shared cognition that

identifies four types of cognitive concordance/discordance (hereafter concordance). Our

taxonomy describes how team members can ‘agree while disagreeing’; i.e., they can hold similar

C-system mental models while possessing dissimilar X-system representations, and vice versa.

We then examine the consequences of these alternative states for intra-team coordination and

develop a series of testable propositions that extend current team cognition theory predicated on

reflective cognition. Finally, we consider the implications of our arguments for future research

on group cognition in organizations more generally.

RETHINKING SHARED COGNITION

In this section we contrast X-system processes with C-system mental models and

examine how shared cognition at the two levels interacts. In so doing, we seek to broaden

understanding of team functioning beyond shared C-system mental models per se, by

incorporating reflexive processes as simultaneous and competing influences on team

coordination processes.

Shared Mental Models

Although there are multiple definitions of the shared mental models construct, we adopt

the seminal one offered by Cannon-Bowers and colleagues (1993: 221):

…knowledge structures held by members of a team that enable them to form

accurate explanations and expectations for the task, and in turn, to coordinate their

actions and adapt their behavior to demands of the task and other team members.

Based on studies of mental models in systems control (Rouse & Morris, 1986), team cognition

research assumes that mental models involve conscious deliberation. For example, Salas, Rosen,


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and DiazGranados (2010: 957) argue that mental models provide the basis for mentally

simulating different course of action, noting that “mental simulation is the conscious and

deliberate process in which decision makers engage.” The assumption that shared mental models

reflect explicit knowledge that is amenable to verbalization is also evident in the widespread

practice of operationalizing them by using direct measures, i.e. measuring beliefs concerning

causal relations among task attributes using rating scales that require deliberative reasoning and

effortful judgment (Cooke, Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Stout, 2000; Mohammed et al., 2010).

Extant research emphasizes the importance of two particular types of shared mental

model, namely, task-related and team-related mental models (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2001;

DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus, 2010a; Mathieu et al., 2000). Shared mental models of the task

contain knowledge of the key task components and their interrelationships, possible scenarios,

and the actions necessary for effective task performance. In contrast, mental models of the team

contain information pertaining to the knowledge, skills and abilities of fellow team members. We

posit that although these two types of cognitive content are important, sharing deliberative

mental models of the task and team is often insufficient for effective team performance; to

function effectively, teams must also share task and team cognition at the reflexive level.

The term ‘shared’ has multiple meanings in the shared cognition literature (Cannon-

Bowers & Salas, 2001; Mohamed et al., 2010). For the present analysis, we define shared in

terms of cognitive similarity (Rentsch, Small, & Hanges, 2008). Specifically, we consider that

cognition is shared when team members’ individual representations contain similar information

elements and the relationships between those elements are depicted similarly by the various team

members. We focus on cognitive similarity because it is a key driver of team coordination.

Similar beliefs and attitudes pertaining to the task and the team enable team members to hold


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compatible perceptions of their tasks and environments, draw common interpretations, and

approach those tasks in a consistent manner (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2001; Mohammed,

Klimoski, & Rentsch, 2000). Conversely, dissimilar beliefs and attitudes pertaining to the task

and team can lead to failed expectations and confusion.

Shared Reflexive Cognition

While we focus on shared-as-similar, we acknowledge that work team members often

possess varied knowledge and skills based on their specialist expertise or roles (Guzzo &

Dickson, 1996; Hackman, 1987; Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006). Nonetheless, we maintain that some

form of cognitive sharedness is necessary for team members with complementary knowledge and

skills to coordinate their activities (see also Mohamed & Dumville, 2001). For instance, in

medical teams surgeons and nurses possess different skills from one another but must also share

common goals to act cohesively. By unpacking the very nature of cognitive similarity, we seek

to understand how different forms of similarity enable teams to maintain harmony given varied

knowledge and skills. To this end, we analyze how (dis)similarity of X-system representations

(rather than (dis)similarity of C-system mental models alone) can contribute to team coordination

by acting as a form of glue that holds together the activities of team members with

complementary knowledge and skills, enabling them to take actions that are consistent with one

another, or in the case of dissimilarity, act as a force that pulls them apart.

By focusing on the effects of similarity across individual team members’ representations,

we adopt what Kozlowski and Klein (2000) term the compositional (as opposed to the

compilational) approach to conceptualizing team cognition. The compositional approach

represents higher level team constructs by describing the array of individual team members’

attributes (e.g. using the degree of similarity across team members’ personal mental models to


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represent team mental models). In contrast, the compilational approach emphasizes the influence

of collective states that are more than the sum of individual parts. The compositional approach is

appropriate for analyzing shared X-system cognition for two reasons. First, the representations

that individuals bring to a given task often influence how they approach that task, thereby

influencing coordination at the team level, even if they are not entered into collective

understanding through some process of group amalgamation (Cronin & Weingart, 2007).

Second, it is necessary to establish the individual-level building blocks of shared X-system

cognition before considering how teams might compile those components into some collective

product. We revisit compilational emergence when discussing the implications of our analysis

for future work.

Individual Level Foundations: Dual-Systems and Intrapersonal Dissociation

Dual-systems theorists posit that individuals possess two distinct information processing

systems (Epstein, 1994; Lieberman et al., 2002; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch,

2004). Although terminology varies among such theorists, there is general agreement that what

we term the X-system operates rapidly and below conscious awareness, with minimal cognitive

effort. In contrast, the C-system operates more slowly in conscious working memory and

requires greater cognitive effort. Researchers distinguish two views of how the systems interact

(see, e.g., Evans, 2008). First generation theories hold to a ‘default-interventionist’ view. They

assume that the two systems operate in sequence, the C-system shutting off the X-system when

(scarce) cognitive capacity is available. In contrast, ‘parallel competitive’ models assume that the

two systems operate simultaneously, such that the X-system continues to function even when the

C-system is active. For present purposes, we adopt the parallel competitive view, consistent with

the growing weight of neurological and experimental evidence (Lieberman, 2007; Sloman, 1996;


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Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Theories falling within this class are united by the following key

assumptions: (a) the two systems contain distinct cognitive and affective content, and (b) they

exert competing influences on behavior.

Two systems, two distinct forms of knowledge. A large weight of evidence indicates that

the X-system stores information in representations that are structured associatively (Gawronski

& Bodenhausen, 2006; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004); that is, X-system

representations capture simple object-attribute relations (e.g. associating a team task with

difficulty). In contrast, C-system representations are propositional in nature, going beyond

learned associations to enable inferential reasoning and prediction (e.g. mentally simulating how

a particular task might develop). A key feature of X-system processes is that they are affectively

charged, i.e. they automatically invoke physiological arousal and feeling states (Dane & Pratt,

2007; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Whereas the X-system deals in hot cognition in the form of

associations learned through emotionally significant events (Epstein, 1994; Lieberman, 2007), C-

system mental models are typically assumed to involve ‘cold’ (i.e. unfeeling) cognition.

Table 1 summarizes three major subtypes of X-system cognition – namely implicit

attitudes, subconscious goals, and implicit stereotypes – and outlines their implications for intra-

team coordination. We focus on these three types of X-system content because as indicated in

Table 1, they constitute reflexive analogues of C-system mental models of the task and team.

------ INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE ------

Dual-systems theories assume that X-system representations are deep seated and stable

across time and situations (Epstein, 1994; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004).

Although there is currently some debate concerning the test-retest reliability of X-system

representations compared to their C-system analogues and whether the two systems are equally


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amenable to change (Nosek, 2007), the balance of evidence suggests that X-system

representations are generally more resistant to external pressures relative to C-system

representations. Specifically, X-system representations tend to change only following repeated

exposure to an association between objects and/or attributes and are therefore less likely to

change based on single instances of new information (Gawronski & LeBel, 2008; Gregg, Seibt,

& Banaji, 2006; Joy-Gaba & Nosek, 2010; Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, 2001). In contrast, C-

system mental models can be updated quickly via single instance learning, e.g. using feedback to

modify mental models of a task in working memory (Marks, Zaccaro, & Mathieu, 2000).

Because the two systems involve different types of knowledge, it is possible that an

individual’s C-system representations can conflict with their X-system representations. We use

the term intrapersonal dissociation to refer to inconsistencies in the knowledge stored variously

in the two systems within a given person, indicated by the (often low) degree of correlation

between their X-system representations and their C-system representations pertaining to a given

object (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005). In so doing, we distinguish

conflict within the person from disagreement across individuals at the team level. Evidence for

intrapersonal dissociation exists in various domains. People often have dual-attitudes toward

objects, constructing reasoned evaluations that may differ from automatic attitudes that have

unidentified origins (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Similarly, they regularly pursue

implicit motives that conflict with their explicitly stated goals (Kehr, 2004). Furthermore,

individuals’ self-reported views of social groups (e.g. ethnic minorities) often differ from their

implicit stereotypes revealed through their actions (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004). Finally, while

problem solving, people often experience simultaneous contradictory beliefs when their

conscious reasoning conflicts with their intuitive reactions (Sloman, 1996).


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Competing influences on behavior. The X-system and C-system influence behavior in

distinctive ways. X-system representations tend to guide spontaneous actions that occur with

little deliberation (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). In contrast, C-system

representations are constructed effortfully in working memory and influence reasoned and

planned behavior through conscious intention. Meta-analytic evidence demonstrates that

measures of X-system cognition predict significant additional variance in behavioral criteria over

C-system measures and are often stronger predictors of behavior overall (Greenwald, Poehlman,

Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; Johnson, Tolentino, Rodopman, & Cho, 2010; Jost et al., 2009).

Parallel competitive dual-systems theories – epitomized by Lieberman’s (2007) X- and

C-system notions – also align with Latham, Stajkovic, and Locke’s (2010) arguments concerning

the competing and additive effects of subconscious and conscious goals. When the two systems

are aligned within the person, the effect is facilitative: subconscious goals assist the attainment of

conscious goals. However, when a person’s subconscious and conscious goals conflict, the effect

is competitive: they are processed in a relatively independent manner and there are two distinct

main effects on behavior.

Effects of Dual-systems at the Team Level

Given the evidence for dual-systems and intrapersonal dissociation, to define whether

cognition is shared at the team level (i.e. across individuals) it is necessary to consider whether

sharedness concerns cognition in the X-system, the C-system, or both. To that end, we posit two

levels of cognitive concordance for teams: X-system concordance refers to the degree of

similarity across team members’ X-system representations. C-system concordance, in contrast,

refers to the degree of overall similarity across team members’ C-system mental models. Given

the relative independence of the two systems, four types of concordance are possible (Figure 1).


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Specifically, team members can: (1) agree at the C-system level but not at the X-system level

(which we term illusory concordance), (2) agree at the X-system level but not at the C-system

level (surface discordance), (3) disagree at both levels (full discordance), or (4) agree at both

levels (full concordance).

------ INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ------

Illusory concordance. In a recent study of hospital workers, Leavitt, Fong and

Greenwald (2011) assessed employees’ attitudes toward their co-workers, supervisors, and the

organization using two types of measure. First, individuals completed self-report satisfaction

scales as an explicit measure of C-system attitudes. Next, they completed an implicit association

test (IAT) to tap their nonconscious (X-system) attitudes toward the same three objects. They

found that individuals’ X-system and C-system attitudes were not significantly correlated,

consistent with findings from similar studies in social psychology (Hofmann et al., 2005).

What predictions would we make concerning shared cognition among these workers? It is

unclear whether implicit attitudes, explicit attitudes, or both need to be shared. The conventional

way to operationalize shared cognition is to compute an index of convergence based on the

degree of similarity across individuals’ scores on explicit (i.e. C-system) measures such as

questionnaire ratings (Cooke et al., 2000; Mathieu et al., 2000). Applying this approach to the

hospital example, a team with similar explicit attitudes across its individual members would be

said to possess a shared (i.e. common) mental model that enabled the team to coordinate its

actions. However, the existence of intrapersonal dissociation problematizes this type of within-

team agreement. Imagine, for example, that some of the above individuals worked in a four-

person team, in which two of the team members were intra-personally dissociated, each holding

positive explicit (C-system) attitudes toward the task at hand but also negative implicit (X-


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system) attitudes toward that task. Meanwhile, the other two team members held consistent X-

system and C-system attitudes; that is, their X-system implicit and C-system explicit attitudes

toward the task were equally positive. In this example, C-system explicit attitudes would be

shared across members of the team, while X-system implicit associations would differ markedly.

When X-system representations are dissimilar but C-system mental models are similar

across team members, the cognitive state of the team is characterized by what we term illusory

concordance. The state is illusory because seeming agreement is in fact equivocal: team

members may well be cognizant of agreement at the conscious (C-system) level but are typically

unaware of their disagreement at the nonconscious (X-system) level.

Surface discordance. Surface discordance is the opposite of illusory concordance. It

refers to situations in which C-system mental models are dissimilar across team members, while

relevant X-system representations are similar. Returning to the above hospital example, surface

discordance would characterize situations in which team members constructed dissimilar (C-

system) explicit attitudes yet held similar (X-system) implicit attitudes. In such situations, the

standard C-system approach to shared cognition would conclude, potentially erroneously, that

the team lacked shared attitudes. Below, we will examine whether, in surface discordance

situations, similarity across team members’ X-system representations might be sufficient to

achieve effective coordination, even in the face of C-system disagreement.

Full discordance and full concordance. Full discordance refers to the state in which both

C-system mental models and X-system representations differ across team members. Full

concordance is the opposite of full discordance. It refers to the state in which X-system

representations and C-system mental models are both similar, across the team’s members.


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Antecedents of team cognitive concordances. We suggest that a primary means by

which illusory concordance and surface discordance originate is through similarities/differences

across team members in respect of two factors: learning histories and salient verbal information.

Sharedness of X-system representations results primarily from similarities in individuals’

general learning histories, i.e. patterns learned from interactions with the social environment

throughout the life course (Epstein, 1994; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). For this reason, even team

members from the same organization or work unit will often have dissimilar learning histories.

For example, the members of a work team composed of individuals from diverse social

backgrounds might apply a range of alternative stereotypes learned in and outside the workplace

when judging their teammates. Although a given task situation is likely to trigger a rich variety

of X-system representations, which particular representations are accessible and come to prevail

in the situation at hand is determined uniquely for each individual, a product of their

particularized learning histories (Higgins, 1996).

Sharedness of C-system mental models, in contrast, owes more to similarities in salient

verbal information that teammates bring to bear mindfully when describing and predicting the

focal task and team dynamics. Verbal information is information represented linguistically that

can be verbalized and used consciously in logical reasoning (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). C-

system mental models become similar when team members heed common verbal information

concerning the task and team, communicated variously in written documents such as reports and

emails (Gurtner, Tschan, Sernmer, & Nagele, 2007; Mathieu et al., 2000) and through verbal

interchanges in activities such as training and planning (Stout et al., 1999). For example,

members of military teams construct similar C-system mental models of new combat missions

based on the shared information they receive on that mission in briefings and documents. Since


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constructing mental models requires logical reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1983), sharedness of C-

system mental models is also likely to reflect similarities in the reasoning strategies applied to

accessible verbal information. Although individuals can also retrieve information from long-term

memory to inform C-system mental models (Rouse & Morris, 1987), because the origins of and

reasons for X-system representations are difficult to verbalize, they are less likely to be

incorporated when constructing those models.

Based on this logic, we suggest that illusory concordance arises when team members with

dissimilar learning histories use common verbal information, whereas the opposite circumstances

generate surface discordance. Specifically, teams will be prone to surface discordance when their

members have similar learning histories pertaining to the task and/or team but for whatever

reason do not use common sources of verbal information pertinent to the situation at hand.

EFFECTS OF X-SYSTEM CONCORDANCE ON TEAM COORDINATION

In this section, we analyze how (dis)similarity across team members’ X-system

representations can exert direct effects on intra-team coordination that compete with the effects

of C-system shared mental models; we also outline three moderators that strengthen the relative

influence of (un)shared X-system representations (see Figure 2). We define intra-team

coordination as the interdependent actions, activities and behavior patterns that enable team

members to work synchronously toward common goals (Arrow, McGrath, & Berdahl, 2000;

Rico, Sanchez-Manzanares, Gil, & Gibson, 2008). Research suggests that effective coordination

is the holy grail of team working. It is a key determinant of various team performance outcomes

– not least task performance, task completion times, and output levels (DeChurch & Mesmer-

Magnus, 2010a; Stewart, 2006) – but notoriously difficult to attain. As Cronin and Weingart

(2007: 768) observe, “coordination problems often occur when one team member’s


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actions/moves work against, contradict, or interfere with another’s.”

------ INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ------

We maintain that C-system and X-system concordance influence teams in distinct ways

because coordination relies on consistency of reasoned and spontaneous actions by team

members. Given that most work teams perform tasks over a period of days, weeks, or months

(Gersick, 1988), they inevitably involve periods of ‘mindlessness’, in which team members’

behavior is relatively spontaneous (i.e. it occurs without deliberative reasoning and conscious

choice), as well as periods where behavior reflects controlled and deliberate thinking (Elmes &

Gemmill, 1990; Gersick & Hackman, 1990; Louis & Sutton, 1991; Moulton, Regehr, Lingard,

Merritt, & MacRae, 2010; Neck & Manz, 1994). Below, we illustrate how C-system

concordance influences the coordination of reasoned action (i.e. action guided by deliberative

reasoning and conscious choice), whereas X-system concordance influences the coordination of

spontaneous action, and analyze how the two influences compete during team work.

Concordance of Implicit Attitudes in Work Groups and Teams

Attitudes are mental representations that signal the ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ of social

objects and thus influence approach and avoidance behaviors (Fazio & Olson, 2003). Cannon-

Bowers and Salas (2001) suggested that attitudes constitute a general category of content that

members of effective teams need to hold in a shared mental model — when team members have

shared attitudes they feel similarly toward issues and objects, favor the same activities, and

approach courses of action in a compatible manner.

Our account of shared cognition builds on our earlier observation that implicit and

explicit attitudes are often dissociated within the person (see also Hofmann et al., 2005; Nosek,

2007; Wilson et al., 2000). To clarify further the distinction between these two types of attitudes,


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we can view explicit attitudes as evaluations constructed ‘online’ in the C-system, to provide real

time appraisals of tasks and people (Wilson et al., 2000). People construct explicit attitudes

based on situational factors including accessible information, logical reasoning, and social

context (Schwarz & Bohner, 2007). In contrast, as shown in Table 1, implicit attitudes are X-

system representations stored in long-term memory that are introspectively unidentified in origin,

activated automatically without the individual’s awareness, and relatively enduring — as noted

earlier, they are less likely to change following single instances of new information (see also

Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Greenwald et al., 2002).

Implicit attitudes and illusory concordance. To illustrate how differences across team

members’ implicit attitudes can compete with and potentially undermine agreement on explicit

attitudes, consider the example of a management team deciding how to respond to a downturn in

revenues. In meetings, all team members agree with the logical proposition that salespeople

generate revenue so cutting back-office staff will reduce costs without hurting income. Hence,

they share a positive explicit attitude toward cutting back-office jobs and agree to investigate this

course of action by analyzing which departments to cut and how this decision will affect the

business. However, for some team members, traumatic prior experiences relating to layoffs has

created an implicit association between layoffs and negative affect, even though they are not

fully cognizant of this association. These dissociated members feel compelled to avoid actions

related to job cuts even while explicitly acknowledging the logic that cuts will be beneficial.

Hence, when working separately on their daily activities, they spontaneously favor other tasks

and avoid completing their part of the analysis. In contrast, the remaining team members take the

intended actions needed to plan the layoffs.

The foregoing illustration demonstrates how intrapersonally dissociated team members


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are liable to engage occasionally in spontaneous behavior consistent with their own implicit

attitudes but inconsistent with the team’s shared explicit attitudes. Implicit attitudes

automatically trigger behavioral tendencies and affective states that influence approach/

avoidance behaviors (Strack & Deutsch, 2004) and in so doing, they guide spontaneous team

actions such as prioritizing task inputs intuitively or choosing among alternative strategies for

completing subtasks without conscious deliberation. Even though teammates may discuss and

think about an agreed explicit attitude related to the task at hand, the influence of such attitudes

on behavior often wax and wanes, leaving conscious awareness due to forgetting, distraction, or

a lack of motivation/capacity to reconstruct the attitude in question (Olson & Fazio, 2009;

Wilson et al., 2000). Hence, when explicit attitudes are similar but implicit attitudes differ across

team members, team activity is likely to be characterized by episodes of deliberate consistency

coupled with episodes of unintentional divergence in behavioral tendencies, which reduces the

team’s overall synchronicity. In contrast, similarity of implicit and explicit attitudes across team

members (i.e. full concordance) increases the likelihood that the team as a whole will act more

harmoniously, in both its deliberative and spontaneous activities.

We suggest that diverging implicit attitudes also affect team dynamics through affective

mechanisms. Specifically, we argue that differences in team members’ implicit attitudes can

create variations in patterns of implicit affective attachment (cf. Barsade, Ramarajan, & Westen,

2009) toward the task at hand (e.g. making lay-offs might automatically stimulate anxiety for

some team members, while stimulating optimism for others). When team members’ exhibit

divergent X-system feelings toward a given task consistently – evident in facial expressions,

body language and spontaneous behaviors – such divergence can undermine group

cooperativeness (Barsade et al., 2000). Moreover, when team members make impulsive choices


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that are inconsistent with explicitly agreed preferences, teammates may attribute such

inconsistencies to deliberate intent, causing anger, distrust and a sense of ‘bad vibes’ within the

team (Lepine & Van Dyne, 2001; Taggar & Neubert, 2004). Furthermore, given that negative

affect can spread through groups via emotional contagion (Barsade, 2002) and that high negative

arousal inhibits C-system functioning (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), such contagion is likely to

increase individuals’ reliance on the X-system and thus amplify divergence when implicit

attitudes differ across the team. Although moderate levels of negative mood might improve

information processing at the team level (van Knippenberg, Kooij-de Bode, & van Ginkel,

2010), our theorizing highlights the harmful effects of more intense negative emotional reactions

that may be experienced toward particular team members.

All other things being equal, our analysis overall suggests that spontaneous divergence

and associated affective dynamics will be more prevalent in illusory concordance situations than

in full concordance situations. Hence, we propose:

Proposition 1a: When the sharedness of explicit attitudes is high but the sharedness of

implicit attitudes is low (illusory concordance), intra-team coordination will be less

effective than when the sharedness of implicit and explicit attitudes is high (full

concordance).

Implicit attitudes and surface discordance. Our analysis suggests a further intriguing

possibility: team members may still be able to coordinate their activities even when the degree of

sharedness in terms of explicit attitudes is low, providing the team’s implicit attitudes are

suitably aligned. It seems self-evident that dissimilar explicit attitudes impede coordination.

However, due to organizational constraints, in many situations teammates must continue to work

together despite dissimilar explicit attitudes (Fiol, 1994; Jehn, 1995). Moreover, as noted above,

team members may reflect and act upon reasoned attitudes only periodically. We suggest that,

under such circumstances, sharedness of implicit attitudes across the team can reduce the


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negative effects of explicit discordance on coordination.

Returning to the management team scenario, imagine now that all the team members

have positive implicit attitudes toward making layoffs because each of them has had several

positive experiences relating to layoffs in the past, but they are not consciously aware of the full

range of implicit associations they are bringing to the problem. Despite holding similar implicit

attitudes, team members can vary in their explicit evaluations; some might be intrapersonally

dissociated, reasoning that cutting back office workers will be disadvantageous because sales

persons will have to undertake support tasks, reducing their time to secure deals. Others might

disagree, reasoning that salespersons will absorb support tasks with little disruption. Hence,

variations in explicit attitudes toward the prospect of layoffs could undermine the team’s ability

to reach explicit consensus in meetings. However, when team members are working separately

on their constituent tasks, based on their similarly positive implicit attitudes, they favor common

task inputs (e.g. information supportive of layoffs) and prioritize common subtasks (e.g.

identifying which activities can be cut without detriment). Through the convergence of micro-

behaviors, team members are thus able to pursue a more consistent pattern of activity.

The net effect of these dynamics is not that implicit attitude similarity overrides

dissimilarities in explicit attitudes. Rather, we are proposing that, in surface discordance

situations, episodes of ‘emergent coordination’ can still occur over the course of a given task,

despite the presence of dissimilar explicit attitudes. Furthermore, when team members observe

that their actions are consistent despite articulated differences in attitudes, the team is likely to

experience a positive sense of unity that reinforces its cohesiveness (Harrison, Price, & Bell,

1998). Such periods of emergent unintended coordination contrast sharply with situations where

teams are in a state of full discordance. In the latter condition, not only will explicit attitude


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dissimilarity foster divergent deliberate behaviors; additionally, dissimilar implicit attitudes will

yield spontaneous divergence. In this way, X-system discordance has an additive effect on team

coordination, magnifying the difference between teams experiencing mere surface discordance

and those experiencing full discordance, in terms of their (in)ability to coordinate. Hence:

Proposition 1b: When the sharedness of explicit attitudes is low but the sharedness of

implicit attitudes is high (surface discordance), intra-team coordination will be more

effective than when the sharedness of explicit attitudes and implicit attitudes is low (full

discordance).

Concordance of Subconscious Goals in Work Groups and Teams

Whereas attitudes are mental representations of prior experience, goals are mental

representations of desired end states that regulate human behavior (Austin & Vancouver, 1996;

Locke, Saari, Shaw, & Latham, 1981). In team cognition research, goals are integral components

of shared task mental models. Teams whose members share task-relevant goals are expected to

coordinate better than teams whose members have divergent goals (Cronin & Weingart, 2007;

Lim & Klein, 2006; Mohammed et al., 2000). Shared goals are typically treated as conscious

purposes or deliberate plans (Locke & Latham, 2002); for example, combat teams agreeing on

protecting assets versus launching attacks (Edwards et al., 2006) or management teams agreeing

on performance targets (Miller, Burke, & Glick, 1998).

However, there is growing evidence that subconscious goals also drive task performance

(Latham & Piccolo, 2012; Latham et al., 2010; Stajkovic, Locke, & Blair, 2006). As defined in

Table 1, subconscious goals may concern generic implicit motives, such as power, achievement

and affiliation (McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989; McMullen, 1997), or specific

behavioral goals (Shah & Kruglanski, 2002). Subconscious goals are often primed by a

triggering stimulus, the effects of which individuals are unaware (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai,

Barndollar, & Trotschel, 2001). Once activated, subconscious goals, “sustain spontaneous


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behavioral trends over time” (McClelland et al., 1989: 690) until they are met.

Locke and colleagues (1981: 126) maintain that there is rarely a one-to-one

correspondence between conscious goals and actions because people have “subconscious

conflicts or premises that subvert their conscious goals.” Studies confirm that subconscious goals

often compete with conscious goals (Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003; Latham et al.,

2010; Légal, Meyer, & Delouvée, 2007), pulling attention away from the latter (Shah &

Kruglanski, 2002). Such conflicts pervade the workplace (Kehr, 2004). For example, employees

deliberately plan to work through their lunch break but get distracted by social media to satisfy

their implicit affiliation motives; managers consciously resolve to refuse future requests for their

time but, to meet their subconscious interpersonal goals, in the heat of the moment find

themselves helping colleagues.

Subconscious goals and illusory concordance. Work teams often reach explicit

consensus on goals before taking action and much of the time their members adhere to the goals

agreed (Hackman, 1987). However, we argue that intrapersonally dissociated team members will

sometimes pursue courses of action directed toward their subconscious goals, thereby diverging

from conscious goals shared at the team level. Switching between subconscious and conscious

goals during task performance is likely because people lack sufficient self-regulatory resources

to suppress subconscious goals over extended time periods (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000).

To illustrate illusory concordance of goals, consider the case of a top management team

deciding how to respond to a new entrant firm that is eroding their company’s market share.

Based on the information at hand, they reason logically that building an alliance will allow them

to learn and protect their position, whereas challenging the new firm will provoke a strong

counter reaction. Hence, the team consciously forms a shared C-system goal of collaborating


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with the new entrant. However, several team members have a high implicit need for achievement

– a nonspecific subconscious (X-system) goal that predisposes them toward competition

(McClelland et al., 1989). Over time, this subconscious goal maintains a pattern of impulses,

whereby the members of this particular subgroup categorize and refer to the new firm as a

competitor, select and share information to construe it as an aggressor, and act hostilely when

communicating with its representatives. Although teammates with lower need for achievement

act collaboratively as explicitly agreed, inconsistent behavior caused by discordant subconscious

goals across the team as a whole jeopardizes the alliance.

In the preceding example, pursuing a discordant subconscious goal spurs spontaneous

courses of action that contradict the team’s consciously agreed goals. The net effect of such

discordance is that, although intrapersonally dissociated team members may still direct some of

their attention toward the consciously shared team goals, it reduces the overall amount of

collective time and energy for doing so, thereby undermining the team’s efforts.

We posit two further effects of illusory concordance pertaining to goals. First, team

members diverging from agreed goals will likely generate frustration and negative emotional

arousal (Berkowitz, 1989; Carver & Scheier, 1990), thus undermining cohesion; furthermore,

when team members are frustrated by their teammates they often withhold their own efforts,

heightening motivational losses (Kerr, 1983). Second, when team members are impeded by

teammates diverging from agreed priorities, they must attempt to make sense of why the

divergence occurred, what effect it will have on the team’s performance, and how to address the

problems thus created. Such task-focused sensemaking can cause team members to question their

mental models and slow down action (Klein, Wiggins, & Dominguez, 2010).

In contrast with illusory concordance situations, the preceding dynamics will be


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noticeably absent when both conscious and subconscious goals are shared across the team

because reasoned and spontaneous actions will be consistent. Accordingly, we posit:

Proposition 2a: When the sharedness of conscious goals is high but the sharedness of

subconscious goals is low (illusory concordance), intra-team coordination will be less

effective than when the sharedness of conscious and subconscious goals is high (full

concordance).

The converse of the situation described in the preceding proposition is that, as with

implicit attitudes, team members can share common subconscious goals but have dissimilar

conscious goals. Returning to our example of the top management team deciding how to react to

a new entrant firm, suppose that through deliberate reasoning based on the information available

to them, half of the team reasoned that competing aggressively through moves such as price cuts

would counter the rival. Those team members would likely champion competitive action. In

contrast, suppose that the other half of the team had access to opposing information; accordingly,

they might reason that the team should seek to collaborate. As a result, C-system goals would

differ markedly across the two halves of the team. However, suppose that all managers had a

high X-system implicit need for achievement, predisposing them favorably toward competition.

Although attempts to assess consensus on objectives using C-system measures (Knight et al.,

1999) would reveal diverse mental models, we contend that team members would still be able to

coordinate spontaneous actions, due to the high level of implicit goal similarity prevailing.

Despite conscious disagreement on explicit goals, work teams must often proceed with

their assignments due to external pressures (Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, & Bourgeois, 1997; Fiol,

1994). Facing such disagreement, teams typically postpone the decision at hand or simply agree

to disagree, while proceeding with their activities. In such circumstances, shared subconscious

goals provide a means of maintaining coordinated actions over time because individuals with

similar subconscious goals tend to derive pleasure from the same types of activity (McClelland,


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1985). Concordance of subconscious goals is therefore likely to keep team members involved in

common activities despite explicit disagreements over how the team should move forward. We

argue that concordant subconscious goals ensure that team members are energized by common

issues (i.e. those relevant to implicit motives), focus on similar activities, and engage in

compatible spontaneous behaviors. Hence, concordant subconscious goals can produce periods

of unplanned coordination, despite discordance in explicitly agreed priorities. Hence:

Proposition 2b: When the sharedness of conscious goals is low but the sharedness of

subconscious goals is high (surface discordance), intra-team coordination will be more

effective than when the sharedness of conscious goals and subconscious goals is low (full

discordance).

Concordance of Implicit Stereotypes in Work Groups and Teams

As with attitudes and goals, intrapersonal dissociation also occurs for social stereotypes.

For instance, self-reported C-system values and beliefs concerning ethnic groups often conflict

with unacknowledged feelings toward those groups arising from implicit stereotypes in the X-

system (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Gupta, Turban, & Bhawe, 2008). As indicated in Table 1,

implicit stereotypes comprise nonconscious associations derived from associative learning that

automatically connect social category members with basic attributes (e.g. greedy, kind) and

confer positive or negative affect (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald et al., 2002).

We maintain that implicit stereotypes can compete with and potentially undermine C-

system mental models of the team. Mental models of the team contain team members’

knowledge of their team mates’ abilities and characteristics (Mathieu et al., 2000). Shared mental

models of the team are a key component of transactive memory systems, i.e. the division of

cognitive labor that enables groups to coordinate information flows (Brandon & Hollingshead,

2004). Researchers assume that if teams agree on the respective qualities of their members then

group storage (i.e. sending task-relevant information to where it is needed) and retrieval (i.e.


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accessing information from whoever is expert in a given domain) will be an effective foundation

for coordination (Hollingshead, 1998).

Implicit stereotypes and illusory concordance. The existence of implicit stereotypes

explains why teams can fail to orchestrate information storage and retrieval, even if they agree

consciously on who is the expert in a given domain. For instance, based on reasoned C-system

judgments, teams may agree that a particular teammate is best qualified in a given domain,

irrespective of their ethnic background. However, individuals who hold negative implicit

stereotypes for the ethnic group of the teammate in question may show reluctance to engage fully

with them, thereby restricting information flows within the wider team. Such resistance is often

passive and subtle. For instance, negative implicit racial stereotypes lead people to maintain

greater social distance from stereotyped individuals (Amodio & Devine, 2006).

In addition to implicit stereotypes concerning basic characteristics (e.g. gender, race)

stereotypes concerning occupation and function can also operate below the level of conscious

awareness (Lassonde & O'Brien, 2013; White & White, 2006). For instance, accountants might

be stereotyped as conservative, engineers as methodical, and managers as dominant. On this

basis, implicit functional and occupational stereotypes can act as specific status cues, providing

(potentially misleading) information concerning individuals’ abilities to perform particular tasks

(Bunderson, 2003). Coordination problems can arise when such stereotypes conflict with the

team’s C-system mental models. For instance, in initial meetings team mates might consciously

agree to allocate an information gathering role to an individual with a relevant management

background, thereby building a shared mental model of the role he/she is to play. However,

members of the team who implicitly associate managers with negative traits such as dominance

may avoid sharing technical information with the focal individual, intuitively preferring to pass


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such information directly to teammates with an engineering background, whom they associate

implicitly with technical skills. In contrast, coordination problems are less likely to occur when

implicit stereotypes are aligned with C-system mental models of the team because such

alignment will help to ensure the consistency of reasoned and spontaneous information sharing

behaviors. Hence:

Proposition 3a: When the sharedness of implicit stereotypes is low but the sharedness of

mental models of the team is high (illusory concordance), intra-team coordination will be

less effective than when the sharedness of implicit stereotypes and mental models of the

team is high (full concordance).

Implicit stereotypes and surface discordance. Implicit stereotyping explains how it is

possible for teams to harmonize information storage and retrieval even when they lack shared C-

system models of team members’ capabilities. For instance, team members may not share mental

models of the team when facing novel tasks (Bunderson, 2003). However, we maintain that

when teams act spontaneously, shared implicit stereotypes can create consistencies in the

patterns of information flows within the team. For example, the members of a top management

team might not agree consciously on which teammates know most about a novel problem they

are working on, yet still orchestrate information sharing consistently by reverting to shared

implicit stereotypes concerning their respective functional backgrounds. Similarly, the members

of an emergency response team might lack deliberative understanding of which individuals

would best assist them with a specific problem, but in the heat of the moment retrieve

information effectively by turning to individuals who fit their implicit stereotypes for

trustworthiness (Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, & Hollingshead, 2007). Hence:

Proposition 3b: When the sharedness of implicit stereotypes is high but the sharedness of

mental models the team is low (surface discordance), intra-team coordination will be more

effective than when the sharedness of implicit stereotypes and mental models of the team is

low (full discordance).

Moderators of X-System Concordance Effects on Team Coordination


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Thus far, we have posited a new independent variable that provides a more complete

explanation of intra-team coordination, namely, X-system concordance. This construct concerns

sharedness across team members of the full range of X-system content identified above. We turn

now to consider conditions under which the influence of X-system concordance is likely to be

most pronounced. To this end, we outline how time pressure, cognitive load, and team

interaction processes moderate the relationships theorized in the propositions above. These

particular factors relate most closely to the causal mechanisms posited in our model. When one

or more of these moderators increases reliance on X-system representations this will exacerbate

the coordination problems outlined above for illusory concordance teams (whose members have

dissimilar X-system representations) but alleviate such problems for surface discordance teams

(whose members have similar X-system representations).

Time pressure. Time pressure refers to feelings of time scarcity that result from

constraints on the duration available from the onset of a given task to the delivery of specified

task outputs (Karau & Kelly, 2004). When time is not constrained team members are able to

reflect at length before taking action, whereas under time pressure they have less opportunity to

deliberate and must therefore act more spontaneously (Bowman & Wittenbaum, 2012; Isenberg,

1981). When time for reflection is scarce, the influence of X-system representations grows

because X-system processes occur rapidly and without deliberation, thus enabling faster

responses (Lieberman et al., 2002). For example, under time pressure individuals are more likely

to solve problems using intuition (i.e. affectively charged judgments borne of automatic and

holistic associations) rather than logical rules (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox, &

Sadler-Smith, 2008).

We argue that a hitherto underappreciated effect of time pressure is that it increases the


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likelihood that consistency between team members’ actions depends on similarity across their X-

system representations, relative to their C-system mental models. If team members are

dissociated in terms of their X-system and C-system representations relevant to the task (i.e. their

implicit attitudes, goals and/or stereotypes favor a different course of action to their explicit

analogues), they are less likely to follow the former when operating under time pressure but

more likely to follow the latter when time is plentiful. We thus posit:

Proposition 4: Time pressure moderates the relationship between X-system concordance

and intra-team coordination; specifically, when time pressure is high (low), X-system

concordance has stronger (weaker) effects on intra-team coordination.

Cognitive load. A second factor affecting the relative influence of the X-system is

cognitive load. In teams, cognitive load varies as a function of team task complexity and

uncertainty (Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006) and the extent to which individuals must divide their

attention between the task and socio-emotional aspects of team work (Brown, 2000).

According to cognitive load theory (Sweller, 1988), the information processing capacity

of conscious (i.e. C-system) working memory is limited to a relatively small number of

information elements and their interactions; hence, cognitive load grows as the number of issues

to be processed increases, to the point where the C-system is distracted and mindful functioning

is impeded. The X-system, in contrast, is relatively unconstrained in its capacity to process

automatically the associative representations stored in long-term memory and is unaffected by

conscious demands (Paas, Renkl, & Sweller, 2004).

Research identifies two mechanisms by which cognitive load increases reliance on the X-

system. First, decision making studies show that if the C-system is overloaded, the X-system

takes over. For instance, when attempting to perform multiple tasks simultaneously people are

unable to perform consequentialist judgments and act instead on emotional responses that arise


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automatically (Greene et al., 2008). Second, high cognitive load reduces the cognitive resources

available to control impulsive behaviors that stem from X-system representations (Hofmann,

Friese, & Strack, 2009). For instance, Friese, Hofmann, and Wänke (2008) found that under high

cognitive load impulsive processes driven by implicit attitudes guided behavior, whereas when

cognitive load was low behavior reflected controlled processes driven by explicit attitudes.

Together, these mechanisms suggest that overloaded team members will lack sufficient cognitive

capacity to construct and act on explicitly agreed attitudes, prioritize consciously agreed goals,

and act on status cues decided mindfully (i.e. the content of C-system mental models), thereby

increasing reliance on equivalent representations in the X-system that will produce behaviors that

they are less able to regulate. Hence, under high cognitive load a greater proportion of team

member behaviors will result from X-system representations and team coordination will

therefore depend to a greater extent on the similarity of those representations across the team:

Proposition 5: Cognitive load moderates the relationship between X-system concordance

and intra-team coordination; specifically, when cognitive load is high (low), X-system

concordance has stronger (weaker) effects on intra-team coordination.

Team interaction processes. Team interaction processes comprise episodes of direct

interrelating among team members (e.g. team meetings, progress updates, and team briefings)

that provide opportunities for exchanging verbal information through discussion, monitoring, and

planning (Hackman, 1987; McGrath, 1984). Team interactions can be viewed as interruptive

events that stimulate reflection (Zellmer-Bruhn, 2003). Two mechanisms produce this effect.

First, team members activate and rehearse their C-system mental models during team

interactions by forming verbal arguments concerning how to perform the task at hand, self-

monitoring those arguments, and deliberating about the task with team mates (Druskat &

Pescosolido, 2002; Weick & Roberts, 1993). Because group discussion activates C-system


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mental models it increases the likelihood that those models will influence deliberate planning

and behavioral intentions formed in team interactions (Schmidt et al., 1989); such intentions are

the main mechanism by which C-system mental models influence behavior (Strack & Deutsch,

2004). In contrast, we suggest that an absence of social prompts for heedful reasoning facilitates

reliance on automatic X-system representations.

Second, team interaction provides a social pressure to act rationally and minimize

intuitive subjectivity. Accountability studies show that the prospect of having to explain or

justify oneself in social interaction encourages more complex, reasoned information processing;

conversely, when individuals work on tasks without the presence of teammates they will do so

based on automatic and emotional associations that enable them to pursue their intuitive

convictions (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 1983).

Because more behavior will be based on X-system inputs when team interaction is less

frequent, a low degree of team interaction combined with discordance across team members’ X-

system representations creates greater opportunity for individuals to ‘go their own way’ – that is,

to pursue divergent spontaneous actions, driven by dissimilar X-system inputs, in a relatively

unchecked manner. It seems reasonable that a high degree of team interaction should attenuate

these effects. Conversely, the potentially positive effects of X-system concordance (e.g. in

surface discordance situations) will be less evident when team interaction is high. Hence:

Proposition 6: Team interaction processes moderate the relationship between X-system

concordance and intra-team coordination; specifically, the lower (higher) the degree of

team interaction, the stronger (weaker) the influence of X-system concordance on intra-

team coordination.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

We have described the nature of reflexive (X-system) concordance, explained its effects

on team coordination relative to reflective (C-system) forms of shared cognition, and identified


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the conditions under which it is likely to be influential. This section outlines how future research

might test our propositions and examines new avenues of inquiry opened up by our analysis.

Measurement and Methods

As a necessary starting point, it is useful to consider alternative methods for studying X-

system cognition in teams. Future research could test our propositions by adapting techniques for

measuring implicit cognition at the individual level (Haines & Sumner, 2006; Uhlmann et al.,

2012) to team settings. By way of illustration, to study the effects of discordance versus

concordance of implicit attitudes, researchers might utilize the IAT (Greenwald, McGhee, &

Schwartz, 1998). At the individual level, the IAT provides a simple score of implicit attitude,

ranging from positive to negative values (for a review, see Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007).

At the team level, the degree of concordance of implicit attitudes could be operationalized via

statistical procedures presently used to assess (C-system) within-group agreement (Cooke et al.,

2000). Researchers should consider which of the various indices for operationalizing sharedness

provides the greatest predictive validity in the context of X-system sharedness. In a related vein,

researchers might also examine the predicted effects of concordant subconscious goals in teams

by measuring the degree of sharedness of implicit motives (Schultheiss et al., 2007) and

analyzing its ability to explain incremental variance in team processes.

Future research might also examine the effects of subconscious priming on the team

dynamics we have discussed. Situational cues such as salient imagery (Latham & Piccolo, 2012)

or prominent text (Welsh & Ordonez, 2013) can activate existing X-system representations and

temporarily strengthen their influence on behavior. It thus follows that if team members have

similar X-system representations, situational cues that activate them should improve

coordination. Conversely, when team members’ X-system representations are dissimilar and they


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are exposed to cues that activate those representations, coordination should be less effective.

Future work could test these ideas using priming methods (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000).

Extending Theories of Team Cognition

In this article, we have confined our attention to the effects of X-system concordance on

intra-team coordination. We suspect, however, that the basic insights of our analysis might be

extended profitably to a range of additional group processes, not least groupthink (Janis, 1982),

strategic consensus (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992), and team identification (Van der Vegt &

Bunderson, 2005). To illustrate these possibilities, consider the case of team identification. Our

analysis suggests that because X-system representations drive spontaneous affect and behavior,

team members whose X-system representations are discordant with those of the majority of the

team will frequently feel negative antipathy toward their colleagues and the tasks at hand,

leading them to de-identify with the team.

Our theory also has significant implications for research on cross understanding. As

conceived presently, cross understanding refers to one person’s understanding of another

person’s C-system mental models (Huber & Lewis, 2010). Our analysis suggests that if

individuals are able to recognize fellow group members’ X-system representations, they should

be able to predict with greater reliability how those individuals will behave in a range of

situations, especially situations in which actions are more spontaneous than deliberate. Future

research should examine the feasibility of reflexive (X-system) cross understanding and its

effects on group processes vis-à-vis reflective (C-system) cross understanding.

Future research should also consider the implications of our arguments for dynamic team

cognition (Cooke, Gorman, Myers, & Duran, 2013). By focusing on similarity across team

members’ mental representations at a given point in time, we have not discussed how teams


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move from one cognitive state (e.g. illusory concordance) to another (e.g. full concordance).

However, our analysis implies that although C-system mental models converge relatively quickly

through team interaction, changes in X-system representations require repeated exposure to new

information, along the lines suggested by associative conditioning studies (Gawronski &

Bodenhausen, 2006). Longitudinal studies investigating the factors that influence team member

convergence or divergence in X-system representations would thus provide much needed

insights into the dynamics of team coordination.

Compilational Emergence, Team Self-Regulation, and Routines

The issue of dynamic team cognition raises important questions about how best to

conceptualize X-system concordance. For reasons noted at the outset, in this article we have

adopted a compositional approach to this problem. An interesting question for future research,

however, is whether X-system processes can yield collective cognition through compilational

processes (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). In other words, might distinctive group-level cognitive

states emerge from interactions between individual X-system representations? Developments in

socially situated cognition support this possibility. Studies show that individuals pick up

automatically on one another’s subconscious priorities and feelings – based on overt gestures,

posture, eye movements and a range of related nonverbal behaviors – and synchronize their

mental representations and actions accordingly (Hurley, Clark, & Kiverstein, 2008). It thus

seems plausible that team members’ X-system processes might trigger adaptive responses at the

group level through a relatively automatic process of interpersonal synchronicity.

The possibility that X-system concordance might facilitate the emergence of

synchronized nonverbal patterns raises important new questions for future research on the

leadership of workgroups and teams. Specifically, given mounting evidence that leaders vary in


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their ability to understand the significance of differentiated implicit and affective behavioral cues

emitted from team members (Ashkanasy, Hartel, & Daus, 2002; Sanchez-Burks & Huy, 2009),

to what extent and by what means is it possible for leaders to recognize, even at a nonconscious

level, the signs of X-system discordance? To address this question, the ‘Reading the Mind in the

Eyes’ test (Woolley et al., 2010) could be used to assess leaders’ sensitivity to relevant nonverbal

social cues. Our analysis suggests that skilled leaders who spot X-system discordance would be

in a stronger position to prevent coordination failures.

Of course, the management of X-system discordance is not always left to team leaders;

the self-regulatory capability of the wider team is another potentially important mechanism for

alleviating its deleterious consequences. Self-regulation concerns the ability to control emotional

impulses and drive states within the self (Lord, Diefendorff, Schmidt, & Hall, 2010). Self-

regulation is thus a potentially potent mechanism for mediating X-system processes because such

processes result from an overarching ‘experiential’ self-system (Epstein, 1994). Future research

should examine whether teams with greater self-regulatory capabilities can control X-system

discordance more effectively than teams lacking those capabilities.

The analysis of reflexive processes might also help to shed light on another interesting

aspect of group life, namely the nature and development of routines. Prior research indicates that

much activity in work groups and teams is governed by routines that are largely reflexive (Cohen

& Bacdayan, 1994; Gersick & Hackman, 1990). Our analysis highlights the importance of two

basic types of routines, which we term task-maintenance routines and team-maintenance

routines. The function of task maintenance routines is to off-load cognitive coordination onto

well-learned patterns of behavior, particularly the cognitively demanding job of selecting actions

that are complementary and compatible with teammates’ actions. Such off-loading facilitates


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synchronous team activities that would be impossible to perform in a short time span using C-

system reasoning alone. For instance, in surgical teams nurses respond automatically to the body

language of surgeons in order to provide information in the surgeon’s preferred manner. The

function of team maintenance routines, in contrast, is to regulate individual team members’

actions so as to bring them into line with the group. A key of such routines is to control for

potential X-system differences among members. For instance, long-standing teams might evolve

repeated tactics to prevent the procrastination that can occur when certain members follow

personal impulses instead of longer term responsibilities.

Heterogeneity, Faultlines and Diversity

Developing team diversity constructs that are more nuanced can help researchers study

how diversity affects team performance (Carpenter, Geletkanycz & Sanders, 2004; Harrison &

Klein, 2007). Our analysis points to a need for a more careful consideration of reflexive and

reflective forms of diversity, not least because, as we have demonstrated, similarity of team

members’ X-system representations pertaining to a given attribute can compete with the putative

effects of diversity in terms of differences across the team’s corresponding C-system

representations pertaining to that same attribute. For this reason, researchers need to consider

whether the type of diversity theorized to affect various team processes and outcomes is likely to

involve X-system diversity, C-system diversity, or both. To illustrate, researchers interested in

how attitudinal similarity affects group cohesion should consider whether similarity of implicit

or explicit attitudes (e.g. toward the task, the job, the team, and the organization) best predicts

cohesion, taking into account the moderating factors we have identified.

Our focus on coordination has led us to emphasize the disadvantages of dissimilar X-

system content. However, applying our framework to the analysis of cognitive diversity (Kilduff,


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Angelmar, & Mehra, 2000; Mohammed & Ringseis, 2001) promises to advance understanding of

how differences in X-system content might benefit teams, going beyond attitudes, goals and

stereotypes. For instance, extrapolating from research on creative problem solving at the

individual level, creative insight at the team level might emanate ultimately from diverse X-

system representations and the application of C-system processes to those representations (cf.

Helie & Sun, 2010. Our own analysis suggests that surface discordant groups will experience

difficulties in generating truly diverse alternatives, due to overlapping X-system content, despite

differences across C-system mental models and associated reasoning, whereas illusorily

concordant groups will be able to generate more radical ideas, due to underlying differences in

their members’ X-system representations.

The concept of reflexive concordance adds an additional layer to the types of diversity

that can create faultlines in teams. Faultines are hypothetical dividing lines within groups based

on group members’ attributes (Lau & Murnighan, 1998). Previous research has contrasted

faultiness based on surface-level diversity (e.g. demographic diversity) with those based on deep-

level diversity, i.e. diversity in attitudes and beliefs (Harrison et al., 1998; Harrison, Price, Gavin,

& Florey, 2002). However, to date attitudes and beliefs have been theorized and operationalized

in terms of C-system content, thereby overlooking X-system content. Our analysis suggests that

affective diversity (Barsade et al., 2000), for example in the form of diverse X-system emotional

associations might be construed as an additional generative mechanism underpinning the

development of faultlines. Much as with deep-level diversity as currently conceived, it would

seem that subgroups based on reflexive similarity would develop later rather than earlier in a

team’s tenure, when team members have had time to observe one another’s spontaneous

behaviors. Future studies might examine whether measuring deep-level faultlines based on X-


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system content enables researchers to predict better the formation of divisive subgroups over and

above measures of diversity in explicit beliefs. The former may be particularly hard to bridge

because X-system content can be difficult to change.

Building on the idea of faultlines, several of the case examples we have developed to

illustrate our theorizing concerning the interactions between reflexion and reflection depict

situations in which the team’s cognitive composition has a bimodal distribution (Harrison &

Klein, 2007), e.g. half of unit members have negative implicit attitudes but the other half have

positive implicit attitudes. In future, researchers might consider the effects of alternative

distributions of X-system sharedness, e.g. team members’ being spread more evenly along the

continuum for a given implicit attitude. Future research might also consider the question of

exactly how much reflexive discordance is required to attenuate reflective concordance and

undermine team performance. In some situations a single intrapersonally dissociated team

member may be sufficient to undermine performance (e.g. where that individual has some

essential skill or controls significant resources), whereas in other situations the average level of

X-system discordance may have a greater negative effect on team coordination and performance.

Our theorizing also speaks to a problem that has dogged research on diversity in top

management teams. Researchers have theorized that teams comprising executives with diverse

functional backgrounds are more innovative and their organizations more successful because

they have broader cognitive resources, functional background being posited as a proxy for

cognition (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). However, functional

background, when measured directly, has proven an ineffective predictor of managerial

cognition (Chattopadhyay, Glick, Miller, & Huber, 1999; Markoczy, 1997). To date, researchers

have assumed that this lack of association is due to the fact that demographic characteristics are


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39

poor proxies for cognition. Our analysis suggests an alternative explanation; namely, that direct

(C-system) measures of cognition do not capture the full range of cognitive content in play

because they neglect X-system content. Hence, a promising way forward is to examine the extent

to which managers’ demographic background characteristics correlate with their X-system

representations that are relevant to strategic decisions, even when their causal (C-system) mental

models do not. If this correlation holds, reflexive cognition could provide the missing link

connecting top team demography to strategic decision processes and organizational outcomes.

Finally, our theorizing might also be useful for understanding distributed expertise in

teams. The concept of transactive memory emphasizes that specialized expertise is often

distributed among team members (Brandon & Hollingshead, 2004; Faraj & Sproull, 2000;

Wegner, 1987). From this perspective, having team members who ‘know who knows what’ may

be more important than having team members with similar knowledge. However, a dual systems

perspective suggests that much of the knowledge underpinning expertise is stored in the X-

system, i.e. procedural knowledge that is tacit and nonconscious (Anderson, 1982). For instance,

in a software team, systems-software engineers and application engineers each have unique tacit

knowledge that they use in a complementary manner to develop software that is compatible with

one other’s needs. In teams where a significant degree of task expertise is stored in the X-system,

it may be difficult for members to accurately know who knows what because such knowledge is

hard to verbalize and share. One possible way to address this problem is by establishing

communities of practice (Wenger, 1998), in which teammates are encouraged to elaborate their

experiences to render explicit the tacit knowledge they use in situated practice.

CONCLUSION

Distinguishing reflexive (X-system) from reflective (C-system) processes, this article has


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40

provided a more nuanced understanding of the nature and effects of shared cognition in work

groups and teams. In particular, it has documented how competition for behavioral control

between the X-system and C-system within individuals can create contradictions across team

members’ actions, thus laying the necessary conceptual foundations for future empirical work to

expand current understanding of the socio-cognitive dynamics underpinning team functioning.


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41

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TABLE 1

X-System (Reflexive) Processes and their Effects on Team Cognition and Team Coordination

Constructs Definitions Examples Content

Types a

Interactions with shared

mental models

Effects on team

coordination

Propositions

Implicit

attitudes

“…introspectively unidentified (or

inaccurately identified) traces of

past experience that mediate

favorable or unfavorable feeling,

thought, or action toward social

objects” (Greenwald & Banaji,

1995: 8).

Implicit

attitudes

toward task

elements;

implicit

attitudes

towards

teamwork.

Task and

Team

Competing (and additive):

discordance (concordance)

across team members’

implicit attitudes weakens

(strengthens) the effects of

shared task mental models

on team processes and

performance.

Low sharedness of implicit

attitudes leads to

incompatible automatic

approach/avoidance

behaviors within the team,

thereby undermining intra-

team coordination.

P1a, P1b

Subconscious

goals

“… goals [that] can be activated

without an act of conscious will

— independently of conscious

purposes — and then operate in

the absence of conscious guidance

to guide cognition and behavior

towards the desired end-state”

(Bargh et al., 2008: 535).

Subconscious

task-relevant

goals; generic

implicit

motives.

Task Competing (and additive):



subconscious goals weakens

(strengthens) the effects of

shared task mental models

on team processes and

performance.

Low sharedness of

subconscious goals leads

members to sustain

diverging spontaneous

courses of action over

time, thereby undermining

intra-team coordination.

P2a, P2b

Implicit

stereotypes

“… introspectively unidentified

(or inaccurately identified) traces

of past experience that mediate

attributions of qualities to

members of a social category”

(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995: 15).

Implicit

social

stereotypes;

implicit

occupational/

functional

stereotypes.

Team Competing (and additive):



implicit stereotypes

weakens (strengthens) the

effects of shared team

mental models on team

processes and performance.

Low sharedness of implicit

stereotypes leads to

breakdowns in knowledge

storage and retrieval

among team members,

thereby undermining intra-

team coordination.

P3a, P3b

Notes a Content type refers to the type of shared mental model with which each X-system process primarily competes. Task mental models contain knowledge of elements of the task and

relations among them. Team mental models contain knowledge of the characteristics, skills and abilities of team members.


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FIGURE 1

Four Types of Cognitive Concordance/Discordance in Teams

Similarity of

X-system

representations

across

members

High Surface

discordance

Full

concordance

Low Full

discordance

Illusory

concordance

Low High

Similarity of

C-system mental models

across members


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FIGURE 2

Effects of X-System and C-System Cognition on Team Coordination and Performance

Intra-team coordination Team performance

Cross-member similarity of C-

system representations

• Shared task mental models

• Shared team mental models

Cross-member similarity of X-

system representations

• Shared implicit attitudes

• Shared subconscious goals

• Shared implicit stereotypes

Time pressure

Cognitive load

Team interaction


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Mark P. Healey ([email protected]) is Senior Lecturer in Strategic Management at

Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, UK. He received his PhD in

Management Sciences from the University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology

(UMIST). His research focuses on cognition in organizations, particularly applied to the

strategic management process.

Timo Vuori ([email protected]) is an Assistant Professor of Strategic Management at Aalto

University and a Visiting Scholar at INSEAD. He studies cognition and emotion in the strategy

process

Gerard P. Hodgkinson ([email protected]) is Professor of Strategic Management

and Behavioural Science, Associate Dean, and Head of the Behavioural Science Group at

Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, UK. His research interests center on

managerial and organizational cognition, the psychological foundations of strategic management,

and the nature and significance of management and organizational research for academia and

wider publics.


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when teams agree while disagreeing: reflexion and reflection in shared cognition

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