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CONTENTS Eye on a Worldwide Weapons Cache Mail for Congress Irradiated, Checked For Anthrax Spores Powell Says Nuclear Warhead Deal Is Close Washington Whispers Nuclear Experts In Pakistan May Have Links To Al Qaeda Uranium Bust Heightens Fears About Russia's Nuclear Material The Nuke Pipeline U.S. Scuttles Germ War Conference "We Were Ready" Ex-Military Linked To Anthrax Mail Al Qaeda's Nuclear Agenda Verified Putin Offers India Nuke, Aircraft Deals All Nuclear And Biological Roads Lead To Iraq's Hussein U.S. Seeks Written Deal On Weapons Cuts Powell Says Russian Leaders Are Resigned To U.S. Intent On Missile-Defense System U.S. And Russia To Complete Talks On An Arms Control Pact The Anthrax Probe Ranges Far And Wide As Investigators Scour Tips, Trash For Leads Bioport Nears FDA Inspection Of Anthrax Vaccine Plant Legislation Calls For Safety Vote On Incinerator Is This The Next Cipro? Not Quite Bomber 'planned chemical attack' Nuclear Industry Faces Jitters

#132 11 Dec 2001

Eye on a Worldwide Weapons Cache By Dick Lugar Thursday, December 6, 2001; Page A39 The United States is engaged in a global war against Muslim religious extremists who seek to reorder the world by destroying our country and various other nations allied with us. The war proceeds in a world awash with nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and materials of mass destruction stored principally in the United States and Russia, but also in India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Sudan, Israel, Great Britain, France and China and perhaps other nations. Throughout much of the past decade, vulnerability to the use of weapons of mass destruction has been the number one national security dilemma confronting the United States, even as it received scant attention. The events of Sept. 11 and the subsequent public discovery of al Qaeda's methods, capabilities and intentions have finally brought our vulnerability to the forefront. The terrorists have demonstrated suicidal tendencies and are beyond deterrence. We must anticipate that they will use weapons of mass destruction if allowed the opportunity. The minimum standard for victory in this war is the prevention of any of the individual terrorists or terrorist cells from obtaining weapons or materials of mass destruction. The war effort in Afghanistan is destroying the Afghan-based al Qaeda network and the Taliban regime. It is a war meant in part to demonstrate that governments that are hosts to terrorists face destruction. But as we prosecute this war, we must pay much more attention to the other side of the equation: making certain that all weapons and materials of mass destruction are identified, continuously guarded and systematically destroyed. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program was enacted in 1991 to address the dominant international proliferation danger: the massive nuclear, chemical and biological weapons infrastructure of the former Soviet Union. The Nunn-Lugar program has devoted American technical expertise and money to joint U.S.-Russian efforts to safeguard and destroy materials and weapons of mass destruction in Russia. During the first 10 years of Nunn-Lugar, 5,700 Russian nuclear warheads have been separated from missiles. Many of the warheads have been dismantled and the fissile material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) safely stored. More than 30,000 tactical nuclear weapons have been collected and stored, and peaceful employment has been provided for thousands of Russian nuclear scientists. Nunn-Lugar also has worked to contain chemical weapons in Russia, which has ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention requiring destruction of all of these weapons in 10 years. Forty thousand metric tons of chemical weapons have been stored in seven locations awaiting destruction. Progress has been made toward controlling Russian biological materials, though their status is less certain. Unfortunately, beyond Russia, there are no Nunn-Lugar-style programs aimed at nonproliferation. We lack even minimal international confidence about many weapons programs, including the number of weapons or amounts of materials produced, the storage procedures employed, and production or destruction plans. This must change. To restate the terms of minimal victory in the war we are now fighting, every nation that has weapons and materials of mass destruction must account for what it has, safely secure what it has (spending its own money or obtaining international technical and financial resources to do so) and pledge that no other nation, cell or cause will be allowed access or use. This task will be expensive and painstaking. During the first two months of the war, many questions have been raised about the security of Pakistan's nuclear program, and similar questions will be raised about India's. With United Nations inspections of Iraq suspended for more than three years, the presence and status of Iraq's weapons and materials of mass destruction are unknown. Much the same could be said of Iran, Syria and Libya. Following agreement on the KFOR program in North Korea, which provides for internationally financed nuclear power facilities and a halt to North Korea's nuclear weapons development, the world has an improved, but still imperfect, vantage point from which to watch developments in that country. Some nations, after witnessing the bombing of Afghanistan and the destruction of the Taliban government, may decide to proceed along a cooperative path of accountability regarding their weapons and materials of mass destruction. But others may decide to test our will and staying power. Precise replication of the Nunn-Lugar program will not be possible everywhere. But a satisfactory level of accountability, transparency and safety must be established in every nation with a program for weapons of mass destruction. When nations resist such accountability, or when they make their territory available to terrorists who are

seeking weapons of mass destruction, our nation must be prepared to use force, as well as all diplomatic and economic tools at our disposal. The writer is a Republican senator from Indiana. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A64851-2001Dec5.html Return to Contents Mail for Congress Irradiated, Checked For Anthrax Spores Thursday, December 6, 2001; Page A25 Mail addressed to Congress is not only being irradiated, it is being slit open by a contractor to check for evidence of biological agents, congressional aides said yesterday. The postal service said this week that it was beginning to deliver to Congress mail that had been processed at the Brentwood station in Washington around the same time as an anthrax-tainted letter addressed to Senate Majority Leader Thomas A. Daschle (D-S.D.). That letter was postmarked Oct. 9 in Trenton, N.J. The mail is first irradiated in Lima, Ohio, or Bridgewater, N.J., by a private firm. Then it is trucked back to Washington. But before it is delivered, Pitney Bowes Inc. also checks for powder, aides said. Any letters containing suspicious substances will be turned over to law enforcement, the aides said. The irradiation should have rendered any anthrax spores harmless. Irradiating the mail is supposed to take two days, postal officials said. The additional inspection will delay delivery up to three more days, aides said. -- Ellen Nakashima http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A494-2001Dec6.html Return to Contents USA Today December 10, 2001 Pg. 1

Powell Says Nuclear Warhead Deal Is Close Putin seeks treaty; Bush wants less formal accord By Bill Nichols, USA Today MOSCOW — Secretary of State Colin Powell said Sunday that a final deal on slashing U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals by roughly two-thirds is "just about done." At a summit in Washington last month, President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals, but they ran into a snag over how to go about that: Bush wants an informal deal, but Putin wants a formal accord. During a 24-hour visit here, Powell will try to work out a compromise that would call for an agreement that falls between a handshake and a treaty. Bush has said he favors reducing the U.S. nuclear arsenal to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads. Putin has not cited a specific number but says he favors a comparable reduction in his nation's arsenal of nuclear warheads. Powell was less optimistic about reaching a separate arms deal that would allow Washington to move ahead with advanced testing of a national missile defense without withdrawing from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which bans development of defensive systems. "There's still this disagreement with respect to missile-defense programs," Powell told reporters aboard his plane en route here from Kazakhstan. "We haven't found yet a way to get through that." Powell met with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov on Sunday night and planned to meet with Putin today. Russia says the ABM Treaty is essential to stability between the two nuclear powers. Bush views it as a Cold War relic signed by a Soviet Union that no longer exists. He wants to scrap it so that the United States can develop a defense against nuclear attacks by so-called "rogue nations" such as Iraq. For months, the two sides have tried to find a way out of their dispute over ABM. Bush wants to be able to continue missile-defense tests without amending the ABM Treaty, which he ultimately hopes to discard. Powell's comments indicate there has been little progress in resolving the dispute since Bush and Putin met. Powell said the ABM deadlock wouldn't affect both sides' desire to cut their stockpiles of nuclear weapons, however.

To move forward on that front, Powell said Putin must give Washington a firm number for the reductions he wants, and U.S. and Russian negotiators must find a way to formalize an agreement to allow for verification of cuts. At last month's summit, Bush said that if Putin "needed a piece of paper," the United States would give him one. Powell said the compromise the two sides are pursuing is to use provisions in two existing nuclear arms reduction treaties, START I and START II, to verify the new cuts being discussed. Powell returns home Tuesday. Return to Contents U.S. News & World Report December 17, 2001

Washington Whispers By Paul Bedard A Korean pox? Nothing scares doomsdayers like smallpox, the bug that wiped out millions before its eradication in 1977. Officially, only the United States and Russia still keep samples, but suspicions have long focused on Iraq and North Korea. New intelligence on North Korea is now irrefutable, say sources. Notes one, "There's a reason why the North Korean Army is the world's only one that requires smallpox vaccinations." Return to Contents New York Times December 9, 2001 Pg. 1

Nuclear Experts In Pakistan May Have Links To Al Qaeda This article was reported by Douglas Frantz, James Risen and David E. Sanger and written by Mr. Sanger. The United States is investigating new intelligence reports of contacts between Pakistani nuclear weapons scientists and the Taliban or the terrorist network Al Qaeda, according to Pakistani and American officials. More than a month ago, Pakistan detained and interrogated two nuclear scientists who had contacts with the Taliban and Al Qaeda, but neither had any knowledge or expertise that would have helped terrorists build or obtain a nuclear weapon, the officials said. Since then, however, American and Pakistani officials have received new reports of other possible contacts involving scientists with actual experience in production of nuclear weapons and related technology. The officials in the United States and Pakistan offered different, and sometimes conflicting, accounts of the nature of those contacts and who might be involved. But American officials said the intelligence was credible enough for them to focus new concern on the security of Pakistan's weapons program. Pakistani officials said their government was resisting some of the American efforts to interrogate several of the scientists and engineers, for fear that the intelligence reports may be a ploy by Washington to learn details of Pakistan's secret nuclear program. According to Pakistani officials and news reports in Pakistan in recent days, the United States has asked that two other nuclear experts, Suleiman Asad and Muhammed Ali Mukhtar, with long experience at two of Pakistan's most secret nuclear installations, be questioned. Pakistani officials said George J. Tenet, the director of central intelligence, discussed this issue with top Pakistani officials while he was in the country last weekend. C.I.A. officials would not confirm that account, but White House officials said Mr. Tenet's trip was related in part to nuclear issues. But in an unusual move, as soon as Mr. Tenet returned to Washington, Pakistani officials volunteered to Pakistani and Western reporters that Mr. Asad and Mr. Mukhtar were the subjects of concern by the C.I.A. The motives of the Pakistani officials for disclosing the information were unclear, but they also said the two men were unavailable because they were sent, shortly after Sept. 11, on a vague research project to Myanmar, formerly Burma, and were not expected home anytime soon.

In fact, one Pakistani official said that Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military president, who met Mr. Tenet during his trip, telephoned one of Myanmar's military rulers to ask him to provide temporary asylum for the two nuclear specialists, offering his assurances that they were not connected to terrorism. A spokesman for Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission told a Pakistani news service that "we don't want to interrupt them" by returning them to Pakistan for questioning. While much about this latest dispute remains unclear, it underscores the degree to which Pakistan and the United States are at odds over important issues despite recent cooperation in the war against terrorism. The United States is concerned that Al Qaeda is trying to obtain at least a primitive radioactive weapon and has concerns about the security of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program, the officials said. The Pakistani government, for its part, is suspicious that Washington, which is also trying to grow closer to Pakistan's nuclear rival, India, is using its security concerns as a pretext for prying open Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Pakistan has always barred international inspectors from examining its facilities or taking stock of its production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, used to make weapons. So far, American officials say, the Bush administration does not believe Al Qaeda has a nuclear weapon, despite its clear desire to obtain one. On Friday Gen. Tommy R. Franks, the American commander heading the Afghanistan operations, said, "We have not yet found evidence of weapons of mass destruction in the sites that we have been in." But officials in Washington remain concerned that Al Qaeda cells elsewhere may be searching for enough material to make a "dirty bomb," in which radioactive material would be wrapped around a conventional explosive and detonated, spreading nuclear contamination. Two Pakistani nuclear scientists who have been detained and questioned by Pakistan did meet with Taliban and Al Qaeda officials in Afghanistan to discuss nuclear issues. But the scientists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudry Abdul Majeed, were not weapons experts, and therefore of little value to terrorists, American officials say. Under interrogation, Mr. Mahmood and Mr. Majeed have recounted discussions with the Taliban and Al Qaeda, an American official said. The interrogations disclosed that Al Qaeda officials did not have even the most basic knowledge of nuclear weapons and materials, the American official said. "It was the blind leading the blind," the official said. The interrogations have provided new evidence to suggest that Al Qaeda has been lacking in technical expertise, the official added. "If they had been handed the plans for a nuclear bomb, the worst they could have done is use them as kindling to start a fire," the official said. But in the interrogations, one of the two scientists mentioned that he had a personal relationship with a Pakistani, and that the man had also been in contact with the Taliban, an American official said. United States intelligence officials believe that they have identified the man as a weapons expert who has left the Pakistani program and is now in business, an intelligence official said. While unable to confirm that account, another American intelligence official said there were new reports suggesting previously undisclosed connections between Pakistani nuclear weapons experts and the Taliban or Al Qaeda. American and Pakistani officials said that at least some of the scientists the United States is worried about had been involved in the complex of top-secret nuclear facilities southwest of Islamabad where much of Pakistan's rogue nuclear weapons program is concentrated. It remains unclear whether Pakistan plans to detain any of the individuals suspected of involvement. The new American concern over Pakistan's nuclear program highlights what could well become a growing source of tension between the United States and Pakistan as the war against terrorism enters a new phase. Mr. Bush is more focused than ever, his aides say, on preventing any repeat of the Sept. 11 terrorism, and is particularly worried that Al Qaeda, seeking revenge for the American success in Afghanistan, will use any weapon it can find. But in private, midlevel Pakistani officials say that while they share Mr. Bush's concern, they also believe that the United States is trying to leverage the current crisis to discover more about Pakistan's facilities, in case Washington someday feels the need to secure or destroy them. But the American approach, to one Pakistani government official, seems straightforward. Asked in Islamabad about the American requests for cooperation, he characterized the requests this way: "One of the things the U.S. wants is Pakistani knowledge of the market. Could these people have passed on how to acquire technology? Who is selling on the international market?" If the survivors of the American-led military assault on Al Qaeda in Afghanistan are searching for such nuclear technology and materials, there are two natural targets: Russia and Pakistan. The Pakistani program may be particularly tempting, American officials say, because its major facilities are near the Afghanistan border, as far from India as possible. Pakistan has barred international inspections of the facilities, so their security is unclear.

While American officials believe that Pakistan has built fewer than 20 complete nuclear weapons, all based on designs that use uranium, they also believe that Pakistan has enough weapons-grade material to build a total of at least 45 nuclear weapons. That figure includes Pakistan's recent production of plutonium, enough for at least five bombs. As one former American official who carefully followed the program until recently said, the estimates of Pakistan's nuclear material are "almost certainly way, way low." The fact of the matter, said another senior Bush administration official in Washington this week, is, "we simply don't know what they've got, how much they've made. That means we can't create a baseline" to determine whether nuclear material is missing. But the most immediate concern is whether Pakistani scientists and engineers harbor sympathies for the defeated Taliban government in Afghanistan, or are willing to carry on for Osama bin Laden. "Is there loose plutonium in Pakistan?" one senior administration official with lengthy experience in Pakistan said on Friday. "I don't think so. Is there loose technology? That's a different question, and everyone there who has knowledge and access to the material needs to be talked to." The interrogations of Pakistani scientists and engineers began several weeks ago. After a tip from the United States, Pakistani authorities last month arrested Mr. Mahmood and Mr. Majeed. Both men were associated with a private foundation that did humanitarian work in Afghanistan, and both apparently had contact with Al Qaeda members within the country. Papers found in the foundation's office in Kabul indicated that someone there was also sketching out designs for a helium balloon that could disperse anthrax. The two men were released and then rearrested, and attempts to reach them have been unsuccessful. They are still being detained without charges. A spokesman for the Pakistani foreign ministry said yesterday that several other associates of the private foundation had recently been detained for questioning, but that none of them were nuclear experts. The families of Mr. Mahmood and Mr. Majeed have said they are innocent of any wrongdoing. Gary Samore, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London and a former senior nonproliferation specialist in the Clinton White House, returned from Pakistan last week with a similar report. "Pakistani officials claim that no sensitive nuclear materials or information was provided by these retired scientists to Al Qaeda, although they acknowledged that there were discussions that were ongoing," he said. "The critical question is whether that is accurate, and whether there are other cases of individual Pakistani scientists willing to sell nuclear or missile information." American intelligence officials are increasingly convinced that Pakistan may become the site of a furtive struggle between those trying to keep nuclear technology secure and those looking to export it for terrorism or for profit. "The Pakistanis themselves have a strong interest in keeping everything locked down," one senior American official said. "But at the same time, they refuse to stop producing new material," because India, Pakistan's nuclear rival, continues its own production. "And there are some in the Pakistani hierarchy who fear a Trojan horse that we are learning about their nuclear program because, in their minds, we may one day need to deal with it." Return to Contents Wall Street Journal December 10, 2001

Uranium Bust Heightens Fears About Russia's Nuclear Material Sale of Low-Grade Material Is Thwarted, But Experts See a Disturbing Trend By Jeanne Whalen, Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal MOSCOW -- The arrest of six men trying to sell uranium near Moscow last week heightened longstanding fears that Russia's nuclear material is vulnerable to theft or sale to terrorist groups. Interior Ministry spokesman Oleg Yelnikov said the men, suspected members of a criminal gang, were caught attempting to sell "one kilogram [2.2 pounds] of uranium" for $30,000 at a roadside cafe near Moscow. Mr. Yelnikov said the uranium, described as "of the isotope 235 ... cannot be used in the production of weapons of mass destruction." Russia's atomic ministry corroborated that view. "As far as we know, it is not weapons-grade, not highly enriched uranium," said Yuri Bespalko, an atomic ministry spokesman. The seized material "is tablets of nuclear fuel not

more than 4% enriched," he said. "It is not dangerous for humans." Uranium must be 80% enriched to be used in a bomb. Mr. Bespalko said last week's arrests marked the first seizure of stolen Russian uranium on record, though Western law-enforcement officials disputed that assertion. In 1994, Czech authorities said they seized nearly six pounds of enriched uranium that they believed originated in Russia from a car in Prague. Also that year, German officials said they seized plutonium stolen from Russia. According to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, a research group in Monterey, Calif., there have been 13 confirmed cases of highly enriched uranium or plutonium being stolen or diverted from nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union since 1991. Russia's atomic ministry has questioned the Czech and German incidents, saying they were attempts to discredit Russia and prove that it wasn't in control of its fissile materials. Mr. Yelnikov of the interior ministry would not comment on who was attempting to buy the uranium last week but said he had "no evidence" that terrorist groups were involved. He said the attempted sale had been carried out in an amateurish fashion at a low price. "If this had been the sale of material for nuclear weapons ... it would have cost hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars," he said. "Nevertheless, [the seized uranium] is radioactive and poses rather grave danger to anyone who happens to be near it," Mr. Yelnikov added. Even unenriched uranium meant to be used as fuel in a nuclear-power plant can wreak havoc if fashioned into a so-called dirty bomb, said Martin Butcher, director of security programs at Physicians for Social Responsibility in Washington, D.C. Such bombs don't trigger a nuclear explosion but can spread harmful radiation over a wide area. "Pretty much the only reason to buy uranium on the black market is to make a bomb," Mr. Butcher said. Return to Contents Time December 17, 2001

The Nuke Pipeline The trade in nuclear contraband is approaching critical mass. Can we turn off the spigot? By Jeffrey Kluger The six men who gathered at the roadside cafe southeast of Moscow last Thursday did not go there for the food. They went there for the uranium. Some of the men, members of the Balashikha criminal gang, claimed to be in possession of 2 lbs. of uranium 235, the kind of top-shelf radioactive material that can be used to build weapons. They were asking $30,000 for the deadly merchandise. The others--the buyers--seemed prepared to pay it. The deal may actually have gone off had Russian security forces not been watching. They swept in, arrested all six men and were led back to the apartment of a seventh, where a capsule containing the promised uranium was hidden. By that evening, the case--the first officially acknowledged theft in Russia of weapons-grade uranium--was getting big play on local TV. The Russian police had reason to be proud; the rest of the world had one more reason to be nervous. For while the bust was disturbing, it was hardly unique. After 60 years of building nuclear bombs and nuclear reactors, the world is fairly awash in radioactive slag--from spent fuel rods to medical waste and contaminated tools--much of it held under little if any security in labs, hospitals and factories. Even the high-test weapons-grade material that's supposed to be locked down at military installations is not as secure as it ought to be. Some weapons-storage facilities don't even have video monitors. That such deadly material is so loosely guarded has been the source of much anxiety since Sept. 11--most of it focused on Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Last week reports surfaced of a meeting in Afghanistan at which an al-Qaeda associate waved a canister of what he said was nuclear material in the air to demonstrate to bin Laden and others how much progress had been made in securing the stuff. But bin Laden is only a part of the nuclear terror problem. Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of global terrorist groups, a new market has emerged to manage the increased supply of--and demand for--nuclear contraband. More and more radioactive material has been getting filched, bundled and sent flowing through an increasingly busy pipeline from Russia and the old Soviet states into the hands, it is feared, of people desperate enough to use it.

The Russian government alone lists up to 200 terrorist organizations it believes may be trying to obtain nuclear material. In Istanbul last month, Turkish undercover officers arrested two smugglers who attempted to sell them more than 2.5 lbs. of non-weapons grade uranium for $750,000. In July police in Paris raided an apartment in which three men were holding a small quantity of highly enriched uranium and plane tickets to various East European countries. And these busts are only the high-profile ones. Russia has broken up 601 attempted transactions since 1998. The International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna reports 376 since 1993, and Turkey has recorded 104 cases of non-weapons grade smuggling in that same time. Moreover, for every trafficker who has been caught, chances are that many more are still in the game--a fact that has security planners deeply worried. "The global effort to control nuclear weapons is based on control of nuclear material," says Matthew Bunn, a nuclear expert at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and a former adviser to President Bill Clinton. "If that stuff gets on the market, nothing else we do will work." The likeliest source of most radioactive booty is Russia and the surrounding states, and the material they have to offer comes in two varieties. Top-quality, weapons-grade material is the only kind that can used to build a true nuclear-fission bomb, and is both hard to obtain and harder to turn into an explosive. But lower-grade radioactive rubbish is also dangerous. It can be fashioned into a so-called dirty bomb: a conventional explosive packed with waste that spreads radiation in all directions. There are at least 100 facilities around the former Soviet Union that store warheads and weapons-grade material, and most of them are reportedly not properly secured. Along the country's eastern coast, according to some sources, up to 80 abandoned, loosely guarded nuclear submarines are rusting in bays and inlets, their torpedo tubes and other openings providing possible access for intruders and an exit for radioactive leakage. The country's nuclear power plants may be just as porous. At the Leningrad facility near the Gulf of Finland, sources say vodka and drugs flow freely among the workers, most of whom earn barely 3,000 rubles a month--about $100. Poorly paid, highly inebriated men make a shabby line of defense against terrorists and traffickers. Vaclav Havlik, a Czech citizen who was part of a group of uranium smugglers arrested near Munich in 1994, told Time that obtaining material from Russia was no great chore. "It was like going for vacation by the sea and bringing back a sack of shells," he says. At the same time that smugglers are getting better at obtaining their merchandise, they are also getting smarter about transporting it. The first nuclear black marketeers carried their contraband straight out of Russia and into Europe, across some of the best-guarded borders in the world. As customs officials caught wise, the smugglers started shifting their route south, running a flanking pattern through Central Asia, the Caucasus Mountains and Turkey before resurfacing in Europe. This modified buttonhook play allows traffickers to take advantage of established drug routes--a smart strategy, since customs agents in a place such as Tajikistan, where 200 tons of drugs may cross the border on a busy day, can easily overlook a few ounces of nuclear contraband. The black marketeers who get caught are often carrying only a few spoonfuls of nuclear material, but that's little comfort. More and more, risk-averse traffickers travel with just a taste of what they're selling rather than the entire inventory. Once they find a buyer, they can attempt the riskier business of delivering the full supply. Just how little they would need to deliver is another source of worry. While a full-scale nuclear bomb may require 100 lbs. of enriched uranium, a more modest device, particularly one fueled by plutonium, could be built with just 10 lbs. (about 4 kg). "Four kilos of plutonium," says Lidia Popova of Russia's Center for Nuclear Ecology and Energy Policy, "is the amount that could sit in your palm." For terrorists who can't get their hands on any weapons-grade uranium, there's the option of the dirty bomb. Allied forces overrunning a suspected al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan a few weeks ago found at least one diagram suggesting the design of such a weapon. To build this type of explosive, terrorists could use almost any kind of nuclear rubbish--perhaps even the water in Russia's Lake Karachai, a nuclear dumping ground that fairly crackles with radioactivity. The International Atomic Energy Agency believes that dirty bombs may not be as lethal as many people assume. The explosion would be a conventional one, and the radiation might not pack much toxic wallop--depending on wind, topography and the radioactive material. The disruption, terror and economic impact, however, would be incalculable. Says Popova: "If such a bomb explodes in a city, very quickly panic will spread." Despite all this, antiterrorism forces have reason for hope. Turkey, with the help of the U.S., has instituted stepped-up security measures at its borders, installing radiation detectors at key crossings--particularly those leading from Iraq, Iran and Georgia. (Unconfirmed reports suggest that Iran and Georgia are doing the same.) The Turkish government won't say explicitly if its security efforts have been ratcheted up since Sept. 11. "The answer is pretty obvious," says Erdener Birol, acting head of Turkey's atomic-energy authority.

Like so much else in the terror wars however, the job of truly securing the nukes--especially in Russia--may fall to the U.S. But Washington doesn't seem to be giving the problem top priority. When the Bush Administration took office, a program was already in place to help Russia dispose of 34 tons of surplus plutonium. When the program crossed the new President's desk, however, he slashed its projected $87 million price tag, seeking just $57 million. Washington and Moscow have also been hard at work in recent years improving security at Russia's nuclear-material storage sites, only 40% of which come up to U.S. standards. The Clinton Administration anticipated $225 million for the project this year, a 30% boost over the previous year. President Bush countered with a $30 million cut. Congress kept the funding at last year's level. Perhaps the most troubled of the existing antinuclear programs is one that relies on the power of capitalism. In 1993 the U.S. agreed to buy 500 metric tons of Russian nuclear material over 20 years, blending it down to a less potent form that could be used in American nuclear power plants. So far, 137 metric tons have been processed and carried off; they account for half the nuclear fuel used in the U.S. In 1998, however, the U.S. group authorized to buy the material was privatized. With the global market for nuclear fuel faltering, the newly profit-driven group found itself locked into the price Washington had agreed to in 1996. In an attempt to square things, the company is seeking a new contract with Russia that would guarantee it rates far below market, though talks last week in Moscow failed to resolve the matter. If the Russians--sellers with but a single major buyer--are told they have to go along with the price cuts, the program could collapse. For now, Washington is simply feeling its way, trying to balance security and cost while tending to the countless other battles it must fight on the home front. Given the power of even a single rogue nuke, however, this battle is clearly one of the most important. "The consequences of failure would be far worse than Sept. 11," says Alexander Strezov, a Bulgarian scientist who helps investigate trafficking cases. "To be honest, I don't want to think about it." The U.S., unfortunately, doesn't have that luxury. Reported by Yevgenia Borisova/Moscow, Andrew Finkel/Istanbul, Andrew Purvis/Vienna, Jan Stojaspal/Prague, Michael Weisskopf/Washington, Regine Wosnitza/Berlin Return to Contents Washington Post December 8, 2001 Pg. 1

U.S. Scuttles Germ War Conference Move to Halt Talks Stuns European Allies By Mike Allen and Steven Mufson, Washington Post Staff Writers An international conference on germ warfare disbanded in chaos and anger last night after the United States sought to cut off discussions about enforcing the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. The 1972 treaty, ratified by the United States and 143 other nations, bans the development, stockpiling and production of germ warfare agents -- but it has no enforcement mechanism. The purpose of the conference, held in Geneva, was to discuss the progress of a group that has been trying for six years to negotiate legally binding measures to enforce compliance. Yesterday, the final day of the three-week conference, the United States stunned European allies by proposing to terminate the group's mandate. Convinced that the action would turn the conference into a failure, organizers suspended international discussions until at least November 2002. The breakup of the meeting renewed complaints from Europe that President Bush was acting unilaterally and not heeding concerns of the nation's allies. That complaint was common early in his administration, but had been muted as Bush assembled an anti-terrorism coalition after the Sept. 11 attacks. A State Department official said the Bush administration believed the enforcement protocol under discussion would not prevent rogue nations from acquiring or developing biological weapons if they were determined to do so. "If the conference had continued, there was a danger that continued negotiations would have undermined our concerted efforts to strengthen the convention," the official said. Administration officials said the United States remains committed to countering the threat of biological weapons and will consult allies on the issue in coming weeks. Tibor Toth, a Hungarian official who was the conference's president, said delegates decided to suspend their work for a year instead of bringing the meeting to an unsuccessful end.

"The differences between positions seemed to be irreconcilable, at least in the time remaining today," he said. "The draft final declaration was 95 percent ready." John R. Bolton, the U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, accused some signatories to the treaty -- including Iraq and Iran -- of having already violated it. "I wish we could have continued talking, but it was obvious that we would not reach an agreement. There were just too many areas of disagreement," Bolton told Reuters in Geneva. "A cooling-off period will be a good thing." Elisa D. Harris, the National Security Council's director for nonproliferation throughout the Clinton administration, said that despite fears about the use of anthrax as a weapon, "the Bush administration has blown up an international meeting aimed at making it more difficult for countries to acquire these biological capabilities." But Larry M. Wortzel, a national security specialist at the conservative Heritage Foundation, said that refusing to be a party to doomed verification efforts is "the sanest thing this administration has done," since the United States has been deceived so often by countries that continued buildups of biological weapons. In July, the United States became the only country to announce its opposition to the proposed enforcement protocol. The White House said it would present other ways to strengthen the treaty and reduce the chance of germ warfare. Last month, as the Geneva conference opened, Bolton presented a U.S. plan that would not make the protocol legally binding under international law, but include it in a politically binding final document. The U.S. package also left out provisions that would have established an international implementing body with the power to investigate suspicious facilities and perform routine visits to declared facilities. However, the U.S. package retained some of the protocol's measures, such as a requirement for any country that signs the treaty to pass laws criminalizing activities prohibited by the treaty. About half of the signatories do not have such laws currently, experts say. The U.S. package would also expand the mandate of the secretary general of the United Nations to investigate suspicious disease outbreaks, clarify vague provisions for resolving compliance concerns and make it easier to extradite criminals who use biological weapons. The State Department official said the administration was "encouraged by the widespread support for U.S. and allied initiatives intended to strengthen the convention through practical national implementation measures." But, he said, "Not everyone welcomed our focus on compliance." "We believe compliance is essential for any arms control regime to be meaningful," he said, and added that the administration was "disappointed" that agreement couldn't be reached. He said that was better than "trying to paper over substantive disagreements with artful drafting." Many arms control advocates said the administration had failed to do all it could to resolve those problems because of its own opposition to a clause that would allow foreign inspections of suspected biological weapons sites on the basis of a challenge by another country. The Bush administration has said that could lead to inspections at private companies and endanger trade secrets. "What John Bolton and the U.S. delegation did was to scuttle realistic practical opportunities to develop an international strategy on germ weapons mainly because the Bush administration fears further negotiations on an international instrument to curb bioweapons that includes possible on-site challenge investigations," said Darryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association. The Federation of American Scientists, which promotes disarmament, issued a statement calling the U.S. action "sabotage," and said that European diplomats "privately accused the U.S. of deceiving them." Staff writer Karen DeYoung contributed to this report. Return to Contents Sea Power December 2001 Pg. 3

"We Were Ready" Sailors and Marines Respond to Bioterrorism By Gordon I. Peterson, Senior Editor When the telephone rang on 20 October, the Marine Corps was ready. Approximately 100 Sailors and Marines assigned to an "immediate-response" team drawn from the ranks of the Corps' Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), based at Indian Head, Md., were soon at work in the Longworth House Office Building in

the nation's capital. Their mission: to collect samples for laboratory analysis to determine if the samples were infected with the deadly spores of the anthrax bacterium. "When they finally said, 'Go!' we were ready within an hour or two," Col. Thomas X. Hammes, the unit's commander, told Sea Power. Working closely with the on-scene incident commander, the U.S. Capitol Police, and the U.S. Coast Guard, Hammes received his first operational tasking to conduct actual biological sampling on 21 October. "We provided a package of biosampling teams, decontamination teams, medical and logistics support, and command-and-control elements," Hammes said. "When we arrived, we had a full package." Because of its in-depth capabilities, the Marine Corps' CBIRF unit assumed command of the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force units also participating in the operation. In addition to the Longworth Building, the joint military team collected samples at a Washington, D.C., power plant and operated at the Capitol Building's "P Street" mailroom to move large quantities of mail to a secure location where it could be examined safely. "The benefit of having a significantly sized and balanced team is that it was no problem for us to restructure from biological sampling to moving large quantities of material from a contaminated environment," Hammes said. "All of our capabilities--sampling, medical, decontamination--came together to allow us to be very flexible in terms of what we could do." CBIRF, a force of approximately 380 men and women, was formed in 1996 as the result of then-Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. Charles C. Krulak's initiative to improve the Marine Corps' ability to respond to the growing terrorist threat of chemical and biological warfare. Although the unit has conducted many realistic exercises through the years--and is poised to respond immediately at the Capitol Building whenever a joint session of Congress is convened--the current anthrax incidents triggered its first actual crisis deployment since its inception. Months and years of training paid off. "We had five years to get ready," Hammes told Sea Power. "We have evolved significantly over that time and learned a great deal. We are very comfortable working within the incident-command system, and we know how to handle both military and civilian logistics to get things done." The Marines' CBIRF unit routinely practices force-protection and mass decontamination so that it can easily tailor its response to the specific scenario it faces at any given time. "Anthrax can be a pretty tough bug to kill," Hammes said, "but we had the expertise to kill it and to apply that knowledge to our decontamination procedures." Hammes said he was pleased with the way the operation was conducted, noting that the Coast Guard coordinates regularly with civilian agencies involved in such domestic crises. "We had all the support we needed, particularly at the edge of the hot zone where we brought materials for packing and transport." There appeared to be few surprises. "My team was really pumped up," Hammes said. "The lesson is what we always learn about warfare--you train, you anticipate what the enemy might do, and you work out how you will respond. That's exactly what my Marines and Sailors have done." While CBIRF officers occasionally entered buildings to gain an impression of how the operation was proceeding, noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and staff noncommissioned officers (SNCOs) led the sampling teams during their missions. "As always, it was our people who made it work, and our NCOs and SNCOs made the key decisions," Hammes told Sea Power. Marine teams worked 12-hour shifts during the two weeks it took for the Longworth Building to be declared safe. Marines and Sailors generally worked in three-hour rotations to allow time for decontamination and rest. "Five years ago," Hammes told Sea Power, "Marines sat down, looked ahead at the likelihood of a chemical or biological incident, and said, 'This is going to happen, so what do we need to do to be ready?' Our response was the fruition of looking ahead--and we were ready." Return to Contents International Herald Tribune December 10, 2001

Ex-Military Linked To Anthrax Mail By Agence France-Presse

WASHINGTON -- The anthrax-laced letter sent to the Senate majority leader, Thomas Daschle, probably was mailed by someone who used to work in the military, the senator said over the weekend. When asked about the probable link, the South Dakota Democrat said: "Correct. That's correct." Mr. Daschle said, "As we look at all the possibilities, that one has the greatest degree of credibility right now." Return to Contents Washington Times December 10, 2001 Pg. 14

Al Qaeda's Nuclear Agenda Verified By Arnaud de Borchgrave, The Washington Times ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Pakistani intelligence officers were assisting Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization to develop the ability to build a "dirty" nuclear device, U.S. and Pakistani intelligence agencies have concluded. Intelligence officers in Washington and Islamabad, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said they are now convinced that al Qaeda was attempting to put together a "nuclear device in the dirty bomb category." Documents uncovered in Kabul and the interrogation of nuclear scientists who were frequent visitors to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan — ostensibly to perform humanitarian work — have produced conclusive evidence of the fact, the officers said. One Pakistani general who has seen the evidence described the device as a "dirty nuclear weapon," meaning one in which radioactive materials are wrapped around conventional explosives. Such a device can contaminate an area of several square blocks with radiation. The general said he also believes bin Laden obtained such materials on Russia's nuclear black market. The International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna is aware of 175 cases of trafficking in nuclear materials since 1993, including 18 that involved highly enriched uranium and plutonium pellets the size of a silver dollar. There are 18 million potential delivery vehicles that could be used to smuggle a nuclear device into the United States. That is the number of cargo containers that arrive in the country annually. Of them, only 3 percent are inspected, and bills of lading do not have to be produced until the containers reach their destination, according to current regulations. Radioactivity is invisible, as was the case in the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. There is no way of knowing in advance the impact on health 10 years hence. It is more a weapon of mass disruption than mass destruction. An unidentified former chief of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency is believed to be the man who coordinated bin Laden's nuclear ambitions. One local intelligence source speculated that before September 11, a dirty bomb could have been smuggled out of Afghanistan in a truck all the way to Karachi and then shipped out in a cargo container. That could be the weapon Taliban chief Mullah Mohammed Omar was referring to when he said, after the U.S. bombing started Oct. 7, that America would soon have to face extinction. Allowing for hyperbole, he may have known what bin Laden was planning next. Another ex-ISI chief, retired Gen. Hameed Gul, predicted after September 11 that one day there would be a single Islamic state that would stretch from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan and Afghanistan and that would have nuclear weapons, as well as control of the Gulf's oil resources. The general is an ISI legend, and still popular among the agency's present crop of leaders who were his junior officers in the late 1980s. Gen. Gul, a Muslim fundamentalist, is vehemently anti-American. He acts as "strategic adviser" to Pakistan's extremist religious parties, and spent two weeks in Afghanistan just prior to September 11. Gen. Gul is slowly emerging as the spokesman for the combined opposition of Islamic fundamentalists. In Urdu-language newspapers on Friday, he was quoted as saying: "No one can tell us how to run our nuclear facilities and nuclear programs. This is being done in the interest of Pakistan, not the United States. Taliban will always remain in Afghanistan, and Pakistan will always support them." He was presumably referring to the Taliban in its guerrilla mode, following the fall of Kandahar. Gen. Gul's only daughter runs VARAN, the public transportation bus company that enjoys a monopoly in Islamabad and its twin military garrison city of Rawalpindi. Gen. Gul himself lives in "Pindi" in an army compound housing development earmarked for retired generals.

Officially, the Pakistani government has accepted the explanation of three nuclear scientists about their "innocuous" relationship to the Taliban. Privately, however, some Pakistani officials, working closely with U.S. colleagues, said their activities "cannot be described as innocuous by any stretch of the imagination." On a brief visit to Islamabad early this month, George Tenet, director of CIA, conferred with President Pervez Musharraf on what was described as the need for "more and better intelligence" from ISI. The CIA has reportedly submitted a list of six more nuclear scientists whom it wants to probe for suspected links to al Qaeda. Two of them, Dr. Suleiman Asad and Dr. Muhammad Ali Muktar, are now in Burma doing undisclosed research with local scientists. Apparently anxious to avoid further U.S. probes into Pakistan's ultrasecret nuclear weapons program, these two scientists have been advised by the government to remain in Burma until further notice. Dr. Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmud, former director of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), and Chief Engineer Dr. Chaudry Abdul Majeed have been questioned by a joint FBI-ISI team. According to PAEC sources, the CIA wishes to conduct a separate interrogation based on documents seized in Kabul. Dr. Mahmud is a close associate of Gen. Gul. They were colleagues when Gen. Gul ran ISI. Dr. Mahmud is one of three scientists who befriended Taliban leaders. He is an expert in enriched uranium and plutonium, having lectured all over Pakistan with odes to the Taliban as "the wave of the future for Pakistan." Dr. Mahmud and two of his colleagues were detained in late October as a result of U.S. questions about Pakistani "relief" organizations active in Taliban-run Afghanistan, including an agricultural project near Kandahar. They admitted to meeting with al Qaeda associates of bin Laden and were officially cleared of passing on nuclear secrets. Dr. Mahmud says publicly that plutonium production is not a state secret, and advocates increasing plutonium output to help other Islamic nations build nuclear weapons. After the start of the U.S. bombing campaign, Gen. Musharraf ordered an immediate redeployment of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal to six new secret locations, including separate storage facilities for uranium and plutonium cores and their detonation mechanisms. Army colleagues now say privately that Gen. Musharraf was fearful of assassination by extremists who were already accusing him of betraying Islam and selling out to the United States. There were also rumors of a coup by hard-liners in the military. The officer corps is 20 percent fundamentalist, according to a post-September 11 confidential survey by military intelligence separate from ISI. Pakistan's community of nuclear scientists is held to be "profoundly fundamentalist" and anti-American. They are particularly resentful of U.S. economic and military sanctions against Pakistan as punishment for their country's nuclear weapons program. The community's guru is Abdul Qadir Khan, the scientist who devised Pakistan's first nuclear weapon. Pakistan now has an estimated 20 such weapons in its arsenal. ISI is still widely distrusted by Western intelligence agencies and by all levels of Pakistani society, from people in the street to top political leaders. An ISI general who is regional director in one of the tribal areas told an important tribal leader known to this reporter that "after Afghanistan, Pakistan is next on America's list of countries to be conquered, and after Pakistan, Iran will be next. All that war talk about Iraq being next is just a smokescreen." Gen. Gul has been touring FATA (Federally-Administered Tribal Areas) along the border of Afghanistan with much the same message about Washington's plans for conquest in the region. ISI is undergoing a traumatic shock in the wake of the Taliban's defeat, according to knowledgeable secular political party leaders. "They have lost thousands of operatives in Afghanistan," said one key politician who asked not to be named. ISI also facilitated the transfer to Afghanistan in the past two months of thousands of young religious school students who had been proselytized by their clerical teachers to volunteer to fight with the Taliban. Gen. Musharraf had a dangerous precedent in mind: Six years ago, a group of Pakistani army officers was arrested for plotting to kill Army Chief of Staff Gen. Abdul Waheed. He had fired the ISI chief for secretly assisting Muslim rebels in several countries. Distributed by United Press International Return to Contents Aviation Week & Space Technology December 10, 2001

Putin Offers India Nuke, Aircraft Deals

By Pushpinder Singh, New Delhi Russian President Vladimir Putin, eager to expand his role in Central Asia, has offered to enhance "nuclear cooperation" with India, including offering it a limited "missile shield." The offer came last month during a visit to Moscow by Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and follows on pledges that Putin made to Vajpayee during a visit to New Delhi in October to sell India more than 300 T-90 tanks, antitank guided missiles and kits of 140 Sukhoi Su-30 KI fighters for assembly in India. The Indian prime minister's visit is regarded as pathbreaking in terms of the pledges of nuclear cooperation between the two countries. A 2,000-megawatt nuclear power plant to be set up by the Russians at Kudankulam, Tamil Nadu, is said to be the first step in a wider nuclear cooperation as Putin works to expand his country's role in South Asian politics. The plant was cleared despite U.S. objections. It is expected to be commissioned in 2008. Indian defense officials were quick to point out that Russia doesn't have much to offer in the way of a so-called missile shield, however. But the country can offer some new- generation missiles and long-range radar. The latter could be set up as part of a technology infrastructure exchange. India has no antimissile missiles and has not developed an effective long-range radar system. Russia also has offered four nuclear-capable Tu-22M Backfire bombers for the Indian navy to employ in a maritime reconnaissance role. They could carry air-launched cruise missiles with a range of 300 km. (186 mi.). The defense deals between Russia and India are expected to exceed $7 billion. They include Indian acquisition of the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov for $2 billion. It is to be equipped with MiG-29Ksand Ka-31s. Officials said a package deal for aircraft, tanks, air defense systems, rocket launchers and cruise missiles is underway. Vajpayee said that a "vitally important decision" has taken place between India and Russia on defense as he prepared to fly to Washington to meet with President Bush in early November. He did not elaborate. But he characterized it as of the highest strategic importance, "beyond the ambit of arms purchases, including the proposed deal on the aircraft carrier for the Indian navy." One official said the agreement would seek to include India in a new international missile regime. Putin also reportedly assured Vajpayee that India would be included in the so-called six-plus-two formula for the future of Afghanistan, in which the country's six neighbors, plus the U.S and the U.K., work on the development of a post-Taliban regime. But as part of such an arrangement, India and Pakistan will have to open talks on Kashmir, officials said. Return to Contents Los Angeles Times December 9, 2001

All Nuclear And Biological Roads Lead To Iraq's Hussein He is the only head of state who has the means and motive to help Osama bin Laden attack the United States By Khidhir Hamza Long before Osama bin Laden got to be No. 1 on the FBI's most wanted list, Saddam Hussein was employing top scientists and developing not only his much-talked-about nuclear program but biological and chemical weapons as well. I know because I spent two decades as a senior official in Iraq's Atomic Energy Commission. Iraq tried every way possible to obtain nuclear weapons technology. That it did not succeed at the onset of the Gulf War in possessing a single weapon or device speaks volumes about the availability of equipment and materials. Despite the scare stories about Soviet nuclear bombs for sale on the black market, the fact remains that the Soviet Union had sophisticated security that is still intact and monitored. All the reported incidents of theft or smuggling were of small or insignificant amounts of nuclear materials, mostly not weapons grade. Materials and literature about nuclear weapons found in Al Qaeda's Afghan hide-outs confirms our understanding of the problems faced by terrorists. Regardless of his wealth and determination, Bin Laden's nuclear quest seems to be a rudimentary program carried out mostly by amateurs. But this does not mean that terrorists can't develop radiation or germ warfare weapons. With a small core of scientists and engineers, the South Africans have made weapons relatively inexpensively that can produce explosions equivalent to the bomb used on Hiroshima.

Death and Damage A terrorist would have more modest objectives. The radiation and contamination associated with the explosion of a weapon of less than one kiloton could cause tremendous death and damage and would be a nightmare to decontaminate and clean up. This brings many possibilities into play, including simpler but less-efficient designs and the possibility of assembling a weapon by smuggling in parts. Many stories are carried in the media about suitcase bombs, which actually are the more sophisticated version of this. A terrorist might find it easier to bring in components and assemble a nuclear weapon inside the U.S. than to bring in a whole bomb in a suitcase. As we found through our purchasing networks in Iraq, almost any component for a nuclear weapon can be bought on the black market. The most difficult item to obtain was the actual nuclear fissile material needed for the bomb core. Bomb-grade uranium is easily transportable because it has little radioactivity. If a terrorist could get just 100 pounds of the stuff, then putting together a simple gun-type bomb or device would be possible with minimal expertise and no need for the advanced explosives and triggering mechanisms. I don't think bomb-grade uranium is available for purchase outside Russia, which means it is essential that the U.S. continue to support Russia's program for controlling nuclear materials. The radioactive materials available in spent reactor fuel rods are good candidates for radiation weapons. But a large number would be required. They leak, and they create a radiation hazard to those nearby. Leakage also makes them easily detectable. The U.S. has stopped processing spent fuel rods, but several U.S. storage areas are used as repositories. If a terrorist could get some rods, then all he would need would be any available explosive, such as TNT, and he would have a radiation weapon. Then there is the scariest possibility of all: Iraq has the capability to produce biological agents, including anthrax, in large quantities--not just raw anthrax in liquid form, which almost anybody can prepare, but in a powder that is effective as a terrorist tool. Whether Hussein was involved in providing the spores and powder that hit Congress, the Postal Service and other people and institutions is irrelevant; it's his capability to do it that should concern us. Iraq's germ warfare program was perfected during its war with Iran in the 1980s. Little known outside scientific circles is the fact that Hussein even experimented on humans, starting around 1985 with anthrax. Cholera was developed as a weapon as well and employed in experiments on villagers in the Kurdish north. Iraq's germ warfare equipment and stocks were supposedly destroyed under the direction of U.N. inspectors after Desert Storm. But Hussein managed to hide quite a bit of it, as well as the biologists who worked on the weapons. German intelligence estimates that Iraq will produce three atomic weapons by 2005. Reports of terrorists trying to get their hands on crop-dusters also point to Iraq. Even before Desert Storm, Hussein's scientists had modified crop-dusters for spraying biowarfare agents. They also had fitted a fighter plane with a spray tank. Terrorist Camps After Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War in 1991, terrorist training camps proliferated all over the country. One was right next to my ranch, 30 miles north of Baghdad on a branch of the Tigris River. The rural setting was ideal for such a facility. There were other camps, I learned later, which were even more remote, reachable only by helicopter. The buildings were so rudimentary that from the air they looked like Bedouin encampments. I got to know one of the commandos who knew of my high rank in the government and had become friendly with my sons. In a relaxed mood one day, he told me that the training included the use of gas masks and special protective clothing, an unmistakable hint that biowar was in the curriculum. Another reason to worry about Iraq: It has a huge underground network of spies and purchasing agents abroad. Bin Laden's agents reportedly were in contact with the network, which could provide them with both the material and expertise to unleash biological attacks on the West. The bottom line is that, taking into account Hussein's vicious nature, his humiliation over the past 10 years and his declared intent to avenge his defeat in Desert Storm, he is perhaps the only national leader with both the means and the motive to help Bin Laden attack the United States. The U.S. government should urgently consider ways to push Hussein out of power. If we wait much longer, it may be too late. Khidhir Hamza, a U.S.-educated nuclear physicist, was director of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program from 1987 to '90. He defected to the U.S. in 1995. He is the author, with Jeff Stein, of "Saddam's Bombmaker" (Scribner, 2000). Return to Contents

Washington Post December 11, 2001 Pg. 28

U.S. Seeks Written Deal On Weapons Cuts Officials Want Agreement With Russia Apart From a Pact on Missile Defense By Alan Sipress, Washington Post Staff Writer BERLIN, Dec. 10 -- The Bush administration is aiming to reach a written agreement with Russia over deep cuts in nuclear weapons by the middle of next year even if the two sides fail to close a deal allowing the United States to proceed with testing of a missile defense system, U.S. officials said today. After a meeting in Moscow between Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Russian President Vladimir Putin, senior officials from both countries reported making progress toward an agreement reducing each side's long-range nuclear warheads by about two-thirds. They said the two governments intend to sign an agreement when President Bush visits the Russian capital, no later than next summer. No date for that trip has been set. Though Russia did not announce precisely how far it was willing to cut into its nuclear stockpile, U.S. officials said they received a clear idea of Moscow's intended level during the private meetings today. "With respect to what the agreed new lower level will be, we're very close," Powell said when asked by reporters whether he had been informed of the limit Russia would propose. "It's a matter of me reporting back to President Bush with what I heard today before being able to say anything more and make it public." Putin told Bush last month that Moscow intended to reduce its arsenal by about two-thirds from its current level of about 6,000 warheads. Bush has already said he would cut the U.S. stockpile, with no more than 6,000 warheads, to between 1,700 and 2,200. A deal over slashing offensive nuclear stockpiles would mark the first major strategic weapons agreement between Washington and Moscow in years. But it could come without comparable progress on Bush's top strategic priority: an understanding with Russia that would allow the United States to proceed with the testing of a missile defense system, which is now limited by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. A senior State Department official said today that the United States would be willing to reach a written agreement on reducing the nuclear arsenals during Bush's visit to Moscow even if the two sides have not reached an understanding on missile defense. The United States' willingness to put the agreement in writing comes in response to Russian requests. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, speaking at a news conference with Powell after the Kremlin meeting, said the ABM issue had been taken up at the talks "but the positions of the sides remain unchanged." The Russians have been more eager to reach an agreement on cutting offensive weapons than on missile defense. The Bush administration has argued that the ABM Treaty should be scrapped so the United States can build a missile shield capable of defending against attacks from such "states of concern" as Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Russia, however, says the treaty remains essential to maintaining stability between the nuclear powers. Powell acknowledged there were still "disagreements with regard to missile defense and the ABM Treaty and we will continue working on the whole strategic framework, both offense and defense, in the months ahead." Russia has sought mutual reductions in both countries' nuclear stockpiles in large part because Moscow can no longer afford to maintain its existing arsenal. The Bush administration has also welcomed cuts in the number of warheads. Powell and Ivanov today spoke of the need for a written agreement on the proposed reductions and measures. "The main thing is that there is an understanding expressed by both sides that these reductions need to be embodied in some form of treaty formalization, and during the negotiations we will decide what form it takes," Ivanov said. Return to Contents Wall Street Journal December 11, 2001

Powell Says Russian Leaders Are Resigned To U.S. Intent On Missile-Defense System By Neil King Jr., Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal

MOSCOW -- Russian leaders indicated to Secretary of State Colin Powell that they are resigned to U.S. intentions to build a missile-defense system and possibly to pull out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, a signal that could allow the Bush administration to resume stepped-up missile-defense tests -- ones that would violate the treaty -- in coming months. The U.S. has been eager to avoid a rift with Moscow when it is providing important support for the war on terrorism. In late October the Pentagon delayed a test of the system when Pentagon lawyers suggested it could violate the treaty. The next test that could violate the treaty is set for early next year, but a Pentagon official said that for now officials assumed it would also be postponed, unless an agreement could be reached with the Russians. (Last week's successful test of a prototype antimissile weapon was legal under the ABM treaty, as were tests that preceded it.) In his remarks Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said that Russia is "not excluding the possibility" of the U.S. withdrawing from the ABM treaty. That, he said, was fully within Washington's right. He went on to say that Russia is now "forecasting" such a possibility and would pursue missile cuts regardless of debates surrounding the treaty. The two countries also agreed in talks at the Kremlin to push for a formal agreement on sweeping nuclear arms reductions by the middle of next year, when President Bush plans to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. The Russians have been insisting that the cuts be codified in a formal arms control treaty, while the White House has called for parallel cuts based on trust. It's not certain how that difference will be resolved, but one senior State Department official said the two sides were prepared to "formalize" an agreement on offensive arms cuts even without a solution to the ABM impasse. On missile defense, Mr. Powell told reporters after the talks that the two sides "still have disagreements" but will continue working on the issue. Paradoxically, Russian acquiescence to U.S. testing could prove problematic to Pentagon hard-liners who want to scrap the treaty entirely. Indeed, many analysts saw Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's late October announcement that the Pentagon would forgo two tests, designed to evaluate the ability of an Aegis radar to track a missile in flight, as an effort to shoulder the ABM treaty aside. Since then, defense officials have said repeatedly that it will be impossible for the Pentagon to pursue a missile shield as long as the treaty is in place. On the subject of arms reductions, Mr. Powell told reporters that the Russians had given a much more precise description of how deeply they plan to cut their Soviet-era arsenal of 6,000 nuclear weapons, but he declined to provide details. Mr. Ivanov also told reporters he wasn't prepared to release a specific number and perhaps wouldn't do so until closer to the summit in Moscow next year. The two leaders agreed to make steep nuclear cuts during a U.S. summit last month. Mr. Bush at the time said the U.S. was prepared to reduce the U.S. stockpile to 1,700 to 2,200 weapons, from around 5,500, while President Putin said he anticipated similar cuts. Return to Contents New York Times December 11, 2001

U.S. And Russia To Complete Talks On An Arms Control Pact By Patrick E. Tyler MOSCOW, Dec. 10 — Russia and the United States said today that they had agreed to complete negotiations on a new strategic arms control accord that could codify a significant reduction in offensive weapons — to about 2,000 weapons each — even if they do not reach agreement on missile defenses. After meeting with President Vladimir V. Putin, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said for the first time that the accord might take the form of a treaty, something the Bush administration has resisted in its quest to act unilaterally in structuring the American nuclear arsenal for the future. Secretary Powell and the Russian foreign minister, Igor S. Ivanov, said at a Kremlin news conference that they were under instructions from both presidents to prepare the arms control accord and have it ready for signing when President Bush makes a state visit to Moscow in the middle of next year.

Both Secretary Powell and Mr. Ivanov agreed, by contrast, that they had made no progress on the thorny issue of missile defenses as the United States continues to press forward with plans for a series of tests next spring that would violate the terms of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty. The envisioned accord on reducing nuclear arms would include significant provisions borrowed from the Start I and Start II treaties to ensure that each side was informed of the capabilities and deployments of the other side's nuclear forces, Secretary Powell said. "Both of our presidents have charged us to finish this work as soon as possible," Secretary Powell said, "and find ways to formalize this agreement at lower levels of strategic offensive numbers and to try to get the work concluded in time" for a Moscow summit. "Both of us recognize the need for there to be a codification of the new levels, and we will be discussing the form that will take," he added. "It might be the form of a treaty or some other way of codifying it." Mr. Ivanov echoed those remarks, saying, "There is an understanding expressed by both sides that these reductions need to be imported into some treaty formulation and here in the negotiations, we will decide which form it will take." Last month, after Mr. Putin and Mr. Bush met in Crawford, Tex., Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, said pointedly that while the Russians had spoken of the need for a treaty, the American side had not. Secretary Powell's remarks today suggested that a treaty might be necessary if any new accord that set limits on the size of the nuclear arsenals was to extend beyond the term in office of both leaders. The announcement today appeared to affirm that Mr. Bush and Mr. Putin have moved well beyond the testy oratory that characterized the opening months of the Bush administration. Moreover, Mr. Bush appears to have modified his initial approach to arms control after developing a personal relationship with Mr. Putin, a relationship that has been bolstered by cooperation with the Russians after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. In the meetings in Moscow today, Secretary Powell said he expected to receive a detailed description from the Russians of strategic arms reductions Moscow was willing to make. The United States has said it will reduce its arsenal of about 6,000 warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200. Mr. Putin has spoken of his desire to go as low as 1,500 warheads, which would save Moscow from having to make major investments in new strategic missiles to replace the Soviet-era multiple-warhead rockets reaching the end of their service life in the next decade. A State Department official said that the Russians did not provide a numerical breakdown on how they planned to reduce their offensive nuclear forces today. "Maybe they are still editing the draft," the official said, adding, "It is up to them to announce it when they want to but I don't think we have any concern about that." The administration knows, he said, that the numbers are going to be in the ballpark of the American reductions. A State Department official traveling with Secretary Powell said the agreement on reductions in offensive weapons could go forward despite the deadlock over missile defenses. The official indicated that Russian officials wanted the United States to engage in detailed discussions on each level of missile-defense testing, something that Washington fears would amount to giving Moscow a veto over tests if the Kremlin deems a particular test would violate, even nullify, the ABM treaty. "We have always been willing to explain our testing program," the State Department official said, adding, "That is different than giving them approval for any particular test." Mr. Ivanov said today that Russia "has never put any prerequisites or conditions with regard to the ABM treaty," which he said still represented "the key element of the whole treaty system of providing strategic stability in the world." The Russian view that the ABM treaty is the cornerstone of strategic arms control is largely shared by Washington's allies in Europe. While in Moscow, Secretary Powell also met with leaders of the Russian Parliament, whose members wanted to know whether the intensification of Russian-American relations during the antiterror campaign in Afghanistan would disappear after the United States achieved its objectives. An American official who was present quoted Secretary Powell as replying that "what happened on Sept. 11 didn't start something, it accelerated" an improvement in relations that "President Bush wants to make permanent." In his talks with Mr. Ivanov, Secretary Powell raised the sensitive issue of Russia's arms sales to Iran and Moscow's assistance in building the first nuclear power station in Iran at Bushehr. The State Department official said Washington acknowledged Russia's right to make certain conventional arms sales to Iran, but was concerned about sales of sophisticated weaponry and nuclear assistance that might advance Iran's secret efforts to build nuclear weapons.

"Our problem is that the legitimate nuclear programs have been used as a cover for a whole lot of other transfers and training that we think is dangerous in a country that we see is trying to develop nuclear weapons," the American official said. Return to Contents Wall Street Journal December 11, 2001 Pg. 1

The Anthrax Probe Ranges Far And Wide As Investigators Scour Tips, Trash For Leads By Mark Schoofs, Gary Fields and Maureen Tkacik, Staff Reporters of The Wall Street Journal Thanksgiving was a busy day in the anthrax manhunt. Trying to solve the mystery of 94-year-old Ottilie Lundgren's death from the bacterium, law-enforcement agents fanned out around her Connecticut home, interrupting turkey dinners to search for clues. In Seymour, Conn., they wanted to know whether Kevin Cox had seen anything suspicious around Ms. Lundgren's house, where he mowed the lawn. The Fritz family was just sitting down to their traditional dinner at Fritz's Snack Bar -- a favorite of Ms. Lundgren's -- when agents came and swabbed the tabletops. And John Criscuolo was about to serve dinner for 24 when eight police cars pulled up. Mr. Criscuolo never knew Ms. Lundgren, but he did hire the same Odd Couple cleaning service, whose owners had told agents they might have dumped her vacuum bag in Mr. Criscuolo's trash. Agents combed the garbage for an hour, but failed to find the bag. They even ran anthrax tests on a dead stray cat in the area. But the results came back negative. As the Thanksgiving visits show, investigators are casting an enormous net as they press forward with one of the most extraordinary manhunts in U.S. history. Agents have pursued thousands of leads, ranging from gumshoe interviews to sophisticated laboratory tests of the anthrax itself to computerized analyses of about 800,000 people who entered the country shortly before the tainted letters were mailed. In one tantalizing clue, a person familiar with the investigation said Monday that one of the letters mailed along with the anthrax was of a size not normally found in the U.S. Yet the very breadth of their search shows just how far they may still be from solving the crime. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the lead agency, says several hundred agents are working the case, with help from the U.S. Postal Inspection Service and state and local police, among others. The FBI members have divided into three teams, working in parallel. One is pursuing the theory that the mailer is a Unabomber-type lone wolf. Another team is investigating whether the mailings are the work of a home-grown terrorist group, and the third is checking out whether the anthrax represents a strike by a foreign organization or state. A portrait of the investigation, code-named "Amerithrax," emerges from dozens of interviews with law-enforcement agents, scientists and people who have been questioned by authorities. The Envelopes and Letters The best clues are hard to trace: the anthrax powder itself, four handwritten envelopes and four letters, all photocopies of originals authorities don't have. The letters to Sen. Tom Daschle, NBC anchor Tom Brokaw and the New York Post have already been examined, and they didn't contain the sender's fingerprints or DNA. One clue was contained in the missive to the New York Post: The letter, which read in part, "Death to America," wasn't printed on a paper size normally found in the U.S., says an FBI official familiar with the matter. An FBI spokesman declined to elaborate. Erich Speckin, who runs a private forensic laboratory in Okemos, Mich., says the height-to-width ratio was approximately 1.41 to 1, according to a photo released by the FBI. He says that ratio is common for business letters in Europe and elsewhere but rare in the U.S. That could suggest that the mailer is from another country or has traveled outside the U.S. Law-enforcement officials say they have gleaned few other useful clues from the first three letters. They were able to discover the brand of tape the mailer used to close the envelope, but it was a common one used by millions of people. They won't reveal the brand. The ink used to address the envelopes was also common. And the envelopes themselves were pre-stamped versions issued by the Postal Service in January of this year, but they are sold at post-

office counters and vending machines around the country. Some are also bought in bulk by companies. There is no way to tell where the perpetrator obtained those used to deliver anthrax. Officials are also scrutinizing the photocopied letters. Analyzing the toner and the "feeder marks from the grippers that pull in the paper" can narrow down the type of copier used, says Gideon Epstein. He worked as a document examiner for many years with the Army crime lab and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and founded the Immigration and Naturalization Service's forensic document laboratory. He says that document experts will also look for "what we call trash marks -- scratches on glass, defects in the drum. These are very individual, so they may tie copies to a particular machine." FBI officials acknowledge examining the documents for these clues, but won't reveal what they've found. Handwriting and Hate Mail The handwriting on the envelopes and the letters has also undergone intense scrutiny. About 10 days after the Daschle letter was discovered, a copy of it was sent to the Secret Service to run the letter through its Forensic Information System for Handwriting, or FISH. The Secret Service digitized the Daschle letter and envelope, placing it in a system that includes the digital images of thousands of threatening letters that have been sent over the years to presidents and other officials. In addition to matching handwriting, FISH also compares syntax. There were no matches. At the same time the Secret Service was running the letter through its computers, the FBI and the Capitol Police were doing the same with their databases of hate mail. The Capitol Police -- which archives thousands of "unusual or inappropriate" communications sent to members of Congress -- is still examining them by hand, says Captain David Callaway, head of the Capitol Police's investigations division. The Profile To shake loose a tip, the FBI released a behavioral profile of the mailer, developed by a team of profilers from the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime at the FBI Academy at Quantico, Va. When members of the unit sat down to analyze the mailer, their first problem was to find an appropriate category for the anthrax mailings. Was it a crime like serial murder, or was it more like sending hoax letters to abortion clinics? "We operate using typologies," explains Kevin Kelm, a profiler for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms who works with the unit stationed at Quantico. But, he says, "how many anthrax letters have ever been sent?" They decided the mailings were closest to bombings, partly because bombers kill from afar without actually being present -- and some, like Unabomber Theodore Kaczynski, send their murderous explosives through the mail. Another key: Bombers tend to have higher-than-average IQs and tend to be technically oriented, taking great interest in how their bombs are prepared, according to a 121-page study co-authored by Mr. Kelm and reviewed by the team that profiled the anthrax mailer. According to the profile, the mailer may hold a grudge against the intended recipients of his letters but may be nonconfrontational and perhaps even reclusive. Investigators are considering incorporating this profile into an unusual version of the traditional "wanted" poster. In place of a photograph, agents of the Postal Inspection Service may display samples of the perpetrator's handwriting and details from the profile. The flyers would likely be mailed to every postal customer around Trenton, N.J., because the anthrax letters were postmarked there and investigators believe the mailer is familiar with that area. The Leahy Letter Top anthrax experts have clashed over one of the most basic questions: Who would have the ability to make the lethal powder? Richard Spertzel, a former U.S. military germ-warfare researcher who later worked as a United Nations bioweapons inspector, argued in congressional testimony that the anthrax material was likely produced by a government program because the anthrax in the Daschle letter had extremely pure spores and very small particles, signs of sophisticated equipment and knowledge. Former Soviet bioweapons specialist Kenneth Alibek countered that making the powder wasn't especially demanding. "It could be a technician working at one of the hospitals or one of the companies or somebody who worked many years before in the field," he said during the hearing. Similar disagreements have raged within the FBI. Last month the Bureau announced that the anthrax could have been produced with equipment costing as little as $2,500. But a senior law-enforcement official working the case says bluntly, "I don't believe that, and I told them I didn't believe it." It is very difficult to ascertain how the anthrax powder was made. For example, the powder is extremely pure, but the method used to wash it is almost impossible to determine, says a scientist familiar with the investigation. The tiny amount of material in the first three letters makes the task even tougher. That's where the letter to Sen. Patrick Leahy could come in handy. Discovered amid more than 600 bags of quarantined mail, the letter was carefully opened last week to preserve as much anthrax as possible. Monday, after having been decontaminated, it was sent to the FBI lab.

The relatively large amount of anthrax in the Leahy letter offers the best chance to resolve some of these disputes. Van Harp, the special agent in charge of the Washington, D.C., field office and the person leading the Bureau's anthrax investigation, publicly announced that the FBI has enlisted "some of the best minds available" to advise it on what tests to run. The FBI has declined to name its advisors, but one member of that group, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the tests will focus on three broad areas: the biological traits of the anthrax spores, such as genetic identifiers; the chemical components of the powder, such as any drying agents or any traces of media used to grow the bacteria; and the physical properties of the powder, such as its electrostatic charge. "There just won't be a smoking gun," cautioned this member of the FBI's advisory team. The Bureau is also considering unorthodox approaches submitted by other agencies. Mitchell Cohen, director of the division of bacterial and mycotic diseases at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, says that the CDC has a method to detect traces of bacteria besides anthrax in the powder. Conceivably, he says, that could provide clues about where the anthrax was produced or mailed from, especially if investigators found a bacterial species or strain that was prevalent only in some regions of the world. Another test may help more. The Institute for Genomic Research, a private, not-for-profit research organization in Rockville, Md., has sequenced more than 99% of the DNA of the terror strain of the anthrax. By comparing that strain to those in other labs -- which a senior law-enforcement official says authorities plan to do -- investigators may be able to narrow down the labs from which the mailer got his stock of anthrax. Labs and Pesticides Whoever created the weapon had to have access to the Ames strain of anthrax. And because the Ames strain is quite rare in nature, according to Paul Keim, a professor at Northern Arizona University who is an expert on anthrax strains, that means the mailer almost certainly obtained it from a laboratory. Martin Hugh-Jones, an anthrax expert at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge, said the FBI returned to his lab in mid-November for a two-and-a-half-hour interview asking him for the "name, rank and serial number" of everyone who had visited the facility in the last five years. Previously, the FBI had subpoenaed records going back a few months. Because of the training required, the anthrax mailer "had a mentor, and we're going to find him," says a senior law-enforcement official. Dr. Hugh-Jones agrees and says the international community of anthrax researchers is tightly knit. "We know this guy," says Dr. Hugh-Jones. "One of us knows him." Professor Keim has estimated that fewer than 20 U.S. labs probably possess the Ames strain. Not so, counters the senior law-enforcement official. "More labs than you think" could have acquired the Ames strain, said this official, who points to how freely scientists share microbes. He says scientists have been known to bring anthrax to conferences in "a test tube in their pocket." Of course, whoever made the anthrax in the letters had to have mastered not just the biology of Bacillus anthracis, as the bacterium which causes anthrax is formally called, but also the technique of transforming it into a powder. That's done by people who deploy germ warfare against insects. A relative of anthrax is Bacillus thuringiensis, or BT. It produces a toxin that kills certain agricultural pests, such as the cotton bollworm. Often formulated as a powder, pesticide BT has particles that are much larger than those of the anthrax in the tainted letters, because pesticides have to fall through the air to coat the leaves of crops. But military bioweapons experts have used BT and similar nonlethal bacilli as a stand-in for anthrax when ironing out production and manufacturing. David Franz, who runs the Chemical and Biological Defense Division of the Southern Research Institute and who headed three United Nations inspections in Iraq, believes the Iraqis used BT as dummy anthrax. UN inspectors found powderized BT at Iraq's Al Hakam plant. The particles turned out to be as small as one to five microns in size, similar to the dimensions of the anthrax spores mailed in the United States, says Dr. Franz, adding that the BT was missing the gene for the toxin that kills bugs, rendering it totally useless as an insecticide. Dr. Franz, who stresses he isn't pointing the finger at Iraq because "anyone could have made this," speculates that the anthrax mailer could be "someone who is a good technician who worked with BT or other species that don't cause disease." He says the mailer could have "just worked and worked until he got it right, and then switched to anthracis." Has the FBI been investigating the BT theory? In response, a senior agent snaps, "Thuringienis -- how do you think I knew the name?" An executive at one of the nation's largest BT insecticide producers, who asked that neither he nor his company be named, says, "We're working with the FBI." An executive from a much smaller company located not far from Trenton, who also asked for anonymity, says the FBI monitored an equipment auction the company held recently. Army Scientists

Recently, public suspicion has been rising that the mailer might have been connected to the U.S. Army. On Saturday, Senator Daschle was asked if the mailer had a military background. "I think as we look at all the possibilities, that one has the greatest degree of credibility right now," Mr. Daschle said. FBI officials say that a military connection is merely one avenue the Bureau is following. The FBI has subpoenaed a list of everyone at the U.S. Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Md., who had access to anthrax, according to a senior employee, who said he had been questioned by law-enforcement agents. "There are people who left here under less-than-the-best circumstances who are being investigated -- where did they go and what are they doing?" This person stressed that other military labs had access to anthrax, including Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, which he describes a particularly bleak and isolated place. "They work with anthrax there, and they have one hell of a turnover. It's 17 miles of just open desert from the main gate to the main lab," he said. Having to work there could fill employees with anger and resentment. "It's like going to a penitentiary," he said. The Americans who probably know the most about making biological weapons are aging researchers who worked on the military's offensive germ-warfare program. Before it was ended by President Richard Nixon in 1969, that program produced powdered anthrax. Interviews with more than half a dozen former American bioweapons experts, including senior people from that program, reveal that none of them have yet been interviewed by the FBI. "I don't want to appear arrogant," says William Patrick III, who used to be a high-level researcher in the biological-weapons program at Ft. Detrick, but "I don't think anyone knows more about anthrax powder in this country." Mr. Patrick, who now works as a consultant and says he would charge the government for his advice, says he attended one advisory meeting with the FBI but hasn't been asked for suggestions on how to test the Leahy letter. FBI spokesman Mike Kortan says agents have talked to some of the people in this group, and adds: "The investigative strategy is based in part on consultation with top experts, and any suggestion that a group of key individuals has been overlooked is simply not true." -- Antonio Regalado and Jerry Markon contributed to this article. Return to Contents Bloomberg.com December 11, 2001

Bioport Nears FDA Inspection Of Anthrax Vaccine Plant Washington, Dec. 10 (Bloomberg) -- BioPort Corp., the sole U.S. maker of a vaccine against the deadly anthrax bacteria, said a long awaited inspection by U.S. regulators would occur within days. BioPort will be ready for a U.S. Food and Drug Administration inspection as early as this week, a company spokeswoman said. The company expects an announcement that ``may go as far as saying, `They're here,' '' said BioPort spokeswoman Kim Root. Lansing, Michigan-based BioPort has been barred from delivering any anthrax vaccine for three years because of deficiencies at its Michigan plant, including rusty equipment and inadequate sterility. Demand for vaccine increased after anthrax spread through the mail system in September and October, infecting at least 18 people and causing the deaths of five. BioPort has a contract to produce vaccine for the U.S. Department of Defense. Its quality deficiencies have prompted calls for the government to take over vaccine production or let other companies compete for the business. North Carolina Republican congressman Walter Jones, who serves on the House Armed Services Committee, said BioPort has received $112 million from government contracts over the past decade to produce anthrax vaccine and still is receiving almost $3 million a month from the Defense Department, even though it can't deliver any vaccine. ``It's just been a fiasco since the very beginning,'' Jones said. ``We're paying $3 million a month to prop up a company that hasn't been able to produce a product. I do not understand. Return to Contents

Birmingham (AL) News December 8, 2001

Legislation Calls For Safety Vote On Incinerator By Mary Orndorff, News Washington correspondent WASHINGTON - The U.S. Army would not be allowed to start its chemical weapons incinerator, according to legislation pending in Congress, if two of four key officials did not believe the people of Calhoun County were protected. "I don't think it's an impediment. It's another step on the road to safety," said Sen. Richard Shelby, R-Ala., who added the provision to a defense spending bill in its early stages. The directive, if it becomes law, would require the blessing of three of the following people: the undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics; the director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency; the governor of Alabama; and the chairman of the Calhoun County Commission. Two negative votes among the four would keep the incinerator from firing up, an event scheduled for early next summer. The governor now has the authority to block start-up of the incinerator if he believes the safety of the community is at risk. It was unclear whether the proposed legislation would usurp that authority, but Gov. Don Siegelman contends that it would not. "What I've said since the beginning and will continue to say is that there will not be a match lit until the safety of residents in Anniston and Calhoun County are ensured to my satisfaction," Siegelman said through a spokeswoman Friday. The Army has built an incinerator at the Anniston Army Depot to adhere to an international weapons treaty and destroy the 2,254 tons of chemical munitions stored there. Local, state and federal officials have spent years preparing the community for a possible accident or leak of the deadly nerve agents, but significant disagreements remain over the definition of "maximum protection." Calhoun County officials question whether all of the agreed-upon safety measures can be completed in time. The Pentagon recently agreed to an additional $40 million for safety improvements such as computer upgrades and protective respiratory masks. Hypothetically, under the proposed legislation, the Pentagon, FEMA and the governor could find that the community is adequately protected and overrule the concerns of the county officials. "With the people we're talking about, if the majority of them agree, then it would probably be safe," Shelby said. "They wouldn't do it otherwise." Return to Contents Time December 17, 2001

Is This The Next Cipro? Not Quite By Jeffrey Kluger There's no pill to keep you completely safe from the effects of a nuclear attack, but that hasn't stopped a lot of people from behaving as if there were. If the anthrax scares taught us a lot about how to respond to a public health emergency--and how not to--the potential threat of nuclear terrorism could teach us even more. For folks living through the cold war, there were few precautions to take in the event of nuclear exchange: go underground, get out of town or at least run upwind. In the years since Chernobyl and Three Mile Island--and the months since Sept. 11--the advice has got a good deal more sophisticated. The safety measure generating the most buzz lately is potassium iodide--a widely available pill that, so the stories go, can help prevent people exposed to radioactivity from developing cancer. The stories are true--up to a point. Nuclear detonations release a hail of charged particles, common among them radioactive iodine. This is bad news for the human thyroid, which soaks up iodine like a sponge. One way to prevent the problem is to dose the body with potassium iodide, which saturates the gland and prevents the nastier form of the stuff from being absorbed. It's simple--but of limited value. First, little if any iodine is given off by a so-called dirty bomb--radioactive waste wrapped around a conventional explosive--which is the device a terrorist would be most likely to manage. Second,

even if radioactive iodine were present, potassium iodide would protect only against thyroid cancer--which is not the sole cancer risk. Nonetheless, potassium iodide has had its successes. Following Chernobyl, which released a giant plume of radiation, the Polish government distributed tablets to the population, while neighboring Belarus didn't. Fifteen years later, the incidence of thyroid cancer has not changed in Poland, while it has jumped an alarming 100-fold among some Belarussian children. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is now giving states the option of stocking up on potassium iodide for communities near the nation's 103 nuclear power plants. Still, the NRC emphasizes that the drug is not the next Cipro. Says NRC spokesman William Beecher: "It can protect only one part of the body against one radioactive element." Meanwhile, the Pentagon is hoping to hasten federal approval of another drug, 5-androstenediol, an immune-system booster that appears to protect mice from radiation. Still another medication, amifostine, is already used to protect the salivary glands of cancer patients during radiation treatment and could find applications in the terror wars as well. For all these pharmacological possibilities, there are other, more straightforward ways to reduce the danger from a nuclear or radioactive device. According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the three variables that determine the impact of radiation have not changed since the cold war: time, distance and shielding. After a nuclear device or dirty bomb goes off, survivors should quickly move away from ground zero and return home or to a safe place indoors--trying to stay uphill or upwind on the way. Once there, they should shower, change clothes and put all items worn outdoors in a sealed plastic bag. Pets should be brought inside; cracks around doorways and windows should be closed off with wet towels and duct tape; air conditioners and vents should be covered with plastic, waxed paper or aluminum foil and sealed with tape. Bathtubs and other containers should be filled with water and the pipes shut off, in case reservoirs become contaminated. If authorities recommend evacuation, car windows and vents should be closed and a first-aid kit packed. FEMA provides more suggestions on its website, www.fema.gov. The advice may not be as appealing as a panacea pill, but to an increasingly jittery public, almost any advice is welcome. Reported by Amanda Bower/New York Return to Contents MONDAY DECEMBER 10 2001

Bomber 'planned chemical attack' FROM DANIEL MCGRORY IN HAIFA AND CHRISTOPHER WALKER IN JERUSALEM THE latest Hamas suicide-bomber to strike Israel may have been planning to detonate a crude chemical weapon, Israeli police said yesterday. The bomber, Nimr Abu Sayfien, smuggled two devices into Haifa in his attempt to add more victims to the 26 Israelis killed in suicide attacks in the past week. According to police, the Palestinian planned to detonate a bomb strapped to his chest as he boarded a bus at Checkpoint Junction. Minutes later, with the street full of rescue workers and bystanders trying to help the wounded, the second bomb hidden in his holdall would have been timed to explode. Instead, however, only the 20-year-old bomber was killed in the attack, a failure described by a policeman who survived the blast as “truly one of the biggest miracles we have witnessed in this terrorist war”. Eleven other people were injured, none seriously. Sayfien was shot dead by police as he lay grievously wounded on the street after triggering the explosives hidden under his coat. With what little life he had left, he was crawling towards the second, even bigger bomb. It was this that police claimed may have contained chemicals. What would be a significant new departure for Palestinian terrorist groups was revealed yesterday by government officials, who said that a bomb that exploded in a pedestrian precinct in the centre of Jerusalem last Saturday night, killing 11, had “traces of hazardous materials”. Forensic teams who examined the bomb believe that it had been dipped in pesticides, but there were no reports of it causing any injuries. That attack, and the one in Haifa shortly afterwards, which killed 15 people, were claimed by Hamas, the radical Islamic group, but last night no group had claimed responsibility for the latest bombing.

Israeli troops killed five Palestinians in two different shooting incidents yesterday in the West Bank, where Palestinian residents were braced for a further tightening of the Israeli blockade. Four of those killed were Palestinian policemen, who Palestinian officials claimed had been “shot in cold blood” during a security raid on the West Bank village of Anapta, where around 20 suspected Islamic terrorists were detained. As an already bad security situation deteriorated, a senior Palestinian source claimed that the retired US Marine General Anthony Zinni, the latest US envoy attempting to revive peace talks, threatened to return to Washington within 48 hours if Israel and the Palestinians did not come to some constructive decisions. Rudolph Giuliani, the outgoing New York Mayor, was cheered by Israelis yesterday as he visited the scenes of recent Palestinian suicide bombings in Jerusalem. Accompanied by Michael Bloomberg, the New York Mayor-elect, and George Pataki, the New York Governor, he said: “We feel a great kinship with the people of Israel. We always have and I think since September 11 and what has happened here in Israel, we are even closer. “The people of Jerusalem and the people of New York City are shoulder-to-shoulder in the fight against terrorism.” Yesterday, Ehud Olmert, the Mayor of Jerusalem, temporarily renamed the city’s historic Jaffa Road, just outside the Sbarro pizza restaurant where 16 people were killed in August, “New York Street” in solidarity with the American city, where the World Trade Centre was attacked by terrorists flying hijacked aircraft. Speaking of yesterday’s bombing in Haifa, an Israeli government spokesman said: “Using poisonous agents now shows the direction these terrorists are moving.” The suspicion that chemicals were involved in the attack was kept from survivors, who, like everyone else, were hurried from the scene while specialist teams carried out tests. Police claimed that they were merely searching for other, unexploded devices. Sayfien had left a note in his home in a village near Jenin, on the West Bank, saying that he was avenging the death of Mahmoud Abu Hanoud, a Hamas leader, who was killed in an Israeli helicopter attack on November 23. Once again the target was rush hour in the port city of Haifa. The bomber chose a busy crossroads just a few minutes’ walk from the scene of the attack seven days earlier, when a Hamas recruit burst open the roof of the No 16 bus as it drove through a residential neighbourhood. This time the young, slightly built assassin knew the bus stop at Checkpoint Junction would be crowded with soldiers returning to duty after weekend leave, as well as commuters and students who had refused to be scared off taking the bus. At about the same time as last Sunday’s attack, Sayfien set out on his mission. He might have succeeded had one of the many police on duty yesterday not thought the frail Palestinian suspicious. Hannan Malka told how he first spotted Sayfien trying to cross the busy road and was intrigued about why he was wearing a huge coat. “He also had this really strange, worried look in his eyes,” he said. Sayfien, who had a vivid scar running down the left side of his cheek, meandered over to the line of gaudily decorated kiosks and sandwich shops that line the roadside at Checkpoint Junction. He was sipping a can of fizzy orange drink, which police now think was a trick since, during the holy month of Ramadan, any devout Muslim would be fasting at this time. Officer Malka and a colleague tried to ease their way through the queues without causing panic. Ten feet away, Kamel Gantous, a café owner, had just opened for business and stared at the young man, who seemed to be agitated about which bus shelter he should be standing at. The bomber walked one way and then retraced his path, before dropping his bag and resting by a newspaper stand. By now the two officers had closed to within a couple of feet and called out to him to show them his identity card. The terrorist’s first instinct was to make a grab for a rifle that a young Israeli woman soldier had resting across her knees as she sat in the bus shelter. He could not reach. Next he searched for his bag, as he must have realised too late that he had not yet primed that bomb. Cornered, the bomber grabbed his bag and then detonated the smaller device strapped to his body. His bag had been flung yards down the road, but, though seriously wounded, he tried to reach it. He was shot in the leg and chest and died. http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/0,,3-2001571146,00.html Return to Contents Tuesday December 11 2:18 PM ET

Nuclear Industry Faces Jitters By DAVID GRAM, Associated Press Writer BRATTLEBORO, Vt. (AP) - Diana Sidebotham attended her first public hearing as a critic of nuclear power when the Vermont Yankee plant's license application was pending in 1971. Some 30 years and scores of such forums later, Sidebotham went to yet another one last week at a Brattleboro high school and encountered the biggest crowd she had ever seen at such an event - more than 500 people. Worries about nuclear power - in particular, fears of a terrorist attack on a plant - have taken on new urgency since Sept. 11. ``Now that a major disaster has occurred, people are beginning to understand that we are vulnerable,'' Sidebotham said. Around the country: - The Federal Aviation Administration (news - web sites) ordered no-fly zones around the nation's nuclear plants for two weeks in October. When a student pilot flew a small plane into airspace near a former nuclear plant in Colorado, two F-16s were scrambled and escorted the aircraft to a landing. - National Guardsmen were posted in recent weeks at nuclear plants in several states, and many installations have added private security guards. - Governors are clamoring for the federal government to open a long-delayed high-level waste-disposal site and take spent fuel now stored in pools considered more vulnerable to attacks than the reactors themselves. - Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton (news - web sites) is co-sponsoring legislation that would make nuclear plant security a federal responsibility. - A panel that advises Connecticut Gov. John G. Rowland recommended the nation consider arming nuclear plants with air defense systems. - Vermont Gov. Howard Dean, a doctor, reversed his earlier position and said he wants the state to stockpile potassium iodide, a drug that can protect against one form of radiation. Defenders of nuclear power have given assurances about security at the nation's 103 reactors. ``There has been no credible threat against any nuclear facility in this country, and if there was, we would be equipped to deal with it,'' Nils Diaz, a member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, said last month in Florida. And at last week's meeting in Brattleboro, Hubert Miller, an NRC regional administrator, repeatedly told the crowd that security at Vermont Yankee is ``robust.'' He said nuclear plants were not designed with an attack by a large passenger jet in mind. But he said the containment vessels that surround reactors are among the strongest buildings in the country. Some in the audience were skeptical because just the week before, preliminary results were released from a drill Aug. 23 at Vermont Yankee in which the plant failed to repel a mock terrorist attack. Vermont Yankee received the lowest grade in the industry. Improvements have been made since then, officials assured the audience, but they would not give specifics. In a measure of how jittery people are, a Brattleboro newspaper photographer was detained by Vernon police last month under a 1917 treason law for taking pictures of Vermont Yankee. Prosecutors declined to press charges. The new wave of concern about nuclear power comes just as the industry's fortunes appeared to be improving. No new U.S. nuclear plant has been ordered since before the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979. But in the couple of years before Sept. 11, several utilities had won license extensions. Nuclear plants that are being sold in the newly deregulated electric market are fetching higher prices. And nuclear power has some supporters in the Bush administration, chief among them Vice President Dick Cheney (news - web sites). However, the call for a new round of nuclear plant construction has been muted since the September attacks. Instead, the discussion has focused on how to protect reactors and how effective emergency evacuation plans would be in a disaster. ``In Vermont and throughout this country now there is very increased concern about the vulnerability of nuclear power plants to terrorist attacks and the huge consequences that an attack could bring forth,'' said Rep. Bernard Sanders (news - bio - voting record), a Vermont independent who organized the Brattleboro meeting and was amazed by the turnout in the town of 12,000. Sidebotham recalled that when she and other nuclear opponents went before the NRC's predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission, in 1971, ``Concerns were raised about the possibility of sabotage at a nuclear plant. It was very much pooh-poohed.'' But Sept. 11, Sidebotham said, ``made the incredible credible.'' http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/20011211/us/nuclear_jitters_1.html

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