1

UK Security in 2014: Contesting Hyper-Globalist Myths.

Nicola Langdon and Jamie Gaskarth.

This is a draft paper. Please do not cite without permission.

In 2015, the UK government will be publishing its next security and defence review.

Already a number of commentators have weighed in to set the context for the

debate. The dominant narrative is that we live in a globalised world, which is more

complex and dangerous than previous eras. As a result, it is also more difficult to try

and devise and manage policy since threats are diffuse, often hidden, and require

military and civilian responses by government and non-governmental actors. In

February of 2014, John Kerry contrasted the certainties of the Cold War with current

security challenges which he sees as “in many ways more complex and more vexing

than those of the last century”.1 In an increasingly interconnected world, so the

argument goes, civil strife, terrorism and ethnic conflict abroad become direct threats

to British citizens at home. Although not facing a conventional threat from a hostile

power, the National Security Strategy describes the UK as “more vulnerable,

because we are one of the most open societies, in a world that is more networked

than ever before”.2 Echoing these themes, Sir Nicholas Houghton, the Chief of the

Defence Staff, recently asserted that the current security environment is one of

uncertainty, instability, diverse threats and interdependence.3 ln the face of this

challenge, former defence policymakers are emphasising the need for the UK to

maintain high defence spending and full spectrum capabilities.4

This article takes issue with a number of the assumptions of this ‘hyper-globalist’

security discourse. Firstly, the idea that the current era is uniquely dangerous is

2

based on the precautionary principle that potential threats need to be considered as

real to ensure the citizenry is adequately protected. However, the result is often to

describe threats as more significant and likely than they are. The actual global

security situation is, we argue, far more benign than represented by many security

reports and much commentary. Substantial academic evidence in the last two

decades has highlighted that overall levels of violence are in decline in most parts of

the world. By many measures, including the vital ones of life expectancy and

poverty, people’s lives across the globe are improving. This is not to gloss over the

continuing problems which remain, but the implicit sense that contemporary politics

is one of increasing danger and insecurity does not tally with global trends.

In a similar vein, the notion that threats in remote regions of the world are, by dint of

globalisation, threats to everyone is also not borne out by the material evidence.

Violence tends to be localised around particular areas of the world that experience

instability and conflict and is usually caused by factors proximate to these regions.

Terrorist groups do sometimes transfer their grievances from local actors to external

powers, but such incidents are comparatively rare. Therefore, geography matters.

Living on the far edge of a peaceful continent, the UK is shielded from the worst

effects of violence and strife globally.

Even if the hyper-globalist perspective is accepted, many of the UK’s current

defence spending commitments are either not suitable for addressing the threats

globalists identify, or are not the most efficient means of doing so. The asymmetric

warfare of terrorist groups and insurgents can be highly resistant to conventional

forces. As a number of commentators have pointed out, aircraft carriers and fighter

3

jets are of little use in such conflicts. Civilian political initiatives are most important

when trying to combat ideas. Furthermore, since conflict tends to arise in fragile

states, there is an argument that if the UK wants to address these problems at

source it might be better off increasing its troop contributions to UN peacekeeping

operations. This need not necessarily mean deploying to places where its presence

is likely to be provocative for historical, cultural or religious reasons; but instead it

might relieve troops in other areas to free up capacity.

Lastly, whilst the defence establishment in the UK has heavily bought into the

globalist discourse, the British public seems highly sceptical of such accounts. This

has created real problems for public support of military operations and led people to

question how far the UK wants to be a global actor in the future. The authors argue

that this is a false reading of both public attitudes and the scope for choosing

between different kinds of role in world politics. Tony Blair continues to try and

portray foreign policy as a choice between isolation and engagement. However,

there is a strong argument that the UK, with its continuing debt problems and

declining relative power, needs to choose its commitments carefully and recognise

the limits of its ability to manage global problems.

Dangerous world?

Hyper-globalists see the world as made up of numerous diffuse and complex

security threats that are burgeoning in a world that is increasingly interconnected.

The phenomenon of ‘globalisation’, so it goes, has accelerated time and space,

rendering us all neighbours within a “global village”.5 Developments in transport and

4

communications technology result in the UK’s expanding presence, physically or

virtually, around the globe. Electronic and digital information is globally networked,

created, distributed, accessed and reproduced through a fluid and dynamic web of

connectivity. Furthermore, the success of the liberal free-market economy has

resulted in the internationalisation of finance, trade and corporate interests across

much of the world.

Cosmopolitans might believe that an epoch of globalisation with its unifying and

homogenising effects could herald a more secure and cooperative international

system based upon mutual interests and connectivity. Yet, for the hyper-globalist

security policymaker, the international system has been rendered more insecure6,

with people susceptible to myriad threats from system, state and non-state actors.

Suddenly, remote or isolated threats don’t seem so distant anymore and our

openness as a result of our interconnectivity has supposedly brought with it more

vulnerabilities. This idea is not a new one. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye

recognised the political and strategic costs generated by interdependence in their

1977 publication Power and Interdependence7; Tony Blair frequently referred to

globalising effects in his Chicago speech justifying NATO action in Kosovo in 1999.8

Political discourse has dutifully absorbed and repeated the “interconnectedness-

insecurity” paradigm, and evermore so since 9/11, generating a pervasive security

discourse that has dominated the political and media agendas.9

In the economic realm, the spread of neoliberalism has led to the generation of a

global economy within which the nation-state is inextricable and its autonomy

arguably weakened. The state has been hollowed out and national regulation and

5

control of the financial sector continues to be seen as unwarranted interference in

the working of the market. Held et al describe this as a “denationalization” of the

economy through the transnationalisation of production, trade and finance and the

rise of economic institutions.10 For the UK, this results in an economy sensitive to

regional and global shocks from which the state finds it much harder to protect itself.

Meanwhile, developments in transport and communications technology have

increased the worldwide movement of goods, people and ideas across borders. In

the process, recruitment of terrorist actors, and the organisation and execution of

terrorist attacks has been made easier. The post-9/11 world is hyper- aware of the

potential for organised terror groups such as al-Qaeda to inflict mass atrocities by

harnessing the trappings of globalisation, as with the 9/11 attacks on the World

Trade Centre and Pentagon (2001), the Madrid (2004) and London (2005)

bombings, the Mumbai attacks (2008) and the Nairobi Westgate Mall attack (2013).

These incidents are recorded and replayed via social media and so their impact is

heightened and they remain fresh in the memory.

Two major effects flow from this increasing connectedness. Firstly, heightened

awareness of violence abroad and the shocking effect of terrorist incidents can

create the impression of vulnerability among UK citizens. Visual images of global

suffering, and the empathy they provoke, foster a sense that this is happening at

home leading to a distorted threat perception. Secondly, the repetition of imagery

and the continual demand for more information about conflict builds the sense that

violence is both a regular occurrence and increasing; however, the empirical picture

is quite different.

6

Indeed, the conflict studies literature points to the opposite being the case11. Globally

we have seen a marked decline in interstate conflict with no conventional war

between significant powers for sixty years.12 Since the end of the Cold War, British

defence documents have routinely stated that “there is today no direct military threat

to the United Kingdom or Western Europe. Nor do we foresee the re-emergence of

such a threat”.13 More generally, dyadic armed conflicts have declined substantially

since their peak in the 1990s, with the lowest levels post-1995 exhibited in Europe

and the Americas.14 Along with this regression in conflict, levels of combat fatalities

have similarly declined over the last half century. This is most likely due to the

decline in interstate conventional warfare, which it is claimed is more deadly in terms

of human losses than other forms of armed conflict.15

While there is broad academic agreement on the decline of interstate wars, there is

some debate with regard to levels of intra-state conflict. Lacina et al purport that civil

wars have become “less frequent, less deadly and less likely to become

internationalized” with the end of the Cold War.16 Yet Harbom and Wallensteen

report a general rise in the global levels of intrastate and internationalised intrastate

conflict, which they find to be increasingly protracted and involving multiple actors.17

The Arab spring and political problems of central Africa have increased the number

of fragile states and the casualty figures in the Syrian civil war continue to mount.

But, the overall trend of human security is broadly positive. According to the World

Health Organization, life expectancy has risen globally by 6 years since 1990. Even

in Africa, which saw a decline after 1990 as a result of HIV/AIDS, average life

expectancy at birth has increased from 50 years in 2000 to 58 years in 201218.

7

Global poverty measures are hugely controversial but the World Bank estimates that

“the number of people living on less than $1.25 per day has decreased dramatically

in the past three decades, from half the citizens in the developing world in 1981 to 21

percent in 2010, despite a 59 percent increase in the developing world population”19.

This still leaves some 1.2 billion people living in extreme poverty. However, most

regions have seen a decline in absolute and relative poverty in recent decades.20 In

light of this, the global environment should arguably be redescribed as one of

broadly increasing security, stability and certainty.

This reality is rarely expressed in official speeches. Official documents do have these

trends as a backdrop. For instance, the cross-departmental strategy on Building

Stability Overseas acknowledges that “the number of conflicts fell sharply from the

end of the Cold War until 2003” but quickly emphasises that “the downward trend

has now stalled”21. Instead it notes that “Over 1.5 billion people now live in fragile

and conflict-affected states or in countries with very high levels of criminal

violence”.22 Similarly, the 2013 annual report on the National Security Strategy and

Strategic Defence and Security Review does highlight where risks haven’t

materialised over the year. But, when it sets out overall trends, it does so in terms of

risks that remain as they were, have shifted in their nature, or continue to grow.23

There is no reference to risks decreasing or disappearing altogether.

The threat that has achieved the most attention in the post-9/11 world is that of

global terrorism. John Reid, whilst Home Secretary, described the UK in 2006 as

“probably in the most sustained period of severe threat since the end of World War

II”.24 Yet, the figures don’t bear this out. According to the independent reviewer of

8

terrorism legislation, David Anderson Q.C., “There is a paucity of official information

about the level of threat”.25 Weighing the threat from terrorism is difficult as a

number of factors have to be considered: do we judge it on the number of attacks,

the number of victims, the number of arrests, the number of successful convictions,

the number of foiled attempts the security services identify, or all of these? There is

also the issue of what acts are defined as terrorism. From the limited information

available, it would appear that the threat of terrorism is not as severe as Reid

presented. A 2011 study of ‘homegrown Islamic terrorists’ – those involved in

terrorists acts in the UK – could only identify 77 individuals in the period 2001-2009

either convicted of offences or killed in their commission.26 In 2010 and 2011, there

were 123 individuals in prison for terrorist or extremist offences, and 122 in 2012, 22

of whom were far right extremists or animal rights activists (these figures include

those on remand awaiting trial). On 31 March 2012, there were 118 terrorist or

extremist prisoners, 75% of whom were British.27 The total prison population as of

July 2013 was 84,05228. In other words, if convictions are anything to go by, the

number of people engaging in Islamist terrorist activities in the UK is very small.

Furthermore, terrorist and extremist prisoners are mostly British citizens.

When it comes to the number of terrorist attacks on British soil, the graph in Figure 1

presents a different picture to the rhetoric emanating from policymakers in the post-

9/11 period. While there have been small peaks in 2001 and 2005 the overall picture

presents a downward trend in the number of terrorist attacks committed in the UK

since the mid-1990s.29 Furthermore, out of the 18 recorded incidents during the

2001 peak, it is suspected that seven can be attributed to the Real Irish Republican

Army (RIRA) and nine to animal rights activists, while two are unknown. In 2005, the

9

peak is attributed to the 7/7 London bombings, with four of the nine recorded

incidents relating to the three tube attacks at Aldgate, Edgware Road and Russell

Square, and the bus attack at Tavistock Square. The remaining incidents relate to

four unsuccessful ‘7/7 copycat’ attempts carried out two weeks later, and one animal

rights activist30. Based upon this evidence the 7/7 attacks have proven the only

large-scale successful terrorist attack to the UK mainland since the Omagh bombing

in 1998. Nevertheless, the rhetoric espoused from policymakers in recent years

appears to be in stark contrast to this. The narrative presented within the most

recent National Security Strategy in 2010 is one of an increasing threat to British

citizens at home from, predominantly Islamist, terror organisations, as in the

assertion that “We know that terrorist groups like Al Qaeda are determined to exploit

our openness to attack us, and plot to kill as many of our citizens as possible or to

inflict a crushing blow to our economy. It is the most pressing threat we face today”.31

Between 2008 and 2012 there were only ten terrorist incidents in the UK recorded by

the Global Terrorism Database. Of these incidents, five were by unknown

perpetrators, while three others were claimed by an animal rights activist group, an

international anarchist insurrectionist group, and a Sikh nationalist group. Only two

of the attacks can be linked to the Islamist cause, the planting of an explosive device

on a plane by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and the stabbing of MP Stephen

Timms by student Roshonara Choudhry, both in 2010.32

Figure 1: Graph showing decline in terrorist attacks on UK since 1980.

10

The graph in Figure 2 illustrates the number of fatalities and casualties caused by

terrorist attacks in the UK between 1980-2012.33 As with the number of terrorist

attacks generally, the numbers illustrate an overall downward trend in fatalities. The

number of fatalities overall has been in decline since a peak in 1988 up until the 7/7

attacks in 2005 which resulted in 56 deaths. While the number of casualties as a

result of terrorism has been less stable with many fluctuations, the graph illustrates

that these figures have remained at exceedingly low levels since the 7/7 attacks in

2005. The peak in casualty numbers in 2001 are the result of two bomb attacks in

London that caused 238 casualties and one fatality. The RIRA are suspected to be

responsible34, as with the corresponding peak in Figure 1. Similarly, the peak in

casualties in 1999 is attributed to four nail bomb attacks in London. While one was

committed by perpetrators unknown, the other three were homophobic and racially

motivated and have been attributed to neo-Nazi groups35. A similar peak in 1996

was caused by suspected attacks by the RIRA. Figure 2 presents an overall

downward trend in the number of fatalities and casualties incurred by terrorism in the

UK since 2005, while those attacks before this date have been attributed to Irish

Republican or neo-Nazi groups.

Figure 2: Graph showing decline in fatalities and caualties from terrorist attacks since

1980.

According to Europol, there were no religiously inspired terrorist attacks in Europe in

2011 and only six in 2012.36 In total, 17 people were defined as dying from

terrorism-related incidents in Europe in 2012, 8 of whom were killed in religiously-

inspired attacks. David Spiegelhalter once observed that if the UK were to encounter

11

annual terror attacks equivalent in scale to those incurred during the 7/7 London

bombings, the risk to the average citizen from such attacks would still only be

approximately one in a million; or the equivalent of a week of fatalities on the roads

in England and Wales.37 In reality, the London tube bombings remain the only

successful mass attack on British soil in the 13 years since 9/11 and this was

conducted by Britons, albeit with encouragement and inspiration from abroad.38

While empirics may appear insensitive, they help to refocus our threat perception

lest we are swept away on the hyper-globalist tide.

Recognising this, the coalition government made an impressive effort to drawback

from some of the more severe legislative measures of the New Labour era. The UK

threat level was lowered to ‘substantial’ (meaning that an attack is a strong

possibility) and has remained at this level since July 2011. Even prior to that, the

classification of the threat level by the UK Security Services only reached the ‘critical’

level twice, the second of which was due to the attempted terror attacks at Glasgow

Airport and the simultaneous discovery of car bombs in London.39 The Director of

MI5, Andrew Parker, acknowledged in a 2013 speech that: “for the public at large

security concerns are rightly not a dominant part of daily life. Lethal terrorist attacks

in the UK remain rare”.40 However, he was not entirely clear about the actual scope

of the threat. Turning to international terrorism, Parker noted that “from 11

September 2001 to the end of March this year 330 people were convicted of

terrorism-related offences in Britain. At the end of that period 121 were in prison”41,

out of an overall prison population of 83,842.42 Yet, as we have seen above, not all

of those 121 prisoners were ‘international’ terrorists and this casts doubt on how

many of the 330 were either. Although the rhetoric is more measured, Parker still

12

conveys a sense of a “rising threat of Islamist terrorism” to which the agency has had

to respond and sees the task as “harder”.

It is possible that the tiny number of attacks and convictions is evidence of the

success of the security services and the government’s overall efforts to prevent

terrorist ideas from breaking out into violence. It is also conceivable that we are

experiencing a lull as Islamists have been distracted by conflicts in Libya, Syria and

Iraq. This could result in a heightened threat in the future from individuals who have

travelled to these areas to train and serve as ‘foreign fighters’ and returned more

radicalised and militant. The UK’s involvement in Iraq (2003-9) and Afghanistan

(2001-14) continue to be useful in producing radical converts to the Islamist cause.

British fusilier Lee Rigby was attacked and brutally murdered on the streets of

London by the radicalised British-born Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale.

Such incidents are shocking but they are highly unusual and arguably unavoidable

given the lack of planning, expertise or equipment required. Indeed, the very crude

nature of such attacks suggest a decline in the resources and sophistication of the

Islamist movement.

Since this broad account of improving global security runs counter to the established

discourse of much security thinking, it might be dismissed as panglossian. It is not

the authors’ intention to suggest that threats do not exist. Instead, we merely note

that insecurity from violence is decreasing – something that is approaching a

consensus in the academic literature.43 In the following section, we make the further

claim that threats remain stubbornly local, despite frequent claims that globalisation

13

is reducing physical and psychological distances and threats in remote regions must

be treated as immediate and proximate.

Local or global?

In the post-Cold War era, and especially in the aftermath of 9/11, it became a mantra

that security was becoming globalized. Tony Blair had already declared in his

Chicago speech in 1999 that “We are all internationalists now, whether we like it or

not…We cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights within

other countries if we want still to be secure”.44 The global scope of the planning and

execution of the 9/11 attacks led policymakers to see terrorism as a global

phenomenon that required defence postures with global reach. The New Chapter to

the Strategic Defence Review launched in 2002 argued that: “Experience shows that

it is better where possible, to engage an enemy at longer range, before they get the

opportunity to mount an assault on the UK”.45 As a result, there was a renewed effort

to enhance the expeditionary capabilities of the armed forces to meet this

requirement. The ability to interdict terrorist operations far from home was seen as

having a deterrent effect.

This theme was also reflected in the 2003 European Security Strategy, which argued

that “In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those

that are near at hand... The first line of defence will be often be abroad”.46 However,

the ESS was careful to downplay the risks faced and set them within a realistic

framework. It began by stating “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure

nor so free”47. The emphasis was also on the proximity of threats. As the report

14

states: “Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the

European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed”.48

The authors of this article concur with the ESS and its emphasis on geography. If we

plot the location of fragile states, as defined by the OECD in 2013, we can see that

they are grouped across Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, with much of the

rest of the world experiencing stability (Figure 3 below). Similarly, when we plot the

incidents of terrorist attacks as identified by the Global Terrorism Database onto this

map, we can see that these are overwhelmingly executed in these regions. Viewed

like this, global terrorist attacks against the West are very much the exception. Most

terrorist incidents are planned and executed in countries far removed from the British

mainland. Of course, these could still have a significant impact on the security of

British citizens – 67 British people were killed on 9/11 after all and attacks against

British targets abroad are a continual threat. However, it is questionable how far the

British state is capable of acting to prevent such incidents without provoking further

retaliatory responses. Indeed, that may very often be a motivation for such attacks in

the first place.

Figure 3: Map of fragile states and global terrorist incidents.

Rather than understand the security of the world as globalised, it is perhaps more

accurate to see it as fragmented into a series of regional clusters; or, as Barry Buzan

and Ole Waever describe them, regional security complexes (RSC).49 Regional

security complex theory suggests that security issues travel over short distances

more easily than long ones, hence security threats often become regionally

15

interdependent, occurring in clusters around the globe known as security complexes.

Buzan and Waever define RSCs as, “a set of units whose major processes of

securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems

cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another”.50 While major

powers may become involved in, or influence, a security cluster, for example, NATO

involvement in the Balkans during the 1990s, the tussle of great and regional powers

for influence in Afghanistan after 9/11, or external interference in the Syria civil war

since 2011, the internal dynamics are often very particular to the region concerned.

Moreover, the insecurity felt is more intense for the local actors involved whose level

of security becomes defined by the actions of neighbours within the cluster.

The Arab Spring uprisings provide a contemporary illustration of security issues

within a regional complex. The initial protests in Tunisia were sparked by the self-

immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi after he was prohibited from trading by officials.

The protests and revolution that followed in Tunisia also had tangible ramifications

across neighbouring states in the MENA region51, producing a domino of uprisings

that led in some cases to elements of political reform, in others regime change52, and

in the case of Syria a protracted civil war. Despite the intensity of the regional

situation, the UK remained relatively remote from the security effects generated from

such conflicts and civil strife. Britain did become involved in Libya, ostensibly on the

basis of the human rights abuses occurring. However, there were clear implications

for Europe’s southern borders in potential mass refugee movements as well as

important economic ties to the state. Other, more geographically remote conflicts

have struggled to motivate similar action and have been largely contained within

their own regional clusters. France’s involvement in Mali, with Britain’s cooperation,

16

is arguably a knock-on effect of the previous Libyan intervention. What that indicates

is that Western involvement in other regional security clusters can lead to

unpredictable and expanding commitments. Awareness of the local drivers of much

of this conflict would lead to a reprioritisation of threats, putting Europe’s regional

security needs before other regional or global ones.

This point has become apparent since the Ukraine crisis earlier this year. Russia’s

violations of Ukrainian sovereignty in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine have important

ramifications for the security and integrity of a whole series of states on Europe’s

borders, as well as the credibility of NATO and relations between Russia and the rest

of Europe. Russia, the US and the UK are signatories to the 1994 Budapest

Memorandum and pledged to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of

Ukraine.53 It is clear that Russia has breached its obligations in this regard. In

addition, in his speech to the Duma in March 2014, President Putin hinted at further

unrest in other former Soviet satellite states when he declared that “Many people

both in Russia and in Ukraine, as well as in other republics hoped that the

Commonwealth of Independent States that was created at the time would become

the new common form of statehood. They were told that there would be a single

currency, a single economic space, joint armed forces; however, all this remained

empty promises”.54 In light of such comments, states across the former Soviet

sphere of influence, from Belarus, to Moldova, to Kazakhstan, might be concerned

about Putin’s future ambitions. These events highlight the need for the UK to redirect

its security focus away from geopolitically distant conflicts and on to its regional

neighbours and allies.

17

This reorientation is important not only in the military but also the economic security

field. The weak European response to the illegal annexation of territory from a

sovereign state on Europe’s border was partly derived from fears that economic

sanctions against Russia might impact on European growth. This local consideration

draws our attention to the UK’s reliance on local and regional over global trade.

Policymakers often describe the UK as a uniquely global trading actor and use this

as a justification for playing an active international role. In 2013, the UK was the 7 th

largest economy in the world and its reliance on foreign direct investment (due to a

lack of domestic investment) means that it is vulnerable to global economic trends.

Britain’s capacity to trade, conduct business and attract investment internationally is

important to its economic well-being and national security. However, it is important

to recall the extent to which trade and economic flows are predominantly local. When

he came into office, William Hague would often decry the fact that the UK traded

more with Ireland than all the BRIC countries put together. Yet, this is consistent with

the pattern of trade flow in the post-Imperial era.

The EU remains the largest destination of UK traded goods55, accounting for 47.5%

of UK exports with 42% to the Eurozone states in 2011.56 Of the top 25 export

partners to the UK in 2011, 13 were made up of our European neighbours and US

allies, including the largest eight. Of the top 25 import partners to the UK in 2011, 15

were made up of our European neighbours and the US.57 At the Liberal Democrat

Spring Party Conference in 2014, Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg described the

EU as the largest borderless market place in the world, with three million UK jobs

connected to it.58 It is also the top trading partner for 80 countries.59 Such regional

trade and financial network credentials support the argument for the UK to continue

18

as an active and engaged EU member when it comes to commerce.60 The fact that

the global economy is becoming progressively more integrated shouldn’t blind us to

the fact that much economic activity remains local or regional.

The UK’s top five non-EU import partners are China, USA, Norway, Hong Kong and

Switzerland. Significantly, Norway is the UK’s largest import contributor of petroleum

crude oils, followed by Russia, Nigeria, Algeria and Denmark. From 2004, when the

UK became a net importer of energy, policymakers have sought to provide greater

security of energy supply by reducing its reliance on imports from countries at risk of

disruption. In 2011, Norway accounted for 67% of our petroleum crude oil imports,

while Libya and Iran accounted for just 1.2%.61 By 2012, Britain’s reliance on

Norwegian oil had dropped to 46%, while imports from the OPEC states of Nigeria,

Algeria, Angola and Libya increased62 thanks to improved infrastructure and stability

in those regions. In 2012 the largest import contributor of transport fuels to the UK

was Sweden followed by the Netherlands.63 While most of our transport fuels for

aviation are sourced from states in Asia, most of our transport diesel imports remain

regional ones, coming from European countries; Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium

and Norway, with Russia and the USA as medium contributors.64 In terms of

transport fuel exports, the main trading partners are the USA and Canada, and

European states, including; Ireland, France, the Netherlands, Germany, and

Sweden.65 In other words, whilst the globalising economy is often used as a

backdrop to narratives of global insecurity, even in this realm regional or historical

ties are most prominent.

19

Overall, a reliance on energy imports does leave the UK at potential risk from price

volatility and issues with supply and demand. It has made efforts to reduce its

individual exposure to risks from energy insecurity but the economic importance of

Europe to the UK economy means that the vulnerabilities of its neighbours to energy

supply shortages are, by extension, vulnerabilities for British economic growth. That

said, such risks can be overstated. A scenario where Russia stopped or severely

curtailed energy supply to Europe on anything but a very short term basis would

bring massive economic costs to the Russian economy and so would be unlikely to

be attempted. The most significant insight from this discussion is that despite the

continual emphasis on globalisation and the UK as an international actor, its

economic fortunes are overwhelmingly tied to the European continent. In both the

military and economic security sectors, geography matters and the most serious

threats are those that are closest to the mainland.

Defence commitments

The logic of defence reforms since the end of the Cold War has been about

decreasing expenditure on purely defensive forces and reorienting towards

expeditionary capability. In addition, the rising cost of military hardware and software

has led to the UK looking to be a niche provider in coalitions rather than an

independent military actor. This is particularly the case for the British army, which

has seen a dramatic reduction in regular troop numbers from 298,000 soldiers in

199166, to 82,000 by 2020.67 Despite these reductions, the UK has engaged in an

extensive number of military interventions in the last two decades, including in

Bosnia, Iraq, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Macedonia, Libya and Mali. The

20

2010 SDSR saw the maximum expected contribution to any large scale military

operations as the deployment of 30,000 troops on a strictly short term basis, with

long term commitments reduced to a brigade. However, far from retreating from the

world, much of the rhetoric seems to be about making troops more deployable in

offensive operations.

Yet, the UK’s willingness to engage in military force on a regular basis creates its

own threats and vulnerabilities. Indeed, security commentators have asserted that

the UK’s involvement in Iraq made it a target of future terrorist activity.68 This

sentiment was echoed by security chiefs such as Eliza Manningham-Buller the

former head of MI5 (2002-2007), who suggested that involvement in Iraq had

exacerbated the terror threat against the UK from those who felt it was an attack

against Islam, and that the intervention had produced Osama bin Laden’s “Iraqi

jihad”.69 It is not the aim of this article to debate the motivations of those drawn into

performing acts of terror, but instead to highlight that the scale of such threats to the

UK is more limited than security policies tend to assert. On that basis, using military

force needs to be very much a last resort due to its tendency to popularise insurgent

and terrorist groups as defenders of the civilian victims of such actions.

Does that have to mean the end of the UK as a global military actor? Public support

for military action has been notably weak in recent years. In 2009, 51% of the public

polled disapproved of the UK’s involvement in Afghanistan compared to just 22%

who approved. Similarly, in March 2011 44% of the public disapproved of the

operation in Libya compared to just 30% who approved.70 Furthermore, the

unpopularity and perceived illegitimacy of previous operations is seen as

21

undermining the “will and capacity” to get involved in Syria in August 2013, despite

international norms being broken and red lines crossed with the Assad regime’s use

of chemical weapons.71 As a recent commentary from the RUSI claims “there is now

more limited public tolerance for military operations with uncertain objectives,

unpredictable prospects for success, and without a clear UN mandate”.72 In this light,

the UK could focus its attention on those forces that are vital to the immediate

threats to its region. This might involve a reconfiguration of its resources towards civil

defence and peacekeeping within the European sphere.

Alternatively, the UK could maintain a global military role by reimagining itself as a

more benign and constructive global actor. With a significant and versatile naval

capacity, the UK can continue to assist in world-wide anti-piracy and anti-smuggling

operations as well as evacuation efforts in times of humanitarian emergency. Its two

new aircraft carriers allow the UK to engage in cooperative patrol activities with

regional neighbours and even assist UN peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.

Indeed, if policymakers decide Russia is not a threat to European security in the long

term, a more radical reconsideration of Britain’s future deployments might see a

greater role for the UK in UN peacekeeping operations. At present, its substantive

involvement is confined to financial contributions. Although it has amassed a wealth

of experience (positive and negative) in its operations in Palestine, Cyprus, Aden,

Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, UK troop contributions to

UN peacekeeping have historically been very small. In March 2014 the UK was only

providing 355 out of 83,841 UN troops involved in peacekeeping. Policymakers will

often cite the threat from failed or fragile states but its actions in Iraq and Afghanistan

22

have meant that the UK has not been a significant contributor to international

peacekeeping efforts in other regions. In evidence to the Defence Select Committee

on the 2003 White Paper, the UNA-UK expressed serious concerns that the New

Chapter to the SDR made “no reference to the UK supporting peacekeeping

missions of the UN through the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations”,

highlighting that “Very little has been said about the role of the United Nations in

current UK defence thinking”.73 The logic of living in a region largely free of threats

could be that the UK ceases to search out tenuous global risks and instead focuses

on being a positive contributor to UN conflict resolution efforts.

The UK certainly has the skills and resources to be a valued contributor to UN

peacekeeping missions. It remains an “international power with global reach”, and

one “of only a handful of countries with a “blue-water navy”, strategic airlift, highly-

trained infantry, global intelligence capabilities, residual imperial influence and

strategically-placed geographical assets”.74 One could argue that public support for

military action is likely to be even lower for involvement in activities that don’t directly

relate to national self-interest. Yet, they could be framed as important humanitarian

activities designed to restore the UK’s reputation as a good international citizen and

contrasted with the unpopular interventionism of recent decades. The legitimacy of

UN involvement would be an important counterpoint to the perceived illegality of the

Iraq deployment from 2003-2009.

There are also a variety of ways the UK could contribute that might be less ‘kinetic’.

For instance, the UK could invest in training and information sharing about

peacekeeping, based on its long experience. It could deploy forces to regions where

23

its presence would not be provocative for historical or cultural reasons – thus freeing

up other contributors to deploy to areas that might resent former colonial powers

from intervening. In that scenario, it could still support the UN in global hotspots by

utilising its elite forces and offering intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance but

with a lighter footprint. This supports the view of a recent MoD report which suggests

that by using special forces the risks of casualty aversion are reduced as the public

tend to have a more robust attitude towards special forces losses.75

Conclusion

The 2015 security and defence review provides the UK with an opportunity to

redefine its threat-response posture. The dominant policy narrative of the last two

decades has seen globalisation as generating complex, diverse and diffuse dangers

which are increasingly difficult to manage. According to this framing, conflicts

occurring in geographically distant areas are, by dint of an interconnected, globalised

world, viewed as threats to the UK. In response, many security experts have

advocated investing in full-spectrum military capabilities, despite financial

constraints. The authors take issue with this hyper-globalist narrative. While not

dismissing the existence of global threats, this article has sought to put them in their

proper context and offer a more realistic assessment of the global security situation.

In doing so, it is important to state that the global security environment is much more

benign, for the UK at least, than is represented within much official discourse.

24

Although developments in Ukraine are concerning, the UK still does not face a direct

military threat to its mainland, or to Western Europe in general. Whilst the number of

fragile states has increased with the Arab Spring and problems in central Africa, the

global human security picture is a positive one with life expectancy increasing and

world poverty ratios declining. Furthermore, while there has been instability and

conflict globally, these incidents tend to remain clustered in particular regional

security complexes, often coinciding with the presence of failed or fragile states.

Potential threats to the UK do exist, such as the future return of radicalised foreign

fighters from Libya, Syria or the Horn of Africa. But, past experience suggests these

will be limited and resistant to military response. Overall, the direct threat to the UK

from terrorist violence is likely to be low given the difficulty of security issues

traversing large geographical distances. Fears that UK involvement in Iraq and

Afghanistan would generate an Islamist terrorist threat against the UK do not appear

to have been borne out by current trends. Using data from the last 34 years, this

article has presented a very different empirical picture. Figures 1 and 2 indicate that

the 7/7 attacks have proved an anomaly as the only large-scale successful Islamist

terror attack against the UK, while overall a downward trend in terrorist violence is

apparent. Policymakers continue to stress the greatest threat to the UK as being

from Islamist terrorism, If so, this is more suggestive of the lack of substantive

threats than the severity of that particular one.

In light of this analysis, the authors posit two alternative scenarios for the UK as a

military actor. Firstly, it could reorient its capabilities towards regional defence and

eschew costly weapons platforms designed to support an expeditionary capability.

25

This would entail a retreat from a global interventionist role, as well as possible

disruption of the relationship with the US. It would also limit future options for

responding to global crises. On the positive side, it would be likely to attract public

support and be cheaper. The other scenario sees the UK seeking to restore its

international reputation by supporting UN peacekeeping operations and multilateral

conflict resolution efforts. At present, this does not seem to have even been

considered by policymakers in the run up to the future defence review. However, it

could provide important diplomatic and soft power benefits and offer the UK a route

to a constructive and influential role in world politics despite its declining relative

power.

1 John Kerry, (2014) ‘Remarks at Munich Security Conference’, 1 February, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/02/221134.htm.2 HM Government, (2010) A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy (London: The Stationery Office), p.3.3 Sir Nicholas Houghton, (2013) ‘Annual Chief of the Defence Staff Lecture’, 18 December, RUSI.4 For instance, the remarks by Robert Gates, former US Defence Secretary, in BBC, (2014) ‘Military Cuts Mean 'No US Partnership’, Robert Gates Warns Britain’, 16 January, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-25754870; Lord Dannatt, former Chief of the General Staff, in Mark Tran, (2014) ‘Britain Should Reconsider Army Cuts 'As Message to Resurgent Russia', The Guardian, 24 March, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/mar/24/britain-army-cuts-resurgent-russia-lord-dannatt; and NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, in David Blair, (2014) ‘Nato Chief Tells Allies: Spend More on Defence to Deter Russia’, The Telegraph, 6 April, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10748432/Nato-chief-tells-allies-spend-more-on-defence-to-deter-Russia.html. 5 Marshall McLuhan, (2001) Understanding Media, (London: Routledge), p.5.6 David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, (1999) Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, (California: Stanford University Press), p.1.7 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, (1989) Power and Interdependence, 2nd ed, (New York: Harper Collins), p.248-9.8 Tony Blair, (1999) ‘Doctrine of the International Community’ 22 April, Speech to the Economic Club of Chicago, Hilton.9 Jamie Gaskarth, (2013) British Foreign Policy, (Cambridge, Polity Press), p.29.10 David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, (1999) Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, (California: Stanford University Press), p.3.11 For useful summaries, see S. Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: A History of Violence and Humanity (London: Penguin, 2012); J. Mueller, (2006) ‘War Has Almost Ceased to Exist: An Assessment’ Political Science Quarterly, 124(2), 297-321.12 Bethany Lacina, Nils P. Gleditsch, and Bruce Russett, (2006) ‘The Declining Risk of Death in Battle’, International Studies Quarterly, 50(3) pp.673-680, p.674; Although there have been noteworthy conflicts such as the Falklands War (1982), the Indo-Pakistani War (1971) and the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).13 MoD, (1998) The Strategic Defence Review, (London: Stationery Office), p.8.14 Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, (2010) ‘Armed Conflicts, 1946-2009’, Journal of Peace Research, 47(4) pp.501-509, p.502.15 Bethany Lacina, Nils P. Gleditsch, and Bruce Russett, (2006) ‘The Declining Risk of Death in Battle’, International Studies Quarterly, 50(3) pp.673-680, p.678.16 Ibid.17 Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, (2010) ‘Armed Conflicts, 1946-2009’, Journal of Peace Research, 47(4) pp.501-509, p.503.18 WHO, (2014) ‘Global Health Observatory: Life Expectancy’, http://www.who.int/gho/mortality_burden_disease/life_tables/situation_trends_text/en/.19 World Bank, (2013) ‘Remarkable Declines in Global Poverty, But Major Challenges Remain’, Press Release, 17 April, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/04/17/remarkable-declines-in-global-poverty-but-major-challenges-remain.20 The World Bank note that Sub-Saharan Africa is an exception, with “more than twice as many extremely poor people living in SSA today (414 million) than there were three decades ago (205 million)” (ibid). Yet, the proportion of people has declined from 58% living in extreme poverty in 1999 to 48% in 2010 (ibid).21 DFID/FCO/MOD, (2011) Building Stability Overseas Strategy (London: Stationery Office), p.9.22 Ibid, p.7.23 FCO, (2013) 2012-2013 Annual Report on the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review, December, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/267808/Annual-report-on-NSS-and-SDSR.pdf, p.1.24 John Reid, (2006) ‘Security, Freedom and the Protection of Our Values’ Speech to Demos, 9 August, http://www.demos.co.uk/files/johnreidsecurityandfreedom.pdf, p.7.25 David Anderson, Q.C., (2013) ‘The Terrorism Acts in 2012: Report of the Independent Reviewer on the Operation of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006’ July, p.21.26 Yener Altunbas and John Thornton, (2011) ‘Are Homegrown Islamic Terrorists Different? Some UK Evidence’, Southern Economic Journal, 78(2) pp.262-272, p.265.27 These figures are from Anderson, p.126.28 Gavin Berman & Aliyah Dar, (2013) ‘Prison Population Statistics’ House of Commons Library, 29 July, SN/SG/4334, www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/sn04334.pdf, p.3.29 The graph is plotted using figures from the Global Terrorism Database, 2013, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/. An advanced search was carried out between 1980 and 2012 within Great Britain, with all three ‘terror criteria’ being met and with the search being inclusive of ambiguous and

unsuccessful attacks with any number of casualties and fatalities. All other parameters within the search were kept the same. The results yielded 420 incidents over the 32 year period. There are two years where no figures are provided; 1993 and 2003. In the case of the former this is due to the loss of records for that year by the provider, as noted within the FAQ section of the website.30 Ibid.31 HM Government, (2010) A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy (London: The Stationery Office), p.3.32 These statistics are gathered from the Global Terrorism Database search.33 Ibid.34 Ibid.35 Ibid.36 EUROPOL, (2013), ‘EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report’, (The Hague: European Police Office), p.9.37 David Spiegelhalter, (2010) ’What’s the Real Risk From Terror?’, The Guardian, 26 January, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2010/jan/26/terrorism-risk-severe-profiling.38 Three of the bombers were British citizens and the fourth, Germaine Lindsay, grew up in the UK as a British resident.39 MI5, (2013) ‘Terrorist Threat Levels’, Security Service MI5, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/the-threats/terrorism/threat-levels.html#history . 40 Andrew Parker, (2013) ‘Director of the Security Service on MI5 and the Evolving Threat’, Address to RUSI, 8 October, https://www.rusi.org/events/ref:E5254359BB8F44#.U3AaSCg3vSc.41 Ibid.42 Gavin Berman and Aliyah Dar, (2013) ‘Prison Population Statistics’, House of Commons, SN/SG/4334, 29 July, www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/sn04334.pdf, p.5.43 Bruno Tertrais, (2012) ‘The Demise of Ares: The End of War as We Know It?’ The Washington Quarterly, 35(3), 7-22; Michael Mandelbaum, (1998) ‘Is major war obsolete?’ Survival, 40(4),20-38. 44 Tony Blair, (1999) ‘Doctrine of the International Community’ 22 April, Speech to the Economic Club of Chicago, Hilton.45 MoD, (2002) The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter, (London: The Stationery Office), p.9.46 EU, (2003) A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, 12th December, Brussels, p.6.47 Ibid, p.1.48 Ibid, p.7.49 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, (2003) Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).50 Ibid, p.44.51 Buzan and Waever cluster security issues within complexes, including a ‘Middle East’ security complex, which may be illustrative of the recent uprisings that affected the MENA during the Arab Spring (Ibid, p.XXV).52 Such as in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen.53 Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances 1994, (1994) Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/arms-control-disarmament-and-nonproliferation/budapest-memorandums-security-assurances-1994/p32484 . 54 Vladimir Putin, (2014) ‘Address by President of the Russian Federation’, 18 March, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6889.55 Stephen Booth and Christopher Howarth, (2012) ‘Trading Places: Is EU Membership Still the Best Option for UK Trade?’, Open Europe, (London: Open Europe), p.9.56 Grahame Allen, (2012), ‘UK Trade Statistics – Commons Library Standard Note’, UK Parliament, http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-papers/SN06211/uk-trade-statistics, p.7.57 Ami Sedghi, (2012) ‘UK Export and Import in 2011: Top Products and Trading Partners’, The Guardian, 10 January, http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2010/feb/24/uk-trade-exports-imports#data . 58 Nicholas Watt, (2014) ‘Nick Clegg Accepts EU Poll but Says Leaving Would be Economic Suicide’, The Guardian, 8 October, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/oct/08/nick-clegg-says-leaving-eu-would-be-economic-suicide . 59 European Commission, (2014) ‘The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership’, European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/ . 60 Stephen Booth and Christopher Howarth, (2012) ‘Trading Places: Is EU Membership Still the Best Option for UK Trade?’, Open Europe, (London: Open Europe), p.46.61 Grahame Allen, (2012), ‘UK Trade Statistics – Commons Library Standard Note’, UK Parliament, http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-papers/SN06211/uk-trade-statistics, p.6.62 Iain MacLeay, Kevin Harris, and Anwar Annut, (2013) ‘Digest of UK Energy Statistics’, Department of Energy and Climate Change, (London: The Stationery Office), p.64.63 Ibid. p.67.64 Ibid.65 Ibid, p.68.

66 From data gathered by Defence Analytical Services and Advice (DASA) and published in The Guardian (2011) ‘Army Cuts: How Have UK Armed Forces Personnel Numbers Changed Over Time?’, 5 July, www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/sep/01/military-service-personnel-total.67 British Army (2013) ‘Army 2020: Transforming the British Army, An Update – July 2013’, MoD, http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/Army2020_Report.pdf . 68 Frank Gregory and Paul Wilkinson, (2005) ‘Security, Terrorism and the UK’, Chatham House and ESRC, Briefing Paper 05/01, http://www.ag-friedensforschung.de/themen/Terrorismus/chatham-house.pdf, p.2.69 Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, in Richard Norton-Taylor, (2010) ‘Iraq Inquiry: Eliza Manningham-Buller’s Devastating Testimony’, The Guardian, 20 July, http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jul/20/iraq-inquiry-eliza-manningham-buller . 70 Jason Reifler, Harold D. Clarke, Thomas J. Scotto, David Sanders, Marianne C. Stewart, and Paul Whiteley, (2013) ‘Prudence, Principle and Minimal Heuristics: British Public Opinion Toward the Use of Military Force in Afghanistan and Libya’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 16(1) pp.28-55, p.45.71 House of Commons, (2014) House of Commons Defence Committee Intervention: Why, When and How? Fourteenth Report of Session 2013–14, Volume II, (London: The Stationery Office), p.16.72 Malcolm Chalmers, (2014) ‘Let Debate Commence: Key Strategic Questions for the 2015 SDSR’, RUSI, https://www.rusi.org/publications/newsbrief/ref:A52D66D2E8A623/#.U2bIY1d_cjo.73 House of Commons Defence Committee (2004) Defence White Paper 2003, Fifth Report of Session 2003-04, Volume 1, (London: The Stationery Office), p.10.74 House of Commons, (2014) House of Commons Defence Committee Intervention: Why, When and How? Fourteenth Report of Session 2013–14, Volume II, (London: The Stationery Office), p.6-7.75 MoD, (2013) ‘MoD Study on Attitudes to Risk’, The Guardian, 26 September, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/interactive/2013/sep/26/mod-study-attitudes-risk, p.7.