nowell-hyper conservative globalization

Nowell, Hyper-Conservative Modernization, p. 1

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Hyper-Conservative Modernization: The United States, Saudi Arabia, and Poland

By Gregory P. Nowell

Paper presented to the International Studies Association, Montreal

Gregory P. Nowell Department of Political Science, Milne 119

State University of New York, Albany Albany, New York 12222

[email protected]

(518) 393-0399

Copyright © 2004 by Gregory P. Nowell


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Hyper-Conservative Modernization: The United States, Saudi Arabia, and Poland

“Gothique” is the actor Julien Carette’s one-word summary of Eric von Stroheim’s character, the Junker Captain von Rauffenstein, in Renoir’s Grand Illusion.The leaders of politically reactionary social formations are easy to characterize as socially backward. The aristocrats of Poland’s feudal reaction, Osama bin Laden’s aggressive Wahabite fundamentalism, and the evident troglodytism of the southern Republican leaders who dominate Congress, the presidency, and the Supreme Court, are all “Gothique.” But they are, or in the case of Poland were for their time, quintessentially modern and up to date. In fact, they all have one thing in common, and that is that without capitalist modernity their entire perspective and way of life would, in fact, be impossible.

In this paper I shall outline the dynamics of what I call hyper-conservative modernization, a process that occurs when one society’s system of rule intensifies in the presence of another, but in a way that seems to accentuate existing characteristics rather than replace them with new ones. These seemingly Gothique social systems are joined at the hip to the presence of a fully modern market economy, without whose presence, in fact, they could not exist. I shall offer three examples. First, I shall discuss the case of Poland’s famous feudal reaction, with some discussion thrown in of the case of Germany. Second, I shall discuss the case of Saudi Arabia’s, and to some extent the Middle East’s, hyper-tribalist reaction to the advance of capitalism and in particular the oil industry. Third, I shall discuss the case of the American South’s hyper-capitalist reaction to the development of a Keynesian polity. I compare these three cases is to illustrate the aleatory character of development dynamics. This to me means that all social systems are subject to unpredictable and irreversible evolutionary developments, and that therefore any discussion of the “dominance of the world capitalist system” or the putative Realist dynamics of the struggle for power “in conditions of international anarchy” are generalizations that have no particular predictive value or even explanatory power. If development paths are truly aleatory then there is any number of possible “system transformation dynamics” at work at any given time, and we discover them as we go along. My notion of “aleatory” is influenced by Max Weber’s analysis of antiquity in general and the Roman Empire in particular (Weber, 1976, pp. 261-366) of the decline of antiquity. The Roman Empire resulted from a unique turn in the development of a “coastal” society: the need to fight Carthage by invading Spain created an opportunity for the aristocrats to weaken the small landowning or “hoplite” soldiers. The triumph of the Roman aristocracy created an aggressive state that expanded militarily to feed its voracious appetite for slave labor. This aggressive use of slavery emerges as an historical innovation of the Roman ruling class. It led to inland conquests and settlements that, centuries later, made possible a new kind of inland feudalism and towns. This inland feudalism developed into the basis for the rise of Western capitalism. The “aleatory elements” in this argument are (a) the Carthaginian military strategy that led to the invasion of Italy; (b) the innovation of the Roman aristocrats in using the war against Carthage to secure their domination; and (c) a mode of imperial collapse that leads to a new kind of inland feudalism that centuries later spawns a new kind of relationship between town and country.


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Weber’s interpretation paves the way for a materialist causality for history, but not materialist determinism. There are too many potentially critical and “determining” processes going on at any given time for us to say which shall push history radically and decisively in a new direction. If we take Weber seriously, we could almost say that by definition we oblivious to the most profound consequences of the systems in which we live, just as Roman aristocrats built the world’s largest empire without any consciousness that they were creating, in the very long term, the preconditions for a new kind of feudalism and ultimately for the growth of capitalism. Having said this, it would be contradictory if I claimed to have identified the decisive transformational dynamics of our own era in the pages that follow. My point is more humble: the “normal machinations” of the international capitalist system that we take for granted, actually seems to generate hyper-conservative modernization pathways that not only are in themselves unpredictable, but have the potential to decisively push the capitalist system in a new direction, and perhaps even bring it to a halt.

So, while the notion of hyper-conservative modernization might have some roots in other explanations about capitalism’s relationship to the “periphery,” most notably the potential for “the development of underdevelopment,” I am proposing something rather different. There is nothing inevitable about the current dominance of “international liberal capitalism,” and in fact, one of the hyper-conservative modernization pathways I explore below is the New South’s capture of the American political system. This particular event cannot really be characterized, as one might the case of feudal Poland, as the “development of underdevelopment,” and that is why I propose that we consider hyper-conservative modernization as a sui generis event that has wide potential applicability, as we here discuss it in relation to feudalism, tribalism, and a modern capitalist polity. Poland and “Hyper-Feudalism”

Poland in the 17th and 18th centuries underwent an intense development of “feudalism” in the presence of international capitalist markets (See Kula, 1976; Kaman, 1968; Malowist, 1959; Wallerstein, 1980). This region’s “feudal reaction” may be summarized as follows: in response to the development of commercial markets in Holland and other parts of Europe, Polish lords seized the opportunity to work their peasants intensively in order to participate in the lucrative grain trade. The result was that the “spread of capitalism,” rather than leading to a development dynamic that would make Poland “capitalist,” led to a particular form of intensified feudalism, in which non-wage peasant labor was used to produce grain for export into world markets. The lords of Polish manors engineered a system that enabled them to exploit all their advantages in terms of social control, to monopolize completely access to the profits to be made on the market.

As Kaman writes: “The result was a step backwards towards the forms of the feudal epoch, though with a stress on production for the market that has led many historians to refer to the ‘great estate/serf labour’ combination as ‘feudal-capitalism.’” (Kaman 1968, p. 59; whole discussion pp. 58-60).


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The paradox of accentuating traditional social forms—the manorial estate—in

order to participate in a revolutionary new situation—international markets that provided both cash income (for the Polish lords) and manufactured goods (also largely for the lords) is captured in Kaman’s use of the term ‘feudal-capitalism’.

But of course ‘feudal capitalism’ is not quite the point, which I would prefer to restate thus: that this was a form of feudalism that could only exist in the presence of a developing modern form of capitalism. In other words, the Polish “feudal reaction” was not an atavistic social system. It was completely modern phenomenon that had no parallel in earlier centuries. This accentuated, modernized feudalism is what I call “hyper feudalism,” an adaptation of a system to the opportunities presented by the capitalist world. Wallerstein (1980, pp. 131-136) has a somewhat different version of this point, that Poland was a “periphery” and “peripheries” are integral to the operation of, in his phrase, the capitalist world-economy. In this case, Poland certainly does seem to be weak: Poland’s particular brand of hyper-feudal modernization diminished its industrial potential and halted the development of its cities (Malowist 1959, pp. 182, 187). The result practically guaranteed a structural inability to compete against Prussia and Russia for power, much less the Dutch and later British “hegemons.” The hyper-feudalism of Poland was stable only insofar as the country could keep out of trouble with its neighbors. Napoleon and the continental blockade, according to Kula (1962, p. 103), broke the force of Polish hyper-feudalism and ultimately turned Polish agriculture towards wage labor. Hyper-feudalism was an innovative response to the challenge of international capitalism. It had no transformational potential for the world as a whole, but it illustrates the notion of an aleatory development path. Not far from the hyper-feudalism of the Polish aristocracy, a different variant of the aristocratic agricultural development path was played out: the German Junkers accommodated sooner to wage labor and then to a powerful coalition with industry. Poland by contrast was anti-development. In Malowitz’s words (1959, p. 188):

“The economic policy of the nobles of the Baltic countries also contributed in a great measure to the decline of the towns. This policy consisted in intensifying the export of foodstuffs and primary products and favouring the import of manufactures by giving strong support to foreign trade in their own territories. This course of action was intended to assure the abundance of foreign goods and to keep their prices down. I define this policy, which was harmful to the industrial production of the country and harmful also, though to a lesser degree, to its commerce, as a specifically eastern anti-mercantilism; a policy prejudicial to the further development of that part of Europe.”

The Junkers, as Gerschenkron argues, were pro-free trade much like their Polish

counterparts, till the famous 1879 “alliance of Iron and Rye” settled German industry and agricultural into a common protectionist cause (Gerschenkron 1943; Abraham, Moore). The result was a phenomenal period of industrialization and expansion of state power.


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We tend to forget just how different the world might have been had either of the twentieth century’s world wars gone differently. Had France and England collapsed under the weight of the German offensives in World War I, Eastern Europe and much of what became the Soviet Union would have been German dominions and protectorates. The Caucasus would have been under Turkish rule. The Middle East, far from being the scene of Arab nationalism thwarted by British and French imperial designs (not to mention Israel), as well as later American intervention, would have been under indirect German and direct Turkish rule. Hitler, his followers, and his genocide might never have appeared to disturb the German elites’ digestion of the spoils. Adam Smith, we might guess, would be an obscure writer of economic theory who was largely ignored by economists steeped in the rationale for imperial preference zones and state directed industrial development. It is interesting to note that Joseph Schumpeter, in his Imperialism and Social Classes (1951), had like Kaman in the passage cited above, a difficult time grappling with the Junker aristocracy, whom he eventually likened to bloody Assyrian rulers. He compared their outlook and lifestyle unfavorably to the liberal values embodied by British capitalism and empire. In short, Schumpeter saw Junker-dominated society as Gothique, a role that Barrington Moore (1966) also tends to assign to large landed elites. Schumpeter implied that if the offending atavistic Junker class could be swept away, benign international capitalist development would follow.

It certainly is tempting to follow such writers as Gerschenkron, Moore, and Schumpeter into thinking that, absent the Junkers, German capitalism and the history of the twentieth century would have been quite different. This evades the issue, however, that if capitalist system tends to engender “hyper-conservative modernization pathways,” that if Germany had not been in that role, then perhaps some other region would have taken its place. The Junkers were completely modern, and in fact, their particular brand of militarism and industrialism was, as with the Polish hyper-feudalism, possible only in a world where capitalism was present. The advanced agricultural capitalism of Britain, the United States, and France sold the grains that threatened the “rye” part of the famous German coalition that steered Germany after 1879. The industrial capitalism of Britain, the United States, and France sold the manufactured products that threatened the “iron” part of the German economy. The workings of advanced capitalism made possible the hyper-conservative modernizing state that united the most famous political economic coalitions of the nineteenth century.

Absent the capitalism of the external competitors, we can have very little idea of what modernity in nineteenth century Germany or in eighteenth century Poland would have looked like. What we can say is that the development of advanced international capitalism forces aspiring modernizers in other countries to consider whether their best possible response is revolutionary, meaning an overthrow of the established way of doing things, or hyper-conservative, meaning, to seek to reinforce the existing traditions and social patterns in such a way as to make them better able to withstand an outside shock. “The development of underdevelopment” is one way to characterize some of these choices. The de-urbanization of Poland seems to be an example: whatever urban capitalist development the country might have had, was thwarted by the pre-eminence of the hyper-feudal exporters of grain who systematically weakened the towns and, keeping their serfs nearly penniless on the land, also held up the development of a mass market.


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But the reinforcement of the aristocratic class that eventually made Poland industrially weak became, in a different context, an essential component of the recipe that allowed Germany to grow extremely strong. The contrast is remarkable given the roughly comparable conditions and close geographic proximity of the two countries.

Germany’s alternate pathway was strong enough, in fact, that it in the twentieth century it twice swallowed Poland and came hair-raisingly close to having blown liberal capitalism off the world map. Had Germany succeeded, the traditions and scientific truths of liberal internationalism that we now take for granted would surely have lapsed into obscurity. Only the more recondite textbooks would have a few footnotes about theories of free trade. “Globalization,” would be synonymous with the iron heel of the modernizing state.

The Middle East and Saudi Arabia: “Hyper Tribalism”

The reinforcement and ideological growth of Wahabite and other fundamentalist variants of Islam, is not, it seems to me, fundamentally attributable to the inept foreign policy of the United States or even to the undoubtedly provocative presence of Israel. For this is to see the process as the result of national political foreign policies rather than an underlying development dynamic. I would suggest, simply, that the principal mechanism that gives the Arabian Peninsula its particular characteristics is hyper-conservative modernization, the hyper-tribal variant of a reactive process that, in Poland, led to hyper-feudalism.

Before continuing, I note that in the Polish case, it matters little that the Dutch Republic, with its comparative tolerance of different religious and political viewpoints, was in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries one of the most liberal societies in world history. It also exhibited capitalist growth dynamics, but for all of its progressivism as a polity, and for all of its antagonism to the reactionary Spanish crown, it nonetheless helped to initiate hyper-feudalism in Poland. For Dutch merchants, the willingness of the Polish aristocratic class to get cash income from grain exports was the most efficient way to proceed. The oppression of the peasant class was a purely a local affair, and probably not, in their perspective, in any way related to their own activities. No doubt Grotius, the great liberal theorist of the seventeenth century, dined on bread produced from grain grown under a Polish aristocrat’s boot.

The reason that the growth of capitalism can initiate hyper-conservative modernization, instead of true capitalist growth, is that the objective of the capitalist is to conduct an exchange and turn a profit, not to revolutionize social relations. The complexities of trade take the full attention of even the most sophisticated mind, and there is little incentive to ponder the long-term consequences of short-term decisions. A “deal with the devil,” which is to say, with a leader or leadership class that embodies not liberal capitalism, but the antithesis of liberal capitalist values, is usually the most expedient way to arrange for the production and distribution of raw materials. Saudi Arabia’s hyper-conservative tribalist development thus needs, to get started, nothing more nor less than what started Poland’s feudal reaction: that the world’s twentieth century oil interests were no more, and no less, expedient in their thinking than the Dutch grain traders and financiers of four hundred years earlier.


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Expediency brings with it another consideration: no capitalist likes to engender competitors. Capitalists are reluctant to lure hyper-conservative modernizers into a more liberal capitalist development path. Dutch traders had enough competition from the French and English. If the Polish feudal lords, in holding back the development of Polish towns, also thwarted the rise of Polish grain merchants, so much better for the Dutch. Today’s major oil companies have no desire to see Middle East oil producers marketing directly to consumers in the west.1 If the Saudis, as a political project, are most concerned with the development and control of a hyper-tribalized Islamic fundamentalism, then they are not likely to emerge as serious contenders in the oil market specifically or in international capitalism generally. The international oil industry has no problem with this. Oil facilities are capital intensive and cover large territories with vulnerable oil wells, pipelines, pumping stations, as well as refining and export facilities. In a fragmented, tribalized society, the lack of a bureaucratic state center is an immediate threat to the maintenance of secure property rights. Any malcontented faction can “ruin the oil export game” for the parties at the top by attacking vulnerable physical infrastructure or the people that run them. The maintenance of order thus requires an iron fist and a velvet glove. The velvet glove is the use of oil revenues to buy the cooperation of other clan and kinship networks. It also takes the form of magnanimous public commitment to religion. The iron fist is, of course, political repression. Saudi Arabia has modernized while absorbing very little from the West except automobiles and skyscrapers. Political democracy is non-existent, the press is controlled, contracts, jobs, and state positions are awarded through clan alliances, state revenue is essentially a family moneybox, and the repression of women of international notoriety.2

The real question about clan and kinship systems is not why they exist and what they are, but why it is that the West is no longer organized on this basis. Centuries of Roman rule, which annihilated conquered peoples and sold them into the anonymous mill of brutal slavery, followed by the feudal system of primogenitor, which awards lands to the first-born son and thus diminishes the value of family ties, are in my view more important than even capitalism for the development of Western societies with truncated family networks. This is to say that it takes a long, long, time of sustained violence to stamp out tribal systems of allegiance. Penury and immiseration can make members of tribal systems more dependent on each other, reinforcing the strength of the system: Stalin’s massacre and exile of the Chechens was insufficient to dismantle permanently the tribal cohesion of these people, who not only returned to Chechnya but whose descendants have resumed a centuries old struggle against Russian rule. Wealth and prosperity, on the other hand, also seem to reinforce tribalism: leaders of smaller tribes approach the leader of the dominant tribe with their hands out, and as payoffs make their

1 Kuwait’s Q8 stations in Europe and Saudi participation in Texaco are limited exceptions. 2 The consignment of women to traditional Islamic roles is in fact one of the greatest indicators of hyper tribalism. Women and arranged marriages are one of the elements by which tribal authority and coalitions are maintained. Women who are free, have their own professions, and choose their own mates are no longer a resource in tribal relationships, and in fact, threaten the coherence of that system.


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way through the various clan linkages, everyone gets brought into the system and the system itself is reinforced.3

There is no intrinsic reason why tribalism cannot exist indefinitely. It is the oldest human social system, it can endure exogenous shocks of the most violent nature, and its loose and coalitional character—which sometimes leads to confusion about what exactly a tribal system is, since clans and sub-clans can change allegiances and memberships—also makes it an extremely fluid system that resists endogenous change precisely because it is so versatile.

Islam, and particularly Wahabite Islam, is particularly adapted to the maintenance of tribal relations. The requirement of charity serves to reduce inter-clan rivalries and jealousies. The requirement of public prayer helps identify who is “in” and who is “out” of the system’s requirements. Those who are non-practicing are, obviously, suspect. The toleration and even encouragement of polygamy also works to ease the potential for tribal conflicts and jealousies. Subordinate clans, marrying off a daughter to a dominant clan, can hope for better treatment, and are also less likely to betray or otherwise oppose the dominant clan. And, of course, the men with the means to support multiple wives tend to be those with the resources that make them worthy of courting favor. Jihad serves to unify a loose coalitional system with centripetal tendencies, and when successful, brings in additional resources to be distributed among the victorious clans. It is a powerful formula for success.

The origin of the modern Saudi system has its direct origins in the aftermath of World War I. The British policy of carving up the Middle East played a “Hashemite stratetgy” in Jordan and Iraq. The British also maintained alliances in the Persian Gulf in Kuwait and Oman. From Ibn Saud’s perspective, the way to combat British influence, and in particular the threat of the extension of Hashemite control into the coveted Hejaz, was through a complete mobilization of available manpower. In this sense, the Ikhwan religious movement, with which he collaborated in relationship, that, though it became at times deeply antagonistic, was an essential component of his strategy: the “nationalist movement” against British and French imperialism in the Saudi peninsula took the form of religious mobilization against the foreign intruder. The deal Ibn Saud cut for the support of the religious sect became the basic pattern of Saudi governance: assent to the external foreign policy of the ruling family in return for control domestic institutions. Ibn Saud’s decision to open his kingdom to the exploration of a non-British firm was a highly rational attempt to balance the power of the British with the Amercians, and also to make sure that any oil found would not become subject to the same production restraints that hamstrung the development of Iraq (Gold, 2003, pp. 48-56).

In later decades, the U.S. alignment with the Shah of Iran would pose the threat of a powerful surrogate from the other side of the Persian Gulf. This was the American version of Britain’s alliance with the Hashemite dynasties, and provoked a similarly antagonistic response to American power among the Saudi ulama.

But the Saudi system of rule, though always precarious, was successful. Oil was found and developed, and money poured in. The wealth poured into a political structure that modernized the coalitional tribal politics of the 1920s into today’s hyper-tribalism. This is not to say that the House of Saud enjoys complete control. To the contrary, the

3 On tribalism in the Middle East see Dore 2003; Beck 1980; Baram 1997; Brand 1996; Khalidi 1990.


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House of Saud lives in fear of tribal rivalries and attack from fundamentalists, which it simultaneously tries to placate by assigning control over domestic social life to the ulama.

Some of the funds that flow to the coffers of the Islamic charities that support armed struggle and terrorism are the result of implicit and explicit blackmail: if you do not contribute, something bad will happen to you. But these contributions are indistinguishable from those that are made voluntarily by all those who see western secularism as a threat to their way of life and values (Gold, 2003, pp. 151-155, 199-203). Osama bin Laden is simply the most visible manifestation of a deeply rooted Saudi philosophy that has always encouraged fundamentalist indoctrination and outlook at the same time that it has tried, with only limited success, to make sure that the export of those doctrines did not work to the detriment of nominal friendly nations, such as the United States. And the United States has willingly accepted Saudi rule as an expedient solution to the problem of maintaining stability in order to get oil out of the ground.

Osama bin Laden is not an “accidental” product of the Saudi system of tribal governance. He is in most respects archetypal. In medieval Europe, the sons of the aristocracy who could not inherit the family estate lived lavishly as clerics, and worked hard to propagate the Catholic institution that helped the entire system of feudal land management and tenure function. Even though he is a personal ascetic, Osama bin Laden’s rich family origins, religious education and consequent prestige in the religious hierarchy, and zealous commitment to propagating his version of Wahabite Islam, make him a tribal society’s answer to the well bred political priest of feudal Europe. It was, after all, the second and third sons of the aristocracy, excluded from direct inheritance, whose jobs were to hold mass and organize war against the infidels.

Saudi Arabia’s hyper-tribalism could no more exist without the context of a surrounding international liberalism than the lords of Poland’s feudal reaction. The money pours in. It finances an international system of madrassas, finds its way to Palestine, Syria, Morocco, Pakistan, and trains an entire generation of faithful of the necessity of waging war against the infidel. The weapons desired and deployed are resourceful, and target an enemy whose vulnerabilities have been carefully studied.

Nor will it go away soon, if ever. The entire Arabian Peninsula, and possibly the Middle East, is in the process of becoming for the United States what the Palestinians are to Israel; and Israel occupies to us the same relationship that the Christian Lebanese have for Israel: sometimes useful, sometimes a headache, but definitely a smaller part of a very large picture.

The political search for “expedient solutions,” so typical of the interaction between advanced capitalism and virtually any other type of society, takes in the Middle East a special character, where the expedient solution of any decade gets compounded with the growing list of failed expedient solutions from previous decades. A short version of this list includes the division of the Ottoman Empire; the settlement of Jews in Palestine; the invasion of Lebanon in 1958; the overthrow of Mossadeq; the Shah of Iran and his war against Iraq in the 1970s; the support for Saddam’s Iraq against Iran in the 1980s; the alliance with Saudi Arabia against the Soviets in Afghanistan; the toleration of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program; the 1991 war against Iraq and its subsequent isolation; the 2003 invasion of Iraq; and the contortions over pipeline export routes from the Caucasus. This compounding list of expediencies, which against a continuing process of funneling billions of dollars of oil dollars into regimes which have no real reason to


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like us, many reasons to hate us, and which have gone about the business of modernizing in their own way: not our way, but their way, and this in part because, decade to decade, the need for oil has depended on the search for expedient short term solutions to regional control.

So, now, a wealthy Saudi Arabia has tight financial and political relationships with Pakistan as well as its own international network for the recruitment and training of anti-western zealots, over whose activities, most interestingly, it neither can nor wishes to exert direct control. And Pakistan has nuclear bombs and is willing to export the technology to the right bidders. These countries are sophisticated modern players. They know what modern education is, they know the prevailing sexual practices and freedoms enjoyed by women in the western countries, and have often had direct exposure themselves as university students in the United States and Europe. But that is not the way they choose to run society at home, and in fact, for all of their sophisticated understanding of the west, every act of governance that they make domestically is antithetical to the values of international liberalism.

The rulers of Saudi Arabia today do not want a confrontation with the West any more than ibn Saud, in his day, sought a direct confrontation with Britain (Gold, 2003, pp 45-56). Yet their dilemma is no different than ibn Saud’s, who purchased internal cohesion with religious leaders in order better to face the western powers who had carved up the Arabian peninsula and ringed it with alliances that on the Persian Gulf, Mediterranean, and in Egypt all posed a threat to the viability of his monarchical and territorial ambitions. Saudi rulers today do not have full control over the politically (and militarily) organized segments of their own populations, and their dilemma remains identical to ibn Saud’s conflictual relationship with the Ikhwan who were nonetheless a critical resource to his success. The Saudis’ rule remains vulnerable to the proselyting of religious cadres whose activities are not only tolerated but generously subsidized: and among the most influential of these cadres are not some abstract group of recruits but, in fact, members of the extended and prestigious ruling families who have been schooled in religious doctrine. The result is that if Saudi rulers cannot contain the popular anti-western mobilization they themselves encourage, confrontation with the west is exactly what Saudi rulers might get. This is in fact a goal of the apocalyptic radical religious movements, and the notion that political stability can be achieved internally so long as the jihad-minded elements of Saudi society are exporting their doctrines elsewhere. But this only works so long as the “elsewhere” is a place like Afghanistan or Mindanao in the Philippines. When the “elsewhere” becomes Madrid and New York, Western capitalism is faced with the dilemma that the political stability so critical to the export of oil is being purchased at the price of funding terrorist attacks against its major metropoles. The

To sum up, hyper-conservative modernization has created hyper-tribalized societies that, in their modernity, have the ability to use modern weapons and sophisticated tactics that could prove deadly to the capitalist societies that feed them the revenue for their continued non-capitalist development. And when I say deadly, I do not mean to a few hundred or thousands of victims. I mean that the mechanisms of investment and production essential to capitalism. These could break down under the weight of fears and uncertainties that dwarf the mere diminished expectations of returns that were foundational to Keynes’ analysis of the abstract investment climate that, even without such threats, is capable of generating significant economic fluctuations.


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The American New South

I have thus far advanced two examples of hyper-conservative modernization, the hyper-feudalism of Poland and the hyper-tribalism of Saudi Arabia. I shall now make a more ambitious argument, which is that the propinquity of an advanced liberal-Keynesian polity can spur a hyper-capitalist modernization within a single capitalist country. The New South has captured control of all the branches of government in the United States and brings to its rule This discussion does not focus on Keynes’ influence as such. Many of the core programmatic ideas can be found much earlier (e.g., Hobson, 1902; see also Lee 1989), and it is not my intention to say that Keynes (1936) wrote a book and changed history. What I am saying is that the analysis in Keynes’ book provides a very useful shorthand and guide to the economic principles that may be called Keynesian. Among these are: Redistribution in the form of higher wages (implying minimum wages and pro-union policies); welfare polices (unemployment insurance, social security, government sponsored healthcare and housing assistance); and “socialization of investment.” are certainly “Keynesian” and part of what is described in Keynes’ General Theory (1936) “Socialization of investment” is also implied, if only in public works, on the assumption that private markets cannot be relied upon to keep investment at levels that guarantee full employment. Deficit spending is, by tradition, part of the “Keynesian recipe” even though very little is to be found on this topic in Keynes’ General Theory.

Nowhere do we find in Keynes a discussion of agricultural subsidies, which nonetheless were integral to the “second New Deal.” As Gourevitch writes (1986, p. 118) the Agricultural Adjustment Act, featuring agricultural subsidies, the Wagner Act, giving workers the right to organize, and the Social Security Act were all part of the same “second new deal.” The first New Deal, by contrast, was more focused on a simple but failed effort to prop up prices through government-sponsored cartelization. The inclusion of agricultural subsidies is helpful in explaining how Roosevelt could drag the largely rural and conservative Democratic South into the New Deal. Roosevelt tackled the issue of union organization but bypassed the issue of race. The provision of a shameful “second minimum wage” for agricultural workers (lower than the regular minimum wage) combined with federal price support programs in such commodities as tobacco, peanuts, and cotton helped “seal the deal” for the “New Deal” in the South. To be sure, social security and New Deal public works were a boon to the South as well as to other parts of the country. Nonetheless, the “agricultural wing” of the New Deal did not really have a Keynesian orientation, and was in most ways, along with major segments of the business community, hostile to the whole idea (Weir, p. 73). But the agricultural new deal was basically government sponsored cartelization and subsidized money (for mortgages). It helped concentrate income in the hands of farmers who had little to gain from the theoretical boost to the “marginal propensity to consume” that New Deal policies promised to other members of the capitalist system. The Keynesian argument for redistribution depends on the marginal propensity to consume, or MPC. The more purchasing power is concentrated in the hands of a few people, the higher the total percentage of income is likely to be saved. Since, in Keynesian economics, savings sends a “non-consumption signal” to businesses, the act of


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saving tends to discourage investment. Redistributive policies such as higher wages put more money into the hands of the people most likely to spend it. The MPC also plays a role in Keynesian theory with regard to taxation, since the government spends everything it takes in, an MPC of 100%, whereas income left in the hands of the upper income brackets tends to be saved. Thus in spite of the widespread view that budgetary deficits are equivalent to “Keynesianism,” Keynesian theory also implies a “balanced budget multiplier” (Haavelmo, 1945). This is an increase in total aggregate income that occurs if the incomes of the wealthy are taxed and their money spent by the government on either income redistribution to the less wealthy (who are more likely to spend) or direct purchase of public goods. The textbook formulation is Y=C+I+G, that is, aggregate income (Y) is the sum of all consumption (C), investment (I), and government spending (G). But this says nothing about who benefits from a rise in incomes and who does not. Farmers tend to overproduce in economic crises, and some agricultural commodities have large inventory overhangs that can continue to depress prices long after a recovery begins. A rise in incomes can make a big difference in the purchase of industrial goods, but in the agricultural sector it is not likely to spark a huge increase in consumption, unless the antecedent condition was one of widespread famine. While hunger was widespread in the 1930s, implying that redistributive policies might have led to increased food consumption and hence an increase in farm incomes, the impact surely would have been modest and greatly delayed due to the preceding years of overproduction. And, absent the hunger of the 1930s, the conditions in which the income enhancing effect of redistribution could be counted on to impact farm incomes have rapidly faded. Thus, assuming that the farm sector ever did have an “investment” in income redistribution as a tool of demand management in a Keynesian economy, this was surely an ephemeral product of the worst moments of the Great Depression. The surer tools to enhance farm income are price supports, production controls, export supports, and other such measures. This is a roundabout way of saying that although the “first New Deal” of price supports was abandoned for industry, it remained the policy tool of choice for agricultural interests. But helping the farm sector to cartelize does very little to spur effective demand. Indeed, since an increase in food prices is equivalent to a decline in the real wage, it is just the opposite. The agricultural policies that brought the Southern Democrats aboard the New Deal—and reluctantly at that—were in their essence anti-Keynesian. Although a modest increase in industrial sales in rural areas might be expected as a result of farm supports, the fact is that concentration in landholding whether in the 1930s or in later decades could be expected to seriously distort the redistributive mechanism. Price supports, in short, can become a means to redistributing income to the top, a point confirmed by recent data of farm subsidies for the 1995-2002 period that show 86% of all agricultural subsidies were collected by 20% of the total farm subsidy recipients (the other 80% of recipients split the remaining 14% of $114 billion for the period). In other words as the New Deal and post-World War II recovery put the industrial Midwest, Northeast (and later California) into a lesser version of the welfare states that developed in Europe, the South and agricultural Midwest remained tied to cartelistic price support programs whose main function was to siphon income from the industrial areas to the agricultural ones.


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This tendency, not toxic by itself, was compounded by the failure of New Deal labor polices to become a universal norm. The South developed industrially in the 1930s and in the wake of World War II, largely as the “low wage zone” that, because of its right-to-work laws, could hope to pilfer investment and jobs from the more unionized areas of the country. The industrial and modern “new south” that thus began to develop was one that had low unionization wages and whose workers owed little or nothing to the New Deal. Even the universally appealing social security program provided lower retirement stipends to lower wage workers. In the higher wage areas of the North and Midwest a unionized worker could look forward to retirement with a private pension supplemented by a social security stipend that was higher as a reflection of his higher level of contribution. Non-unionized low-wage workers in the South would look forward to no private pension and a lower, often rock bottom social security benefit. Their plight was the same with low-income workers anywhere else in the country, but there was a greater proportion in the South. Left in the cold with regard to unions, the developing “New South” that would take shape under decades of New Deal and Great Society policies was politically crippled from a Keynesian welfare state perspective. The union exemption for the region not only weakened unions in the North (defined as everywhere except the South), because they had to compete against Southern wages, but most importantly, failed to socialize the political system into the values of the modern welfare state, which tend to temper the worst excesses of capitalism with a notion of collective responsibility for the management of such issues as employment, health, education, and in more recent decades, the environment. Southern congressional leaders, who to put it mildly were not socialized into the values of the New deal, enjoyed durable congressional seats in the House and Senate, as well as the seniority system. This made for a situation wherein the South was ideally situated to milk the Keynesian state’s budget for the best cream without internalizing any of the values that are necessary to sustain it. Southern political representatives remained hostile to the core precepts of the New Deal and its Democratic successors, the Fair Deal and Great Society. For three decades, until the 1960s, the New Deal Democratic party sent the message to the South that its distorted political system and phenomenal maldistribution of wealth and power were not only to be left alone, but to be bolstered with regionally targeted income transfers that structurally reinforced the reactionary political elites. The New Deal “fed the monster” that would emerge as powerful bloc at the end, and seek to destroy it. To be sure, there exists a “New Deal popular constituency” in the new South, but in the absence of unions to give it a broader and sustainable popular base, such voters are not as effective as they can be in other parts of the country. Even laying aside right-to-work laws, the fact that the agricultural Midwest and South were, as regions, generally more generally agricultural than other parts of the country made them “miss out” on the wave of unionization that had such a powerful effect on the development of the rest of the country. Republicans were alive to the possibilities of alliance with southern conservatives. The Eisenhower administration obliged the Southern Democratic wing with the Oil Import Quota of 1959, which discriminated against the multinational oil companies and siphoned more of the nation’s aggregate income into the hands of a limited number of wealthy oil producers. With no fundamental challenges in civil rights, with a dual wage


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system that attracted Northern investors to the low wage south, with major crops such as cotton, peanuts, and tobacco enjoying aggressive government support, with the largely southern oil industry enjoying unprecedented favoritism under the terms of the Oil Import Quota and the Oil Depletion Allowance, Southern representatives might understandably come to see the federal government as something they could readily tolerate so long as they were not asked to pay for it.4

But by the end of the 1970s this world would begin to unravel. Tobacco would come under sustained attack in both the Johnson and Clinton administrations. The Oil Import Quota and Oil Depletion allowance were repealed. The civil rights movement effectively changed the composition of southern politics by enfranchising millions of black voters. The environmental movement brought unprecedented levels of regulation to industrial activities, even in the South. The race issue provided an opening for conservative republicans to lure white voters. The party whose primary attachments to the New Deal had been agricultural subsidies and the “sucker’s game” that let the unionized north ship jobs to the south fused with generic anti-tax Republicans. If we look at the New Deal’s fallout with regard to unionization and agricultural subsidies, and how these in a sense created a “political socialization” that continues to impact contemporary politics, we can compare union membership with the number of agricultural subsidy recipients in the most recent election. Inspection of the data shows interesting divisions and trends in Table 1 (States that voted for Bush in 2000) and Table 2 (States that voted for Gore in 2000). Although we might say that the “New Economy” features a number of white-collar jobs that are not unionized (particularly so-called high technology jobs) and that the “rural component” of voting is not as crucial in an era when farmers are a small percentage of the population,5 one cannot help but notice that the 2000 electoral map shows the “big empty states” voting for Bush and the “highly populated industrial states” voting mainly for Gore. In Tables 1 and 2 a simple analysis produces rather striking results: in the Gore states, there are 17 union workers for every 1 person who received an agricultural subsidy in 1995-2002. In the Bush states, the ratio of unionized workers to agricultural subsidy recipients falls to 3:1. Furthermore, when we look at states that have “Republican ratios,” or a number of union members compared to subsidy recipients, we find that if these states did vote for Gore, they did so with very narrow margins (e.g., Iowa). Further analysis of this data suggests that the Southern states get about as much as they put in out of agricultural subsidy programs and that the main flow of agricultural income transfer accrues to the agricultural Midwest and plains states. The most highly populated and unionized states, such as Michigan, California, New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, whose combined population is in the same ballpark as the entire South, have a union to agricultural subsidy recipient ratio of 48:1, and their combined share of agricultural subsidy money is marginal (only 7.3% of national agricultural subsidies in 1995-2002).

4 Ferguson’s analysis (1984) correctly, in my view, attributes a powerful effect to the alliance of multinational oil companies with the Democratic party in the 1930s, and an equally powerful effect to their exit from the party in the 1970s (Ferguson, 1983). The Oil Import Quotas and Oil Depletion Allowance were huge boons to primarily southern “independent” oil producers. See Vietor (1984). 5 The voting situation in the South is complex, but one overwhelmingly important variable was and is race. Black and Black (2003) give detailed examination, but do not examine the agricultural subsidy/union dichotomy explored here.

Nowell, Hyper-ConservativeModernization, p. 15

15

States forBush

Population(millions)

% USPopulation

AgriculturalSubsidies1995-2002(billions)

% Share ofUS Agr.

Subsidies

% AgriculturalSubsidies

Divided by %Pop.

% UnionWorkforce

Est. # unionmembers

# AgriculturalSubsidy

Recipients

Union:AgRecipients

Ratio

Est. Take ofTop 20%Subsidy

Recipients($ billions)

AK 0.6 0.2 $0.01 0.01 0.0 20.4 61,200 334 183 $0.01AL 4.5 1.5 $1.19 1.04 0.7 9.7 218,250 58,388 4 $1.02AR 2.7 0.9 $5.19 4.55 4.9 6.2 83,700 56,685 1 $4.46AZ 5.6 1.9 $0.58 0.51 0.3 6.5 182,000 10,704 17 $0.50CO 4.6 1.6 $2.04 1.79 1.1 9.1 209,300 41,540 5 $1.75GA 8.7 3.0 $2.33 2.04 0.7 7.4 321,900 66,903 5 $2.00ID 1.4 0.5 $1.40 1.23 2.6 7.8 54,600 28,685 2 $1.20IN 6.2 2.1 $4.26 3.74 1.8 16.2 502,200 116,053 4 $3.66KS 2.7 0.9 $6.55 5.75 6.2 7.9 106,650 166,163 1 $5.63KY 4.1 1.4 $1.48 1.30 0.9 13.1 268,550 163,811 2 $1.27LA 4.5 1.5 $2.38 2.09 1.4 7.8 175,500 52,259 3 $2.05MO 5.7 2.0 $4.09 3.59 1.8 13.7 390,450 136,411 3 $3.52MS 2.9 1.0 $3.26 2.86 2.9 5.6 81,200 56,908 1 $2.80MT 0.9 0.3 $2.74 2.40 7.8 13.9 62,550 40,354 2 $2.36NC 8.4 2.9 $1.81 1.59 0.6 4.2 176,400 129,502 1 $1.56ND 0.6 0.2 $5.13 4.50 21.8 9.1 27,300 73,987 0 $4.41NE 1.7 0.6 $6.83 5.99 10.3 10.3 87,550 118,706 1 $5.87NH 1.3 0.4 $0.02 0.02 0.0 11 71,500 1,480 48 $0.02NV 2.2 0.8 $0.04 0.04 0.0 17 187,000 2,044 91 $0.03OH 11.4 3.9 $3.13 2.75 0.7 19 1,083,000 101,104 11 $2.69OK 3.5 1.2 $2.59 2.27 1.9 8.6 150,500 92,983 2 $2.23SC 4.1 1.4 $0.66 0.58 0.4 4.5 92,250 38,112 2 $0.57SD 0.8 0.3 $3.82 3.35 12.2 6.4 25,600 69,252 0 $3.29TN 5.8 2.0 $1.35 1.18 0.6 7.9 229,100 122,646 2 $1.16TX 22.1 7.6 $9.86 8.65 1.1 5.9 651,950 205,959 3 $8.48UT 2.4 0.8 $0.25 0.22 0.3 6.8 81,600 11,008 7 $0.22VA 7.4 2.5 $0.69 0.61 0.2 6.8 251,600 53,830 5 $0.59WV 1.8 0.6 $0.07 0.06 0.1 12.6 113,400 12,551 9 $0.06WY 0.5 0.2 $0.30 0.26 1.5 9.6 24,000 10,909 2 $0.26

Totals 129.1 44.4 $74.05 64.96 1.46 -- 5,970,800 2,039,271 3 $63.68Florida omitted

Table 1. Comparison of Agricultural Subsidy Allocations, Recipients, and Unionization in States that Voted for Bush in 2000

Nowell, Hyper-ConservativeModernization, p. 16

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States forGore

Population(millions)

% USPopulation

AgriculturalSubsidies1995-2002(billions)

% Share ofUS Agr.

Subsidies

% AgriculturalSubsidies

Divided by %Pop.

% UnionWorkforce

Est. # unionmembers

# AgriculturalSubsidy

Recipients

Union:AgRecipients

Ratio

Est. Take ofTop 20%Subsidy

Recipients($ billions)

CA 35.5 12.2 $4.01 3.52 0.3 16.1 2,857,750 41,590 69 $3.45CT 3.5 1.2 $0.04 0.04 0.0 17.5 306,250 1,217 252 $0.03DE 0.8 0.3 $0.11 0.10 0.4 13.6 54,400 2,263 24 $0.09HI 1.3 0.4 $0.01 0.01 0.0 26.5 172,250 778 221 $0.01IA 2.9 1.0 $10.24 8.98 9.0 12.5 181,250 125,729 1 $8.81IL 12.7 4.4 $8.65 7.59 1.7 18.9 1,200,150 204,476 6 $7.44

MA 6.4 2.2 $0.04 0.04 0.0 15.9 508,800 2,212 230 $0.03MD 5.5 1.9 $0.38 0.33 0.2 14.1 387,750 9,795 40 $0.33ME 1.3 0.4 $0.08 0.07 0.2 12.6 81,900 5,117 16 $0.07MI 10.1 3.5 $1.94 1.70 0.5 21.6 1,090,800 59,551 18 $1.67MN 5.1 1.8 $6.73 5.90 3.4 18.8 479,400 118,977 4 $5.79NJ 8.6 3.0 $0.07 0.06 0.0 22.0 946,000 2,312 409 $0.06NM 1.9 0.7 $0.55 0.48 0.7 9.40 89,300 17,983 5 $0.47NY 19.2 6.6 $0.74 0.65 0.1 25.4 2,438,400 27,467 89 $0.64OR 3.6 1.2 $0.72 0.63 0.5 16.1 289,800 19,205 15 $0.62PA 12.4 4.3 $0.64 0.56 0.1 16.3 1,010,600 32,994 31 $0.55RI 1.1 0.4 $0.00 0.00 0.0 19.0 104,500 298 351 $0.00VT 0.6 0.2 $0.10 0.09 0.4 9.4 28,200 5,023 6 $0.09WA 6.1 2.1 $1.82 1.60 0.8 21.2 646,600 30,103 21 $1.57WI 5.5 1.9 $2.63 2.31 1.2 18.7 514,250 102,175 5 $2.26

Totals 144.1 49.5 $39.50 34.65 0.70 -- 13,388,350 809,265 17 $33.97US Census Bureau (July 2003)Environmental Working Group: Farm Subsidy Database (www.ewg.org)

Table 2. Comparison of Agricultural Subsidy Allocations, Recipients, and Unionization in States that Voted for Gore in 2000


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There seems to be some basis, in other words, to the general proposition that the

Republicans today are a rural party that builds in to the suburban vote, whereas the Democrats are an urban party that builds out to the suburban vote, and that in this fact is the kernel of truth in the view that the big empty states tend to vote Republican. In fact, even California’s electoral map, with its heavy concentrations of Republicans in the Central valley and northern forested and mountain areas, is a mirror of the larger national phenomenon, except that the demographics of the state are heavily tilted to the urban coasts. Where the Republican party does best in heavily populated urban areas is typically in those places where the Keynesian elements of the New Deal—unions, redistribution, and a tolerance of government management of the inherently unstable capitalist economy—penetrated least, and that, of course, is the modern South. The Midwestern agricultural states are towed along in the southern Republican wake partly as a reflection of a common desire to transfer income to farm constituencies, and partly as a reflection of a deeply rooted hostility to taxation and income transfer programs that can bring no tangible benefit in the form of “demand stabilization” to areas whose political economy does not match the model of declining demand and unsold inventories—the model of industrial crisis—that Keynes assumed in the General Theory. The virulent character of the Republican Party is due to a religious energy that is picked up from rural constituents and fused into a religious hostility to the Keynesian state and everything that it implies in terms of taxation and income redistribution. The result, in its essence, is an angry white man’s party that, with sufficient funds, can propagandize other constituencies into keeping it in power. The party must press particularly hard on “affective” issues: race, sexual orientation, abortion rights, gun ownership, because it has so little to offer the common person. The Republican Party in practice maintains the traditional attitude of “get as much as possible out of government” without any commitment to the corporatist redistributive philosophy and commitment to judicious management that can be found even in the typical conservative European “Christian Democratic” attitude. An attitude that George W. Bush hideously and successfully mimicked in his promise of “compassionate conservatism.”

The South has modernized, and the “hyper capitalist” attitude of the Republican leadership seems to be a crudely instrumentalist approach to government that views it schizophrenically as a gravy train that should be used to favor specific constituencies (a pharmaceutical company subsidy disguised as a national drug coverage plan) and yet starved of revenue. The willingness to shipwreck the national finances, the intense desire to destroy the principal accomplishments of the New Deal and yet at the same time an unwillingness to touch them for fear of provoking a voter revolt and losing the power to hand out even more favors to core constituencies, bespeaks a grave danger to the polity.

The post-New Deal southern leadership that is now in control of both houses of Congress, the presidency, and the Supreme Court, reached political maturity in an environment that stressed income transfers to the wealthy (e.g. oil policies, agricultural subsidies), diminished redistribution to the poor (two tier minimum wages, low levels of social security protection) and reacted to the most elementary civil rights protection as if it were a declaration of war (hence the need for troop deployments to integrate the South), and was stripped of “political socialization” implicit in a polity that has effective unions.


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And yet, all of this was developed hand-in-glove with the Democratic Party’s New Deal, which took other parts of the country in a diametrically opposed direction. There is indeed a “New South.” But it is the “New South” of hyper-conservative modernization, and the hyper-capitalism of the New South takes a particularly savage approach to governance that could only have taken its specific form in the context of a polity that had tried to implement Keynesian style social welfare and demand management. It was the “Keynesian United States” that fueled the anti-union industrialization and income transfers that helped spawn the “rise of the New South.” And, ironically, southern hyper-capitalism can only continue to govern (at least in democratic terms) so long as the system it seeks to destroy continues to redistribute incomes, stabilize aggregate income, preserve the public health from the environmental depredations of corporate America, and provide basic social welfare services in education and social security. For when these protections disappear, economic stability will disappear with it; and either the fragile voter constituency behind the Republican era will crumble, bringing with it electoral change, or the basis of democratic governance will simply disappear. Conclusion

The hyper-conservative feudalism of Poland came and went nearly two centuries ago, though, of course, the continued price that Poland pays is the “economic given” of its subordination to Germany. But the hyper-tribalism of Saudi Arabia and the hyper-capitalism of the New South are very much with us today. Both are the products of commercial and political contact with international capitalism and the seemingly benign Keynesian welfare state that so profoundly modified the major capitalist powers in the post-World War II era. Both are incredibly toxic political forces. The international terrorist offshoots of the Saudi hyper-tribal state wreak havoc with the ordinary work and play of the developed world. The hyper-capitalist New South steers the policy toward financial catastrophe, and time and again savages the norms of the United Nations and international treaty making.

The development of these hyper-conservative modern polities is not something that can be anticipated from capitalism as such. Hyper-conservative modernization pathways are the purely contingent outcomes of regional responses to the opportunities and challenges of presented by an expanding capitalist economy. But there is no reason that their hyper-modernization pathways further the development of the expanding capitalist economy.

We cannot, in other words, deduce the “endogenous characteristics” of hyper-conservative modernization in the way that Marx deduced a structural weakness in capitalism as a result of class antagonisms. Hyper-conservative modernization allows us only the general sense that we can expect a capitalist system of exchange to spark, in some social systems, responses that will take radically different paths depending on the characteristics of those systems. One might think, in a more naïve time, that the goal of a puissant civilization is to cultivate the arts and sciences, bring peace, prosperity, and good health to its citizens, as well as to anticipate and forestall crises. But the post-cold war period of American hegemony has unleashed the era of hyper-conservative capitalist domination, led by


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Southern politicians whose only appreciation of the principles of a social welfare state lies in what they might plunder from it for their local or national constituents. These leaders adhere to a confrontational Baptist religious teleology and have an unwavering confidence that in every society there lies dormant an inner call to be capitalist just as they are. Perhaps, in this sense, it is unsurprising that their reaction to the religious fanaticism of 9/11 was not antipathy to the source, Saudi Arabia, but to invade the most secular Arab state in the Middle East, Iraq.

Blundering about the Middle East seeking regime change in the wrong places is not going to solve “the terrorist problem,” as the bombings in Madrid have shown. There is in fact no evident solution to the zealotry of the hyper-tribalists’ attacks on Western civilization. We may simply surmise that in an era where small groups of people can unleash weapons of great power, the consequences will not be calculable in any ordinary capitalist sense, or even in any ordinary military sense.

Perhaps the unthinkable will become banal, and western societies will learn to live with occasional casualties in the thousands, and the entire Middle East and its outlying zones, such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, will for us—and Europe—become what Palestine is to Israel.

It seems more likely, however, that we are entering on a new age. The collapsing dollar, mounting deficits, unstoppable unconventional military threats and the inability of the hyper-conservative capitalist state to adopt a positive attitude towards its own citizens and governance, much less those of other regions of the world, are an indication not just of the collapse of the New Deal but of the entire era of liberal international capitalism that began with the end of World War II. Roosevelt’s social welfare, Keynes’ redistribution, the international liberalism of Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, Hugo Grotius, John Hobson, and Woodrow Wilson: it is all dead. It is not just our hyper-tribal enemies, but we ourselves, who are Gothique.


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Gourevitch, p. 104: as agriculture became an interest group, its influence increased (post WWII)


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nowell-hyper conservative globalization

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