Treading the straight andrighteous path: curbing

corruption in the PhilippinesEric Vincent C. Batalla

Political Science Department, De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines

AbstractPurpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the anti-corruption performance of the Philippinegovernment, particularly under the leadership of President Benigno Aquino III.Design/methodology/approach – The paper evaluates the anti-corruption measures as representedby pertinent laws as well as anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) under the Aquino administration.Findings – The Aquino government has exercised remarkable political will in acting on high-profilecases involving former government officials, including former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.However, the government’s overall anti-corruption performance is hampered by outdated andconflicting laws, lack of compliance with anti-corruption laws and regulations by public officialsand employees, poor ACA operational capacities, judicial inefficiency, deficient organizational systemsand change-resistant government agencies, and selective and partial enforcement of anti-corruption laws.These problems are characteristic of Philippine political administrations and are arguably rooted in asystem long characterized by fragile state institutions, strong oligarchic control, and weak citizenship.Originality/value – The paper is intended to update scholars, policy makers, and anti-corruptionpractitioners interested in corruption, ACA performance, and political reform in the Philippines.It discusses corruption-related problems of public administration within the purview of politicaleconomy. Based on this perspective, it argues that the key to effective control of corruption is a changein the political system’s configuration rather than the mere change in leadership.Keywords Philippines, Corruption, Benigno Simeon Aquino III, OmbudsmanPaper type Research paper

IntroductionIn May 2010, the Liberal Party presidential standard-bearer, Benigno SimeonAquino III was elected to office after campaigning successfully on the platform,Daang Matuwid (“The Straight or Righteous Path”). The platform, animated by thereformist mantra, kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap (roughly meaning “if there’s nocorruption, there’s no poverty”), swayed the majority of Filipino voters. Apparently,they wanted a cleaner government than that which had been led previously by GloriaMacapagal-Arroyo.

The Arroyo government had a curious relationship with corruption. As Oyamada(2005) showed, the former president pursued a strong anti-corruption program andintroduced several reforms, which included, among others, passing important legislationto reform government procurement, bringing in reformers to head graft-ridden agencieslike the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), committing government agencies to integritydevelopment pacts, and prosecuting corrupt government officials and military officers.The government, through Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo, even secured the assistance of

Asian Education and DevelopmentStudies

Vol. 4 No. 1, 2015pp. 51-75

©Emerald Group Publishing Limited2046-3162

DOI 10.1108/AEDS-10-2014-0043

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:www.emeraldinsight.com/2046-3162.htm

The author would like to thank Jon S.T. Quah and Michael Johnston for their comments andsuggestions. The paper also benefited from comments by participants of the workshop, “FightingCorruption in Asian Countries,” held at Shih Hsin University Taiwan in June 2014. The authorexpresses his gratitude to De La Salle University for its continuing support of his research.

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the anti-corruption expert, Tony Kwok, a former Deputy Commissioner of Hong Kong’sIndependent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC).

However, the Arroyo reforms were overshadowed by a series of political corruptionscandals that dogged her presidency from 2005 onwards. A year after her electionin 2004, the country was rocked by election-related scandals, particularly the “HelloGarci” affair and the Fertilizer Fund scam. These scandals quickly eroded thepresident’s legitimacy and popularity. Whistleblowers involved in these scandals wereinadequately protected. Some were even killed. Later, Arroyo’s husband and associateswere implicated in brokering the National Broadband Network (NBN) deal with ZTE,a Chinese telecommunications firm. In October 2008, another major scandal occurredwhen a police general was detained at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo International Airportfor possession of an undeclared sum of 1,05,000 euros. The money was intended tobe used by police officials and their spouses for expenses while on a conference tripto Russia.

Aquino’s election to office offered the promise of cleaner political leadership thanthat which had been provided by Arroyo. The son of a charismatic former president,Aquino possessed a clean track record of public service. However, four years into hispresidency, the anti-corruption performance of the Philippines’ institutions had onlyslightly improved. Although the Aquino administration had successfully jailed theformer president Arroyo and also prosecuted some former public officials, such actionswere apparently insufficient to deter graft and corrupt practices, even in the upperechelons of government. In September 2013, a survey revealed that fighting graftand corruption had become the country’s most urgent concern (Pulse Asia, 2013). Whyhas corruption remained pervasive even under a government that has vowed to fightcorruption and poverty?

In the succeeding sections, this paper presents and evaluates the government’smajor anti-corruption measures. On the surface, the evaluation reveals the existence ofoutdated laws and poor enforcement. Arguably, these problems are manifestations of adeeper systemic failure, rooted in a political system perennially beset by fragile stateinstitutions, strong oligarchs, and weak citizenship (Hutchcroft, 1998; Johnston, 2008).The current political configuration suggests that effective reform cannot be achievedby the mere replacement of one set of reformist elite leaders with another set that isperceived to have more political will to fight corruption. More likely, successful reformand the generation of political will would be the products of bottom-up politics wherecitizens demand and play a more active role in public affairs.

Major anti-corruption lawsThe Philippines has several laws concerning the accountability, integrity and theethical behavior of public officials and employees. The earliest of these laws isthe Penal Code, which dates back to the Spanish colonial era. The Revised Penal Code,enacted in 1930 and observed until the present, provides penalties for various offenses.The penalties would have been considered harsh at the time of their enactment.

Chapters 2-4, Title VII on Crimes Committed by Public Officers, cover penalties formalfeasance, misfeasance, bribery, fraud, and malversation of public funds or property.The penalty for fraud against the public treasury includes imprisonment or a fine of200-1,000 pesos (equivalent to US$100-US$500 at the time of their original enactment).On top of fines and imprisonment, persons guilty of the malversation of public funds orproperty suffer the penalty of disqualification from office and a fine equal to the

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amount of the funds malversed. Qualified bribery imposes on a public officer the samepenalty as an offender whose crime is punishable by thirty years’ imprisonment ordeath, if the said officer is found to have refrained from arresting or prosecuting theoffender in consideration of any offer, promise, gift, or present.

The early decades following independence in July 1946 saw legislation dealingspecifically with the problem of graft and corruption. In 1955, Republic Act No. 1,379was enacted authorizing the forfeiture in favor of the State of any property foundto have been acquired unlawfully by a public officer or employee. Then, in 1960, theAnti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3,019) was passed. The lawidentifies various corrupt practices and prohibitions. Under this law, unexplainedwealth serves as prima facie evidence for dismissal or removal from office. Propertiesin the name of the public official’s spouse and dependents could also be considered inany investigation.

The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was the first law that prescribed thedisclosure of assets and liabilities by public officers, as well as a statement ofthe amounts and sources of their incomes and expenses. The obligation for the publicdisclosure of assets, liabilities and net worth was reiterated in the 1987 Constitution andin the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officials and Employees.

During the martial law years, the government of President Ferdinand Marcosintroduced amendments as well as new laws to strengthen the country’s legal frameworkagainst corruption. Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution authorized parliament (theNational Assembly) to create the anti-graft court (Sandiganbayan) as well as theOmbudsman (Tanodbayan). Actually, the Sandiganbayan and the Tanodbayan wereestablished in June 1978 by virtue of Presidential Decrees 1,486 and 1,487, respectively.Presidential Decree 1,606 further defined the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The Commission on Audit (COA) was another constitutional commission createdunder the 1973 Constitution via its Article XII. The COA’s mandate was to serve as theexternal auditor of all government agencies, including government-owned and controlledcorporations (GOCCs). In 1975, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 749,which granted immunity from prosecution to givers of bribes and other gifts if theytestified against corrupt officials. This was the first law that encouraged whistleblowers.

The post-Marcos era witnessed a new constitution as well as other laws intended tostrengthen the legal framework against corruption. Article XI of the 1987 PhilippineConstitution lays down provisions to promote and ensure the accountability of publicofficers. Salient provisions of the article are worth pointing out. Section 3 provides forthe impeachment of public officials from members of constitutional commissions to thePresident. Sections 4 and 5 allow the continuation of the Sandiganbayan and the Officeof the Ombudsman (OMB). Furthermore, Section 14 provides for the OMB’s fiscalautonomy to ensure its independence from vested interests and partisan politicalinfluence. Section 17 reiterates the obligation for public officers to offer full financialdisclosure of assets, liabilities, and net worth.

Article XII of the 1987 Constitution also reestablished the COA as a constitutionalcommission. It strengthened the COA’s political independence by guaranteeing its fiscalautonomy, as had been done with the OMB. It also prohibited new legislation thatexempted government entities from the COA’s scrutiny. This was a reaction to the Marcosadministration’s previous practice of granting exemptions to GOCCs (Ancog, 1986).

In 1989, the government of Corazon Aquino introduced the Code of Conduct andEthical Standards for Public Officials and Employees by virtue of Republic Act No. 6,713.The law provides a system of incentives and penalties for public officers and

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civil servants. Incentives, which are announced in public ceremonies, include bonuses,promotions with commensurate salary increases, citations, directorships in GOCCs, localand foreign scholarship grants, paid vacations and the like. Penalties are imposed onprohibited acts and transactions declared to be unlawful, which are: first, benefiting byhaving financial and material interests in transactions requiring the approval of theiroffice, second, outside employment and other activities, third, disclosure or misuse ofconfidential information, and fourth, solicitation or acceptance of gifts.

Republic Act No. 6,713 requires the resignation of a public officials or employeesfrom any private business and their divestment of shareholdings in order to avoidconflicts of interest. Violators face fines not exceeding six months’ salary, suspensionnot exceeding one year, or removal from office depending on the gravity of the offense.Heavier penalties are imposed on grave violations via fines, imprisonment extending tofive years, as well as disqualification from holding public office.

In July 1991, a new law was enacted which criminalized plunder. Republic ActNo. 7,080 defines plunder as the accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth in theaggregate amount of P50 million or more. On the basis of valid information and evenprior to final judgment, a public officer is immediately suspended from office. Violatorsreceive punishments of imprisonment and unlawfully acquired properties are forfeitedin favor of the State (under Sections 2 and 6).

The Arroyo administration witnessed the enactment of several laws directly andindirectly related to graft and corruption. The first of these was the Anti-MoneyLaundering Act (AMLA) of 2001 (Republic Act No. 9,160). The AMLA defines moneylaundering as a crime and it criminalizes the use of the Philippines as a money-launderingsite for unlawful activities, including graft and corruption. The crime carries penalties ofimprisonment that range from seven to 14 years and admits fines varying from threemillion pesos to an amount not more than twice as much as the monetary instrument orproperty involved in the offense.

In 2003, Republic Act No. 9,184, also known as the Government Procurement ReformAct, was passed. The law was designed to reduce corruption opportunities arising fromgovernment procurement. It aimed at streamlining procurement processes, promotingtransparency and accountability and encouraging the public monitoring of biddingprocesses for contracts. The law prescribes a standard procurement process, includingbidding procedures. Bidding awards are based on decisions made by the Bids andAwards Committee (BAC), whose members are appointed for a fixed one-year term.The head of the procuring entity is not a member of the BAC. In addition, the lawrequires that procurement entities invite observers for all stages of the procurementprocess. Invitees include a COA representative, a representative of a private grouprelevant to the procurement item and a representative from a non-governmentalorganization (NGO). Representatives are given honoraria payments subject to theavailability of funds.

In 2007, the Arroyo government passed the Anti-Red Tape Act (or Republic ActNo. 9,485) in order to improve government efficiency and to prevent graft andcorruption. The law requires government agencies to conduct time and motion studiesand also to reengineer systems when deemed necessary. It further directs agencies andlocal government units to publicize their respective service standards (called a Citizen’sCharter) in the form of information billboards posted at the main entrances of offices.

A Citizen’s Charter contains pertinent information including the procedures requiredto obtain a particular service, the person in charge of the process at each step, themaximum period of time allowed to conclude the process, the documents to be

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presented, the amounts of fees to be paid and the procedure for making complaints.Offices are directed to act upon requests and applications for services for a maximum offive days for simple transactions and for ten days for complex transactions. The law alsorequires government employees involved in a transaction to wear official identificationcards. Further, the Anti-Red Tape Act subjects all government offices with frontlineservices to a Report Card Survey initiated by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) incoordination with the Development Academy of the Philippines.

In 2008, the Arroyo government passed a resolution to upgrade civil service salaries.Although the upgrade was primarily meant to adjust wages to rising prices, it couldalso be considered as a preventive anti-corruption measure. The President’s monthlysalary was raised from about P60000 in 2001 to P120000 in 2010. Salary Grade 31,covering senators and congressmen, ranged from P90000 to P97000 – the same gradeand compensation as the Ombudsman’s. The lowest monthly salary for an OMB graftinvestigator was P24887 and the highest was P78916. The monthly salary for thelowest civil servant (Salary Grade 1, Step 1) was pegged at P9000. Table I provides acondensed schedule illustrating the range of salaries available for civilian governmentemployees.

Anti-corruption agencies (ACAs)The first ACAs in the country were presidential anti-graft and investigation agencies.Starting with President Elpidio Quirino’s Integrity Board in 1950, a pattern could bediscerned in which Philippine presidents usually established special anti-corruptionunits attached to the Office of the President (Batalla, 2001; Oyamada, 2005; Quah, 2010).In November 2010, President Aquino issued Executive Order 13, abolishing thePresidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC), which had been established by Arroyo inApril 2001(Official Gazette, 2010). The PAGC investigated and acted upon complaintsagainst presidential appointees (and non-appointees in collusion with the former).The abolition of the PAGC in 2010 did not mean that a presidential ACA no longerexisted. In fact, the PAGC’s functions were transferred to the Office of the DeputySecretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), which resulted in the creation of a new division(the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division) within that office (Official Gazette, 2010).

In addition to ODESLA, there are four other government instrumentalities specificallycreated as anti-corruption bodies. These are, to wit: the OMB, the Sandiganbayan, the

Salary grade Step 1 Step 8

1 9,000 9,6495 12,019 12,88610 17,255 18,50015 24,887 26,86820 36,567 39,47825 53,730 58,00630 78,946 85,23031 90,000 97,16332 103,000 111,19833 120,000Notes: Salary grades 1-32 have eight steps. Table only shows steps 1 and 8Source: Annex “A”, Official Gazette (2012)

Table I.Monthly salary

schedule for civilianpersonnel of the

national governmenteffective June 1, 2012

(condensed)

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Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), and the Inter-agency Anti-graftCoordinating Council (IAAGCC).

Currently, the OMB serves as the lead agency for the government’s anti-corruptionefforts. The 1987 Constitution, further enabled by the Ombudsman Act of 1989,authorizes the OMB to perform the following major functions: investigation, prosecution,administrative adjudication, graft prevention, and public assistance.

The investigation of corrupt practices has been lodged in the Field InvestigationOffice (FIO), which was created during Simeon Marcelo’s stint as Ombudsman(2002-2005). The FIO basically conducts fact-finding missions in respect of complaints,as well as lifestyle checks of government officials and employees. Based on theseinvestigations, the OMB files formal charges before the Sandiganbayan (for SalaryGrades 27 or higher) or in the regular courts. The OMB also has the power to adjudicatein administrative cases and to impose sanctions on any non-impeachable public official.Even though it does not possess disciplinary authority over impeachable officials(e.g. members of constitutional commissions and the Supreme Court (SC)), the OMB hasthe power to investigate such officials “for the purpose of filing a verified complaint ofimpeachment if warranted” (OMB, 2013, p. 2).

The OMB’s corruption prevention function allows it to determine the causes ofinefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in government and make thenecessary remedial recommendations. Its major corruption prevention activities include:

(1) The launch of the “Close Watch” program assigning resident ombudsmen tograft-prone agencies.

(2) The deepening of anti-corruption education and involvement with schoolsand youth organizations. The OMB accredits Campus Integrity Crusaders andpromotes studies of the OMB for academic research.

(3) The conduct of policy reviews and systems studies. In 2012, such studies includedred tape and integrity assessment studies of several government agencies andactivities.

(4) Celebrating December 9 as Anti-Corruption Day.

(5) The conduct of anti-corruption education for government officials and employees.

(6) The continuation of the Integrity Development Review (IDR) project initiatedduring the Arroyo presidency. The project assesses the vulnerabilities tocorruption of 18 government agencies such as the BIR, Bureau of Customs(BOC), and the Department of Public Works and Highways. The project will beextended to local government units (OMB, 2013).

Finally, the OMB performs its public assistance function by helping citizens obtaingovernment services, which have been denied to them. In addition to its constitutionallymandated functions, the Ombudsman Act of 1989 directs the OMB to investigate andprosecute involved parties in connection with ill-gotten wealth and/or unexplainedwealth amassed since February 25, 1986. The investigative and prosecutorial powersgranted to the OMB on ill-gotten wealth are delineated by period since the PCGG servesas the investigating and prosecuting authority for ill-gotten wealth acquired during theMarcos dictatorship.

The Ombudsman is appointed by the President from a list of 21 nominees preparedby the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). Compensation is set at Salary Grade 31, rangingfrom P91000 to P97000 (excluding allowances), which is two grades lower than that of

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the President. The term of office is seven years without reappointment. As such, theappointed Ombudsman’s term overlaps with any President’s term of office, which isonly six years. As shall be discussed later, this overlapping of terms could cause somefriction between the two offices.

The Sandiganbayan is a special court created by the Marcos government to handlegraft and corruption cases. Presidential Decree 1,606 defines its jurisdiction as follows:

(1) violations of Republic Act 3,019, as amended, otherwise, known as the Anti-Graftand Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1,379;

(2) crimes committed by public officers and employees including those employedin GOCCs, embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple orcomplex with other crimes; and

(3) other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, includingthose employed in GOCCs, in relation to their office.

In 1997, by virtue of Republic Act No. 8,249, the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction wasamended, limiting its coverage to cases involving high-level public officials (at SalaryGrade 27 or higher). Such officials include municipal mayors, congressmen, militaryofficials, members of constitutional commissions and higher-level officials.

The President appoints Sandiganbayan justices, who serve until they reach the ageof 65 years. The position of Presiding Justice belongs to Salary Grade 31, which is thesame grade enjoyed by the Ombudsman. Associate Justices belong to Salary Grade 30.

The fourth ACA is the PCGG, which was formed immediately after the ousting ofPresident Ferdinand Marcos. The PCGG was established by the revolutionarygovernment of Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No. 1, Series of 1986. The PCGG isa quasi-judicial body that has been tasked principally to track down and recover theill-gotten wealth accumulated by President Marcos, his family and relatives and hisclose associates. However, Corazon Aquino’s Executive Order No. 1 also provides itwith two other mandates, namely: the investigation of graft and corruption casesassigned to it by the President, and the adoption of safeguards and measures to preventthe occurrence of corruption in government (Official Gazette, 1986). These mandateshave been reiterated in the PCGG’s 2013 Annual Report, suggesting that there ispotential for it to be deployed in future anti-corruption endeavors beyond its scope ofinvestigating ill-gotten wealth acquired during the Marcos years.

The fifth ACA is the IAAGCC. The IAAGCC was formally established in 1999 byvirtue of Administrative Order No. 79 issued by President Joseph Estrada (OfficialGazette, 1999). The Council was led by the OMB and was composed of the COA,Department of Justice (DOJ), CSC, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), and thenow defunct PAGC. Under the auspices of the IAAGCC, the government couldcreate special task forces to look into complex fraud cases bearing national impact,cases involving amounts of P50 million or more, and those involving governmentofficials with the rank of bureau director or higher. The Council was not convenedduring the term of Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez (2005-2011), but it was laterreactivated by her successor, Conchita Carpio-Morales. In September 2011, theIAAGCC admitted three new members, namely: the Department of Finance (DOF),Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and ODESLA. In August 2013,a special task force consisting of the OMB, the COA and the DOJ was created toinvestigate cases related to the pork barrel scandals that erupted in the previousmonth (Official Gazette, 2013).

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The IAAGCC is representative of an evolved pattern of institutional arrangementsin the fight against graft and corruption in the Philippines. The OMB works with lineagencies of the government and other constitutional commissions. Even though theyare not strictly ACAs, the COA and DOJ, which are IAAGCC members, are activelyinvolved in anti-corruption work.

By virtue of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, the COA is authorized to examine,audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues, expenditures, and use of fundsand property owned or held by the government. The COA submits annual reportsto the President and Congress on the financial condition and operations of thegovernment. The audit reports could indicate improprieties committed by a particulargovernment agency or corporation. Based on these reports, complaints could be filedbefore the Ombudsman.

As a constitutional commission, the COA is designed to be politically independentbecause its fiscal autonomy is guaranteed constitutionally. The President nominatesthe COA Chair (and Commissioners) to the Commission on Appointments (CA),a congressional body consisting of members of the Senate and the House ofRepresentatives. The CA confirms the appointments of the heads of governmentagencies, regular members of the Judicial Bar Council, and heads of three constitutionalcommissions (the COA, the CSC, and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)).The COA Commissioner enjoys the same remuneration as the Ombudsman and theSandiganbayan’s Presiding Justice.

Another agency relevant to the government’s anti-corruption efforts is the DOJ.The DOJ has investigative and prosecuting powers for use against government officialsand employees. It supervises the NBI, which is patterned after the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation of the USA. It also maintains a witness protection program, establishedby virtue of Republic Act No. 6,981, otherwise known as “The Witness Protection,Security and Benefit Act.” Since the start of the Aquino administration, the DOJ hasbeen active in investigating and prosecuting former and current government officials,including former President Gloria Arroyo.

AssessmentBased on the descriptions above, Figure 1 shows the major anti-corruption measures inthe Philippines. The chart shows an elaborate and sophisticated design that hasevolved down the years and covers areas of corruption prevention, detection andinvestigation as well as prosecution and adjudication. Furthermore, these measurestouch on the legal, administrative, judicial, and economic aspects of the problem.

Such measures have enabled the incumbent government to report gains regularly inits crusade against corruption. Big fish, consisting of former presidents, legislators, andexecutives of local government units and government corporations, as well as militaryofficials have been prosecuted and convicted. In 2012, the OMB filed charges beforethe Sandiganbayan against former President Gloria Arroyo and other officials forirregularities in the use of P366 million from the intelligence funds of the government’slottery corporation. Exercising its administrative adjudication powers, the OMB alsodismissed police officials, executives of the Development Bank of the Philippines, andan agent of the NBI from their offices (OMB, 2013, pp. 9-10).

Despite an elaborate anti-corruption framework, performance has generally beendismal. Figure 2 provides Transparency International’s Corruption PerceptionsIndex (CPI) scores for the period 1995-2011. In 2012, Transparency International (TI)adopted a new CPI methodology, with 100 instead of the previous ten as the highest

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score. The country’s CPI scores and ranking suggest improved perceptions. The scoreswere 34 and 36 for 2012 and 2013, respectively. In 2013, the country ranked 94 out of177 countries. The improved scores and ranks notwithstanding, the Philippines stillbelongs to TI’s high corruption category.

In July 2013, the country was rocked by a serious controversy regarding the use ofgovernment pork barrel funds, particularly the Priority Development Assistance Fund(PDAF), which was a lump-sum discretionary fund allotted to senators andcongressmen for projects that benefited their constituents. A whistleblower by thename of Benhur Luy revealed publicly that his former employer, Janet Lim-Napoles,

Anti-graft and related lawssuch as governmentprocurement regulation law

Establishment of severalanti-corruption agenciesand an anti-graft court

Public employees’disclosure of wealth

Anti-corruption educationand awareness campaigns

Integrity and red tapeassessments

COA accounting rules andregulations

Civil service salaryupgrades

COA audit reports

OMB lifestyle checks

Independent and joint fact-finding investigations andlifestyle checks

DOJ witness protectionprogram

OMB administrativeadjudication

Office of the SpecialProsecutor under the OMBto file and prosecute casesbefore the Sandiganbayanand regular courts

Sandiganbayan and courtdecisions

PreventionDetection andInvestigation

Prosecution andAdjudication

• •

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Source: Eric Vincent C. Batalla

Figure 1.Major anti-corruption

measures in thePhilippines

Notes: CPI scores for a country indicate the perceived level ofpublic sector corruption, ranging from 0 to 10, with 10 regardedas very clean and 0 as highly corrupt Source: Transparency International (2014)

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Figure 2.Corruption

Perceptions Indexscores for thePhilippines,1995-2011

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gave payoffs to legislators. The exposé, which became known as the “Pork BarrelScam,” implicated legislators, executives of the DBM, government agencies, NGOs andit identified private agents (or brokers) who facilitated the scam’s operation. Thescheme involved the payments of commissions, rebates and profits to various actors inPDAF-funded projects.

The Napoles scandal spilled over to raise questions about presidential discretionaryfunds such as the Malampaya Fund, the President’s Social Fund (PSF) and theAquino-initiated Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), allegedly the brainchildof President Aquino’s party-mate and DBM Secretary, Florencio Abad. In November2013, the SC ruled against the constitutionality of the PDAF, the Malampaya Fund andthe PSF. Eight months later, it decided that certain practices under the DAP were alsounconstitutional.

The pork barrel scandals enraged the public, which was made aware of the extent towhich government funds were systematically siphoned into private pockets. InSeptember 2013, public opinion based on Pulse Asia’s (2013) Ulat ng Bayan surveyplaced “fighting graft and corruption” at the top of the list of the country’s most urgentconcerns. Previously, it was among a list of five foremost national concerns thatincluded economic issues such as inflation and employment. Following the Pork BarrelScam, “Fighting graft and corruption” rose by 17 points from its previous level in thesurvey (Table II).

The 2013 survey by the Social Weather Stations (SWS), another leading polling firm,validated rising public concern over corruption. In January 2014, the SWS released its2013 survey of enterprises concerning corruption. Compared to a record low of 43percent in 2012, more people in the business sector (56 percent) saw “a lot” of publicsector corruption occurring in 2013. The majority of the respondents indicated thatthey were aware of corruption both at the national level (which increased from 81percent in 2012 to 90 percent in 2013) and at local levels of government (which rosefrom 72 percent in 2012 to 82 percent in 2013 for provincial governments and from 76percent in 2012 to 82 percent in 2013 for city/municipal governments). Over 40 percentof the respondents maintained that “most or almost all” companies in their sector paidbribes to win government contracts. Furthermore, corruption occurred mostly atcabinet and middle management levels of government rather than among the rank andfile. Respondents reporting cabinet-level corruption increased from 54 percent in 2012to 69 percent in 2013. Similarly, those respondents reporting corruption amongmid-level government managers registered an increase from 70 to 80 percent during thesame period.

While President Aquino maintained excellent trust ratings, the SWS survey resultsalso showed a mix of government agencies receiving good and bad sincerity ratings intheir attitudes to fighting corruption. Of these agencies, only the BOC, which Aquinohad criticized in his July 2013 State of the Nation Address, received a “very bad” rating.The public polls suggested that despite a trusted president, political and bureaucraticcorruption continued to be rampant in the country.

The persistence of endemic political and bureaucratic corruption in the Philippinescould be attributed to several reasons. From a public administration standpoint, theproblem could simply be a question of the adequacy of laws and of enforcement. Thedesign and efficient enforcement of rules would either encourage or discourage graftamong government and private actors, regardless of the entrenched culture ofcorruption. As shall be discussed later, the persistence of pervasive corruption in thePhilippines has social and political roots (Johnston, 2008, 2010).

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NationalC

oncerns

Novem

ber-12

Janu

ary-13

February-13

March-13

June-13

Septem

ber-13

Figh

tinggraftandcorrup

tion

3735

3935

3148

Controlling

Infla

tion

5154

5251

6148

Improving/increasing

payof

workers

4744

4954

4946

Creatin

gmorejobs

3339

3931

4142

Reducingpovertyof

manyFilip

inos

3233

3234

3732

Sou

rce:

PulseAsia(2013)

Table II.Five most urgentconcerns of the

country, November2012-September2013 (percent)

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Some scholars and public intellectuals have deemed extant Philippine anti-corruptionlaws to be sufficient for deterrence (e.g. Co et al., 2007, as cited in Quah, 2010, p. 26).However, some of these laws are outdated, while others prevent effective anti-corruptionefforts. From an earlier description of laws in this paper, the fines imposed on graftpractices are low by today’s standards. For instance, under the revised Penal Code, fraudonly carries a maximum fine of P10000 (about US$220). Likewise, violators of the Code ofConduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officials and Employees face fines notexceeding P5000 (approximately US$110). Similarly, standardized compensation forgovernment employees, based on Republic Act No. 6,758 (the Salary StandardizationLaw), has not been revised quickly and has not adapted readily to rapidly changingeconomic conditions and needs. Government salaries have been updated only twice sincethe law was enacted in 1994. In a climate of rising prices, uncompetitive civil servicecompensation induces government corruption.

Some laws get in the way of enabling the ACAs to investigate effectively. Forinstance, Bolongaita (2010, p. 14) points out that unlike Indonesia’s CorruptionEradication Commission (KPK), the OMB “cannot wiretap, it cannot examine bankaccounts or freeze assets, and it cannot make arrests.” Accordingly, other existing lawssuch as the anti-wiretapping law and the anti-money laundering law restrain theOMB’s investigative powers.

More than in its established laws, it is in the area of enforcement where thePhilippines is at its weakest. Enforcement of anti-graft laws suffers from a number ofproblems. First, many public officials themselves do not comply with anti-graft laws.For instance, despite the law governing government procurement contracts, VincentLazatin, head of the Transparency and Accountability Network (TAN) observed, “ThePhilippines is cited very often for having a world-class type of legal framework [forprocurement], but where we fail most of the time is in actual compliance andimplementation. So here we are 10 years into the law and we are still having hugeimplementation problems” (Furmas, 2013).

Public officials and employees, including those of the ACAs, take the legalobligation for financial disclosure lightly, as it is provided by the Code of Conduct andEthical Standards of Public Officials and Employees. In March 2011, the PhilippineCenter for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) reported that there was no record of aStatement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) for four OMB officials,including Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez. The importance of diligent financialdisclosure only came to light in 2012 during the impeachment proceedings againstSupreme Court Chief Justice Renato Corona. On the basis of an under-reported SALN,the Senate convicted Corona for betraying public trust.

Second, the problem of enforcement is exacerbated by the ACAs’ serious lack ofcapacity and resources to monitor and investigate corruption cases. In the case of thelead ACA, previous Ombudsmen have lamented the lack of personnel and funds.Former Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo once described the situation as “disabling.” Uponhis assumption of office in October 2002, he found that the OMB was not onlyundermanned but its employees were also grossly underpaid and lacked proper skillsand equipment. At that time, there were only 37 field investigators and 32 prosecutorsat the OMB (Marcelo, 2013). In 2003, he successfully lobbied the DBM for an increasedbudget for field investigators and prosecutors. The DBM authorized the addition of 56new field investigators and 35 new prosecutors.

The Marcelo lobby led to a gradual increase in the OMB’s capacity and resources insucceeding years. The number of field investigators increased from 152 in 2010 to 171

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by December 2013 (OMB, 2011a, 2014c). Similarly, the number of prosecutors increasedfrom 73 to 88 during the same period. The OMB budget also experienced increases,jumping from P647 million in 2005 to P1 billion in 2010 and P1.67 billion in 2014 (OMB,2011a, 2014a). Despite these increases, the OMB continues to be strapped foroperational resources. In an open letter to the PCIJ dated 11 February 2011, the OMB(2011a) wrote that its increased operating budget was only sufficient to cover thecompensation of authorized plantilla positions. Even then, it expressed the need for atleast 3,000 personnel to watch over 1.5 million public officials and employees. As of 31December 2013, the OMB (2014c) had 1,211 personnel.

The OMB’s (2011a) claim that its budget for operations was meager could bevalidated. An analysis of the OMB’s budgets for 2010 and 2014 shows measly sumsavailable for operations, particularly for field investigations. Although the budget forgeneral fact-finding and investigation increased from 12 percent of the total OMBbudget in 2010 to 16 percent in 2014, the increase was absorbed by existing personnelservices (compensation), largely on account of revisions prompted by the SalaryStandardization Law. Maintenance and other operating expenditures (MOOE)accounted for <1 percent of the total budget (Table III). The budget for MOOEoperations amounted to approximately P12.5 million and within this item, P3.7 millionwere allocated to field investigation. The MOOE budget includes such items asprofessional expenses, utilities, supplies, rent and travel. About P18 million havebeen allocated for confidential, intelligence, and extraordinary expenses at the generaladministration and operations levels.

Marcelo (2013, p. 3) argues that the “cornerstone” of anti-corruption is “a strong fieldinvestigation department staffed by an adequate number of competent and honestinvestigators and provided with sufficient resources” to accomplish their task.Effective investigation not only requires personnel but equipment and resources forefficient surveillance, communication, and documentation. Indeed, the small amountallocated for fact-finding and investigation hampers the OMB’s ability to evaluatecomplaints against government agencies and public officials properly. Backlogs areregistered every year on a constantly increasing number of complaints received.Likewise, the small budget for investigation affects the successful administrativeadjudication as well as prosecution of cases before the Sandiganbayan and the regularcourts. (OMB prosecutors only work on cases before the Sandiganbayan while DOJprosecutors are deputized by the OMB to work on cases before regular courts.) In 2013,the OMB reported a disposition rate of 42 percent based on a total workload of 8,300administrative cases (OMB, 2014b). In terms of prosecution, from 2009 to 2013, convictionrates were below 50 percent of cases decided by the Sandiganbayan. In an earlier study,over three-quarters of Sandiganbayan cases were acquitted (Hunter, 2002).

Resource limitations have led the ACAs to seek and accept external support, such asfrom the DBM and foreign donor agencies (e.g. the US Agency for InternationalDevelopment). Not only do such decisions lead to “project fatigue” (Johnston, 2010,pp. 20-21), they also compromise the ACAs’ independence and integrity. In November2013, Senator José “Jinggoy” Estrada questioned the COA’s integrity in securing P143.7million from the DBM through the controversial DAP (Manila Times, 2013c).The transaction could be considered as an illegal “cross-border” funds transfer, i.e. froman executive agency to a constitutional commission. The COA used the funds for theacquisition of computers and other equipment, including vehicles for officials.

Another problem of enforcement is the heavy reliance on the justice system, whichin itself is slow and inefficient. The snail’s pace of the justice system holds true for

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2010

2014

General

budg

etitem

Personnel

services

(%)

MOOE

(%)

Capital

outla

ys(%

)Total

(%)

Personnel

services

(%)

MOOE

(%)

Capital

outla

ys(%

)Total

(%)

General

Adm

inistrationandSu

pport(in

clud

ingoperation/

maintenance

ofcompu

terizedinfo

system

s)19.1

19.4

2.5

41.0

54.6

11.1

2.8

68.4

Operatio

ns57.9

1.1

0.0

59.0

30.8

0.7

0.0

31.6

General

fact-find

ingandinvestigation

11.7

0.1

0.0

11.9

16.4

0.2

0.0

16.6

Adm

inistrativeadjudicatio

n2.6

0.0

0.0

2.7

Prosecution

11.3

0.5

0.0

11.7

6.0

0.3

0.0

6.3

Publicassistance

andcorrup

tionpreventio

n12.7

0.3

0.0

13.0

5.8

0.2

0.0

6.0

Sectoral

operations

22.3

0.1

0.0

22.4

nana

nana

Sou

rces

:Ofbasicdata:O

MB(2010,2014a)

Table III.Major budgetedexpenditures asshare of OMBbudget, 2010and 2014

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corruption cases at the Sandiganbayan and other courts. The anti-graft court only handlescases involving high-level officials, while regular courts deal with lower-level cases.

Of the various Philippine courts, the Sandiganbayan is reputed to be among theslowest in rendering its decisions. According to Hunter (2002, p. 10), the medianduration for a Sandiganbayan case is “over six years.” Further, Bolongaita (2010)estimates that court decisions on corruption cases can extend up to 9.8 years whenappeals are made before the SC. This performance pales in comparison withIndonesia’s eight-month timescale for a similar judicial process (Bolongaita, 2010).In a recent conference, former Ombudsman Marcelo claimed that it takes an average of10.2 years for the Sandiganbayan to render a decision from the time a case is filedbefore it. In 2012, the Sandiganbayan’s disposal rate was 14 percent of 2,662 cases.Disposed cases consisted of dismissed petitions and motions, transferred cases, anddecided/resolved cases. The comparable disposal rate in lower courts was 38 percent,which included non-corruption-related cases.

Like the ACAs, the Philippine judiciary suffers from a serious lack of competentjudges and operating resources, which along with the society’s culture of litigiousness,contributes to case congestion and consequently, delays in the administration of justice.In 2012, the MOOE accounted for 16 percent of the P15.3 billion appropriated tothe judiciary. There were 1,622 judges, or about one judge per 59,800 Filipinos in 2012.The Sandiganbayan has an authorized plantilla of only 15 justices.

Amidst the existing court congestion, the PDAF scam has added to the judicialburden because of the sheer volume of cases involved. The sworn affidavit of Napolesidentified 18 senators and 100 congressmen (current and former) allegedly involved inscandal. Included in the affidavit were legislative staff, government officials andemployees, as well as NGO personnel. In April 2014, the OMB filed corruption chargesbefore the Sandiganbayan against 54 individuals in a list that included three senators,namely: Juan Ponce Enrile, José “Jinggoy” Estrada, and Ramon Revilla, Jr (Santos,2014). The cases represented the first batch of NBI complaints filed before andsubsequently validated by the OMB. In November 2013, the NBI filed a second batch ofcomplaints involving 34 people with a third batch expected to be filed in 2014. TheOMB has not yet filed these NBI complaints before the Sandiganbayan.

Fourth, enforcement is hampered by the maintenance of inefficient organizationalsystems and procedures in government. Despite Daang Matuwid, many agencies ofgovernment have resisted changes that would promote greater efficiency. Based on the2013 SWS survey, 17 out of 26 government institutions received net sincerity ratingsfor fighting corruption that ranged from “very bad” to “moderate” (Table IV). Ninegovernment institutions garnered ratings of “good” to “excellent” (the latter of whichwas awarded to the Office of the President only).

Table IV shows that even the OMB itself received a “moderate” and not a higher netsincerity rating. This reflects the public’s opinion regarding the effectiveness andefficiency of the lead ACA. The likelihood of OMB cases being dismissed is partly dueto flaws in its internal procedures. According to Bolongaita (2010), the OMB elevatescases to the courts based on inputs from investigators whose recommendations arebased on probable cause. It does not receive inputs from prosecutors, who would tend toobserve more stringent criteria to prove guilt “beyond reasonable doubt” (Bolongaita, 2010,p. 15). Prosecutors work on cases assigned by the OMB based on the recommendation ofjust the investigators. This suggests that not only are the OMB’s investigative powersdiminished by the deprivation of resources/capacity, but also that its prosecutorialcapacities have been weakened further by its own inadequate procedures.

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Governm

entInstitu

tion

2013

Net

Sincerity

Rating

Governm

entInstitu

tion

2013

Net

Sincerity

Rating

Governm

entInstitu

tion

2013

Net

Sincerity

Rating

Officeof

thePresident

Excellent

Commission

onAud

itModerate

Senate

Neutral

Departm

entof

Health

Verygood

Ombu

dsman

Moderate

Trial

Courts

Neutral

Departm

entof

Trade

and

Indu

stry

Verygood

Departm

entof

Interior

andLo

cal

Governm

ent

Moderate

House

ofRepresentatives

Poor

Departm

entof

Social

Welfare

andDevelopment

Verygood

YourCity

Governm

ent

Moderate

Philipp

ineNationalP

olice

Poor

Social

Security

System

Verygood

Sand

igan

bayan

Moderate

Bureauof

Internal

Revenue

Poor

Departm

entof

Laborand

Employment

Good

Commission

onElections

Neutral

Departm

entof

PublicWorks

andHighw

ays

Poor

Departm

entof

Health

Good

Departm

entof

Env

ironmentand

Natural

Resources

Neutral

Land

TransportationOffice

Bad

Suprem

eCo

urt

Good

Departm

entof

Bud

getand

Managem

ent

Neutral

Bureauof

Custom

sVeryBad

Departm

entof

Justice

Good

Departm

entof

Transportationand

Commun

ication

Neutral

Sou

rce:

Social

Weather

Stations

(2014)

Table IV.Net sincerity ratingsin fightingcorruption, 2013

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The BOC, which is an enduring symbol of Philippine corruption, offers a case in pointof deficient and inefficient organizational systemsunder Daang Matuwid. Between Mayand June 2011, a total of 1,910 container vans disappeared while being transshippedfrom the Port of Manila to Batangas International Port. The lost cargoes cost thegovernment P240 million in lost duties and taxes (DOF, 2011). The scandal took a tollon the then BOC Commissioner Angelito Alvarez. In September 2011, President Aquinoappointed Rufino Biazon as the BOC Commissioner. Biazon was a member of PresidentAquino’s party, who had lost in the 2010 senatorial elections. Though the appointmentwas viewed as a political accommodation, according to a presidential spokesperson,Aquino believed in Biazon’s competence to achieve BOC reforms and customs revenuetargets (PhilStar.com, 2011).

Under Biazon’s leadership, smuggling went on unabated, however. Based onInternational Monetary Fund statistics, it was estimated that between July 2010 andJune 2012, annual losses in the Philippines due to smuggling averaged at US$19.6billion (Tiglao, 2012a). This was appreciably higher than the estimated average annuallosses of US$3.8 and US$3.1 billion experienced during the Estrada and Arroyoadministrations, respectively. Smuggled commodities identified prominently were rice,oil, steel, pork and chicken, arms, narcotics, and luxury vehicles (Angara, 2012;ManilaTimes, 2013b; Tiglao, 2012b). The smuggling problem exacerbated shortfalls in theBOC’s revenue collection targets. It was later learned that high-level politicians at theexecutive and legislative branches of government protected “kingpins” in the agency(Manila Times, 2013a). In January 2013, Commissioner Biazon expressed his desire toreassign these kingpins but failed to do so.

Biazon offered to resign following President Aquino’s criticism of the BOC in his2013 State of the Nation Address. However, Aquino refused the commissioner’sresignation, expressing his continued confidence in him while recognizing thedifficulties of reforming the BOC (Fonbuena, 2013). The president’s decision not toaccept Biazon’s resignation was “puzzling” and sent mixed signals about his DaangMatuwid program (PhilStar.com, 2013). A BOC reform project was later initiated to“reboot” the organization instead. The project was envisioned to take place in threephases aimed at changing systems and procedures, as well as personnel. A majorcomponent of this project was the deployment of change agents recruited and trainedby the DOF. These change agents would go on to be tasked to formulate and implementchange in BOC systems and procedures.

On November 29, 2013, the NBI filed a second batch of corruption complaintsagainst 34 people in connection with the Pork Barrel Scam (Manila Bulletin, 2013). Thecomplaint included Biazon, in his earlier capacity as a congressman. The NBI chargesprompted Biazon to submit his irrevocable resignation to President Aquino onDecember 2, 2013. Aquino then appointed a bureaucrat, John Philip Sevilla, who hadbeen serving as undersecretary of the DOF, to replace him. Almost immediately,Commissioner Sevilla worked to reform and repair the BOC’s tainted image. During thefirst quarter of 2014, the BOC experienced a 20-percent year-on-year growth in cashcollections. Likewise, a big-time rice smuggler was arrested in January 2014.

In May, some newspapers reported Sevilla’s resignation, which the Commissionerlater denied. However, he revealed frustrations about the continued rampantsmuggling and about poor systems at the BOC. Sevilla said that many BOC processeswere still being processed manually and there was no “single, organized, and reliabledatabase for valuation references.” As such, customs examiners were able to makedecisions on transactions instead of simply processing them. Sevilla admitted that the

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BOC’s working environment was inefficient and that the system “makes it easy forcorruption” to thrive (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2014).

Fifth, enforcement is typically partial, selective, and dependent on political whimsand enforcers’ caprices. During the term of Ombudsman Gutierrez, the IAAGCC wasnot convened despite the flurry of high-level and complex corruption scandalsincluding the Fertilizer Fund Scam, the ZTE-NBN deal, and the “Hello Garci” electoralfraud. Gutierrez was the schoolmate of the First Gentleman, Miguel Arroyo, and beforebeing appointed as the Ombudsman, she had served as President Arroyo’s LegalCounsel and Executive Secretary. As Ombudsman, Gutierrez decided to disengagefrom dialogues with reform-oriented civil society organizations (Transparency andAccountability Network, 2009).

Recent prosecutions of high-level corruption continue to show a pattern of partialityand politicization. Based on its record, the OMB has been selective in its prosecution offormer presidents and their close associates. One of the reasons behind selectiveenforcement is that Ombudsmen have been appointed on the basis of personal andpolitical ties (Mangahas and Ilagan, 2011). Since the Constitution only provides for asix-year presidential term, Ombudsmen serve office beyond the terms of theirrespective appointing presidents.

Ombudsman Ananiano Desierto cleared President Fidel Ramos in connection withcomplaints on the PEA-Amari deal and overpricing during the Centennial Expo.Desierto was a Ramos appointee. When Gloria Arroyo seized the presidency in 2001,Ombudsman Desierto filed a plunder case against former President Joseph Estrada.Estrada was convicted by the Sandiganbayan but was later pardoned by Arroyo.

In the latter half of the 2000s, Ombudsmen Marcelo and Gutierrez did not prosecutePresident Arroyo’s family members, despite corruption complaints. The OMB underGutierrez dismissed the case filed against First Gentleman Miguel Arroyo in connectionwith the NBN-ZTE deal because “the complainants failed to present sufficient evidenceto warrant his indictment” (OMB, 2011a). Even after Arroyo’s term, OmbudsmanGutierrez made no attempts to prosecute the former president, her family members orallies. This frustrated the Aquino government, which apparently wanted a more decisiveresolution of high-profile corruption cases brought during the Arroyo administration. OnMarch 11, 2011, the House of Representatives impeached Ombudsman Gutierrez herself.She resigned instead of undergoing a conviction trial by the Senate. It was only afterGutierrez was gone that the Aquino government was able to build a case against Arroyofor various corruption charges.

In November 2011, upon the complaint of the COMELEC and the DOJ, theSandiganbayan ordered the arrest of the former president for electoral fraud. She waslater released on bail. In 2012, Ombudsman Carpio-Morales filed plunder chargesagainst the former president in connection with irregularities in the use of theintelligence funds of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, the state lottery firm.She also provided witness testimony during the conviction hearings of Chief JusticeCorona before the Senate.

In the recent pork barrel scandals, Conchita Carpio-Morales’s OMB has filed plundercharges against three senators identified with the political opposition. Althoughassociates of the President and cabinet members have been similarly implicated, noaction from the ACAs has been forthcoming with respect to them to date. Though it isnormally the Chief Justice of the SC of the Philippines who swears in new Presidents ofthe Republic, Carpio-Morales performed this task for Aquino as a SC Justice. Aquinohad refused to be officially installed as President by Chief Justice Renato Corona

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because of the latter’s controversial acceptance of the position while Aquino waspresident-elect. The President appointed Carpio-Morales as Ombudsman after herretirement from the SC.

In July 2014, the SC ruled on the unconstitutionality of certain DAP practices,namely: first, the withdrawal of obligated allotments from government agencies priorto the fiscal year and declaring such funds as “savings” in violation of the statutorydefinition provided by the General Appropriations Act (GAA); second, the cross-bordertransfers of such savings to other government offices outside of the executive branch(e.g. the legislature, constitutional commissions and judiciary, thereby violating theprinciple of the separation of government powers; and third, funding programs andprojects not covered by the GAA. However, the SC ruling failed to lay down a verdicton the accountability of any public officials involved. This has led to a strong publicdemand for political accountability. Like others before it, the Aquino administrationhas suddenly found itself embroiled in a serious corruption issue that has underminedthe government’s legitimacy and stability. Would the OMB and other ACAs like theODESLA and DOJ act on corruption complaints and demands for political accountabilityin relation to DAP? Given the pattern of partiality in the ACAs’ investigation andprosecution activities, it is reasonable to expect that action would depend on shifts in thecountry’s political winds.

Quah (2010, pp. 15-16, 33-34) argues that the lack of political will is the mostimportant reason for the ineffectiveness of the enforcement of the country’santi-corruption laws. Accordingly, the lack of political will is reflected in the partial orselective enforcement of laws, the inadequate allocation of personnel and budgets to theACAs, and the existence of multiple ACAs. This situation has not changed muchfor the period from 2010 to 2014. The Aquino administration has shown that it canwield immense political power if it so desires. It has demonstrated a remarkabledetermination to remove the “obstacles” to reform, including a former president, a SCJustice, the Ombudsman, and three senators. However, just as in the past under otheradministrations, the government’s political will has yet to be applied to the morefundamental aspects of the anti-corruption effort.

The characteristic lack of political will is symptomatic of deeper problems in thepolitical system. A significant feature of this system is its continued domination byoligarchic and political clans who compete for lucrative spoils based on rents and illegaleconomic activities (McCoy, 1994; Sidel, 1997; Hutchcroft, 1998). Throughout much ofthe country’s modern history, patrimonial domination has led to the plunder of stateresources and state institutions have been weakened further by partisan politicalappointments to the bureaucracy (McCoy, 1994; Hutchcroft, 1998; Corpuz, 1957).Political appointments in presidential patronage alone have ranged from 5,000 to 8,000positions (Hodder, 2014, p. 16). Yet the bureaucracy is also highly vulnerable to politicalintrusion by powerful legislators, often through a process of political bargaining withthe executive (Nowak, 1977). This situation has been reaffirmed by last year’s exposé ofthe rampant smuggling that was being coordinated in cahoots with BOC kingpinswhose patrons included powerful legislators (Manila Times, 2013a).

Patronage and machine politics maintain the system of elections and their spoils.In the absence of strong policy-oriented and mass-movement-based political parties,“weak, patronage-based political parties” (Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003, p. 261) madeup of “unstable family alliances” (Pinches, 1997, p. 107 as cited in Hodder, 2014, p. 14)help to project the illusion of healthy electoral contests in what is actually a fragiledemocracy. In exchange for political and financial support, elected officials provide

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particularistic benefits via the distribution of government licenses and contracts,monopoly and regulatory advantages, state equity and loans, employment, pork barrelprojects, etc. This continues to occur within the context of great inequalities of wealthand power in the Philippines. Victors of electoral contests and their allies, wittinglyor unwittingly, preserve the patrimonial character of Philippine politics, which iseffectively unchallenged due to the relative weakness of reform-oriented political forces,particularly those from the middle and lower classes. Consequently, many Filipinos havelearned to accept or tolerate the political economy of private accumulation at the expenseof national development.

Therefore, corruption is not viewed as the random deviant acts of civil servants andgovernment officials but as a systematic condition derived from the country’s politicaleconomy. In Johnston’s (2008, 2010) framework, Philippine corruption falls under the“Oligarchs and Clans Syndrome.” Accordingly, this syndrome of corruption occurs inthe course of “expanding political and economic opportunities in a setting of very weakinstitutions” (Johnston, 2010, p. ii). It is characterized by “entrenched oligarchs, theirfamilies, and personal clients” engaging “in pervasive corruption” and inhibiting “thegrowth of democratic forces while enriching themselves in both the public and privatesectors” (Johnston, 2008, p. 214).

Following this conception of the Philippine system, it is difficult to predict a credibleanti-corruption commitment emerging from the political elite unless a sea change inPhilippine political and economic conditions is experienced. The political will to applyanti-corruption laws universally and impartially contradicts the patrimonial andpatronal goals of the ruling political clans and their allies. As Hodder (2014, p. 14) notes,“Economic sectors are left sluggish and uncompetitive under monopolistic control.Revenue and ACAs are ordered to ignore certain cases and concentrate their effortson others.” Likewise, curbing bureaucratic corruption is difficult to achieve partlybecause public funds are allocated less for capacitating and developing governmentorganizations (including providing competitive civil service salaries) than for legislators’priority projects.

ConclusionLegal deficiencies and law enforcement difficulties plague the anti-corruption crusadein the Philippines. Unresponsive laws and poor enforcement reflect the deficientcharacter of state institutions, whose continued weakness and malleability providetremendous opportunities for the private accumulation of wealth and power, especiallyfor those with favorable access to state resources. The preservation of weak stateinstitutions follows the logic of patrimonial domination in the Philippines. Ceterisparibus, one can expect very limited success in the overall fight against corruption.

B.S. Aquino III assumed the presidency vowing to fight corruption and poverty inthe Philippines. This has somehow raised public expectations as well as public tolerancetoward his administration. For more than three years since his election, President Aquinohas enjoyed high public trust ratings despite some high-profile scandals involving hiscabinet and other key officials of his administration. The recent DAP controversy changedthis situation. Soon, media revelations of other improprieties allegedly committed byseveral political appointees have poured out, giving rise to further serious doubts aboutPresident Aquino’s Daang Matuwid.

Yet, conceived as a universal and an impartial anti-corruption campaign, DaangMatuwid has not been likely to succeed within the current institutional and politicalcontext. On the one hand, political administrations have found it difficult to reform

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weak but corrupt government institutions. Graft-prone agencies have time and againdemonstrated stiff and protracted resistance against reform initiatives. On the otherhand, the election and spoils system have been so entrenched that it is extremelydifficult for a reformist elite faction to dismantle the patrimonial political system.To the extent that they greatly benefit from the system, political allies and supportersof reformist leaders would not always share any genuine interest in ridding thecountry of corruption and neither would the bureaucrats of graft-ridden governmentagencies, nor other politicians with stakes in the system.

Granted, however, that the current administration has the political will, it still hassome time to begin fundamental anti-corruption reforms in government. Such reformsshould lead to operations that go beyond the usual catching of “big fish.” Somerecommendations for change follow:

(1) Regular salary revisions in the civil service. Government salaries should beadjusted annually against inflation and such adjustments should be included inthe annual General Appropriations Act. Not only are these salary revisions fair,they are also important corruption prevention measures. As Quah (2013, p. 150)points out, despite some initial success in reducing red tape and in streamliningadministrative procedures, opportunities for corruption would remain wherelow civil service wages reinforce the need for “speed money.” As describedearlier, the monthly compensation for government employees remains low,ranging from P9000 (roughly US$200) for the lowest civil servant to P120000(approximately US$2700) for the country’s president. As the economy’s healthhas improved in recent years, regular upward revisions in government salariesshould be considered seriously along with revised rewards and penalties formisconduct and bad performance.

(2) The creation of a single, but well-resourced, ACA that reports directly to thepresident in order to promote better accountability. This proposal has beenraised as a better alternative to the multiple, sometimes competing ACAs,which have been deemed to be ineffective, under-staffed, underperforming, andlacking in coordination and consistency (Quah, 2013, p. 151; Johnston, 2010,p. 20). Currently, the IAAGCC vaguely constitutes this entity for two reasons.First, its composition compromises the non-partisan character expected ofmember constitutional commissions. Second, the OMB-led Council lackspolitical accountability and it cannot be made accountable to the presidentsince constitutional commissions are supposed to be politically independent.

(3) Redesigning of judicial institutions and processes to be more responsive andefficient in the handling of corruption cases. The state of the judicial process is amajor reform obstacle, which combined with the prosecution-oriented butinvestigation-challenged ACAs does not bode well for the anti-corruptioncause. As Johnston (2010, p. 22) points out, court delays undermine “thecredibility of anti-corruption efforts, generally and of the Sandiganbayan,specifically.” Placing the burden of proof on a government official, subjected toprior investigation, might help to speed up court decisions.

(4) Promoting the creation of programmatic, policy-oriented, and broad-basedpolitical parties as opposed to pork barrel-based alliances (Hutchcroft andRocamora, 2003). Changing the rules of membership, participation andrepresentation in political parties, as well as in Congress, should be considered

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with the end in view of achieving a more equitable distribution of politicalpower in government.

(5) A continuous public education program on political accountability should beseriously considered.This program should be aimed at raising public expectationsand demands on government performance, particularly in the delivery of publicservices. Popularizing standard indicators of accountability, transparency andclean government through the mass media and schools could help in this regard.Likewise, public education should cover procedures that citizens could follow tocomplain about graft and corrupt practices (Batalla, 2001).

Some of the above recommendations may necessitate constitutional amendments andtherefore entail serious institutional design and political challenges.

A more skeptical view of anti-corruption performance has been provided in thediscussion linking corruption to the conditions of political economy. The problem ofPhilippine history is precisely the non-existence of a solid elite commitment to anti-corruption and development. Despite the lip service paid to tackling corruption duringelection campaigns, elected officials have not delivered on their campaign promises.Furthermore, they are also directly or indirectly involved in corruption scandals.In 1966, the historian Renato Constantino wrote:

Daily, in the halls of congress, through the printed word and over the airwaves, ourpoliticians and our civic leaders expose, denounce, or deplore this or that government’sanomaly. During election time the principal issue is always graft and corruption.No wonder public concern is almost exclusively centered on malfeasance in government.But with every change of administration, the problem only becomes aggravated.The panaceas and the grandiose promises fizzle out. The accusers become the accused; thehalo of righteousness changes heads. The list of dishonor is different but corruptionremains the same. Graft and corruption persist, like a cancer gnawing at our entrails,showing no signs of abatement and consigning us to a state of helplessness andhopelessness (Constantino, 1966, pp. 81-82).

Constantino’s observations have apparently withstood the test of time. Avarice ingovernment has remained undiminished from the authoritarian rule of PresidentFerdinand Marcos and through the various administrations that have succeeded him inthe post-authoritarian era. The authoritarian regime may still be considered as a nadirduring which a systematic plunder of the country’s public resources took place.However, the recent pork barrel scandals have shed new light on the massive scale ofsystematic corruption that has been ongoing in a democratic context. The experienceof the Aquino administration in fighting corruption provides a stronger case forstructural political reform. The effective control of rapaciousness in government inthe Philippines has simply not come from the mere replacement of presidents or thepunishment of previous ones.

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About the authorDr Eric Vincent C. Batalla is a Professor and Chair of the Political Science Department, De LaSalle University. He teaches undergraduate and graduate courses in political economy,comparative politics, and public policy. Recent publications include articles on the politics of regionalintegration and the political economy of Philippine development. Dr Eric Vincent C. Batalla can becontacted at: ecbatalla@gmail.com

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