totemism and food taboos in the early neolithic: a feast of roe deer at the coneybury ‘anomaly’,...
TRANSCRIPT
Neolithic Studies Group
Totemism and Food Taboos in the Early Neolithic: A Feast of Roe Deer at the Coneybury ‘Anomaly’, Wiltshire, Southern Britain Ffion Reynolds
Deer are like people Like men, like men
When they make a sound like a small child, it foretells evil for us The sound is: oeee-oeee-oeee
They [people] say: ‘An evil spirit is calling: it is a deer’ They say they are like people
People do talk about this – they do talk It is an omen
That is the way they are.
(from Reichel-Dolmatoff 1997, 172)
INTRODUCTION
The construction of worldviews and lifeways is ultimately tied up with the various
relationships which humans have with their environments. There are several ways of
thinking, seeing and doing things in the world. One way of approaching this
complexity is to look towards the kinds of relationships which humans have with
animals. The social and symbolic significance of food consumption or conspicuous
non-consumption is a topic which may afford us some insights into the idiosyncrasies
and multiplicities of worldview. This paper will focus more closely on the totemic
aspects of possible Early Neolithic worldviews, but I will also argue that we can
concurrently use combinations of other more animic, shamanic or perspectivist
ontologies as well (see Alberti and Bray 2009, for a current review of animism;
Vitebsky 1995, for a popular explanation of shamanism; and Viveiros de Castro 1998;
2004; 2006, for a detailed account of Amerindian perspectivism). This will allow me
to move between areas of interest or significance, whilst also demonstrating that a
close analysis of the evidence can be read from a variety of angles.
The argument for the existence of totemism in the Early Neolithic has remained
unfashionable. Although its presence has occasionally been alluded to (e.g. Tilley
1994; 2004; Pollard 2006; Sharples 2000; Whittle 2003, 78–9), no one, to my
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knowledge, has classified any Early Neolithic society in southern Britain as totemist.
The main reason for this is probably because totemism as a concept, has had a very
bad press within anthropology since Lévi-Strauss (1964) so convincingly
deconstructed it nearly forty years ago (Pedersen 2001). Unlike animism,
perspectivism and shamanism, which have remained acceptable, if not fashionable
within anthropology (Alberti and Bray 2009; Atkinson 1992; Bird-David 1999;
Dowson 2009; Harvey 2003; 2006; Latour 2009; Sillar 2004; 2009; Vitebsky 1995;
Viveiros de Castro 1998; 2004), totemism is widely taken to be illusory as a concept
of universal applicability and therefore one misleading to employ. I will argue in this
paper however, that totemism – once an outdated and ‘primitive’ theory – one which I
now perceive to be a powerful trend in both anthropological and archaeological
theory. This is partly due to the work of Tim Ingold (1994; 1998; 2000), who has
primarily focused on the differences between Australian ‘totemic’ and circumpolar
Northern ‘animic’ ontologies (Ingold 2000, 112; Fowler 2004). I will argue here
however, that Ingold’s geographical separations lack a dynamic, fluid sense of
worldview. An ongoing debate between Philippe Descola (1996; 2005a; 2009) and
Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (1998; 2004), has also provided a base for further
discourse (Latour 2009). This will allow me to develop the notion of multiple
perspectives, in which animism, perspectivism and totemism for example, can exist
together in one context (Insoll 2004; Latour 2009).
Having brought this very brief discussion of totemism in theory to a close, I will then
move on to consider the archaeological implications of totemism as a useful
theoretical framework. I will be working through the detail of the Coneybury
‘Anomaly’ in Wiltshire, focusing specifically upon the character of the depositional
practice evident at this site within the Early Neolithic perhaps around 3850 cal. BC
(Maltby 1990, 58; Richards 1990, 42). Through this I will attempt to define how we
might comprehend the pit as a form of totemic practice. Christopher Tilley’s (1994;
2004) work on phenomenology and landscape studies will allow me to argue, as
Ingold has, that a totemic worldview provides ‘a set of linkages between people, land
and ancestral beings’ (Ingold 1998, 182; 2000, 113). More importantly for the subject
of this paper, totemism may be employed as a tool to describe inter-relationships
between social groups and specific animals (see Durkheim 1965 (1909), Elkin 1978;
Frazer 1910; Fowler 2004; Ray and Thomas 2003). Acts of feasting, like the one
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evident at the Coneybury ‘Anomaly’, would have shaped the ways people
conceptualised certain animals, with the symbolic significance of particular species
changing through time. During the Early Neolithic especially, cattle bones saturate
faunal assemblages, with certain species such as deer being under-represented,
perhaps because they were not domesticated (Marciniak 2005; Ray and Thomas 2003;
Sharples 2000; Whittle 2003). Alternatively, wild species such as deer may have been
subject to formal taboo. To fully contextualise this line of argument, I will be using
several non-western analogies to illustrate that the business of taboo is a complex one.
Within many totemic, animic, shamanic or perspectivist ontologies, deer are
proscribed; sacrificed; considered sacred; treated as if they were persons; used in
shamanic performances; and appear in an anthropomorphised form. This paper will
consider the effects of possible ideological behaviour at the Coneybury ‘Anomaly’ –
especially in relation to the patterns of wild deer deposition. In this, I aim to identify
some of the potential archaeological correlates of Neolithic taboos and through this,
begin to offer possible ways of understanding the missing link: why were deer not
domesticated?
TOTEMIC WORLDS
Many authors begin by defining totemism in opposition to human relationships with
the world which are animistic (Mithen 1996; Ingold 2000; Tilley 2004; Fowler 2004;
Descola 2005a; Harvey 2006; Bird-David 2006; Cobb 2008). It is argued that totemic
classifications model social relationships, primarily in terms of discontinuities
between species – birds, animals, plants and things – while animism endows natural
species and things with a living essence (Tilley 2004, 20; Bird-David 2006, 34–5).
The basic difference therefore, is the way that human beings identify themselves in
comparison to animals and the other entities of the world (Fowler 2004, 122). At the
core of a totemic worldview, the ‘natural’ world is used to classify and to categorise
(Lévi-Strauss 1964). A totemic landscape is conceptualised as a ‘sign’ system or a
network of places with animals, places and things containing what may be called
‘ancestral energies’ (Ingold 2000, 113; Tilley 1994; Bird-David 2006, 35). In a
totemic worldview, non-humans are treated as ‘symbols’, ‘totems’ or ‘emblems’, with
everything belonging to the same ‘totem’ sharing the same attributes (Tilley 2004, 24;
Descola 1996, 88). As for the Algonquin people of Canada, ‘totem’ can be translated
into ‘he is a relative of mine’ (Bowie 2000, 138; Harvey 2006, 165; Lévi-Strauss
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1964, 18; B. Morris 1987, 270). Totemic systems therefore use natural emblems only
as symbols of a relationship, in order for example, to delineate one group as eagles in
relation to another group as crows (Descola 1996; 2005a; Viveiros de Castro 1992;
1998; 2004).
This short summary provides readers with a flavour of what it means to be totemic. It
will be impossible for me to give a comprehensive analysis of totemism in this paper
as I would like; there are several conflicting perspectives, with some authors having
more than one theory of totemism (Frazer 1910; Radcliffe-Brown 1952; see Barnard
1999, 51–2). It would require a book all to itself, to fully critique older ideas and to
set out detailed analyses of Frazer (1910), Durkheim (1909), Radcliffe-Brown (1952),
Freud (1913) and Lévi-Strauss (1964) and so readers are directed to the wider
literature for a fuller discussion of these concepts and their impact and use in
anthropology. Instead, this paper will pick out two authors who I believe to be at the
centre of the current totemic debate, and so the next sections will briefly turn to the
work of Philippe Descola and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (see also Latour 2009).
Descola’s four modes of relation
For Philippe Descola (1996, 89; 2005a), totemism is only an abstract topological grid
for distributing specific relational identities within the collectivity of humans and non-
humans. It is only one mode of relation in a set of four, which he categorises as
animistic, naturalistic, totemistic and analogistic (Descola 1996; 2005a; Latour 2009;
Viveiros de Castro 1998; 2004). Naturalism, Descola argues, is our own mode of
relation and is the default Western position. In the naturalist’s ontology, humans
distinguish themselves from other entities in the world, because it is said that they are
the only ones who posses interiority, even though they are linked to non-humans by
their material characteristics (Descola 2005a; 2009; Latour 2009). Animism, on the
other hand takes the opposite position, holding that many animals, plants and objects
are considered to have interiority similar to that of humans, but they distinguish
themselves from one another by the sort of body they are given (Descola 2005a; 2009;
Latour 2009). The common sense and scientific aspects of naturalism have resulted in
it becoming our ‘natural’ presupposition structuring our epistemology and in
particular, our perception of other modes of relation. What is important however, is
that we should not privilege our own epistemological premise over all others.
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Figure 1: (Upper left) A naturalistic painting: ‘The great piece of turf’ (by Albrecht Dürer 1471–1528); (Upper right) An animate object: ‘Couronne Arawak’ (© Musée du quai Branly, Paris, 2010. Photo: Thierry Ollivier, Michael Urtado); (Bottom left) A totemic acrylic painting: ‘Dream of the flying ant’ (© Musée du quai Branly, Paris, 2010. Photo: Thierry Ollivier, Michael Urtado); (Bottom right) An analogist’s mask: ‘Big mask of diablada’ (Bolivia) (© Musée du quai Branly, Paris, 2010. Photo: Thierry Ollivier, Michael Urtado).
By arguing that the naturalist’s world was only one perspective, Descola was then
able to add another pair of contrasting relationships to his definition: totemism and
analogism. The first is totemism, in which the relations between humans and non-
humans are similar on both sides. In a totemic ontology, some humans and non-
humans share, within a named class, the same physical and moral qualities that the
totem is considered to incarnate (Descola 2005a; 2009). Totemism ignores the
difference between beings on the moral, as well as the physical plane in order to
favour sharing, within the same class, of qualities which apply as much to humans as
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they do to non-humans. This is in opposition to analogism, where they are different on
the two sides (Latour 2009). In analogist ontology, all those who occupy the world,
including their elementary components, are said to be different from one another,
which is the reason for which we strive to find relationships of correspondence
between them (Descola 2005a). Therefore, rather than merging entities sharing the
same substances within the same class, as with totemism, this system distinguishes all
the components of the world and differentiates them into single elements. The classic
figure of analogism is the chimera (see figure 1), a being made up of attributes
belonging to different species, but presenting a certain coherence on the anatomical
plane (Descola 2005a; 2009). The main point I wish to make in relation to Descola’s
work is that we can say that people vary not only in their culture but also in their
nature, or in other words, in the way they construct relations between humans and
non-humans (Descola 2005a; Latour 2009).
Perspectivism as a theoretical ‘bomb’?
Viveiros de Castro (1992; 1998; 2004; 2006) has challenged Descola’s four modes of
relation, by introducing an Amerindian perspectivist approach to the mix. For
Descola, Viveiros de Castro is more concerned with exploring just one of the local
contrasts that he had tried to construct (Descola 2005a; 2009; Viveiros de Castro
1998; 2004; 2006). However for Viveiros, perspectivism should not be thought of as a
category within Descola’s typology, but rather as a ‘bomb’, with the ability to
‘explode’ the whole notion of Kantian ideals, so implicit in most anthropologists’
reading of the material (after Latour 2009, 2; Viveiros der Castro 2006, 467).
Amerindian perspectisvism for Viveiros de Castro (1998; 2004; 2006) is a world full
of inhabitants with the same culture but many different natures. This conception,
common to many indigenous Amazonian cultures and neighbouring regions of South
America, is a way of looking at the world ‘in which the world is inhabited by different
sorts of persons, human and non-human, which apprehend reality from distinct points
of view’ (Viveiros de Castro 1998, 469; 2006, 466). This differs from Descola’s
arguments, in which he argues that people are different not only in their culture but
also in their natures. For Viveiros de Castro, there is a need to go beyond these
categories, in an attempt to get rid of the ‘nature versus culture’ divide, so dominant
in social science. Vitally, Descola (1996, 88) does point out that no community need
be only animistic, totemic or analogistic and these ways of relating are not mutually
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exclusive. Some societies therefore may combine degrees of all four of his analytical
constructs.
EARLY NEOLITHIC WORLDS
The challenge now is to put some of these strands together. The implications of these
arguments may hold great potential, especially as we weave the concepts through the
Early Neolithic material. For example, were human-animal relationships during the
Early Neolithic more complicated than we have previously perceived, with some
prehistoric people including animals within their communities, and even within their
descent groups (see Jones and Richards 2003; Ray and Thomas 2003)? Like human
people, animals might have been dividual persons, shaped through contextually
specific trends in partibility or permeability, rather than indivisible entities isolated
from the community at large, or thought of as resources. Thinking about animals in
these ways provides a useful perspective on prehistoric butchery, consumption
preferences, daily routines with livestock or prey, and depositional practice. Contact
with the bone of dead animals alongside dead humans was clearly an important
feature of the Early Neolithic in southern Britain, which may even suggest an
equivalence of one kind or another (e.g. Jones 1998; Whittle et al. 1999; Whittle
2003). I would also argue that above all, communal food eating and feasting played a
crucial role in the introduction of the Early Neolithic mode of life, combining special
food and special locales (see Herne 1989). Events would be recalled as much in terms
of where they took place as of when they happened (cf. Lefebvre 1991, 98; Ingold
2000). Certain places may have therefore come to act as locales, where
understandings of the world and where the setting against which the world was
realised, were renewed, (re)negotiated and emphasised. These feasts, along with other
ritual and ritualised activities, could have provided a ‘set’ or a special arena for
conceptualising, performing, renewing and (re)negotiating human-animal
relationships and totemic concepts and categories (cf. Marciniak 2005).
A feast of roe deer at the Coneybury ‘Anomaly’, Wiltshire
At one site in particular, there is clear evidence for feasting. The Coneybury
‘Anomaly’, an Early Neolithic pit on Salisbury Plain from southern Wessex (Richards
1990), is contemporaneous with a similar sized pit at Rowden, Dorset (perhaps c.
3850 cal. BC) (Cleal 2004, 187; Harris 2009; Thomas 1999, 70). Both pits would
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have been situated within a mobile landscape of human movement (Whittle 1997),
where large-scale farming was non-existent, (though there is evidence to suggest
some cereal crops were being grown) and living in permanent houses was extremely
rare (cf. Bogaard and Jones 2007; Whittle 2007, 389–90). It is also reasonable to
suggest that monuments were particularly infrequent in Wiltshire during this period,
with Whittle (2007) arguing that they were not commonplace before 3650 cal. BC.
Other than flint scatters, the only evidence for occupation we have comes from pit
sites such as the Coneybury ‘Anomaly’.
The fill of the ‘Anomaly’ contained major assemblages of pottery, animal bone and
worked flint. The amount of animal bone from the primary deposit was substantial
and produced a single radiocarbon date of 3980–3708 BC (Maltby 1990, 58; Richards
1990, 42). This inadequacy is currently being readdressed in a dating programme by
Alistair Barclay, which aims to provide at least ten new radiocarbon dates for the site
(pers. comm. Barclay). The original fill of the pit contained large quantities of lithic
material, 1744 sherds of Neolithic pottery and 2110 animal bone fragments, some of
which had been burnt (Maltby 1990, 57). Along with this, the pit contained large
amounts of charcoal, both in small lumps and more finely divided, including bits of
oak, hazel, blackthorn and hawthorn and both wheat and emmer in small quantities
(although the original organic content would have been much larger) (Richards 1990,
40–3; Carruthers 1990, 250). The frequency of cattle and roe deer out-numbered other
species. Smaller numbers of pig, red deer and beaver, together with one fish were also
represented (Maltby 1990, 57). This contrasts with most Early Neolithic assemblages
in which deer bones of any kind are only present in small quantities.
The assemblage at the Coneybury ‘Anomaly’ arguably represents a major episode of
butchery, in which at least ten cattle, several roe deer of varying ages, one pig and two
red deer were killed and processed. In relation to the roe deer bones, it appears that at
least seven animals were represented, with most of the other bones belonging to at
least two or three animals. Rather than groups exploiting the same animals for
seemingly similar purposes, here we have quite unusual evidence for the butchering
of several roe deer. Mark Maltby (1990, 60) suggests that the roe deer bones represent
the remains of meat consumed immediately after butchery.
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Figure 2: The Coneybury ‘Anomaly’: plan, section and distributions of finds in primary deposit (from Richards 1990, 41).
The evidence from the pit would clearly suggest some sort of communal activity took
place there. It is difficult to suggest the number of people involved in such a
gathering; but the ‘Anomaly’ does present us with a gathering larger in scale than that
experienced every day (Maltby 1990, 247). It may have been a gathering large enough
to accommodate several families, where people would have the opportunity to come
together to eat a feast of roe deer. But why did the groups at the ‘Anomaly’ choose to
deposit whole carcasses of roe deer, but only leave the head and feet bones of the
cattle and red deer? (Maltby 1990, 58).
One suggestion is that those of cattle and red deer were removed either for
consumption elsewhere, or for preservation for later consumption. The deer appear to
have been butchered at the same time as the cattle. Unless the animals were killed
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nearby, people must have been prepared to carry their carcasses to this site for
processing. An alternative suggestion for the inclusion of heads and hooves is that it
represents the enactment of a performative mortuary ritual, involving the clothing of
the deceased, in the skin of another animal, here with red deer and cattle (Ray and
Thomas 2005, 41; Politis and Saunders 2002; Vitebsky 1995, 136). This might or
might not have been the case, but could suggest at least a metaphoric ‘cloaking’ of
bones associated with the movements of animal members of the community – with
the roe deer being treated as persons in themselves. This is reflected in the practice of
‘cloaking’ human bones with ox hides. For example, at Fussell’s Lodge there is
evidence for what looks very much like a single animal’s hide, with head and feet
intact, draped over the timber chamber before the final construction of the long
mound (Ashbee 1966; Ray and Thomas 2003, 40).
Figure 3: A Siberian grave with shamanic devices, such as the skins of sacrificed deer (from Vitebsky 1995, 136).
At the ‘Anomaly’, these practices could have emphasised the symbolic attributes of
deer as a totemic animal. Deer appear to be ambiguous animals placed between the
wild and domestic spheres and through this may have held important positions within
the community and been consumed as a ‘special’ food (Sharples 2000, 114). This may
well have been the case, especially since deer bones are extremely rare in other
contexts of the period. This implies that the practices associated with the butchery of
the roe deer at the ‘Anomaly’ were out of the ordinary, perhaps even a dangerous
undertaking, especially if we are to take worldview approaches seriously. Could it
also point towards the idea that deer were a taboo animal, only eaten on special
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occasions or for special reasons? In several other cultures, like the Nukak of the
northwestern Amazonian forest of Colombia, the consumption of deer is forbidden as
they are considered sacred and appear in an anthropomorphised form in the mythical
framework which supports Nukak spiritual life. Among the Siona and Secoya of
northeastern Ecuador, deer are rarely hunted because they are considered as evil
spirits or ‘devils’ (Vockers cited in Politis and Saunders 2002, 118). For the Achuar,
on the borders between Ecuador and Peru, the brocket deer is the transformed shadow
of a deceased person and is subject to formal taboo (Descola 1994, 92). In other cases,
when deer is eaten, though it is regarded as possessing a soul, its meat is potentially
dangerous and has to be purified by the blowing of shamanic spells (Århem 1996;
Politis and Saunders 2002; Viveiros de Castro 2006, 471 and 476).
Deer for many indigenous Amazonian groups are variously regarded as spirit-animals,
ancestors, or as being ‘like people’ (Politis and Saunders 2002, 116). Viveiros de
Castro’s analysis of ‘Amerindian perspectivism’ is certainly one alternative
worldview which considers animals as people, who in turn view themselves as
persons, each with their own distinct perspectives on the world around them (Viveiros
de Castro 1998, 470; 2006, 476; Conneller 2004, 43; Ingold 2000, 94). In such
animistic or perspectivist ontologies, the natural world is not regarded as a discrete
domain separated from the social or supernatural realms. Here it is common for
certain animals to possess a range of human-like attributes, motives and behaviours,
for a variety of mythological and cosmological reasons (Politis and Saunders 2002,
115; Vitebsky 1995, 106). These instances are also reflected in totemic worldviews, in
which some people consider animals (along with other plants and inanimate objects),
within several hierarchical levels of symbols and signs; their use mediated by a
system in which some animals play a significant role as ‘owners’ of places, and
‘managers’ of situations (Lévi-Strauss 1964; Reichel-Dolmatoff 1971; Reichel–
Dussan 1995). This seems noteworthy when we consider the studies of red and roe
deer which indicate that separate groups often keep to the same range, which could
mean that people may have associated particular places with red or roe deer (Sharples
2000; Morris 2005).
It may be suggested that something analogous was being stressed at gatherings like
those that took place at the ‘Anomaly’. There is a strong case for a possible form of
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totemic practice associated with the pit. The lack of wild deer bone in other contexts
could point to the conspicuous non-consumption of the meat, making deer a taboo
animal relating to older hunting practices. Julian Thomas has suggested elsewhere that
Early Neolithic pit deposits are performative acts which fix particular worldviews at
specific events, whether feasts, gatherings or periods of occupation (Thomas 2000,
80). By placing important substances from these events into a pit, people emphasise
not only what is included within the pit itself, but also the place in which it is
positioned within the landscape. Even though these acts would not have been as
visible as other stone, wooden or earthen monuments, they would still have performed
a similar purpose in transforming the significance of a place, associating it with
particular practice and social grouping. Taking place at the transition between
hunting/gathering and primarily relying on domesticated stock, the deposits at the
‘Anomaly’ may have resulted from events which both dramatised and materialised the
social and cultural changes which were taking place. This pit therefore may have been
used as a prompt, filled with a higher than normal assemblage of roe deer bones,
giving the place itself explicit meaning, especially as groups revisited the location.
This is emphasised by the fact that such locations were later chosen as the sites for
tombs and henges (Thomas 2000, 80; Richards 1990). The construction of these
monuments drew upon and transformed the existing meanings of these places in a
totemic sense, whilst also emphasising an animistic understanding through
(re)visiting, renewing or (re)negotiating particular locations (Reynolds 2009).
CONCLUSIONS
At the beginning of this paper, I introduced the concept of totemism as only one mode
of relation in a series of worldviews and ontologies. Philippe Descola’s (1996; 2005a,
2009) work expressly demonstrates that to understand one worldview, we need to
situate it within a broader framework. In this sense, it is actually quite difficult to talk
about totemism without considering other animistic or perspectivist approaches.
Viveiros de Castro (1998; 2004; 2006) on the other hand, considers Descola’s project
to be one which prioritises typologies, and if there is one approach that is totally anti-
perspectivist, it is the very notion of a type within a category. Viveiros de Castro’s
contribution may very well provide us with a completely new way of approaching
human nature, but it seems unreasonable to suggest that his term be privileged in
some way over all others. In my view, each worldview approach offers us a resource
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to explore the gaps in our own dualistic structures of thought, opening the doors to
more pluralistic understanding of and approaches to the world, celebrating, rather than
problematising multiplicity. It is however, impossible to describe what it truly meant
to think Neolithic. We can be sure that whichever term is used, it is essentially an
academic creation. As both labels and notions, totemism, animism and perspectivism
are entirely a matter of consensus, discussion and continuing redefinition. Yet by
utilising these labels as potential avenues of discussion they become useful tools for
reconstructing possible worldviews for the Early Neolithic. Animism, for example, is
not exclusive to hunter-gatherers as Kirk (2006, 337) has demonstrated; and animism,
shamanism or perspectivism do not precede totemism in an evolutionary way,
functioning simultaneously among the North American Anishinaabeg, for instance
(Harvey 2006; Wallis 2009, 53). This is also the case for North Asian societies as
Pedersen has discussed (2001, 419). Here animism and totemism can mix together
and rather than societies being purely animistic, totemic or perspectivist, they can
form various combinations. Therefore, a fresh reading of the evidence would reveal
split ontologies – half-animist, half-totemist or even quarter-animist, quarter-totemist
and half-perspectivist – the combinations are endless. I believe that these varying
positions were vital to the processes and activities that took place at the Coneybury
‘Anomaly’, for example. The site on the one hand, exhibits animistic or perspectivist
attitudes through the special treatment of the roe deer bones and the head and hooves
of the red deer and cattle, but also in the more totemic vein, its location and products
are inextricably visual nodal points in the landscape (contra Ingold 2000, 112–6 ).
What I have argued here then, represents an essentially different interpretation of the
Early Neolithic period in southern Britain. Here I have suggested that the lifeways of
Early Neolithic inhabitants seem concerned with a need to cite place through
recursive transformations – whether by digging pits, exchanging substances or
feasting – all of which are activities and practices which wove into increasingly
complicated worldviews. By using an animistic or perspectivist approach we can
argue that human and non-human entities played equivalent roles, with certain
animals like deer, being treated as persons in themselves. The possibility that the roe
deer carcasses were covered by red deer and cattle skin may point to a special practice
associated with the handling of symbolically important species. The placing of these
materials within a pit represents a unique assemblage, where the citing of place was
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equally significant. During the early fourth millennium BC, people’s relationships
with their worlds became more fixed and rooted and so did their notion of place in a
totemic sense, highlighted as people revisited the pit location. I would argue therefore,
that it was specific locales that began to act increasingly as the nexus for the
construction of worldviews. As with the Coneybury ‘Anomaly’, the mixing of
substance at certain positions in the landscape in the form of a feast would act as a
‘prompt’ to points of importance within the landscape. The ways in which deer bone
were deposited at the ‘Anomaly’ demonstrate that animals were used in specific ways
and placed in distinctive arrangements. This may be understood by seeing an
animistic relational epistemology working alongside a more totemic mnemonic
understanding of landscape and geography. Here both totemic and animistic
governing principles can operate alongside each other, rather than forming distinct
ontologies (contra Ingold 2000; Cobb 2008). Through this, it may be argued that we
need to consider acts of deposition as relational but contextually specific
understandings of the world, in which varying degrees of the factors above could take
shape, fluctuating significantly, depending on context at any one time (Pollard 2001;
Thomas 2000). So, as a concluding remark, I propose that as archaeological theorists,
we need to be bolder and confront the subject matter of our discipline: that of human-
ness. The ways in which we as humans engage with our worlds, represent our worlds
and contribute to modifying those worlds are remarkably diverse. Rather than
labelling an Early Neolithic society as exclusively totemic therefore, this paper has
argued that by weaving these links into wider expressions of human and non-human
multiplicity, we could develop new insights that are both more accurate and locally
relevant.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Alasdair Whittle for his continued encouragement and support,
and Jacqui Mulville for stimulating conversations about deer in prehistory. The Arts
and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) made this research possible, and to them I
am greatly indebted. Thanks also go to Sara Huws, Liz Reynolds and Seren Griffiths
for reading draft copies of this paper. All remaining mistakes are of course, my own.
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