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Topic B: The Situation in Syria

Bruno Gomes Guimarães and Willian Moraes Roberto

Born as a product of war and imperialism, Syria’s fate remains inextricably tied to regional and international struggles in good part outside of its control.

Raymond Hinnebusch

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1.1. The formation of the Syrian state

The Syrian Arab Republic is located in a key point of the Middle East, with access to

the Mediterranean Sea, making its territory a strategic ground for a great number of

civilizations throughout History. In ancient times, the actual Syria was in the middle of a great

number of empires and for this reason different people marched upon those lands. The

territory was conquered firstly by the Persians, but its control later changed to other empires,

like the Macedonians, and it eventually came under the yoke of the Roman Empire.

In the Middle Ages the territory of Syria was conquered by the Muslims and it became

part of the great Umayyad Caliphate, the seventh largest contiguous empire ever to exist.

Practically all of the region’s inhabitants were then converted to Islam and Arabic became the

administrative language (BLANKINSHIP, 1994).

The territory was yet again conquered by other empires. The Byzantines managed to get

it under their control until the Turks arrived and right after them the Mongols raided those

lands. Traces of Muslim’s influence, however, remained even when other empires conquered

Syria’s current territory. Eventually, Syria became part of the Ottoman Empire in the 16th

century, to whom it belonged to until the 20th century.

Being part of one of Silk Road’s trading routes, Syria’s importance declined when, in

the 15th century, sea routes linking Europe to the Far East were discovered, putting an end to

the need of a land route through Syria (LIU, 2001). Its population and wealth declined

throughout these years, and it only managed to recover in mid-20thcentury. Its territory also

regained huge importance due to regional oil and gas pipeline networks connecting Syria with

neighbouring countries.16

Some years before the First World War, the Ottoman Empire’s dissolution began,

directly affecting Syrian territory, changing the profile of its domination. In 1916, France and

16 Syria has in its territory oil pipelines from Iraq and Saudi Arabia, with the last one remaining closed since the 1970’s. It also has gas pipelines from Egypt and signed projects for new gas pipelines from Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran and Iraq (USA, 2011).

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Britain signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which allowed for part of the Middle East region

to be divided between these two European countries; Syria would be under France’s

dominion.17 In 1920 the independent Arab Kingdom of Syria was established, but it clashed

with French forces, which occupied its territory. The League of Nations then put Syria under

the mandate of France in the same year.

The Syrian State, therefore, was “carved out from the defunct Ottoman empire on the

basis of foreign imperial interests and in the absence of any credible base of authority upon

which to erect new structures” (LUCIANI, 1990). Prior to this period, there were no

autonomous states in the region of the Fertile Crescent. The European powers that carved the

design of these States had no landmarks to guide their way, leading eventually to a creation

based upon traditional claims and zones of influence.

However, surrounded by the atmosphere of self-determination and independence that

emerged after the First World War, revolts began, uniting the Syrian population in a struggle

against the French, which more than once responded with violent counter-insurgency. Finally,

in 1943, Syria became independent from France, as well as Lebanon, a fact that Syria

hesitated to accept, since most Syrians considered Lebanon as a part of their

country.18Nonetheless, the newly independent Syria lacked political stability and experienced

a series of military coups during the first decades that followed its independence (CIA, 2012).

Besides all the internal problems of stabilizing a new State, Syria managed to become a

regional leader in the Middle East after its independence and has always shown signs of

political proactivity. The first regional action carried out by Syria was founding the League of

Arab States in 1945, along with other countries.19

The historical conflict with Israel also began in the early years of the Syrian state. As

soon as the Israeli State was created, Syria positioned itself against it. “Israel was perceived

by the Arab countries as a kind of enclave or western colony, behind which new imperialist

17 The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 was a secret agreement between the United Kingdom and France that effectively divided the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire outside the Arabian peninsula into areas of future British and French control or influence. “Britain was allocated control of areas roughly comprising the coastal strip between the sea and River Jordan, today’s Jordan, southern Iraq, and a small area including the ports of Haifa and Acre, to allow access to the Mediterranean. France was allocated control of south-eastern Turkey, northern Iraq, Syria and Lebanon” (SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT, 1916). 18 During four centuries the Ottoman rule, Mount Lebanon was considered part of the larger geographic entity of Syria. Ambiguous administrative divisions prompted persistent questions over Lebanon’s autonomy as well as its boundaries. Competing claims were not resolved when France gained a mandate over Syria and Lebanon in 1920. French designation of new boundaries for each state favored Lebanon at Syria’s expense. The subsequent refusal by Syria to establish diplomatic relations with Lebanon reflected an enduring perception that Lebanon was right-fully part of Syria (WEINBERGER, 1986). 19 Syria was one of the founders of the League of Arab States together with Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

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interests would be penetrating in the region” (VIZENTINI, 2007).20 This led to the First Arab-

Israeli War in 1948, in which Syria took part as a member of the alliance of Arab States that

intervened on the Palestinian side, ending in a war between sovereign states. The Arab

countries were defeated by better trained and equipped Israeli forces (VIZENTINI, 2007).

Fighting on the side of the Arabs together with Egypt made Syria emerge as a de facto

regional actor and that role was maintained throughout the years to come. Facing this new

conjuncture in the Middle East, Syria, following Nasser’s Egypt, managed to achieve more

efficient military capabilities, establishing cooperation agreements with the Soviet Union.21

During the 1950’s, Syria also tried to spread pan-Arabism together with Egypt, what can be

seen through the creation of the United Arab Republic in 1958, uniting Syria and Egypt into a

federation.

However, in a context of internal instability, in 1961, the Ba’ath Party took over power

in Syria and removed the country from the United Arab Republic. The Ba’ath Party was a

reformist, modernizing and pan-Arab movement, which considered the existing States as parts

of the same Arab nation, which should be unified. It had a policy of state-building, which is

really important to Syria given its state’s formation and consolidation. Gradually, the Ba’ath

overcame Nasserism as a more consistent alternative not only in ideological but also in

pragmatic terms, since the party consisted only on a modernizing and socio-economic

development strategy, without Marxist connotation (VIZENTINI, 2007).

This new regime and its strong nationalism created even more tension with Israel. In

1967, the Six Days War began as Israel’s answer to a crisis triggered by Nasser through the

interdiction of the Gulf of Akaba for Israel’s ships. Israel stroke Egypt, Syria and Jordan by

surprise. In the north front, against Syria, Israel conquered the region of the Golan Height,

entering fifteen kilometres inside Syria’s territory.22The war was a tough strike against the

Arabs, which decided to reject a peace accord with Israel.

After the loss of the Golan Heights, Syria experienced two military coups. The second

one, in November 1970, put Hafiz al-Assad, a member of the Socialist Ba’ath Party and of the

minority Allawi sect, in the power through a bloodless coup which brought political stability

to the country (CIA, 2012).

20 In the original: “A criação do Estado de Israel foi percebida pelos países árabes como uma espécie de enclave ou colônia ocidental, atrás da qual novos interesses imperialistas estariam penetrando na região” (VIZENTINI, 2007). 21 “Nasserism was view as a system of ideas comprising components such as anti-imperialism, pan-Arabism—or nationalism—, and Arab socialism” (PODEH, WINCKLER, 2004). Trying to achieve more room to have independent maneuver in politics, Egypt was the first Arab country to sign an arms-deal with the USSR in 1955. 22 Besides the Golan Heights, Israel also conquered the territories of Egypt, the Sinai Peninsula, and from Jordan, the West Bank. The United Nations through resolution 242 demanded the exit of Israel from those areas, but Israel never complied with it.

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1.2. Syria under the Ba’ath party

1.2.1. Hafiz al-Assad’s main goals and internal politics

During his time in power Hafiz had three main goals: continued rule by Assad and the

Alawite minority, to which he belonged; the desire for strategic parity with Israel; and the

achievement of the Greater Syria. This latter is related to the search for the reunification of the

original Syrian territories during the Ottoman Empire, which consisted of the current

territories of Syria, Lebanon and parts of Israel and Turkey (PIPES, 1991).

The Alawite minority composed at that point not more than 10% of Syria’s population,

and they continue to be a minority in power (GOLDSMITH, 2012). Hafiz al-Assad was part

of them, and during his time in power he turned this sector of Syria’s society into the new

elite.23 Since then, for the Alawites to protect themselves, they had to stay in power through

Assad, a strategy that continues until this day.24 Still, the government always made good

efforts to reach the Sunni majority, doing so not only through a secular Constitution, which

should appease the other Muslim’s sects, but also by stressing issues of foreign policy instead

of domestic contentious issues. The greatest foreign policy issue was the subject of the

Greater Syria, which Hafiz al-Assad made his centerpiece goal since 1974, in an attempt to

use Syrian nationalism to avoid problems of a centralized party inside the country. Anti-

Zionism, directed to the great adversary of the Greater Syria, Israel, also managed to unite the

Syrians (PIPES, 1991).

Economic issues, however, were the worst of all Syrian internal problems. The

economy under Assad was stalled, compromised by corruption and huge military

expenditures. Inept government policies have resulted in annual inflation rate of some 50%,

an overvalued Syrian lira and huge foreign debts, mainly to the Soviet Union. Civil servants

were making less than U$50 a month and cities routinely experienced electricity shortfalls.

Oil revenues, which were not so high comparing to other Arab countries, were not being used

to Syria’s modernization, but to temporary fixes which harmed the economy in the long term,

creating dependent attitudes (PIPES, 1991). Despite these problems, Assad managed to keep

Syria as a big leading player in the Middle East, being one of the governments of the Middle

East less influenced by economic considerations at the time.

23 The Allawism was in fact a wholly distinct religion from the mainstream Muslims, since it rejects the sacred law of Islam and it maintains an elaborate but secret theology, and its rites are alien to Islam (PIPES, 1991). 24 The rise of Alawites in Syrian society throughout the 1960s was assisted by political infighting among the Sunnis and the Ba’ath Party coup of 1963, which united working-class Alawites and Sunnis under one banner. When Hafiz al-Asad, proposed a new constitution that mandated a secular state and allowed the presidency to be awarded to a non-Muslim, Sunnis protested across the country. In February 1982, the struggle reached its climax in Sunni-dominated Hama. Seeking to end the rebellion, Assad massacred the Sunni population of the city. Since the Hama slaughter of 1982, the Alawites have consolidated their control of the country (GOLDSMITH, 2012).

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1.2.2. Hafiz al-Assad’s Syria and the international sphere

Regarding the actions of Hafiz al-Assad in the international arena, in the year of 1973 it

was Syria and Egypt who attacked Israel by surprise in the Yom Kippur War, which had the

main goal of restoring the lost territories of the Six Days War. Israel was attacked in two

simultaneous fronts, in the North and in the South. Both countries managed to get back part of

their original territories, but Israel counterattacked and successfully expelled them

(VIZENTINI, 2007).

Syria was directly affected by the consequences of the war. Firstly, because of Egypt’s

peace accord signed with Israel in Camp David, mediated by the United States, which left the

Arabs feeling betrayed by one of the most important Arab States, granting Syria with an even

more important position in the Middle East. The other consequence was the beginning of a

civil war in Lebanon in 1975, which would later involve Syria.

The Syrian stake in Lebanon long precedes the independence of both countries

(WEINBERGER, 1986). Taking advantage of the fact that Lebanon was divided in a civil war

between Christians and Muslims, Syria tried to gain more influence in the country. Syria,

looking for a way to take advantage of the situation in Lebanon, backed the Christians and

made a ceasefire ordering the end of the violence perpetrated against them by the leftist

Muslims. Since they rejected it, Syria moved its troops into Lebanon. The Arab League would

later grant its approval. By 1978 Damascus had finally switched sides and began to support a

leftist coalition of Palestinians and Muslims. This support also led to the 1982 Lebanon War,

when Israel also got involved in the conflict. Syria would only withdraw from Lebanon in

2005, after an agreement with the United Nations.

Still in Hafiz al-Assad regime, in 1991, during the First Gulf War, Syria supported the

US attempt against Iraq. This action is mainly because Syria saw in Iraq, under Saddam

Hussein’s rule, a regional rival. However, the conjuncture of those years also mattered, since

the Soviet Union was deteriorating and declining. This balanced the relationship of Syria with

not only the Arabs, but also with the West.

2. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

2.1. The local level of the Syrian crisis

2.1.1. Syria under Bashar al-Assad’s rule

In 2001, following the death of President Hafiz al-Assad, speculations on whether

instability would emerge from the situation of power transfer arose. As a means to counter de

disintegration of the regime, the Parliament amended the constitution, reducing the minimum

age for being president from 40 to 34 years old, thus allowing Bashar al-Assad—son of

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Hafiz— to be appointed as the new president.Following this, through a popular referendum,

he was elected the new president. Bashar was deemed a natural choice, because it seemed that

he would not betray his father’s Ba’athist legacy and yet he was very popular with the

population for his modernizing stances, particularly with the younger generations (LESCH,

2005; LEVERETT, 2005).He pleased the Syrian elites and the populace, hence, Bashar

“represented both continuity and change” (HINNEBUSCH, 2008, p. 274). Indeed, as Gerges

(2012) points out, Bashar al-Assad’s rule was based on political hegemony, co-option and

balancing of various groups and their interests, not only on coercion and hard

domination.Accordingly, in May 2007 he was elected to his second term as president.

During the time of Bashar’s ascent to power, there was a climate of social and political

fermentation known as “Damascus Spring”, which took place in Syria until 2001. It started as

a private gathering of ideologically aligned intellectuals, but soon informally spread by word

of mouth across all of Damascus and other major cities of Syria. Not only intellectuals and

members of the opposition participated in the social and political debates which occurred, but

also some members of the government and of the reformist wing of the Ba’ath Party (HRW,

2007). Among the most prominent claims of the “Damascus Spring” were the abolition of

martial law, the end of the state of emergency in the country, the return of political exiles and

the right to form political parties and other civil associations (HRW, 2007).

All across the Arab world, optimism ensued with the “Damascus Spring” and Bashar’s

accession to the presidency with promises of social, political and economic reform. From the

part of the Syrian regime, there was a brief political opening,through which the government

released several political prisoners and increased some civil liberties. However, the

Syriangovernment started to undo these reforms and to crack downon dissent—sometimes

violently—in August 2001. “Many who once viewed Bashar as a potential partner, open-

minded, and Western-oriented, now perceived him as, if anything, more ideological than and

just as tied to the Ba’athist regime as his father” (ICG, 2004, p. i).

Despite this setback of the “Damascus Spring”, Bashar al-Assad carried on with many

reforms within the government and the regime. A few years after his election, he had already

established himself as the main decision maker and had renovated the political elite of Syria,

effectively transferring power to a new generation where reformist tendencies were dominant

(PERTHES, 2004). Bashar recruited to ministerial offices many technocrats with Western

education and who favoured integration with the world economy. Yet, this partial

abandonment of the Ba’athist ideology—which no longer was the basis for governmental

policies—did not mean that the reforms would lead to an immediate socio-economic

liberalization (LESCH, 2005; LEVERETT, 2005). Syria would rather follow a middle way, a

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“modernizing authoritarianism” in the words of Perthes (2004).25Nonetheless, Hinnebusch

notes that these reformist surges were not very successful, because:

bureaucratic, legal, and political obstacles slowed down even this modest reform program, while corruption, crony capitalists, the lack of accountability, and continual regional conflict remained major disincentives to getting the investment that alone could make reform a success (HINNEBUSCH, 2008, p. 275).

The “modernizing authoritarianism” rendered some positive economic results: The

economy of the Syrian Arab Republic has improved under the rule of Bashar al-Assad in

comparison with the last decades of his father’s presidency. Until the global economic crisis

of 2008,Syria sustained rates of economic growth of approximately 5% per year; later,

however, the pace slowed down with significant plunges in energy consumption and gross

domestic product (GDP) growth (WB, 2012; IMF, 2012). Zubair Iqbal (2012) notices that, in

spite of this GDP growth in the last decade, inflation rates have been steadily high (two digit

variations being not uncommon) and that the minimum wage has not accompanied the general

economic growth. These economic indicators point to a growing income inequality in Syria,

raising dissatisfaction among the population (IQBAL, 2012). Furthermore, the unemployment

rate has been of around 10% of the labour force, and youth unemployment has represented

roughly 20% of the total in the past decade (WB, 2012). The growing inequality and high

unemployment, particularly among the youth, has led to a gradually increasing discontent of

the population with the government, since it has not enjoyed the results of the economic

growth of the past ten years. Therefore, “[t]hese developments, in the absence of civil society

institutions needed to absorb discontentment, point to pressures for violent democratic

transition [...]” (IQBAL, 2012).

2.1.2. The Syrian uprising

As a part of the so-called“Arab Spring”, a series of civilian protests that began in

February 2011 in Tunisia and rapidly spread to other Arab countries, the Syrian counterpart

started in March of the same year as people who were protesting against political arrests were

arrested themselves (AL JAZEERA, 2012). The triggering event of the current situation

occurred in Dar’a, southern Syria, when 15 schoolboys got arrested for writing anti-

government slogans on walls and their parents demanded their release through

demonstrations, which were violently repulsed by Syrian security forces (ZIADEH, 2011).

The rebuffing of these protests caused the death of six protestors, what led to major

manifestations in Dar’a and in other Syrian cities shortly afterwards (ZIADEH, 2011).

25 Hinnebusch (2008) affirms that Syria’s path towards reform would be similar to the East Asian model of economic modernization before democratization.

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The sudden escalation of these protests found its equivalent in government response.

Ziadeh (2011) affirms that the reaction of the Syrian security and intelligence services was to

use live ammunition, unlawful detentions and torture to prevent and combat demonstrations.

These violent actions at first were aimed at peaceful protesters, who demanded more

democracy and greater freedom in Syria, but not the resignation of the president. As a result

of such actions, though, protesters began to demand regime change as well as an end to state

repression, including political detentions, extrajudicial killings and torture (BBC, 2012).

Although the protests were peaceful in the beginning of the Syrian revolt, this

opposition soon resorted to arms as well.26 The violence used by the demonstrators served as

a legitimate justification for the government to keep on using force as well, albeit in a larger

scale. As Seale puts it: “No regime, whatever its political colouring, can tolerate an armed

uprising without responding with full force. Indeed, the rise of an armed opposition has

provided the Syrian regime with the justification it needed to seek to crush it with ever

bloodier repression” (SEALE, 2012, p. 1).Nevertheless, by the end of 2011, witnessing an

intensification of the clashes, Bashar al-Assad tried to placate the protesters by acquiescing on

some of their demands, such as the end of the 48-year long emergency law. In this context,

Syria also approved—through a referendum—a new constitution which provided for a

multiparty system and imposed a limit on the presidential mandateon February 2012.

However, these concessions were dismissed by the opposition. This was seen as an indication

that the mounting casualties had created great grudge amongst the population, especially the

protesters, reducing the chances of a negotiated solution (SEALE, 2012).

In the same month, the UN-Arab League envoy Kofi Annan launched his six point

peace plan for Syria. Its text was agreed upon by both the opposition and the government and,

therefore, endorsed by the Security Council. The plan stated that there was a commitment to

“an inclusive Syrian-led political process to address the legitimate aspirations and concerns of

the Syrian people” and to a ceasefire (HAMILTON, 2012). It also included humanitarian

provisions and claimed for freedom of movement for journalists, the end of unlawful arbitrary

and political detentions, freedom of association and peaceful demonstration. The ceasefire

plan brokered by Kofi Annan was supposed to be in place in on the April 10th, but Assad only

announced it four days later. Even though there were allegedly many ceasefire violations by

government troops, indeed the Syrian forces halted their assaults in major theatres of war.

26 At this point, there were at least two branches of the opposition, the military and the political one. The military is known as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which was formed by deserters of the Syrian military by the end of July, 2011. The political branch is the Syrian National Council, a coalition of many political groups which was founded in August 2011 after foreign pressure for a sole interlocutor from the opposition. For more information see section 2.1.3.

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Because of this situation of a fragile (or even incomplete) ceasefire, the opposition did not

acknowledge that the government was duly following the plan and kept on with the hostilities.

Thus, it may be noted that the ceasefire was hardly being followed by both sides

(GUTSCHKER, 2012; MacFARQUHAR, 2012; UN, 2012).

The turning point for this whole situation came in late May, with the so-called Houla

Massacre. Shabbiha forces—militiamen of Alawite background backed by the government—

and even government soldiers attacked rebel-controlled villages of mid-western Syria

reportedly killing 108 people, most of them civilians, in summary executions (UNHRC,

2012). The government affirmed that it was acting against terrorist forces linked to Al-Qaeda

that wanted to draw international attention before a meeting of the UNSC on Syria. However,

an independent inquiry conducted by the United Nations Human Rights Council found that

there were no witnesses of the official version and that most of the killers were indeed either

government-backed or part of Syrian forces themselves (UNHRC, 2012).27 The UN Security

Council issued a presidential statement condemning the use of heavy weapons in civilian

agglomerations and the government for firing them at civilians on this occasion (UNSC,

2012c).As a response to this massacre, the Free Syrian Army (FSA)—military branch of the

Syrian opposition—resumed nation-wide military assaults on government troops after issuing

an ultimatum for Bashar al-Assad. Consequently, the ceasefire was ultimately wrecked,

leading to further intensification of hostilities. This characterized an evolution of the situation,

which was no longer an uprising, but rather a civil war.

One of the main features of the conflict is its territorial inconstancy. Although the

opposition forces control many towns and villages, this control seems to be very flimsy with

troops loyal to the government re-conquering them and then losing them again to the

opposition. There are however many strongholds located mainly close to border regions

(especially Turkey, but also Lebanon and Jordan, and Iraq to a lesser degree). Much fighting

occurs close to the Turkish border where border control outposts change hands very

frequently. This uncertainty facilitates the inflow of illegal weapons and terrorists. Yet, the

worst fighting rages in Aleppo, the economic centre of Syria, and Homs. In addition to these

warring parties, supposedly neutral Kurdish groups have been in control of many cities next

to the Turkish border, not without belligerent acts against government forces, whence

government troops were withdrawn in order to be relocated to worse scenarios. According to

the United Nations, approximately 19,000 people have died since the beginning of the

conflict, many of them civilians, and 260,000 refugees have escaped Syria going towards

bordering countries, mainly Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon (MAGNITUDE, 2012; UN-ARAB, 27 This inquiry also noted that both sides of the conflict were committing a plethora of war crimes.

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2012). This massive refugee flows have caused the conflict to spill into neighbouring

countries, for instance Syrian forces have bombed Lebanese territory used by rebel forces as

safe havens (AP, 2012).

2.1.3. Opposition groups

As the protests began in March 2011, the opposition movements were very

disorganized, especially due to their very popular and autonomous character. Any sort of

organized mobilization was hindered by Syrian security and intelligence forces, therefore,

these demonstrations were indeed very spontaneous and they happened without prior planning

(ZIADEH, 2011). They were also very urban and, in the cities where they happened, the

mosques served as gathering points, since the Alawite—Bashar al Assad’s Muslim sect—

tradition does not include frequenting mosques. In this early stage, the chants varied from city

to city, but their common denominators were justice, dignity and freedom, and all of them

carried more aspirations for change of the poor socio-economic condition of the country than

for attempts at overthrowing the regime (PEREIRA, 2012).

In this context the Local Coordination Committees (LCC) emerged. The LCCs were an

array of protesters who provided online information on the status of the demonstrations and

government reactions. They shared and coordinated local data for the whole country without

any formal organizational structure. The LCCs were anti-government but with no particular

political leaning (JOHNSON, [2012]).

Soon, however, the LCCs joined a broader coalition of the opposition, namely the

Syrian National Council (SNC), which currently exercises the political leadership of the

rebels. Besides the LCCs, the SNC comprises the grouping of the Damascus Declaration for

Democratic Change (created in the “Damascus Spring”), the Muslim Brotherhood of Syria,

the Syrian Revolution General Commission (a coalition of 40 opposition grassroots groups)

and some Kurdish factions, as well as tribal leaders (GUIDE, 2012). It was created mainly

due to the international community’s pressure aimed at having a single interlocutor for the

whole opposition. The SNC works to legally overthrow the regime, maintaining national unity

and protecting Syria’s independence and sovereignty, thence rejecting calls for foreign

military intervention. It has also tried to keep the revolution peaceful, what created several

disagreements with the Free Syrian Army. Notwithstanding that, both groups have tried to

work more closely in order to coordinate their actions.

Another main opposition group is the National Coordination Committee (NCC), which

was formed in September 2011. It is composed of 13 left-wing political parties, three Kurdish

parties and independent political and youth activists (GUIDE, 2012). It is the only group that

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still considers negotiations with the government as the least costly settlement of the civil war.

However, it affirms that such dialogue may only happen provided that the government meets

certain conditions. Thus, the NCC has rejected several initiatives from the government that

claimed for unrestricted dialogue without preconditions. Just as the SNC, the group also

rejects foreign military intervention. However, the NCC is wary of the Islamists’ influence

within the SNC and therefore has rejected attempts at joining it and even challenged its

primacy (GUIDE, 2012).

The military branch of the opposition is the Free Syrian Army, which was created in

August 2011 by army deserters based in Turkey.28 It serves as an umbrella group for all sorts

of armed combatants: army defectors, Islamist militants and armed civilians. FSA

combatants—allegedly 40.000, but probably closer to 10.000—have only limited or no

contact with the leadership in Turkey or with each other (GUIDE, 2012). In the beginning of

the uprising, the FSA made only small-scale attacks on military targets close to the border

with Turkey. Nevertheless, it gradually spread its operations to other parts of the country. Its

tactics are those of guerilla warfare. At first they had only light equipment (weapons

included), but now they reportedly have access to more sophisticated and heavier weaponry.

After a major FSA setback in early 2011, many Arab and Western countries started helping

the Free Syrian Army: The first vowed that they would supply weapons and the latter said

they would give the necessary funding and communication equipment. Turkey, Saudi Arabia

and Qatar supposedly supplied them with automatic rifles, ammunition, rocket-propelled

grenades and anti-tank weapons, whilst American intelligence workers advise on which

groups should receive the military equipment so as to prevent it from falling in the hands of

terrorists (GUIDE, 2012). There have been many accusations and reports of gross human

rights violations made by the FSA (UNHRC, 2012). This organization has had many

divergences with the Syrian National Council and other opposition groups on the terms for

negotiating with the Syrian government, especially because it represents the armed struggle

that many of them oppose.

2.2. The international level of the Syrian crisis

2.2.1. Syria’s geopolitical importance

Located in the region of the Levant, Syria lies in a most strategic spot of the Middle

East. It lies at a hub for terrestrial and maritime routes, being vital for the so-called “New Silk

28 The Syrian army is composed mainly by Sunni fighters, but the top ranking officials are of Alawite background. Analysts say that it has approximately 200.000 soldiers (GUIDE, 2012).

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Road” or “Modern Silk Road”.29It is, thus, of primary importance for regional integration

processes and the world great powers. As Roberto (2012) puts it, this fact makes Syria very

susceptible to the whims of all great powers at the same time.

In this context, it is noticeable that many energy trade routes pass through Syria. Even

though oil revenues compose a great part of the Syrian balance of payments, the country is not

a major oil producer: it only has about 0.2% of the world proved oil reserves (BP, 2011), 95%

of which is traded with European countries (USA, 2011). For that reason, the country heavily

relies on oil and gas pipelines. On top of that, there are many prospective transnational

pipelineswhich could connect Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Egypt and Azerbaijan, allowing for greater

shipment in the Mediterranean (USA, 2011; ESCOBAR, 2012). The implementation of such

projects could minimize the reliance of oil importing countries on other transit routes such as

the Suez Canal and the Ormuz Strait by supplying oil and gas directly to the Mediterranean.

Although many agreements have been reached by Syria with neighbouring oil-supplying

countries (most importantly Iraq and Iran), the endpoints of pipeline projects have been

somewhat contentious, mainly with Turkey. Besides theseterrestrial routes, the country’s

location is also very strategic due to its capacity to affect the whole East Mediterranean,

where important maritime world trade routes lay, namely the Suez Canal (PEREIRA, 2012).

Another factor of great importance for Syria has been its autonomist character. The

Syrian State under the Ba’ath Party has been a symbol of independence and resistance in

opposition to Western countries, especially the United States—which characterized Syria as a

“rogue state”—and former European colonial powers. Syria became a bulwark of autonomous

socio-economic development during the Cold War and maintained this status even during its

economic stagnation until 2011 (PEREIRA, 2012). Not only that, but Syria has also been very

significant for Pan-Arabism and, therefore, for integration processes in the Middle-East.

Because of these resistance to world powers, Western or not, the country has served as an

example to developing countries around the world (VIZENTINI, 2002; HINNEBUSCH,

2001).

2.2.2. The regional context

As previously stated, Syria has had a prominent role in the Middle East for it has beena

major supporter of Pan-Arabism, sometimes hostilely towards Israel, and an example of

resistance against the influence of world powers. Especially after the Camp David Accords

29 It is nothing else but “the physical infrastructure of the globalized world: oil and gas pipelines, optical fiber trunk cables, roadways and railways. Resorting to an image: the connection of Tokyo to Rome, of the Pacific Ocean to the Mediterranean, of Shanghai to the Gulf of Guinea.”(REIS, 2012, p. 3, our translation).

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between Israel and Egypt, Syria has been the main bulwark of such ideas together with Libya

and Iran to some extent. Thus, Syrian regional influence has been one of ideologies rather

than military power.

Nevertheless, since the end of the Cold War Syria found itself in the midst of a great

regional rivalry between the two major Muslim sects, namely the Sunnis and the Shiites.

There has been intense competition between Iran, main representative of the latter, and Saudi

Arabia, the advocate of the former (ROBERTO, 2012). Albeit the majority of the Syrian

population is Sunni, the governing elite is Alawite, a peculiar Shiite sect deemed heretic by

the Sunni. This has led to closer relations between Syria and Iran at the expense of Saudi

Arabia.30 In addition to those two regional powers, Turkey has also been trying to increase its

influence in the region since the beginning of the 21st century (ROBERTO, 2012).

The “Arab Spring” and its Syrian counterpart have incited the rivalries between these

three main regional players. Both Turkey and Saudi Arabia have realized that the Syrian

uprising could be turned in their favour to the detriment of Iranian influence over the region.

At first, Saudi Arabia had to cope with the Arab Spring in its neighbouring countries, that is,

Yemen and Bahrain. Once the situation was stabilized in these countries, the Saudis could

focus their attention on how to augment their influence sphere in Syria, taking advantage of

the situation as a means to counterbalance Iran and the Shiites, effectively “exploiting the

regional chaos” (JACOBS, 2012). That is why Saudi Arabia along with other Gulf States was

among the first to condemn and castigate Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria already in August

2011. Jacobs (2012) tells that these countries have tried to create an organized and formalized

payment structure for the FSA, besides supplying weapons to these opposition groups—

regardless of background—through smuggling routes in Jordan and Iraq. The author also goes

further and affirms that the Saudi government has sanctioned a jihad against the heretic

Alawite regime of Syria so as to enthrone a Sunni aligned regime in the country, meaning that

the country is working with Islamist groups in Syria and in Saudi Arabia itself (JACOBS,

2012). Moreover, Bakr (2012) reports that other Gulf countries, belonging to the Sunni-Saudi

sphere of influence, press for humanitarian military intervention in Syria.

As for Turkey, the country was at unease in the outset of the Syrian revolt in 2011. At

first the country did not seem to wish for instability in Syria. However, Escobar (2012) notes

that Turkey has begun to foster opposition groups inside Syria and in its own border regions

with that country, hosting the leadership of the FSA. It can be seen that Turkey has put aside

30 Although the religious factor is very important for such alliances, it should not be forgotten that Iran is also part of the resistance against the influence of western powers, especially the United States of America, being logical that such proximity exists between the two countries.

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its good-neighbourhood policy in order to reinforce its presence and influence in the Middle

East (ROBERTO, 2012).31 Particularly for the “Arab Spring”, Turkey has been an example

aspired by protesters, for it is largely religiously and politically free and has presented

sustained economic growth (YURIDITSKY, 2012).

From the beginning of the “Arab Spring”, Iran has been left aside from these popular

movements, being unable to claim any role in the developing of the events (WITTES, 2012).

Therefore, the country found itself regionally weaker and losing ground in the Middle Eastern

balance of power, according to Wittes (2012). Nevertheless, ever since the events spread to

Syria Iran has tried to uphold the alliance of sorts with Syria for maintaining its ideological

and geopolitical partner (ROBERTO, 2012). The maintenance of the Alawite regime is of

chief importance to Iran and for that reason the country has reportedly sent military advisors

of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard—although not for directly engaging in combat—and even

weapons to Syria, circumventing sanctions of the UNSC (CHARBONNEAU, 2012;

GORDON, 2012; DEHGHANPISHEH, 2012).

2.2.3. Sources of instability

The prolongation of the armed uprising in Syria may engender dire instability in the

country and the region as a whole. Among the many dangers and risks of the current

continuation of the conflict are the huge flows of armaments, chemical and biological

weapons stockpiles, fundamentalist Islamist terrorism and sectarianism, besides many other

spillovers to neighbouring countries.

The inflow of weapons to Syria, either to the government or to the Free Syrian Army,

raises alarm, because once the fighting is over they may fall in the hands of terrorists and keep

the chances of violent armed actions very high in the country. These weapons could also be

diverted to other countries to instil insurgencies or perpetrate terrorist attacks. Hence, the legal

and illegal flows of weaponry could destabilize the region not only in the short term, but also

in the long one.

Syrian weapons of mass destruction (WMD) also raise great concern. Although Syria

supposedly had a military nuclear program carried out with the assistance of Iran and North

Korea, Israel bombed the alleged plutonium production reactor in 2007. Notwithstanding the

fact that nuclear artefacts are not in the Syrian arsenal, the main concern lies at the stockpiles

of chemical and possibly biological weapons that Syria has. Syria’s chemical WMDs were

first supplied by Egypt during the conflict with Israel, but after peace between those countries

31 For an analysis of the Turkish interests in the Syrian uprising concerning oil and gas pipelines, read Escobar (2012).

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was reached the Iranians begun assisting Syria to develop its capacities (NTI, 2012).32 On the

other hand, data about biological weapons has not been very credible, for some agencies

report that Syria has capacity to produce anthrax and botulism, while others found no

evidence of that (NTI, 2012). However, intelligence reports state that Syria has at least one

biological weapons storage and other five for chemical weapons, one of which in Homs,

where some intense fighting has raged during the uprising (WMD, 2012). Much apprehension

has emerged with the possibility that the Syrian government would use its chemical weapons

against protesters, but officials stated that this would never happen; it could, however, be

considered as a last resort provided that the scenario changes with the intervention from

foreign powers in the country (LANDLER, 2012).33 Nevertheless, there is also serious risk

that these stockpiles fall in the hands of the rebels, whose heterogeneity means that these

weapons could be taken by Islamist terrorists to be used elsewhere.

This has gradually become a greater threat in the region. The number of jihadists

fighting in Syria has risen enormously since the beginning of the uprising. According to al-

Shishani (2012), the Free Syrian Army scrutinizes the jihadists very closely for they could

represent a real threat after the regime changes. In spite of that, there have been several

reports of the growing role of fundamentalists in the rebellion. Since the beginning of 2012

terrorist attacks have been made by groups related to al-Qaeda (HUSAIN, 2012). In the past

months, however, Jabhat al-Nusra, a fundamentalist terrorist group (also linked to al-Qaeda)

has become prominent in the fight against government troops (VELA; SLY, 2012). This

group acts more frequently in urban regions, such as Damascus and Aleppo (AL-SHISHANI,

2012). The aftermath of the conflict poses a serious concern when it comes to those terrorist

groups, for their members will probably scatter in the Middle East, endangering the stability

of the region as a whole.

Concerning sectarianism, this is a real threat because the Assad’s regime branded itself

as a protector of minorities and communities, successfully managing to maintain the Syrian

society very cohesive despite its many ethnic and religious groups (GERGES, 2012). Gerges

(2012) even says that it is this feature that determined the durability of the Ba’ath regime, for

Bashar and Hafiz promised those minorities many rights and protection from the Sunni

majority. Besides the Alawites, which comprise 12% of the Syrian population, the Christian

minority in Syria—amounting to 10% of the population—also officially backs the regime due

32 Syria has stated that it will renounce its chemical weapons program once Israel does the same with its military nuclear program (NTI, 2012). 33 Blomfield (2012) reports that the Syrian military has recently conducted drills of chemical weapons usage with the help of Iranian advisors, further raising questions about the likelihood that Syria will use such WMDs to counter the rebels.

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to fear of an Islamist government (SECRETIVE, 2012; JOHNSON, [2012]). Nonetheless,

many Christians are active members of the opposition, either in the LCC or the SNC, so as to

guarantee the right to religious liberty in a future new constitution (JOHNSON, [2012]).

Taking into account the fact that the majority of the Syrian National Council and the Free

Syrian Army is composed of Sunnis, there have been many reports of sectarian violence by

the opposition against Alawite civilian neighbourhoods (GUIDE, 2012; SECRETIVE, 2012).

Such clashes have oftentimes occurred in Lebanon as well in a spillover of the conflict,

raising concern that the religious sectarian fight spreads all over the region.

Another sectarian struggle that may come to happen inside Syria and perhaps spill to

neighbouring countries is the one involving the Kurd minority. Even though the Kurds follow

different religions and its sects such as the rest of Syria, they are the country’s largest

minority and have long been discriminated by the central government (JOHNSON, [2012]).

Escobar (2012) tells that they are mainly neutral in the fighting, but it should nevertheless be

noticed that clashes with government troops have already occurred. Since Syrian troops were

withdrawn from Kurdish areas, there has been much pressure from Turkey against their own

Kurdish populations. Milne (2012) says that there is a rising chance that the country may

strike Kurdish areas within Syria in order to combat Kurdish sectarianism in the Middle East.

Finally, the continuation of the civil strife in Syria will increase the number of refugees

going to neighbouring countries. Byman and Pollack (2012) report that there have been more

than a million Syrian refugees flowing to Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq. These great

refugee waves cause dire social and economic consequences to the host countries, which

further endangers the stability of the region. They could also bring the conflict with

themselves, spreading the fighting to other countries, such as it has already started to happen

in northern Iraq (ARANGO, 2012).

3. PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTION

3.1. The United Nations and the Arab League

After almost one year of conflict in Syria, the League of Arab States34 and the United

Nations choose a Special Envoy to deal with the issue. Mr. Kofi Annan soon worked to create

a peace proposal, aiming to achieve support from all external actors involved in the resolution

of Syria’s problems. His peace plan was composed of six points and it was launched in

February 2012. Mr. Annan’s main aim was the necessity of imposing a cease-fire by both

34 The League of Arab States was one of the first international organizations to condemn the Syrian regime for the violence perpetrated against civilians (PEREIRA, 2012).

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parties involved in the conflict, which then would pave the way to build a way of

communication between the government and the opposition.

After the ceasefire agreement was reached, the United Nations Security Council decided

to establish the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) to monitor the cessation of the

violence on April 21st 2012 through Resolution 2043. Initially mandated for 90 days,

UNSMIS had to suspend its activities in mid-June since armed hostilities worsened

throughout Syria (UNSMIS, 2012).

In the same month a UN-backed Action Group met at a summit in Geneva in to build a

consensual peace plan for the Syrian conflict. The permanent members of the UNSC and

some members of the Arab League agreed on a transitional plan which aimedat forging a

government of national unity putting together members of the present government and the

opposition, basing itself on mutual consent. The summit tried to focus on an alternative that

would enable all segments of society to be included in the national dialogue process (MEO,

2012). In spite of the consensual nature of this agreement, which recalled Annan’s peace plan,

many countries differ over the interpretations of the final text.35 Western countries affirm it

implies that Bashar al-Assad should step down, but Russia and China state that there was no

such message (GUTTERMAN; GROVE, 2012).

A month later UNSMIS resumed its duties and had its mandate renewed for another 30

days. The UNSC stated that a further renewal would only be in order provided that heavy

weaponry stopped being used with a significant reduction on the violence level. Because this

was not accomplished, the mission ended in mid-August 2012 (UNSMIS, 2012). Because of

this failure, Annan stepped down and Lakhdar Brahimi, former Algerian Minister of foreign

affairs, became the new UN-Arab League envoy to Syria.

3.2. Friends of Syria

Outside the auspices of the United Nations, a diplomatic collective of countries and

bodies named Group of Friends of the Syrian People met to convene on the topic of Syria.

Initiated by the then-French president, Nicholas Sarkozy, the group has already met three

times and put together more than seventy countries, aiming to support the Syrian opposition

and to increase pressure on the Syrian government. The Friends of Syria demand that Bashar

steps down. The Syrian National Council attended the summits, demanding serious actions in

their favour. The Turkish Prime Minister and the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, were

some of the most prominent actors which were supporting stronger measures against the

Syrian regime. Syrian government denounced the collective as a conspiracy against Syria, 35 Read the final text of the Geneva Accord at UNOG (2012).

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especially after some of the countries part of the group called for funding and arming the

opposition.

3.3. Teheran’s initiative

In the beginning of August 2012, Iran hosted the Tehran Consultative Meeting on Syria.

Approximately 30 countries attended the meeting, including Russia, Pakistan, India and

China. The final document of the meetingstated its firm support to non-interference in Syria

through direct military interventions. A very strong point of the meeting was that there should

be a political solution based on national dialogue and that military assistance to armed groups

should be ceased. Tehran’s initiative also proposed the creation of a contact group of the

participating countries with the Syrian government and opposition in order to initiate an

inclusive dialogue, thus defusing the tension through political negotiations

(ESTABLISHMENT, 2012). The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, who was also present

at the meeting, noted that for the proposal to work there should be a first move by the

government to show goodwill towards the negotiation process (ESTABLISHMENT, 2012).

4. BLOC POSITIONS

Since the beginning of the impasse, the Russian Federation has firmly and consistently

called for the non-use of force by all parties and has emphasized the need for a political

solution to the country’s problems (UNSC S/PV.6751, 2012). It also strongly supports the

necessity of implementing the six-point plan of the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations

and the League of Arab States, as well as the transition plan agreed by the Action Group for

Syria in Geneva. Moscow insists that Syria’s sovereignty must be respected, and more than

once have cautioned about the dangers that attempts of external influence can cause. Also, it

have been stressing that it is essential that all parties of the conflict, including the armed

opposition, quickly refrain from violence, according to Annan’s six-point peace plan, and

enter in broad-based talks to negotiate the settling of the crisis. Russian Foreign Minister

Sergei Lavrov has also emphasized that Russia opposes any military intervention in Syria,

since it would only lead to a greater catastrophe not only in the country but also in the region

(RT, 2012). The Foreign Minister has also voiced concern about the reaction on the part of

some foreign players who, he said, support armed groups of the opposition and at the same

time demand that the international community take decisive steps to change the regime in

Syria (RT, 2012).

Russia has already vetoed, along with China, three UN Security Council resolutions

regarding the situation on Syria. Moscow does not want that any resolution deviates for its

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original purposes and turns into an experience similar to the one that happened in Libya, in

2011, where Russia accused the Western countries of trespassing the resolution’s mandate,

using the situation to topple an unfriendly regime. However, Moscow have been one of the

main supporters of the resolutions that authorized the dispatching of the United Nations

unarmed observer mission in Syria, calling to expand it after its mandate finished, being

rejected by the other Council members (UNSC S/PV.6810, 2012).

The United States of America strongly condemns all the violence perpetuated by the

Syrian government and supports the full implementation of the six-point plan of the Joint

Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, as well as the transition

plan agreed by the Action Group for Syria in Geneva. Washington sees Syrian government’s

non-compliance as a proof that the regime is not willing to honour its commitments, which

makes the US sceptical about the regime’s intentions (UNSC S/PV.6810, 2012). Although

having voted for the authorization of dispatching an United Nations unarmed observer

mission to Syria through UNSC Resolution 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012), the US did not

agree upon the extension of the mission, since it deems that the Security Council should be

imposing swift and meaningful consequences for Syria’s regime non-compliance in

implementing Annan and Geneva plans, also condemning Security Council members that

refuses to apply sanctions or other types of retaliation for Syrian government (RICE, 2012).

The USA is also really concerned about the large stockpile of chemical weapons which

are under Syrian government’s control at the moment, making themselves clear that those

weapons must remain secure and that the regime would be held accountable for their use

(UNSC S/PV.6810, 2012). President Obama himself has also warned that if Syria were to

deploy chemical or biological weapons, the United States would follow through with its threat

of launching an attack, since its deployment is the red line they have posed to Al-Assad

regime (RT, 2012). Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, has also recently said that Washington

is working with its external partners in planning ways to assist the rebels in their fight to

topple President Bashar Al-Assad, including implementing a no-fly zone. However, she also

said that this specific issue needed a greater in-depth analysis (RT, 2012).

The People’s Republic of China believes that Syria’s independence, sovereignty, unity

and territorial integrity, as well as the choice and will of the Syrian people, should be

respected. All the parties of the conflict, including the Syrian government and all opposition

factions, should honour their commitments to cease all acts of violence and create conditions

for the launch of a Syrian-led inclusive political process (UNSC S/PV.6751, 2012). Beijing

also insists that the best solution to the end of the Syrian crisis is the implementation of the

six-point peace plan of the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of the

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Arab States and the agreed Geneva final communiqué made by the Action Group for Syria,

initiated by the Joint Special Envoy. China, as well as Russia, has vetoed the last attempt of

passing a resolution on Syria by the Security Council, since it believes that it was unbalanced,

pressing only one side of the conflict. Moreover, it deems that is necessary to extend for more

time the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), since it is paving the way

for the implementation of the already agreed international plans for solving the issue.

However, it does not agree with the idea of setting preconditions for the expansion of the

mission, like the implementation of sanctions against the Syrian regime firstly. Beijing insists

that the future and fate of Syria should be independently decided by the Syrian people, rather

than imposed by outside forces and that military interference would achieve nothing.

France also believes that the implementation of the six-point plan made by the Joint

Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, Kofi Annan, is of utmost

importance to settle the crisis in Syria. Paris urges that the Syrian government fully and

immediately fulfil all the commitments it has made to the Joint Special Envoy, halting

violence in every form. Furthermore, it also considers that the Syrian regime has a criminal

responsibility for all the violence it has already committed against its own civilians (UNSC

S/PV.6751, 2012). Beyond that, France also considers that the goal in Syria is not only just

ending the repression, but also helping to pave the way to a political transition towards a

democratic system. Moreover, according to Paris, the provisions adopted by the Security

Council have been systematically violated by the Syrian regime, thus being necessary for the

Council to develop tools to exert pressure, such as the threat of sanctions, in order to make the

Syrian regime abide to its international obligations (UNSC S/PV.6810, 2012).

The United Kingdom believes that the six-point peace plan proposed by Mr. Kofi

Annan offers the last opportunity to finally put an end to the bloodshed in Syria, insisting that

the Syrian regime must have to fully implement the plan, as well as follow the Geneva

agreement. London deems that the opposition too must refrain from violence and ensure that

it gives the regime no excuse to renege on its commitment. When all the violence is sustained,

all parties must move quickly to engage in a Syrian-led political transition, as the Geneva

agreement and the six-point pace plan proposes (UNSC S/PV.6751, 2012). Besides that, the

United Kingdom also thinks that sanctions are a pre-condition to make the Syrian government

complies with the adoption of the Annan plan, since, according to London, the regime has

done little to demonstrate that it has any intention of taking the steps necessary to end the

crisis. London has also declared that it could not support the expansion of USNMIS since it

was unable to operate in the proper way given the still not ended violence (UNSC S/PV.6810,

2012).

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Azerbaijan supports all efforts to end the violence in Syria, aiming to overcome the

crisis as well as to find a solution by peaceful means and through dialogue. It also fully backs

up the six-point peace plan proposed by the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the

League of Arab States, Mr. Kofi Annan, seeing its implementation as the only wait to solve

the current crisis in the country. Furthermore, Azerbaijan deems necessary to end all violence

and human rights violations, securing humanitarian access and facilitating a Syrian-led

political process leading to a democratic, pluralistic political system, always encouraging

dialogue between the parties (UNSC S/PV.6751, 2012).

Colombia has been calling to the Syrian government to cease its violence and also the

unfettered repression of its people, which has jeopardized peace and security in a region that

has been experiencing an extremely fragile situation. Bogota deems that the basis for dialogue

is what has been established by the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League

of the Arab States, Mr. Kofi Annan, together with the agreements reached in Geneva within

the framework of the Action Group for Syria (UNSC S/PV.6751, 2012). Moreover, it

supports that all parties must cease violence in all its forms, and that a United Nations mission

to monitor the situation is important, although being necessary that the Government of Syria

firstly fulfill its commitments to the accorded plans, thus allowing the mission to correctly

work. Colombia also considers necessary that a clear message be sent to all parties in Syria

about the importance of complying with its commitments and obligations.

Germany stands entirely behind the efforts made by the Joint Special Envoy Kofi

Annan to achieve a sustainable cessation of violence and to facilitate a political transition

process in Syria. It believes that Damascus has to make a fundamental change of course, as

demanded by Kofi Annan, to enable a durable cessation of violence in all its forms. However,

Berlin deems that many commitments made by the Syrian Government in the past have not

been kept. Furthermore, it considers that a United Nations mission in Syria cannot be

deployed if all the necessary conditions are not in place. The Syrian Government must ensure

that the mission can freely and effectively implement its mandate and that any impediments to

that must make the Council to implement consequences against the Syrian regime.

Always maintaining that the violence in Syria must cease immediately and that the only

way out of the impasse is through a political dialogue led by the Syrians themselves,

Guatemala supports the initiative of the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the

League of Arab States, seeking a peaceful political outcome for the situation (UNSC

S/PV.6751, 2012). However, Guatemala shares the scepticism expressed by various members

of the Council regarding the commitment of the Government of Syria in complying with all

six points in the Special Envoy’s proposal. It also believes that the potential application of

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sanctions on the grounds of non-compliance may be the least necessary tool to be tried, given

the sequence of broken commitments on the part of the Government of Syria (UNSC

S/PV.6810, 2012).

Believing that the only way to influence events in Syria is through a united voice of all

members of the Security Council, Morocco has been working to emphasize the need for

complete and immediate implementation of the six-point proposal presented by the Joint

Special Envoy, accepted by all parties (UNSC S/PV.6751, 2012). It is also strongly being in

line with the recent resolutions of the League of Arab States, which is convinced that the

parties alone will not be able to end the violence or to purse dialogue. The violence and the

number of Syrian victims have reached a level that prevents the parties from tackling the

Syrian crisis through existing mechanisms. For that reason, the Arab League has urged the

Council to take strict measures that would enable the Council to work within the framework

of Chapter VII of the Charter in order to put an end to the growing violence in Syria (UNSC

S/PV.6810, 2012).

Portugal has been giving full support and appreciation for the efforts of the Joint

Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of the Arab States. This way, Lisbon

deems that the Security Council is in urgent need for concerted action to enforce the six-point

plan, also calling on the Syrian Government to cooperate and to immediately and visibly

implement it in its entirety, as Damascus has committed to do. In Lisbon’s view, the plan

represents the last chance for a peaceful political solution to the Syrian crisis. Portugal deems

that the Syrian authorities must, once and for all, demonstrate serious intent with stated

commitments (UNSC S/PV.6751, 2012).

Togo strongly supports the six-point plan proposed by the Special Joint Envoy of the

United Nations and the League of Arab States and believes that its full implementation is of

utmost importance for the settlement of the Syrian crisis. Furthermore, Togo remains

convinced that the achievement of a peaceful and prosperous Syria is first and foremost the

responsibility of the Syrians themselves – presidential and opposition supporters alike.

Consistently supporting all efforts to resolve the Syrian crisis through an inclusive,

Syrian-led political process that meets the legitimate aspirations of all sections of Syrian

society, India strongly backs the full implementation of the six-point plan of the Joint Special

Envoy. Furthermore, it also believes that all parties involved in the conflict must abide to their

obligations, meaning that clear conditions have to be met by not only the Government of

Syria, but also by the armed opposition groups. Both parties must cooperate to the full

implementation of Annan’s plan and the Action Group for Syria’s final communiqué (UNSC

S/PV.6756, 2012). New Delhi also deems that the issue in Syria must be resolved in a way to

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avoid spillover effects in the countries of the region. Moreover, it also supports that is

necessary to retain UNSMIS on the ground, since it facilitates the implementation of the

agreed plans, which, according to India, are the only viable process for international

community’s engagement in the resolution of the Syrian crisis (UNSC S/PV.6810, 2012).

Pakistan strongly supports the efforts of the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations

and the League of Arab States, which it has backed from the outset. It also believes that a

peaceful political solution to the situation in Syria must be promoted, with full respect for that

country’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity, through a Syrian-owned and Syrian-led

political process. Islamabad also deems that all sides, particularly the Syrian Government,

must fulfil their responsibilities and commitments (UNSC S/PV.6751, 2012). However,

Pakistan expressed its reservations about a coercive approach, which in its view could further

escalate tensions and be counterproductive and unhelpful in the pursuit of the situation’s

pacific settlement. It does believe that a continued United Nations mission presence on the

ground is crucial to facilitate and support peace efforts, but Islamabad is of the view that

linking its mandate extension to Chapter VII of the United Nations charter and coercive

measures are not the right course of action (UNSC S/PV.6810, 2012).

Strongly supporting the efforts of the Joint Special Envoy, and emphasizing that there is

a need for all forms of violence in Syria to cease, South Africa has been calling for all sides

of the Syrian conflict to fully implement their commitments under the six-point plan. It deems

that the plan of the Joint Special Envoy is the only credible mechanism that could deliver a

positive and realistic outcome for the situation, coupled with the final communiqué of the

Action Group for Syria, adopted in Geneva (UNSC S/PV.6751, 2012). In such way, keeping

in mind the respect of Syria’s sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity,

Pretoria deems that the deployment of a United Nations mission is a calming influence to the

Syrian issue. Nonetheless, South Africa is concerned about unbalanced approaches to the

situation, and it supports that the threat of sanctions by the Security Council against the

Government of Syria without realistically allowing any action to be taken against the armed

opposition, would only permit that this side defies the six-point plan without consequences.

Thus, Pretoria calls for a continuation of the UNSMIS, as a critical part of the effort to find a

solution in Syria, which should therefore continue its work in one form or another (UNSC

S/PV.6810, 2012).

5. QUESTIONS TO PONDER

1) How can the Security Council help implement the Special Envoy six-point peace

plan and the Geneva Accords in the context of the current situation in Syria?

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2) Should the Council extend UNSMIS mandate in order to help Syria in the

implementation of the agreed international plans?

3) How can the Council deal with Syria’s stockpile of chemical and biological

weapons?

4) Should the Council impose sanctions or other consequences in case of Syrian

government’s non-compliance? What about the consequences for the armed

opposition non-compliance?

5) How can the Council deal with the flow of external influence entering into Syria

through bilateral parties?

REFERENCES

AL JAZEERA. Interactive: Timeline of Syria unrest. Al Jazeera, Middle East, 29 March

2012. Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2012/02/

201225111654512841.html>. Last access: 16 April 2012.

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