Igor Kovač: The Power Structure of the Post Cold War International System

© Igor Kovač, 2012All rights reserved.

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KOVAČ, Igor, 1984- The power structure of the post cold war international system / Igor Kovač. - 1. natis. - Ljubljana : eBesede, 2012

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Igor Kovač

THE POWER STRUCTURE OF THE POST COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank my family and Manja for their support in pursuing my vo-cation; Katy for language comments; president Gaiser for expanding my geopolitical horizons; professor Neuhold for his guidance and patience; professor Bučar, professor Csurgai, and professor Petrič for their comments. You all have been a big part of my research and work, thank you.

Table of Contents

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

2. Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .172 .1 Neoclassical Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .192 .2 Realism – Constructivism Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .272 .3 The Definition of Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .292 .4 Power factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35

3. Theories and Concepts of the Power Structure of the Post Cold War International System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .413 .1 New World Order, Unipolarity and Multipolarity . . . . . . . . . . . . .483 .2 Uni-multipolarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .643 .3 Through Non-polarity to Bipolarity Again? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .733 .4 International Relations Repeating – from Bipolarity

to Bipolarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81

4 Economic Power Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .834 .1 Today’s Economic Power Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92

5. Other Power Facotrs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .955 .1 Military Power Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .955 .2 Political Power Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1065 .3 Ideological Power Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1095 .4 Amalgamation of Power Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .111

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Preface

The international system, in all its anarchy, is a very dynamic and almost unpredictable process. History is its main witness. Despite such dyna-

mism, some concepts and elements are static: these are states and their strug-gle to survive, be sovereign and have power. In order to achieve and guaran-tee these basic goods, each state has to possess certain leverage(s); whether economic, political, military or ideological. These four factors, which the author describes, analyses and causal-consecutive intertwines, are rudiments for understanding the world geopolitics and changes in international system. Moreover, if we know these axioms, I dare say that unpredictability can no longer threaten state’s fate in international system.

The author addresses these changes in the international system through the lance of polarity and ventures to predict its future development. On the basis of several case studies, he is unequivocally substantiating different concepts of international system in different periods. His research about ‘polarity theories’ in international system can be indubitably seen as a new approach towards studying of international relations. When speaking of polarity, we have always had in our mind a political perception of polarity. But the author gives us other aspect, which is for sure a good basis for future academic exploration, i.e. economic polarity. It is a very interesting interpre-tation which he offers us that we are stepping towards economic bipolarity, but grounded with same real-political elements – power, interest, sovereignty, survival and self-help.

The most precious contribution for the theory of international relations is a conceptual finding that a ‘real power’ can be fully and most entirely meas-ured through and with four power factors – economic, military, political and ideological. In these times this is more than true, because we cannot measure the ‘real power’ only through military means or economic power. Political

6. Prediction and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113

Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .117

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activity and engagement, especially and mainly in the field of foreign affairs, and ideological penetration are of crucial importance. Two examples, China’s and Russia’s foreign policy and their actions, confirm this assumption.

One relevant point of view needs to be put forward; this is the relevance of neoclassical realism in today’s world. After the end of the Cold War it was assumed by many academics and experts that the theory of realism and its derivates have come to an end. What the author set forth in conclusion is the opposite – neoclassical realism as a derivate of realism, with certain theoretical corrections, is still very alive. Power in all its forms and as its main element is still relevant in today’s international system .

Moreover, some have assumed that immediately after the end of the Cold War, the state, as a fundamental realist unit, was no longer the main and most important international subject and was thus replaced by economic relations (market theory) and explained by theory of constructivism. We should not and cannot accept such simplification. States (representing the political level) and markets (representing the economic level) started to work hand in hand and therefore created a strategic partnership (referred also to as private-public partnership). The author gives such example when analyzing Russia, and more precisely the Gazprom case.

To step aside from theoretic discourse and switch to empirical behavior of states, we can draw some present examples. With the election of new French president, François Hollande, France has immediately turned its economic compass from saving towards investing. This decision sharply influenced the political power redistribution of the European Union and particularly the euro-zone. Newly elected US president, Barack Obama, has chosen China for his first official political visit and thus clearly indicated that US-Asia relations remain main economic potential. Inversely, the US has withdrawn some military resources from Europe and thus showed that Europe is no longer priority number one in US foreign policy. While on the ideological side, we can agree that the US still holds its supremacy not only on ‘soft’ (life style) but also on ‘hard’ (moral) ideological part. Neither ever more assertive Indian Bollywood can cope with American ideological industry.

The author’s conclusion suggests that the world and international system are moving towards bipolarity once again, but disguised in a more sophis-

ticated form. That is, on the one hand democratic capitalism, and on the other autocratic capitalism. We will probably not witness military sustained bipolarity but economically preserved bipolarity . But this bipolarity is de-pendent on several premises, of which political and ideological will play very significant role.

The present book will uncover to reader that the so called ‘New world order’ is not yet to come. We cannot expect the international system to change on a systemic level – elementary state’s concepts cannot be surpassed or replaced, such as geography, natural endowment and neighbors. Neither can new paradigms change or replace state’s role in the international system, such as globalization, multinational companies or international market. We can only expect changes in power perception and (re)distribution of means of power. What that will be, I invite you to attentively read the book in your hands .

Laris GaiserPresident Euro Mediterranean University

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1. Introduction

Henry Kissinger begins his famous book Diplomacy (1994, 17) with the following words: »Almost as if according to some natural law, in

every century there seems to emerge a country with the power, the will, and the intellectual and moral impetus to shape the entire international system accordance with its own values.«

The end of the Cold War, a significant milestone in international history, led to a wave of questions related to the power structure of the new interna-tional system. The present work addresses two of these questions; what is the power structure of the post Cold War international system and what kind of balance of power do we have today?

My goal is to find the distribution of power in the current international system . This is a rather ambitious goal since there are several prominent au-thors who disagree about the nature of this distribution. Specifically, various assessments have been made since the fall of the Berlin Wall regarding the power structure of the post Cold War international system. These assessments include the theories of unipolarity, multipolarity, uni-multipolarity, non-po-larity and bipolarity. The present work is devoted to clarifying these different theories and finding a convergence among them. The motivation behind it is to bring clarity, order and sense into the discourse of power relations after the end of the Cold War. The goal is to bring transparency into the debate, and establish which theories have been developed and why, while examining in what specific moment of the last 20 years they did emerge, what they claim, and what correlation they have to other ideas.

The analysis is composed in two parts. The first part is mainly theoretical: defining power and analysing the different theories of the power structure of the post Cold War international system. Its purpose, by analysing existing literature, is to provide insight into the development of different ideas and

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theories of the power structure of the post Cold War international system in history .

The second part is primarily empirical, where a comparison of current eco-nomic, military, political, and ideological power factors, using primary sources, of different actors in the international system is made. In other words, I will pres-ent what kind of structure we are facing in the contemporary international sys-tem (today’s balance of power) and what may we expect in the near future.

Each of these two parts contains a main idea. First, I will argue that the timeline of the development of the different assessments of the power struc-ture of the post Cold War international system − multipolarity, unipolarity, uni-multipolarity, non-polarity − reflects a specific and brief moment in the history of the last 20 years. Namely, the power structure of the post Cold War world was not static and universal, but rather volatile and specific. The power structure has changed several times in the last two decades, providing us with the main reason why an academic consensus regarding the nature of the contemporary world has not yet been reached.

In the second empirical part I will venture into speculation of a possible future structure. Since there are many unknowns, especially regarding the internal development of certain actors, and since the international system has shifted several times in the last two decades, any prediction lacks credibility. Nevertheless, with the conversion of different ideas and with a holistic geopo-litical analysis I will venture into the future and deduct a vision of the coming international system. My speculation is that the future power structure of the post Cold War international system will be a bipolar one, as the polarity will be represented by two concepts of global governance: democratic capitalism on the one hand and autocratic capitalism on the other .

A detailed structure of the book is the following: First, a theoretical frame-work and a definition of power will be presented. The theoretical basis for my analysis is a rather new international relations theory: a contemporary debate about fusing realism and constructivism into a new theory – realist constructivism or constructivist realism. This theory will be built on the points of neo-classical realism, which unites both classical and structural realism. This theoretical amalgam will provide a unique possibility to capture and encompass the notion of power.

Thus, the definition of power will be based on Barnett and Duvall’s defi-nition (2005) which built on the concept of ‘four faces of power’, claiming that there are two analytical dimensions of power: firstly – ‘power over’ – the idea that power works through social relations of interaction; and secondly – ‘power to’ – meaning that power works in the social relations of constitution (Barnett and Duvall 2008, 10). They claim that such a power definition has four different power dimensions – compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 12). However, these dimensions are very difficult to measure. Therefore, in my analysis I will supplement this definition with a more measurable perception of power from Mann (2005), who analyses four types of power: military, economic, political and ideolog-ical (Mann 2005, 13). I will refer to these types of power as power factors, since a true notion of power is only found in their conglomerate. Neverthe-less, the methodology of making a power conglomerate from these power factors has not yet been made. It is a deficiency of social science, which has not yet found a way to fully incorporate quantitative and qualitative analyses into one conglomerate. I fully acknowledge this problem and I am aware of biased qualitative methodology, which I will partially address. Yet, I have to stress that my intention is to carry out a holistic investigation of a topic which lacked such an approach for a long time.

Second, an overview of the analysis of the power structure of the post Cold War international system, and its evolution throughout the period since the fall of the Berlin Wall will be made. I will present the different con-cepts of: ‘new world order’, multipolarity, unipolarity, uni-multipolarity, and non-polarity. Critical analysis of these concepts will be made with a special focus on the reasons that lead to a particular theory being presented at a specific moment of the post Cold War international system. Hereby, I will conclude the theoretical presentation and will continue with the empirical section .

Third, I will analyse the level of power factors which specific actors in international relations possess. The result will enable me to draw a conclusion about the nature of the power structure of the post Cold War international system. The main focus of the book will therefore be on the third level of analysis – systemic analysis (Waltz 1959). However, I will enter the sphere

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of the second level (Waltz 1959) as well – the internal level of states – when analysing the power factors of a particular actor in international relations and the political decisions of state leaders. In this part, power factors will be presented – economic, military, political, and ideological . Although one has to take all of the power factors into consideration in order to get a holistic view of the power of certain actors in international relations, the fact is that some power factors are more relevant than others. Notably, in the past mili-tary was the essential factor. I will argue that after the end of the Cold War, it is the economic factor of power which plays the dominant role. Therefore, I will focus on this factor in a separate chapter. Thus, I will analyse the con-temporary economic power structure of the world, focusing on several major actors i.e. the US, China, the EU and Russia. In this part economic figures will be compared and qualitatively analysed.

Fourth, the other three power factors (military, political, and ideological) will be analysed in a similar way as the economic one, in order to supplement the picture which the economic power factor will draw. Furthermore, based on these conclusions, I will present my vision of the power structure of the post Cold War international system .

Fifth, a projection of the future power structure of the international system will be made. I will argue that it is again bipolarity that awaits us. One has to stress that there are a lot of unknowns, especially in the internal situation of the analysed players in the international community. Therefore, every projection has to be viewed with all possible scepticism. Moreover, the data and facts which are presented were gathered and analysed in April 2012; so some new facts have inevitably occurred since. Unfortunately, they are not taken into consideration, but may have importance for such an analysis.

To conclude the introduction, Dr . Otto von Habsburg once said that the only thing you learn from history is that no one learns anything from his-tory. The present work analyses theoretical and practical history of the last two and a half decades. A serious attempt was made to avoid the challenge pointed by the Archduke and that my assessments will contribute to deeper understanding of the world to come.

2. Theoretical Framework

Power is the key concept of international relations theory. Different the-ories of international relations perceive power differently. As already

noted, the theoretical framework of this analysis will be derived from ne-oclassical realism to which an aspect of constructivism will be added.

There are three core elements of realism i.e. statism, survival, and self-help (Dunne and Schmidt 2006, 163). Moreover, different realist schools also have several crucial concerns in common, namely, they share questions about power and security in international relations, the role of human egoism and the potential for anarchy in the international system (Simoniti 1998, 12).

Statism refers to the realist notion that the state is the main actor in the international relations and sovereignty is its distinguished trait (Dunne and Schmidt 2006, 172). Sovereignty means that, within its territorial space, the state has supreme authority to make and enforce laws (Weber 1919). In the in-ternational community the story is a bit different – there is no sovereign, which makes international community anarchic (Dunne and Schmidt 2006, 172). In realism, states are the only actors that ‘count’ . Transnational corporations, international organisations, terrorist organisations and non-governmental organisations may rise and fall, but the state is the one permanent feature in the landscape of modern global politics (Dunne and Schmidt 2006, 173).

Survival of a state is seen by realists as a precondition for attaining all other goals (Dunne and Schmidt 2006, 174). Beyond the survival motive, the aims of states may be endlessly varied (Waltz 1979, 91). However, a nation’s survival is the first and ultimate responsibility; it cannot be compromised or

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put to risk (Kissinger 1977, 204). Therefore, the realists evoke Machiavel-li’s perception of two different ethical systems. The realm of international politics requires different moral and political rules from those which apply in domestic politics – protect the state at all cost, even if this may mean the sacrifice of one’s own citizens (Dunne and Schmidt 2006, 174). This notion may be easily misused. State leaders may, under the veil of national security and survival of the state, pursue certain actions and enact policies that are overreacting and not necessary, and therefore morally questionable. Such a debate arose when the US introduced the Patriot Act in 2001, the Bush Doctrine in 2002, and the drone attacks by president Obama since 2009.

Self-help denotes the only concept through which a state may realize its security (Dunne and Schmidt 2006, 175). In an anarchical structure of interna-tional system self-help is necessarily the principle of action (Waltz 1979, 111). Therefore, states cannot rely and trust others to guarantee their survival: they can be certain only about their own actions (Dunne and Schmidt 2006, 176). The self-help principle may lead to a ‘security dilemma’, where increasing armament of one state forces other states to increase their armament as well; and that triggers a spiral of events. A structural notion in which states attempt to use the self-help principle to look after their security needs tend, regardless of intention, leads to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening (Herz 1950, 157). Robert Jervis (1978) gives the example of Germany and Britain before World War I. An argument against the usefulness of this concept would be the role of collective defence organisations like NATO; however, collective defence does not provide security within the alliance as the conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus has proved. Although there was no armed conflict between these two states, which could also be attributed to NATO, the fact remains that by definition, collective defence organisations cannot protect states within the alliance from another internal attacker. Furthermore, another counter argument to the principle of self-help is collective security. Yet, there are very few suc-cessful cases of collective security. Therefore, the concept of self-help remains relevant, no matter how dangerous it may be due to the ‘security dilemma’.

Elman recognizes six types of realism (2008, 16): classical realism, neore-alism, rise and fall realism, neoclassical realism, offensive structural realism

and defensive structural realism. The last four are sometimes referred to as contemporary realism (Elman 2008, 16). Yet my view on the issue is a bit different. There are three different approaches in the grand theory of realism i.e. classical realism, neorealism (within it, one can find offensive structural realism and defensive structural realism), and contemporary realism (which contains different modern realistic schools). Neoclassical realism thus folds into contemporary realism .

Since this work focuses on the third level of analysis – the international system – one could argue that the theoretical framework of the book should be based on neorealism. However, the structural approach of that theory cannot explain certain important events in international affairs; namely, the internal reasons in the Soviet Union for end of the Cold War. Furthermore, structural realism is not fully compatible with the second part of my analysis, in which I focus on states and their sources of power. Yet, classical realism is also not useful, since it overlooks some types of power (structural and cultural power; i.e. soft power).

Thus, a bridge between neorealism and classical realism has to be made. The theory that enables the building of that bridge is neoclassical realism (Dunne and Schmidt 2006, 170–2). Neoclassical realism continues the tradi-tion of classical realism, claiming that states depend on their own internal po-tential (Williams 2008, 25), and it brings these internal factors into a broader structural relationship within the international system. States differ not only in their interests, but also in their ability to make use of their resources and capacities (Dunne and Schmidt 2006, 170–2).

Neoclassical realism bridges the gap between both of the major realist pre-decessors – classical realism and neorealism . In neoclassical realism, agency, usually attributed to state leaders, plays a crucial role (Dunne and Schmidt 2006, 170–2) – and in this sense the theory is close to constructivism as well.

2.1 Neoclassical Realism

The theory of neoclassical realism is a product of a theoretical debate after the end of the Cold War. This event exposed the shortcomings of Waltz’s

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neorealism: the Soviet Union collapsed from within, something neorealism cannot explain. Some critics of realism proclaimed that realism was dead (Kegley 1993; Lebow 1994), while some realists went on to blindly defend Waltz’s neorealism (Mearsheimer 1994/1995; Vasquez 1997). Through this debate, a new type of realism emerged that refined, rather than refuted Waltz’s neorealism (Schweller 1997).

Schweller argues that the ‘hard core’ of realism remains unchanged; however, it is the ‘protective belt’ of realism that has to be adapted to the new challenges:

»When anomaly does appear, or ambiguity arises as the realist perspective is applied to new areas of interests, or when empirical or experimental work is undertaken to improve the explanatory and pre-dictive precision and power of different auxiliary hypotheses, change takes place in the ‘protective’ belt, but it must not occur in the hard core (Schweller 1997, 927).«

Every theory has core elements which represent its foundations. On these foundations, different authors built different theories, which are then subject to the changes mentioned above by Schweller within the ‘protective belt’. The ‘protective belt’ is a sphere of theory that is in constant change and is adapting to the new elements of international relations. Core elements however, are not touched by the day-to-day changes in international affairs. The argument is that the ‘hard core’ of the realist school of thought consists not of Waltz’s structural balancing proposition, as neorealists would argue. Waltz’s theory folds into the ‘protective belt’ of the idea that may and should be subject to revision. The ‘hard core’ of realism, neoclassical realists argue, is seven assumptions of international politics (Schweller and Priess 1997, 6−8):

1 . Humans do not face one another primarily as individuals but as mem-bers of groups that command their loyalty (Gilpin 1986, 304−5; Gilpin 1996, 7) .

2 . International affairs take place in a state of anarchy.

3 . Power is the fundamental feature of international politics (Morgenthau 1985); it is the currency of international politics that is required to secure any national goal, whether mastery over the world or simply fulfilment of the wish to be left alone.

4 . The nature of international interaction is essentially conflictual: »A world without struggle would be a world in which life had ceased to exist (Spykman 1942, 12).«

5 . Human-kind cannot transcend conflict through the progressive power of reason to discover a science of peace (Morgenthau 1946, 90−5).

6 . Politics are not a function of ethics; morality is the product of power (Carr 2001, 63−4; Spykman 1942, 18).

7 . Necessity and reason of state trump morality and ethics when these values conflict (Wolfers 1962, 244).

One can see the resemblance of these seven points to the Morgenthau’s (1985, 4−17) famous six principles of realism:

1 . Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is gov-erned by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.

2 . The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power.

3 . Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category, which is universally valid, but does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all.

4 . Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political ac-tion .

5 . Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particu-lar nation with the moral laws that govern the universe.

6 . The difference, between political realism and other schools of thought is real, and it is profound.

The main point of neoclassical realists’ is that it is not the neorealist assumptions that are at the core of realist theory, but the classical realist

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assumptions . Neorealism is in the ‘protective belt’, and not a theory or a paradigm on its own. Therefore, it can be adapted without undermining the foundations of the grand theory.

Neoclassical realism explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realist thought (Rose 1998, 146). International relations are a two way street – statesmen shape the international community with their policies that are than implemented by a state, and then the environment – the international system – influences these statesmen in their policy making, which is a sub-jective perception of reality in international affairs. Neoclassical realists argue that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities (Rose 1998, 146). Recent research by neoclassical realists does not disprove Waltz’s balancing proposition; rather, these works have tended to add unit-level variables in order to transform Waltz’s theory of international politics into one of foreign policy (Schweller 1997, 927). In other words, Waltz’s theory and neorealism, is only a single lane on the two-way street.

Neorealists treat all states as ‘satisfied with the status-quo’ powers that seek primarily to maximize their security rather than their power (Schweller 1997, 929). There is a slight difference between the offensive and defensive neoreal-ists; the first group argues that states seek to maximise power in order to provide security, and the second argues that states seek to maximise their security.

Offensive realism assumes that international anarchy is generally Hob-besian, i.e., that apart from situations of bipolarity or nuclear deterrence, security is scarce and states try to achieve it by maximizing their relative advantage (Mearsheimer 2001). In the offensive realist world, rational states pursuing security are prone to taking actions that can lead to conflict with others; and usually do (Mearsheimer 1990). Domestic differences among states are considered to be relatively unimportant because pressures from the international system are assumed to be strong and straightforward enough to make similarly situated states behave alike, regardless of their internal characteristics (Rose 1998, 149). To understand why a state is behaving in a particular way, offensive realists suggest one should examine its relative

capabilities and its external environment, because those factors will be trans-lated relatively smoothly into foreign policy and shape the opinion on how the state chooses to advance its interests (Mearsheimer 1994/1995). A recent example is Russia and its conflict with Georgia in 2008. Russian security was not threatened by Georgia; it was the Georgian will to restore its sov-ereignty over the two secessionist provinces, and to provide an alternative route of transporting energy resources from Central Asia to the West which bothered Russia. This restoration of sovereignty would undermine the power of Russia, and that was the backbone of the conflict and root of the Russian motive – maximising power.

Defensive neorealism assumes that international anarchy is often more benign i.e., that security is often plentiful rather than scarce and that normal states can understand this or learn it over time from experience (Brooks 1997). In defensive neorealism, rational states pursue security and can often afford to be relaxed, bestirring themselves only to respond to external threats, which are rare – they balance against threats (Walt 1987). Foreign policy activity is the record of rational states reacting properly to clear systemic incentives, coming into conflict only in those circumstances when the security dilemma is heightened to a fever pitch (Rose 1998, 149−50). But this dance is repeatedly interrupted, according to defensive realists, by rogue states that misread or ignore the true security-related incentives offered by their environment (Rose 1998, 149−50). A contemporary example is North Korea and its dealing with its nuclear program. Western states see it as a threat and thus they wish to balance the threat. When the nuclear program did not exist, North Korea did not appear on the threat-radar-screens in the West. However, North Korea does not play by the balancing rules, nor does it consider imposed sanctions as a threat .

Schweller argues (1996) that the ‘balancing status-quo neorealist bias’ overlooks the main protagonists of balance-of-power theory that is repre-sented by revisionist; dissatisfied powers that seek to expand their power at the expense of others. Without these states there would be little need for security (or security studies) in world politics (Schweller 1996). Therefore, Schweller (1996) talks about the balance of interests, which go beyond the idea of self-preservation, the focal point for neorealists. States are not only in-terested in the status quo balance of power and security, but also as Raymond

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Aron (1966, 598) pointed out, all great states have jeopardized their survival to gain ulterior objectives. A good example is Germany under the Third Re-ich. Its foreign policy and actions went beyond the struggle for security and balance of power; it followed a long-term goal that also meant the end of that entity in international affairs, thus having a completely different result from the logic of security seeking and balance of power would assume.

Neoclassical realists agree with neorealists that states use balance of power to preserve themselves; however, neoclassical realists do not stop there (Schweller 1997, 929). They also stress striving for power and the profit of agencies within the state in their analysis . Neorealism includes some general assumptions about the motivations of individual states, but does not purport to explain their behav-iour in great detail or in all cases (Rose 1998, 145). Statesmen have a profound influence on state behaviour, therefore, for example, the power and aspirations of Napoleon contributed a great deal to the French foreign policy and struggle for dominance at the end of 18th and early 19th centuries.

For neoclassical realists, foreign policy choices are made by actual political leaders and elites, and so it is their perceptions of relative power that matter, not simply relative quantities of physical resources or forces in being (Rose 1998, 147). Unlike standard balance of power theory as articulated by Waltz and other structural realists, in which states respond in a timely and systematic way to dangerous changes in relative power, neoclassical realism presents a more elaborate causal chain of how policy adjustments to changes in relative power occur. Specifically, changes in the relative power mean a change in elite consensus about the nature of the threat and the degree of elite cohesion; the final step in changing foreign policy depends on mobilization hurdles as a function of regime vulnerability and social cohesion (Schweller 2004, 169). Again turning to the Third Reich – when Germany gained its economic and military power at the end of the 1930’s the narrative in its foreign policy changed. However, they did not adapt their military strategy of Blitzkrieg for Operation Barbarossa, even though the invasion of Poland and Western Europe showed its deficiencies, hurdles, and vulnerability of such an approach.

Thus, neoclassical realists believe that understanding the links between power and policy requires close examination of the contexts within which foreign policies are formulated and implemented (Rose 1998, 147).

Instead of assuming that states seek security, neoclassical realists assume that states respond to the uncertainties of international anarchy by seeking to control and shape their external environment (Rose 1998, 152). The state’s objective is not only security, but the implementation of their interests and their vision of the international system. Security is indeed one of interests, however it is not the only one, and it is not the only motive for the actions of states in international affairs. Neoclassical realism sees states as much more active than neorealism which sees states more as reactionist actors that re-spond to the threats to status quo. Regardless of the myriad of ways in which states may define their interests in order to want more rather than less external influence and pursue such influence to the extent that they are able to do so, the central empirical prediction of neoclassical realism is that as a state’s relative power rises, it will seek more influence abroad, and as it falls, its actions and ambitions will be scaled back accordingly (Rose 1998, 152).

Whether states balance against threats is not primarily determined by systemic factors but rather, like all national security decisions, by the domes-tic political process (Schweller 2004, 166). A typical example of different domestic perceptions of a threat is the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, where President Kennedy received five different pieces of advice from different administration officials, ranging from doing nothing to full-scale invasion of Cuba (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 111−6). So, the question arises – what is the difference between classical realism and neoclassical realism?

The key points of classical realism were already introduced in the com-parison of Schweller’s and Priess’s basic principles to Morgenthau’s key points of realism. However, there is one major difference between classical and neoclassical realism. One of the crucial assumptions of classical realism is that states are rational players (Elman 2008, 18) . National interest is per-ceived as completely rational, thus enabling a theoretical understanding of politics (Morgenthau 1985, 5−10). However, as Carr wrote (2001, 87), pure realism and pure rationality is impossible. National interest is not always rationally defined; states sometimes behave as irrational actors. A case that immediately comes to mind is the Serbian ‘obsession’ with Kosovo. This is what neoclassical realism understands and takes into consideration, and classical realism cannot explain it. Such a stand opens the door to a more

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constructivist analysis of international relations, which alongside material rationality sees relevance also in the values, human emotions and personal perceptions of actors. There is nothing rational about Serbian perception of the Kosovo issue; it is the result of emotions and historical memories that are very important for an Orthodox nation like Serbia.

Neoclassical realism builds on the complex relationship between state and society found in classical realism without sacrificing the central insight of neorealist balance of power theory (Sterling-Folker 1997, 4−8). Like classical realism, neoclassical realism holds that state power varies across states and across different historical periods (Sterling-Folker 1997, 4−8). Yet, like neorealism, neoclassical realism maintains that the international envi-ronment in which states interact is the primary determinant of their interests and behaviours (Sterling-Folker 1997, 4−8).

Neoclassical realism challenges important elements of classical realism and neorealism (Rose 1998 150−1). Table 1 (Rose 1998, 154) compares classical realism (innenpolitik theories), defensive realism, offensive realism and neoclassical realism . Only neoclassical realism combines internal and systematic factors in its system analysis and is thus the most appropriate to be used as a basis for a holistic power definition.

2.2 Realism – Constructivism Debate

Neoclassical realism is setting the stage for a debate between realism and constructivism. Constructivism is a theory of international relations which emphasizes the social nature of international relations, and the view that the structure of international relations shapes the actors and their identities and interests (Wendt 1995, 71–2) – human structures are determined mainly by shared ideas rather than material forces.

Realism and Constructivism are two opposing theories of international rela-tions. Constructivist criticism of realism is that it is over-deterministic and that it does not take into consideration the power of ideas, social structures and the human factor in politics (Gilpin 2001, 19–20). However, without some degree of determinism and materialism of realism, constructivism is in real danger of becoming what Fred Halliday calls ‘presentism (everything is new)’; and without some degree of constructivist social historicism, realism can fall prey to ‘trans-historical complacency (nothing is new)’ (Halliday 1996, 324).

As neoclassical realism points out, there is room for a debate between the two approaches. Even Wendt, who analyses international affairs through constructivism, brought a realistic notion of a state and its power as the main actor and issue in international relations into his theory (Wendt 1999) .

I will argue further that some aspects of constructivism are shared with realism . Human nature, identity, symbols, values, emotions, spirituality and religion are crucial in international relations. It does not make realism less realistic; it is quite the opposite. Taking into consideration the factors that are relevant for foreign and security policy is making realism more ‘realistic’ and closer to the truth. What is more ‘realistic’ than a diplomacy in which the human factor plays an enormous role? One could even argue that there are no international relations, only diplomacy .

Realism and constructivism need one another to correct their own worst excesses (Sterling-Folker 2002, 74). Thus, the establishment of neoclassical realism triggered a debate between realism and constructivism. One of the protagonists of this debate is Samuel Barkin, whose arguments amount to a call for a ‘realist-constructivism’ – a realism that takes norms and ideas seri-ously as objects of analysis (Barkin 2003). The realist constructivism would

Table 1: Comparison of four realistic theories (Rose 1998, 154)

Theory

View of international system View of units Causal logic

Innenpolitik theories (classical realism)

unimportant highly differentiated

internal factors → foreign policy

Defensive realism occasionally important; anarchy’s implications variable

highly differentiated

systemic incentives (independent variable) or internal factors (independent variable) → foreign policy

Neoclassical realism important; anarchy is murky

differentiated systemic incentives (independent variable) or internal factors (intervenining variable) → foreign policy

Offensive realism very important; anarchy is Hobbesian

undifferentiated systemic incentives → foreign policy

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look at the way in which power structures affect patterns of normative change in international relations and conversely, the way in which a particular set of norms affects power structures (Barkin 2003, 337). Realist constructivism could study the relationship between normative structures, the carriers of political morality, and uses of power (Barkin 2003, 338). Consequently, as a result, realist constructivism could address issues of change in international relations that no other theory can . By doing so, realist constructivism could fill a gap in the current international relations theory (Barkin 2003, 338). Barkin’s vision is not the establishment of a theory about how international politics works, but the establishment of a method for studying international politics . This means that realist constructivism should be understood as a set of practices, procedures, or guidelines for inquiry into the substantive problems of inter-national relations (Bially Mattern 2004, 343−4).

Realism and constructivism should be combined – through including eth-ics and morality, which would silence realist critiques who say that realism lacks ethics (Barkin 2003). What a realist-constructivist combination promis-es to reveal is that even though morality is socially and culturally constructed, both have a power application (Sterling-Folker 2004, 342). Jackson and Nexon argue differently; i.e. that a realist-constructivist combination should be positioned closer to the postmodern end of the constructivist spectrum (Jackson and Nexon 2004). They reject both anarchy and human nature as appropriate places to start, arguing that any discussion of realist-constructivist fundamentals must begin with power (Jackson and Nexon 2004). It would seem that this debate is in line with the question: ‘Which came first, the chicken or the egg?’ However, it has a theoretical justification. Anarchy and human nature are both only ‘one lane’ on the ‘two way street’ of international relations theory – anarchy being stressed by neorealists and human nature by classical realists. On the other hand, power is a concept that encompass ‘both lanes’ and therefore is holistic and the most appropriate concept to start bridging the gap between the two paradigms. Moreover, we will see later on via the definition of power that this is a concept where the fusion between realism and constructivism is most needed and most applicable .

Whatever the approach for bringing realism and constructivism together, the theoretical collaboration between seemingly contradictory approaches like

realism and constructivism can only be achieved if there is already an ontological common ground (Sterling-Folker 2002, 75). Establishing this common ground demands comparisons which focus on the most contradictory elements of the the-ories in question and the ontological sources for those elements (Sterling-Folker 2002, 74). It also demands adopting what Ernst Haas and Peter Haas refer to as a pragmatic version of theoretical tolerance, which acknowledges, accepts and respects difference on the grounds that one’s own ‘social construction of reality cannot be proved superior to anyone else’s’ (Haas, and Hass 2002, 90) .

I agree with Jackson and Nexon that one should perceive power as an area in which realists and constructivists can find a common ground. Namely, all the theories mentioned (realism, constructivism and realist-constructivism) are faced with the same problem – what is power? Although, neither Barnett and Duvall (2005), nor Mann (2005) mention a realist-constructivist debate, I argue that their definitions of power and power factors can contribute to bridging the gap between realism and constructivism.

2.3 The Definition of Power

Since the early days of international relations theory, power has been a crucial concept to define. Classical realists define it as a goal (Morgenthau 1985) and an ability of actor A to make actor B do things that it otherwise would not do (Dahl 1957, 202−3). In this classical perception of power, power is seen as a midway point between influence and force (Schwarzenberger 1941, 14). Power distinguishes itself from influence by reliance on external pressure as a background threat (influence may be achieved without a threat in the background), and from force by preference for achieving its ends without the use of physical pressure (Schwarzenberger 1941, 14).

Bachrach and Baratz (1962) broadened Dahl’s power definition while analyzing the decision making process and concluded that power lies in the ability of A to make B do what A wants it to (Dahl’s definition), and also in the ability to say no (structural power) – the dynamics of non-decision-mak-ing. The manner in which A makes B do certain things was broadened as well. Namely, B may do what A wants not only because A has an authority

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over B, but it also may be the case that B likes A and wants to please it. B may have certain affection towards A (sharing the values) and thus is ready to do what A wants even though otherwise it would not. Therefore, B may do what A wants because of A’s authority over B, or because B feels certain affection towards A. This gave the basis for the concept of soft power that was developed by Joseph Nye in the 1990’s. With their soft power, stronger states establish a structure of narrative and behaviour that other states fol-low. Therefore, states possessing soft power are able to influence the overall structure of the international system. Nye defines soft power as a subtle power of cooptation (Nye 1990, 153–71). A state’s soft power is similar to parents raising their children and giving them certain patterns of behaviour (Nye 1990, 153–71). It influences the deeds and standpoints of another state not by force, as would be hard power (military and economic), but by more subtle measures such as culture and ideology (Nye 1990, 153–71). One of the best examples of soft power is the US, which with its popular culture, language, and corporations created an attractive image across the world.

The Bachrach and Baratz concept of softer manners on how A influences B opened additional questions of authority. Does A need to have authority over the government of B, over the people of B, or both? An example of this is the good relationship between the George Walker Bush administration of the US and the Topolanek government in the Czech Republic. Although in Czech public opinion anti-Americanism was growing, Topolanek was a strong supporter of the ‘missile defence system’ (Waisová 2011, 111−3). Although support for the project contributed to the fall of his government; ultimately it was the Obama administration that terminated the project (Mis-sile defense critics welcome Czech govt’s fall 2009).

Moreover, Bachrach and Baratz (1975, 900) wrote:

»[...] the major assumption upon which the concept [of power] is grounded: in a reasonably stable polity, power is mainly exercised not by those who make decisions nor by those who decide agendas, but by persons and groups who direct their energy to shaping or reinforcing predominant norms, precedents, myths, institutions, and procedures that undergird and characterize the political process.«

Bachrach and Baratz have created a so-called ‘two faces of power’ con-cept. They note that sociologists find power highly centralized, while political scientists characterize it as widely diffused (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 947). Yet, neither notion gives the whole picture, emphasizing why both aspects are relevant. The first face of power has to deal with the exercise of power on critical issues – the ability of A to make B do certain things (Dahl’s defini-tion). The second face of power is the restrictive face of power – non-decision making (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 952) – meaning that influence is used to limit the scope of discussion or to prevent conflicts from ever being brought to the foreground. A typical example of the non-decision making power is the ‘veto’ in the Security Council.

Bachrach and Baratz (1962) stress the importance of combining both faces of power to fully understand it. Similarly, Nye, in 2009, developed a concept of ‘smart’ power – a combination of soft and hard power (Nye 2009). Furthermore, Thomas Friedman (2000, 464) wrote: »The hidden hand of market cannot function without the hidden fist.«

In the 1970’s, in the time of anti-colonial and independence movements, a ‘third face of power’ was conceptualised, which illustrates that a full con-cept of power should include both subjective interests and ‘real’ (objective) interests that might be held also by those excluded by the political process (Lukes 1974, 25). The question of what is objective and subjective interest is difficult to answer. Wendt (1999, 234) defines objective interests as a nor-mative national interests – what states should do, and subjective interest as a preference – what states actually do. The first is independent of perceptions (Kratochwil 1982). Objective interests are not only guidelines for action, but causal powers that predispose states to act in certain ways (Wendt 1999, 234). An objective interest is like a gravity that pulls a certain state into a certain direction. In this analogy, the wind represents the subjective interest that may blow the state in completely different direction than gravity pulls it. However, in the long run, the objective interest can be deducted. For example: Germany’s objective national interest is to be the dominant po-litical-economic factor in Central Europe; and through the Franco-German alliance the dominant political-economic actor in the ever closer and ever stronger EU. In the past the subjective interest blew Germany towards the

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two far ends – to the Urals and to the notion that Germany does not need a foreign policy and military.

In 1990’s the ‘fourth face of power’ was added to the conceptualisation of power. It further widens the power spectrum – tackling the problem of identifying when power is present (Digeser 1992, 980). The fourth face of power postulates that subjectivity or individuality is not biologically given (Digeser 1992, 980). Subjects are understood as social constructions, whose formation can be historically described (Digeser 1992, 980). This fourth face is based on Foucault’s philosophy, thus power is linked with the con-struction of A’s and B’s (Digeser 1992, 980). This face of power is useful when analysing transit countries. Several newly independent states, which emerged after the end of the Cold War, are facing the problem of framing and managing their own foreign policy. For example, Slovenia was never independent until 1991, thus it was and still is facing a challenge to recog-nise and internalize its national interest, while independently managing its foreign policy according to the necessities of statesmanship. So, according to this ‘fourth face of power’, power in and over Slovenia lies within the entity which can construct Slovenian national interest.

Stemming from such a conception of power is an analysis of truth and knowledge that has troubling implications for the epistemological basis of empirical social science (Digeser 1992, 1005). From this notion of power a description of the formation of norms and practices can also be derived, which raises difficult questions for those who simply take norms and practices as given in the construction of political theory (Digeser 1992, 1005). Finally, from such an understanding of power comes a focus upon how our self-under-standing is produced, which engenders resistance to and expansion of the tra-ditional subject of the discipline of political science (Digeser 1992, 1005). In other words, power may only be exercised if a state is aware of its power.

If one combines all ‘Four faces of power’, one gets the holistic perception of power. The different faces of power may be presented like semantic con-centric circles of power; each face enhances the previous one. The first face focuses on decision making (Who, if anyone, is exercising power?), the second expands the power concept with the agenda setting (What issues have been mobilized on or off the agenda and by whom?), the third extends power with

the notion of preference shaping – subjective perception of objective material reality (Whose objective interests are being harmed?), and the fourth face rounds up with the ability to recognise and shape one’s own power (What kind of actor in international affairs is being produced?) (Digeser 1992, 980).

From the concept of the ‘Four faces of power’, Barnett and Duvall (2005) draw their power definition. They argue that power works in various forms and has various expressions that cannot be captured by a single formulation (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 2). The concept of ‘Four faces of power’ evokes the argument that conceptual distinctions of power should be represented in terms of two analytical dimensions that are at the core of the general concept, i.e. the kinds of social relations through which power works; and the specifics of social relations through which effects on actors’ capacities are produced (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 8−9).

The two analytical dimensions may be summed up as ‘power over’ – con-trol over others; and ‘power to’ – who are the actors, what are their capacities, and what are practices they are empowered to undertake (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 10). Such a power definition has four different power dimensions – com-pulsory, institutional, structural, and productive (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 12) . ‘Power over’ and ‘power to’ may be manifested also through four different factors: military, economic, political, and ideological (Mann 2005, 13). These factors are easier to measure than the four power dimensions of Barnett and Du-vall. At least this is the case of military and economic power factors; political and ideological power factors are still quite problematic to measure. Moreover, the power factors are not a simple reflection of power dimensions. Each power dimension is a sort of conglomerate of the four power factors of its own. That is why power dimensions present a methodological challenge in measuring power and furthermore are harder to measure than the power factors.

Moreover, since a methodology of how to combine these four power factors has not yet been invented, I can only provide my solution to this challenge. There are two possibilities – non-positivistic and positivistic. First, make a qualitative analysis of which power factors in the contemporary world are more important than the other and create an amalgam from it; second, give each power factor a weight of influence, and create a mathematical amalgam based on that. However, the latter is still arbitrary and subject

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to one’s perception of importance of a particular power factor. Although admitting the defectiveness of the present work, I will still venture into the non-positivistic qualitative analysis.

One can see the usefulness of my theoretical framework – bringing non-pos-itivistic constructivism and positivistic neoclassical realism closer to one an-other. The presented power definition and power factors do not map precisely different theories of International Relations (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 4). Each theoretical tradition does favour an understanding of power that corresponds to one or the other abovementioned forms (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 4). However, the true nature of power lies in the interface of all the forms of power. It bridges the gap between realism and constructivism in international relations. There-fore, in order to fully grasp the concept of power in theory, a different theoret-ical approach has to be taken into consideration as well: an approach that will cut across traditional fault lines of theories of the international relations. Such a theoretical concept has been presented in the previous chapter – neoclassical realism which is entering the debate between realism and constructivism.

To conclude, the definition of power that is going to be used in the coming analysis is derived from the classical one (Dahl) – power as the ability to alter and channel the behaviour of other states. Since Dahl’s definition does not tell us ‘how’ and ‘why’ a state exercises power over another state, a concept that is relevant for this analysis, my definition continues with Barnett and Duvall’s concept of ‘power to’ and ‘power over’. This was built on Bachrach and Baratz’s, and Freeman’s attribution of power to national will (a state’s perceived propensity to risk using its capabilities to achieve its ends), national strengths (political, cultural, economic and military) and national potential (the capacity of a state to actually apply its capabilities to other states on an issue) (Freeman 2010, 15–21). This definition bridges the gap between real-ism and constructivism. The presented definition of power not only focuses on the material capabilities of a sate, but also on the nature of statesmen (are they able, ready and willing to use the capabilities), and to the results of states actions – the usage of their capabilities. A state’s power is questionable if it cannot control the results of using its capabilities. To measure power, which is my goal in this book, I will actually measure the power factors defined by Mann (2005, 13) – economic, military, political and ideological .

2.4 Power factors

The four power factors that will be part of this analysis are: economic, mil-itary, political and cultural. I will argue that the economic power factor is the most important one after the end of the Cold War. For centuries it was the military power factor that was predominant. However, by the end of the Cold War, the economic factor had become dominant. Strange wrote (1996, 189) that power had shifted sideways from states to markets, thus to non-state authorities deriving power from their market shares. The reasons are globali-sation and the lack of global governance (Sunkel 1995, 135–6). Furthermore, economic power has become more important because of the relative increase in the costs of armed force and the fact that economic objectives loom large in the values of post-industrial societies (Keohane and Nye 2000). Military power is not only based on numbers of soldiers or tanks or guns anymore, but is hidden in the level of sophistication of weapons, which is linked to innovation, research and development, thus to economic performance.

Although globalisation is not a new phenomenon, the nature of globali-sation after the fall of the Berlin Wall is different from the globalisation in the 15th or 19th century (Nayar 2005, 259) . There is one very important difference – the world is more economically (trade and finance) integrated than ever (Nayar 2005, 259) .

The degree of today’s globalisation is much higher than in the past. In-ternational trade, world production, and thus economic interdependence are bigger than at any other point in history – international trade is six times big-ger than in 1950, and world production has increased by a factor of 5.5 since 1950 (Kim 2000, 8). Moreover, in contemporary finances, 99% of all trans-actions are folded in the capital account in the balance of payments, and at the end of 1980 95% were folded into the current account (real economy).

Graphs 1, 2, and 3 present how world foreign direct investments (FDI), world global exports, and world GDP have increased since 1975 (all data taken from the World Bank). They show us the scale of globalisation and confirm my statement.

Authors writing about globalisation may be divided into three groups: agnostics − who do not perceive today’s globalisation as a new feature of

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If the economic power factor has taken over, and if power has shifted towards the markets, is there any reason for a state to exist?

There are three possible ways to interpret the increasing role of the econ-omy and the role of the state. The first group of authors claims that the economy has replaced politics (the state) and that the nation state has lost its meaning (Kindleberger 1969) . The second group asserts that the economy and politics (the state) are two separate systems, without mentioning the end of the nation state at all (Hudson 2001). The third group suggests that the economy and politics (the state) should not be perceived separately because geoeconomics is part of geopolitics and consequently, for this school, the significance of the nation state is preserved (Dicken 2007).

The first group of authors claim that the era following the Peace of West-phalia in 1648 marked the end of state sovereignty. German sociologist Ulrich Beck is convinced that the nation state was ‘swept away’ (Beck 2003, 207). One of the first to write about the nation state as solely an economic entity was Kindleberger (1969, 207). Tuathail (1996, 240) claims that geoecono-my contributes to de-territorialisation as it works in favour of mobile and transnational capital and not in the interest of citizens and certain territo-ry-bound social communities. Some authors write about the beginning of the new Middle Ages as a model for governance of globalisation. The first one to use this term was Hedley Bull in his book The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (1977) . He used this term to describe the globalised world as a world in which state sovereignty is subject to erosion (Bull 1977, 248–85). This results in an international system which is similar to the one of the Middle Ages where there were different political authorities with non-territorial origins such as religion (Bull 1977, 248–85). Today, the state and politics fall in the service of the economy.

The second group clearly draws a difference between the economy and politics (state). Hudson argues (2001, 76) that the state is important for the economy as it creates conditions for production that cannot be created by the economy itself. These conditions are: infrastructure (roads, railways, ports, airports, and telecommunication systems) and human infrastructure (education, work force and legislation enabling companies to do business) (Hudson 2001, 180). States possess instruments to encourage and control

Graph 1: Increase of FDI – current US dollars (World Bank)

Graph 2: Increase of global exports – current US dollars (World Bank)

Graph 3: Increase of world GDP – current US dollars (World Bank)

international relations, enthusiasts − who perceive today’s globalisation as a completely new occurrence that has changed international relations completely, and critics − who point out to the flaws of globalisation, namely neo-colonialism (Nayar 2005, 1–3). However, all authors are faced with a question which is also relevant to the present research – the role of the state.

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their own economies and to protect them with their own market policies (customs, quotas etc.) (Hudson 2001, 180). The state has to provide pub-lic goods and foundations for an economy, which does not take place in a vacuum, but rather in the framework set by the state. However, politics and economy are two separate systems, and the decisions and actions in either are rarely influenced by one another.

The third group of analysts assert that the economy cannot be separated from politics (state) and that geoeconomic issues cannot be separated from geopolitical ones (Dicken 2007, 548). Economic and political logic are two sides of the same coin, i.e. the struggle for power (Simoniti 1997, 49). Every decision in politics and economics has both political and economic reasons and consequences. Politics and the economy are one system with a linkage that goes beyond the state providing public goods. A good example of this is Russia and Gazprom – economic logic of making a profit go hand in hand with the state logic of gaining power. Furthermore, Gazprom does not only follow the logic of profit, but also political logic. It is this type of relationship between economics and politics (state) hich this analysis will build on.

I argue that states are still the most important actors in international rela-tions. The main argument for this is that the economy has not yet achieved total conquest over other power factors, nor has it thwarted other social structures of the state. States have adapted to the new situation and became also one of the key actors in the economy.

Economics does not occur in a vacuum. Therefore, it is false to make a strong division between the economy and politics (Gilpin 2001, 22), as one can argue that they are both opposite sides of the same coin. Luttwak (1993b, 317) observes that with the increased role of the economy, state intervention into the economy has also increased. New instruments for states, such as sovereign wealth funds (SWF), have risen. SWF are state-owned investment funds or entities that are commonly established from balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, governmental transfer payments, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from resource exports (What is a SWF? 2010). SWF are created by a state in order to enter the international financial markets, and therefore influence and regulate them (Helleiner 2009, 300) .

Another argument which supports the idea that international relations have remained state-centric (Kim 2000, 7) is production locations . In 1939, 71% of the world’s production took place in just 4 states (US, UK, Germany, France) and 90% of the world’s production took place in 11 states (Dicken 2007, 34). The main producers exported 2/3 of their total exports to their former colonies and absorbed 4/5 of the primary products of those colonies (Dicken 2007, 34). Today we are faced with similar data. 4/5 of the world’s products and services and almost 2/3 of the world’s agricultural production are concentrated in only 15 states (Dicken 2007, 41). Ninety percent of ex-ported FDI is concentrated in 15 states, with the leading two, the US and the UK, representing 1/3 of the world total exported FDI (Dicken 2007, 41). Over 1/2 of all imported FDI is located in just 5 developing markets, and China, including Hong Kong, accounts for 1/3 of the total (Dicken 2007, 41).

This data confirms that economic power remains within a small number of states. So, the argument that power has moved towards the markets should not be interpreted to mean that states have become less relevant, but that the markets, and thus globalisation, have increased enormously (Pelanda 2007, 17−46). Still, one could argue that markets control these few states, how-ever, I would disagree. Why these states, why not others? Are these states economic wonders? No. Alongside market logic, it is also due to the political decisions of these states and the political history of the international commu-nity that these states are in the position that they are today. A good example of the role of the state is the comparison between South Korea and North Korea. Before the separation, Korea was culturally, linguistically, ethnically, religiously and economically homogenous. 50 years later, South Korea has 10 times higher GDP per capita than North Korea (Blanchard 2009, 304). It was the state’s political decisions about what type of economic policy to follow that created the economic gap. Moreover, the rise of the importance of an economic power factor does not mean that this power factor was not important until the end of the 20th century. Luttwak (1993a, 39) explains economic reasons for the war between Carthage and Rome. However, the economy has become an instrument of political action like never before.

Luttwak (1993a, 35–6) draws analogies between investment capital and firepower; state development support and production with innovations in

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the arms field; presence in the markets and military bases in foreign coun-tries and diplomatic influence. Geoeconomic ‘weapons’ are tariffs, quotas and other forms of protectionism, investments in research and development (R&D), FDI and other economic measures. As in war, in a geoeconomic offensive, arms dominate, especially R&D in economic territory (Luttwak 1993b, 307). The goal of traditional world politics is to expand one’s own territory and influence other governments; in a geoeconomy, the main goal is not reaching a higher standard of living, but taking and defending certain roles in the world economy (Luttwak 1993b, 309–10). As in war, so too in geoeconomy are alliances made against the common enemy offering a basis for a new ‘battle’ – a geoeconomic one (Luttwak 1993b, 323–5). Rivalry and conflicts among countries in a geoeconomy are dealt with via geoeconomic ‘arms’ (export support, import limit, funding of the most competitive branch, funding of the desired education and of the infrastructure needed etc.).

The primacy of the economic factor does not mean the irrelevance of other factors. Moreover, power factors are interlinked and mutually enforcing. Ken-nedy suggests (1989, XVI) that wealth is necessary for the establishment of military power and the latter is necessary for gaining and securing wealth – a strong correlation between both has been established throughout history. Thus, the hidden hand of the market cannot function without the hidden fist (Fried-man 2000, 464). Markets can function only if personal possessions and security are guaranteed and supported by military power (Friedman 2000, 464).

Since the economic factor is the most relevant of the four mentioned, I will devote a special chapter to it. The other three factors − military, politi-cal, ideological − will be taken into consideration in a separate chapter.

To conclude the first, more theoretical part, I still have to analyse different assessments of the Power Structure of the post Cold War International System that have arisen since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

3. Theories and Concepts of the Power Structure of the Post Cold War International System

Different authors present different analyses on the power structure of the post Cold War international system: unipolarity, multipolarity,

uni-multipolarity, non-polarity and bipolarity. Furthermore, there is no con-sensus in the academic community on which country(s) or which centre of power will be or is the global governor.

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When dealing with the question of polarity, Umbach (2006, 81) makes an important distinction: he differs between political strategy (unilateralism, multilateralism) and power distribution (unipolarity, multipolarity). The first describes an internal political decision and the second refers to the nature of the international system. Combining the two notions there are four possi-bilities: unilateral unipolarity (Kagan – The Return of History and the End of Dreams 2008); unilateral multipolarity (Nye – The paradox of American power: why the world’s only superpower can’t go it alone 2002); multilateral unipolarity (Mearsheimer – The Tragedy of Great Power Politics 2001); and multilateral multipolarity (Calleo – Follies of power: America’s unipolar fantasy 2009) .

Although both aspects are interlinked, the emphasis of my work is on the power distribution. Therefore, I will use the terms ‘polarity’.

Furthermore, the terms unipolarity and multipolarity have to be defined. Unipolarity in international politics is like a monopoly in economics – only one great power exists (Hansen 2011, 2). Great power refers to the state with a qualitative edge relative to other states based on the aggregate score on the size of territory, population, economy, military, resource, endowment, political stability and political competence (Waltz 1979, 131). However, uni-polarity is not merely about pinpointing the strongest power in the system; it is also about distinguishing it from other notions of an international system and about the identification of unipolar dynamics (Hansen 2011, 5). Unipo-larity refers to the type of global system, where one state has significantly more capabilities then the other (Jervis 2011) .

However, what does it mean to have ‘significantly more capabilities’, or a ‘larger share of power’? Is this a political or material fact (Walt 2011, 99−139)? Particularly, does the unipolar power need to command more than 50% of the resources available (Posen 2011, 324), or does it merely need a large and unwieldy coalition of the remaining actors to equal its power (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008, 35−7)? Today’s situation proves that both approaches are relevant (as described in the second empirical part of the book). Presently there is no coherent ‘balance-American-power’ coalition on the horizon. However, the material perception of the US power has been significantly reduced in the ‘post-Lehman Brothers’ world.

Unipolar systems have three defining features (Monteiro 2011/2012, 13). First, unipolarity is an interstate system (Monteiro 2011/2012, 13). It is not coeval with empire. Unipolarity implies the existence of many juridically equal nation-states; something an empire denies (Jervis 2011). In empires, an intersocietal ‘divide and rule’ practice replaces interstate ‘balance of power’ dynamics (Nexon and Wright 2007, 253). Second, unipolarity is anarchical (Monteiro 2011/2012, 13). Anarchy results from the incomplete power preponderance of the unipole. As Waltz puts it (1964, 888), a great power cannot exert positive control everywhere in the world. Other states have significant freedom of action and may well pursue independent poli-cy preferences on issues that they care more about than the unipole (Pape 2005, 11). By highlighting the limits of the unipole’s power, anarchy helps to distinguish between unipolar and hegemonic systems (Gilpin 2002). If the unipole increases its power to the point where it can control the external behaviour of all other states, then it has become a hegemon, making the system hierarchical. Third, unipolar systems possess only one great power, which enjoys a preponderance of power and faces no competition (Monteiro 2011/2012, 13). As soon as competition emerges, the system is no longer unipolar (Monteiro 2011/2012, 13). Unlike in bipolar and multipolar systems, in unipolar system, there is no systemic equilibrium balance of power. Yet, the system is stabile and it may be referred to as a dominance perception of the balance of power and will be further described later.

One has to make a difference between the empire and hegemony. Empire denotes political control exercised by one organized political unit over an-other unit separate from and alien to it (Schroeder 2003). This need not mean direct rule exercised by formal occupation and administration (Schroeder 2003), it is however based on the fear and military threat. Such a definition is generally true; however, there are also examples of empires which do not have ‘over-seas’ colonies – i.e. the Soviet Union. Therefore, the terms ‘sep-aration’ and ‘alienation’ in the definition should be interpreted in a political sense, not geographical .

The word ‘hegemony’ was used originally to describe the relationship of Athens to the other Greek city states that joined it in an alliance against the Persian Empire (Ferguson 2003). Hegemony means a clear, acknowledged,

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recognized authority and dominant influence by one unit within a commu-nity of units not under a single authority (Schroeder 2003). A hegemon is a first among equals; an imperial power ruling over subordinates (Schroeder 2003). It is a softer approach to governance than an empire – fear and military power, or the threat thereof, is not in the forefront. Furthermore, hegemonic power referrers to a state’s ability to impose its set of rules on the interstate system, thereby temporarily creating a new political order (Ferguson 2003). Whereas an imperial power rules the system and imposes decisions as it wishes, a hegemonic power is the necessary factor for a final decision to be reached within a given system; its responsibility is essentially managerial in order to see that a decision is reached (Schroeder 2003).

When it comes to the US, one should not talk about an empire, but rather a hegemony. Americans, do not ‘do’ empire; they do ‘leadership’ − ‘hegem-ony’ (Ferguson 2003). I believe that history proves this statement and that both of the main political parties in the US have confirmed it on several occasions. Speaking in 1999, Sandy Berger, President Clinton’s national security adviser, declared that the United States is the first global power in history that is not an imperial power. A year later, then candidate G. W. Bush echoed his words arguing that America has never been an empire, but it may be the only great power in history that had the chance, and refused it (Fer-guson 2003). Indeed every image of one’s self may be a twist from reality. Furthermore, the perception of others may be completely different from your own. However, I argue that a hegemonic, not imperial, tendency of the US foreign policy repeats itself throughout history. Even when the US follows the policy of an empire by overthrowing a government and installing a new one (Latin America, Afghanistan, Iraq), the US does not have an intention to further directly influence the internal day-to-day politics in that country. If the US was an empire they would display this intention, but the US does not create colonies .

Pictures bellow explain the theoretical distinction that I have made very clearly. Picture 1 presents unipolarity, Picture 2 shows hegemony, and Pic-ture 3 portrays empire (the legend for the pictures may be found under the picture 3) .

Picture 1: Unipolarity (Nexon and Wright 2007, 257)

PredominantPower

LesserPower

Picture 2: Hegemony (Nexon and Wright 2007, 257)

PredominantPower

LesserPower

Picture 3: Empire (Nexon and Wright 2007, 257)

Predominant Power

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So far there has not been a debate about the definition of multipolarity to the extent that there has been on unipolarity. Usually, the term is used loosely, and frequently juxtaposed to unipolarity, where it is widely and simply assumed to be its more positive and desirable opposite (Smith 2012, 52). However, one can define multipolarity as an international system which would be made up of three or more significant powers (Smith 2012, 53) with possession of vast capabilities that far exceed those of the smaller states (Les-age, van de Graaf, and Westphal 2010, 76), however no one can dominate the other (Lesage 2009, 13) .

When talking about power distribution, the concept of balance of power immediately comes to mind. The balance of power is a concept and a meta-phor (Kornprobst 2010, 54) for analysis and description of states behaviour in international relations and for analysis of the international structure (Fry, Goldstein and Langhorn 2002, 3). Morgenthau (1985, 187) saw four dif-ferent meanings of balance of power: as a state policy, as a state of affairs, as an approximately equal distribution of power, and as any distribution of power. Furthermore, Haas (1953, 447–55) provided 8 different definitions of balance of power: distribution of power, equilibrium, hegemony, stability and peace, instability and war, power politics, as a universal law of history, and as a system or guide for forming state policy. Zinnes (1967, 271–2) presents even more – 11 – different definitions of the meaning of the term balance of power.

Clearly, the concept of the balance of power is perceived very differently by different authors. I will argue that there are only two different meanings of balance of power that are applicable to a state of the international system. The first is equilibrium in the international system and the second is dominance in the international system. The two different meanings may be portrayed by the two different pictures. Picture 4 portrays an equilibrium perception of balance of power, and picture 5 portrays the dominance perception of balance of power.

The concept of balance of power is very useful for neorealism, since neo-realism deducts its conclusions from the third level of analysis – the system. For the present analysis however, it is less relevant since neoclassical realism looks into internal factors of an actor as well. Balance of power therefore is

not a suitable mechanism to analyse power distribution after the end of the Cold War, since it cannot address some of the concepts that arose – non-po-larity and uni-multi polarity. A similar conclusion about the necessity of the two level analysis of balance of power is made by Wright and Wright (1983, 445) who make a distinction between two aspects of balance of power that interact. First, is a static aspect that represents the nature of the international system and second is a dynamic aspect that represents the nature of national policy (Wright and Wright 1983, 445) .

For more than 20 years, different authors have been writing about the post Cold War world. As 20 years is quite a long time, some authors are referring to the present as the post-post Cold War world (Friedman 2006). Most authors find September 11, 2001 as a dividing date between post Cold War world and the post-post Cold War world (Cossa 2001; Haass 2002), while others see the delimitation with the last financial crisis, especially the events of September 15, 2008 – the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.

However, I do not share the view of differentiating between a post Cold War world and a post-post Cold War world. Since scholars still have not yet come to an agreement about the nature of the post Cold War world − giving it a self-supporting name − nor have they separated this period into smaller periods with their specific substance and names, it seems rather unusual to make an additional delimitation of a period for which there is no clear con-

Picture 4: Equilibrium perception of balance of power

Picture 5: Dominance perception of balance of power

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cept. Saying that, it may be correct to point to September 11, or September 15, or in fact both, as a turning point in the history of the international system. However, than the names of these periods have to follow. Scholars have to find substantial difference between the periods and then name them accord-ing to their nature. In fact this is one of the goals of this analysis. Referring to the concepts with their own names is essential, because it shows a true understanding of the nature of a concept and it provides clear differentiation from other concepts.

By distinguishing unipolarity from hegemony, empire, and multipolar systems, a uniqueness of the post Cold War era will be revealed. History does not record a similar situation. Therefore, a self-imposed name for this period is essential for the development of an international relations theory that struggles to fully analyse the empirical in international affairs.

3.1 New World Order, Unipolarity and Multipolarity

At the end of the Cold War there were three ideas present in the academic world about the new nature of the international system. The three ideas were conceptually quite different and contradictory, yet they all found a political manifestation.

First was the idea of a ‘new world order’; power would not play a sig-nificant role in international relations, the role of a state would vanish, and the main actors of international relations would become international organ-isations and/or economic entities. Different names for such concepts were framed, all of them slightly differ from one to another; however, their basis is the same – power politics and realism will give way to the cooperation and liberal perception of international relations. This neo-idealist moment (Kegley 1993) is also referred to as ‘neo-Wilsonian idealism’ (Fukuyama, 1992), ‘ide-alpolitik’ (Kober, 1990), and ‘neo-liberalism’ (Nye, 1988; Grieco, 1990).

Such ideas were present for quite a while before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Already in 1969 Kindleberger wrote about the state solely as an eco-nomic unit (Kindleberger 1969, 207) and furthermore, Bull’s idea of the new Medievalism had already been mentioned as well (Bull 1977). In his speech

‘Toward a New World Order’, on September 11, 1990, US President George Herbert Walker Bush (1990) said:

»[...] opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooper-ation. Out of these troubled times [...] a new world order [...] can emerge: a new era -- freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavour. Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we’ve known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.«

An advocate of this vision who received the most echoes is Francis Fuku-yama, who in 1989 published an article ‘The End of History’, and then in 1992 his famous book The End of History and the Last Man . In his article he wrote (Fukuyama 1989):

»What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolu-tion and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. [...] the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is as yet incom-plete in the real or material world. [...] the death of ideology means the growing ‘Common Marketization’ of international relations, and the diminution of the likelihood of large-scale conflict between states. [...] This does not by any means imply the end of international conflict per se. For the world at that point would be divided between a part that was historical and a part that was post-historical. Conflict be-tween states still in history, and between those states and those at the

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end of history, would still be possible. There would still be a high and perhaps rising level of ethnic and nationalist violence, since those are impulses incompletely played out, even in parts of the post-historical world. [...] The end of history will be a very sad time. The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one’s life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands. In the post-historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history.«

In light of both the much older Kantian ‘democratic peace’ concept, which states that democracies do not fight, or threaten to use force, against one another (Weart 1998) and Fukuyama’s thesis, Singer and Wildavsky (1993) further de-veloped the ‘new world order’ idea. They have stated that the world is divided into ‘zones of peace’ and ‘zones of turmoil’. The former comprise advanced, developed democracies like the US, Western Europe, and Japan, while the rest of the world falls into the latter type. Within the zones of peace, war is now impossible because democracies do not fight each other (Singer and Wildavsky 1993). Furthermore, developed states have a preponderance of power and thus need not fear attack from the zones of turmoil (Singer and Wildavsky 1993).

»What counts about the zones of peace is that they are something new in the world. Without a government over them they will be peace-ful and democratic. They will be a daily reminder to the world that the old message of history, that war is a natural and inevitable part of life, no longer has to be true. The zones of peace will be a demon-stration that peace is possible among countries that used to fight one another - a model of how world peace may be obtained without world government (Singer and Wildavsky 1993, 30).«

Contrary to ‘the optimists’, as authors of the ‘new world order’ are some-times referred (Grieco 1988; Mearsheimer 1990; Jervis 1999), the second

group of authors, sometimes referred as ‘the pessimists’ (Grieco 1988; Mear-sheimer 1990; Kegley 1993), developed the idea of a multipolar post Cold War world. As the Soviet Union collapsed, these authors argued that due to the rise of Japan, the EU and other actors in international affairs, the world would become multipolar. One of the best summaries of this vision of the post Cold War world is the quote from Paul Tsongas, the late US Senator from Massachusetts, who at the 1992 Democratic Convention said: »The Cold War is over; Japan won« (Dowd 1992). In this pessimistic context, Paul Kennedy (1989, 438–9) introduced the term ‘Imperial Overstretch’ with which he portrayed the nature of the empire to extend itself beyond its ability to maintain and control its military and economic commitments .

One of the protagonists of the second big idea at the end of the Cold War is John Mearsheimer, who in his 1990 article ‘Back to the Future: instability in Europe After the Cold War’ argues that the end of the Cold War – and the subsequent end of bipolarity – means the return of instable multipolarity (Mearsheimer 1990). Mearsheimer (1990) makes explicit use of neorealism and the balance of power theory in order to argue that this reversion from bipolarity to multipolarity will likely have disastrous consequences for Great Power peace. He compares the future of the Great Powers with the expe-riences of Europe in the 20th century prior to the Cold War; and criticizes optimistic arguments that the future will be peaceful due to the high costs of modern war, the existence of many democracies, and learning – a socialisa-tion process (Mearsheimer 1990). Mearsheimer (1990) argues further that flaws in the optimistic assumption of the post Cold War world (reducing the reasons for war to pure economic logic liberals fail to see other reasons for war, which have not been erased; international economic order does not guarantee peace, there is no proof that ‘democratic peace theory’ holds) un-dercuts the ability to accept the scenarios they advance . He concludes that the US must carefully manage the dangerous multipolarity that the end of the Cold War will bring (Mearsheimer 1990).

Huntington (1989) expresses similar cautions about accepting the op-timists’ views of the future. He is also critical of expectations based on the democratic peace proposition, cautioning us that the democratic peace proposal is valid as far as it goes, but it may not go all that far (Huntington

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1989). Huntington does not see the end of the Cold War as the end of history or as the introduction of something new in history; like Mearsheimer, he sees it as the return of the danger of the past (Huntington 1989).

Where the optimists see the end of the Cold War as the negation of the international system’s war-like past, the pessimists see it as the return of the past. The end of the Cold War does not mean the end of political, ideolog-ical, diplomatic, economic, technological, or even military rivalry among nations; it does mean increased instability, unpredictability and violence in international affairs (Huntington, 1989). Pessimists argued that power rela-tions matter and that there would be no peaceful ‘new world order’, but that a ‘new world order’ will be a return to an instable multipolarity.

The third grand idea is the idea of a unipolar world. As the Soviet Union collapsed there was only one superpower left – the US. Thus, mathematically it would be logical that the world would be transformed from a bipolar one into a unipolar one. The main protagonist of such an idea was Charles Krauthammer, who in 1990 wrote an article titled ‘The Unipolar Moment’. Krauthammer (1990/1991) predicted that a unipolar moment will last approximately a decade before an unstable multipolar world will emerge. Some Authors proclaimed the post Cold War as Pax Americana (Muravchik 1991), and others as Amer-ican Hegemony (Layne and Schwarz 1993). Layne (1993, 7) agreed with Krauthammer that unipolarity would give way to multipolarity eventually:

»I argue that the ‘unipolar moment’ is just that, a geopolitical interlude that will give way to multipolarity between 2000 and 2010. Expectations derived from Structural realism: (1) unipolar systems contain the seeds of their own demise because the hegemon’s unbal-anced power creates an environment conducive to the emergence of new great powers; and (2) the entry of new great powers into the international system erodes the hegemon’s relative power and, ulti-mately, its pre-eminence.«

There is a sense of pessimistic similarity between multipolar and unipolar idea, namely second and third big idea of the post Cold War international sys-tem. Wohlforth explains (1999, 37) the main difference between the two:

»Even if world politics works by the old rules − even if democracy, new forms of interdependence, and international institutions do not matter − we should not expect a return of balance of power politics à la multipolarity for the simple reason that we are living in the modern world’s first unipolar system .«

Whereas the second big idea stresses balancing of power, the third stress-es dominance of power. Looking back, one can conclude that the three dif-ferent ideas were partially right and partially insufficient. All of them tend to overestimate their arguments and oversee other relevant factors that a holistic analysis must not .

As attractive as it sounds, Fukuyama’s thesis did not fully fulfil itself. It had big momentum in the first Clinton administration as well as in the G. H. W. Bush administration (Bush’s speech on new world order). Additionally, even more ‘hawkish’ politicians shared this optimism at the turn of the dec-ade: »Our fundamental belief in democracy and human rights gives other nations confidence that our significant military power threatens no one’s aspirations for peaceful democratic progress (Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy 1993, 7).« However, the end of the Cold War did not represent a peaceful acceptance of a capitalist-liberal international order, and is it not impossible for new challenges to the international order to emerge. Thus, one has to look to the second and third big idea to identify what bipolarity at the end of the Cold War turned has turned into.

Since the Soviet Union dissolved, the US has become the focal point of any geopolitical analysis. The US was faced with the question ‘what to do with its primacy’ (Haass 1999, Art 1991)? The US did not find an answer to this question. I argue that the end of the Cold War surprised the US, and furthermore it did not have an answer to these unexpected challenges. Therefore, the US did not play the role of the one remaining superpower (Rice 2000, 45). The US needed time to fully understand the new situation in international relations (Kissinger 1994, 809). Due to this inability of the US to exercise its unique role in the early 90’s, the world was not unipolar as it would have been if the US had exercised its power potential, but rather multipolar .

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The administration of G. H. W. Bush stressed that foreign policy was not their priority (Heffernan 2005, 570). However, the administration’s foreign policy made quite an impact on international affairs. In 1989, the US inter-vened in Panama (Operation Just Cause 2012), in 1991 Bush and Gorbachev signed a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty – START I (negotiations lasted 9 years) (BBC 2012a), and, most importantly, the US began the Gulf War in January 1991 (BBC 2012b) . Despite these actions, and although Assistant Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz said that the US must act to prevent the rise of peer competitors in Europe and Asia (Ikenberry 2002, 50), the G. H. W. Bush administration did not develop a new foreign policy vision and strategy for a new situation in international affairs in order to implement the idea of unipolarity. Furthermore, neither did the first Clinton administration (Stein and Lobell 1997, 121). Therefore, the 1990s made the unipolar vision moot (Ikenberry 2002, 50), which is why Layne (1993, 5) wrote that the United States has not imposed a universal monarchy.

A lack of a new foreign policy vision does not mean that there was no debate about it. There were some that called for a new isolationism. For example Jeane Kirkpatrick wrote (1990):

»[...] to be sure before the Gulf crisis, that it is time to give up the dubious benefits of superpower status, time to give up the unusual burdens of the past and return to normal times. That means taking care of pressing problems of education, family, industry and technol-ogy at home. That means that we should not try to be the balancer of power in Europe or in Asia, nor try to shape the political evolution of the Soviet Union. We should aspire instead to be a normal country in a normal time.«

On the other hand there were also some like Wolfowitz who called for a more active role of the US, to implement the unipolar idea. In March 1992 an initial draft of the Pentagon’s Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) for Fiscal Years 1994-99 was leaked to the New York Times (Tyler 1992), where it was written:

»We must account sufficiently for the interests of the large indus-trial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political or economic order and that we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role (Tyler 1992).«

The initial draft of the DPG was controversial, and in a subsequent draft the language referring to the goal of preserving unipolarity was deleted.

Coming back to the Gulf War and president G. H. W. Bush, some may argue that through the resolution of the Security Council 678 in 1990 and the invasion of Iraq, the US manifested the unipolar moment. I beg to disagree. The resolution 678 (acting under Chapter VII) is not a product of American hegemony or unipolarity, but rather a product of the optimistic view of a new world order and a responsibility to humanity that filled the political space at that point in time. A parallel to the intervention in Somalia in 1992 and 1993 may be made – Operation Restore Hope (Security Council Resolution 794).

Intervention in Somalia went through different stages. A weak peace-keep-ing mission, United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) based on Security Council resolution 751, was deployed in July 1992 and due to its inefficiency, the US offered to establish a multinational force to secure the hu-manitarian operation. Thus, Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was created with Security Council resolution 794 (under Chapter VII). However, UNITAF was only a transition mission to secure the environment for the UNOSOM II mission, which was reinstated in 1993 with Security Council resolution 814 (under Chapter VII). Although there is a difference between the two opera-tions – collective security (major military operation) and peace-keeping – in both cases the US was the state that provided the majority of forces even though the command structures had to be shared. If one can superficially say that the US went into Iraq because of oil, one cannot say that for Somalia. There was no oil in Somalia, but there was US intervention, clearly driven by humanitarian concerns (Mastanduno 1997, 57). Moreover, if the Gulf war had been the result of unipolarity then the US would have removed Saddam Hussein and changed the regime; but that did not happen . On the other hand,

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one could argue that changing the regime was not a sign of unipolarity, since the US may have believed that Hussein was one of the factors of stability in the region. However, the US was dealing with Hussein for more than a decade, and because of his nature and history, it is rather difficult to believe that the US perceived him as a stability factor. It was rather the opposite. The Gulf War is not a sign of unipolarity, but a sign of confidence in the UN as the global governor. Indeed the US also dominated the UN at that point. However, this is actually an additional argument for my statement.

Even though the US had a dominant position in the world, it preferred UN action rather creating a world order that it wanted. The G. H. W. Bush administration kept the sharpness of its Cold War foreign policy without providing a new substance to it, and furthermore it shared the optimism of the ‘new world order’ of Fukuyama.

Another argument as to why the US never fully seized the unipolar mo-ment in the early 90’s, what consequently made the world multipolar, was the 1992 elections. Here the interior topics are always in the forefront. Thus, the G. H. W. Bush administration had to focus on internal political issues, and therefore foreign policy did not get the attention, time and energy it needed .

Saying that, one has to agree also with Singer and Wildavsky (1993) and their concept of two different zones. It seemed that there were two different worlds emerging – a zone of peace, and a zone of turmoil. In the zone of peace, the US was a passive actor; Europe introduced the Maastricht treaty establishing the European Union. In the zone of turmoil: the Balkan wars had begun, genocide, several coup d’etats, civil conflicts in different Afri-can states, the Nagorno-Karabakh War was still taking place, and civil war continued in Cambodia .

Thus, the power structure of the international system went from bipolar (in the Cold War) to multipolar (post Cold War) . It seems that the G . H . W . Bush administration followed a combination of the two grand ideas – ‘new world order’ and ‘unipolarity’, and that the first Clinton administration, as it will be shown in a moment, was a ‘new world order’ administration. More-over, combining these internal factors with the earlier mentioned external ones, the result was a chaotic multipolar world.

Furthermore, even if one accepts the argument of the Gulf War as a sign of unipolarity, the US did not follow up on that action. I do not share this view, but even if this is the case, then the unipolar moment was really just a moment. It was so brief that it lasted only a few months in the transition from bipolarity to multipolarity, and did not have a relevant impact on the changing power structure of the international system at that point. As I will show, the unipolar momentum of the US came to fruition ten years later.

The priorities of the first Clinton administration were economic – there was economic growth and inflation together with a decrease in unemploy-ment. However, the Clinton administration continued to be passive in the international arena. Ikenberry (1996, 387) wrote: »If there is one consist-ent complaint in politics around the world today, it is about the absence of leadership – local, national, global.« The US did not take the position of the world hegemon, nor did it exercise its unipolar capability, what plunged the world into a multipolar chaos (already mentioned (civil) wars, genocides, lack of global economic governance, the rules of the new international affairs were not set). Mearsheimer is right when he compares such behaviour to the period between the two World Wars, where the US retreated into isolationism (Mearsheimer 2001, 58–9). The mistake was not repeated after the Second World War; however it was repeated after the Cold War.

Clinton’s trade policy (Trade first) contradicted numerous security and other interests of the US (Nau 1995, 3–6). Such a policy focused on exports, but overlooked security and political instabilities of the markets where the exports went to (Nau 1995, 3–6). Therefore the US did not confront the main challenges of the post Cold War world (the rise of China, what to do with Russia, growing instability of some regions) (Nau 1995, 3–6). According to the ‘Clinton doctrine’, the US does not need allies because in the economic markets one does not know who is an ally and who is a competitor; hence the US foreign policy was reduced to power-economics (Nau 1995, 16). Mastanduno (1997, 52) referred to such a policy as ‘economic hardball’ and ‘security softball’.

The raw data barely confirms this statement. It is shown in table 2 that if we compare military expenditures of the US, China, Russia, and Japan, from 1990 to 1995 in constant 2010 US dollars, we can see a big decline

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in the US and a small rise in China and Japan (data taken from The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database). Although the US significantly cut its budget, the difference remained vast. Yet, the idea and trend is obvious.

Table 2: Military expenditures between 1990 and 1995 in constant 2010 US dollars (The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2012)

USA CHINA RUSSIA JAPAN

1990 510,998 17,943 259,734 49,421

1991 448,806 18,86 / 50,542

1992 474,215 22,919 64,464 51,768

1993 449,281 21,233 56,948 52,342

1994 421,917 20,308 55,499 52,595

1995 399,043 20,875 32,867 53,12

What makes Nau’s and Mastanduno’s statement more convincible is the qualitative analysis of the first Clinton administration. Namely, the admin-istration was very reluctant to use force – it hesitated in the Balkan conflict, did not act after the 1993 terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre, and was no longer interested in intelligence activity (CIA: Secret Wars, part 3 2003). However, during the Clinton administration, a large number of trade agreements were ratified and implemented, over 300 of them (Clinton 2000). Some very large in scope − such as NAFTA and the Uruguay Round of GATT – still, all were important to the US economy (Frankel 1997).

The idealistic concept that economy, democracy and peace had prevailed led to a reduction in the military (United States Military Spending 2009) and foreign policy budgets in the US (Raščan 2005, 121). Such global passivity, the lack of a clear foreign policy strategy and vision (this goes for both G. H. W. Bush and Clinton administration), the burden of the Gulf War, the preoc-cupation with the internal political situation, and stressing economic issues, made the first Clinton administration inefficient in foreign affairs, dangerous for the global financial system (because it did not address security aspects

of investment and trade, therefore encouraging and generating speculations on the financial markets) and devastating for some nations – genocides in Africa, and the Balkans (Pelanda 2007, 33–5) .

In the view of Layne and Schwarz (1993, 5−23), the lack of a new foreign policy vision and the passiveness of the US may be attributed to the notion that any change is bound to be bad because it may undermine the predomi-nance of the US. On the other hand, a counterargument would be that one will only act to prevent change. These are two different philosophies on how to resist change. Yet, the historical facts point us to state that the first Clinton ad-ministration was rather passive in terms of exercising global governance.

To be fair to the first Clinton administration, in 1993 it facilitated the Oslo agreement between Israel and Palestine (BBC 2007) and in 1994 the agreement with North Korea (The U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework at a Glance 2004). However, neither of these two agreements solved the problems. Even as Clinton laid out his extremely ambitious foreign policy goals, he proved unwilling to support them with the necessary means (Dueck 2003/2004, 6). In particular, he proved reluctant to support these initiatives with the requisite amount of military force (Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, or Kosovo). In one case after another of humanitarian intervention, a pattern emerged: the Clinton admin-istration would stake out an assertive and idealistic public position, and then refuse to act on its rhetoric in a meaningful way (Dueck 2003/2004, 6).

By the end of the Clinton’s first term it was clear that in order to bring order to the international system, the US needed to start implementing its hegemonic potential . Alongside the already mentioned genocides, Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia (Kabul was seized in 1996) was growing, attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the economic rise of China and its penetration into different world regions with rich energy re-sources; all of these were additional catalysts for the change in the US behav-iour in international relations. In December 1995, the Dayton accords were signed in Paris that ended the war in the Balkans (BBC 2012c). However, the violence continued in 1998 in Kosovo, yet this time the second Clinton administration was more determined and in 1999 NATO intervened without the authorization of the United Nations Security Council and in the same year NATO also admitted three new members to NATO.

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The second Clinton administration noticed the shortcomings of the first and was more active in international affairs; perhaps also to avert the public attention away from the Lewinsky scandal. However, the second Clinton administration remained without a new foreign policy vision as well. Layne (1998, 8) points:

»The collapse of Soviet Union transformed the international sys-tem dramatically, but there has been no corresponding change in U.S. grand strategy. In terms of ambitions, interests, and alliances, the United States today is following the same grand strategy that it pursued from 1945 until 1991.«

The second Clinton administration continued with the ‘economy first’ strategy that led to the inclusion of China into the World Trade Organization (WTO), without putting pressure on it to follow the WTO rules and principles (Nayar 2005, 203). The reason behind these actions was that if China were included into the global community, democratic changes could be triggered . The US followed an idea that no authoritarian regime can stand a certain level of economic development – $3000 GDP per capita (Gunde 2004) . The case of China casts doubts on it, since Chinese GDP is already more than $4000 per capita (Gunde 2004). Furthermore, China does not respect commitments of certain international organisations (WTO) (Hughes 2005, 94). Clinton’s policy towards China did not provide the results it wanted.

The slight change of activity in the US behaviour was noticed by academ-ics and analysts. Zakaria pointed out (Zakaria 1998/1999, 20):

»Unfortunately it appears that the United States is trying to have it both ways, adopting the rhetoric of intervention – so as to appear to be ‘doing something’ – and the reality of abstention, in terms of actually putting time, money, and energy into its policies. The result is that increasingly Washington is becoming a hollow hegemon.«

The second Clinton administration became more assertive and began to follow the unipolar momentum. It also changed its rhetoric. Madeleine

Albright, in 1998 said that: »[...] we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us (Albright 1998).« However, it still lacked a substantial foreign policy vision. Therefore, it may be quite similar to the G. H. W. Bush administration – mixture between the two grand ideas: ‘new world order’ and unipolarity. In spite of this, the global power structure was not significantly changed during the second Clinton administration .

To explain my statement, I have to start with the above mentioned 1999 intervention in Kosovo. Unlike Iraq and Somalia, this intervention did not have the mandate of the UN Security Council. In light of the intervention, Wohlforth (1999) made a compelling case that the world was indeed unipolar and would remain so for some time. His argument was that the US’ unipo-larity rests on two pillars that are very hard to shake. First, the sheer size and comprehensiveness of the power gap separating the United States from other states (Wohlforth 1999, 28). Second, geography and its four truest allies: Can-ada, Mexico, the Atlantic, and the Pacific (Wohlforth 1999, 28). Furthermore, Zuckerman (1998) wrote: »France had the seventeenth century, Britain the nineteenth, and America the twentieth. It will also have the twenty-first.«

If unipolarity is so robust, why do so many writers hasten to declare its demise? Moreover, why do I claim that the world was multipolar also in the second half of the 90’? One answer may lie in the common human tendency to conflate power trends with existing relationships (Wohlforth 1999, 37−8). Another explanation for this tendency is that the extent of the US power is inconvenient for the scholarly debate (Wohlforth 1999, 37−8).

»For neorealists, unipolarity contradicts the central tendency of their theory. Its longevity is a testament to the theory’s indeterminacy. For liberals and constructivists, the absence of balance-of-power pol-itics among the great powers is a much more interesting and tractable puzzle if the world is multipolar (Wohlforth 1999, 37−8).«

Yet, the ground for my statement lies in the Wohlforth’s underestimation of the role of agency and its political power applications. The power factor gap was enormous in the 1990’s; however, the US did not take advantage of

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it due to the actions of its internal political agency. Thus, Samuel Huntington (1999) presented an idea of uni-multipolarity – mixture between unipolarity and multipolarity .

Similar to Huntington Charles Kupchan (1998) constructed a US grand strategy based on encouraging the development of benign regional unipo-larity in North America, Europe, and Asia to counter the fragmentation and rivalry likely to result as a consequence of America’s waning supremacy. It seems that this idea echoes the ‘two zones idea’ of Singer and Wildavsky (1993). Furthermore, David Wilkinson (1999) presented another similar concept – Unipolarity without Hegemony. Both, Kupchan and Wilkinson, presented valid and tempting analyses. Yet, both underestimated the role of agency and ideology in international relations .

The US had all the potential to make the international system unipolar, and even to take the throne of the hegemon, or to fulfil whichever theses from Kupchan or Wilkinson; however due to political decisions (agency) based on the ideology of ‘the new world order’ where power politics is a thing of the past, it did not. Lawrence Summers, Clinton’s Deputy Secretary of the Treas-ury, stated that the US is the ‘first non-imperialist superpower’ (Huntington 1999, 38). The statement summarizes the second Clinton administration and provides us with its message: we know we have the power to build Empire, but our ideology says no. Therefore, the second Clinton administration was indeed different than the first one; still it did not fully follow the idea of the US hegemony or unipolarity. Thus, the power structure of the international system gradually tilted from multipolarity to unipolarity, but the final push came after the new millennium.

My interpretation of the NATO intervention in 1999 is that it is not as much a sign of strive for unipolarity, as it is the final blow to the ‘new world order’ ideology that was present in the political arena for a decade. 1999 clearly marks the ‘return of the history and the end of dreams’ as Robert Kagan’s 2008 book is entitled. Alongside the demise of the ‘new world order’ idea, the year 1999 marks another change. The multipolar world of the 1990’s that was a result of the inactivity of the US began to take a different shape. Until the millennium the idea of unipolarity was never implemented and manifested fully in a foreign policy vision. Gradually in the second Clinton

administration, it began to take a serious shape. After 1999, and with the new president, G. W. Bush, such a vision took on flesh and bones.

The world thus became unipolar in 2001 with the first G. W. Bush admin-istration. Upon taking office in 2001, the G. W. Bush administration initiated some significant changes in American grand strategy: it emphasised military preparedness, great-power politics, and concrete national interests (Dueck 2004, 523). Immediately after the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq some authors even argued that such a concentration of power was never present in world history (Brooks and Wohlforth 2002).

As one can observe, the reasons for changing polarity since the end of the Cold War were not material, but rather political. It was the agency factor (political decisions) that produced multipolarity in the 1990’s, and so it was at the end of the decade and millennium, when the unipolar international system formed again due to the agency. Such a statement is confirmed also by Hun-tington (1999, 40) who saw the reason for a non-unipolar world in American leaders who make threats, promise action, and fail to deliver; consequently the result was a foreign policy of ‘rhetoric and retreat’. Huntington was the author who was aware of that; yet ironically his 1999 thesis of uni-multipolar-ity became a reality some years later due to different, non-agency, factors.

The difference between the US in 1990 and in the new millennium is clear. Even though they had some differences, the G. H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations both attempted to articulate a vision of world order that was not dependent on an external threat or an explicit policy of balance of power (Ikenberry 2004, 622). The G. H. W. Bush talked about the importance of the Euro-Atlantic community and articulated ideas about a more fully integrated Asia Pacific region; in both the Atlantic and Pacific regions the Bush strategy was to offer a positive vision of alliance and partnership that was built around common values, tradition, mutual self-interest, and the preservation of sta-bility (Ikenberry 2004, 622). The Clinton administration attempted to shape the post Cold War order in terms of the expansion of democracy and open markets; what emerged was a liberal vision of order (Ikenberry 2004, 622). Democracy provided the foundation for a global and regional community, while trade and capital flows were seen as forces for political reform and inte-gration (Ikenberry 2004, 622). With the President G. W. Bush this perception

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of the ‘new world order’ faded and the US began to enforce its hegemony. Consequently, a second post Cold War power structure of the international system shift was made. From bipolarity in the Cold War we went to multipo-larity in 1990’ and then in the new millennium to unipolarity. In both cases, shifts and their form took place because of the internal policy in the US.

Nevertheless, a deeply rooted belief in liberal democracy (a crucial sub-stance of the ‘new world order’ idea) remained in the policies of G. W. Bush administration as well. Ikenberry (2002, 2004) sees liberal (idealist) and imperial (realist) logics as the main characteristics and foundations for every US foreign policy. Stiegerwald (1994, 169−71) explains that liberalism is an integral component of a complex US grand strategy that melds liberal and realist assumptions into a coherent whole, often described as ‘liberal realism’ or ‘national security liberalism’. Art (1998/1999, 80) refers to this fusion as ‘Realpolitik plus’. The devotion to liberal democracy is also a link between Clinton and G. W. Bush – the first believed in the passive victory of liberal democracy and free market, and the second was convinced that the same ideas needed to be pursued actively .

3.2 Uni-multipolarity

The G. W. Bush administration came into office confident of US supremacy, especially militarily, and was determined to preserve it (Friedberg 2009, 30). This administration had a vision of a new foreign policy for the US, which was missing in the 1990’s. It was manifested in an article written by Condoleezza Rice in 2000. The implementation of a new strategy may be seen in the opening of new basis in the former Soviet geopolitical space (Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Lithuania, Georgia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan) (Paolini, 2004 123–38), withdrawal from the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty (due to the building of missile defences against the rogue states), the US using its veto power on the verification protocol Biological Weapons Convention, the US had stopped sending Russia aid for reduction of nuclear arsenal as stated in Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, START I and START II were jointly replaced by Bush and Putin with an informal

Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) agreement (Raščan 2005, 97), transforming the US armed forces to prepare them for 21st century warfare against future advanced opponents (Rice 2000), refusing to sign the Kyoto Protocol, and refused to ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Ikenberry (2002) saw this new US-foreign policy strategy as neo-im-perialistic. However, Krauthammer (2001) saw it differently:

»After eight years during which foreign policy success was largely measured by the number of treaties the president could sign and the number of summits he could attend, we now have an administration willing to assert American freedom of action and the primacy of Amer-ican national interests. Rather than contain power within a vast web of constraining international agreements, the new unilateralism seeks to strengthen American power and unashamedly deploy it on behalf of self-defined global ends.«

Without a doubt the US embraced the unipolar idea and thus also the in-ternational system became unipolar. Dueck (2004, 511) wrote that G. W. Bush changed Clinton's liberal internationalist foreign policy into a more realist approach Yet, did this unipolarity result in hegemony, or even empire?

The key feature of the new concept of the US foreign policy was coping with rogue regimes, and managing Beijing and Moscow (Rice 2000). Early on the G. W. Bush administration saw China and Russia as strategic challenges. This view changed after September 11, 2001 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In many ways September 11, 2001 made the world even more unipolar, since the US showed its military potential – the conquest of Afghanistan and the overthrow of the Taliban took about two months from a standing start, with virtually no advance preparation; despite warnings of a quagmire like the one the Soviets had fallen into in the 1980’s (Friedberg 2009, 30). It showed the power and unipolar resolve of the US. Brooks and Wohlforth wrote (2002, 21): »If today’s American primacy does not constitute unipolarity, then nothing ever will.«

The second change the administration made after September 11, 2001, in-volved a change from a strategy of realism to a strategy of American primacy. However, September 11, 2001 does not represent a structural change in the inter-

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national system. It did intensify the unipolar structure and bring changes to the US foreign policy, but the international system was not systematically changed by it. Therefore, I argue that unipolarity was intensified to hegemony after September 11. However, it did not develop into empire. Indeed the US under G. W. Bush was a global hegemon, but the notion of an empire was never his goal, nor was it the goal of any other US president. In his 2004 State of the Union address, G. W. Bush said (2004): »We have no desire to dominate, no ambitions of empire.«

Another reason to argue about the intensified unipolarity or hegemony after September 11, is an interesting neorealistic (both defensive and offensive) observation. Namely, the prediction that a counterbalancing will take place immediately after the unipolarity is reached against the US (Waltz 1993). However, this did not happen, and Layne (2006, 10) finds three reasons for that: First, the neorealists failed to fully appreciate the ‘duality of American power’ in a unipolar world; that is, they did not recognize that second-tier major powers would face pressures both to align with the US hegemon and to balance against it. Second, they did not foresee that virtually all of the possible counterbalances − Russia, China, Germany, and Japan − had internal problems that constrained their ability to balance against the US. Simply stated, ‘the Waltzians’ underestimated the geopolitical consequence of the Soviet Union’s sudden demise: there were no other states with the capabilities to step into the post Cold War geopolitical vacuum and act as counterweights to the US. Third, they did not understand that balancing against an extant hegemon would be more difficult than countering a rising one.

On the other hand, the acts that followed September 11, 2001 revealed a vulnerability of the super power. Moreover, after the attacks, the US foreign policy was altered. China and Russia were not perceived as strategic challenges anymore, but as strategic allies. The War on Terror demanded the adaptation of the 2000 strategy. The National Security Strategy of the United States in 2002 had conceptualised such a change and some authors named it the ‘Bush doctrine’ (Krauthammer 2004). This new strategy made it possible for states that violated basic human rights, but were geopolitically significant (Uzbekistan and Sudan) to become strategic partners with the US (Raščan 2005, 98). As Secretary of State Colin Powell put it (Tyler 2001): »Nobody’s calling us unilateral anymore. That’s kind of gone away for the time being; we’re so multilateral it keeps me up

24 hours a day checking on everybody.« Furthermore, the Pentagon adopted a new doctrine – the so-called 1-4-2-1. It required a force able to defend the US homeland, operate in and from four forward regions, swiftly and simultaneously defeat two regional adversaries, and achieve a more decisive and enduring result such as regime change in one of those regions (Owens 2006, 315).

It would seem that a new treatment of Russia and China, alongside the multilateralism stated by Colin Powell, contradicts my argument of hegemony. Yet, if we recall picture 2, which portrays hegemony, it is clear that a hegem-on has to be actively engaged in preservation of its position. Indeed, super powers prefer bilateral relations, where they can more easily implement their superiority into multilateral forums. However, ‘star shaped’ bilateral relations (Pelanda 2007, 48) result in a kind of multilateral relation where multilateral does not mean inefficient international forums as were characteristic for Clinton administrations, but rather multiple effective bilateral relations, with the US in the middle in order to achieve multilateral reconciliation . Moreover, the 1-4-2-1 military strategy clearly implies a notion of vast superiority and willingness to implement it, further confirming my argument of hegemony.

Still, these new approaches of the US had their negative effects as well, especially regarding soft power. In the eyes of many countries, the US is becoming the rogue superpower (Huntington 1999, 42). In 2002 and 2003, American supremacy was not yet disputed or disturbed. Krauthammer (2002, 17) reframed the unipolar moment into a unipolar era. Even more, Kennedy, who predicted the fall of America in the late 1980’s admitted his mistake.

»To put it another way, while the battle between the US and in-ternational terrorism and rogue states may indeed be asymmetrical, perhaps a far greater asymmetry may be emerging: namely, the one between the US and the rest of the powers. [...] Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing. I have returned to all of the comparative defence spending and military personnel statistics over the past 500 years that I compiled in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and no other nation comes close. The Pax Britannica was run on the cheap, Britain’s army was much smaller than Euro-pean armies, and even the Royal Navy was equal only to the next two

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navies – right now all the other navies in the world combined could not dent American maritime supremacy (Kennedy 2002).«

Indeed, the ideas of multipolarity and declinism were at that point in the back seat. Zakaria points to the reasons why authors of declinism and multipo-larity made important errors in the perception and measurement of American power and thus the situation in the world (Zakaria 1998/1999, 11−3):

»First, America’s elites had forgotten that power is relative. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the most immediate, dramatic effect was a massive increase in Americas standing in the world. As one diplomat put it to me at the time: ‘There used to be two global games, one in Moscow, one in Washington. But now everybody comes to us’. [...] The second reason for the misperceptions of elites was that they judged the world purely on the basis of economic power, which they had begun to believe was the only kind that really mattered. In fact, what makes a great power is composite power – a combination of economic, military, cultural, and ideological strength. Only the United States had the full package. [...] The third flaw in elite thinking was a failure to see that one of the most important elements in America’s composite power is not its military or its economy, but what Joseph Nye called soft power. [...] American ideas and culture have swept the globe. Indeed, that awkward watchword of the moment, ‘globalization might well be de-fined as the worldwide penetration of American political and economic ideas, goods, services, brand names, movies, songs, even sports. [...] Finally, America’s elites misunderstood their own economy, which by the early 1990s was performing better than it had for thirty years and was easily the strongest of any industrialized nation. The fear of decline in the 1980s, an important shift in government policies, and intense foreign competition began to transform the American economy. American businesses restructured and increased their efficiency.«

However, things were getting complicated. Krauthammer’s definition of unipolarity, as a system with only one pole, made sense in the immediate

wake of a Cold War, but a decade later what increasingly seemed salient was less the absence of a peer rival than the persistence of a number of problems in the world that Washington could not dispose of by itself (Brooks and Wohlforth 2002, 20−1).

The US economy started to show weaknesses (Pelanda 2007, 45–6). Fur-thermore, the military interventions could not stabilise Afghanistan and Iraq. Military power was not ‘the all mighty’ which can solve all challenges. The US learned the hard way that, as Jervis (2003, 86) put it, it is harder to build than to destroy. The G. W. Bush administration noticed this and for the second time readjusted its foreign policy strategy outlined in The National Security Strategy of The United States of America 2006. Condoleezza Rice presented this in her 2008 article, where she further stressed the importance of cooperating with China and Russia (Rice 2008, 3–6). By the end of 2006, even Krauthammer was forced to conclude that the United States was ‘past the apogee’ of its unprecedented power (Krauthammer 2006). Nye (2002) pointed out that the structural power and the different power factors of the US, although it is the biggest power, cannot be controlled. The term unipolarity is misleading because it exaggerates the degree to which the US is able to get the results it wants in some dimensions of world politics (Nye 2002, 38−9). In other words, the US was a great power which had efficiency, but lacked efficacy.

»Some observers made the classic Political Science 101 mistake of equating ‘power as control over resources’ with ‘power as control over outcomes’. Just because the United States has the largest economy and the most powerful military does not mean that it can get everyone to do everything it wants all of the time (Friedberg 2009, 32).«

The unipolar moment was nearly over. Was a new era of multipolarity at hand? My answer is – not entirely. At that point, the world was far from multipolarity and much closer to the Huntington’s concept of uni-multipo-larity (Huntington 1999, 35−6):

»There is now only one superpower. But that does not mean that the world is unipolar. A unipolar system would have one superpower, no si-

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gni fi cant major powers, and many minor powers. A multipolar system has several major powers of comparable strength that cooperate and compete with each other in shifting patterns. Contemporary international politics does not fit any of these three models. It is instead a strange hybrid, a uni-multipolar system with one superpower and several major powers.«

Furthermore, Huntington (1999, 36) explains that in the international affairs settlement of today, key issues require action by the super power and some of the other major states. On the other hand, the super power can veto action on key issues posed by group of other states (Huntington 1999, 36). There are two levels of these major states. Firstly, there are major regional powers that are preeminent in areas of the world without being able to extend their interests and capabilities as globally as the United States: the German-French combination in Europe, Russia in Eurasia, China and potentially Japan in East Asia, India in South Asia, Iran in Southwest Asia, Brazil in Latin America, and South Africa and Nigeria in Africa (Huntington 1999, 36). Secondly, there are regional powers whose interests often conflict with the more powerful regional states: Britain in relation to the German-French combination, Ukraine in re-lation to Russia, Japan in relation to China, South Korea in relation to Japan, Pakistan in relation to India, Saudi Arabia in relation to Iran, and Argentina in relation to Brazil (Huntington 1999, 36). This is one of the characteristics of the uni-multipolarity – superpower cannot ‘go it alone’, on the other hand, nothing can be done without the superpower.

Another feature of the uni-multipolar system is that the superpower’s efforts to create a unipolar system stimulates greater effort by the major powers to bal-ance against it and move the system toward a multipolar one (Huntington 1999, 37).The hegemon in a unipolar system, lacking any major powers challenging it, is normally able to maintain its dominance over minor states for a long time until it is weakened by internal decay or by forces from outside the system, both of which happened to fifth-century Rome and nineteenth-century China (Huntington 1999, 36). In a multipolar system, each state might prefer a unipolar system with itself as the single dominant power, but the other major states will act to prevent this from happening, as was often the case in European politics (Huntington 1999, 36). In both cases the most powerful actors have an interest

in maintaining the system . This is less true in uni-multipolarity (Huntington 1999, 37), which is rather unstable exactly because of its nature.

As explained for the first three grand theories of the power structure of the post Cold War international system – they were all right and wrong – and the same goes for Huntington’s uni-multipolarity.

The concept that Huntington presented became a reality after 2006, not in 1999, when it was written. Why was that so? I argue that Huntington also underestimated the role of the agency, and overestimated the power of other players in the world. Namely, the unipolarity was inserted due to the policies of G. W. Bush; moreover, ‘the rise of the rest’ was not as challenging to the US in 1999, as it was in 2006.

The situation in 2006 was such that the US was the world’s biggest power; however it could not kept the world in a state of unipolarity. Furthermore, other major powers could not yet counter-balance the power of the US, so the world was not multipolar. Other major powers still needed the US on board if they wished to do something substantial in the world. The same was true for the US, which needed a number of major powers in order to be efficacy. The US cannot ‘go it alone’ and others cannot do anything without the US. Although correct in 2006, there is a time gap of seven years from the time when Huntington wrote his article. Furthermore, after 1999, the US was able, albeit briefly, to create a unipolarity, moreover hegemony. However, these two facts do not undermine the usefulness of Huntington’s assumption.

Huntington presented a new type of structure of the international system. Thus, we can identify another shift in the post Cold War power structure of the international system. If the multipolarity of the 1990’s gave way to unipolarity in 2001, than in 2006 unipolarity changed to uni-multipolarity . However, if the changes so far are atributed to the role of polititians, person-alities (agency), the 2006 change from unipolarity to uni-multipolarity can be attributed to the economic and other ‘real’ power factors.

As I will present later on, some authors build on Huntington’s concept. He holistically analysed the international system and came up with the specific name for it – uni-multipolarity. Such a name may not only be interpreted as a fusion between the two more familiar ideas. A different, more partial, interpretation is possible, namely that some of the aspects of the international

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system are unipolar, while others are multipolar. However, before getting to that analysis, I would like to focus on the name – uni-multipolarity.

Huntington’s hybrid approach in the academic world in dealing with the issue of polarity in the international system is not a new one. In the 1960’s, similar nomenclature arose. Most scholars agreed in the fifties and early sixties that the world system was bipolar, but by the middle sixties this became a ma-jor point of contention (Dean and Vasquez 1976, 8). The phenomena that gave rise to this contention seemed to be the gradual breakup of the Communist and Western blocs along with the growing recognition that other nation could at-tain nuclear status besides France and China (Dean and Vasquez 1976, 8).

Waltz (1964, 886) argued that the world is still bipolar because of the ab-sence of peripheries outside the Cold War, the great range and intensity of the super power competition, the persistence of crisis, and the possession by the super powers of ‘preponderant power’ over all other states. By ‘preponderant power’ Waltz meant the gap in general economic strength, military spending and the discrepancy in the quality and quantity of nuclear and conventional weapons between the super powers and the other states nearest them in these capabilities (Waltz 1964, 898−9). Because this preponderance of power will remain despite the spread of nuclear weapons, he predicted that the world will remain bipolar until the end of the century (Waltz 1964, 898−9).

Hanrieder, however, has questioned whether the complexities of the sys-tem can be adequately described as either bipolar or multipolar (Hanrieder 1965, 299−308). He maintained that some aspects of international politics appear to be bipolar (nuclear capabilities) whereas other aspects appear to be multipolar (UN voting system) (Hanrieder 1965, 300−3) and referred to the international system as bipolar with polycentric patterns (Hanrieder 1965, 300) . He argued that almost all important systemic relationships are char-acterized by both a fundamental bipolar tension and a multipolar dimension (Hanrieder 1965, 303) .

Out of this discussion Rosecrance, who criticizes both bipolarity and multipolarity as having undesirable destabilizing features, presented a con-cept of ‘bi-multipolarity’ (Rosecrance 1966, 314−27). This is a system in which the bipolar nations (presumably the US and Soviet Union) and the multipolar ‘lesser’ states would act as checks on one another to lessen con-

flict arising from interstate competition (Rosecrance 1966, 314−27). In the bi-multipolarity interests and the superpowers are partly opposed and partly harmonious (Rosecrance 1966, 322) .

As demonstrated, the first G. W. Bush administration implemented the idea of unipolarity. Therefore, the structure of the international system went from multipolar to unipolar. With the US entangled up in Afghanistan and Iraq, its economy slowing down, the rise of other actors in the international arena, unreached goals, and dealing with uncontrollable outcomes, the world has become uni-multipolar. Many expected that such an unstable system will be transformed into a multipolar one (Pape 2005; Paul 2005; Layne 2006). However, I will argue differently. In 2008, Haass introduced yet another con-cept – non-polarity – and through it the structure of the international system may be becoming a bipolar again as Pelanda argues (2007).

3.3 Through Non-polarity to Bipolarity Again?

Through the military entanglement in Afghanistan and Iraq, the new Security strategy of the US (2006) and the economic situation in the US, Haass (2008) observed an increasing distributed power, rather than a concentrated power in the world. Thus, he defined non-polarity as (Haass 2008):

»The principal characteristic of twenty-first-century international relations is turning out to be non-polarity: a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power. [...] In contrast to multipolarity − which involves several distinct poles or concentra-tions of power − a non-polar international system is characterized by numerous centres with meaningful power.«

A similar concept was put forward by Ferguson already in 2004, who argued that the alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity – a global vacuum of power (Ferguson 2004, 39). And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such

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a not-so-new world disorder, just like in the time after Charlemagne and inter-war period in the 20. Century (Ferguson 2004, 39).

Haass (2008) explains that today’s world differs in a fundamental way from a classic multipolarity as there are many more power centres, and quite a few of these are not nation-states. Indeed, one of the cardinal features of the contemporary international system is that nation-states have lost their monop-oly on power and in some domains their pre-eminence as well (Haass 2008). States are being challenged from above, by regional and global organizations, from below, by militias, and from the side, by a variety of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and corporations (Haass 2008). Power is now found in many hands and in many places (Haass 2008) . Haass continues the narrative of Strange (1996, 189), who wrote that the power is shifting sideways from states to markets and other non-state actors.

Furthermore, Hass argues that globalization reinforces non-polarity in two fundamental ways: first, many cross-border flows take place outside the control of governments and without their knowledge; second, these same flows often strengthen the capacities of non-state actors, such as energy com-panies (who are experiencing a dramatic increase in wealth owing), terrorists (who use the internet to recruit and train, the international banking system to move resources, and the global transport system to move people), rogue states (who can exploit black and gray markets), and Fortune 500 firms (who quickly move personnel and investments) (Haass 2008).

It seems that especially with the economic crisis that began in 2008, Haass’ concept of non-polarity is a very convenient way to describe the power distribution in the world. Some observers have interpreted the 2008 global financial crisis as the beginning of the decline of the US (Pape 2009; Nye 2010; Cohen and DeLong 2010), especially due to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (September 15 2008). Indeed, the later has had a much bigger impact on the international system then September 11, 2001. The September 15 has structural consequences, which was not the case after the September 11. Such a perception may be further strengthened by calling on Krauthammer’s thesis of a unipolar moment from. In his article he wrote:

»An American collapse to second-rank status will be not for for-

eign but for domestic reasons. America’s low savings rate, poor edu-cational system, stagnant productivity, declining work habits, rising demand for welfare state entitlements and new taste for ecological luxuries have nothing at all to do with engagement in Europe, Central America or the Middle East. Over the last thirty years, while taxes remained almost fixed (rising from 18.3 percent to 19.6 percent) and defence spending declined, domestic entitlements nearly doubled (Krauthammer 1990/1991, 26).«

Nye agrees with such an analysis and argues that the US does not suffer from ‘imperial overstretch’; on the contrary, defence and foreign affairs expenditures have declined as a share of GDP over the past several decades (Nye 2010). Nonetheless, the US could decline not because of imperial overstretch, but because of domestic under reach – Rome rotted from within after all (Nye 2010).

The economic crisis not only hurt the US economic and military power, but it would seem that it hurt its soft power as well. Wall Street’s inability to police itself showed devastating consequences for the rest of the world and could further diminish US soft power by discrediting its model of liberal capitalism (Friedberg, 2009, 35). Furthermore, similar effects on the US soft power had also the reluctance to close Guantanamo prison, incidents in Abu Ghraib and other indiscretions by US soldiers (urination on corpses, tarring the Quran), and the drone war.

However, I argue that this new wave of ‘American declinism’ suffers from the same flaws as previous waves – overestimation of particular facts.

»Every ten years, it is decline time in the US. In the late 1950s, it was the Sputnik shock, followed by the ‘missile gap’ trumpeted by John F. Kennedy in the 1960 presidential campaign. A decade later, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger sounded the dirge over bipolar-ity, predicting a world of five, rather than two, global powers. At the end of the 1970s, Jimmy Carter’s ‘malaise’ speech invoked ‘a crisis of confidence’ that struck ‘at the very heart and soul and spirit of our national will.’ A decade later, academics such as the Yale historian

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Paul Kennedy predicted the ruin of the US, driven by overextension abroad and profligacy at home. But three years later, Washington dis-patched 600.000 soldiers to fight the first Iraq war--without reinstating the draft or raising taxes. The only price of ‘overstretch’ turned out to be the mild recession of 1991 (Joffe 2009).«

Indeed the ‘rise of the rest’ has had its consequences for power distribution – the relative power of the US is in decline, however, as it was true in the late 1980’s, it would be unwise to bet against the resilience and adaptability of the American system (Friedberg 2009, 35). American soft-economic power has by no means declined – [...] for the moment, the dollar has not lost its lustre and has actually become more attractive in light of recent uncertainties (Eichengreen 2009) .

It seemed that with the Obama administration, the US would buffer the neg-ative consequences, which military actions especially in Iraq had on the US soft power. Although receiving a Nobel Peace Prize, Obama continued the G. W. Bush practices regarding the War on Terror . Not only had Guantanamo not been closed as Obama had promised, but distasteful incidents by soldiers continued, the drone war escalated, and the US assassinated not only foreigner terrorists in foreign countries, but also its own citizens in foreign countries that were considered as a threat to its security, and above all – without a trial. However, some aspects of the US soft power remained unshaken – popular culture, education, language, tourist destination, and the image of ‘a country where dreams are possible’.

In his article ‘Default Power’ which was published during the economic crisis in 2009, Joffe, explains that even with the economic crisis, the US eco-nomic predominance is not threatened .

»In all instances of declinism, economic failure serves as Exhib-it A. But current figures show the U.S. economy to be worth $14.3 trillion, three times as much as the world’s second‐biggest economy, Japan’s, and only slightly less than the economies of its four nearest competitors combined − Japan, China, Germany, and France. Today, there is only one challenge to the dominance of the U.S. economy: the European Union’s aggregate GDP of $18 trillion. But the more appro-

priate comparison may be with the 16‐member euro-zone, which has a common monetary policy and a rudimentary common fiscal policy ‐‐ and a collective GDP of $13.5 trillion. The United States also comes out ahead among major powers in terms of per capita income, with $47,000 per inhabitant. It is followed by France and Germany (both in the $44,000 range) (Joffe 2009).«

Additionally, the US military power is unreachable. In 2008, the US spent $607 billion on its military, representing almost half of the world’s total mili-tary spending (Joffe 2009). The next nine states spent a combined total of $476 billion, and the presumptive challengers to the US military supremacy − China, India, Japan, and Russia − together devoted only $219 billion to their militaries (Joffe 2009). Similar can be said about the ‘soft power’ of the US. Of the world’s top 20 universities, all but three are American; of the top 50, all but 11 are located in the United States (Joffe 2009). By contrast, India’s two best universities are tucked away in the 300 to 400 tier. China does a bit better as, its top three – Nan-jing University, Peking University, and Shanghai University – are in the 200 to 300 group of the world’s 500 best universities (Joffe 2009).

I will get back to the specific numbers in the next chapters, but for the time being the Joffe analysis provides arguments that oppose Haass’ statement of non-polarity. How is it possible that within the timeframe of one year, although observing the same actor – the US, two such contradicting assumptions were made?

Haass focuses on the analysis of the outcomes, and Joffe on the power factors. There is a big gap between them, since both ignore the aspects of the other. Yet, both authors are right and wrong at the same time. Haass is right when he stresses the relevance of non-state actors; however, is their influence and impact so vast that it makes the world non-polar? On the other hand, Joffe stresses the power factors and capabilities; however he overlooks the outcomes and results of implementing that power. The first overestimates asymmetric warfare in its military, economic and ideological components and the second underestimates it. I have defined power as ‘power to’ and ‘power over’. Both authors point to only one part of power, but overlook their integration. Power measured in resources rarely equals power measured in preferred outcomes,

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and cycles of belief in decline reveal more about psychology than they do about real shifts in power resources (Nye 2010). Furthermore, both authors did not make a distinction between the US perception of itself and the per-ception of it by the other actors. As in finance, expectations and perceptions play a crucial role while actual facts matter less. Facts may portray a certain picture of the US power; however, that picture is blurred by the perception of other actors that may be completely different than the reality. This further complicates the analysis of power distribution.

This anomaly was tackled by Nye. He builds on Huntington’s thesis about uni-multipolarity and said:

»Power today is distributed in a pattern that resembles a complex three-dimensional chess game. On the top chessboard, military power is largely unipolar, and the United States is likely to retain primacy for quite some time. On the middle chessboard, economic power has been multipolar for more than a decade, with the United States, Europe, Japan, and China as the major players and others gaining in impor-tance. The bottom chessboard is the realm of transnational relations. It includes non-state actors as diverse as bankers who electronically transfer funds, terrorists who traffic weapons, hackers who threaten cyber-security, and challenges such as pandemics and climate change. On this bottom board, power is widely diffused, and it makes no sense to speak of unipolarity, multipolarity, or hegemony. The word ‘decline’ mixes up two different dimensions: absolute decline, in the sense of decay, and relative decline, in which the power resources of other states grow or are used more effectively (Nye 2010).«

Haass’ analysis of international affairs is the outcome and result of differ-ent activities of the US. It can be concluded from it that the world is lacking global governance. Such a thesis is presented by Pelanda (2007) and Brem-mer and Roubini (2011). Nye explains:

»The United States is not in absolute decline, and in relative terms, there is a reasonable probability that it will remain more powerful than

any single state in the coming decades. The problem of American pow-er in the twenty-first century, then, is not one of decline but what to do in light of the realization that even the largest country cannot achieve the outcomes it wants without the help of others (Nye 2010).«

Bremmer and Roubini (2011) named this world G-0, where no single country or bloc of countries has the political or economic leverage – or the will – to drive a truly international agenda. Washington is too weak to drive the ‘Washington consensus’ alone, however a ‘Beijing consensus’ cannot be developed (Bremmer and Roubini 2011). This has created a vacuum of international leadership and no global governance (Bremmer and Roubini 2011) .

This is the world that we live in today. Huntington and Nye refer to it as uni-multipolar, Bremmer and Roubini as G-0, but the fact remains that it is a world where power is being rearranged. Beliefs in decline – at home and abroad – can lead to dangerous mistakes in policy (Nye 2010). The Obama administration is not a copy of Clinton’s administration. In 2010 US President Barack Obama introduced a new National Security Strategy, which is not dif-ferent from G. W. Bush’s of 2006 (Feaver 2010). The cooperation with Russia, China, and India is stressed, as well as the fight against international terrorism, and nuclear proliferation (The National Security Strategy 2010). Not only are the priorities the same, the narrative and dictions are similar too (Feaver 2010). We are yet to see what the second Obama administration will do.

The US has the will and the potential to be the global governor; however, its power has faced a decline, as shown by the poor results in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the struggling economy. Not being able to control the results of its actions, the US is facing a paradox. Based on power factor distribution, stressed by Joffe (2009) the structure of international community should still be unipolar or at least uni-multipolar. Yet, taking in consideration the a-sym-metric warfare, the rise of non-state actors, which baffles the US to control the outcomes of its actions, the structure of the international system should be non-polar. Thus, if we combine the two approaches, we may conclude that at the moment we are witnessing yet another shift in the structure of the international system – from un-multipolarity to non-polarity.

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So when will the rearrangement be finished? One can only speculate. Still, I believe that the era of non-polarity, if it ever fully develops, will not be long . Moreover, as I have described, also the uni-multipolarity has not last very long. Thus, what can we expect in the future?

My argument is that contemporary we are witnessing a shift from uni-multipolarity through non-polarity to bipolarity . Even assuming that ‘the rest’ remain on track, what lies ahead is not true multipolarity − with three or more roughly equal powers − but something closer to a return to bipolarity, with China and the US head and shoulders above the rest, yet America still significantly ahead of China (Friedberg 2009, 34).

In the second, empirical, part of the book, I will analyse the data and the trends that I believe will lead the world into a bipolar structure once more. The core antagonism between them will be the struggle for global govern-ance. Furthermore, their main difference will be, as it was in the Cold War, ideological. The main difference between the future bipolarity and that of the Cold War are going to be the main actors in the rivalry . In the Cold War it was two states – the US and the Soviet Union. However, the future bipolar world the main actors will be two different concepts – autocratic and demo-cratic capitalism. Such a thesis was presented by Carlo Pelanda in his Grand Alliance theory published in 2007. The tension between the two ideological concepts will be manifested through the actions of the big actors, mainly the US and China. They will be engaged in a traditional power politics game – struggling for zones of influence and material power.

The Grand Alliance theory analyses the contemporary lack of global governance. Pelanda argues (2007, 17−46) that the world is too big to be governed by one single state. It is not the case that the US grew smaller, but the world got bigger (Pelanda 2007, 9). In such an international system, alliances to secure global governance are needed. There are two concepts of global governance that constitutes the contemporary bipolar struggle for global governance: Democratic and Autocratic capitalism (Pelanda 2008). The crucial state in this fight is Russia. If Russia decides to become a part of the Autocratic side, then it will be very hard for the US and the EU to set the rules of the future international system. In such a case, China (whose autocracy does not seem to be threatened), with the rise of the middle class,

Russia, and other world autocracies will decide the rules of the game (Pelan-da 2007, 107−46).

3.4 International Relations Repeating – from Bipolarity to Bipolarity

Evoking the first quote in my work from Kissinger, I can conclude that the post Cold War world had a global governor, but only from 2000 to 2006. In the 1990’s the world was in turmoil, since the US did not exercise their role as the hyper-power (the term was coined by Peregrine Worsthorne 1991 and was later popularized by the French foreign minister Hubert Védrine). After 2006 and especially after 2008, due to the financial crisis, the world is again in turmoil and lacking a global governor.

The structure of the international community thus changed several times in the last two decades: from bipolarity in the Cold War to multipolarity in the 1990’s, to unipolarity at the beginning of the new millennium, to uni-multipo-larity after 2006. Contemporary, we are in the midst of yet another shift from uni-multipolarity to non-polarity .

The fact that the world went from bipolar to multipolar was a result of policy decision by two US presidents (G. H. W. Bush, Clinton), not as a re-sult of a distribution of power factors. Neorealism fails to accept this level of analysis, but, my theoretical scope – neoclassical realism and the debate between realism and constructivism – enables such a conclusion. However, it is very difficult to pinpoint a specific date that would serve to distinguish the two systems – the fall of the Berlin Wall, and disintegration of the So-viet Union came first to mind. Furthermore, the change from multipolarity to unipolarity can be attributed to the same cause – the internal political decisions of the G. W. Bush administration in 2001. Here, the dividing date is much clearer . It is only the change in 2006 to uni-multipolarity and the contemporary shift to non-polarity where the power factors play a role.

The power structure of the post Cold War international system changed quite rapidly. Therefore, it is not a surprise that there were numerous dif-ferent assumptions and visions of the post Cold War international system.

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Furthermore, it is no surprise that all of these assumptions overestimated one or more of the aspects of the post Cold War international system. Since the system had been in a state of constant change, it is very hard to find a constant in it. Consequently, the analyses’ were both right and wrong.

Subsequently, there are three different fates that each assumption may be faced with. First, part of its assumption was taken as a foundation for another vision (Nye’s three-level chess game adaptation of Huntington’s uni-multipolarity); second, a certain aspect of an analysis had a prolonged effect over the last 20 years (‘new world order’); and third, it is possible that an idea could be completely correct but had been introduced too early to be credible or proven correct (uni-multipolarity) .

The next chapter begins the second and empirical part of the analysis; I will analyse whether or not the power structure of the post Cold War inter-national system is moving gradually from uni-multipolarity through non-po-larity into a bipolar world. I will do this by looking to the four power factors that can portray both ‘power to’ and ‘power over’, which are based on ‘four faces’ of power. It should be stressed again that political science has not yet develop a methodology how to fuse these factors. Moreover, measuring some of them, particularly political and ideological, is very difficult. Therefore, it is upon every scholar to do a qualitative analysis on his own, what opens room for subjectivity and biased analysis. This analysis suffers from the same anomaly as other assumptions critically assessed in it. Yet, there is a differ-ence, since the present work is holistic in nature, what others are lacking.

Although Nye (2010) talks about three levels of chess board power game, I have presented four power factors (economy, military, political, ideologi-cal), thus I argue that there are four levels of power struggle – each for each power factor. Therefore, every level may have a different structure, and the final structure is not a simple sum of them all but a qualitative analysis of them all. Moreover, statements about the future are speculative, since no one can predict what will happen without a reasonable doubt. One cannot prove the future, thus I will only speculate and point to the relevant facts that, what I think, will lead the international affairs to another bipolar structure.

4 Economic Power Factor

As noted earlier, the economic power factor is the most important one in the post Cold War era. There are several ways to measure it. I will look

at the following economic data: GDP, GDP (PPP) per capita, GDP growth, GDP (PPP) as a share of world total, foreign debt (percentage of GDP), high-technology exports as a percentage of all manufactured exports, and the savings-investment ratio as percentage of GDP.

The actors that I will be looking at are the US, China, Russia, and the EU. The data is taken from the data bases of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). The time frame of the data is 1990 – 2011. In some cases the data was available for the early 1990’s. In these cases I took the earliest data available .

Graph 4 presents GDP1 from 1990 to 2011 of the US, the EU, China, and Russia in constant 2000 US dollars (World Bank 2012). Graph 5 presents GDP per capita PPP2 from 1990 to 2011 of the US, the EU, China, and

1 Definition (World Bank 2012): GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using single year official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used.

2 Definition (World Bank 2012): GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2005 international dollars.

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Russia (World Bank 2012). Graph 6 presents the GDP growth3 from 1990 to 2011 of the US, the EU, China, and Russia (World Bank 2012). Graph 7 presents a share of high-technology exports4 in the manufactured exports between 1990 and 2011 for the US, the EU, China, and Russia (World Bank 2012). Graph 8 portrays a Gross domestic product based on purchasing-pow-er-parity (PPP) share of world total5 from 1990 to 2011 for the US, the EU, China, and Russia (International Monetary Fund). Graph 9 portrays General government gross debt as percent of GDP6, from 1990 to 2011, for the US, the EU, China, and Russia (International Monetary Fund 2012). Graph 10 presents the savings-investment ratio as percentage of GDP from 1990 to 2011 for the US, China, Russia and the EU7 .

The US GDP almost doubled in 17 years since 1990. However, after 2006 clear signs of economic ‘slow down’ can be seen, which were strengthened with the 2008 crisis. The share of the world output dropped below 20% after 2008, the external debt increased dramatically after 2006 and a signif-icant drop of high-technological exports may be seen after 2006. All of this confirms what has been written in the previous chapter; after 2006 the US

3 Definition (World Bank 2012): Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2000 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.

4 Definition (World Bank 2012): High-technology exports are products with high R&D intensity, such as in aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical machinery.

5 Definition (International Monetary Fund): Expressed in percent of world GDP in PPP dollars. These data form the basis for the country weights used to generate the World Economic Outlook country group composites for the domestic economy. The IMF is not a primary source for purchasing power parity (PPP) data. WEO weights have been created from primary sources and are used solely for purposes of generating country group composites. For primary source information, please refer to one of the following sources: the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the World Bank, or the Penn World Tables.

6 Definition (International Monetary Fund): Gross debt consists of all liabilities that require payment or payments of interest and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in the future. This includes debt liabilities in the form of SDRs, currency and deposits, debt securities, loans, insurance, pensions and standardized guarantee schemes, and other accounts payable.

7 Definition of Total investment (Percent of GDP) (International Monetary Fund 2012): Expressed as a ratio of total investment in current local currency and GDP in current local currency. Investment or gross capital formation is measured by the total value of the gross fixed capital formation and changes in inventories and acquisitions less disposals of valuables for a unit or sector.

Definition of Gross national savings (Percent of GDP) (International Monetary Fund 2012): Expressed as a ratio of gross national savings in current local currency and GDP in current local currency. Gross national saving is gross disposable income less final consumption expenditure after taking account of an adjustment for pension funds.

Graph 4: GDP of the US, the EU, China, and Russia from 1990 to 2011 in constant 2000 US dollars (World Bank 2012)

Graph 5: GDP per capita PPP of the US, the EU, China, and Russia from 1990 to 2011 in constant 2005 international dollars (World Bank 2012)

Graph 6: GDP growth from 1990 to 2011 of the US, the EU, China, and Russia in annual % (World Bank 2012)

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Graph 7: Share of high-technology exports in the manufactured exports for the US, the EU, China, and Russia between 1990 and 2011 in % of manufactured exports (World Bank 2012)

Graph 8: Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) as % of world total from 1990 to 2011 for the US, the EU, China, and Russia (International Monetary Fund 2012)

Graph 9: General government gross debt as % of GDP from 1990 to 2011 for the US, the EU, China, and Russia (International Monetary Fund 2012)

Graph 10: Savings-investment ratio as % of GDP from 1990 to 2011 for the US, the EU, China, and Russia (International Monetary Fund 2012)

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got into economic trouble and as a result the unipolarity of the international system since 2001 faded.

Since the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, the US has been run-ning budget deficits (except for the last years of the Clinton administration) (US Government Spending Charts 2012). The IMF database for savings and investment ratio goes back to 1980 and it shows that savings were predom-inantly smaller then investments (International Monetary Fund 2012). This was the one of the reasons for the repeating occurrences of declinism that I have been discussing in the previous chapters. However, the US is still one of the greatest economic powers.

The savings-investment ration is the reason for the increasing debt that Luttwak (1993b, 239–41) attributes to the American life-style and con-sumerism. In 1970 the average American spent $8650 per year, in 1989 $12,760 (USD in 1987), thus consumption increased 47.5%. However, GDP in that period of time increased only by 38.7% (Luttwak 1993b, 239–41). Furthermore, 35% of the budget is consumed by the US government itself; Americans prefer to borrow then to save and even the tax policy of the US encourages people to borrow (Luttwak 1993b, 239–43). Although Luttwak’s analysis was done almost 20 years ago, everything is still relevant today. Moreover, the anomalies that he mentions have only increased in occurrence . In 2011, the US government has spent 42.2% of its GDP (Index of Economic Freedom 2012) and the US household debts have increased from 60% of GDP in 1990 to 90% of GDP in 2011 (US Federal Reserve Board 2012).

One can speculate with relative certainty that the US will have to re-structure its economy in the future and tackle the low savings rate which has caused such large debt. It is hard to say exactly when the US will do this, but it is certain that when it does, it will need some time to adjust its consumption, labour market and other aspects of the economy. This will undoubtedly lead to a relative decline in its economic growth and therefore its economic power.

China is the greatest economic performer in this period of time. Its GDP has tripled, and its GDP per capita has quadrupled. Its economic growth since 1991 has consistently been at least 9%. Its world output increased to 15% and its high technology exports quadrupled. China’s foreign debt increased,

but is still relatively low – at 25%. Furthermore, its reserves peaked at 3.2 trillion US dollars in December 2011 (China’s foreign exchange reserves, 1977-2011 2012), and its long-term foreign debt, which may cause problems in the future, dropped from 90% in 2000 to 37% in 2010 (World Bank 2012). The financial crisis of 2008 had an impact in the last two aspects, but still the Chinese performance is astonishing. Although China lags behind the US in terms of GDP and especially in GDP per capita, its world output share has almost caught up . .

Considering that high technological exports are higher in China than in the US, the gap between these two big powers will continue to become smaller. The difference in high technological exports became vast (after 2006 and 2008) – more than 10%. Furthermore, China is increasing its investments in research and development (R&D). In 1995, it invested only 0.6% of its GDP, in 2005 the level was already 1.3% of GDP and for the year 2020 their projection is to increase it to 2.5% of GDP (Levin 2010, 69–70). However, these numbers only place China as 22nd in the world. Regarding this spe-cific data, China is far behind the US (3% of its GDP), and the EU (2% of its GDP), which on the other hand both have a steady share (Norris 2010). This is unlike Japan and South Korea (both invest over 3% of their GDP for R&D), who, like China, are increasing their own share (Economy Statistics, Research and development expenditure 2005) .

Furthermore, in 2006 China invested only 1.5% of its GDP into the higher education, which is three times more than10 years ago; however, there are only 23% of Chinese people have a higher education, where-as in the US it is 82% (Levin 2010, 64–5).

Economic relations between the US and China have additional aspects: the US generates 30% of Chinese GDP and more than 20% of Chinese ex-ports end up in the US (US-China Trade Statistics and China’s World Trade Statistics 2009). Furthermore, China is the biggest buyer of US state bonds (owning its foreign debt) (Major Foreign holders of treasury securities 2010). If China wishes to continue its economic growth, it has to secure markets for its exports; therefore it has to encourage demand and consumption in the US. This is why China finances US debt. Even though both economies are interlinked, when the US begins restructuring its economy, it will affect the

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Chinese’s will to credit the US. This may lead to economic tensions that may spill over into other fields of power relations.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian GDP decreased until 1997, when it began to grow again. Between 1998 and 2006 the Russian economy doubled; real per capita income more than doubled and the number of people living below the poverty line was bisected (Kagan 2008, 13–4). However, it still took 10 years for Russia to reach the output level of 1990. Its foreign debt has fallen 90% since 1999. Furthermore, it is clear that the economic crisis hit Russia severely as its economic growth dropped 12% in just 2 years. Russian economic performance may be attributed to its oil and gas exports which have reduced the high technological exports from almost 20% to 8%.

Russian economic performance can be attributed to the rising prices in oil and natural gas, which in 2007 represented 68.4% of all Russian exports (in 1997 only 47.1%) (Foreign trade of Russia 2010). With this revenue, Russia paid its debts and raised the third largest reserves in the world (Kagan 2008, 13–4). If the US and China have close economic relations, then similar may be said for Russia and the EU. Russia provides 80% of the energy resources of Europe and for the former Soviet Union (Stulberg 2005, 13). However, European countries are the biggest investors in Russia – around 65% of FDI in Russia are of European origin (Souza 2008, 3). Moreover, in 2010 48% of all Russian exports went to the EU and 50% of all Russian imports came from the EU (Economy Watch 2010) . Besides energy and minerals, an important Russian export and industry is arms; and China is the main buyer (Kagan 2008, 30). The Russian military industry is the only world competitive in-dustry of Russia (Labban 2009, 19).

In order to become a serious global player in the future, Russia has to increase its high-technological exports and move away from a ‘Dutch disease’ economy (relationship between the increase in exploitation of natural resourc-es and a decline in the manufacturing sector); based on oil and gas . Russia has to introduce new high-technological companies with non-energy products that will boost its economy even further, and provide jobs, opportunity, hope for decreasing population, suffering from brain drain (Trenin 2002, 208−9).

The EU’s GDP increased also due to its expansion (2004, 2007). Its nom-inal GDP is the size of the US; however, GDP per capita is still smaller . The

economic growth of the EU was small but consistent in the period after the end of the Cold War until the financial crisis in 2008. The financial crisis hit the EU hard and had a big impact on foreign debt which is larger than 80%. The EU’s world output share dropped from 30% to 20% and its high technol-ogy exports settled at around 15% − similar to the number of the US. Still, the EU is the world’s largest trader – in 2011 it traded 4,475 billion US dollars, in second place was the US with 3,825 billion US dollars and in third was China with 3,561 billion US dollars (World Trade Organization 2012).

Another big asset of the economic power of the EU is Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). The EU is the global leader (45%), followed by the US (14%) in the FDI (Inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Performance Index 2010). In this data the EU has a gigantic lead compared to the US, whose numbers have actually declined. Furthermore, in 2008, 168 of the 500 biggest companies in the world originated from the EU, and 153 from the US (Rosecrance 2010, 47). Table 3 presents the world’s distribution of inward FDI in 1990, 2000 and 2007 (Inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Performance Index 2010)

Table 3: Share of the worlds’ distribution of inward FDI in 1990, 2000 and 2007 (in % of the world total) (Inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Performance Index 2010)

1990 2000 2007

Developed economies 72,7 68,9 68,8

EU 39,2 37,9 45,2

USA 20,3 21,7 13,8

Emerging economies 27,2 30 27,9

China 1,1 3,3 2,2

Transition economies 0,1 1,1 2,7

Although the data presented is for the EU as a whole, one has to mention the Euro and its role in the global economy. The introduction of the Euro decreased the role of the US dollar as the main global currency (Wolf 2002,

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47). From 1999 to 2011, official foreign exchange reserves in the Euro have increased to 25%, and the US dollar decreased from 71% in 1999 to 62.1% in 2011 (International Monetary Fund 2011). However, in April 2010 the Euro accounted for a 39.1% share of the currency distribution of global foreign exchange market turnover, and came in second after the US dollar – 84.9% (because each transaction involves two currencies, the shares sum to 200%), which turnover has since 1998 decreased only for 1.9% (Bank for Interna-tional Settlements 2010, 12). Apparently the Euro has built an image of a stabile and strong currency that can compete with the US dollar. However, the financial crises of 2008 and subsequently the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro zone portray the Euro in a different light.

Since the investment and savings ratio are very similar in the EU, we can predict that a rather small economic growth will continue.

4.1 Today’s Economic Power Distribution

So what do the numbers tell us about the contemporary and future economic power distribution? The numbers confirm that there is no economic hegemo-ny. The EU is the world’s biggest market, China the fastest growing power, and the US remains the richest power in the world. Thus, one could argue that regarding economic power factor, the international system is multipolar.

Yet, the US, the EU, and China have a similar share of world output. However, they also have different visions of an economic global order. Both facts were confirmed by the 2008 financial crisis. First, there was no one who could impose the rules and order into the broken system. No entity had the power to do it. Second, when the G-20 met in 2009 to set new political-eco-nomic rules, it was not successful.

»On the highest-profile issues of financial regulation, fiscal stim-ulus and monetary policy, there was little progress. But on the In-ternational Monetary Fund, the American side engineered a break-through − not just in terms of how much money the fund can lend to countries, but also in terms of rebuilding its legitimacy and making it

more effective as the world’s only global crisis-fighting organization (Johnson 2009).«

If the international system on the level of economy had been multipolar, then the US, the EU, and China would struggle among each other to find a solution and an exit strategy for the economic crisis. However, this has not happened. Moreover, although passive and inefficient, the G-20 proved two things: one, the number of relevant players on the economic chess board is not only three but many more; two, unable to reach an agreement, states in the G-20 have prolonged the period without global economic governance.

Therefore, I can argue that the contemporary world’s economic structure is non-polar. Today’s economic power structure is not multipolar, but non-po-lar, since nobody exercises power and power is diffused among many dif-ferent actors. Still, there are three other power factors that need to be looked at in order to make a final conclusion about the contemporary shift from the uni-multipolarity to non-polarity and about the speculation of the future.

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5. Other Power Facotrs

The other three power factors that I am going to analyse are according to Mann (2005, 13) military, political and ideological .

5.1 Military Power Factor

One of the key elements in measuring military power is the military budget. Graph 11 and table 4 show the International Institute’ for Security Studies’ ‘The Military Balance 2011’ and ‘SIPRI’s Yearbook 2011’ data for the US defence budget for the period between 2000 and 2012; graph 12 and table 5 shows the International Institute’ for Security Studies’ ‘The Military Balance 2011’ and ‘SIPRI’s Yearbook 2011’ data for the Russian defence budget for the period between 2000 and 2012; graph 13 presents the International Insti-tute’ for Security Studies’ ‘The Military Balance 2011’ data for EU-NATO countries defence budget from 2000 to 2009; graph 14 presents the Interna-tional Institute’ for Security Studies’ ‘The Military Balance 2011’ data for the Chinese defence budget from 2008 to 2011 (percent of GDP).

Because of different methodologies, different sources, and because states hide their true military numbers, there are some differences between the two data collections. Namely, the SIPRI numbers are higher than IISS. Yet, this fact does not overrule any conclusions made, since both point the same direction .

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Graph 11: The US defence budget (% of GDP) (International Institute for Security Studies 2011, 44)

Table 4: The US national defence spending (current US dollars – billions) (SIPRI Yearbook 2011, 158)

2001 2008 2009 2011 2012 Change 2001-10 (%)

DOD, military 290,2 594,6 636,7 739,7 707,5 130

Military personnel 74 138,9 147,3 157 159,3 110

O&M 112 244,8 259,3 311,9 301,7 146

Procurement 55 117,4 129,2 151,9 134,4 143

RDT&E 40,5 75,1 79 80,7 78,2 80,1

Other DOD military 8,8 18,3 21,8 38,2 33,9 177

DOE, military 12,9 17,1 17,6 21,2 21,8 49,6

Other, military 1,6 4,3 6,8 7,3 8,2 375

Total national defence 304,8 616,1 661 768,2 737,5 128

- DOD = Department of Defence; DOE = Department of Energy; O&M = operations and maintenance; RDT&E = research, development, testing and evaluation

- Figures for 2011 and 2012 are estimates

Graph 12: Russian defence budget (% of GDP) (International Institute for Security Studies 2011, 180)

Table 5: Russia’s military expenditure (SIPRI Yearbook 2011, 164)

National defence spending (billion roubles)

National defence spending as a share of GDP (%)

SIPRI estimate of military spending (billion roubles)

SIPRI estimate of military spending as a share of GDP (%)

2011 1517 3 / /

2010 1277 2,8 1782 4

2009 1188 3 1693 4,3

2008 1041 2,5 1448 3,5

2005 581 2,7 806 3,7

2001 248 2,8 365 4,1

- Figures for 2011 are estimates

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Graph 13: EU-NATO defence budget in % of GDP (International Institute for Security Studies 2011, 79).

Graph 14: Chinese defence budget (% of GDP and in US dollars) (International Institute for Security Studies 2011, 33)

1.3 % = 76.4 billion

2010 - 11GDP

5733 billion

2008 - 09GDP

4422 billion

1.4 % = 60.1 billion 1.4 % = 70.4 billion

2009 - 10GDP

4984 billion

In the last decade the US has increased its military budget (81%), and so has Russia (80%) (SIPRI Yearbook 2011, 8). However, the EU’s military budget has declined. The official Chinese defence budget for 2010 was 78 billion US dollars, but SIPRI estimates that China’s total military expenditure was 119 billion US dollars (SIPRI Yearbook 2011, 159). It’s a fact that China is hiding its true military expenditure numbers, which is why there is some data missing. Some military expenditure comes from different ministries and

is not publically available (SIPRI Yearbook 2011, 185). The differences are vast – SIPRI believes (2011, 187) that the Chinese de facto military budget is more than 50% higher than the official statement. Furthermore, SIPRI states that between 2001 and 2010 the Chinese military budget increased by 189% (SIPRI Yearbook 2011, 8). However, it still remains on the same level measured by share of Chinese GDP.

If one compares the leading military spenders, one can see that the US has a big advantage compared to the other powers. Table 6 and table 7 compare the data from IISS and SIPRI – the US represents 43% of world’s military expenditure. The biggest discrepancy in the two data bases is Russia – in IISS it is listed at number 7 and in SIPRI at number 5. Furthermore, if one would sum up the military budgets of all the EU states, then it would put it in second place, behind the US.

Table 6: Top Ten Defence Budgets in 2008, 2009, and 2010 (International Institute for Security Studies 2011, 469)

2008

DB GDP %

1. USA 696,3 14264 4,9

2. UK 71,4 2670 2,7

3. China 60,1 4422 1,4

4. Japan 46 4926 0,9

5. France 44,6 2863 1,6

6. Germany 43,3 3659 1,2

7. Russia 40,5 1680 2,4

8. Saudi Arabia

38,2 469 8,1

9. India 28,4 1223 2,3

10. Italy 24,1 2307 1

2009

DB GDP %

1. USA 693,3 14119 4,9

2. China 70,4 4984 1,4

3. UK 60,5 2179 2,8

4. Japan 50,3 5075 1

5. France 46 2656 1,7

6. Germany 43,5 3339 1,3

7. Saudi Arabia

41,3 376 11

8. Russia 38,3 1236 3,1

9. India 34,4 1231 2,8

10. Brazil 28 1592 1,8

2010

DB GDP %

1. USA 692,8 14624 4,7

2. China 76,4 5733 1,3

3. UK 56,5 2255 2,5

4. Japan 52,8 5387 1

5. Saudi Arabia

45,2 434 10,4

6. France 42,6 2587 1,6

7. Russia 41,4 1488 2,8

8. Germany 41,2 3346 1,2

9. India 38,4 1545 2,5

10. Brazil 34,7 2039 1,7

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Table 7: Global Top Fifteen Defence Budgets (SIPRI Yearbook 2011, 183)

Spending in billion of US $ - MER

Change from 2001-2010 (%)

Share of GDP (%)

World share (%)

Spending in billion of US $ - PPP

1. USA 698 81,3 4,8 43 698

2. China 119 189 2,1 7,3 210

3. UK 59,6 21,9 2,7 3,7 57,6

4. France 59,3 3,3 2,3 3,6 49,8

5. Russia 58,7 82,4 4 3,6 88,2

Sub-total top 5 995 61

6. Japan 54,5 -1,7 1 3,3 43,6

7. Saudi Arabia 45,2 63 10,4 2,8 64,6

8. Germany 45,2 -2,7 1,3 2,8 40

9. India 41,3 54,3 2,7 2,5 116

10. Italy 37 -5,8 1,8 2,3 32,2

Sub-total top 10 1218 75

11. Brazil 33,5 29,6 1,6 2,1 36,2

12. South Korea 27,6 45,2 2,8 1,7 40,8

13. Australia 24 48,9 2 1,5 17,3

14. Canada 22,8 51,8 1,5 1,4 19,4

15. Turkey 17,5 -12,2 2,4 1,1 23,9

Sub-total top 15 1344 82

World 1630 50,3 2,6 100

- MER = Market Exchange Rates- PPP = Perching Power Parity- Numbers in Italics = estimates

If one continues in more detailed analysis of military power (number of different types of weapons), one can see that the US is head and shoulders above any other state .

In terms of active manpower China is the world leader (2,285,000), fol-lowed by the US (1,563,866), India (1,325,000), and Russia (1,046,000); far behind are France (238,591) and UK (178,470) (International Institute for Security Studies 2011, 34−5). In strategic ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) launchers, the US is ahead (450) of Russia (376) and both are far infront of China (66) (International Institute for Security Studies 2011, 34−5). In strategic bomber aircrafts is Russia first (251), the US second (155), but comming close is China (132) (International Institute for Security Studies 2011, 34−5). Regarding strategic nuclear power submarines, the US and Russia are tied (14 each) in the first place, followd by France and UK (4 each), which are infront of China (3) (International Institute for Security Studies 2011, 34−5). In manouvering weapons, the US has a enourmous lead in number of battle tanks (6,242), second is China (2,450) and third is Russia (1,300), followed by India (444), UK (325) and France (254) (International Institute for Security Studies 2011, 34−5). In armoured infantry fighting wehicles the difference is not as big as in tanks, but still the US holds a dom-inant first place (6,452), followed by Russia (4,960) and China (2,390), than India (1,105) infornt of UK (526) and France (232) (International Institute for Security Studies 2011, 34−5). In fourth generation of tactical aircraft (in service from 1980), the US letads (3,324), followeb by Russia (897), China (591), France (254), India (244), and UK (189) (International Institute for Security Studies 2011, 34−5). In fifth generation of tactcal aircraft (in ser-vice from 2012) only the US has s far developed a jet fighter, more precicly 168 of them (International Institute for Security Studies 2011, 34−5). Other states are still developing these fighting aircrafts. When it comes to attack helicopters the US has a strong lead (1,404), followd by Russia (336), UK (66), France (30), India (20) and China (6-10) (International Institute for Security Studies 2011, 34−5). When it comes to heavy/medium transport helicopters the US leads (2,366), Russia is second (624), followed by China (306), UK (180), France (162), and India (117) (International Institute for Security Studies 2011, 34−5). When we look at the numbers for ISTAR (In-

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telligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance) weapons the number of airborne early-warning and control aircrafts is the biggest in the US (104), far behind is Russia (20), folowed by China (8), France (7), UK (6), and India (2) (International Institute for Security Studies 2011, 34−5). In heavy unmanned aerial vehicles the US has even greater advantage (239), followed by UK (5), India (3), and France (3). However, China, has more imagenry satelites (15) than the US (6), still both are infront of France (3), Russia (2), and India (1) (International Institute for Security Studies 2011, 34−5). In terms of electronic/signals-inteligence satelites, US leads (17), China is second (8), and third is Russia (2). In terms of navigational satelites, Russia is first (36), second is the US (32), and third is China (8) (International Institute for Security Studies 2011, 34−5).

Nevertheless, the core military power may be measured by the power of projection that military fighing power. In this sense aircraft cariers are the most important, where the US has a very strong lead. If one compares the number of aircraft-carriers, one can see the extent of US military superiority. The US has 11 aircraft carriers in service, while all other states in the world combined have 10 (International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2010). Fur-thermore, the US has 1 aircraft carrier in reserve and 3 under construction, whereas the rest of the world has 4 under construction and 2 being rebuilt in total (International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2010). In September 2012, a lot of states raised their eyebrows when after 12 years of reconstruction, China finally introduced their first aircraft carrier, or to be more specific reconstructed old Soviet, than Ukrainian aircraft carrier (Chang 2012). In the number of crusiers/destroyears, US leads (81), Russia is second (25), followed by China and France (13 each), India (10), and UK (7). Similar is the case of nuclear powered submarienes, where US has 57, Russia 25, UK 7, China and France 6 ech and India 1. Regarding amphibious ships, the US leads (31), UK is second (7), fllowed by France 4, China and India (1 each) (International Institute for Security Studies 2011, 34−5). However, China is the first (65) in terms of the number of frigates, second is the US (31), followed by UK (12), India (12), france (11), and Russia (7) (International Institute for Security Studies 2011, 34−5). When it comes to the heavy/me-dium aircraft transporter aircrafts, the US leads (746), followed by Russia

(162), China (62), France (56), UK (50), and India (24). The US (539) has considerable lead before France (29) in tanker and multi-role tanker/trans-port aircrafts, followed by UK (22), Russia (20), China (13), and India (6) (International Institute for Security Studies 2011, 34−5).

If one combines the two aspects, fighting capability, and capability of projecting this power, one gets an aggregate combat power, and this is where in my point of view the US has the biggest lead. Namely, it has both, ability to project its power across the globe and the ability to engage in military action on the ground .

Graph 15 shows key global tactical aviation assets from 1990 to 2010 (International Institute for Security Studies 2011, 39). Surprisingly, the US did not have a superior position in 1990, but gained superiority by 2010 . A big drop in tactical ability (warships and aircrafts) of the European states (UK and France as the main Europe military powers) can be seen from 2000 to 2010 (International Institute for Security Studies 2011, 81).

Graph 15: Key global tactical aviation assets from 1990 to 2010 (fighter, fighter-ground attack and attack-aircraft holdings) (International Institute for Security Studies 2011, 39).

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

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1990 2000 2010

China USSR / RussiaUSA India France UK

Table 8 and table 9 compare the presented data on Strategic Force (nu-clear weapons) from the International Institute’ for Security Studies’ ‘The Military Balance 2011’ and ‘SIPRI’s Yearbook 2011’, where it is obvious

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that the US and Russia have a clear dominant position. Again the data varies between the two data bases – the SIPRI data base numbers of the nuclear arsenal is much higher than the IISS number.

Table 9: Strategic Forces Comparison (SIPRI Yearbook 2011, 320)

Year of first nuclear test

Deployed warheads

Other warheads inventory Total

USA 1945 2150 6350 8500

Russia 1949 2427 8570 11000

UK 1952 160 65 225

France 1960 10 300

China 1964 200 240

India 1974 80-100 80-100

Pakistan 1998 90-110 90-110

Israel 80 80

North Korea 2006 ?

Total 5027 15500 20530

- Deployed means warheads placed on missiles or located on bases with operational forces

The data presented shows a clear superiority of the US military power. Furthermore, two trends have to be stressed: first, the diminishing military power of the EU; second, the rising military power of China. Regarding the later, one has to mention the Chinese military strategy that was set already set in 1988 by Admiral Liu Huaqing. It states that by 2010 China should have established a blue-water presence in ‘the first island chain on the Pacific (Ja-pan, Taiwan, Philippines), by 2025 China should take control of ‘the second island chain’ (Sakhalin and South-west Pacific), and by 2050 they should dominate in ‘third island chain’ (Aleutian Islands, Antarctica) (Shambaugh 2004, 67) . Although, China did not achieve these stated goals by 2010, they are unambiguous and clearly challenge to the US interests in the region.Ta

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The increased lack of transparency in the military budget and military strategy of China gives a clear signal that the US military supremacy will have to deal with Chinese strategic aspirations. Furthermore, Russian military pow-er cannot be underestimated due to its rising military budget, increased sales of its weapons – second after the US (23% of the world share between 2006 and 2010) (SIPRI Yearbook 2011, 302) − and the ‘Soviet military tradition’.

Yet, after this data and analysis, one can without a doubt state that the military level of the global power chess game is unipolar. The US has an overwhelming advantage over everyone. It is the only power today, which pos-sesses both fighting capability and projection capability. If we add to this also its second strike capability with the number of its nuclear weapons, it does not seem likely that any power can threaten the US military in the near future.

On the other hand, the a-symmetrical warfare that is being fought in Iraq and Afghanistan proved vulnerability even of such a powerful system as the US military is. The US still has not found an answer to this challenge. The answer to it is of course not only military, but also economical (development), political, and ideological. Such a holistic approach to foreign and defence policy was stressed by the US State Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton in her 2010 article in Foreign Affairs. We are still to see if the second Obama administration will develop a solution to this challenge.

Moreover, I have to stress that the military power factor is only one out of four, which I analyse, and in order to have a full overview of the contem-porary power structure and to make a prediction about the future, two more power factors have to be taken in consideration.

5.2 Political Power Factor

Political power characterises the diplomatic and political aspects of inter-national relations – negotiations, (non)decision, and agenda setting. One of the manifestations of it is the ‘veto power’ in the Security Council. Table 10 shows the state distribution of the ‘veto’ utilisation.

Table 10: ‘Veto utilisation’ in the Security Council (Global Policy Forum 2012)

China France UK USA Russia Total

Total 6 18 32 82 124 261

2008 1 1 2

2007 1 1 2

2006 2 2

2005

2004 2 1 3

2003 2 2

2002 2 2

2001 2 2

2000

1999 1 1

1998

1997 1 2 3

1996

1986-95 3 8 24 2 37

1976-85 9 11 34 6 60

1966-75 2 2 10 12 7 33

1956-65 2 3 25 31

1946-55 1 2 80 83

However, if a state has the power to set the agenda then it does not need to use the veto power. Furthermore, as already noted, the UN is not crucial when it comes to setting the rules and the setting of the structure of the inter-

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national system; therefore one has to look elsewhere to analyse the political power. This proves how difficult it is to measure political power.

In my point of view, the different G-groups are most relevant for analys-ing political power. What started as a Group of six (G-6) in 1975, became the G-7 in 1976 and the G-8 in 1997 when Canada and then Russia were added to the group (G8 2012). Therefore the members of the G-8 are: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, UK and the US. After the end of the Cold War the power rested with this group.

However, the 2008 financial crisis changed that. Due to the intercon-nected global economy and the rise of the BRICS, the 2009 G-20 Pittsburgh Summit decided that the G-20 will replace the G-8 as the main economic council of wealthy nations (CNN 2012). The G-8 alone could not solve the systematic challenges of the crisis. Created in 1999, the G-20 includes 19 countries (Argentina, France, Japan, South Africa, Australia, Germany, Mexico, Turkey, Brazil, India, Republic of Korea, UK, Canada, Indonesia, Russia, USA, China, Italy, and Saudi Arabia) and the European Union (G20 2012). In November 2008, during the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression (1929), the US’s president G. W. Bush convened a meeting of the G-20 leaders in Washington (G20 2012) . At that meeting the leaders discussed the causes of the global economic and financial crisis and agreed to implement an Action Plan centred around three main objectives: restoring global growth, strengthening the international financial system, and reform-ing international financial institutions (G20 2012). A clear political decision has been made in favour of the G-20 as the main political body in the world, however, as noted already in the preceding chapters, the G-20 has yet to deliver results (Johnson 2009) .

Thus, it may be more adequate to point to a different group, which is much more efficient – the G-2 – the US and China. The initial idea was presented in Fred Bergsten’s 2005 book The United States and the World Economy. In 2007 Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick came up with the term ‘Chimerica’. The point is that without cooperation, recovery and a strong G-2, the G-20 will be another disappointing political project.

However, as described earlier, the US and China have a very particular relationship. A sort of ‘love-hate’ relationship is being drawn. Both econo-

mies are interlinked and have mutual interests; however, there are also some economic disagreements, namely, the flexibility of China’s exchange rate and consequently the competitiveness of China’s goods on the US market. Furthermore, strategically speaking, China and the US are on a collision course of what can be obviously seen in the build up of Chinese military and the recent US decision to put the majority of its navy in the Pacific (U.S. naval fleet to shift towards Pacific 2012). However, they also have a com-mon strategic interest – combat against extreme Muslim terrorists. Last but not least, China and the US have opposing ideologies and visions for global governance (Pelanda 2007).

To conclude, the changing forums of political power from the G-8 to the G-20 means that the political power of the EU is being reduced, China is rising, Russia is re-emerging and the US endures its political power. Yet, if the G-2 would prevail over G-20, then the political chess board would be bipolar. However, that is not the case. Nor is the case of multipolar global political governance of the G-20. One could argue that since the two entities, G-2, and G-20 are in a similar state as Huntington (1999) argues for the whole world. Namely, neither can do anything without the other, thus, the political chess game should be uni-multipolar. Yet, since both groups are not homog-enous, one cannot make such a statement. Throng in each group is too big for a statement to be true. It would seem that in such a situation the reality of political aspect of the power struggle is non-polarity – a lot of different actors, and no one exercises global political governance.

5.3 Ideological Power Factor

At the end of the Cold War Fukuyama (1992, 211) predicted a world without the clash of ideologies. Even though capitalism and democracy are ideolog-ical tendencies, the dominant language in the international affairs is Eng-lish, and we all follow American popular culture and enjoy products which were framed in the US. Fukuyama’s argument cannot be fully confirmed, particularly because different visions of democracy and capitalism have emerged .

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Ideological power, linked with the already explained concept of soft power, may be even harder to measure then political power. Friedberg wrote (1994, 15) that Iranian militants may drink soft drinks and wear track suits first made popular in America, but this hardly means that they love the United States, and still less that they embrace the policies of its government. They look to the ideology of extreme Islamism. American soft power has no in-fluence on them.

Moreover, a different model of development, rather than liberal democracy, is appealing to many state autocrats and their people. The US favours a liberal approach in economic and political development . On the other hand, China has proven that a state may keep its authoritative nature and its ‘export led economic’ growth; such an approach seemed appealing (due to the economic results – growth rates in China and big unemployment rates in the West) for states in Central Asia and Africa (Forsythe 1996, 26). However, a rhetorical question arises about who would like to live in China, and who would like to live in a world that would be similar to China? China may have developed an alternative economic vision and approach; however it fails to provide an alternative lifestyle, popular culture, language, education and professional aspirations that the US provides. These are referred to by Friedman (2002) as ‘weapons of mass attraction’. Thus far, China has been unable to do that, show-ing that its soft-ideological power is not as great as its economic power.

However, this does not take away its relevance. If the ‘autocratic’ camp generates enough power, it can set the rules of the global game, which will also have to be followed by the West. In this case, the West will be able to keep its internal liberal ideology, but the rules in the international system will be of a different nature.

If it can be said that China has partially developed an ideology that com-petes with the one of the US, it can also be stated that Russia has lost its communistic ideology and is therefore in an ideological vacuum. Although many draw parallels between Putin and previous totalitarian regime (Kagan 2008; Service 2005; Shevtsova 2005), today Russia cannot be classified as an autocratic regime. However, Putin has managed to ideologically unite Rus-sian political elite and overcome the antagonism between the two opposing Russian strategies – ‘west’ and ‘eurasianism’ – into their fusion ‘euro-east’

(Tsygankov 2007, 375–99). Therefore, also Russia has developed an alterna-tive governance approach, which is a sort of fusion between the Chinese total-itarian and European democracy. It was referred to as ‘managed democracy’ (Sakwa 2008, 51). Yet this developing model may be interesting only for the former Soviet Union and may not be applicable to the rest of the world.

On the other hand, the EU has developed a model for integration and thus for development, which is appealing to the whole globe. The integration model was imitated in some world regions (ASEAN, African Union, and MERCOSUR). Although it would seem that the EU would lose its appeal as the ‘peaceful global actor’ with the start of the Saint Malo process in 1998 and gradually establishing military/defence integration, it did not. Contrary to such assumptions, the attraction of the EU model only grew with increased devotion to regional integration all across the world. However, the EU failed to develop an ideology that would contain a vision for global governance and could be actively ‘exported’ around the world. The EU is rather a passive observer of the happenings in the world, and does not actively engage to secure its interests. Reasons for this are internal; when the EU resolves the question of how to unite 27, soon to be more, states into one political entity without overrunning smaller nations, then it can become a serious player on all levels of the power chess game.

To conclude, the US possesses the most ideological power in the world, yet China, Russia, and the EU are quite substantial as well. China and Russia are limited to specific regions in the world and the EU is limited by its lack of assertiveness for implementing its power and ideas. Each on its own cannot threaten the US soft power. Still, one cannot claim that this level of power chess is unipolar. I argue it is uni-multipolar, where there us one superpower and several major powers.

5.4 Amalgamation of Power Factors

I have looked at four power factors, economic, military, political, and ide-ological, and found that each of them represents a power game of its own. Every level has peculiar characteristics, thus how to combine them remains

113112

an open question. My methodological answer in this work is through a qual-itative analysis. Another possibility would be to give weights to each power factor based on their relevance. However, a similar question arises – how much consideration should be placed on each power factor?

The four-level (four power factors) chess game has the following results: the economic power level has a non-polar structure; the military power structure shows a unipolar structure; the political power chess game has a non-polar structure; and the ideological power plays in the uni-multipolar structure .

What to make of these results? Of course it is reasonable to ask whether it makes any sense to do the amalgam of power; would it be better to leave the power distribution separately on the level of its factors? It is a valid ar-gument, to which a human curiosity, tendency for universality, and ontology contradict. Therefore, I have to continue in fusing all four power factors into one amalgam .

If one takes into consideration two things: First, the economic power factor is the most important one after the end of the Cold War; second, two out of four analysed power factors describe non-polar world structure. Then the conclusion is clear. The world is in the final stages of the shift from uni-multipolarity to non-polarity. This is a qualitative deduction from facts described in previous chapters. In order to make a forecast, one needs to speculate a bit as well.

6. Prediction and Conclusion

My speculation for the future power structure of the international sys-tem is a return of bipolarity, where the polarity will be represented

by two concepts of global governance: democratic capitalism and autocratic capitalism. In the background of such argument there is a notion that the ideological power factor will gain its importance and become as important as economic power factor.

If I evoke the numbers, data and analyses of the four power factors, I can conclude that there are some tendencies, which speak in favour of my prediction. However, there are many unknowns, especially when it comes to internal development of some actors. Namely, will China remain an au-tocracy (communism) with its rising middle class? Will her economic model continue to perform as well, how and when will the US restructure its econ-omy, and will the EU find a solution to its troubled integration model and to the sovereign debt crisis? With all these issues remaining open one cannot state anything about the future without a reasonable amount of doubt and scepticism .

The focus of the present work was the power structure of the post Cold War international system. After the bipolar stability came a conceptual cha-os, where different assumptions of the system arose and the system itself changed very rapidly. In this chaos of ideas a new theoretical framework needed to be made and the concept of power redefined.

I argued that a holistic theoretical framework has to take into consid-eration internal and external factors of international relations. Moreover,

115114

it needs to remain open also for the role of agents, namely politicians and diplomats, which with their decisions played a crucial role in the post Cold War power structure. Such a new paradigm may have its foundations in neoclassical realism, which needs to remain open for entering in a dialogue with constructivism. This paradigmatic fusion enables to build up the ‘four faces of power’ concept to define power as ‘power to’ and ‘power over’, with their four different dimensions (compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive) (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 12). Yet, in order to measure power a more measurable distinction needed to be made . Thus, Mann's (2005, 13) deffinition of power factors (economic, military, political, and ideological) comes in very conveniant. Although the question of measurment was not entirely answered (political ideological power facotr), the mixture of these power factors gives us a clear picture of the ‘real power’ of an actor.

In less than 20 years after the end of bipolarity, the structure of the inter-national system has shifted several times. Due to political (non)action, the bipolar world was replaced by a multipolar one, since the only remaining global power (the US) did not take the position of a global hegemon. In 2001, the system shifted to a unipolar system due to a new political vision and strategy of the US. However, in 2006, the international system morphed into uni-multipolarity, since the US lost power relative to other states and could no longer control the outcomes of certain actions. Furthermore, in 2008, due to the economic-financial crisis, the international system is gradually chang-ing into non-polarity. The contemporary mix between uni-multipolarity and non-polarity is framed if we build the Nye’s three level chess game, into four level chess game (four power factors). The final outcome is not only a mix of them all, but rather a notion that one has to be aware of the complexity of the contemporary international system, which is changing.

Thus, the future power structure of the international system remains ambiguous. The US is a robust power, but it has to tackle serious structural economic issues. These will indeed have their consequences for their relative and maybe even absolute power. The US power was relatively reduced by the ‘rise of the rest’, if it fails to adapt its economic system, it will also lose its military edge, since the money for it might be gone. China has gained the most power since the end of the Cold War; however, it is faced with some

challenges – preserving the so far successful model of combining economic growth with autocracy. The EU has a big power potential, but in order to fully take advantage of it, it has to find a new paradigm of functioning. The contemporary situation means ‘live or die’ for the EU – disintegrate or get stronger. For Russia, although its power began to grow, it is lagging behind the other three powers. Its main challenges are in restructuring its economy so that it will not only to export energy resource and arms.

Based on my research, I predict that in the near future we will see a shift from non-polarity, and once it is fully formed, to bipolarity. The lack of global governance, non-polarity, and the different ideas of the global governance, opposing values and visions, will push the US and China into gathering international support for their own idea of a so desperately needed global order. Consequently different blocks will be formed, deterring one another and tossing the international structure again into bipolarity .

I began my book with Kissinger, and thus I would like to conclude with him as well. »Power is the ultimate aphrodisiac«, he told The New York Times in 1973 (Kissinger 1973). Therefore, states and statesman will always yearn and struggle for power, and scholars will continue to try to analyse them both. A future bipolar world is a possible scenario; however, as with different visions I have described and analysed in the book, only time will tell if it will be a reality as well.

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