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Asian Security

ISSN: 1479-9855 (Print) 1555-2764 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fasi20

The Philippines Discovers its Maritime Domain:The Aquino Administration’s Shift in StrategicFocus from Internal to Maritime Security

Renato Cruz De Castro

To cite this article: Renato Cruz De Castro (2016) The Philippines Discovers its MaritimeDomain: The Aquino Administration’s Shift in Strategic Focus from Internal to MaritimeSecurity, Asian Security, 12:2, 111-131, DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2016.1195813

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2016.1195813

Published online: 30 Jun 2016.

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The Philippines Discovers its Maritime Domain: The AquinoAdministration’s Shift in Strategic Focus from Internal to MaritimeSecurityRenato Cruz De Castro

ABSTRACTWith China’s naval expansion in the South China Sea, the Philippine govern-ment has eased up its counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism campaign andhas vigorously pursued instead the modernization of the Armed Forces of thePhilippines (AFP) particularly in developing the deterrence capability of thePhilippine Navy (PN). However, slow-paced and hampered by scant resources,the naval build-up will hardly deter China’s encroachment on the Philippinemaritime territory. Faced with this predicament, the Philippines has resorted toforging new security partnerships with the United States and Japan, two majornaval powers in East Asia. The paper concludes that maritime security willremain the Philippines’ priority concern way into the third decade of the 21stcentury.

During Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s nine-year presidency, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)concentrated its efforts and resources on neutralizing the various insurgent movements in the country. In2009, however, the Arroyo administration was suddenly jolted by Chinese naval presence in Philippineterritorial waters and increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea. China’s belligerent behavior againstthe Philippines beganwhenPresidentArroyo signedRepublicActNo. 9522, or the Philippine BaselinesAct,into a law in March 2009. Immediately after, China deployed a fishery patrol vessel and, in the followingmonth, sent six more patrol vessels allegedly to curb illegal fishing in the contested area. These movesreflectedChina’s intention to consolidate its jurisdictional claims, expand its naval reach, andundermine thepositions of other claimant states through coercive diplomacy.1 With China’s heavy-handedness in theSouth China Sea, the Philippines realized the need to develop its naval capability to protect its vast maritimeborders and its territorial claim over some land features in the South China Sea.

TheAFP’s shift from internal tomaritime security gainedmomentumwhenBenigno SimeonAquino IIIbecame president in 2010. On several occasions, he vowed to pursue the AFP modernization programintended to transform the Philippine military from an army-centered, counter-insurgency-oriented orga-nization in to a modern armed force capable of overseeing maritime security. In clear emphatic terms,President Aquino spoke of “enhanced security” for national defense and put forward the country’s claim forterritories in the South China Sea through the modernization of its navy and the air force.2 In 2013, heannounced that his administration is pursuing The Philippine Navy Strategic Sail Plan 2020 to upgrade thePhilippine Navy’s (PN) capabilities for maritime security.3

These official pronouncements relative to modernizing the AFP redirect the Philippine military awayfrom asymmetric/low intensity conflicts (LICs) to maritime security. This shift requires providing theAFP with the necessary equipment, technical training, and expertise for external defense. In turn, thePhilippine military must train its officers and personnel to broaden their skills, knowledge, and capability

CONTACT Renato Cruz De Castro renato.decastro@dlsu.edu.ph International Studies Department, College of Liberal Arts,De La Salle University, 2401 Taft Avenue, Manila 1004, Philippines.The first draft of this article was first read during the 2015 Berlin Conference on Asian Security 2015 “International Dimensions ofNational (In) Security: Concepts, Challenges, and Ways Forward,” 13–14 June 2015, German Institute for International and SecurityAffairs, Berlin, Germany.© 2016 Taylor & Francis

ASIAN SECURITY2016, VOL. 12, NO. 2, 111–131http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2016.1195813

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in maritime security instead of merely discharging constabulary functions, and undertaking socio-civicactivities – a role it has performed since the Philippines became independent in 1946. It also means thatthe PN must go beyond being a transport arm of the Philippine Army (PA) and become a naval forcethat can stand up to the security challenge posed by an expansionist China. To do so, the PN has to focuson protecting the country’s maritime interests, which involves promotion of good order at sea, safety ofmaritime navigation, sustainable exploitation and exploration of marine resources, and territorialdefense.4 Along with the Philippine Air Force (PAF) and the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), the PNmust be part of a boarder security system that will undertake surveillance, deterrence, and patrol of thePhilippines’ vast maritime domain.5 Lastly, this stance calls for the Philippines to form and fosterpartnerships with other naval powers with common values and mutual interests in this vital maritimearea.

This article examines the growing importance of maritime security to the Philippine govern-ment’s governance agenda. It addresses this main problem: How is the Aquino administrationmanaging the security challenge emanating from the Philippines’ maritime domain? It also exploresthese related questions: (a) What are the traditional security concerns of the Philippines? (b) Whatevents prompted the government to shift its focus from counter-insurgency/internal security tomaritime security? (c) What primary security challenge does the Philippines face in its maritimedomain? (d) What are the internal and external measures undertaken by the Aquino administrationto address this security challenges? And finally, (e) How effective are these measures?

Strategic change and adjustments: The case of small powers

How do strategic changes affect small powers? How do small powers adjust to strategic changes?Constant innovations and trends in technology and in the global economy exact changes in the strategic

environment. These changes are manifest in the development of new military technologies that trigger anarms race or a revolutionary change in the conduct ofmilitary operations, in the new pattern of relationshipbetween politics and strategy in an innovating state, in the introduction of new cultural norms on howwarfare should be conducted, and even in changes in the military’s operational means and methods thathave no implications for organizational strategy or structure.6 As a normal course, states adapt their foreignand defense policies to changes in the strategic landscapes.7 At other times, they either have to adjust orhave adjusted inappropriately to changes, often leaving the state pursuing policies that jeopardize itsprimary interest.8 It is assumed that the states’ ability to realize their national security policy goals dependson how well their defense establishments and military organizations adjust to their changing strategic,political, budgetary, and technological environments.9

Neo-realism maintains that states respond to strategic changes by considering systemic factorslike the prevailing military technology, other states’ relative power, and the distribution of militarypower in the international system.10 Their strategic adjustments take the form of emulation.Accordingly, the competitive logic governing the international system creates a powerful incentiveto adopt the strategic practices and institutions of the most militarily successful state in the system.11

Competing states may imitate the strategic innovations contrived by the country with the greatestmilitary capability, ingenuity, and economic/political system. The basic instinct of survival in ananarchic international environment produces emulation, either because there is simply one bestpractice and everyone figures it out or because the best practice is difficult, so states satisfice byimitating.12

Strategic emulation, however, can only be effective between states with more or less same level ofmilitary and economic resources. A small power cannot approximate a big power’s defense policy.Unlike a big power, a small power cannot rely on its own resources to deter a potential aggressor orto defend itself against a foreign aggressor if deterrence fails. A small power must examine its abilityto extract resources from its society that is ridden with domestic instability, graft and corruption,and political and economic underdevelopment. It can also be plagued by internal conflicts that

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undermine its external policy as it diverts resources away from a planned military build-up. Clearly,strategic emulation is not an option for a small power.

Instead of emulation, a small power adopts an asymmetric defense policy. It can counter athreatening big power in several ways. It can form defensive alliances with other states, or it mayopt for appeasement, or buck-passing, or, in worst-case scenarios, even bandwagoning.13 Despitetheir obvious differences, these diplomatic strategies share two common features: (1) they arecomparatively cheap; and (2) they all seek to minimize any drastic change in the status quo.14

Moreover, they can become components of a small power’s asymmetrical defense policy against a bigpower.

How do leaders of a weak power decide on which strategy to apply? Stephen Walt provides ananswer. Accordingly, a small and weak neighbor of a great power will likely bandwagon because itwill be the first victim of expansion; it lacks the capabilities to stand alone, and a defensive alliancemay operate too slowly to do it much good.15 A small power, however, can balance a threateningneighboring state if allies are available and their assistance is assured.16 Another requirement is asystem of diplomatic communication that allows allies to recognize their mutual interests and tocoordinate their collective responses. A formal treaty alliance embodies this system as it defines theparties’ legal obligations and provides the institutional structures for their common efforts to addressthe threat.

An alliance enables a small power to counter a threatening great power by pooling its limitedresources with those of other (and more powerful) states.17 Furthermore, an alliance provides athreatening state with fairly reliable information about whether the dispute (with the small power) islikely to remain bilateral or to involve outside (other major powers) parties.18 When a small powerhas allies committed to assist it in a conflict, a big power knows that it will face a multilateral forceand is less likely to achieve its goal.19 Observably, while a big power rarely attracts a third-partysupport, a small power may often attract some external support or allies. A small power couldpossibly win in an asymmetric conflict not because it has external support but rather because it usesa favorable counter-strategy.20 A minor power’s alliance with a great power, however, cannot addressall the strategic dilemmas the former faces – inherent military weakness, possible abandonment inthe conflict, or being dragged by its allies to other conflicts. However, having discounted the risks offighting alone, and the unlikelihood of achieving its desired goal of directly balancing or possiblydefeating a great power alone, a small power fulfills the lesser, and probably the unstated satisfyingaim of bringing in the other great powers to balance a threatening major power in the region.21

An asymmetrical defense policy against a big power combines limited internal mobilization andalliance formation, though typically, political leaders give a greater weight to one strategy or theother.22 This is the case of the Philippines’ defense efforts against China in the South China Sea issue.Since 2011, President Aquino has challenged China’s expansive territorial claim in the South ChinaSea. He redirected the AFP’s focus from domestic security to territorial/maritime defense. He alsoforged closer security relations with the US by acquiring American military equipment, seeking fromWashington an equivocal security guarantee based on the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), andgiving the US military greater strategic access to Philippine territory. He also fostered a securitypartnership with Japan, China’s main rival in Asia. All these efforts are aimed at countering China’sexpansionist moves in the South China Sea.

The primacy of internal security

The Philippines consist of 7,107 islands and occupies a maritime area that stretches for 1,850kilometers from about the fifth to the twentieth parallels north latitude. Of these sprawling 7,107islands, only 1,000 are inhabited. Topographically, the country is fragmented by inland waters, whichalso gives the Philippines one of the longest coastlines among other countries in the world. Asidefrom the rugged landmass, the Philippines has an irregular coastline spanning about 10,850 miles,twice as long as that of the continental United States. All the islands are of volcanic origin, with hilly

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or mountainous centers, and with limited arable lands located either in the narrow strips of coastalplains or central valleys. The Philippines is also geographically isolated from mainland East Asia, asits maritime borders serve as an almost impenetrable moat against any external threat emanatingfrom the Asian continent. Thus, maritime security is crucial for the Philippines, a maritime and anarchipelagic state in Southeast Asia.23

The Philippines, however, has focused primarily since 1946 on containing social unrest generated byeconomic inequality and the lack of national unity. Its national security concerns are traditionally rooted inconflicts and in the nature and identity of the nation-state, particularly over regime legitimacy, and socio-economic inequality, which continue to create tension between the state and society.24 This resulted in theprimacy of land-based security threat, withmaritime defense taking a backseat to internal security concernsand counter-insurgency operations. Furthermore, the perceived absence of any visible external threatsemanating from themaritime domain reinforced the Philippines’ reliance on the US for its external defenserequirements.25

Until now, the Philippine state has been plagued by a persistent domestic insurgency problem. Inthe past four decades, the Philippine government and its military have been combating the localrebel movements such as the communist-led Hukbong Magpapalaya ang Bayan (People’s LiberationArmy in the 1950s) and later the New People’s Army (NPA), the secessionist Moro NationalLiberation Front (MNLF) and later the Moro Islamic Liberation (MILF), and the bandit/terroristgroup Abu Sayaff. During the Cold War, the Philippine military was engaged ideologically andmilitarily against these insurgent movements. Prior to the withdrawal of the American militaryfacilities in 1992, the presence of the US forces was viewed as an effective deterrence against anyexternal attack (primarily conventional) on the country. The Philippines also received base-relatedeconomic and security assistance packages under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) of 1947,the Economic Support Fund (ESF), and the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Credit. As a result, thePhilippine government had considerable savings on defense expenditures. The country saved morethan US$ seven billion for a ten-year period (1980–1989) based on the given economic and militaryassistance, and reduced defense expenditures.26 During this time, the Philippine military did notdevelop its external defense capability and, instead, attended to the more pressing matter of counter-insurgency.27

Consequently, the Philippine military has become the laggard among the more modern (and middlepower) Southeast Asian armed forces (Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and even Vietnam) interms of force modernization, development, and naval capabilities.28 The PN has a functioning fleet of law-enforcement naval assets consisting mostly of fast patrol crafts acquired during the martial law years in the1970s.29 The PN also has capabilities for coastal patrol duties, troop transport, and disaster relief. However,it lacks vital naval capabilities, rendering it totally outclassed by most modern navies in East Asia. The PNhas no missile-armed ships. In fact, most of its ships are former-US-made World War II-vintage surfacecombatants with limited anti-air and no anti-submarine and mine-sweeping capabilities. Thus, the PN isgreatly inadequate in safeguarding the country’s territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).30 AFilipino naval officer candidly admits: “While the Navy is still able to perform its ISOmissions. . .albeit on alimited basis, it may not be able to sustain a campaign against more formidable external threats.”31

During the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Philippines was still bedeviled by its longand protracted wars against various insurgent groups. In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks inthe United States, the Bush administration opened a second front on the war on terror in SoutheastAsia. Needing American military assistance to neutralize the various insurgency groups in thecountry, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo immediately declared her support for the US’s cam-paign against global terrorism. Despite the poor state of its navy in particular and the armed forcesin general, the Arroyo administration adopted two major policy decisions in the early twenty-firstcentury: (1) a single-minded focus on internal security, and (2) a revitalized alliance with the US toprocure materiel and funds for its counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism campaigns. Focused oninternal security, the AFP’s territorial defense development efforts were relegated to the sidelines.Materiel intended for external defense were used for internal security purposes. Furthermore, scant

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financial resources for the AFP modernization were channeled to personnel costs and combatoperations against insurgent groups. The September 2007 AFP Capability Assessment gave a thor-ough and candid analysis of the AFP’s deteriorating equipment and combat capabilities. It reportedthat the poor condition of the equipment severely affected the military’s effectiveness and efficiencyin counter-insurgency operations. It also indicated that the emphasis on LICs diverted the AFP’sattention and resources away from external defense-related modernization projects.32 Specific to thenavy, it noted that the “PN lacks the assets for [the] conduct of maritime patrols over territorialwaters, since it does not have any anti-air capability and is incapable of mounting anti-submarineand mine warfare operations.”33

The emergence of Chinese naval power

As the biggest and most powerful littoral state, China has declared its undisputable sovereignty overthe body of water, islands, and rocks within its nine-dash line in the South China Sea.34 China basesits sacred and inalienable claim on the South China Sea on purported historical accounts of Chinesenavigators and sailors who had sailed its waters during the Han, Yuan, Ming, and Ching dynasties.This claim, however, is predicated on China’s geo-strategic exigencies and status as a great power inEast Asia. In addition, China has been historically preoccupied with the control of its “SouthernSeas.” The South China Sea serves as the main corridor of Chinese maritime trade into SoutheastAsia and South Asia. China’s decline as a great power in the late nineteenth century coincided withits loss of control of this sea to Western powers, especially France.35 At present, to regain its greatpower status in East Asia, China has modernized its navy to stave off the encroaching Western andlater Japanese power in the South China Sea.36 However, from the viewpoint of the small SoutheastAsian states, this is an outright Chinese expansionism in an area of key strategic location andeconomic resources.37

With its huge economy, China has incrementally developed a formidable navy. This navy hasshifted from preempting possible US intervention in a Taiwan Straits crisis to developing thecapacity to deny the US Navy access to East China Sea and South China Sea or inside the so-calledfirst island Chain that runs from Japan–Okinawa–Taiwan down to the Philippines. China has had anannual double-digit increase in defense spending since 2006. In recent years, the People’s LiberationArmy’s Navy (PLAN) has acquired a growing fleet of Russian-made, diesel-electric Kilo-classsubmarines and Sovremenny-class destroyers, along with several types of indigenously built destroy-ers, frigates, and nuclear-powered attack submarines. At the advent of the twenty-first century,China has introduced three new classes of destroyers (Luyang I, Luyang II, and Luzchou) withsophisticated radar and air-defense weapon systems, as well as frigates (Jiangwei II, Jingkai I andJingkai II) with improved war-fighting capabilities and seaworthiness.38 The PLAN has enhanced itsoperational capabilities across the waters surrounding Taiwan with the deployment of two newclasses of ballistic and attack submarines. These naval developments have enabled the PLAN toextend its operational range from the first island chain to the second island chain, which extendsfrom northern Japan to the Northern Marianas Islands, Guam, and further south to Palau.39

China’s assertiveness in pushing its claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea hasincreased in tandem with the expansion of its navy and maritime services.40 To support its maritimeclaim, China conducts numerous naval exercises that employ more modern surface combatants andeven submarines.41 These simulated war games are staged to show China’s determination tounilaterally and militarily resolve the dispute, to flaunt its naval preponderance, and to impressupon the other claimant states its de facto ownership of these contested maritime territories. In theprocess, the Chinese navy backs the official claim of Beijing that the South China Sea is its territorialwaters. Hence, Vietnamese and Philippine vessels are harassed, detained, or even fired upon byChinese patrol craft.42 These are Chinese bullying tactics to pressure these claimant states to backaway from the disputed area.43

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This pattern of Chinese actions signifies that China presently occupies the top hierarchicalposition in the regional pecking order. It also bears all the requirements (economic and militarymight, diplomatic prowess, and carrying a lot of weight with the smaller powers) of a great powerdetermined to alter the power game in East Asia. Proud of its comprehensive power and strongarmed forces commensurate to its dramatic economic growth, China has embarked on variousmaritime actions relative to the South China Sea issue. These include the unilateral declaration of anEast China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), the active conduct of several live-fire navalexercises by the PLAN and People’s Liberation Army’s Air Force (PLAAF) in the Western Pacific/South China Sea, and the hardline responses by the PLAN coordinating with other Chinese maritimelaw-enforcement agencies regarding the territorial disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam in theSouth China.44 These moves heightened the apprehension of other littoral states about China’smaritime design in the region.45

China’s naval prowess generates regional tension by challenging the claims of small littoral statesover parts of the South China Sea and by changing the strategic pattern in the maritime commons ofEast Asia and West Pacific where the US Navy is still dominant. Interestingly, Chinese mediacommentators, academics, and analysts have consistently emphasized the significance of navalpower and the need to protect China’s sovereignty over its surrounding waters. They agree unan-imously that the PLAN should have unlimited operational range, and must possess blue-watercapabilities to maintain a military presence at sea, provide deterrence, and conduct military diplo-macy missions.46

China, however, avoids outright provocative naval deployment in the disputed waters by assign-ing routine patrolling of politically sensitive waters and land features to the vessels and aircraft ofcivilian agencies such as the State Oceanic Administration, its subordinate Marine SurveillanceForce, and the Bureau of Fisheries now integrated under the Chinese Coast Guard.47 China usesthese civilian vessels to challenge and detain fishing boats from other littoral states, explore andidentify sites for future Chinese oil drilling, and prevent other claimant states from deploying theirseismic ships in energy-rich areas of the disputed waters. All these efforts pursue one specificobjective in the South China Sea: “to change the (territorial) status quo by force based on Chineseassertion, which is incompatible with the existing order of international law.”48 By the end of thefirst decade of the twenty-first century, China’s militant nationalism, growing naval prowess, andunilateral actions are overtly directed against a militarily weak Southeast Asian country – thePhilippines.

Discovering the maritime domain

As earlier mentioned, upon assuming the presidency in June 2010, President Aquino vowed to modernizethe AFP in line with shifting its focus from internal security to maritime/territorial defense. Taking the cuefrom President Aquino, a joint Department of National Defense (DND)–AFP task force formulated theAFP “Long-Term Capability Development Plan.”49 The plan included the appropriation of Php421 billion(an estimated US$8.5 billion), with the lion’s share going to the PAF and the PN instead of the PA. Of thisbudget, Php200 billion (an estimatedUS$4 billion) is earmarked for the PAF’s acquisition ofmulti-role andlead-in fighter planes, surface attack aircraft, and long-range reconnaissance planes. It also envisions the PNobtaining multi-role attack vessels, off-shore patrol craft, and even surface-to-surface and surface-to-airmissiles. Specifically, it rationalizes the upgrade of the PN’s materiel for “joint maritime surveillance,defense, and interdiction operations in the South China Sea.”50

This thrust of the AFP is highlighted as well in the 2011 AFP Internal Peace and Security Plan(ISP) – Oplan Bayanihan (Operational Plan Community Spirit). The plan acknowledges the AFP’slack of capabilities to perform its mandated task of guarding the Philippines’ extensive maritimeborders and ensuring its security from even the remotest possibility of external aggression.51 Itprovides a three-year transition period within which the Philippine military would develop thecapabilities essential to undertake unilateral defensive operations against external armed

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aggression.52 To enable the AFP to focus its attention and resources to maritime security, the Aquinoadministration continues to conduct peace talks with the country’s major insurgent groups. Itbelieves that the peace process, utilizing direct negotiations with the rebel groups, and social reformprograms will eventually resolve the domestic armed conflicts.53 The goal is to reduce the domesticarmed threats to a level that they can no longer undermine the stability of the state and (that) civilianauthorities can ensure the security of ordinary Filipinos.54 By 2018, the AFP will hand over themanagement of internal security threats to the local government units and to the Philippine NationalPolice (PNP). Then, the national government and the AFP will reallocate resources away fromcounter-insurgency operations to the build-up of the country’s territorial defense capabilities.55

The government’s long-term goal is to establish a modest but “comprehensive border protectionprogram.” Such program is anchored on the surveillance, deterrence, and border patrol capabilitiesof the PAF, the PN, and the PCG that will extend from the Philippines’ territorial waters to itscontiguous to the EEZ.56 For decades, the PN (along with the PAF) suffered from neglect, lowfunding, and ageing equipment. Since 2011, however, the PN has been getting more attention andresources because of the growing importance of the country’s maritime environment amidst theincreasing tension in the South China Sea.

Developments in Philippine–China relations have provided the catalyst for the actualization ofPresident Aquino’s defense agenda. On March 2, 2011, two Chinese patrol boats harassed a surveyship commissioned by the Philippine Department of Energy (DOE) to conduct oil exploration in theReed Bank (named Recto Bank by the Philippine government), 150 kilometers east of the SpratlyIslands and 250 kilometers west of the Philippine island of Palawan. The Aquino administration wasstunned by the Chinese action since this maritime encounter happened east of the Spratlys and itsadjacent waters. Two days after the incident, the Philippine government filed a protest before theChinese embassy in Manila. A Department of Foreign Affairs spokesperson commented that, “thePhilippines is (simply) seeking an explanation for the incident.”57 Brushing aside the Philippinecomplaint, a Chinese embassy official insisted that China has indisputable sovereignty over theNansha Islands and their adjacent territory.

In early June 2011, the Philippines sought clarification on the sightings of China MarineSurveillance (CMS) and PLAN ships near the Kalayaan group of islands. Philippine defense andforeign secretaries publicly expressed the Aquino administration’s serious concerns over the allegedChinese intrusion into the country’s EEZ to stake China’s territorial claim and to construct aprojected oil rig on the uninhabited Iroquois Bank, which, according to these ranking Philippinegovernment officials, “are clear violations of the China–ASEAN 2001 Declaration on the Conduct ofParties on the South China Sea.”58 In response, the Chinese foreign ministry sternly told thePhilippines to stop “harming China’s sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, which leads tounilateral actions that can expand and complicate the South China Sea dispute.”59 It was Beijing’sreaction to the Philippines’ diplomatic protest against China’s aborted plan to construct an oil rigdeep within the Philippines’ EZZ.

Beijing then went on to demand that Manila first seek Chinese permission before it could conductoil exploration activities even within the Philippines’ EEZ. China, in fact, badgered the Philippinesand other claimant states to recognize China’s sovereign claim over the South China Sea.60 China’shaughty and hostile attitude towards the Philippines and Vietnam in the first half of 2011 escalatedthe territorial dispute. By then, President Aquino unmistakably saw that the Philippines was on adirect collision course with China regarding the South China Sea issue.

The March 2, 2011 incident at the Reed Bank and China’s dismissive response to the Philippines’diplomatic queries drove the Aquino administration to hasten the AFP’s modernization. Chinaclaims a wide maritime territory in the South China Sea which includes areas that are well within thePhilippines’ EEZ. Hence, the current modernization of the Philippine military is externally influ-enced by a changing balance of power in East Asia generated by a geo-strategic reconfiguration ofnational capabilities in the light of an emergent China.61 In June 2011, the executive branch of thegovernment and the AFP agreed on a multi-year, multi-billion peso defense upgrade spending and

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military build-up. The Department of Budget Management (DBM) released a Multi-Year ObligationAuthority (MOA) to the DND, allowing the AFP to enter into multi-year contracts with othergovernments or private arms and military hardware manufacturers. The DBM also committedPhp40 billion (estimated US$800 million) in the next five years (2012–2016) to develop the AFP’scapabilities for greater domain awareness of the Philippine territorial waters and EEZ.

In the proposed “rolling’ program, the executive branch asked the Philippine Congress to allocatePhp 8 billion (an estimated US$160 million) annually for the procurement of air-defense surveillanceradar, surface attack aircraft, close air support aircraft, combat utility helicopters, and long-rangepatrol aircraft.62 Also covered are current upgrade programs such as the installation of a radar andcommunication network along the coast of Palawan and East Mindanao under the Coast WatchSystem and the acquisition of two refurbished US Coast Guard Hamilton-class cutters for the PN.

Discovering maritime security

In its first 17 months, the Aquino administration spent Php33.596 billion (US$387 million) to boostthe AFP’s internal security and territorial defense capability.63 According to Defense SecretaryVoltaire Gazmin, the DND-AFP signed 138 defense contracts that would be implemented in thenext five years to improve the AFP’s force protection, maritime surveillance, transportation, andcombat support system.64 The bulk of the budget earmarked for these projects are for “the use by thePAF and the PN specifically for the purchase of materiel.”65

In September 2011, President Aquino signed Executive Order 57, which created the NationalCoast Watch System, a central inter-agency mechanism to coordinate maritime security operations.The system was initiated by the DND and AFP to conduct maritime domain awareness operationsnot only in Southern Philippines but also throughout the entire archipelago.66 As a result, during thefirst two years of the Aquino administration, Philippine defense budget went up from Php57.6billion (estimated US$1.2 billion) in 2010 to Php104.5 billion (US$2.1 billion) in 2011 and Php106.9billion (US$2.1 billion) in 2012.67

In October 2011, Voltaire Gazmin released the Defense Planning Guidance (2013–2018), restruc-turing the AFP to a “lean but fully capable” armed forces to confront the challenges to the country’sterritorial integrity and maritime security. It contains the following measures:68

(1) Reduction of infantry and marine battalions and the redirection of limited financialresources to key priorities such as theater mobility, close air-support, air-surveillance, andair-defense

(2) Acquisition of naval assets for off-shore patrol, strategic sea-lift, and accompanying basesupport system and platform to sustain the deployed maritime assets

(3) Development of the AFP’s long-range maritime air patrol and surveillance through theacquisition of assets for long-range maritime air patrol, and accompanying base supportsystem

(4) Reactivation of the Philippine Air Defense System (PADS) through the acquisition of airsurveillance radar and a squadron of air defense/surface attack aircraft to provide air defensecoverage over areas of high concern

In December 2012, six months after the tense Scarborough Shoal stand-off between Philippineand Chinese civilian vessels, President Aquino signed into law Republic Act 10349, extending theAFP modernization program of 1995. The implementation period of the original AFP modernizationlaw or Republic Act 7898 expired in December 2011 without any significant arms acquisition for thePhilippine military. The Asian financial crisis of 1997, the outbreak of the secessionist rebellion ledby the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Central Mindanao, the renewed communistinsurgency all over the country in late 1990s, and the tedious procurement process and complexacquisition structure stipulated by the original law prevented the AFP from acquiring any major

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weapon system for territorial defense.69 RA 10349 extends the military modernization program up to2027 to give the PN and PAF ample time to develop and acquire modern weapons for maritimesecurity. The law also streamlined the procurement process and shortened the 29 stages into twoassessment levels, including the actual procurement and contracting stages.70

The March 2015 Defense Planning Guidance for 2016–2022 emphasized the importance ofdefending “the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, specifically in the West PhilippineSea (South China Sea),” which accordingly “poses the foremost security challenge” to the Philippinesand the AFP.71 Thus it stressed the need to maximize all available resources at the government’sdisposal to achieve a credible defense posture in territorial defense and maritime security.72

Such defense posture requires enhancing the AFP’s capabilities, prioritizing its needs, andgradually restructuring its forces for territorial defense. The long-term goal, according to the earlier2011 AFP’s Strategic Intent, is to develop the force structure and capabilities enabling the Philippinemilitary to maintain a “credible deterrent posture against foreign intrusion or external aggression,and other illegal activities while allowing free navigation to prosper.”73 Specifically, the AFP plans todevelop the following limited capabilities:

(1) Enhancing maritime domain awareness—The AFP’s capability for maritime surveillance isextremely limited. The establishment of the National Coast Watch System in September2011 to monitor the country’s vast maritime environment requires air-assets, trainedpersonnel, and radars. The PAF acquisition of a long-range patrol aircraft, lead-in-fighterjets, and surface-attack aircraft addresses the need for maritime awareness and limited navalinterdiction capability, particularly within the Philippine territorial waters to the 200-nautical mile EEZ.

(2) Joint operations between the PAF and PN for limited naval interdiction capabilities – Giventhe Philippines’ inadequate defense budget and defense capabilities, the PAF will support thePhilippine Navy’s limited naval interdiction operations. The PAF’s Air Defense System andthe PN’s Coast Watch System will provide coverage for and augment the over-the-horizonreconnaissance and targeting capabilities.74 The PAF’s maritime patrol and surveillanceaircraft would serve as the primary platforms of patrols, surveillance, and interdiction,while the PN’s surface combatants would conduct helicopter patrol and provide longeron-station time, visible, and enhanced naval presence/deterrence.75 The PAF’s air-defenseand coastal missile system would be linked with the navy’s surface and underwater inter-diction capabilities that will constitute the first layer of maritime defense for the Philippines.

The above-mentioned targets can be translated into two mundane yet enabling tasks for the Navy:(1) To monitor the Philippines’ vast maritime territory, the PN should build the necessary surfaceand air capability to survey and safeguard Philippine-controlled islands in the South China Sea andprevent idle or empty island/reefs from being occupied by other claimant states.76 (2) To developsufficient capabilities to deter external threats and protect the country’s maritime interests, the PNmust create an effective force presence in the maritime domain that exhibits competence to defendthe territory, if necessary.77

Developing a credible defense posture

In 2012, the Center for New American Security (CNAS) released a study on Philippine defenserequirements vis-à-vis the challenge posed by China in the South China Sea. The study disclosed thatfor the Philippines to have a credible defense capability, the AFP should acquire 48 upgraded F-16fighter planes, several corvette or frigate- type surface combatants, and four to six midgetsubmarines.78 However, these requirements are beyond the AFP’s plan and could not be supportedby the current defense budget. President Aquino recognizes the urgency of modernizing armedforces especially the PN and PAF. Nevertheless, he is also aware of the limitations that competing

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demands (especially funds for education and public infrastructure) put on the military moderniza-tion. From the Aquino administration’s perspective, arms modernization should be undertakensimply for developing a credible defense posture, and not for power projection capability or outrightwar-fighting purposes.79 For the PN, this defense posture means building capabilities for substantialmaritime situational awareness, limited territorial sea interdiction operations, and defensive deter-rence to protect the country’s interests in the South China Sea.

In mid-2012, the PN publicly presented a 15-year acquisition plan called the “Philippine FleetDesired Force Mix.”80 This plan does not aspire to match the level of naval capability of China but todevelop a certain deterrence capability for the PN to inflict damages to any hypothetical opponent inthe South China Sea.81 The Php500 billion (US$10 billion) naval build-up program provides for theacquisition, within a 15-year period, of the following naval assets: six frigates designed for anti-submarine/anti-air warfare; 12 corvettes primarily for anti-submarine warfare; 18 offshore patrolvessels (OPVs) that will comprise the backbone for naval patrol; 26 naval and multi-purposehelicopters for maritime domain awareness; 42 multi-purpose assault Craft (MPAC) armed withtorpedoes and missiles for territorial sea interdiction and maritime situational awareness; and threediesel submarines for limited sea-denial operations.82

At the core of this Desired Force Mix is the acquisition of six modern frigates whose goal is togive the PN some limited anti-air/anti-submarine capabilities. In this respect, the Philippines hasalready acquired two former US Coast Guard Hamilton-class high endurance cutters in 2011 and2012. These vessels underwent a Service Life Extension Program (HHI) and capability-upgradedwith the installation of new systems and equipment for anti-submarine and anti-air operations. Thedefense department also signed a deal with Augusta Westland for the purchase of three AW109Power maritime helicopters to be deployed aboard these two ships for EEZ protection, surfacesurveillance, search and rescue operations, and maritime security.83

Aside from the refurbished Hamilton class cutters, the PN is also in the process of acquiring twoadditional modern frigates. The PN plans to arm these two frigates with air-to-air, anti-ship andanti-submarine weapons and sensors for extended maritime patrol and surveillance operations.Initially, the defense department thought of purchasing two decommissioned Italian Maestralefrigates for their credible missile and anti-submarine capabilities. However, it decided against thepurchase after evaluation studies found out that operating these second-hand vessels would be morecostly to maintain in the long run.84

Currently, the government is looking into the offers by South Korea and Spain to supply twobrand-new frigates. However, the project has been in limbo for the last two years because the PN isin quandary whether it will buy cheaper second-hand ships or the more expensive, newly con-structed vessels. In the end, however, the decision to purchase depends on the strategic exigency ofthe frigates and, more importantly, on the availability of public funds. As one ranking defense officialnotes, only vessels that will provide the country a “credible defense posture” and (more importantly)at an affordable cost will be selected.85

The arms build-up for maritime security is a very expensive undertaking because the PN has tostart from scratch. In addition to its frigate requirements, the Navy has to replace its antiquatedsurface combatants with new vessels. It needs as well communications and weapons systems andmission-essential devices such as daytime/nighttime electronic navigational equipment, communica-tion suites, safety-of-life-at-sea, propulsion seamanship and ship-handling gears, correspondinglogistic support packages, and new naval facilities. The Navy has to develop an organic underwayreplenishment at sea/fueling capability in the next five years. The deployment of modern frigates alsonecessitates increased endurance support vessels for long-term maritime operations given thearchipelagic geography of the Philippines.86 Likewise, the PN requires bigger piers for its largervessels and radar systems for its new naval facilities.87 Finally, the PN officers and sailors have to betrained on manning, training, and equipping new modern ships. To operate new ships from differentsources, naval officers and crews must continuously learn different systems and ship-handlingprocesses. Given its current pace and budget allocation, the PN’s modernization would hardly

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deter the PLAN in the contested sea. The PLAN has procured large surface combatants andsubmarines since the first decade of the twenty-first century.88 Fortunately, the US and Japan, twomajor maritime powers, have forged security arrangements with the Philippines. In addition, the US’strategic pivot to the Asia-Pacific region and Japan’s growing strategic interests in the South ChinaSea dispute augur well for Philippines’ maritime security.

External dimension of maritime security: The US factor

An important factor in ensuring maritime security is the continuing Philippine–US military ties.Policymakers in Washington are starting to share the Philippines’ view that the archipelago is astrategic bellwether of Chinese trajectory in the Asia-Pacific and a natural barrier to check China’smaritime expansion.89 Hence, it makes perfect sense that the US help the Philippines develop itsnaval capabilities to counter China’s efforts at power-projection in the Asia-Pacific.90 Needless tosay, the Philippine military requires new arms and equipment for territorial defense. The most recentUS assistance included the transfer of the two aforementioned US Coast Guard’s Hamilton-classcutters to the PN through the Foreign Military Sales credit.91 These cutters are now the largestvessels in the Navy’s inventory. They are deployed to safeguard the country’s oil exploration venturesand territorial claims in the South China Sea. As stated earlier, the PN plans to retrofit the cutterswith electronic monitoring modern electronics and surveillance equipment.92

To overcome its naval inadequacies vis-à-vis China, however, Manila has asked for an unequi-vocal US commitment to Philippine defense and security as provided for in the 1951 MDT,specifically American naval/air support in the Spratlys. Philippine officials rationalized that anarmed attack on Philippine metropolitan territory and forces anywhere in the Pacific, includingthe South China Sea, should trigger an automatic US armed response. Unfortunately, the 1951 theUS–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) does not provide for any automatic response fromeither the Philippines or the US. The treaty only requires the allies to consult each other anddetermine what military action, if any, both would take. However, an armed attack against a formaltreaty ally like the Philippines will be viewed in Washington as an affront to America’s credibility asa treaty partner and a challenge to the US status as the leading military power in the WesternPacific.93 This will trigger either an American diplomatic or military response or both. Nonetheless,a US retaliatory action depends on American forces’ access to facilities near the South China Seafrom where they can react in a timely manner.

During the August 16, 2011 meeting of the Mutual Defense Board (MDB)/Security EngagementBoard (SEB), the allies formulated a framework for heightened bilateral and multilateral security, anddomain awareness. The board considered the following measures:94 (a) rotational presence of USmaritime defense assets in the Philippines to support MDB and SEB activities while the AFPdevelops its territorial defense capabilities; (b) increased joint bilateral maritime security activitiesin the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea; (c) development of joint-use maritime security supportfacilities; (d) improved information-sharing between US and Philippine forces; and (e) the conductof integrated maritime security initiatives between the US Pacific Command and the AFP. Thesecourses of action can compensate for the AFP’s insufficient territorial defense capabilities andexpedite joint operations in case the MDT is invoked when of an armed attack is mounted againstthe Philippines.95

The 2012 Scarborough Shoal stand-off and later, China’s subsequent occupation of the shoal,made it urgent for Manila to negotiate the “Framework Agreement on Increased Rotational Presence(IRP) and Enhanced Agreement” with Washington. The agreement facilitates the deployment ofAmerican troops and equipment on a rotational basis, thus skirting the controversial issue of re-establishing US bases in the country. Curiously, the negotiation was conducted against the backdropof recurring tension between the Philippines and China over the South China Sea. On August 14,2013, talks on the enhanced defense agreement started in Manila. Earlier, the Pentagon clarified thatit is not establishing huge (permanent) bases reminiscent of the Cold War but simply maintaining a

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light (strategic) footprint in Southeast Asia.96 This policy statement reassured Manila thatWashington has neither the desire nor the interest to create US-only bases in Southeast Asia.”97

On April 28, 2014, Philippine Defense Secretary Gazmin and US Ambassador to the PhilippinesPhilip Goldberg signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) a few hours beforePresident Obama arrived in Manila for his first state visit. EDCA is not actually a new security pact;it is merely an updated version of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty.98 This executive agreementprovides the framework by which the Philippines and the US can develop their individual andcollective (defense) capabilities. Such task can be accomplished through the rotational deployment ofAmerican forces in Philippine bases.99 Although the EDCA allows American forces to utilize AFP-owned and -controlled facilities, the Philippine base commander has unhampered access to theselocations. Likewise, American-built or -improved infrastructure inside these installations can be usedby the AFP. Furthermore, any construction and other activities within in the Philippine bases requirethe consent of the host country through the MDB and the SEB.

On a strategic level, the EDCA undercuts China’s anti-access/area-denial strategy in SoutheastAsia even without the US establishing any permanent base in the region. Since the late 1990s, thePLA has been developing tactics and acquiring weapon systems that could disrupt American USnaval/air operations or slow down the deployment of American air and naval forces to the theater ofoperations.100 The Chinese could even prevent US forces from operating from certain locations orcould force the US Navy’s ships and planes to operate from distances farther than the US militarywould otherwise prefer.101

Through the EDCA, however, US forces are afforded two innovative access arrangements in thePhilippines, namely:102 (1) forward operating sites–expandable warm military facilities with limitedUS military support presence; and (2) cooperative security locations – facilities with little or nopermanent American presence and which are maintained by the host-nation. These are lessexpensive, less visible, and less vulnerable access arrangements that offer greater strategic andoperational flexibility. They are less likely to create local political problems and are expected topromote long-term security cooperation between the US and the Philippines. Moreover, theseoperationally flexible facilities, located over a sprawling archipelagic country located near China,can thwart the PLA’s anti-access/area denial strategy. Lastly, US naval and air assets in thesetemporary sites will expedite the rapid and massive deployment of American forces if hostilitiesbreak out in the South China Sea or even in the East China Sea.

External dimension of maritime security: Building security ties with Japan

The Philippines also foster its security partnership with Japan, China’s main rival in East Asia. Since2011, Japan has been closely observing China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea dispute, inwhich initially, it has no immediate interest. In July 2011, then-Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda andPresident Aquino bolstered security relations between Japan and the Philippines. After PresidentAquino’s third visit to Japan, Tokyo and Manila held high-level talks on maritime and oceanicaffairs, exchanges between Filipino and Japanese defense and maritime officials, as well as Japan’scapacity-building training of the 3,500-strong PCG.103 In September 2011, then Japanese PrimeMinister Naoto Kan and President Aquino issued a joint statement in Tokyo, affirming that theSouth China Sea is vital as “it connects the world and the Asia-Pacific, and that peace and stabilitytherein is of common interest to the international community.”104 Prime Minister Kan alsoinstructed the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) to further train the PCG, consult regularly withFilipino naval officers, and increase joint coast guard exercises.105

In April 2012, at the start of the two-month stand-off between Philippine and Chinese civilianships at Scarborough Shoal, then-Japanese Ambassador to the Philippines Toshio Urabe mentionedthe “close-knit triangular relationship among Japan, the Philippines, and their closest (mutual) ally –the US”106 Then in May 2012, three Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) surface combatantsarrived in Manila for a four-day port call.107 The visit came after Tokyo announced its plans to

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provide the Philippines with ten new patrol vessels to bolster the latter’s maritime patrol capability.The newspaper Yomuri Shimbun’s linked the ship visit to the on-going Scarborough Shoal stand-offand editorialized that Japan could not just stand by and wait for China and the Philippines to clashopenly.108 It also stressed that it is in “Japan’s national interest to ensure that its sea-lanes remainsafe.”109 Interestingly, the arrival of the MSDF’s ships happened just a few days after the US Navy’sVirginia-class attack submarine, the U.S.S. North Carolina, made a port call at Subic Bay on Luzon.As mentioned, these ship visits were routine port-calls, however, they tacitly conveyed to Beijing thatWashington and Tokyo could jointly respond if the Philippines is threatened by any form of Chinesearmed aggression.110

In July 2012, then-Japanese Defense Minister Satoshi Morimoto and his Filipino counterpart,Secretary Gazmin, inked a bilateral agreement on maritime security.111 This agreement featureshigh-level dialogues among Japanese and Filipino defense officials and reciprocal visits by the MSDFchief-of-staff and the PN flag commander. A few days later, Philippine Foreign Affairs SecretaryAlbert Del Rosario announced that Tokyo was likely to provide the PCG with ten 40-meter boats aspart of Japan’s ODA to the Philippines by the end of the year.112 Newspapers also reported a grant oftwo additional bigger vessels to the Philippine government.

In January 2013, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida announced Japan’s technical assistance to thePCG consisting of essential communication equipment for maritime safety.113 On June 27, 2013,Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera and Secretary Gazmin confirmed the continuous“exchanges of information aimed at strengthening Philippine-Japan defense relations and on work-ing together to make US strategic rebalancing a reality in Asia.”114 Secretary Gazmin also raised thepossibility of allowing the Japanese MSDF access to the former American military bases in thePhilippines if Tokyo is interested in signing an access agreement with Manila.115

The Philippines and Japan have conducted high-level meetings and consultations to cement theirsecurity cooperation. In December 2013, President Aquino tackled with Prime Minister Abe inTokyo China’s establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea.116

President Aquino was worried that China might extend the zone into the South China Sea, adverselyaffecting Philippine security. Prime Minister Abe assured President Aquino that Japan wouldcounter China’s attempt to change the status quo in the region by force and would cooperate withthe Philippines to ensure that the freedom of flight and navigation is respected.117 To help build upthe PCG’s capability, Prime Minister Abe approved the yen-based soft loan to finance thePhilippines’ acquisition of ten 40-meter long multi-purpose patrol boats from Japan.

In June 2014, President Aquino again met Prime Minister Abe in Tokyo to discuss ways andmeans to further Philippine-Japan security relations.118 Tackled in particular were areas of possiblecooperation to enhance the recently forged Philippines–Japan Strategic Partnership.119 PresidentAquino followed up the PCG’s request for ten patrol boats to be acquired by the Philippines througha US$184 million soft loan from Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).120 Prime MinisterAbe assured President Aquino that three of the vessels would be delivered in 2015, while theremaining seven would be ready for delivery in 2016. The PCG needs the patrol boats to securethe waters around the seven islands claimed and occupied by the Philippines in the Spratlys. Theboats will also monitor foreign naval presence in the several reefs and shoals within the country’sEEZ currently occupied by Chinese forces. For the PCG’s maritime domain awareness operations,Japan promised to provide VSAR and Inmarsat communication systems.

More significantly, President Aquino endorsed Prime Minister Abe’s move to expand Japan’ssecurity role in the region. In the light of the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Senkaku Islands, PrimeMinister Abe has pushed for the reinterpretation of the pacifist 1947 Japanese constitution toaccommodate the Japan Self-Defense Force’s (JSDF) right of “collective self-defense,” which wouldallow the MSDF to assist allies such as the US, even if Japan is not attacked.121 This move was theresult of a review of the legal basis for Japanese security policy and informed by the findings of anadvisory panel submitted to the Abe government in May 2014. The panel recommended that theCabinet Legal Bureau revise its interpretation of Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution to enhance

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defense cooperation with the US and other countries for Japan’s own national interests.122 The Abegovernment justified that the self-defense measures also meet the standard interpretation of theminimum use of force, which is permitted under Article 9 when an armed attack on a country withclose relationship with Japan occurs and consequently threatens Japan’s own security.123 PresidentAquino boldly declared that expanding the MSDF’s role and strengthening bilateral economic andsecurity ties between the Philippines and Japan would ensure regional security.124

As an indication of this growing security partnership, the Philippines and Japan held a joint navalexercise in the South China Sea in early May 2015. Japan sent two MSDF destroyers that conducted atraining exercise with a PN frigate on communication strategies in responding to “unplannedencounters at sea.”125 Known as the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), the jointMSDF-PN May 12 naval exercise is part of a security agreement signed by Tokyo and Manila inJanuary 2015 to tighten security cooperation between the two US allies.126 Japan also announced thatit is sending surveillance planes and naval vessels to assist the US Navy in conducting maritimepatrols in the South China Sea.127

During his June 2015 visit to Japan, President Aquino announced that the two countries wouldsoon start talks on a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) allowing the Japanese Self-Defense Force(SDF) access to Philippine military bases.128 President Aquino revealed that Japanese and Filipinoofficials discussed the possibility of a SOFA since both countries have boosted their securityrelationship significantly over the past few years.129 The SDF’s possible use of the Philippinebases, on a limited and rotational basis, will benefit Japan as it actively pursues a policy of Pro-Active Contribution to Peace in East Asia. With refueling and basing facilities in the Philippines,units of the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) and MSDF can conduct joint patrols with their Americancounterparts for a longer period of time and over a larger area of the South China Sea.

Domestic and external challenges

In building up the capabilities of the PN, the Aquino administration sinks its teeth into challengingChina’s expansive claims in the South China Sea as the latter directly encroaches into the country’sEEZ. The Philippines’ maritime security goal is very modest – to develop a credible posture forterritorial defense and maritime security. Unfortunately, the PN’s goal of developing a credibledefense capability is hampered by a tedious procurement process and limited defense budget. So far,the Philippine government has acquired two second-hand US Coast Guard cutters (the BRP GregorioDel Pilar and the BRP Alcaraz), a Landing Craft Utility (BRP Tagbanua), and three AugustaWestland AW 109 helicopters.130 Though the PN already has six multi-purpose attack crafts(MPAC) in its fleet, the DND has postponed the purchase of missile-armed MPAC until after theDBM finally releases the funds.131

Furthermore, due to a shortfall in fund allocation by the Philippine Congress, war materiel suchas blue-water missile-armed ships, search-and-rescue vessels, naval helicopters, strategic sea liftships, and top-of-the-line interceptors could not be sourced. Another setback was the PhilippineSupreme Court’s issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) on the use of the government’sproceeds from the Malampaya Gas Plant off the island of Palawan to finance public projects underthe Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), including the AFP modernization program. Thishalted the AFP’s acquisition of communication devices, closed air support aircraft, long-range patrolaircraft, radar system, and engineering equipment.132 It also derailed the PN’s plan for upgrades ofvital naval infrastructure such as the building of piers and the installation of maritime surveillanceradar system along the Philippine coastline.133

Moreover, even if the PN succeeds in creating the Philippines’ Fleet Desired Force Mix, there issimply no way for the Philippines to equal the naval capability of China. The Philippines has norecourse but to pursue a regional balance of power where the US remains a resident Pacific powerand a major twenty-first-century strategic player. Fortunately, the US and its ally, Japan, assist thePhilippines through their provision of materiel assistance, training, and recently, a security

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guarantee. However, engaging these two major naval powers in the South China Sea dispute willundoubtedly complicate the issue and make China more belligerent and uncompromising. With itsgrowing wealth and expanding military power, China will certainly match the naval capabilities ofthe US and Japan.

A critical challenge facing the AFP’s strategic policy shift is whether the next Philippine presidentin July 2016 will continue or discontinue President Aquino’s policy of standing up to China’sexpansive claim in the South China Sea. President Aquino’s successor needs to carefully weigh theoptions given other foreign policy concerns (economic diplomacy and protection of OFWs), the highprice of naval build-up amidst the competing government priorities such as the allocation of publicresources to education and infrastructure and the opportunity cost of strained bilateral relation withthe second largest economy in the world. Some of the 2016 presidential candidates have alreadycriticized President Aquino’s alleged hardline policy vis-à-vis China.134 They prefer accommodatingChina’s maritime expansion in the South China Sea and call for closer relations with the emergentpower. Among these candidates who favor a policy of accommodation with China is Vice PresidentJejomar Binay. He appealed for moderation and engagement with China especially in the areas oftrade and investment.135 He is also pushing for a joint development venture similar to the JointMaritime Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) with China and Vietnam from 2006–2009.

Whether the next Philippine president will continue or discontinue President Aquino’s policy ofstanding up to the China challenge or pursue a policy of accommodation with this emergent power,he or she must take into account not only domestic factors such as public opinion on the SouthChina Sea dispute and the clamor within the AFP top leadership for more resources to support themilitary’s shift from internal security to territorial defense. He or she must also consider the evolvinggeo-strategic competition among the great powers over the disputed territory.

The growing involvement of the US and Japan in the maritime dispute has generated a strategicimpasse in East Asia. This impasse enables these two naval powers to demonstrate their maritimeprowess and draw their long-range surveillance and strike capabilities to maintain their “forces-over-the-horizon” and projecting power against an expansionist China in the South China Sea.136

Alarmed by the PLAN’s expansion in the contested waters, the US (with the support of Japan andother allies) shows its naval and air prowess to constraint China from establishing its primacy in theregion.137 The stable but fluid strategic situation can be described as an old-fashioned strategicbalancing of an emergent regional power by a small power (the Philippines and, to a certain degree,Vietnam) that relies on other major naval powers to maintain a precarious status quo in the SouthChina Sea for the present and the foreseeable future.138

However, this situation has two major flaws. One, it generates a very fluid environment whereinerror or miscalculation by any claimant state could trigger an armed confrontation that may escalateor may drag the other maritime powers into a major systemic war. Two, while this impasse hasstabilized the situation, it has simply failed to resolve the dispute, creating a tense and protractedstand off. The claimant states are using this lull to build-up their respective naval capabilities for anyeventuality. If the current stalemate works against its interests, however, China might use force onany of the claimant states (like the Philippines) that have cemented their security ties with the USand Japan.139 Nonetheless, such maneuvering by China will surely invite possible intervention bythese two maritime powers especially if Chinese forces will make the strategic push against American(and Japanese) naval presence in the first-island-chain. In effect, this incident can become whatMao-Zedong described as “a single spark that can start a prairie fire.”

Conclusion

Using the Philippine government decision to shift its military’s focus from internal to maritime/territorial security as a case study, this article examines a small power’s efforts to apply an asym-metric defense policy against a regional power. This defense policy combines a limited internalmobilization and an alliance formation. Confronted with China’s growing naval might and

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assertiveness in the South China Sea, President Aquino has supported and pursued the moderniza-tion of the Philippine military. This entails the build-up of the PN and PAF to enable them todevelop a credible defense stance against any external threat. This posture necessitates the PN todevelop its maritime domain awareness and limited naval interdiction capabilities.

The PN’s goal of developing a credible defense capability is hampered by a tedious procurementprocess and limited defense budget. Furthermore, even if the PN succeeds in creating the“Philippines’ Fleet Desired Force Mix,” there is simply no way for the Philippines to equal thenaval capability of China. To offset its naval inadequacies vis-à-vis China, the Philippines hasstrengthened its alliance with the United States and has forged a new security partnership withJapan. Steadily, the US and Japan assist the Philippines through their provision of materiel assis-tance, training, and lately, a security guarantee.

Whether the next Philippine president in June 2016 will continue or discontinue PresidentAquino’s policy of standing up to the China challenge in the South China Sea, he or she mustconsider the growing geo-strategic competition between China on the one hand, and the US andJapan on the other hand. The growing involvement of the US and Japan in the South China Seadispute has generated a dangerous impasse in the region. This situation allows these two navalpowers to demonstrate their maritime prowess and draw their long-range surveillance and strikecapabilities to maintain their “forces-over-the-horizon” and projecting power against China in theSouth China Sea. The US and Japan also continue to help the Philippines in building up its limiteddeterrence capabilities against China. However, if the situation works against its interests, Chinamight use force on any of the claimant states (like the Philippines) that have tightened their securityties with the US and Japan. Given China’s possible use of force against its weaker adversaries, abrewing geo-strategic competition among the major naval powers, and the prospect of a systemicconflict among them in East Asia, maritime security will be the Philippines’ concern and preoccupa-tion way into the third decade of the twenty-first century.

Notes

1. Chin-Hao Huang and Robert Sutter, “China-Southeast Asia Relation: ASEAN and Asian Regional Diplomacy,”Comparative Connection: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (October 2009), p. 5. Availableat http://csis.org/files/publication/0904china_seasia.pdf.

2. Alma Maria O. Salvador and Jennifer Santiago, “Defense Budget and Spending: Alignment and Priorities,” inJennifer Santiago Oreta, ed., Philippine Defense Spending (2001–2012) (Quezon City, the Philippines: Ateneo DeManila University Press, 2012), p. 14.

3. Originally drafted in a workshop attended by 60 naval officers in early November 2006, the 98-page documentprovides a policy road-map to transform the PN into a strong and credible naval force capable of securing thePhilippines’ maritime environment. See Philippine Navy, Philippine Navy Strategic Sail Plan 2020 (Manila, thePhilippines: Philippine Navy, December 2006).

4. See Ronnie Gil L. Gavan, “Organized National Engagement (ONE) at Sea: Optimizing the State’s Option forMaritime Security,” Digest: A Forum for Security and Defense Issues Vol. 19, No. 1 (First Quarter 2012), pp.13–15.

5. Gavan, “Organized National Engagement at Sea,” pp. 13–15.6. See Theo Farrel and Terry Terriff, “The Sources of Military Change,” in Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, eds., The

Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, and Technology (Boulder, CO; London, UK: Lynne RiennerPublishers, 2002), pp. 3–38.

7. Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 3.8. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire, p. 3.9. Farrell and Terriff, “The Sources of Military Change,” p. 3.10. Peter Trubowitz, Politics and Strategy: Partisan Ambition and American Statecraft (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 2011), p. 2.11. Emily O. Goldman, “The Spread of Western Military Models to Ottoman Turkey and Meiji Japan,” in Theo

Farrell and Terry Terriff, eds., The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, and Technology (Boulder, CO;London, UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p. 42.

12. Goldman, “The Spread of Western Military Models to Ottoman Turkey and Meiji Japan,” p. 42.13. Trubowitz, Politics and Strategy, p. 35.

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14. Trubowitz, Politics and Strategy, p. 35.15. Stephen M. Walt, The Origin of Alliances (New York, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 31.16. Walt, The Origin of Alliances, p. 31.17. Trubowitz, Politics and Strategy, p. 12.18. Brett Ashley Leeds, “Alliances and the Expansion and Escalation of Militarized Interstate Disputes,” in Sarah

McLaughlin Mitchell and John A. Vasquez, eds., Conflict, War, and Peace (Washington, DC: SAGE Publications,2014), p. 64.

19. Leeds, “Alliances and the Expansion and Escalation of Militarized Interstate Disputes,” p. 30.20. Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (Cambridge, UK; New York,

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22. Trubuwitz, Politics and Strategy, p. 13.23. Gavan, “Organized National Engagement at Sea,” p. 1.24. Noel M. Morada and Christopher Collier, “The Philippines: State versus Society,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed.,

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25. Gavan, “Organized National Engagement at Sea,” p. 10.26. Kathline Anne S. Tolosa, “Owning Sovereignty,” Digest: A Forum for Security and Defense Issues (4th Quarter

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32. Office of Plans and Program, AFP’s Capability Assessment, presented during the National Defense and SecurityReview Module Priming Session (Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, the Philippines: National Defense College ofthe Philippines, September 3–6, 2007), p. 25.

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2007), p. 104.38. Ronald O’ Rourke, “PLAN Force Structure: Submarines, Ships, and Aircraft,” in Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher

Yung, Michael Swaine, and Andrew Nine-Tzu-Yang, eds., The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, EvolvingRoles. (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011), pp. 154–155.

39. Nan Li, “The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From ‘Near Coast’ and ‘Near Sea’ to ‘FarSeas,’” in Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher Yung, Michael Swaine, and Andrew Nien-Dzu-Yang, eds., TheChinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles. (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press,2011), p. 129.

40. Peter Dutton, “Three Disputes and Three Objectives: China and the South China Sea,” Naval War College ReviewVol. 54, No. 4 (Autumn 2011), p. 47.

41. For details on China’s training exercises in its surrounding waters, see National Institute for Defense Studies,NIDS China Security Report 2011 (Tokyo, Japan: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2012), pp. 18–21.

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43. Robert Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang, “Managing Rising Tension in the South China Sea,” ComparativeConnections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relation, (September 2011), p. 1. Available athttp://csis.org/files/publication/1102qchina_seasia.pdf.

44. National Institute for Defense Studies, NIDS China Security Report 2014 (Tokyo, Japan: National Institute forDefense Studies, 2015), p. 3.

45. National Institute for Defense Studies, NIDS China Security Report 2014, p. 3.

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46. Daniel M. Hartnett and Frederic Vellucci, “Toward a Maritime Security Strategy: An Analysis of Chinese Viewssince Early 1990s,” in Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher Yung, Michael Swaine, and Andrew Nien-Dzu-Yang, eds.,The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press,2011), p. 101.

47. See Paul B. Goodwin and Alice Miller, China’s Forbearance as its Limits: Chinese Threat and Retaliation Signalingand its Implications for Sino-American Military Confrontation (Washington, DC: National Defense University,April 2013), p. 11.

48. National Institute for Defence Studies, NIDS China Security Report 2013 (Tokyo, Japan: National Institute forDefense Studies, January 2014), p. 2.

49. Office of the Deputy-Chief-of-Staff for Plans (J-5), DND-AFP Thrust for Capability Upgrade: The AFP Long-TermCapability Development Plan (Quezon City, the Philippines: Camp Aguinaldo, 2010).

50. Office of the Deputy-Chief-of-Staff for Plans (J-5), DND-AFP Thrust for Capability Upgrade, p. 8.51. AFP General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Armed Forces of the Philippines Internal Peace and

Security Plan (Quezon City, the Philippines: Camp General Aguinaldo, 2010), p. 8.52. AFP General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Armed Forces of the Philippines Internal Peace and

Security Plan, p. 13.53. Office of the Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines: Strategic Intent (Quezon City, the

Philippines: Camp Aguinaldo, 2011), p. 27.54. Office of the Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines: Strategic Intent, p. 27.55. Office of the Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines: Strategic Intent, p. 28.56. National Security Council, National Security Policy 2011–2016 (Quezon City, the Philippines: National Security

Council, April 2011), p. 39.57. Simeone Orendain, “Philippines Says China Harassed Oil Exploration Vessel,” Voice of America of America

News (March 5, 2011), p. 1. Available at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=56&did=2287143411&Src.58. Carlye Thayer, “China’s New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea,” International Journal of

China Studies Vol. 2, No. 3 (December 2011), p. 563.59. “China Says Philippines Harming Sovereignty, Interests in Spratlys,” BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, June 9, 2011,

p. 1. Available at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=64&did=2369715781&Src.60. “China Wants Philippines to Seek Permission before Spratlys Oil Search,” BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, June 10,

2011, p. 1. Available at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=281&did=2370661661&Sr.61. Salvador and Oreta, “Defense Budget and Spending: Alignment and Priorities,” p. 13.62. William B. Depasupil, “Armed Forces to Spend P14b to Upgrade Naval, Aerial Defense,” Tribune Business News,

June 20, 2011, p. 1. Available at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=48&did=2386470651&Src.63. “Philippines Spends US$387 million on Armed Forces Upgrade,” BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, January 16, 2012,

p. 1. Available at http://search.proquest.com/news/docview/916135970/fulltext/1348.64. Anonymous, “AFP Modernization Program in Full Swing-Gazmin,” The Philippines News Agency, March 18,

2012, p. 1. Available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/928841133/1367BFEC0AABC.65. Melanie Rodulfo-Veril, “AFP Modernization,” Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force Philippines (Quezon

City, the Philippines: Ateneo University Press, 2012), p. 47.66. Charlemagne F. Batayola Jr., “A Closer Look into Philippine Southern Border Security Concerns: Analyzing its

Importance to National Security and AFP Capability Build-Up,” Digest Vol. 19, No. 1 (1st Quarter 2012), p. 25.67. Salvador and Oreta, “Defense Budget and Spending: Alignment and Priorities,” p. 14.68. Secretary of National Defense Voltaire T. Gazmin, Defense Planning Guidance, 2013–2018 (Quezon City, the

Philippines: Department of National Defense, October 11, 2011), pp. 11–16.69. See AFP Modernization Board, Annual Accomplishment Report 2006 (Quezon City, the Philippines: General

Headquarters Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2007), p. 8.70. Rodulfo-Veril, “AFP Modernization,” p. 47.71. Voltaire T. Gazmin, “Defense Planning Guidance 2016–2021” (Quezon City, the Philippines: Department of

National Defense, March 2015), p. 4.72. Gazmin, “Defense Planning Guidance 2016–2021,” p. 4.73. Office of the Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines: Strategic Intent (Quezon City, the

Philippines: Camp Aguinaldo, 2011), p. 27.74. Commodore Jose Renan C. Suarez, “The Imperatives of Defending the Philippines and Air-Defense Partnership,”

presentation at the Air Power Symposium 2012, June 21, 2012, SMX Convention Center, Pasay City, Philippines,p. 6.

75. Suarez, “The Imperatives of Defending the Philippines and Air-Defense Partnership,” p. 6.76. Gazmin, “Defense Planning Guidance 2016–2021,” p. 4.77. Gazmin, “Defense Planning Guidance 2016–2021,” p. 4.78. Richard D. Fisher, “Defending the Philippines: Military Modernization and the Challenges Ahead,” East and

South China Seas Bulleting 3 (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security 3 May 2012), p. 6.

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79. “Philippines: Military to Pursue Modernization Plans to Attain Minimum Credible Defense, Says PalaceOfficial,” Asia News Monitor, March 25, 2014. Available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/1509637280?accountid=28547.

80. Jaime Laude, “Philippine Navy Needs Php500 Billion to Upgrade War Capability,” The Philippine Star, May 24,2012), p. 1.

81. Ronron Calunsod, “Philippines Beefs up Military’s Naval Capabilities,” Kyodo News Service, December 17, 2014,p. 1.

82. Eric Johnson, “Modernizing the Philippine Navy,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings Vol. 140, No. 11(November 2014), p. 82.

83. James Hardy, “AgustaWestland Signs AW109 Helo Contract with Philippine Navy,” Janes Defence Industry Vol.30, No. 4 (April 1, 2013), p. 1. Available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/1321291893?accountid=28547.

84. “Philippines: DND Eyes Acquisition of Two Brand New Frigates,” Asia News Monitor, August 15, 2013, p. 1.Available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/1420301565?accountid=28547.

85. “Only Best, Affordable Naval Ships will be Acquired for the Philippines,” Asia News Monitor, January 9, 2013), p.1. Available at http://search/proquest.com/docview/1267135710?accountid=28547.

86. Johnson, “Modernizing the Philippine Navy,” p. 83.87. Rahmat Ridzwan, “Philippine Plans to Upgrade Naval Bases Hit by Lack of Funds,” Jane Navy International Vol.

119, No. 6 (1 August 2014), p. 1. Available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/1531488109?accountid=28547.88. Richard A. Bitzinger, “Recent Developments in Naval and Maritime Modernization in the Asia-Pacific:

Implication for Regional Security,” in Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher Yung, Michael Swaine, and AndrewNien-Dzu-Yang, eds., The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles (Washington, DC: NationalDefense University, 2011), p. 24.

89. Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “The U.S. Alliance with the Philippines: Opportunities and Challenges,” in Ashley J.Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark, and Greg Chaffin, eds., Strategic Asia 2014–2015: U.S. Alliances and Partnership atthe Center of Global Power (Seattle, WA; Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2014), p. 128.

90. Greitens, “The U.S. Alliance with the Philippines: Opportunities and Challenges,” p. 128.91. “Philippine Navy to Acquire Largest Ship in Inventory,” GMA News, January 23, 2011, p. 1. Available at http://

www.gmanews.tv/print/211298.92. “Philippine Military Looks Forward to Arrival of New Warship,” BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, August 25, 2011,

p. 2. Available at http://proqust.umi.com/pqweb?index=13&did=2434423821&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt.93. For an interesting and in-depth discussion of US view on possible Chinese military actions in East Asia, see Paul

H. B. Godwin and Alice L. Miller, China’s Forbearance as its Limits.94. Philippine–US Mutual Defense Board/Security Engagement Board Co-Chairman, “2011 Mutual Defense/Board

Engagement Board Strategic Guidelines,” August 16, 2011, p. 1.95. Greg Torode, “U.S. Under Pressure over Sea Dispute Washington Has Stopped Short of Specifics on its Position

Under a Defense Pact with Manila on Recent Incursion by China in the South China Sea,” South China MorningPost, June 17, 2011, p. 1. Available at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=177&did=2376593311&Sr.

96. Craig Whitlock, “U.S. Seeks to Expand Presence in the Philippines,” The Washington Post, January 26, 2012, p.A-1. Available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/917826110?accountid=28547.

97. Whitlock, “U.S. Seeks to Expand Presence in the Philippines,” p. 1.98. “New Defense Agreement Enhances Philippine, U.S. Alliance on Security Challenges—DND Chief,” The

Philippines News Agency, April 28, 2014, p. 1. Available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/1519443096?accountid=28547. Also see Sheldon Simon, “U.S.–Southeast Asia Relations: Enhancing the Rebalance,”Comparative Connections Vol. 16, No. 2 (September 2014), pp. 5–6.

99. Jim Garamone, “U.S.–Philippine Pact Expands Defense Cooperation,” Targeted News Service, April 28, 2014, p. 1.Available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/1519453450/17CC0F621D4441CBPQ/55?accountid.

100. See Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, and Kevin L. Pollpeter, Entering the Dragon’s Lair:Chinese Anti-Access Strategies and their Implications for the United States (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation,2007), p. xvii.

101. Cliff, Burles, Chase, Eaton, and Pollpeter, Entering the Dragon’s Lair, p. xvii.102. For details regarding this new forms access arrangements, see Robert Harkavy, “Thinking about Basing,” Naval

War College Review Vol. 58, No. 3 (Summer 2005), pp. 12–42.103. “Japan and Philippines Strengthen Maritime Security Ties,” Jane’s Country Risk Daily Report Vol. 18, No. 195

(September 9, 2011), p. 1. Available at http://search.prospect.com/docview/894795349/13A384763AF488.104. Christian V. Esguerra, “Philippines Gets Japan Support on Spratly Dispute,” Tribune Business News, September

28, 2011. Available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/894306416/13A34DA4D4DFF70.105. James Hookway and Yoree Koh, “Japan, Philippines Seek Tighter Ties to Counter China,” Wall Street Journal,

September 27, 2011, p. 1. Available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/894125705/13A349E13622FC.106. “Japan/Philippines/United States: Japan Envoy Notes Close-Knit Relations among Philippines, Japan, and U.S.,”

Asia News Mentor, April 11, 2012, p. 1. Available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/993161337/13A384763AF88.

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107. “Philippine Navy Says Japan Sending Three Warships for Port Call to Manila,” BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific,May 26, 2012, pp. 1–2. Available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/1023495212/13A384763AF48.

108. “Philippine Navy Says Japan Sending Three Warships for Port Call to Manila,” p. 1.109. “Philippine Navy Says Japan Sending Three Warships for Port Call to Manila,” p. 1.110. Alec Almazan, “U.S. N-sub in Subic a Strong Signal to China: Routine Visit Comes amid Reports China is

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111. Jane’s Country Risk Daily Report, “Japan and Philippines Sign Defense Pact,” Jane’s Country Risk Daily ReportVol. 19, No. 134 (4 July 2012), p. 1. Available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/102349/13A38763AF488.

112. Jerry E. Esplanada, “Philippines, Japan to Enhance Maritime Security Ties,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 9,2012, p. 1. Available at http://globalnation.inquirer.net/43508/philippines-japan-to-enhance.

113. Asia News Monitor, “Philippine/Japan: Philippines, Japan Agree to Enhance Cooperation in Maritime Security,”Asia News Monitor, January 14, 2013, p. 1. Available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/1269104724?accountid=28547.

114. “Philippines, Japan Agree to Strengthen Defense Ties,” BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific, June 27, 2013, p. 2.Available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/137173115?accountid=28547.

115. “Philippines, Japan Agree to Strengthen Defense Ties,” p. 2.116. “Japan, Philippines to Cooperate on China’s Air Defense Zone,” Jiji Press English News Service. December 13,

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E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (September 2014), p. 2.123. Green, “U.S.–Japan Relations,” p. 2.124. Alexander Martine, “Philippine President Backs Abe’s Military Push; Benigno Aquino II Throws Support behind

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125. Yuka Hayasho, “Japan, Philippines Hold Naval Drills in the South China Sea,” The Wall Street Journal, May 13,2015, p. 1.

126. Tim Kelly and Manuel Mogato, “Japan and the Philippines are about to Upset China in the South China Sea,”Reuters, May 8, 2015, p. 1.

127. Kelly and Mogato, “Japan and the Phillipinbes are about to Upset China in the South China Sea,” p. 1.128. Priam Nepomuceno, “VFA Possible with Japan Due to Robust Relationship with the Philippines,” The Philippine

News Agency, June 24, 2015, p. 1. Available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/1690936480.129. Sheldon Simon, “U.S.–Southeast Asia Relations: Courting Partners,” Comparative Connections: A Triannual

E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (September 2015), pp. 57–58.130. Philippine Navy, The Philippine Navy Strategic Sail Plan 2020: Charting the Navy’s Course for Transformation

(Manila, Philippines: Philippine Navy Headquarters, 2014), p. 22.131. “Philippines: DND Postpones Bid Opening for Missile-Armed MPACs,” Asia News Monitor, April 7, 2015, p. 1.

Available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/1669932527?accountid=28547.132. Rene Acosta, “Pork Scam Stuns AFP Modernization,” Business Monitor, June 4, 2014, p. 1. Available at http://

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134. Ernest Z. Bower and Conor Cronin, “Seizing the Moment: Preparing for Obama’s Trip to Manila,” SoutheastAsia from Scott Circle Vol. VI, No. 22 (October 29, 2015), p. 4.

135. Bower and Cronin, “Seizing the Moment,” p. 4.136. See Malcolm Cook, Raoul Heinrich, Rory Medcalf, and Andrew Shearer, Power and Choice: Asian Security

Futures (Sydney, Australia: Lowy Institute, June 2010), p. 36.137. Cook, Heinrich, Medcalf, and Shearer, Power and Choice, p. 33.138. David Scott, “Conflict Irresolution in the South China Sea” Asian Survey Vol. 56, No. 6 (November/December

2012), pp. 1019–1042; p. 1041.139. For an in-depth study on the possibility of China’s use of force against the Philippines and Vietnam, see Paul H.

B. Godwin and Alice L. Miller, China’s Forbearance as its Limits.

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Notes on contributor

Renato Cruz De Castro is a full professor in the International Studies Department, De La Salle University, Manila, andthe holder of the Charles Lui Chi Keung Professorial Chair in China Studies. His research interests are Philippine-U.S.security relations, Philippine defense and foreign policies, U.S. defense and foreign policies in East Asia, andInternational politics of East Asia. He has written over 80 articles on international relations and security that havebeen published in a number of scholarly journals and edited works in the Philippines, South Korea, Canada, Malaysia,France, Singapore, Taiwan, Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States.

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