the necessity of metaphysics - citeseerx

American Journal of Social Issues & Humanities

(ISSN: 2276 - 6928) Vol.1(2) pp. 35-49 Nov. 2011

Available online http://www.ajsih.org

©2011 American Journal of Social Issues & Humanities

THE NECESSITY OF METAPHYSICS

OCHULOR, CHINENYE LEO

AND

APEBENDE, STEPHEN ATAH

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR

CALABAR – NIGERIA

Email: [email protected]

Phone: +2348037367066

AND

METUONU, IHEANACHO CHUKWUEMEKA

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN-NIGERIA

Abstract

This paper argues in defence of the thesis that metaphysics is an indispensable discipline, the

negative views of the critics notwithstanding. Metaphysics, the paper opines, is the foundation and

most basic branch of philosophy. The paper strongly argues in favour of metaphysics and shows that

rejecting metaphysics radically is an impossible feat, which if it were possible will not only destroy

what binds and keeps society together but will also imply the absence of God and the idea of the

divine which culminates in the destruction of the foundation of religion and other human disciplines

and society itself. The cardinal discovery of this paper, therefore, is that metaphysics cannot be

radically rejected because it is the foundation of all systematic human inquires. Upholding

metaphysics, the paper argues, will help us understand that reality consists of much more than what

we perceive with the senses.

Keywords: Indispensable; Foundation; Systematic; Reality;

INTRODUCTION

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American Journal of Social Issues & Humanities Vol.1 No.2. (Nov.2011)

©AJSIH Vol.1 No.2. (Nov.2011) 35-49 Ochulor, Apebende, Metuonu | 36

Philosophy, as a body of knowledge, is generally believed to be pure abstract speculation

about theories that have no bearing on practical life. Consequently, philosophy is generally

considered as irrelevant to practical life. The attack on philosophy has been more excruciating on

metaphysics as a branch of philosophy. With the polemical ventures or adventures of philosophers

like Hume and Kant as well as the positivists, we sharply grasp a total rejection of metaphysics. For

this class of thinkers metaphysics is not just not a necessity, it is in fact meaningless. Thus, it is

nonsensical to venture into or dedicate time to it. What matters and is of relevance is that which can

stand the tribunal of experience.

Although, it is a fact taken for granted that metaphysics does not serve a utilitarian purpose,

but that does not rule out its necessity, relevance, significance or value. Metaphysics is concerned

with being in general, hence its conclusions will apply to everything which falls under the extension

of the concept of being. This write up sets out to establish the necessity of metaphysics. To

adequately attempt this task, the reason why metaphysics cannot be radically rejected will be

underscored, followed by an exposition of the metaphysical foundations of other disciplines and a

consequent examination of the implications of the absence of metaphysics. Evaluation and conclusion

would end the work. But before then, it is pertinent to explicate what metaphysics is all about.

The Notion of Metaphysics

The word “Metaphysics” derives from two Greek words, “meta” which means “after” and

“physika” which means “physics” (or nature). Thus the word metaphysics, literally means “after

physics” and it was first used by Andronicus of Rhodes, the editor of Aristotle‟s works (Omoregbe,

2006,p.ix). Aristotle had some treatises on physical matters which bore the title, physics. He also had

some other treatises dealing with non-physical matters, but without a title. In his arrangement of

Aristotle‟s works while editing them for publication, Andronicus placed the treatises dealing with

non-physical matters, after those dealing with physical matters. He did not know what to call them; so

he simply called them “after physics” – “metaphysika”. That is, the treatises that come after those

dealing with physical matters which bore the title physics. This was the origin of the word,

metaphysics. Mautner (1996,p.351) captured the scenario thus: “When Andronicus of Rhodes, the

tenth Head of the Lyceum, edited Aristotle‟s works, the fourteen books dealing with the first



philosophy, were placed after the books on physics and were accordingly called metaphysics.”

Eventually “after physics” came to be understood as “beyond physics”, that is, beyond the

physical world, and metaphysics came to be understood as the discipline dealing with realities beyond

the physical world. This understanding of the word is not quite accurate because it is not only realities

that are beyond the physical world that metaphysics deals with. As a branch of philosophy, it is the

study of the totality of being, that is, the nature and structure of reality as a whole. According to Brain

Carr (1987,p.1) the ambition of metaphysicians is,

to reveal the true nature of reality, its contents and structure, to place

man within the cosmos in his relation to other kinds of things and to

his creator, to determine man‟s duty to himself and to God, and the

true route to happiness…..

Brown Thomas (1981,p.2) defines metaphysics as “the philosophical study whose object is to

determine the real nature of things- to determine the meaning, structure and principles of whatever is,

in so far as it is.” Aristotle called it “first philosophy” or again the science which studies “Being qua

Being”. Plato called it “Dialectics” and it is the core of his philosophy. For him, metaphysics is the

study of reality as distinct from appearances. Bradley (1987, p.2), an outstanding metaphysician of

our time, combines both the Aristotelian and Platonic concepts of metaphysics when he said:

We may agree, perhaps, to understand by metaphysics, an attempt to

know reality as against mere appearance, or the study of first

principles or ultimate truths, or again, the effort to comprehend the

universe not simply piecemeal or by fragments but somehow as a

whole.

On the whole, metaphysics as distinct from other disciplines, studies realities in their essences and

universality while other sciences study realities in their particularity.

Why Metaphysics Cannot Be Radically Rejected

Metaphysics as a discipline has met with excruciating criticisms by many. The wonderful

progress of the sciences during the last few centuries has been the occasion of prejudice against

metaphysics in a variety of ways. It is objected that metaphysics has no corresponding progress to

boast of. The comparison is unfair for many reasons. While the positive sciences have increased our



knowledge mainly in extent rather than in depth, it is metaphysics and only metaphysics that

can

increase this knowledge in its unity, comprehensiveness, and significance (Coffey, 1938,

p.25).

Metaphysics as a discipline has an enduring value to man. Thus Emile Meyerson, according to

Regis, Jolivet (1961, p.16) tells us that “Man practices metaphysics just as he breathes, without

thinking about it.” Man has often been defined as a metaphysical animal, which, apart from telling us

that man is a “reasoning animal” strongly indicates the characteristic power of reason namely, that of

looking beyond the empirical and relative to the absolute. “Man, therefore, from this stand point,”

says Regis (1961, p.13) “is of his very essence metaphysical;” which means that there is in him

something incapable of expression in terms simply of “nature” or “physics” something which always

radically transcends nature and which is to be described as spiritual. It follows then, that “if anything

is certain in the history of man as a thinking being it is this universal aim of his, under the conditions

of time and space, of the purely “given” and of entering that of the invisible and transcendent” (Regis,

1961, p.6). The overwhelming relevance of metaphysics makes it unreasonable to radically reject it.

Once we accept the distinction between appearance and reality, and realize that things are not always

the way they appear to us, then the role and value of metaphysics become evident. Once we accept

that man is not purely and exclusively material, that there are immaterial elements in his being then

we would be able to understand man‟s irresistible urge to go beyond the material realm of human life

and experience, and strive for the immaterial realm through metaphysics. “Even Kant who was

himself a devastating critic of metaphysics, still had to admit that the human being has a natural and

irresistible tendency towards metaphysics” (Omoregbe, 2006: 133).

Without Metaphysics, the fundamental ideas of science cannot be resolved into their ultimate

elements, nor can their validity be established. Celestine Bittle (1947: 7) underscores the above in an

interrogative fashion when he writes: “Do not the ideas of „cause‟ „effect‟ „quality‟ „truth‟ „relation‟

and similar ones previously noted, lie at the very root of all scientific knowledge? Science simply

presupposes the validity of these ideas. Consequently, to rob the above ideas of their objective value

is to rob science of the ground upon which it stands. And to accept these ideas without examination

and proof, means to leave the ultimate foundation of all knowledge open to question and doubt.



Man‟s mind can never be satisfied with this. If this ultimate foundation is insecure, every thing based

on it becomes insecure. It is the purpose of metaphysics to prove this foundation valid. Therefore,

metaphysics proves the rationality of science in general.

As a matter of fact, scientists themselves cannot avoid metaphysical problems, nor do they

actually leave them aside in their scientific discussions. Sooner or later, they must reach a stage in

their researches where metaphysical questions are asked. The deeper they delve into the mysteries of

nature, the more frequently they come face to face with metaphysical problems, which demand

definite solutions. Pursuant to this, Coffey (1938) has exposed the submissions of one who is a

sincere scientist as well as an earnest philosopher with regard to the necessity of metaphysics. As

Coffey (1938, p.27) points out:

The further science has pushed back the limits of the discernable

universe, the more insistently do we feel the demand within us for

some satisfactory explanation of the whole. The old, eternal problems

rise up before us and clamor loudly for some newer and better

solution. The solution offered by a bygone age was soothing at least,

if it was not final. In the present age, however, the problems reappear

with an acuteness that is almost painful: the deep secret of our own

human nature, the question of our origin and destiny, the

intermeddling of blind necessity and chance and pain in the strange

tangled drama of our existence, the foibles and oddities of the human

soul, and all the mystifying problems of social relations. Are not these

all so many enigmas which torment and trouble us wheresoever we

turn? And all seem to circle around the one essential question: Has

human nature a real meaning and value, or is it so utterly amiss that

truth and peace will never be its portion?

Consequently, the scientist cannot go very far without asking himself: what is quality, quantity,

causality, change and energy? What is the ultimate constitution of bodies, of protons, of electrons and

of matter? What is the essential difference between truth and error, substance and accident, power and

act? These are metaphysical questions, and scientists do actually discuss them. But they usually lack

the philosophical knowledge offered by a thorough understanding of metaphysics, and as a result they

often exhibit an ignorance of fundamental ideas and principles, which is harmful to the best interests

of science itself.

Metaphysics is a science of prime importance for every department of human knowledge.



Those who reject metaphysics are in error. For instance, the empiricists and the positivists see man as

a purely material being, forgetting that man is a multifaceted being. Man is not only material but also

spiritual. They also have a limited notion of truth. They see truth as only related to matters of fact and

experience. But there are metaphysical truths just as there are metaphysical experiences. There are

spiritual truths just as there are spiritual experiences. Kant‟s criticism of metaphysics is also faulty

because of his contradictory claim of knowing that the monumental world is unknowable, which

makes his claim false. The position of this paper is that metaphysics cannot be radically rejected,

because it is the foundation of all systematic human inquires.

The Value of Metaphysics

Henry J. Koren in his book: An Introduction to the Science of Metaphysics outlines the

importance of metaphysics. They include the following:

i. Metaphysics is a speculative science

Metaphysics is a speculative science and does not serve a utilitarian purpose. It is not studied

because it teaches us how to do certain things, but because man seeks to know “for the sake of

knowing”. As Aristotle (1932, 982b 11ff) points out:

It is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first

began to philosophize; … therefore, since they philosophized in

order to escape from ignorance, evidently they were pursuing

science in order to know and not for a utilitarian end. And this is

confirmed by the facts: for it was when almost all the necessities of

life and the things that make for comfort and recreation had been

secured, that such knowledge began to be sought. Evidently, then,

we do not seek it for the sake of any other advantage; but … we

pursue this as the only free science, for it alone exists for its own

sake (Metaphysics, Bk. 1, Chapter 2).

Although we may disagree with Aristotle on the necessities of life, it is clear that metaphysics does



not serve any utilitarian purpose.

ii. Metaphysics has absolute value

As a pure science, the value of metaphysics can hardly be overrated. For metaphysics is

concerned with being in general; hence its conclusions will apply to everything which falls under the

extension of the concept of being. Consequently, whatever conclusions metaphysics reaches will have

absolute value; they apply to the objects considered in any branch of human knowledge and not only

in philosophy. For the objects of other sciences are things which fall under the intension of the

concept of being.

iii. Metaphysics renders secure the ultimate foundations of all sciences

Without metaphysics, the ultimate foundations of all other sciences are left insecure. In other

sciences, we presuppose and take for granted such things as the principles of contradiction and of

causality, the multiplication of individuals in the same species, the possibility of change, etcetera. If

we accept all these things without examining their value, the whole structure built upon them stands

on insecure grounds and thus leaves everything open to doubt. On the other hand, if we do not accept

them, scientific knowledge of any kind will be impossible. Hence, in order to make true science

possible, these principles and presuppositions must be examined, and their validity established. This

does not, however, mean it would be impossible to study other sciences without a previous study of

metaphysics. Man quite spontaneously accepts the validity of certain metaphysical principles without

critical examination. But, it is quite obvious that such an examination must be made if we do not wish

to leave everything open to doubt. The task of evaluating these principles does not belong to any

empirical science, but to metaphysics.

iv. It is the task of Metaphysics to examine all general principles

Man is naturally inclined to philosophize, even if he has not received any training in

philosophy. Hence, it may easily happen that in the course of research in other sciences one will

tacitly assume, or explicitly formulate metaphysical principles which sound reason cannot accept. It is



the task of metaphysics to analyze and evaluate any such general principles, which are

assumed or put forward in the study of other sciences. It is to be noted that general principles are

principles which by their very nature are applicable to all things. For it is obvious that metaphysics is

neither entitled to nor equipped for the examination of relative principles and laws particular to any

empirical sciences, that is, a principle or law which applies only within the limits of an empirical

science or group of cognate sciences. For instance, metaphysics should not attempt to examine purely

physical principles, like the law of gravitation or the law of energy. Hence, this claim of metaphysics

to the exclusive right of examining all general principles does not jeopardize the hard-won autonomy

of empirical sciences.

v. The norms of life ultimately depend upon metaphysical principles

Man is guided in his life by certain practical philosophical principles, whether these principles

be embodied in an established religious system or remain purely ethical and personal. Now,

ultimately, even practical philosophic principles are based upon metaphysical principles. Therefore,

whether we are aware of it or not, the principles which govern the way we want to live and act

ultimately depend upon our metaphysical principles. Of course, we may continue to live and act

according to a principle whose ultimate basis we have never subjected to a rational analysis; for we

can accept them on authority or even as quite natural without scientific examination, just as in

experimental science we may continue our research without examining the metaphysical foundation

of these sciences. However, it should be clear that in doing so we remain exposed to the danger of

being easily led astray by false principles.

Metaphysical Foundation of Other Disciplines

It was Jacques Maritain (1969) who asserted that metaphysics is the foundation of all

sciences. This view synchronizes with that held by Henry Koren (1955) who opines that without

metaphysics, the ultimate foundations of all other sciences are left insecure. This is true for many

reasons. First and foremost, metaphysics is the study of being as the totality of reality, and every

other science is concerned with the study of one aspect of being or the other. The study of any aspect

of being obviously presupposes metaphysics which is the study of being qua being. Indeed,

metaphysics underlies every academic discipline and is presupposed by every discipline.

Secondly, scientific knowledge by its very nature is universal. The knowledge of any



particular object, which cannot be generalized or universalized, is not scientific knowledge.

Induction, which is the foundation of modern science, is an important example. Here, until general

principles can be deduced from individual instances, we do not yet have induction. Thus it is

universality that makes knowledge scientific, and universality presupposes necessity. As Maritain

(1969, p.35) puts it:

The universality of the object of knowledge is the condition of its

necessity, in itself the condition of perfect knowledge or science.

Exactly, as knowledge can only be of what is by necessity, there can

only be knowledge of the universal.

Kant and Hume both agree that universality and necessity are not part of man‟s empirical experience.

Thus universality and necessity belong to the metaphysical realm, yet they are presupposed by every

academic discipline especially modern science. All these mean that metaphysics is presupposed by

every academic discipline as its foundation. Metaphysics, in other words, is the foundation of

scientific knowledge and of all academic disciplines. In the following section, an attempt will be

made to show metaphysics as the foundation of the academic disciplines that the scope of this work

can examine.

The Metaphysical Foundation of Modern Science

The fact that modern science has a metaphysical foundation is very glaring. One will grasp

this when an analysis of the developments in modern science is undertaken. About three hundred

years ago, Gottfried Leibniz, the great metaphysician, analyzed matter conceptually and reduced it

beyond the level of atom, called it “monad” and presented it as immaterial, spiritual elements,

underlying matter below the level of atom. In other words, quite ahead of his time and the physics of

his age, he divided atom conceptually and broke it up into monads, that is, into immaterial elements,

meaning that atom itself (which was believed to be indivisible, and said to be the smallest unit of

matter) was discovered by him to be composed of immaterial elements – monads. Thus matter is

ultimately composed of immaterial elements below the level of atom. The finding of this

metaphysician is corroborated today by modern physics. The discovery of subatomic particles-

protons, neutrons and electrons, which are immaterial elements close to (if not exactly the same as)



Leibniz‟s monads points to the metaphysical foundation of modern science. All these lend

support to our thesis that metaphysics is the foundation of science. The metaphysical foundation of

modern science becomes evident when we reflect on the problem of induction. Modern science is

based on induction which is itself based on a metaphysical foundation as is evident from the principle

of causality. This is what emerges clearly from the analysis of the problem of induction by David

Hume and Karl Popper. Hume and Popper did not find any empirical foundation of induction

precisely because its foundation is metaphysical, not empirical. For instance, there is no empirical

proof that the future will be exactly like the past; that future occurrences will be like those of the past.

These are apriori, metaphysical features that constitute the foundation of science.

The Metaphysical Foundation of Religion

Religion has to do with divine reality, the meaning of life, good and evil, immortality, man‟s

relationship with the divine, etcetra. It usually involves beliefs about such things and beliefs that are

worked out and adhered to in a fairly systematic and fixed manner. Kant tells us that man has a

natural tendency towards metaphysics. Hence for Kant, according to Iroegbu (1995, p.192) “it is in

the nature of the human person to tend towards the transcendental ideas of Pure Reason.” In other

words, it is part of human nature to seek to know or to understand realities beyond what we perceive

with our senses. Metaphysics is thus based on the premise that there is more to reality than is

perceived with the senses. Man is by nature a religious being. Man has within him as part of his

being, a natural tendency towards religious worship. Thus religion is based on the metaphysical

principle that there is more to reality than is perceptible with the senses and on the metaphysical

tendency towards realities that are beyond sense perception, a tendency which is part of human

nature.

It is because of this that Copleston (1974) speaks about the “religious character of

metaphysics.” He explains that it is often said that metaphysics presupposes religion, but it is in fact

the other way round; it is religion that presupposes metaphysics. It is metaphysics that is the

foundation of religion and not the other way round. It is because religion presupposes metaphysics

and is based on a metaphysical foundation that theologians generally employ metaphysical concepts

and terms in their exposition of religious doctrines. The study of metaphysics makes the study of

religious doctrines easier. The simple, pious, religious man who simply practices his religious beliefs



is not aware of the metaphysical implications of his religious beliefs. But the theologian who comes

along and makes a systematic study of these beliefs, making use of metaphysical terms and concepts,

uncovers their metaphysical foundation. In other words, religious beliefs and practices are “first

order” activities while theology is a “second order” activity. Just as there are various metaphysical

systems so there are various religions because every religion is based on a certain metaphysical

worldview. To find metaphysical language meaningful is to find religion meaningful and vice versa.

Thus Copleston (1974, p.227) says “the problem of God is a metaphysical problem,” meaning that

metaphysics is the foundation of religion.

The Metaphysical Foundation of History

History is an indispensable and important aspect of man‟s existence and of reality as a whole.

History is the memory of the past experience as it has been preserved in written form. In the usual

sense, history is the product of the historians‟ work in reconstructing the flow of events from the

original written phrases or sources into a narrative account. History is not a mere narrative of

sequence of events. The historian does not simply inform us that certain events have taken place.

Rather he goes further to tell us the causes of such events, and their significance. In doing this, the

historian is also interpreting events and any interpretation is always from a certain viewpoint. Hence a

search for absolute objectivity in history would be a futile exercise, since there is no such thing.

The human mind is not content with simply knowing that certain things happened; it wants to

know the cause and the significance of such occurrences. That there is no event without a cause is a

principle which is central not only to physics, but also to history. The principle of causality is a

metaphysical principle, an apriori principle which is presupposed by history. Thus the historian

employs a metaphysical concept, a metaphysical principle, in his investigation. Metaphysics,

therefore, underlies history and is at the heart of history through the use, by history, of the principle of

causality.

Another way in which metaphysics is presupposed by history is that history presupposes the

rationality of nature. History in other words, presupposes that nature is rational otherwise the very

idea of explaining events would be meaningless, except on the presupposition of the rationality of

nature. But the concept of rationality of nature is metaphysical. Empirical experience cannot establish

it. Aristotle in his metaphysics stressed the rationality and teleology of nature, according to which



nature does nothing in vain. Hegel expressed this more when he held that the real is rational and the

rational real. It is on the basis of this metaphysical assumption that nature is rational and that the

historian is not content with just knowing a certain event took place that the historian explains events.

This gives rise to meta-history or speculative philosophy of history. This is what has led to various

theories and philosophies of history. This is the realm of philosophy of history.

The Implications of the Absence of Metaphysics

The best way to really capture the implications of the absence of metaphysics is by taking a

critical look at the relevance of metaphysics. This is because its absence will imply the absence of its

importance. The implications that will be exposed here are premised on the fact that metaphysics as a

discipline, is of enormous necessity. Consequently, it should not be radically rejected or jettisoned.

Thus the implications of the absence of metaphysics would, in this paper, be viewed from the

scientific and religious contexts.

i. Scientific Implications

The sciences seek the knowledge of things in their proximate causes. Metaphysics, on the

other hand, is the science of things in their ultimate causes, reasons, and principles, acquired by the

aid of human reason alone. It endeavors to obtain more definite, extensive scientific knowledge of

those realities which are the foundation of the empirical sciences and which they take for granted

without previous investigation or proof. This is the realm of metaphysics. Metaphysics is thus the

basis of the sciences. Consequently, with the absence of metaphysics, the fundamental ideas of

science cannot be resolved into their ultimate elements, nor can their validity be established.

At the very root of all scientific knowledge are the ideas of cause, effect, quality, truth,

relation, and similar ones. Science can only presuppose the validity of these ideas, consequently

robbing them of their objective value, which robs science of the ground upon which it stands.

Accepting these ideas without examination is tantamount to leaving the ultimate foundation of

scientific knowledge open to question and doubt. Without metaphysics the foundation of scientific

knowledge remains insecure (Maritain, 1969).

ii. Religious Implications

The major implication of the purported radical rejection of metaphysics is the spread of



positivism and empiricism. The negative impact this spread has on human society, morality and

religion cannot be overemphasized. The peace and progress of society, morality of human conduct,

and religion are all based on metaphysics, that is, on the existence of an absolute, omnipotent and

omniscient being to whom we will all give account of our actions and inactions. Any rejection of

metaphysics will lead to the rejection of the idea of the divine by human consciousness which in turn

affects the actions of man and his relationship with his fellow man. It leads to the rejection of any

essence in man which defines man as man, thereby resulting to man being seen as having no

ontological dignity that ought to be respected. This leads to man being viewed as a mere object in

reality and hence treated as a means to an end and not as an end in itself.

In the society, the attempted rejection of metaphysics and concomitant spread of positivism,

materialism and empiricism have brought about much embezzlement of public funds, ritual murders,

increased criminality, and lack of morality, the dearth of respect for elders and above all the wanton

consumerism and debasement of man witnessed in the world today. Man‟s inhumanity to fellow man

has become the order of the day. The rejection of metaphysics leads to the rejection of the existence

of God who is the foundation of religion. Religion is anchored on the existence of a being that created

and sustains the world and is the object of religious worship. Rejecting metaphysics implies the

rejection of the existence of God. With this, the foundation of religion collapses. If there is no God

for religion to worship, then religion will not be in existence. This is because the idea of God is the

central idea in religion. This absence of God and religion would, in turn, affect morality since religion

is the custodian of man‟s moral consciousness. So metaphysics is the basis for religious values.

Metaphysics is equally the basis of legal values. The attempted rejection of metaphysics, has

in law, resulted to legal positivism which rejects the natural law and by implication the natural rights

of man. The natural law is a law of universal reason, which should form the basis of positive law. It

gives positive law its obligatory nature and its rejection is an unpardonable error.

Evaluation and Conclusion

Effort has been made to expose not just the relevance or significance of metaphysics but to

prove that metaphysics can never be done without in all spheres of human endeavor. The

metaphysical foundation of other disciplines has been examined and the implications of the absence



of metaphysics have been laid bare. The prejudices against metaphysics become unfounded when we

quickly grasp the relevance and value of metaphysics to all systematic human inquiries. Instead of

being hostile to metaphysics, the scientists should welcome metaphysical investigations. This will

help to complement their findings and efforts. The fact remains that in man lies a metaphysical need

that cannot be done without. The concepts of the purpose of human existence, causality, origin of

man and his destiny are metaphysical concepts and are great concerns of man. Metaphysics should be

upheld or we reduce man to an object that can be spoken of only in terms of materiality. Upholding

metaphysics will help us understand that reality consists of much more than what we perceive with

the sense

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