I.

THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING REALIST

Rene van Hezewijk

SUMMARY: Interdisciplinary research presupposes taking theories seriously, that is realistically.

It first presupposes taking theories from other domains or levels (or disciplines) seriously, in the

sense that one must accept preliminarily that they explain real phenomena at their own level, but

then suggests that there may be real interrelations or interactions between processes of

"neighboring" levels. In this chapter it is claimed that only a realist can participate seriously in

interdisciplinary research . It goes without saying that this not only regards sociologists, biologists,

linguists, anthropologists or economists, but also psychologists.

Interdisciplinary Research

In psychology, interdisciplinary research aims at integrated explanations of social, mental, biological and/or behavioral phenomena, that relate these phenomena to each other, or transcend them. Instead of having just one integrative discipline, we in fact have, partly for historical and political reasons, several disciplines with their own domains or levels of explanation that seem to correspond more or less with ontological distinctions that are more plausible than other distinctions. There might be social or mental causes for the development of the present disciplines, but there may be ontological, methodological, or theoretical reasons for the present distinctions as well. Disciplinary distinctions at least help one to make a provisional selection between urgent and less urgent (counter-) arguments. We feel justified in not thinking of elementary particles as a first source of hypotheses for, or criticism of, psychological explanations. But ontological levels are not fixated forever. Any distinction of ontological levels is preliminary. This does not imply, however, support for relativism: It is not claimed that any distinction is as good as any other. The present distinction in ontological levels-­{ social\mental\biological\chemical\physical }--could be substituted for a more fruitful one, for example, {behavioral\biochemical\physical} or else {non-linear dynamics\linear dynamics\static}. Domains that are the focus of the present disciplines would change (and universities would therefore develop new "faculties" to take the place of the "old ones"). But this substitution would only make sense if there were good reasons: Fruitfulness is the only candidate that comes to mind. What, then, are good reasons? When can we say ontological distinctions are fruitful?

Theories Presuppose and Are Therefore Prior to Ontological Levels

One of the conclusions of Watkins (1984) is that we cannot design and accept, or reject, an abstract ontology before we practice science in detail. Neither do we have to demonstrate the truths of any ontology independent and prior to the theories that presuppose it. It is rather the other way around. Watkins uses an idea of Ramsey's (1931), which was originally meant to remove all non-empirical elements from a theory,

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to show that every theory will have metaphysical elements. This "method of quasi­ramseyfication"1 is used to show that if the metaphysical component is removed, the "de-metaphysicalized" version is not identical with the original theory. Theories not only imply (a) consequences that are empirically testable, but they also imply (b) metaphysical and (c) quasi-empirical consequences. The latter claim that there are certain entities with certain properties, that are more or less autonomous. Examples of some quasi-empirical consequences are: that "there exist" stimuli, responses, reinforcements, and so forth.

Metaphysical consequences are those consequences of a theory that, taken separately, can be regarded as postulates, and that are not testable in a direct way. Examples are such presuppositions as: "for every response of any organism there is some stimulus or reinforcement that produces the responses"; "for every class of behavior there is a set of mental powers that give the organism the competence to produce this behavior"; or, "for every event there is a cause." Metaphysical statements, though not verifiable or falsifiable, are nevertheless fruitful. Implied by and embedded in a theory, they embody heuristics that can be used in other theories. We cannot do without them. They fulfill a role in the realist interpretation; they "make the sense" and the coherence of the theory.

Skinner's behaviorism, driven by supposedly the most anti-theoretical and anti­metaphysical ideology ever (Chow, 1987), implies metaphysical and quasi-empirical statements, thereby constituting an ontological level on and of its own. Stimuli are not just physical entities: A stimulus can be implemented by quite different physical events, and a physical event can be the implementation of quite different stimuli. Reinforcements are only reinforcements for an organism if they satisfy some of the organism's concerns.

Thus, it is first assumed that every theory implies a certain metaphysical component or metaphysical core, and that they are all necessary presuppositions; in addition, this metaphysical component is not empirically falsifiable as such, yet rationally criticizable. Watkins's philosophy claims (a) to be non-foundational (scientific theories cannot be legitimized or do not become true because they are well-founded, because they are based on other, more certain statements or on observations, etc .); and claims that (b) this does not imply relativism or skepticism. Not being able to find, let alone give, absolute foundations does not inhibit one from criticizing propositions (theories, assumptions) "afterwards." Some have withstood criticism better than others, therefore not all assertions are equally true (relativism) or false (skepticism). In addition, every criticizing statement can itself be criticized afterwards, and so on. Watkins next observes that whereas metaphysical statements in isolation are unfalsifiable, and therefore unacceptable, there are those metaphysical statements that due to their embeddedness in (falsifiable) theories can be criticized indirectly . They can in fact be falsified indirectly by falsifying the theory of which they are a component. Or they can be criticized by showing they are inconsistent with other statements, that they are incoherent with that theory, that they do not "converge" with knowledge from other disciplines, or that they lead--if held true--to conflict with other accepted theories. Moreover, suppose one holds a certain metaphysical presupposition in one's theory; then having (by implication) accepted it

1Quasi-ramseyfication involves complex logical operations (Watkins, 1984; Vries & Hezewijk, 1978).

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leads to the possibility of criticizing it because its consequences are not accepted at some other time. For once a theory is provisionally accepted and acceptable (i.e., no substantial criticism has been found; it is not yet falsified), it may have unforeseen consequences. Once the embeddedness of metaphysical ideas in serious theories is accepted, it is possible to discuss implications of metaphysical ideas and implicitly or explicitly put those ideas to a non-empirical test.

It is next assumed that the metaphysical component is internal to scientific theories and may be inferentially influential in other theories. The metaphysical component cannot be left out, without undermining the stability and content of the theory itself. The metaphysical component can be criticized and revised when, for example, it is internally inconsistent or incoherent, or incompatible with corroborated theories within the same domain, or if nonconvergent with other well-corroborated theories in other domains. This position further implies that metaphysical components are not relativistic presuppositions that can be accepted, or left in the lurch, at will. They do not control scientists' thoughts, nor are they personal commitments or cultural idols; they are, instead, debatable assertions implied by, and part of, our theories (under test).

Finally, the metaphysical component, though unfalsifiable, does speak about reality. It does claim that certain entities exist, what properties they may have and of what nature the relations between them have to be, provided the theory in which they are embedded has not been falsified . They do not, however, forbid the existence of other entities, relations, or properties. This is why, and where, interdisciplinarity and its realistic assumption enter.

The Tenets of Realism

Indirect realism or representational realism claims that: (1) there is an external reality that is independent of our beliefs, theories, conceptions or categorizations of it; (2) external reality consists of entities, events, relations between entities, and so forth; (3) we have only indirect access to reality, by way of theories explaining certain classes of phenomena; and, (4) theories assert, among other things, the objective existence of the theoretical entities figuring in the theories (Watkins, 1984; Popper, 1983; Musgrave, 1985, 1988; Greenwood, 1992).

Realism doesn't claim the truth of a certain theory . Whether a certain theory is true, remains to be discovered. Neither does realism claim that if a certain theory is false, the theoretical entities referred to in it do not exist at all. For a theory can be about the properties of things, and although the properties attributed to it by theory T1 may be false, the entities may exist relatively independently of the theories we have. We do not even have to be sure about all properties : New properties can be discovered at any time.

Realism need not entail the kind of naturalism advocated by Bhaskar. His is a methodological position based on the "thesis that there is (or can be) an essential unity of method between the natural and the social sciences" (Bhaskar, 1989, p . 2) . Bhaskar thinks rightly that there can be more than what our present knowledge asserts a) that there is, and b) the properties things have. But I reject his assumption that there are "closures" (i.e., experimental situations) to which causality is restricted (cf. Bhaskar, 1989, p . 47).

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Though social or psychological knowledge is produced by human beings, its contents are not necessarily restricted to what individuals think they assert; the fact that social scientific theories are produced in a particular society does not imply that the theor(y/ies) produced thereby need be restricted to that particular society, or might be useless in explaining events in other societies.

Realism need not entail the kind of materialism or physicalism advocated by Churchland (1986), for example. Beliefs, desires, societies, stimuli, mental mechanisms may have an independent existence of their own, in the light of theories that introduce them as theoretical entities in order to explain classes of events ( e.g., human actions, animal behavior, conscious experience, etc.) . If this seems to imply an interactionistic dualism or epiphenomenalism, note that such general philosophies of mind cannot be decided upon a priori. Such general positions are the implications of theories about particular bodily and mental events, behavior, and so forth. The more general such positions are, the more indirect support there must be. Psychology has perhaps not reached the level of theoretical and empirical sophistication that makes it possible to choose between such general philosophies of mind or matter.

Representational or indirect realism is not to be identified with direct realism. Though direct realists like James J. Gibson have offered important insights due to their direct realist approach, Marr (1982) has shown there cannot be a direct pick-up of information without some form of computation. This implies indirect realism as far as perception is concerned. It also has consequences for domains other than perception. Harre (1983), for instance, seems to believe that personal experience gives direct access to reality. He therefore only accepts material things, persons, and societies (or "joint actions") as real. Mental events are "just" the products of joint actions. This kind of reductionism leads to relativism.

Neither is realism the same as empiricism, although both respect the empirical. A realist goes beyond the given observable evidence and claims that theoretical entities will figure in predictions about future events as well, or in domains that go beyond the ones in which they were originally meant to play a role (e.g ., Musgrave, 1985 vs. Van Fraassen, 1985, 1980). Moreover, a realist can refer to entities or mechanisms that have not yet been observed or cannot be observed directly in principle; an empiricist cannot. A theory should be empirically adequate (empiricism), but it should also predict novel facts, and it should be possible to embed a theory in a more abstract or general theory (correspondence). Realism allows "metaphysical" considerations when it comes to the choice between theories . If two theories were empirically equivalent in respect to existing evidence, the preferable theory is that which: (1) has excess empirical content (predicts more novel facts--even if not yet observable facts); and/or (2) can be embedded in more general theories; and/or (3) has excess metaphysical content.

It is this metaphysical content that is crucial : The importance of being realist in interdisciplinary matters has to do with (1) metaphysical content, (2) acceptance of theoretical entities as real; and, (3) the correspondence relation between theories (embedding).

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The Importance of Being Realist in Interdisciplinary Research

Why then is it important to be a realist in interdisciplinary research? The first reason has to do with metaphysical content. The metaphysical content of a theory is the set of those of its consequences which: (1) remain after the subtraction of all of its empirical (i.e., observationally testable) and quasi-empirical consequences (existential statements); (2) imply that within the domain of the theory certain relations between entities can be found; (3) can be formulated as postulates of the logical form {for every entity xi there is a certain property p that relates it to other members of the class of xs}; and, ( 4) are-­taken separately--postulates of other theories, as well. Only if one interprets these postulates realistically can one decide whether the postulated properties figure in other theories. As a consequence, only if one interprets the postulates realistically can they be involved in interdisciplinary enterprises as well--for example, as "connecting principles" between ontological levels2 (e.g., Elredge & Grene, 1992), as relations between entities at one level as well as at another level (e.g., Panhuysen & Tuiten, 1993; this volume), or as auxiliaries to theories at another level (e.g., Boudon, 1986). If not interpreted realistically, there will be no restrictions on what can be said about one level in relation to another level; one does not actually assert anything at all, if it is not asserted with a realistic intention.

A second reason for being realistic in interdisciplinary research, is that one might be wrong to claim the existence of certain entities at a certain level. This might be the consequence of successful reductions to another level. No doubt within a century, some mental properties will be successfully reduced . But one has to discover whether, and for which properties, this is the case. One has to be a realist about entities in order to discover that they do not "exist" after all. It was the realists who discovered that "ether" and phlogiston did not exist. Convergence of theories from different disciplines can only be reached if all theories (and their implied entities) are taken to refer to existing entities and relations (unless it later becomes apparent they do not exist).

A third reason is related to this. Supposing important progress would be made in science if it can be shown that one theory T 1 corresponds with a better theory T2; then it might be found that the correspondence crosses levels, as it were. 3 A certain sociological theory T 1 might be found to be superseded by a psychological theory T2--that is to say, the psychological theory explains all the facts the sociological theory explains plus some additional "new" facts.

2"Levels" is used here as a partially interpreted term. Realism does not specify the exact "content" of levels, only that "as far as is know at this time" there must be disparate ontological levels.

3There is "correspondence" between theories T2 and T, if T2 explains all the phenomena that T1

explains, if T2 explains at least one more class of phenomena than T,, and if T1 can be considered an "extreme" realization (marginal case) of T2• The classical example is Newton's theory of mass­phenomena, as the T1 in correspondence with Einstein's theory of relativity (Ti). In psychology, neo­classical conditioning (T2) (e.g. Grossberg, Schmajuk, & Levine, 1992) is in correspondence with Pavlov's classical conditioning theory (T1).

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Conclusion

I have tried to show that only a realist can be taken seriously in any kind of interdisciplinary enterprise. An empiricist such as Van Fraassen (1980, 1985)--empirical adequacy is enough--can only accept the observations that have been found within the domain of the theory at issue. There could never be a theory of another domain. A naturalist such as Bhaskar (1989) can only accept the entities and relations found under restricted conditions (e.g., of a laboratory), and will not be able to accept theories implying entities that cannot be reproduced without artificial circumstances. Reductionism--a priori reduction to the material or the social--is absurd in inter­disciplinary research: Societies are not material in the physical sense, and physiological properties go beyond what could be explained as social constructions. Nor is direct realism an advantage; Harre's (1983) direct realism is a mere a priori denial of the mental as an independent realm. Nor is social constructivism a candidate: Could it claim to be interdisciplinary once it denies the existence of any domain other than the social? Therefore, if it is important to be earnest about psychology, it is important to be realist.

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