the grand strategy of charles v (1500-1558): castile, war, and dynastic priority in the...

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1 The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, trans. Siân Reynolds(Los Angeles, 1995, 1949), 842-44.

2 For the thesis of confessionalization, see Wolfgang Reinhard and Heinz Schilling,eds., Die Katholische Konfessionalisierung, Schriften des Vereins für Reformationsgeschte 198(Heidelberg, 1995); Schilling, Religion, Political Culture and the Emergence of Early ModernSociety, SMRT 50 (Leiden, 1992). For debate on “states” and early modern structures,see Mark Greengrass ed., Conquest and Coalescence: The Shaping of the State in Early ModernEurope (New York, 1991); Willem Pieter Blockmans and Jean-Philippe Genêt, eds., Visionssur le développement des états européens: théories et historiographies de l’état moderne: actes du colloque(Rome, 1993); Kenneth H.F. Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe: A Study of an

THE GRAND STRATEGY OF CHARLES V (1500-1558):CASTILE, WAR, AND DYNASTIC PRIORITY

IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

AURELIO ESPINOSAArizona State University

“Mediterranean Christendom abandoned one war to fight another, as its religious fervour carriedit in a new direction”

Abstract

This paper analyzes two imperial policies, the dynastic strategy of Charles V and thenationalist agenda of the Castilian clerical elite. The Protestant Reformation forcedCharles to assess his priorities according to his conviction of religious unity and hisdynastic claim of universal monarchy. Charles’ ambitions compromised Spain’s entre-preneurial agenda, which consisted of the defense of the Mediterranean against theOttomans. Seeking to protect the coalescing transatlantic system and established com-mercial networks of Spanish businessmen, the Spanish administration under PresidentTavera (1524-1539) failed to convince Charles to focus on the Muslim enemy and toallow the German people to decide their own religious destinies. Instead, Charles soughtto contain his universal monarchy in Europe, and his decision to restore religious unityin the empire resulted in the overextension of Spanish resources and the eventual declineof Spain.

Fernand Braudel pointed to the religious crisis that forced Philip II ofSpain to decide whether to deploy his forces against the maritimeProtestant powers of northern Europe, or against the Muslims in theMediterranean and the Maghreb.1 The state of scholarship recognizesthis ‘northern’ shift as the beginning of confessionalization and the trans-formation of medieval monarchies into absolutist nation states that com-peted to preserve and enlarge their spheres of activity.2 The precursors

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240 aurelio espinosa

Idea and Institution (New York, 1980). For Spain, see Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, Fragmentosde monarquía: Trabajos de historia política (Madrid, 1992).

3 John H. Elliot, “The Decline of Spain,” Past and Present 20 (1961): 52-75; The Revoltof the Catalans: A Study in the Decline of Spain, 1598-1640 (Cambridge, 1963). For an oppos-ing perspective, see Henry Kamen, “The Decline of Spain: A Historical Myth?” Pastand Present 81 (1978): 24-50. This historical debate goes back, at least, to the Napoleonicinvasion of Spain. See, for example, Juan Sempere y Guarinos, Considerations sur les causesde la grandeur et de la decadence de la monarchie espagnole, 2 vols. (Paris, 1826). This debatewas taken up by Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, Historia de la decadencia de España desde eladvenimiento de Felipe III al trono hasta la muerte de Carlos II (Madrid, 1910); cf., Earl J. Hamilton, “The Decline of Spain,” Economic Historical Review 8 (1937-1938): 168-179.

4 On “grand strategy” see Geoffrey Parker, The World is not enough: The imperial visionof Philip II of Spain (Waco, TX, 2001); The Grand Strategy of Philip II (New Haven, 1998).On concepts of strategic overstretch and imperial decline, see Paul M. Kennedy, ed.,Grand Strategies in war and peace (New Haven, 1991), introduction “Grand Strategy in warand peace: toward a broader definition”; The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: EconomicChange and Military Conflict from 1500-2000 (New York, 1987).

5 Juan Sánchez Montes, Franceses, protestantes, turcos: los españoles ante la política inter-nacional de Carlos V (Granada, 1995; 1951). For the argument that Charles and Spainmanifested a monarchia universalis and that Charles V was lord of the world, see AnthonyPagden, Señores de todo el mundo: ideologías del imperio en España, Inglaterra y Francia en los sig-los XVI, XVII, y XVIII, trans. M. Dolors Gallart Iglesias (Barcelona, 1997; 1995), 60-86,61; Gonzalo Arredondo y Alvarado, Castillo inexpugnable defensorio de la fe y concionatorioadmirable para vencer a todos enemigos espirituales y corporales (Paris, 1528). For comparison toCharlemagne and for the range of medieval imperial ideas that influenced Charles, inparticular the model of religious reformer and just king, see Francis A. Yates, Astraea:The Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century (London, 1993; orig. 1975), 1-28, 22-23, 26;Karl Brandi, Carlos V: vida y fortuna de una personalidad y de un imperio mundial, trans. ManuelBallesteros-Gaibrois (Mexico, 1993; 1937), 68-71. For the argument that Charles adoptedthe idea of universitas christiana from the Spanish medieval tradition, see Ramón MenéndezPidal, Idea imperial de Carlos V, Colección Austral 172 (Madrid, 1971). For Gattinara’sarticulation of Charles’s universal empire, based on Dante and the mos italicus, see John

to this shift occurred during the reign of Philip’s father, Charles V.Essentially Charles’s decision to confront the Protestants in the 1540sset him and his possessions on a course of action that would lead tostrategic overextension and, eventually, the decline of Spain.3 The declinewas caused by the need to conduct major military operations in sev-eral theaters: the Mediterranean, North Africa, Italy, the Netherlandsand the North Sea, the Atlantic, the Americas, and the German empire.An examination of Charles’s grand strategy of universal monarchy willexpose the flaws in his plan, and hence demonstrate reasons for thedecline of Spain.4

Charles’s grand strategy evolved from his decision in 1530 to defendhis universal monarchy against an array of enemies—the Ottomans inthe Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, Francis I of France, and theProtestants.5 President Tavera of the council of Castile (1524-1539) was

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the grand strategy of charles v (1500-1558) 241

M. Headley, The Emperor and his Chancellor: A Study of the Imperial Chancellery under Gattinara,Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History (Cambridge, 1983), 11-12.

6 For Charles’s imperial vision and dynastic priorities, see James D. Tracy, EmperorCharles V, Impresario of War: Campaign Strategy, International Finance, and Domestic Politics (NewYork, 2002), 20-38; H.G. Koenigsberger, The Habsburgs and Europe, 1516-1660 (Ithaca,1971), 2.

7 For analysis of Charles’s imperial obsession as detrimental, see Mia J. Rodriguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire: Charles V, Philip II, and Habsburg Authority, 1551-1559(New York, 1988).

8 For Philip’s powers of attorney, see AGS, Patronato Real, leg. 26, fol. 71, Barcelona,1 May 1543; Francisco de la Iglesia, Estudios Históricos, 1515-1555, 3 vols. (Madrid, 1918-1919), vol. 1, 42-45.

9 For Charles’s 1543-1543 grand plan of campaigns in the Rhineland and France,see Tracy, Emperor Charles V, 183-203, 195. For Charles’s grand plan to secure Philip’simperial succession, see Tracy. Emperor Charles V, 231. The two Schmalkaldic wars wereextensions of Charles’s grand plan to preserve religious unity in his empire and defeatFrench forces under Duke Francis of Guise. For details, see Tracy, Emperor Charles V,204-48.

to be the fiercest critic of Charles’s global strategy and universal monar-chy.6 In 1530 Tavera argued for retrenchment, for a defensive war inNorth Africa based upon the use of fortresses, a division between Viennaand Madrid, and a religious settlement with the Protestant princes,almost anticipating the Peace of Augsburg (1955). Tavera was criticalof the practicality (and the desirability) of an all-out war against Muslims,Protestant powers, and France; he wanted to protect the Spanish sys-tem, Spanish commerce in the Mediterranean, and the coalescing trans-atlantic economy. Tavera and other Spanish advisors warned Charlesof overextension and admonished him to prioritize the Mediterranean,in particular, to counter Ottoman expansionism and to subdue the fickleBarbary republics into obedience. Castilian ministers could not haveknown how the religious crisis in the German empire would evolve intoProtestant churches and national programs, but they did predict thatfighting “heretics” would be disastrous for Spain.7

Instead of defending the Spanish commercial system Charles optedfor re-establishing a universal empire under one faith. Charles wantedto imitate Constantine and Theodosius rather than Scipio Africanus. Afterthe Algerian humiliation of 1541, Charles left the Mediterranean forgood, and handed the responsibilities of ruling Spain (and dealing withMuslim pirates and the Ottomans) to Philip.8 Beginning in 1543 andending with the Second Schmalkaldic War (1551-1553), Charles thenpursued his grand plan to resolve religious dissension, “either by peace-ful means, should the Protestants agree to submit disputed issues to theadjudication of a council, or if not, as was more likely, by force of arms.”9

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10 For orientation and overview of scholarship on Spanish proto-capitalism, see BartoloméYun, Marte contra Minerva: el precio del imperio español, c. 1450-1600 (Barcelona, 2004). ForCharles’s support of transatlantic business, see AGS, Estado, leg. 20, fol. 73, Cristobalde Haro to Charles, Madrid, 25 Feb. 1530 (de Haro financed the Magellan expedition).For the contracts between Charles and two German slave merchants (Enrique Eynquerand Jerónimo Sailer), see AGS, Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, leg. 1410, s.f. TheEynquer and Sailer contract was for twenty-eight years (1520-1548), and the contractstipulated the transfer of 4000 Black slaves to the Americas. For orientation in the slavetrade, see Paul E. Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa (NewYork, 2000); John Kelly Thornton, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World,1400-1800 (New York, 1998); Robin Law, The Slave Coast of West Africa, 1550-1750: TheImpact of the Atlantic Slave Trade on an African Society (New York, 1991); William D. Phillips,Slavery from Roman Times to the early transatlantic trade (Minneapolis, 1985).

11 For commercial network of exports, see Henri Lapeyre, El comercio exterior de Castillaa través de las aduanas de Felipe II, Estudios y Documentos 41 (Valladolid, 1981); PierreVilar, La Catalogne dans l’Espagne moderne: recherches sur les fondamentes économiques des structuresnationales, 3 vols. (Paris, 1982; 1962). For the growth of banking and credit due to thedevelopement of Spanish trade and industry, see Ricardo Rodríguez González, Mercaderescastellanos del siglo del oro (Valladolid, 1995); Felipe Ruiz Martín, Pequeño capitalismo, grancapitalismo: Simón Ruiz y sus negocios en Florencia (Barcelona, 1990); José Ignacio GómezZorraquino, La burguesía mercantil en el Aragón de los siglos XVI y XVII, 1516-1652, ColecciónEstudios y Monografías 4 (Zaragoza, 1987).

12 Raymond Fagel, De Hispano-Vlaamse Wereld: de contacten tussen Spanjaarden en Nederlanders,1496-1555 (Brussels, 1996).

By the time Charles abdicated in 1556, he realized that he could notdominate Germany. He had fought to weaken the enemy and to acquirea reputation that served to intimidate the opposition and preventaggression, but he never achieved any lasting victory. Upon Charles’sdeath in 1558 Philip inherited his father’s enemies and wars.

The Late Medieval Tradition

By the time Charles first arrived in Spain in 1517, Iberian entrepre-neurs had already initiated the processes of colonialism and global impe-rialism. Spaniards, their Genoese partners, and a range of bankers hadestablished links between Sicily, Andalusia, and Flanders, transportingwheat, silks, wool, and sugar to Antwerp, while German associates beganto participate in an expanding slave market that linked West Africa, theMediterranean, and eventually the Americas.10 Spaniards connected theNorth Sea and the Mediterranean by means of exports of wool, Ibizasalt, olive oil, tuna fish, Basque iron, Canary sugar, citrus, fortified wines,and vinegars.11 Importing Flemish linens and artwork, Spanish busi-nessmen established banking firms and partnerships to extend trade toEngland, France, and the Netherlands.12 Aragonese merchants were partof a large international hub of commerce, as they merged the Northern

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13 For overviews, see J. De Vries and A. Van der Woude, The First Modern Economy:Success, Failure and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815 (Cambridge, 1997); CarlaRahn Phillips, “The Growth and Composition of Trade in the Iberian Empires, 1450-1750,” The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750, ed. James D. Tracy (Cambridge, 1990), 34-101; E. Otte, “Il ruolo dei genovesinella Spagna del XV e XVI secolo,” La Repubblica internazionale del denaro tra XVe XVIIsecolo, eds. Aldo de Maddalena and Hermann Kellenbenz, Annali dell’Istituto storicoitalo-germanico Quaderno 20 (Bologna, 1986); Herman Kellenbenz, The Rise of the EuropeanEconomy: An Economic History of Continental Europe from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century,revised Gerhard Benecke (New York, 1976); H. Vander Wee, The Growth of the AntwerpMarket and the European Economy, Fourteenth-Sixteenth Centuries, 3 vols. (The Hague, 1963);Fernand Braudel, “Les Emprunts de Charles-Quint sur la place d’Anvers,” Charles-Quintet son temps (Paris, 1959).

14 Antonio Calabria, The Cost of Empire: The Finances of the Kingdom of Naples in the Timeof Spanish Rule (Cambridge, 1991); Tommaso Pedìo, Napoli e Spagna nella prima metà delCinquecento (Bari, 1971).

15 Carlos José Hernándo Sánchez, Castilla y Nápoles en el siglo XVI: el virrey Pedro deToledo, linaje, estado y cultura, 1532-1553 (León, 1994), 347.

economy with the Mediterranean, exporting Castilian wool, sugar, silkand raisins from Granada, Valencian rice and Castilian saffron. Spaniards,Hispanicized Genoese, and the Portuguese had contacts with Muslimmerchants in North Africa, Egypt, and Asia Minor. By the sixteenthcentury Portuguese and Castilian explorers had forged new avenues oftrade in India, Indonesia, China, and the Americas. Seville, Lisbon, andAntwerp became central banking centers, which facilitated state-building,global commerce, and the military revolution of the early modernperiod.13 Hence, Spanish resources flowed in three directions: the currentof Mediterranean commerce, the transatlantic enterprise, and the NorthSea.

Fernando of Aragon (r. 1474-1516) saw the Maghrebian fortificationsas a vital part of his general imperial strategy, serving as a link to hispossessions in Italy, the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily. They would alsoserve to protect—and tax—seaborne commerce. Fernando appreciatedthe complexity of the Mediterranean Aragonese empire that he hadinherited. Secure passage across the western half of the sea was a crucialfeature of his government. In particular, Fernando was dependent uponNeapolitan revenues, the focatico and donativo, which not only financedcampaigns against the Turks but also funded the defense of the Iberianpossessions.14 The kingdoms of Naples and Sicily continued to supporttheir kings as they contributed over eight million ducats during the reignof Charles V, and the majority of the funds continued to contribute togalley warfare, especially the most expensive element of galley opera-tions, hardtack.15

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16 The literature of Spanish and Muslim relations during the middle ages is exten-sive. For general orientation, see Mercedes García-Arenal and María J. Viguera, Relacionesde la península ibérica con el Magreb, siglos XIII-XVI: actas del coloquio, Madrid, 17-18 Diciembre,1989 (Madrid, 1988); Repertorio bibliográfico de las relaciones entre la península ibérica y el Nortede África, siglos XV-XVI: fuentes y bibliografía (Madrid, 1989). For economic relations, seeOlivia Remie Constable, Trade and Traders in Muslim Spain: the Commercial Realignment ofthe Iberian Peninsula, 900-1500 (New York, 1994). For Catalan expansionism, see CharlesEmmanuel Dufourcq, L’Espagne catalane et le Maghrib aux XIIIe et XVe siècles de la bataillede Las Navas de Tolosa (1212) à l’avènement du sultan Mrinide Abou-L-Hazzan (1331) (Paris,1966). For the conquest of Granada, see Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, “La defensade Granada a raíz de la conquista: comienzos de un problema,” Miscelánea de EstudiosÁrabes y Hebraicos 16/17 (1967-68), 7-46, 20. For Fernando’s military strategies, see JoséMaría Doussinague, La política internacional de Fernando el Católico (Madrid, 1944).

17 Jamil M. Abun-Nasir, A History of the Maghrib (London, 1971), 11-12. For overview,see Rolan Oliver and Anthony Atmore, Medieval Africa, 1250-1800 (New York, 2001).

With the conquest of Granada in 1492, Fernando resurrected MedievalCatalan naval policies, establishing a network of harbors throughoutNorth Africa.16 The harbors of the Maghreb and the Straits of Gibraltarwere critical for the security of Spanish commerce, and their importanceincreased after 1492: the western Mediterranean was now key to thewealth of the Atlantic. Fernando had to connect the western Mediterraneanby means of garrisons in North Africa. His was a limited defensive strat-egy, a pre-emptive strike against future incursion by Islamic ghazi raiders.Fernando’s aim was to ensure that his galleys and those of his alliescould safely navigate the seas from Cádiz to Naples. The benefit oferadicating Muslim corsairs would be felt on a number of levels: theelimination of the Barbary corsairs would mean security for Christiangalleys, the freeing of coasts of Christendom from the raids of theBarbary rovers, as well as the encouragement of seaborne commercelinking the disparate territories of the crown of Aragon. Once his galleyscould depend on a friendly system of harbors and watering stations,Fernando could make available to entrepreneurs the protection they had solicited from their state partners. The Maghreb was Islamic andmarked by the rulership of local Berber dynasties, whose structure ofgovernments remained tribal.17 The population of the entire northerncoast of Africa was Islamic, and so the strategy of establishing Christianstrongholds in the Maghreb was essential to the development of Spanish commerce.

Fernando recognized the economic benefits of ending the politicalindependence of the Hispano-Muslim kingdom of Granada, not leastbecause the Sultan in Granada was viewed as a potential military allyof the Sultan in Istanbul. Fernando’s intention was to establish new

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18 Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, Los señores de Andalucía: investigaciones sobre nobles yseñoríos en los siglos XIII a XV (Cádiz, 1998); Granada después de la conquista: repobladores ymudéjares (Granada: Diputación Provincial de Granada, 1993).

19 For Fernando’s control of ecclesiastical revenues, especially the crusade proceeds,see Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, Andalucía a fines de la Edad Media: estructuras, valores,sucesos (Cádiz, 1999), 302. For a description of revenues of the military order of Calatrava,see Manuel Corchado Soriano, Las jerarquías de la orden con rentas en el campo de Calatrava(Ciudad Real: Instituto de Estaudios Manchegos, Diputación Provincial de Ciudad Real,1983). Charles, too, exploited “revenues of grace”—the leasing of revenues of the militaryorders and crusade bulls. For details, see Ramón Carande, Carlos V y sus banqueros, 3vols. (Barcelona, 1987; 1949), vol. 2: la hacienda real de Castilla, 367-464. For the relationshipbetween Charles and the bankers with contracts to collect ecclesiastical incomes, seeHerman Kellenbenz, Los Fugger en España y Portugal hasta 1560, trans. Manuel Prieto Vilas(Salamanca: Junta de Castilla y León, 2000; orig. 1990). Upon his first arrival in Spain,in particular during the civil wars of 1520-1521 when all other revenues dried up, Charlesused the incomes of the military orders to pay for administrative and military expenses(AGS, Estado, leg. 7, fol. 73, Charles to Francisco Vargas, Barcelona, Feb? 1519.)

20 For the thesis that the Catholic Monarchs sought to unify their kingdoms, becauseof their religious zeal, see Pascual Boronat y Barrachina, Los Moriscos Españoles y su expul-sión (Valencia, 1901), 103, 113. For an analysis of how the Moriscos integrated them-selves and on the interaction between “natives” and immigrants, see David Coleman,Creating Christian Granada: Society and Religious Culture in an Old-World Frontier City, 1492-1600 (Ithaca, 2003).

political partnerships with the grandee class of Castile.18 Isabel of Castile(r. 1474-1504) and Fernando’s supporters in the civil wars of 1476-1479received the spoils of conquest, extensive landed estates, municipalitiesand tax paying subjects. Fernando and Isabel of Castile legitimized theircampaign by means of holy rhetoric, aware that a religious elementwould have numerous benefits, including financial support from Rome.Fernando’s strategy was complex; he could rely on the incomes fromthe military orders, of which the pope was the titular head. He couldalso rely on revenues from the crusade bulls as both the collateral forloans and as incomes for the knights who had fought for the upstartmonarchy.19 Traditionally understood (by nationalist historiography) ashaving been undertaken in order to secure religious unity in Spain, theconquest of Granada was in fact motivated by the need to secure landsfor immigrants and investors.20 Economic considerations were muchmore important than religious ones.

Isabel and Fernando advanced a policy of religious conformity aspart of their overall goal of expanding economic horizons for Christiansand the newly converted. “We must show to them [the conqueredHispano-Arabs],” they said, “that we want very much the salvation oftheir souls, which would give us much satisfaction if they convert.” Theygave Hispano-Muslims the opportunity to change their religion in return

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21 Fernando and Isabel to the royal judge of Córdoba, Granada, 27 Sept, 1501, AGS,Cámara de Castilla, Cédulas de la Cámara, libro 5, fol. 261. See also the royal decreeissued by Fernando and Isabel, Granada, 20 July 1501, and Seville, 12 February 1502,in Novísima Recopilación de las leyes de España (Madrid, 1992; orig. 1976), vol. V, 311-312(Tomo V, Libro XII, Título II, Ley III).

22 “Sepa Vuestra Sanctidat que, como los moros, enemigos de la sancta Fe Catholica . . .cada dia roban e cativan en los mares de Sardenya, Sicilia, Mallorques, Barchinona eValencia, porque no hay quien les resista” (Fernando to Pope Alexander IV, Medinadel Campo, 13 March 1494, in Antonio de la Torre, ed., Documentos sobre relaciones inter-nacionales de los Reyes Católicos, Biblioteca Reyes Católicos 9 [Barcelona, 1962], vol. 3,416, #30).

23 “. . . casum dia los mals creixen, car, sentint que no y ha galerer, creix la audia-cia als cossaris e infels, de armar e venir en nostres regnes, e damnificar, robar e encatiuarnostres subdits, lo que, no solament redunda en dan de aquells, qui son damnificats,mes encaraen total detriment e destructio vniversal de aqueixos nostres regnes, per causadel comerci esser del tot desuiat” (Fernando to jurados of Valencia, Medina del Campo,21 June 1494, in Documentos sobre relaciones internacionales de los Reyes Católicos, vol. 4, 475).

24 The Alexandrine Bull, Ineffabilis of 13 February 1495, legitimized the conquest ofAfrica. See Luis Suárez Fernández, Los Reyes Católicos: el camino hacia Europa, vol. 4 (Madrid,1990), 19-20, 299-302.

for legal residency. “We intend to achieve these goals,” they added,“but if in the end they do not want to convert on their own volition,we must tell them that they must leave because we no longer want toallow infidels to live in our kingdoms.”21 The Spanish Monarchs soughtto rule the peninsular borders by permitting Muslims to share the fruitsof their labor with the rest of Iberia, as long as the Arab-speakers ceasedto practice Islam. But Islamic piracy, conducted from the Maghreb andextending to the Southern Alpujarras of Granada, resulting in the enslave-ment of Christians, not only interrupted business, but also aggravateddomestic security. Allowed to remain Arabic, the Moriscos posed a threatto society if they also continued to adhere to the law of Allah, sincethey could and did provide intelligence and resources to their fellowbelievers.

Fernando and Isabel sought papal licenses that would allow them theeconomic resources to defend their territories and resist Muslims whosailed the western Mediterranean in search of booty and captives.22 TheTurks were also attacking Aragonese possessions, and they assembledan armada that Fernando feared would assail territories in Sicily andSardinia.23 Fernando retaliated against the increase of piracy by obtainingpapal permission to attack North African ports as a religious crusade,which would give him legal standing to draw from ecclesiastical revenues,specifically the crusade bull and revenues of the masterships from themilitary orders.24

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25 For orientation on Aragonese policies in the Maghreb, see P. Prieto y Llovera,Política aragonesa en Africa hasta la muerte de Fernando el Católico (Madrid, 1952).

26 Testamento de Isabel la Católica (Valladolid, 1944). For Isabel’s “politica africanista,”consult Tarsicio de Azcona, Isabel la Católica: Estudio crítico de su vida y su reinado (Madrid,1993; orig. 1964), 813-17, 884-86. Olesa Muñido’s chapter, “Las galeras de España,”places Aragon and Castile on one trajectory (La Organización Naval de los Estados Mediterraneosy en especial de España durante los siglos XVI y XVII (Madrid, 1968), vol. 1, 330-65, 333.

27 For general analysis of the rise and deployment of Ottoman power in the Maghreb,see Rolan Oliver and Anthony Atmore, Medieval Africa, 38-48.

28 Jacques Heers, “Le royaume de Grenade et la politique marchande de Gênes enOccident, XVe siècle,” Société et économie à Gênes, XIVe-XVe siècles (London, 1979: orig.1957), 87-121. For Genoese commercial activity during the middle ages, see GeorgesJehel, Les Gênois en Méditerranée occidentale: fin XIème-debut XIVème siècle: ébauche d’une stratégiepour un empire (Amiens, 1993).

29 For Cádiz, see AGS, Diversos de Castilla, lib. 9, doc. 3, Cadiz, 31 May 1493;Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada, “Unas cuentas en Cádiz (1485-1486),” in Los Señores deAndalucía: investigaciones sobre nobles y señorios en los siglos XIII a XV (Cádiz, 1998; orig. 1974-1975), 457-485, 462, note #17. For Seville, consult Ruth Pike, Enterprise and Adventure:the Genoese in Seville and the Opening of the New World (Ithaca, 1966).

30 Jacques Heers, “Portugais et Génois au XVe siècle: La Rivalité Atlantique-Méditerranée,” Société et économie à Gênes, 138-47.

31 Vitorino Magalhâes-Godinho, L’économie de l’empire portugais aux xve et xvie siècles (Paris,1969); R. Richard, Etudes sur l’histoire des portugais au Maroc (Coimbra, 1955); F. BejaranoRobles, Documentos para le estudio del abastecimiento y auxilio de las plazas portuguesas en Marruecosdesde el Sur de España (Tanger, 1941).

The Aragonese campaign to re-establish bases in North Africa gainedadditional support from Castile in the subsequent decade.25 In her tes-tament, Isabel urged Castilians to continue the conquest of North Africa.26

In the early sixteenth century, the conquests of North African locationswere part of an overall Spanish strategy to secure seaborne commerce,which required a concomitant higher level of naval deployment throughoutthe western Mediterranean.27 This economic concern was becomingmore and more significant in the course of the second half of the fifteenthcentury. The conquests of Málaga (1487), Almería (1489), and Granada(1492) allowed Spanish merchants to take over maritime monopoliescontrolled by Genoese and Muslim businessmen.28 As the CatholicMonarchs encouraged Hispano-Arabs to convert, they encouraged Genoeseinvestors to make deals with Andalusian businessmen centered in Cádizand later in Seville.29 Competing with Portugal, the Spanish monarchssought to command the traffic of gold and wheat, which stretched fromMelilla to Tunis.30 The crown’s major competitors were the Portuguese(who had already established fortifications along the western Africancoast and were about to establish the spice route between the clove-producing islands of Molucca and western Europe).31 But relations with

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32 Treaty of Alcaçovas-Toledo (1479), in Jesús Varela Marcos, El Tratado de Tordesillasen la Política Atlántica Castellana (Valladolid, 1997), 9. In 1529 the King of Portugal pur-chased the Moluccas and in return Charles received 350,000 ducats. For the treaties,see P. Mariño and M. Morán eds., Tratados Internacionales de España: Carlos V, Tratados conPortugal, vol. 1 (Madrid, 1978), 264-311. Between 1521 and 1528, no peace treatiesbetween Spain and the King of Tlemcen are recorded in Tratados Internacionales de España,Carlos V, Norte de Africa, ed. P. Mariño (Madrid, 1980).

33 “. . . el Rey moro de Tremecén, llamado Muley Abdila, se hizo vasallo de la Coronade España, con cargo de tributo de catorce mil doblas zeyenes cada año, pagadas enOrán, con otras muchas condiciones contenidas en los capítulos de las treguas, así ensu nombre del dicho Rey con su ciudad de Tremecén, como de todo su Reyno, lugaresmarítimos y terrenos del, Mazagrán, Mostagán, Ténez, Briscar, Sargel, Argel, Tedelez,Bugía, Alcalá de Bent Arax, Mazona, Meliana, Medía,” Diego Suárez, Historia del MaestreUltimo de Montesa y su hermano don Felipe de Borja (Madrid, 1889) 62-63. For Spanish andMuslim truces, see Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (Cambridge, 1971), 161-166. For Islam in Africa, see Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (New York,1988), 489-548.

34 After the conquest of Bugía, Fernando was inspired to pursue a “grandiose project”to conquer the Maghribian coast. Trumpeting “Africa por Don Fernando,” the publicsupported Fernando’s order to mobilize over 200 ships to transport over 30,000 men.For details, see Cesareo Fernández Duro, Armada Española desde la unión de los Reinos deCastilla y de Aragón, 9 vols. (Madrid, 1972; orig. 1895-1903), vol. 1, 77-89; JerónimoZurita, Historia del Rey Don Hernando el Católico (Zaragoza, 1996), vol. 5, 3-18 [Book 9,chapters 1-4].

Spain’s neighbors to the west and south were profoundly different.Whereas diplomacy worked on occasions with Portugal (e.g. the treatyof Tordesillas, 1494),32 Muslims in Africa had no interest in discussingChristian claims.

In the early years of the sixteenth century Fernando established gar-risons ( presidios) across the Alborán Sea in order to secure his conquestsand commercial activity. In 1505, the Muslim fortress commander ofMazalquivír turned it over to the Spanish. Count Pedro Navarro con-quered Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera in 1508, a conquest that thePortuguese contested and resolved in 1509 with the treaty of Sintra.Navarro followed with the conquest of Orán in 1509, Bujía in 1510,and then he obtained from the Algerians their capitulation in 1510,which led to the submission of nearby ports of Mostaganem, Cherchell,Dellys, and Ténès. The pinnacle of Spanish military presence in theMaghreb came with the conquests of Djerba and Trípoli in 1510 andin 1512 when the Genoese defeated Hayrüddin Barbarossa at La Goletta,the fortress protecting the harbor of Tunis. In 1511 the King of Tlemcenmade a treaty with Fernando.33 Fernando secured coastal areas by incorporating tributary domains.34 His successful strategy to extend adefensive line of garrisons came to a halt in 1512 at La Goletta, as the

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35 On the relationship between garrison supplies and galley warfare, see John F. Guilmartin, Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Seain the Sixteenth Century (Cambridge, 1974).

36 Frederic Chapin Lane, Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of the Renaissance (WestportConnecticut, 1975; orig. 1934), 138. Lane noted that “the creation of a large and per-manent war fleet was a result of the advance of the Turk. . . . But not till 1470 did theVenetians realize that the acquisition of Constantinople by the Ottoman Empire meantthe creation of a naval power of far different and more formidable character than anywhich had yet disputed the dominion of the sea.” During the conquest of Granada andNorth Africa the construction, rigging, arming, and outfitting of ships flourished. Thisis emphasized in the preparations against Muslims: “Provision del Consejo de Gobernacion,dando comision al Licenciado Chinchila para que proveyese sobre una representacionhecha por los Maestros de naos de la villa de Bilbao, pidiendo que se les permitiese llevar hasta cien quintales de salitre con que fabricar pólvora para la defensa y guarni-ción de los buques” (AGS, Registro General del Sello, April 1487, Fernando y Isabel aLicenciado Garci Lopez de Chinchilla, Tordesillas, 7 April 1487). Cf., AGS, RegistroGeneral del Sello, Aug 1487, Fernando e Isabel a Don Juan de Ribera del nuestro con-sejo e nuestro Capitan General en las Fronteras de Navarra, Málaga, 23 Aug. 1487;Colección de Cédulas, Cartas-Patentes, Vizcaya (Madrid, 1829), vol. 1, 162-63; Carta realpatente para que la Junta de Guipúzcoa trate de servir con las naves y gente que pudiereen la Armada para la Guerra de Granada, Vitoria, 13 Dec. 1483, AGS, Registro Generaldel Sello; Colección de Cédulas, Cartas-Patentes, Provincia de Guipuzcoa, vol. 3, 85-86.

37 For description, see Acción de España en Africa: Cristianos y musulmanes de Occidente,Ministerio del Ejército (Madrid, 1941), vol. 2, 109-30.

38 See, for example, de la Torre, Documentos sobre relaciones internacionales de los ReyesCatólicos, vol. 4, 475-77: “. . . audacia de los cosarios e infieles, para armarse y venir anuestros reinos, y damnificar, robar y cautivar a nuestros súbditos.” See also Diego deHaëdo, Topografía e Historia General de Argel (Madrid, 1927), vol. 1, 26-31, 213-77.

39 “. . . hasta que muriendo el dicho Rey en el mes de enero, en el año 1516, deter-minaron [Berbers and Moriscos] con esta ocasión de quitarse deste yugo y sujecciónque a los christianos tenían, y por tanto enviaron luego a llamar a [Horuj] Barbarossa . . .quisiese venir luego con sus galeotas y turcos, a librarlos de poder de christianos” (deHaëdo, Topografía e historia general de Argel, vol. 1, 26). For the careers of the Barbarossa

Spanish had obtained a sufficient land base to permit Christian galleysto take on water supplies extensively throughout the African littoral.35

Great battle fleets, required to protect commercial convoys, began tosail from Biscay to Sicily.36 The catalyst that transformed what had beena relatively low-level privateering conflict into the unprecedented navalwar of the 1530s and afterwards was the arrival of the Turks in thewestern Mediterranean.37 This shift in Ottoman maritime ventures con-tinued full stream once Fernando died, as Algerians increasingly seizedSpanish goods.38 The Maghrebian appeal to the Ottomans led to anintensification of naval engagement. One detail noted by chroniclers wasthe arrival of the Barbarossa brothers and their vessels filled with Turks,renegades, and Hispano-Muslims.39 Because North African Muslims werenow allied with the Sultan, Spanish fortifications on the Barbary Coast

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brothers, consult the useful article by Suat Soucek, “The Rise of the Barbarossas inNorth Africa,” Archivum Ottomanicum 3 (1971): 238-50.

40 Spanish naval officers believed that the key to the control of the Maghreb wasAlgiers: “porque allanado lo de Argel, no solo se allana lo de Berberia, mas se ponefreno á lo de Ytalia, y se da aviso á Syçilia, porque con siete ó ocho mil onbres quese juntaran en esta armada, se daria gran rreputación á todo” Diego de Vera and Juandel Rio to Cardinal Cisneros, Cartagena, 1 Sept. 1516, in “Apendice de documentos ala Crónica de Francisco López de Gómara,” Crónica de los Barbarossas, Memorial HistóricoEspañol 6 (Madrid, 1853), 463-66, 465. De Vera and del Rio did not know whetherthe lateen vessels were “Moorish” or Turkish, but by August 1518, de Vera includedin his correspondence references to Turks.

41 In 1514, Horuj Barbarossa had enlisted the assistance of the Sultan and in 1518Hayrüddin Barbarossa sent his deputy to Istambul with the offer that Selim (1512-1520)consider the reconquered cities as part of his Islamic empire. Afterwards, Hayrüddinbecame a Turkish pasha. For details, see Mouloud Gaid, L’Algérie sous les Turcs (Algiers,1991), 33-46. Provoked by the Portuguese, the Moroccan dynasty as well solicited theTurks. See A. Cour, L’établissment des dynasties des chérifs au Maroc et leur rivalité avec les Turcsde la régence d’Alger, 1509-1830 (Paris, 1904) and Mercedes García Arenal and MiguelÁngel de Bunes, Los Españoles y el Norte de Africa, siglos XV-XVIII (Madrid, 1992), 14.

42 Before the discovery of gold in America, Sudanese gold was exported to Málagaand Cádiz from two principal ports, Tunis and Orán. Gold was then coined by theGenoese in Southern Spain. For details, see Jacques Heers, “Portugais et Génois au XVe

siécle: la rivalité Atlantique-Méditerranée” Société et économie à Gênes, XIVe-XVe siècles, 138-47. For general overview of the trans-Saharan trade, see J.D. Fage, A History of Africa(New York, 1995; orig. 1978), 55-140; J.D. Fage, A History of West Africa (Cambridge,1969), 35-46. See also George E. Brooks, Landlords and strangers: ecology, society and trade inWestern Africa, 1000-1630 (Boulder, 1993); Claude Meillassoux ed., The Development ofIndigenous Trade and Markets: Studies Presented and Discussed at the Tenth International AfricanSeminar at Fourah Bay College, Freetown, December 1969 (London, 1971).

no longer represented the penetrating thrust of Spanish expansionism;rather they were weak outposts standing in the way of expansion fromthe east.40 With the Turkish conquest of Egypt in 1517, Algerian cor-sairs began to conquer the Barbary cities to the West.41 No longer waspiracy mere plunder and illegal trade; since their expulsion from Granada,Muslim refugees had targeted Spanish-based commerce. The Muslimcoalition attempted to gain the upper hand in commercial activity, whileexploiting Berber villages and taxing the caravans of the sub-Sahara.42

The Habsburg Transition

For a time, then, Spain maintained naval hegemony in the westernMediterranean by establishing garrisons and watering stations in theBarbary. In terms of Mediterranean warfare, Spanish galleys had theadvantage in that they could navigate longer distances, thereby limitingthe harbors where their enemies could find water and take on supplies.Fernando’s unbroken chain of successes in the western Mediterranean

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43 For Charles’s concern due to the Ottoman challenge, see Charles to Poupet de laChaux, 25 August 1522, Palencia, (Karl Friedrich Lanz, ed., Correspondenz des Kaisers KarlV, 3 vols. [Frankfurt, 1966], vol. 1, 63-64). For the significance of the Ottoman west-ern front, see Colin Imber, Keiko Kiyotaki, Rhoads Murphey eds., Frontiers of OttomanStudies: State, Province, and the West (New York, 2005); Rhoads Murphey “Süleyman I andthe Conquest of Hungary: Ottoman Manifest Destiny or a Delayed Reaction to CharlesV’s Universalist Vision,” Journal of Early Modern History 5 (2001); Rhoads Murphey, OttomanWarfare, 1500-1700 (New Brunswick, 1999).

44 For Maghrebi-Turkish links, see Westen F. Cook, The Hundred Years War for Morocco:Gunpowder and the Military Revolution in the Early Modern Muslim World (Boulder, 1994);Michael Winter, Egyptian Society under Ottoman Rule, 1517-1798 (New York, 1992). For anoverview of the Ottoman system in the early modern period, see Huri Islamoglu-Inan,The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy (New York, 1987); Halil Inalcik, The OttomanEmpire: Conquest, Organization, and Economy (London, 1978).

45 “[Barbarossa] se avia llevado dos lugares de Moriscos del Reyno de Valencia yandava por aquella costa haziendo mucho daño” (Empress to Charles, Segovia, 4 Sept.1532, AGS, Estado, leg. 24, fol. 72; based on intelligence reports from the duke of

resulted not only from his naval victories but also from the lack of anorganized Ottoman counter-thrust. Sultan Suleyman the Lawgiver (1520-1566) initiated Ottoman attacks at sea by a naval offensive in which hecaptured Rhodes (1522); there followed campaigns in which he defeatedthe Hungarians at Mohács in 1526, and laid siege to Vienna in 1529.43

By the time Charles had arrived in Spain in 1517, Ottoman strat-egy relied on the consolidation of the Maghreb.44 Charles at once orderedthe conquest of Algiers, which in the previous year had become thenew center of Muslim privateering and piracy in the western Medi-terranean. Charles fully appreciated the value of Mediterranean com-merce and sought to protect it whenever feasible. He understood thatsuccessful campaigns in North Africa would achieve three objectives:not only would the Spanish take strategic bases from the Ottoman Sultanand his Maghrebian allies, but they would also inhibit the operationalcapacity of the Ottoman armada and secure the navigation of Spanishgalleys. Therefore, military, economic and administrative concerns were unified.

During the years 1517 to 1529 Muslim corsairs liberated hundredsof fellow believers. This was achieved in two ways—by conqueringSpanish possessions in North Africa or by evacuating Moriscos in theIberian Peninsula, following amphibian attacks on coastal and inlandsettlements.45 The raids were to escalate. By the middle of the sixteenthcentury, Muslim forces endeavored to inflict damage all along the Spanishcoast. Charles faced the possibility that he might not live up to the military accomplishments achieved by Fernando; he too had a fifth

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Gandia). Not only Algiers, but Tetuan and Tunis as well were important centers forrefugees. See J.D. Latham, “The Reconstruction and Expansion of Tetuan: The Periodof Andalusian Immigration,” Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A.R. Gibb (Leiden,1965), 387-408; J.D. Latham, “Contribution à l’étude des immigrations andalouses etleur place dans l’historie de la Tunisie,” Recueil d’etudes sur les morisques andalous en Tunisie(Madrid, 1973), 21-63. For a list of evacuations of entire Morisco villages and demographicalinformation, see Antonio Dominguez Ortiz and Bernard Vicent, Historia de los Moriscos:vida y tragedia de una minoría (Madrid, 1978), 86-90. For the early period, see J.E. Lópezde Coca, “Granada y el Magreb: la emigración andalusí (1485-1516),” Actas del ColoquioRelaciones de la Península Ibérica y el Magreb (Madrid, 1988), 409-51.

46 Pascual Boronat y Barrachina, Los Moriscos españoles y su expulsión: estudio histórico-critico (Valencia, 1901), 118; López de Gómara, Crónica de los Barbarrojas, vol. 6, 360.

47 Prudencio de Sandoval, Historia del Emperador Carlos V, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles80 (Madrid, 1955), vol. 80/1, 97-8; López de Gómara, Crónica de los Barbarrojas, vol. 6,370; Lorenzo Vital, Relación del primer viaje de Carlos V a España, trans. Bernabe Herrero(Madrid, 1958), 323; Jamil M.Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib, 164.

column, the Moriscos of the Alpujarras in the kingdom of Granada,and to a lesser extent those in Valencia. These new Christians contin-ued to fight back, long after Fernando defeated them in 1500 and triedto expel practicing Muslims in 1502.

In addition to the taking of Spanish goods and Christian captives,Islamic corsairs wanted to control the canal of Sicily. Sicily was a majorproducer of wheat and superior hardtack. The turning point came in1517 when Hayrüddin defeated the Sicilian viceroy, Hugo de Moncada,off the coast of Sardinia. In the same year, Cachidiablo, one ofHayrüddin’s corsairs, sailed at the head of a powerful flotilla of seventeenlateen sails and galleys all along the coastline of the principality ofCatalonia and the kingdom of Valencia. Cachidiablo’s flotilla plunderedthe Valencian towns of Chilches, Badalona, Denia, and Parcent, andcaptured Spanish cargoes of wheat.46 During Charles’s first two yearsas king of Spain, it was clear that the decade-long Spanish initiative tocontrol the North African coastline had failed. Charles could no longerdepend on the Sicilian squadron to contain the Islamic menace in theMediterranean. He faced additional challenges as their territorial gainsgave further encouragement to the Barbarossa brothers. To the west,in the Islamic kingdom of Tlemcen, Horuj conquered Ténès as well asthe inland towns of Ujda and Debdu.47 The more harbors (and inlandtowns that supported the ports) the pirates could take, the greater theiroperational effectiveness, and the pirates were achieving these goals justwhen Charles began to assume responsibilities as the king of Spain.

During Fernando of Aragon’s reign North African fortifications werebetter funded than they were under Charles’s imperial rule. The Peñónof Algiers, the fortified island that Count Pedro Navarro began to build

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48 Rafael Gutiérrez Cruz, Los presidios españoles del Norte de África en tiempo de los ReyesCatólicos, Historia de Melilla 8 (Melilla, 1997), 279.

49 On the Medieval Aragonese coastal defenses, see Silvia Orvietani Busch, MedievalMediterranean Ports: The Catalan and Tuscan Coasts, 1100 to 1235 (Boston, 2001). For Valencia,see J.F. Pardo Molero, La Defensa del Imperio: Carlos V, Valencia y el Mediterraneo (Madrid,2001); F. Requena Amoraga, La defensa de las costas valencianas en la época de los Austrias(Elche, 1997); A. Sánchez-Gijón, Defensa de coastas en el reino de Valencia (Valencia, 1996).On piracy along the Valencia coast, see Andrés Díaz Borrás, Los orígenes de la pirateríaislámica en Valencia: la ofensiva musulmana trecentista y la reacción cristiana (Madrid, 1993).

50 On Andrea Doria’s alliance with Charles, see AGS, Estado, leg. 16, fol. 370, themarquis of los Vélez to Charles, Vélez, 15 Oct. 1528. On the Knights of Malta, seeFrancisco-Felipe Olesa Muñido, La organización naval de los estados mediterráneos y en especialde España durante los siglos XVI y XVII, 2 vols. (Madrid, 1968), vol. 2, 1082.

in 1510, was one of six strategic fortifications that included the Peñónde Vélez de la Gomera, Melilla, Mazalquivír, Orán, and Bujía. From1509-1516, Fernando funded garrisons on a yearly basis: 2,666 ducatsfor fortification of Peñón of Algiers and 1,760 ducats for the garrisonVélez de la Gomera.48 In 1516, Mallorca’s viceroy ensured that thePeñón of Algiers had 200 men, a combination of soldiers, craftsmen,and construction workers, whom the royal government paid with fundsgenerated from the sales of the cruzada, crusade indulgence. Yearly aver-ages of expenditures for Melilla were 6,257 ducats, 42,211 ducats forboth Orán and Mazalquivír together, and over 33,659 ducats for theport of Bujía: a total of 86,553 ducats drawn from ecclesiastical rev-enues. In sum, during the second decade of the sixteenth century, expen-ditures for the defense of Melilla, Mazalquivír, Orán, and Bujía amountedto almost 90,000 ducats per year.

After Charles assumed the crowns of Castile and Aragon, Spanishforces held on to only a few of the fortifications that Fernando of Aragonand his naval commanders had established.49 The decisive improvementin Charles’s Mediterranean forces was achieved only in 1528-1530, whenCharles won over the Genoese contractor Andrea Doria to his cause,and settled the Knights of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem in theirnew island home of Malta.50 These two acts decisively improved andextended Charles’s naval forces, for he now commanded an additionalseventeen high-caliber galleys. Had Charles been able to sustain until1528 the North African presidios gained by Fernando, he would havehad a very good chance of maintaining his hegemony in the westernMediterranean. But the great irony is that Fernando’s Mediterraneanpolicy was not maintained by Charles. The convergence of various con-tingencies during the first four to five years of Charles’s rule as king ofSpain meant the loss of the strategic bases in the Maghreb.

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51 Kellenbenz, Los Fugger en España y Portugal, 73-80, 80; Carlos Javier de CarlosMorales, Carlos V y el crédito de Castilla: el tesorero general Francisco de Vargas y la hacienda realentre 1516-1524 (Madrid, 2000), 42-49.

52 For discussion on the system of running the galleys through private contractors(asiento), see Carla Rahn Phillips, Six Galleons for the King of Spain: Imperial Defense in theEarly Seventeenth Century (Baltimore, 1986), 27. For galley administrations through asientoor administración, see I.A.A. Thompson, War and Government in Habsburg Spain, 1560-1620(London, 1976).

The contingencies inherent in dynastic unions were political. UnlikeFernando, Charles was a foreigner who encountered resistance fromcities of Castile, in particular the comuneros, who rejected Charles andhis Burgundian regime because they changed the tax code and failedto implement parliamentary accords. Charles’s departure from Spain in1520 (to seek the imperial title) triggered the comunero revolt and resultedin the collapse of royal revenues (Charles’s creditors were unable to col-lect Spanish taxes for the duration of the civil wars). Upon his returnin 1522, he had to take time to build trust, forge a new administrationand restore the mechanisms of tax collection. He spent the next sevenyears building alliances with Castilian oligarchies and reforming theSpanish bureaucracy, acting under severe financial strain: future rev-enues were already promised to the lenders who paid for his imperialelection.51 These financial problems had profound ramifications forCharles’s naval strategy. He could neither outfit his own galleys (bymeans of royal administration, via de administración) nor could he negotiatecontracts (asientos) with galley entrepreneurs and the great nobles ofAndalusia.52 Compounding the severe lack of finances was also the factthat the servicios, Castilian subsidies, which constituted Charles’s onlycollateral, had to be re-negotiated after two years of the cities’ non-compliance with the tax settlement of 1520.

For these reasons, in the first years of Charles’s rule the provisioningof North African garrisons suffered from severe administrative difficulties.After 1518, the situation was compounded by the frequent earthquakesthat shattered coastal fortresses throughout the kingdom of Granada,from Málaga to Mojácar. These natural disasters forced the king to sup-plement the rebuilding of fortifications in the Iberian Peninsula by pro-viding tax exemptions to coastal communities of the kingdom of Granada.These fiscal measures unfortunately proved insufficient, because whathad been rebuilt was then crushed by subsequent tremors. Charles wascaught between an earthquake and a hard place. The earthquake of1518 was followed by additional tremors in 1522, 1529, and 1531.

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53 For coverage of earthquakes, see César Olivera Serrano, Sismicidad histórica del reinode Granada, 1487-1531 (Madrid, 1995).

54 “Capítulos y condiciones que don Hugo de Moncada concede de parte de SuAlteza a Sait, hijo del Xeque Solimán, Xeque de la isla de los Gerbes,” TratadosInternacionales de España: Carlos V-Norte de África (Madrid, 1980), vol. 2, 4-5.

55 AGS, Patronato Real, leg. 11, fol. 144; “Capitulación entre el Rey de Tremecén

These disasters diverted funds that could have been used for the defenseof garrisons in North Africa.53 Faced with administrative and fiscal crisis,Charles had to prioritize his inheritance, and so the North African out-posts were relatively neglected.

The increase of Charles’s responsibilities as the emperor-elect did notdissuade him from ordering an immediate response to Islamic expan-sionism, but the losses he endured during his first decade as the rulerof Spain forced him to reconsider the utility of North African investment.A conquest of the North African harbor system was out of the question.What was crucial was to hold on to enough fortifications to providewatering stations for galleys sent out to pursue the corsairs, to trade,and to protect commerce. Charles’s shift of policy was not an intentionalundermining of old dreams. He realized that a team of well-mannedand well-disciplined galley fleets defending wheat supplies was moreimportant than pacifying Muslim North Africa.

The Spanish and the Muslims fought many battles between the years1516-1541. Warfare was not conceived on the level of grand strategy:the term empire in its modern sense was never employed by Taveraor Charles. Contemporaries saw only a constant war of attrition betweenChristian and Muslim naval forces. Spanish victories were never sufficientlydecisive enough to wipe out the corsairs. In 1520, Hugo de Moncadaand Diego de Vera with an amphibious armada containing 13,000 soldiers conquered Djerba.54 But this victory was not sustained. Thecorsairs evaded the Spanish war fleet and the Christians found very little booty to recoup their investment. Christian campaigns resulted in successful Islamic counterattacks. To the west of Algiers, Muslimalliances became stronger because Charles did not have sufficient resourcesto hold on to Fernando’s conquests. In the years 1517-1518, the marquisof Comares (the governor of Orán) routed the corsairs led by Horujwho had overtaken the Spanish ally, the king of Tlemcen. The marquisof Comares sustained the fortresses of Ténès with the annual tributeprovided by the king of Tlemcen.55 With this assistance, Comares supplied the harbors of Orán and Bujía and sacked seventeen Muslimtowns. But these gains were short-lived because fortifications continued

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y el segundo marqués de Comares,” Orán, 1 Oct. 1521, in Tratados Internacionales deEspaña: Carlos V-Norte de África, vol. 2, 7-9.

56 Pedro Mártir de Anglería to the marquises of Mondéjar and los Vélez, Barcelona,1 Dec. 1519, Opera: opus epistolarum (Graz, 1966), 593.

57 AGS, Estado, leg. 10, fol. 282, Victoria, 15 June 1522.58 On grain supply dynamics in the Western Mediterranean and the Portuguese trade

in Morocco, see Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, L’Économie de l’empire portugais aux XVe etXVIe siècles (Paris, 1969). For Portuguese commercial activity, see John Vogt, PortugueseRule on the Gold Coast, 1469-1682 (Athens, GA, 1978); Eric Axelson, Portuguese in South-EastAfrica, 1488-1600 ( Johannesburg, 1973). For adversarial relations with the maritime forcesof Muslim North African societies and the Ottoman empire, see J.H. Pryor, Geography,Technology, and War: Studies in the Maritime History of the Mediterranean, 649-1571 (Cambridge,1988); H. Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600 (London, 2000; 1973).

59 Alonso de Santa Cruz, Crónica del Emperador Carlos V, 4 vols. (Madrid, 1920), vol.2, 185-186.

60 Servicio Histórico Militar, Dos expediciones españoles contra Argel, 1541 y 1775 (Madrid,1946), 17.

61 Appellate Judge Ronquillo to the Empress, Málaga, 1529? AGS, Estado, leg. 12,fol. 66; Estado, leg. 12, fol. 67, Málaga, 9 July 1529?; Estado, leg. 12, fol. 91, relaciónde las cuentas de la emperatriz, June 1529.

62 The Empress to Charles, Madrid, 4 April 1530, AGS, Estado, leg. 19, fol. 238;the Empress to Charles, Madrid, 7 June 1530, Estado, leg 19, fol. 102; Charles toPerafán de Ribera, Zaragoza, 16 Jan. 1534, Estado, leg. 26, fol. 225.

to suffer from the lack of supplies. Bujía, for example, had no provisions.56

During the years 1522 through 1528, Spanish forces were at the mercyof the king of Tlemcen who often failed to pay tribute, which meantthat the Spanish could not depend on their Islamic allies for food.57

Charles failed to sustain his garrisons with wheat and ammunition.58

Garrisons in Africa did not have sufficient provisions in part becausetransportation was dangerous and expensive. While soliciting reinforce-ments and food, Martín de Vargas and his 150 soldiers lost the Peñónof Algiers to the forces of Hayrüddin in May 1521. The following yearSpanish defenders of Vélez de la Gomera abandoned the fort and itsweaponry.59 The Muslims, on the other hand, had plenty of suppliesand were able to withstand the naval forces led by the marquis ofMondéjar.60 The rationing of hardtack meant that Spanish defenders inthe Barbary frontier had to go hungry. Again, Charles had to choosehis strategic priorities: he decided to send wheat and ammunition onlyto Orán and Bujía.61 Between 1529 and 1534, contracts with the mar-quis of Tarifa were finalized in order to ensure that the men of Oránand Bujía were properly fed.62

Charles sought additional assistance from the Castilian parliament.In his opening speech to the Cortes in 1523, Francisco de los Cobos,Charles’s secretary, begged the deputies to provide the king with an

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63 AGS, Patronato Real, leg. 70, fol. 9, Valladolid, 14 July 1523.64 For the 1526 clerical contributions, see AGS, Estado, leg. 14, fols. 66, 69, 70, 71,

73, 108; Estado, leg. 13, fols. 322 and 338. For the 1530 administration’s successfuleffort to provide for the Austrian defense, see Estado, leg. 19, fol. 102 and Estado, leg.20, fols. 3 and 4.

65 The bishop of Almería to Charles, Almería, 18 July 1528? AGS, Estado, leg. 16,fol. 405.

66 Juan Vázquez de Molina to the Empress, Jerez de la Frontera, 10 June 1529, AGS,Estado, leg. 19, fol. 98.

increase in the servicio subsidy. The urgency of Cobos’ message camenot from the lack of wheat, but from the alliance between the French,the North Africans, and the Turks. This alliance had penetrated, Cobosclaimed, past the Straits of Gibraltar and had begun to confiscate Spanishconvoys coming from the Canary Islands and Spanish America.63 Cobos’speech suggests that by 1523 Algerians counted on French assistance. ThisFranco-Muslim alliance allowed the corsairs to secure their base inAlgiers and to increase their range of activity to the Atlantic. After 1526(and the capture of Francis by imperial forces in the battle of Pavia),Francis began to provide Barbary pirates with cannons and ordnance.

Charles continued to face more challenges due to the Franco-Ottomanalliance that split apart Habsburg defenses. The Ottoman victory atMohács in 1526 had already compromised the ability of the Habsburgsto defend two frontiers. Vienna was now seriously threatened. For theHabsburgs, Austria was more important than North Africa. The admin-istration financed the transfer of Spanish forces from Italy to Austria.In 1526, a contract between Rodrigo Ponce and Charles earmarkedproceeds from the crusade grace for the defense of Melilla, Orán,Mazalquivír, Bujía, Algiers, and Trípoli, but these funds went to Ferdinandof Austria, Charles’s brother. Charles also began to divert Spanish cler-ical contributions to Austria. Charles, or rather the Spanish church,heavily subsidized the defense of Austria.64

The loss of African ports allowed the corsairs to attack Spain withunprecedented frequency. The stretch of shoreline from Barcelona toCádiz was immense. Although the city of Cádiz benefited from thecount of Benavente’s ships, Barbarossa’s fleet of nine galiots and twogalleys took advantage of the undefended harbors of Málaga and Almería.Corsairs knew exactly when to attack. They landed in Almería, sackedit and forced the inhabitants to seek refuge in the cathedral.65 A yearlater, the reverse occurred: the Gulf of Cádiz was left defenseless, invit-ing the arrival of an armada of Algerian and Turkish vessels.66 Muslim

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67 On Doria’s change of obedience, see, AGS, Estado, leg. 16, fol. 370, the marquisof los Vélez to Charles, Vélez, 15 Oct. 1528; Estado, leg. 12, fol. 119, del Corro to theEmpress, Seville, 20 Aug. 1528?; Francisco López de Gómara, Guerras de mar del EmperadorCarlos V, ed. Miguel Angel de Bunes Ibarra and Nora Edith Jiménez (Madrid, 2000),118-19. On Doria, see Vicente Cadenas y Vivent, El Protectorado de Carlos V en Génova:La condotta de Andrea Doria (Madrid, 1977); Arturo Pacini, La Genova dell’Andrea Doria nell’imperio di Carlo V (Florence, 1999).

68 On estimates of Spanish naval forces, see Francisco-Felipe Olesa Muñido, La orga-nización naval, vol. 1, 363; Carla Rahn Phillips, “Navies and the Mediterranean in theEarly Modern Period,” in Naval Policy and Strategy in the Mediterranean: Past, Present, andFuture, ed. John B. Hattendorf (London, 2000), 14; and Jan Glete, Navies and Nation:Warships, Navies, and State-Building in Europe and America, 1500-1860, 2 vols. (Stockholm,1993), vol. 2, Apendices 1-4. On the armada of Granada between the years 1521-1534,see Esteban Mira Caballos, La armada guardacostas de Andalucía y la defensa de la carrera deIndias, 1521-1550 (Seville, 1998), 64-71.

69 “To state it baldly, I believe that the separation of the Mediterranean world intodifferent, well-defined cultural spheres is the main theme of its sixteenth-century history.Morover, this divergence in the internal patterns of Latin Christendom and Turko-Muslim civilizations continued long past the death of Philip II in 1598,” Andrew C. Hess, The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Frontier(Chicago/London, 1978), 3.

intelligence traveled all along the Mediterranean, allowing their leadersto flood the Spaniards with more information than they could absorbor evaluate as to reliability.

In 1528, Charles brought the Genoese Andrea Doria into his alliance,prying him away from Francis.67 Alvaro Bazán’s squadron also defendedSicily and Naples. Both constituted the bulk of the forty galleys now inroyal service. The armadas of Andalusia, Cantabria, and Granada weremuch smaller. The armada of Granada, for example, was made up oftwo 200-ton ships and two armed caravels.68 Charles used the majorityof his forces under Doria and Bazán to safeguard his own voyages, andto protect the Sicilian wheat trade, which was given strategic priorityover the defense of coastal villages or the conquest of North Africa. Allin all, Charles permitted corsair activity because it was too expensiveto control effectively. His policy was essentially a cost-effective strategyof protecting valuable shipments and his own movements in theMediterranean.

When Charles left Spain for Italy in 1529 the Mediterranean sea wason the brink of an irreversible division, becoming a perpetual frontierbetween two religions.69 Castilians believed that Charles’s efforts inGermany would cause a new set of expensive entanglements, but Charleshad already consigned Spanish ecclesiastical and parliamentary revenuesto the Genoese and German bankers. The Castilian clerical leadership

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70 “Le suplico con toda humilldad que vuestra magestad escuse de poner su personareal en aquellas materias por que son tan hondas dificultosas y de tan grandes peligrose ynconvinientes y rrequieren tan largo tiempo y gasto que se deve mirar mucho antesque vuestra magestad se meta enellas por que para las remediar no tiene aparejo dedinero ny de donde sacar tan grandes sumas” (Tavera to Charles, 19 Dec. 1530? AGS,Estado, leg. 20, fol. 204; Tavera to Charles, Estado, leg. 20, fol. 294).

71 “. . . pues conquistarlos y reduzirlos con sangre no se si convyene a servicio de diosy de VM ny al estado de aquella tierra y del señor rey de ungria” (the archbishop ofToledo to Charles, Madrid, 9 Dec. 1530, AGS, Estado, leg. 20, fols. 205-206).

72 I.A.A. Thompson, “The Armada and administrative reform: the Spanish councilof war in the reign of Philip II,” Crown and Cortes: Government, Institutions and Representationin Early-Modern Castile (Brookfield, VT 1993; orig. 1967), 698-725.

73 Tavera to Charles, Madrid, 14 July 1530? AGS, Estado, leg. 20, fol. 183.

was ambivalent about the religious and military problems in the Germanempire, and the two most powerful clergymen of Spain, President Tavera(the archbishop of Santiago) and Cardinal Fonseca (the archbishop ofToledo), regarded the Lutheran heresy as irremediable. Certainly theysaw that a military solution to the problem of “heresy” would demandenormous—and unobtainable—amounts of money. President Taveraregarded any conciliatory effort to be futile. Sums designated for thereduction of heretics in Germany would be wasted, he believed. Therebellious disobedience of the Germans had no clear-cut resolution;moreover, the theological questions they advanced were recondite. Inboth its military and theological dimensions the Lutheran predicamentwas thought to be impossible to resolve, requiring too much time andmoney.70 The archbishop of Toledo reiterated a similar rationale of non-intervention. First of all, the consensus necessary to convoke a generalcouncil of the Catholic Church was unlikely. Do not incur bloodshed,Fonseca insisted. Cracking down on the dissenters would benefit no one,not Charles, Ferdinand, Germany, not even God himself.71 Tavera andCardinal Fonseca opposed Charles’s dream of cementing a universalmonarchy under the Habsburg dynasty. The Castilian strategy shouldhave been to restore an administrative system that could function inde-pendently of the monarch.72

President Tavera told Charles that the most important element oflordship was the physical presence of the king; in other words, forgetabout the empire and return to Spain at once. “It is absolutely neces-sary,” Tavera wrote, “that all God-given kingdoms and lordships mustbe ruled, administered and governed by the presence of their properlords.”73 Tavera feared that Charles’s “foreign” policy would preciselyundermine this contract. Charles’s decision to reject Tavera’s andFonseca’s admonitions compromised the political gains made by the

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74 AGS, Estado, leg. 19, fol. 385.75 For annual averages of the production of American bullion, see Ramón Carande,

Carlos V y sus banqueros (Barcelona, 1987; 1943), vol. 1: La vida económica en Castilla, 462-464. For imports by five-year periods, see Earl J. Hamilton, American Treasure and thePrice Revolution in Spain, 1501-1650 (Cambridge, 1934), 34. For overview of the Americansystem, see Pierre Chaunu, Séville et l’Atlantique (1504-1650): Structures et Conjoncture del’Atlantique espanol et hispano-américain, les Structures, vol. 8 (Paris, 1959).

76 Braudel, The Mediterranean, vol. 1, 474. For newer scholarship and orientation, seeJoseph Bato’ora Ballong-Wen-Mewuda, São Jorge da Mina, 1482-1637: la vie d’un comptoirportugais en Afrique occidentale (Lisbon, 1993); P.E. Lovejoy, “The Role of the Wangara inthe Economic Transformation of the Central Sudan in the Fifteenth and SixteenthCenturies,” Journal of African History 19 (1978), 173-93; Roland Oliver, ed., CambridgeHistory of Africa, vol. 3, c. 1050-c. 1600 (Cambridge, 1977); Anthony G. Hopkins, AnEconomic History of West Africa (London, 1975; orig. 1973); Eric Axelson, The Portuguese inSouth-East Africa, 1488-1600 (Cape Town, 1973).

77 For historical range of geopolitical arguments regarding military defenses, see AnthonyPagden, Peoples and Empires: A History of European Migration, Exploration, and Conquest from

administration to restore the Castilian empire after the devastating civilwars of 1520-1521. Charles chose to pursue the grand strategy of uni-versal monarchy, believing that Castile was rich enough in resources tosubsidize his military engagements if necessary.

Yet the Castilian leadership hope for modification of Charles’s impe-rial ambitions. The council of finance repeatedly alerted Charles that aplanned campaign in the empire (1530) would strip the patrimonialassets of future incomes necessary for ordinary expenditures. Now, withthe imperial voyage at hand, the royal treasury would continue to dete-riorate, forcing the administration to sell royal patrimony in order topay for the expensive armadas.74 The primary task of the council offinance, established in 1524, was to maintain Charles’s credit-worthiness.Fortunately for Charles, the substantial increase in imports of Americanbullion in the mid-1530s helped to secure loans and annuities.75 Evenso, American silver and gold relegated North African trade to a lessimportant role in the international sphere. “We do not know exactlywhat happened in North Africa during the crucial years 1520-1540,”wrote Braudel. “Nor do we know exactly what interrupted the goldtrade between the West and Barbary,” Braudel goes on to say, “onepossible factor was Spanish intervention . . . an even more likely causewas the ‘wave’ of Islamic conquest spreading west from Egypt to Turkey,which prevented the Maghreb from becoming, as there was a real pos-sibility it might, a European market.”76 What happened was the com-bination of debt, the increase of military expenditures, natural disasters,Ottoman expansionism, the French and Muslim alliance, the Reformation,and Charles’s vision of a universal monarchy united in one faith.77

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Ancient Greece to the Present (London, 2001), 41-79. For subsequent Spanish policy, seeGeoffrey Parker, “The Making of Strategy in Habsburg Spain: Philip II’s ‘bid for mas-tery’, 1556-1598,” in W. Murray, M. Knox, and A. Bernstein, eds., The Making of Strategy:Rulers, States, and War, (New York, 1996). For a Portuguese perspective of Ottoman expan-sionism in Africa and Asia, see W.G.L. Randles, “The artilleries and land fortificationsof the Portuguese and their adversaries in the early period of the discoveries,” in Geography,Cartography and Nautical Science in the Renaissance: The impact of the great discoveries (Brookfield,VT, 2000). For Italian geopolitical views, see David Abulafia, Mediterranean Encounters,Economic, Religious, Political, 1100-1550 (Burlington, 2000); Abulafia, Commerce and Conquestin the Mediterranean, 1100-1500 (Brookfield, VT, 1993). For the Ottoman challenge inEastern Europe, see Rhoads Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700 (New Brunswick,1999). For Christian perspective of the Ottoman “offensive,” see Paula S. Fichtner,Ferdinand I of Austria: The Politics of Dynasticism in the Age of the Reformation, East EuropeanMonographs (New York, 1982); John Shirley, The History of the State of the Present War inHungary, Austria, Croatia, Moravia, and Silesia between Leopold Emperor of Germany and Mahamet(Ann Arbor, 1991; orig. 1683).

78 AGS, Estado, leg. 18, fol. 15; Estado, leg. 19, fol. 147.79 Jose Goñi Gaztambide, Historia de la Bula de la Cruzada en España (Vitoria: Editorial

By 1530 a new system had been established in which Spain controlledover half of the American continent, but in the years 1529-1533 theproblem for Charles as ruler of Spain was that that he could not abandonhis responsibilities as Holy Roman Emperor. Faced with a choice betweencentral Europe and the western Mediterranean, Charles diverted fundsto fight the Lutheran “heresy,” thus fatally compromising his defenseobligations in the Mediterranean. The legacy of Fernando—the promiseof control of the inland sea from Otranto to Gibraltar—was lost by1530. However, this reverse was not primarily due to the actions ofSuleyman or Barbarossa, who were the prime beneficiaries of develop-ments elsewhere. Rather the figure who more than any other causedCharles to lose his hegemonic position in Algiers and other Maghrebianstrongholds was Martin Luther.

During these years Tavera and the Castilian administration soughtways to convert Castilian real estate into liquid assets, primarily throughthe dismemberment of natural resources (forests and uncultivated lands)owned by the Spanish military orders of Calatrava, Santiago, andAlcántara, in order to maximize efficiency in naval and military pro-curement and secure the best possible results from expenditures onfortification.78 The Castilian regency and the Empress attempted to swayCharles to take up the cross against the infidels in the Mediterranean,while also distancing Spain from the German crisis. The Castilian admin-istration had negotiated with Rome a new bull of the crusade, whichwould be used to defend Spanish possessions in the Mediterranean.79

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del Seminario, 1958), 476-501, 478. For the year 1533, the negotiated amount was170,000 ducats (AGS, Estado, leg. 25, fol. 150). The royal order specifically stated thatthe funds were earmarked for the African outlay and the defense of the Alborán (Charlesto the bishop of Ciudad Rodrigo, AGS, Estado, leg. 25, fol. 157).

80 Tavera to Charles, Madrid, 6 June 1530?, AGS, Estado, leg. 20, fol. 16. The set-tlement between Tavera, the Council of Finance, and the Genoese was ratified in Madrid,24 Dec. 1532 (AGS, Estado, leg. 25, fols. 161-164).

81 AGS, Patronato Real, leg. 26, fol. 32, Toledo 8 March 1529; Patronato Real, leg.26, fol. 31, Toledo 8 March 1529.

82 On the centralized system of fortifications along the coast of Andalusia, see AlfonsoGámir Sandoval, Organización de la defensa de la costa del reino de Granada desde su reconquistahasta finales del siglo XVI (Granada, 1988). Gámir does not investigate the financial costsof fortifications; he noted that the local populations had to pay the salaries of guards.

83 “. . . las fortalezas del reyno estan muy mal reparadas y sin gente y no estanpagadas . . . la costa de granada no esta tan a recaudo como sería menester y cada díavienen moros y llevan cristianos” (AGS, Estado, leg. 17, fol. 5).

84 Ellen G. Friedman, Spanish Captives in North Africa in the Early Modern Age (Madison,1983). For Christian renegades, see Bartolomé Bennassar, Les chrétiens d’Allah: l’histoireextraordinaire des renégats, XVIe et XVIIe siècles (Paris, 1989).

The Spanish church, and certainly the major churchmen in Spain, sub-sidized such military campaigns for the purpose of what they consideredto be the defense of the faith.80 The regency and the major bishopsargued, however, that Charles’s German policies were too ambitiousand his access to Spanish funds should not be for imperial aid. To con-tain the long-term leasing of the royal patrimony, Tavera advocated abudget allocated for Spanish defenses, prioritizing the conservation andperpetuity of the Trastámara inheritance.

Because the Empress implemented a series of ad hoc reforms to facil-itate the Emperor’s departure in 1529, defense procurement for NorthAfrica was poorly funded.81 The defense of the coasts and frontiers ofSpanish territories required the continual mobilization of resources andmen, and many defensive operations lacked soldiers and munitions.82

Funds for essential repairs of fortifications were nonexistent; wheat wasso very scarce. Frontier fortifications, dilapidated, and their defenders,unpaid, were easy targets. Also, along the shores of kingdom of Granada,Muslims were indefatigable, constantly attacking and abducting Christians.83

The Maghrebi “raiding” economy certainly inspired fear, as the dynamicof corsair activity subsisted on capturing Christians.84 There were there-fore serious concerns that upon leaving Spain Charles would be takingher forces with him, leaving the fortifications and galleys of the sea ofthe Alborán and the western Mediterranean poorly supplied and inad-equately defended, thereby reducing the efficacy of galley warfare underAlvaro de Bazán. The defense of the Mediterranean was not an easy

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85 Tavera warned how bankers make money from loans at high interest rates andhow they exploit ecclesiastical rents: “llevan los intereses y cambios de dinero . . . 1533esta gastado toda la dicha suma . . . no le queda nada para el de 1534 de cruzada niservicio ni fructos ecclesiasticos casi nada porque se consume en la consignacción y enlos cambios y intereses” (Tavera to Charles, Madrid, 17 Nov. 1532, AGS, Estado, leg.24, fol. 178).

86 Tavera to Charles, 19 Dec. [1529], AGS, Estado, leg. 20, folio 204.87 AGS, Estado, leg. 20, fol. 204, Tavera to Charles, 19 Dec. 1530?: “yo le torno a

suplicar humilmente que VM con toda la brevedad y presteza que sea posible conpongay hordene las cosas de alla y toma las sus coronas se buelva luego a estos sus reynospara poner horden en que vuestro patrimonio y rentas no se acaben de todo punto devender y consumir como se va haziendo; que sería mayor daño y peligro de que a nadiese puede por agora representar y lo otro y no menos importante para que con su realpresencia se pacifiquen y rremedien las cosas de africa y de los moros.”

objective, especially when the best troops and ships were away on theimperial journey.

President Tavera forecast that the religious schism would not onlyconsume royal reserves but also shake the foundations of tradition.Tavera recognized that the imperial dilemma caused an endless cycleof the encumbrance of royal revenues.85 He failed to convince Charlesthat hard-fought North African victories had to be consolidated, andthat continental priorities in the German empire had to be delegatedto their natural lords. “In my estimation,” Tavera wrote, “your com-mitment to the preservation, perpetuity, and continual succession tothese kingdoms is much more important than everything in the empire,and I humbly beseech you to return at once and immediately, returningwith your crowns in order to repair your finances so that your patrimonyand revenues will not be depleted, which is happening and is a seriousdanger and damage.”86 During the Emperor’s absence, Tavera attemptedto convince his king to focus on domestic problems in order to securehis inheritance and succession, which was more important than “thosethings over there.” Tavera advised him to return to Spain as soon asCharles had been crowned emperor by the pope (Bologna, February1530); Charles’s priority had to be the conservation of the royal domain.The mortgaging of the royal patrimony could be nothing other thanprofoundly detrimental, and the negligence of Islamic counter-offensivescould be nothing but damaging. Charles had to return at once in orderto pacify and secure the coasts of Spain.87

The destruction of Barbarossa’s North African force was the strategicpriority for Spain, at least in the eyes of Tavera and some of the mostimportant Spanish military officials. From the other side of theMediterranean, the governor and royal judge of Orán underscored the

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88 Corregidor of Orán to the Empress, Luçena, 3 July 1529, AGS, Estado, leg. 18,fol. 102.

89 The count of Benavente to the Empress, Valladolid, 23 Dec. 1529, AGS, Estado,leg. 17, fol. 131.

90 The count of Miranda to Charles, Madrid 21 Aug 1530, AGS, Estado, leg. 20,fol. 229.

91 The Empress to Charles, Madrid, 4 April 1530, AGS, Estado, leg. 19 fols. 238and 239.

92 “. . . recuados de dineros con que poder adereçar las ocho galeras que ha de traeren la costa de estos reynos que no podria salir de alli y por lo que quedava del ver-ano pudiese hazer alguna buena presa en los moros enemigos” (Madrid, 12 Oct. 1529,AGS, Estado, leg. 18, fol. 19).

grave threat of infidels regaining Christian territories. In a letter to theEmpress, the governor of Orán maintained that Barbarossa must bedestroyed. It was ultimately vital that the Emperor secure the commu-nities of both coasts of “these kingdoms,” Spain and North Africa. Toachieve this goal was more important than the glory of gaining addi-tional kingdoms.88 His message to the Empress is quite simple: conquerMuslim strongholds in the Barbary and reconsider the military and reli-gious responsibilities of the imperial inheritance.

Another Spaniard advocating the destruction of Muslim Algiers wasthe count of Benavente. Benavente grasped the seriousness of two Islamicfronts, “the Turk as well as the Muslims from North Africa.” The countrecalled the epoch of the Catholic Monarchs, how they conqueredGranada and allende (the other side of the Mediterranean).89 The countof Miranda too alerted Charles to a similar urgency: the present momentwas critical for the conquest of Algiers, because “if it is not achieved itwill be impossible to mobilize the conquest of Algiers and Africa,”because the Turks would fortify their positions.90 Intelligence reportsgave real indications that Barbarossa was preparing an armada to con-quer the few remaining Spanish fortifications in North Africa.91

The problem of insufficient funds bedeviled the regency and dimin-ished the capacity of the Spanish armadas. As early as 1529, the Empresshad already written to Charles that the captain of the royal armada,Portoundo, still had not received the necessary funds to put in goodorder the galleys necessary to pursue Cachidiablo.92 A month later, Isabelreceived notice that Portoundo and his galley had been destroyed byCachidiablo. Then, in May of 1529, Barbarossa’s conquest of the strate-gic fortification of Peñón of Algiers was achieved with the help of can-non engraved with the fleur de lis. After the humiliation of Pavia in1525, Francis I had repudiated his previous commitment to defendChristendom, and now his support of a “crusade” went against Charles

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93 For correspondence detailing Francis’ alliance with the Sultan, see Lanz, Correspondenzdes Kaisers Karl V, 3 vols., Ferdinand to Charles, Innsbruck, 14 March 1525, vol. 1, 155;Marino Sanuto, Diarii (Venice, 1894), vol. 40, 700; Gayangos, Calender of Letters, Despatches,and State Papers, Spanish (London, 1873), vol. 3, 801, Lope de Soria to Charles, 15 July1526. For analysis, see J. Ursu, La Politique Orientale de François I, 1515-1547 (Paris, 1908),27-82.

94 E. Charrière, Negociations de la France dans le Levant, Collection des Documents Inédits(Paris, 1848) vol. 1, 119.

95 AGS, Estado, leg. 20, fol. 39, Don Antonio de Fonseca to Charles, Madrid, 24Jan. 1530: “. . . que pues dios hizo a VM tan católico que le pareçera bien para man-dallo asi efectuar . . . es tanto lo que se gana de reputación y provecho en desarraygarderrayz esta cossario . . . quanto mas se tardase de deshazer este barbarossa tanto masyra creçiendo y hazendose mas fuerte. . . .”

96 AGS, Estado, leg. 20, fols. 133-36.97 AGS, Estado, leg. 19, fol. 390, Madrid, 25 Feb. 1530.98 AGS, Estado, leg. 20, fol. 266, Madrid, 16 Aug. 1530.

and in favor of the Islamic ghazis in the Mediterranean.93 Turkish andNorth African ships encountered friendly waters in the south of France,allowing them to travel more extensively and to do more damage toSpanish commerce.94 It is no coincidence that at this time Castilianobservers urged Charles to destroy Algiers and Barbarossa without hes-itation and immediately—before it was too late and the corsair simplybecame too powerful.95

Describing the difficulties surrounding the empresa (campaign) againstthe Algerians planned for the summer of 1530, Tavera criticized AndreaDoria’s campaign at Cherchell, not far from Algiers; it was not a seriouseffort, but it used up Castilian revenue nonetheless. In fact, Doria liedabout a lack of provisions: it was his excuse for Barbarossa’s havinggotten away. In spite of the famine in Andalusia, which complicatedthe demand for hardtack for the galleys, Doria’s armada was provisionedat numerous ports. Tavera organized the transport of cargo necessaryfor the campaign, and was not to be deceived by a foreigner who hadonly recently aligned himself with Charles.96 Without a doubt, Taveraspoke plainly to Cobos and Charles: it had never been Doria’s intentionto fight Barbarossa, for the Genoese captain, always so fastidious aboutmoney and supplies, greatly feared this enemy. The Castilian councilof war decided that Doria’s demands were not only exorbitant but alsothat his naval tactics were doomed to failure.97 When he had sailedfrom the port of Málaga, Doria perhaps had some intention of facingBarbarossa. The Empress reported that Doria was supported by a fleetof thirty-two galleys, eight galleons, five brigantines, two lateen sails,and three ships that had returned from the Moluccas.98 But at the decisive

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99 AGS, Estado, leg. 20, fol. 284.100 The Empress to Charles, Yllescas, 13 Oct. 1530, AGS, Estado, leg. 20, fol. 287.101 AGS, Estado, leg. 24, fol. 51, the Empress to Charles, Segovia, 10 Oct. 1532.102 “La guerra que los moros de africa hazen a los reynos de vuestra magestad mas

tiene calidad de levantamiento rebelión que de guerra por que esta suele ser entre per-sonas iguales o que la una parte puede defenderse de la otra y a dios gracias esto nose puede aqui dezir pues esta conoçido que ninguna potençia de africa es sino comoun vasallo de los que somos de vuestra magestad a quien puede castigar y destruyrbrevemente si quierre” (the duke of Arcos to the Empress, Marchena, 2 Jan. 1530, AGS,Estado, leg. 19, fol. 59).

103 For a detailed analysis of how groups Moriscos became Christian, see DavidColeman, Creating Christian Granada: Society and Religious Culture in an Old-World Frontier City,1492-1600 (Ithaca, 2003). Philip II would also consider resettlement policies, especiallyin the 1560s.

104 AGS, Estado, leg. 23, fol. 174, Tavera to Charles, Segovia, 15 Sept. 1532.

moment, off Cherchell, the Algerian artillery fired into the galleys andsome ships received major damage; the others were forced to abandonthe cause.99 Meanwhile, the Turks had come to the coasts of Spain,and no galleys were there to defend Spanish ports or villages.100

There was a vast Iberian coastline running along the Mediterranean,chinked with hundreds of vulnerable towns and villages, harboring mer-chants and sailors seeking protection. All along the coast there wereMorisco villagers in the hills who did not leave in 1492, deciding insteadto become legal residents of Spain. When corsairs landed, Moriscoscame down the hills to escape or to assist in providing information andfood. Christian homes were burned down and all their supplies taken.The Empress had to remind Charles about the Muslims at sea andtheir willing partners on Spanish soil, because he was preoccupied withimperial affairs and his journey to Italy.101 For the Duke of Arcos, theMuslims of Africa and the Moriscos of Spain were rebellious subjects;he recommended an amphibious assault against Algiers as soon as pos-sible.102 Turkish, Morisco, and renegade involvement in raids had causedenough concern to make major nobles in Andalusia solicit from Charlesa preemptive attack and a new policy of relocating Morisco villages tothe interior of Castile, where they would be acculturated into Spanishsociety.103

In effect, Castilians feared that Charles had become too preoccupiedwith the German empire. Even so, in 1532, when Charles requestedadditional funds, the urban deputies to the Cortes appeared sympatheticand willing to grant him the subsidy.104 True, the townspeople of Castilehad endured unproductive years, famines and plague, so collectinganother round of taxes would prove difficult. Tavera, a staunch supporter

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105 “Vuestra magestad lo deve tener por buena governación según los años han sidoy la fatiga de la gente pobre que lo ha de pagar y el trabajo destos reynos es cargareste servicio sobre la gente mas menuda y necesitada y quedarse los ricos y los tratanctesy hombres de caudal sin pagar nada” (Tavera to Charles, Segovia, 13 Oct. 1532, AGS,Estado, leg. 24, fols. 233-235).

106 AGS, Estado, leg. 19, fol. 347.107 AGS, Patronato Real, leg. 70, fol. 23, Cortes de Segovia, 1532.108 The king of Tlemcen at times wanted Charles to destroy the corsairs in Algiers.

But according to intelligence reports, he was unreliable (AGS, Patronato Real, leg. 11,fol. 109).

109 AGS, Estado, leg. 27, fols. 78-80, Empress to Charles, Almuña, 2 March 1533:“gran contentamiento y remedio sería para estos reynos echar de alli aquel cosario, deque tanto daño se recibe estando en Argel . . . aunque aya tanta falta de dinero.”

of ordinary tax-payers, criticized the tax-exempt for not providing loans,and defended the cities’ recalcitrance.105 The Empress had failed to con-vince the rich to donate funds, pleading the cause of the defense ofSpain against the Muslims.106 The city representatives were told thatroyal incomes were insufficient to support Charles’s foreign expenditures.They also had to subsidize the defense of the frontiers of Africa andSpain.107 Castilians also wanted their king to return after a three yearabsence.

The cities granted the subsidy that would secure Charles’s voyagehome, where he could then direct an armada against the coalition ofAlgerians and Turks.108 Upon returning to Spain, Charles was encour-aged to supply the galleys in Barcelona and then destroy Algiers. Sucha campaign, to be accomplished even in the light of insufficient funds,would give Castile great relief and satisfaction, argued the Empress.109

In April 1533, when the imperial galleys in Barcelona were armed,ordered, and outfitted with over 15,000 Spaniards recruited fromAndalusia, the prospect of victory seemed very likely. In retrospect, how-ever, there is little dispute that Charles had other plans. Instead ofattacking Algiers, he told Doria to return to Genoa to prepare a counter-attack against the Turks in Greece. The great lords of Spain who hadaccompanied Charles for the last three years returned to their estates;the 15,000 soldiers demanded back pay before they would sign up foranother fight, there was no money to pay for future campaigns.

The admiral of Castile understood the costly consequences of theemperor’s imperial duties. He told Charles that Spain was caught inthe middle between two raging fires, the Turks in the East and theMuslims in Africa, and Charles must not deceive himself into believingthat by using “the waters of Spain he can quench the enemy fire inHungary.” The North Africans, the admiral went on to say, are no

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110 AGS, Estado, leg. 19, fol. 333, the Admiral to the Empress, Valdescopeço, 3 Jan.1530.

111 President Tavera to Charles, 19 Dec. 1529? AGS, Estado, leg. 20, fol. 204.112 Alfred Kohler, Carlos V, 1500-1558: una biografía, trans. Cristina García Ohlrich

(Madrid, 2000; orig. 1999), 210-228; Friedrich Edelmayer and Peter Rauscher, “La fron-tera oriental del Sacro Imperio en la época de Carlos V,” Hispania 206 (2000), 853-80.

113 President Tavera to Charles, 1530? AGS, Estado, leg. 20, fol. 133; President Taverato Charles, Ocaña, 15 Nov. 1530? Estado, leg. 20, fol. 136.

114 On the count of Oliva, see López de Gómara, Crónica de los Barbarrojas, vol. 6,396-397. On Portundo’s defeat, see AGS, Guerra Marina, leg. 2, fols. 119-120, the dukeof Calabria to the Empress, 12 Nov. 1529.

115 Sancho Alemán to Charles, Palermo, 7 Jan. 1530, AGS, Estado, leg. 20, fol. 50.

small flame, but a lightning bolt that can scorch Spain. Charles mustaccept the necessity of living in Spain, from where both the Germanempire and the Spanish territories could be defended. Furthermore,Charles should realize that the failure to preserve Spain would be agreater setback than the loss of lands in Eastern Europe. If he securedand protected Spanish territory from the North Africans, the Turkishonslaught would be stopped. The admiral’s great fear was “the preg-nancy of those dogs,” or the birth of an Islamic empire stretching fromIstanbul to the Straits of Gibraltar.110

Charles instead opted to pursue his universal grand strategy. In 1530he was in Bologna negotiating with Pope Clement VII. Charles receiveda letter from Tavera, who urged him to consider the primacy of theSpanish inheritance.111 Tavera’s message was that Charles should notgo ahead with his plan to cross the alps to convene a Diet of the Germanprinces and the imperial cities. For Tavera, it was critical that Charlesreturn to the Mediterranean, pursue Barbarossa, and destroy his squadronat once. Charles rejected Tavera’s advice and headed to Augsburg. Heput North Africa on the back burner; his imperial responsibilitiesdemanded his immediate attention.112 In addition, Tavera believed thatAndrea Doria did not want to pursue Barbarossa, fearing to lose hisfleet in an engagement with the corsair.113 Only if Charles himself ledthe armada would Doria make the sacrifice necessary to destroy Algiers.

Barbarossa took advantage of Charles’s involvement in Germany and Doria’s reluctance, conquering the fortress of Peñón of Algiers in1529. While evacuating Morisco vassals of the count of Oliva, Barbarossa’scorsair, Cachidiablo, destroyed Captain Rodrigo de Portoundo’s fleet ofeight galleys near the island of Formentera.114 In 1530, “el Judío,” oneof Barbarossa’s allies, intercepted shipments of hardtack intended forDoria’s crew.115 In the spring of 1530, a small squadron of Muslim

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116 The viceroy of Mallorca to Bartolomé Ferrer, Feb? 1530, AGS, Estado, leg. 20,fol. 49.

117 AGS, Estado, leg. 19, fols. 104-110, fol. 107, the Empress to Charles, Madrid, 29March 1530.

118 AGS, Estado, leg. 19, fol. 185, Sigüenza, 21 April 1530.119 AGS, Estado, leg. 20, fol. 284, the Empress to Charles, Madrid, 22 June 1530.120 AGS, Estado, leg. 20, fols. 15-18, President Tavera to Charles, Madrid, 6 June

1530?121 AGS, Estado, leg. 22, fol. 137, the count of Miranda to Charles, Ocaña, 1 May

1531, “en las comarcas todas hay lugares dañadas de pestilencia.”122 AGS, Estado, leg, 22, fols. 109-111, President Tavera to Charles, Ocaña, 1531?123 Licentiate del Corro to the Empress, Seville, 20 Aug. 1530?, AGS, Estado, leg.

12, fol. 119.

vessels navigated the shores of Mallorca and confiscated two monthsworth of supplies.116 These confiscations enabled the pirates to plundervillages from Alicante to the Cap de Tortosa.

While Charles was in Italy, plagues hit Spain. From early March andto the end of April of 1530, pestilence wiped out several thousandsaround Barcelona.117 There would be no crusade against the pirates.“This is the greatest mortality rate that has ever been known in all ofthe world,” wrote the bishop of Sigüenza, “and here in Barcelona eachday more than 130 people die in the streets and the hospital, andthroughout the principality there have been no safe place to run tountil recently in the cities of Tortosa and Vic.”118 In June, plague out-breaks were reported in Perpiñan and along the Spanish-French fron-tier.119 Additionally, throughout Costa Brava and along the coast of thekingdom of Valencia, the cathedral chapters of the crown of Aragoncountered Charles’s demand for subsidies, pleading with the king forsympathy due to the “miseries of hunger and pestilence.”120 The fol-lowing summer (1531) plague epidemics broke out in towns everywherein Old Castile,121 including the important city of Medina del Campoand the town of Madrid.122 Hence, during the critical years 1529-1533environmental conditions were mixed with fears and attacks. In a reportto the Empress, a royal officer described the Gulf of Cádiz as a seainfested with Muslims who encountered no resistance. “Everywhere inall the coasts,” he wrote her, “fishermen stay put and when farmers goout to their fields they risk their lives.”123 Yet the Gulf of Cádiz wasthe entrance to the Atlantic and the strategic key to the colonial project.

In the mid 1530s Charles was also concerned about Francis I. Francissupported the German Protestant League that had conquered Württembergin 1534, and his alliance with the Turks transformed southern French

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124 AGS, Estado, leg. 25, fols. 165-66, Madrid, 1532.125 For the support of Orán, see AGS, Estado, leg. 12, fol. 66, Alcalde Ronquillo to

the Empress, Málaga, undated.126 AGS, Estado, leg. 22, fols. 82-83, the council of finance to Charles, Avila, 8 Sept.

1531.127 For a concise description of Spanish naval defenses, see Hugo O’Donnell, Duke

of Estrada, “la política naval de Carlos V en los mares Europeos,” Carlos V: la náuticay la navegación (Madrid: Lundwerg Editores/Sociedad Estatal para la conmemoración delos centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, 2000), 143-66. For analysis of Spanish Mediterraneannavies, see Francisco-Felipe Olesa Muñido, La organización nava de los estados mediterráneosy en especial de España durante los siglis XVI y XVII (Madrid, 1968), vol. 2, 939-88.

128 See the asiento between Charles and Rodrigo Ponce, Granada, 31 Oct. 1526, AGS,Estado, leg. 14, fols. 153-55. Orán, Mazalquivír, Algiers, Bugía, Trípoli and Mellila werelisted as the fortification in need of repairs, which were to be paid by using the pro-ceeds from the crusade bull.

ports, especially Marseilles, into safe harbors for Muslim corsairs. Whiledecreasing the strategic importance of North African fortresses to a min-imum, Charles began to give sums of unprecedented magnitude to hisnaval captains who would serve to counter French naval mobilizations.In 1532, for example, Andrea Doria received 90,000 ducats and Alvarode Bazán got 65,000 ducats. Juan de Guzmán was given 5,000 ducatsfor the defense of Granada. Doria and Alvaro de Bazán obtained themajority of the money budgeted for naval expenses.124 The expendituresof 1532-1533 amounted to 240,000 ducats. Though an increase comparedto figures of 1516, Charles’s military budget shows that only Orán andBujía were sustained with 30,000 ducats.125 These expenditures for Oránand Bujía (30,000 ducats) constituted a significant decline compared toFernando of Aragon’s investment for North African garrisons. By theend of his reign, Fernando was spending 90,000 ducats each year onAfrican harbors.

Charles understood that the situation in the Mediterranean had dete-riorated. He decided to strengthen two defensive mechanisms: galleysand key fortifications on the French border and the Maghreb. In 1531Charles’s expenditures on his imperial campaign had depleted all Castile’sfuture revenues, for royal incomes from the masterships of the militaryorders, the crusade bull, the clerical subsidy, and the parliamentary ser-vicio were already promised to creditors.126 Charles, with no money ortime to engage the Islamic pirates personally, prioritized galley war-fare.127 He came down firmly in favor of the warship, even though hisadvisors had proposed an extensive defense strategy of North Africanpresidios.128

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129 AGS, Estado, leg. 17, fols. 22-24, the Empress to Charles, Toledo, 26 May 1529.For an overview, see Carlos José Hernando Sánchez, ed., Las fortificaciones de Carlos V(Asociación Española de Amigos de los Castillos/Miniterio de Defensa/Sociedad Estatalpara la conmemoración de los centenarios de Felip II y Carlos V, 2000); Alicia Cámara,“Las fortificaciones del Emperador Carlos V,” Carlos V: las armas y las letras (Granada:Universidad de Granada/Sociedad Estatal para la conmemoración de los centenarios deFelipe II y Carlos V, 2000), 123-37.

130 AGS, Estado, leg. 12, fol. 221, Burgos, 20 Feb. 1524, “consulta del consejo.”131 AGS, Guerra Marina, leg. 1317, fol. 29. For precursors, such as Pedro Navarro

and his work in North Africa at the turn of the century, see Juan Antonio Rodríguez-Villasante Prieto, “Buques y fortificaciones: aproximación a la defensa de la fronteramarítima del imperio de Carlos V,” Las fortificaciones de Carlos V, 195-217. For the devel-opment of fortifications, see Fernando Cobos Guerra and José Javier de Castro Fernández,“Diseño y desarrollo técnico de las fortificaciones de transición españolas,” Las fortificacionesde Carlos V, 219-43. For fortification construction in the larger European context andinternational scene, see J.M. Lafont, Chitra: Cities and Monuments of Eighteenth-Century Indiafrom French Archives, (New Delhi, 2001). For analysis of the early modern fortresses, the“trace italienne” and the military revolution, see W.G.L. Randles, Geography, Cartographyand Nautical Science in the Renaissance: The impact of the great discoveries, (Burlington, VT, 2000);Bert S. Hall, Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe: Gunpowder, Technology and Tactics,(Baltimore, 1997), 156-64, 202-10; Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovationand the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 (New York, 1988); Jeremy Black, A Military Revolution?Military Change and European Society, 1550-1800 (Houndmills, 1991).

132 For his work in Pamplona, see AGS, Guerra Marina, leg. 7, fols. 167-168. Forhis involvement in the construction of fortifications and new conceptual designs for Cádiz,Jerez, and Gibraltar, see Estado, leg. 28, fol. 44; Estado, leg. 29, fols. 35-47, 54, 113,121-123, 144-145; Estado, leg. 28, fol. 44 and fol. 58.

133 AGS, Guerra Marina, leg. 14, fol. 86.134 AGS, Estado, leg. 36, fol. 235.135 María Concepción Porras Gil, “La defensa de los territorios Hispanos,” Carlos V

y las Artes: promoción artística y familia imperial, ed. M.J. Redondo Cantera and M.A. Zalama(Valladolid, 2000), 165-201, 183.

Charles instead prioritized fortifications in Catalonia and on theFrench-Spanish border.129 The Castilian parliament had long wantedCharles to protect the frontiers, such as Navarre, and the council ofCastile had proposed the funding of fortifications, especially in keyports.130 Charles recruited Italian engineers to rebuild fortifications inIberia, using their new trace italienne technology (cannon-proof fortresseswith angle bastion construction and thick sloping earth layers).131 Benedictoda Rávena redesigned the walls of Pamplona and in 1534 he went tothe Mediterranean ports of Jerez de la Frontera, Cádiz, and Gibraltarto begin the construction of earth-backed walls and to make repairs.132

The cathedral chapter of Cádiz was to pay for the costs.133 Other pro-jects were commissioned for La Coruña.134 Just prior to his 1535 Tuniscampaign, Charles diverted funds towards the defense of Spanish pos-sessions along the French frontier, in Guipúzcoa and Navarre.135 Charles

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136 AGS, Guerra Marina, leg. 16, fols. 6-9, Sept. 1534.137 For Logroño, see AGS, Estado, leg. 32, fol. 20. On Pazaño, see Guerra Marina,

leg. 25, fol. 49; leg. 26, fo. 120.138 For Perpiñán, see AGS, Estado, leg, 32, fol. 136, and for Rosellón, see Estado,

leg. 33, fol. 266.139 For the fortifications in Fuenterrabía, San Sebastián and Pamplona, see AGS,

Guerra Marina, leg. 25, fol. 55; Guerra Marina, leg. 52, fols. 1-6; Guerra Marina, leg.34, fol. 44; Estado, leg. 32, fols. 92-93; Guerra Marina leg. 23, fol. 11. For Pamplona,see Guerra Marina, leg. 13, fol. 53 and fol. 87. For Fuenterrabía, see Guerra Marina,leg. 13, fol. 86.

140 On the fortification of Bona in 1535, see AGS, Guerra Marina, leg. 14, fol. 76.For the range of North African fortifications, see Antonio Sánchez-Gijón, “La Goleta,Bona, Bugía, y Africa: los presidios del reino de Túnez en la política mediterránea delemperador,” Las fortificaciones de Carlos V, 625-51.

141 AGS, Guerra Marina, leg. 14, fols. 46-47.142 For Bona and Bizerta, see AGS, Guerra Marina, leg. 14, fol. 76; Estado, leg. 14,

fol. 76 (soliciation for additional funds to continue construction plans). For Bugía, seeEstado, leg. 476, fols. 178-179.

143 For problems in La Goletta and Bugía, during the 1540s, see AGS, Estado, leg.471, s.f., relación Luis de Peralta, alcaide, 10 Dec.; Guerra Marina, leg. 30, fol. 197;Guerra Marina, leg. 48, fol. 1; Guerra Marina, leg. 48, fol. 1; Guerra Marina, leg. 65,fol. 226.

ordered the bishop of Pamplona to subsidize the fortifications inFuenterrabía, San Sebastian, and Pamplona.136 The church of Logroñoalso had to pay for its city’s walls, and the architects and engineers whoarrived in Navarre were Gabriel Tadino de Martinego and Luis Pizano,who reformed the Sarriola in San Sebastian and Fuenterrabía.137 In1535 the Empress hired Micer Benedicto to construct new earth-supportedwalls in Perpiñán and Roussillon.138 The Captain General of Guipúzcoa,Sancho de Leyva, supervised the on-going reconstruction of fortificationsalong with the Italian engineers, who included de Rávena.139

After his victory at Tunis, Charles used Italian engineers to rebuilda few Maghrebian presidios, including Tunis, trying to maximize thesmall claim on North Africa held by Spanish forces.140 The Sicilian engi-neer, Antonio Ferramolín, who had worked on the fortifications inPalermo and Messina, was given the task of redesigning La Goletta, theisland fortress guarding access to Tunis.141 Additional construction con-tracts began in Bona (conquered in 1531), Bizerta and Bugía, under deRávena.142

In the subsequent two decades, however, Charles’s military officialsin North Africa constantly complained about the lack of funds and pro-visions, from hardtack to salaries for the master stonemason and hisstaff.143 Funds were also short for remodeling and upgrading fortifications

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144 For Perpiñán and Barcelona, see Estado, leg. 318, fols. 16-19. For Ibiza, Estado,leg. 318, fols. 14-16; Mahón, Estado, leg. 319, fol. 7.

145 AGS, Estado, leg. 55, fols. 115-120, 5 Feb 1541, Tavera to Charles (Fortificationof Gibraltar, Cádiz, Málaga and Cartagena); Estado, leg. 51 fols. 34-37, 29 July 1541,Tavera to Charles (Bugía “y galeras de Turcos peleando”); Estado, leg. 113, fols. 7-9.

146 AGS, Estado, leg. 113, fols. 7-9.147 José Luis Casado Soto, “Carlos V y la construccion naval en España,” Carlos V:

la náutica y la navegación, 117-142, 124-126; Braudel, The Structures of Everyday Life: TheLimits of the Possible, trans. Siân Reynolds (New York, 1981; orig. 1979), vol. 1, 387-92.

148 AGS, Estado, leg. 23, fols 238-239, Empress to Charles, Avila, 8 Sept. 1531.149 AGS, Estado, leg. 25, fol. 66, Cobos to Vázquez (concierto entre Tremecén y

Bazán); León Galindo y de Vera, Historia vicitudes y política tradicional de España respecto desus posesiones en las costas de África desde la monarquía gótica y en los tiempos posteriores á la restau-ración hasta el último siglo (Madrid, 1884), 127.

150 AGS, Estado, leg. 26, fol. 27, 20 Feb. 1533, “relación de las cosas principales quela emperatriz y el cardenal presidente escriven.”

in Perpiñán, Barcelona, Gibraltar, Ibiza, and Mahon.144 Overall, forti-fications in the Spanish peninsula and the Balearics seemed more essen-tial than those in North Africa, for example, Cádiz, San Sebastian andFuenterrabía. The sums directed to North Africa were marginal andusually the monies came from Muslim vassals loyal to Charles and cler-ical institutions.145 For La Goletta, Charles relied on the annual tributefrom the king of Tunis, 55,000 ducats, to pay for the on-going recon-struction project, and (as mentioned earlier) the cathedral chapters inNavarre subsidized new construction there.146

Muslim piracy revived in the Mediterranean in the 1530s. As acounter to Islamic activity, Spanish militarization became more efficient:Spanish fleets were better fitted, smaller in number, stronger with heav-ier cannons, and in good order.147 Fleets of a dozen or so galleys werevery effective machines for the overall security of commerce and forconquest or directed attacks. In September of 1531, for example, theEmpress supervised a campaign to conquer two North African ports,Bona and Orán, which Alvaro de Bazán, Captain General of the Spanisharmada, achieved with eleven galleys and two ships, well-manned withtwo months of supplies on board.148 The following spring, in April 1532,Charles sent Bazán to the Islamic kingdom of Tlemcen, to support theimperial Muslim vassal, King Muley Hacén. In this instance Bazán andhis ten galleys killed over 600 Islamic rebels, enslaved 1,000, and burntthe town of Oné to the dust.149

The conquest of Algiers was much more difficult, and requiredCharles’s personal intervention. But Charles had decided not to devotehimself to the conquest of Algiers.150 He opted instead to travel to the

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151 AGS, Estado, leg. 26, fol. 183, Charles to the Empress, Genoa, 28 March 1533.152 AGS, Estado, leg. 26, fol. 179, Charles to the Empress, Modena, 1 March 1533.153 AGS, Estado, leg. 26, fol. 62, the city of Cartagena to Charles, 29 June 1534?;

Estado, leg. 26, fol. 61, Andrés de Avalos to Juan Vázquez, Cartagena, 29 June 1533.154 AGS, Estado, leg. 26, fol. 63, Andrés de Avalos to Charles, Cartagena, 29 June

1533.155 AGS, Estado, leg. 26, fol. 64, La Coruña, 31 Jan. 1533?156 AGS, Estado, leg. 27, fols. 146-151, Málaga, 5 Dec. 1532 to Jan. 1533.157 AGS, Estado, leg. 26, fol. 77, Charles and Juan Vázquez to the corregidor of

Cartagena, Monzón, 20 Sept. 1533. Charles told the corregidor to find more about thissituation and to verify the revolt. For a sixteenth-century definition of alárabes, see Lópezde Gómara, Guerras de Mar, 175-76

interior of Castile upon his arrival at Rosas in April 1533.151 TheAlgerians took advantage of this decision by conquering the Spanishfortification of Cazaza, while a large Turkish armada invaded Italy.152

In Aigues-Mortes, at least twenty-five Turkish fustas (lateen-rigged boats)were reported, while an Algerian armada of over fifteen vessels was seenalong the coast of Valencia. Spanish intelligence reports listed an armadaof forty vessels based in Algiers and ready to attack. If all of these shipswere to unite in a campaign, they would be able to cause immenseharm in Cartagena.153 The Algerians had already initiated a series ofattacks along the Cabo de Palos, as twenty Turkish galleys, all wellarmed with cannons, supported a fleet of forty sailing ships and eightgalleys. Over 140 Muslims landed and attacked the properties of theduke of Escalona and the marquis of los Vélez. Another group of fourAlgerian fustas took everything the fishermen had, save their lives, atthe coastal village of Cañizada. Normally, about five or six fustas werealways near the Cabo de Palos, because of the many small ports andlanding points. To the north, in Castellón de la Plana, a Turkish armadaof twenty-five fustas and galleys, had come from Southern France sail-ing along the coastline.154 French corsairs coordinated an assault by sail-ing past the Straits to the kingdom of Galicia, where they did harm.155

In the meanwhile Captain Bazán destroyed ten Muslim vessels, whichcontained nearly 500 Islamic sailors, “Moros y Turcos,” and 150 Christianslaves.156 Bazán captured ninety Muslims, while the remainder fled tothe morerías (Morisco villages and neighborhoods) in the kingdom ofValencia. Barbarossa left Algiers for his voyage to Istanbul, outfittingsix galleys and eighteen fustas, filled with precious metals, jewels andChristian slaves. Barbarossa apparently was not concerned about thepoor conditions in Algiers, where Alarabes (Arabs of the Maghreb), unwill-ing to pay Barbarossa his tribute, rebelled against the Turks, forcingthem to leave.157 On his way to Istanbul, Barbarossa captured three

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158 AGS, Estado, leg. 27, fol. 50, the Empress to Charles, undated.159 Pedro Girón, Crónica del Emperador Carlos V (Madrid: CSIC, 1964), 34.160 López de Gómara, Crónica de los Barbarrojas, vol. 6, 405-413, 413; López de Gómara,

Guerras de Mar, 156; León Galindo y de Vera, Historia vicitudes y política tradicional, 127.161 López de Gómara, Guerras de Mar, 184.162 López de Gómara, Guerras de Mar, 156-159; Girón, Crónica, p. 47.163 For the assasination plot, see AGS, Estado, leg. 24, fols. 202-205, President Tavera

to Charles, 13 May 1533? For the Tunis campaign, see CODOIN, vol. 1, 207-27 andG. Illescas, Jornada de Carlos V a Túnez, CODOIN, vol. 112.

164 Charles to the cities of Spain, Barcelona, 9 May 1535, in CODOIN, vol. 1, 154-159, 154-155. Charles further elaborates on his mission, “considerando lo que importaa la honra y servicio de nuestro Señor, defension y bien común de la religion cristiana,conservación y seguridad de nuestros reinos, y a nuestra autoridad y reputación . . .”(155-56).

165 President Tavera to Charles, 10 July 1535, AGS, Estado, leg. 30, fols. 136-137;López de Gómara, Guerras de mar, 159-79.

vessels filled with wheat, merchandise and Christians.158 A Turkish con-voy then attempted to sack Corón, but landed on the island of Tenera,near Sardinia, overtaking eight Genoese merchant ships filled withgrain.159 Barbarossa arrived in Istanbul in November in 1533 and receivedfrom the Sultan 800 Janissaries, a crew of 8,000 Greek slaves, 8,000Turkish infantry, and 800,000 ducats. With an armada of over eightyvessels, consisting of twenty fustas and sixty galleys Barbarossa returnedto attack Italy and Spain.160 The French ambassador had told the Sultan:attack Charles by sea and land, then Charles could not maintain mul-tiple defenses in Flanders and Lombardy.161 In August of 1534, Barbarossalanded in Bizerta, and then overtook Tunis, meanwhile the Sultan cap-tured Budapest.162

Charles attempted to have Barbarossa assassinated, but then resortedto a more costly plan: he assembled a fleet of over 300 ships in orderto retake Tunis.163 Tunis was the hub of the western Mediterraneanand was vital for the protection of the Sicilian wheat trade. Charleshimself took the command of the armada against Tunis and La Goletta,in order “to resist and attack, and for the preservation of our kingdomsand security of Christendom.”164 Charles’s fleet included some seventy-four galleys, thirty brigantines and galiots and around three hundredsailing vessels.165 Castilian and Aragonese forces, under the marquis delVasto, Alfonso de Avalos, led a contingent of forty-five ships, 800Germans, and 2,500 Spanish veterans of Italy, eight galleys from Genoa,six galleys from Naples, and four from Sicily. Doria went with seventeengalleys that contained 1,800 fighting men, oared with 150 men per gal-ley. Bazán contributed fifteen galleys, the pope nine galleys, Portugal

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166 CODOIN, “Conquista de Túnez y La Goleta por el Emperador Carlos V en1535,” vol. 1, 154-206.

167 AGS, Estado, leg. 23, fol. 9.168 The Empress to Charles, Madrid, 30 Sept. 1535, AGS, Estado, leg. 31, fols.

201-211, fol. 201; Galindo y de Vera, Historia vicitudes y política tradicional, 142; MHE,vol. 6, 422.

169 Girón, Crónica, 73; Dos Expediciones, 17.170 López de Gómara, Guerras de mar, 205.171 Braudel, The Mediterranean, 868.172 Girón, Crónica, 70; José María Jover, Carlos V y los Españoles (Madrid, 1988),

216-217; Mira Caballos, Aramada guardacostas, 73.173 Girón, Crónica, 97.

provided twenty-three caravels, a galleon and 2,000 infantry, Vizcayasent twenty-three zabras (pinnaces, or lateen-rigged ships able to useauxiliary oar-power) and two galleons, The Knights of Malta sent fivegalleys. This number of oared ships was not superseded until the late1560s. The Tunis campaign had four goals: to destroy Barbarossa’s fleet,to defend and secure Christian kingdoms, to protect Christendom andthe common good of all Christianity, and to maintain royal authorityand restore Spanish reputación.166 When Charles defeated the Tunisianshe left behind 1,200 troops in La Goletta, 600 in Bona, and 500 inBugía.167

As important as the battle for Tunis was, the sea continued to beHayrüddin’s domain, and North Africa was his backyard. While Charlesconsolidated his victory in Tunis, Hayrüddin raided the Minorcan har-bor of Mahón, enslaving 1,800 Christians.168 The following year (1536),the fortification of Cazaza fell to the Muslims, and a coalition of thir-teen French galleys and eight Turkish galleys landed on the Catalancoast near Barcelona.169 In June 1536, the Algerians sailed to Villajoyosawith thirty-four ships and assailed the central square of the town.170 Acoalition of the French and Turks plundered Ibiza in August 1536,171

and then French pirates sailed through the Straits of Gibraltar to theAzores, capturing a ship containing gold bullion from Peru.172 In thespring of 1537, Charles ordered the mobilization of two armadas, becauseof French confiscations of American bullion. Both of them were todefend Spanish convoys traveling from the Indies. One armada pro-tected the gulf of Cádiz, the other transversed the Galician coastline asfar as Bilboa.173

After Tunis, Charles’s Mediterranean strategy was defensive. Themarquis of Villafranca was in Naples, warning Charles about the realchance of a Turkish armada directed at Italy. Charles organized a defen-

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174 Girón, Crónica, 112.175 A winter storm drove 38 of Barbarossa’s galleys to the coast (Braudel, The Mediterranean,

vol. 1, 248).176 Galindo y de Vera, Historia vicitudes y política tradicional, 144; Lafuente, Historia de

España 8, 360.177 Angel González Palencia and Eugenio Mele, Vida y Obras de Don Diego Hurtado

de Mendoza, 3 vols. (Madrid, 1941), vol. 1, 105-6; López de Gómara, Guerras de mar, 198-202.

178 AGS, Estado, leg. 49, fols. 133-34.179 AGS, Estado, leg. 49, fol. 173, 30 Oct. 1540, Tavera to Charles; Estado, leg. 50,

fols. 103-105, Tavera to Charles, 11 Oct. 1540.180 Los Españoles y el Norte de Africa, 86; AGS, Estado, leg. 49, fol. 173, 30 Oct. 1540,

Tavera to Charles.181 López de Gómara, Guerras de mar, 207.

sive crusade and Genoa fortified its walls for a possible invasion. About7,000 Spanish infantry landed in Naples and Sicily, arriving in late June1537, and Pope Paul III subsidized 5,000 Spanish soldiers for the summermonths, at a cost of 20,000 ducats per month. Doria went to Civitavecchiathen, joining the pope’s galleys, went with them to Naples and Messina,matching the Islamic armada of over 300 galleys.174 Even so, the post1535 victories were short lived. A Spanish armada of fourteen galleysunder the marquis of Terranova failed to subdue Susa, and the Christiancampaign at Préveza in September of 1538 resulted in a lasting victoryfor the Turks, irrespective of losses sustained by Barbarossa during awinter storm.175 Charles tried to win Barbarossa over, offering him thecities of Bona and Bujía, assistance in conquering the kingdom ofTlemcen, and possibly Trípoli. All Barbarossa had to do was burn theOttoman fleet.176 Instead Barbarossa and twenty-thousand Turks retookCastelnuovo, capturing the Spanish garrison.177 Meanwhile, corsairs fromAlgiers invaded Gibraltar in September 1540.178 The following month,an attack led by the captain general of the Spanish armada, Bernardinode Mendoza, repelled the Muslims from Gibraltar.179 Doria followedwith a concerted campaign east of Tunis, capturing Sfax, Sùsah andAl Munastir.180 The Islamic corsairs countered, heading toward Cádizwith a force consisting in 1,500 Turks and Mudéjar refugees fromValencia and Granada, over 1,000 Christian slaves, six galleys andtwelve galleons.181 They landed in Gibraltar and easily took sixty-threecaptives. The viceroy of Granada organized an army from dozens ofmunicipalities in order to defend Málaga and other ports. The Spanisharmada was wintering in Cartagena when news arrived about the enslave-ment of Christians. Captain Mendoza sailed from Gibraltar to trap the

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182 López de Gómara, Guerras de mar, 210-11.183 AGS, Estado, leg. 638, fol. 95.184 Dos expediciones españolas contra Argel, 22.185 Charles to Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, Cartagena, 4 Dec. 1541, in Corpus Documental

de Carlos V, 1539-1548, ed. Manuel Fernández Alvarez, 4 vols. (Salamanca, 1973-1981,1975), vol. 2, 76-77.

186 Juan Francisco Pardo Molero, La defensa del imperio: Carlos V, Valencia, y el Mediterráneo(Madrid, 2001), 375-409.

corsairs, Caramami and Haly Hamet. The Spanish forces succeeded,redeeming over 700 Christians while losing 400 men including CaptainMendoza.182

Charles was in Germany when he decided to attack Algiers.183 Heplanned to complete imperial business by the end of June and headsouth to Genoa in order to defeat the Algerians, which would seriouslyundermine piratical activity and deprive the Sultan of a major ally. ButCharles was not able to leave the empire until the end of July, whichdelayed the Algerian campaign until dangerously late in the season.Algiers knew that Charles had started the mobilization and preparationfor an immense fleet and 22,000-strong army, so the Muslims hadsufficient time to prepare for the invasion.184 Equally as apparent to theSpanish was that the armada that sailed from Málaga would not havesufficient supplies. With much of his fleet wrecked by a storm, Charlesreturned from Algiers with the humiliation of having lost the opportu-nity to subdue Algiers, and with the burden of obtaining additionalfunds merely for the defense of Spanish fortifications along the Frenchborder.185

The dangers of the Mediterranean (ghazis from Algiers, Turks, Frenchpirates, and Moriscos at home) were acute.186 After 1541 Charles gaveup on recapturing the glory of an historic conquest in the Mediterranean;after all, he had a difficult time just holding onto the few cities in theMaghreb. The count of Alcaudete defeated the king of Tlemcen, MuleyMahemet, and by February of 1543, Alcaudete installed a new king,who soon abandoned the city. In March 1543, Alcaudete again failedto gain control of Tlemcen and Mostaganem. Muslim attacks contin-ued, as Sala Rais invaded Guadamar in 1543. Barbarossa then razedNice after spending the winter in Toulon, then sacked Prochita andLipari, and Cadaques in Catalonia in 1543. Charles did not engage thefoe personally, but instead decided to deal with the German predicament.The Schmalkaldic wars (1546-1552) marked a new beginning for Spain,for Charles wanted to heal the divisions in Europe, and thus had to

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187 Pardo Molero, La defensa del imperio, 375-76.188 AGS, Patronato Real, leg. 26, fols. 52-54, Charles to Tavera, Madrid, 10 Nov

1539; Patronato Real, leg. 26, fol. 59, Charles (and Juan Vázquez) to the cámara, Madrid10 Nov 1539.

189 Charles to Philip, Madrid, 5 Nov 1539, Corpus Documental de Carlos V, vol. 2, 36. For the subsequent instructions, see instrucción secreta, 6 May 1543, in José March,Niñez y Juventud de Felipe II: documentos ineditos (1527-1547), 2 vols. (Madrid, 1942), vol. 2,23-34.

draw Spanish funds and men away from the Mediterranean.187 Charles’sclosest advisors had foreseen the impossibility of ruling across diversejurisdictions, especially in the light of his competitors, and thus Charles’sadvisors now posed for him this question: he must choose between Milanand the Netherlands.

Continuity and Achievements

Charles had initiated a ‘northern’ shift as he feared he would lose hisFlemish lands, for he was embarked in 1539 on a campaign to sup-press a tax revolt in Ghent and then to discuss a peace settlement withFrancis. Charles prepared a dossier of emergency decrees and regencyorders for President Tavera and the Castilian administration.188 He alsowrote the first set of instructions to Philip on how to govern, a modificationof his grand strategy of universal monarchy. Charles described an ententewith Francis I, a marriage proposition, and the dowry of Flanders.“These lands of Flanders,” the Emperor wrote,

“for the longest time have been without their natural lord, all those divisions andfactions, riots and uprisings, unappreciative and unruly people, no matter who gov-erns over them, so many dissensions have progressed in so many regions and towns,that I fear it will be a great burden, so many groups of citizens and their religioussects, all contrary to our holy faith and religion, sects founded on the pretense ofliberty and of new government, upstart volitions, which all will result not only inthe total perdition and separation from our patrimony and royal house, but alsotheir alienation from our faith.”189

Charles was prepared to divide his patrimony, and thus recommendedthat Philip evaluate the cost of universal empire. Charles himself envi-sioned geographical limits regarding his empire. Because jurisdiction andthe monarch were synonymous, any separation (e.g. the continuousabsence of the monarch) would necessarily imperil a nation’s politicaland religious integrity. Charles realized that his son could not rule theempire that he had forged; the empire had to be synonymous with theemperor’s ability to spread himself throughout his jurisdictions, especially

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190 AGS, Estado, leg. 24, fols. 315-16.191 The Cardinal of Toledo to Charles, 3 Feb. 1544, AGS, Estado, leg. 64, f. 193;

cf. Estado, leg. 26, fol. 27; leg. 70, fols. 31-32; leg. 70, fol. 68.192 AGS, Estado, leg. 69, fols. 79-87.193 Federico Chabod recognized Tavera’s Castilian policies and placed them within

the tradition of the foreign affairs policy of the Catholic Monarchs. Chabod noted thatCastile’s exterior policies were synonymous with the strategies of the administration underIsabel of Portugal and President Tavera (“Milán o los Países Bajos? Las Discusiones enEspaña sobre la ‘Alternativa’ de 1544,” Carlos V, 1500-1558: Homenaje de la Universidadde Granada [Granada, 1958], 331-72). For the Empress’s Castilian views, see AGS, Estado,leg. 31, fols. 195-204; Jover, Carlos V y los Españoles, 195-231.

those that were not founded and inhabited by Castilians. As one ofCharles’s bishops reminded him about the Flemish inheritance, “. . . akingdom without the king is like the body without the soul.”190

In order to deal with the range of problems regarding his Burgundianinheritance, Charles required a settlement, at least for a short while,with Francis (Charles wanted a universal accord with Francis so thatthere would be wide participation in the planned session of the ecu-menical council). In the winter of 1544, the representatives of Charlesand Francis agreed upon the treaty of Crépy (meanwhile the Ottomanfleet retreated). One of its clauses stipulated that Duke Charles of Orleansshould wed either the Spanish Infanta, María, or Ana, the second daugh-ter of Ferdinand, king of the Romans. María’s dowry would includethe Low Countries, Burgundy, and Charolais. Charles’s niece, on theother hand, would bring to her union Lombardy as part of the imperialfief. (In fact, the duke of Orleans died, nullifying the treaty.) Tavera,having power of attorney, recommended to Charles the acceptance ofthis treaty, especially in the light of the lack of funds necessary to keepfighting the French in Northern Italy.191 Furthermore, Charles ought toconsider María’s willingness to consent to this marriage, and shouldevaluate the character of the young Frenchman, whose manners andmorals were questionable. Tavera regarded Lombardy as the source ofwarfare between the French and the Spanish; for him, the resources ofCastile should be directed against the infidels plundering Mediterraneanports.192 The defense of Spain against Islamic ghazis and Moriscos werethe enterprises that should command Spain’s resources. Milan, on theother hand, wasted military and economic advantages, underminedCharles’ responsibility to defend Christianity, and provoked Italian states,Venice in particular, to plot with Suleyman and Francis.193

The duke of Alba, who in his early years was trained in galley war-fare and who twenty-three years later would lead thousands of Spanishsoldiers on the road to the Netherlands, urged Charles to hold on to

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194 For Gattinara, see C. Bornate, “Historia Vitae et Gestorum per dominum MagnunCancellarium, Mercurino Arborio di Gattinara,” Miscellanea di Storia Italiana, serie III(Turin, 1914), vol. 16, 83. Also very informative is John M. Headley, The Emperor andhis Chancellor: A Study of the Imperial Chancellery under Gattinara, Cambridge Studies in EarlyModern History (Cambridge, 1983).

195 AGS, Estado, leg. 67, fols. 13-16.196 Sandoval, Historia del Emperador, vol. 3, 323-37.197 Corpus Documental de Carlos V, vol. 2, 569-92, 570.

Milan. He thus advocated Charles’s grand strategy of universal monarchy.Alba felt that Milan was crucial: without it the security of Naples andSicily would always be in jeopardy. He reiterated the Italian policy ofGattinara and the Spanish-Italian generals, Pescara and Leyva, who urgedtheir king to control Milan.194 Milan was the door necessary to enterinto Germany and Flanders, the key to the conservation and obedienceof the empire. Without Milan, the commerce with Flanders was foreverin danger of being intercepted in case of a Franco-English alliance.195

The question of dividing the Habsburg inheritance arose again afterCharles’s initial victory over the German Protestants. In January 1548,gravelly ill, Charles sent the duke of Alba to Spain to convey to PrincePhilip a farewell.196 After lamenting that death might soon divide himfrom his most loyal subjects and family, Charles outlined strategies andadvice. “Due to the continual instability and changes of earthly affairs,it is impossible to provide you with a sure and reliable strategy (ley cierta)to govern your kingdoms, lordships, and states that I leave behind.”197

Charles thus warned Philip against repeating his mistake of forging agrand strategy. Charles recommended that his daughter, María, andArchduke Maximilian should govern Flanders, including the newly con-quered duchy of Güeldres,

because as we have seen and understand, those over there do not endure well tobe governed by foreigners, nor for that matter have we found someone of theirown to govern them, someone without envy and passion, and thus we have alwaysprovided someone of our house . . . and because you are not able to reside there,nor visit regularly, the people over there may well take a liking of the Archdukeand your sister, especially if God were to give them children.

Charles concluded with the advice that Philip see with his own eyesthe Low Countries and decide for himself his course of action.

Continual religious and military confrontations between Charles andthe princes of Europe prevented him from cementing any kind of dynasticsuperstructure and universal monarchy throughout Europe capable ofreplacing his constitutional monarchy accountable to local governmentsand parliaments. Dynastic conflicts also made the Spanish policy of Islamic

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198 See Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change,Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, 1994).

199 Not until the early 19th century were Algerian pirates eliminated by modern nationstates. See Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and ExtraterritorialViolence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, 1994), 110-12, 112.

200 For a comparative analysis, see James D. Tracy, The Political Economy of MerchantEmpires (New York, 1997); Paul Kennedy, ed., Grand Strategies in war and peace (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1991); James D. Tracy, ed., The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750 (New York, 1990).

201 “Castile,” wrote James Tracy, “became Charles’s treasury of last resort not becauseCastilians wished it so, but because Castile had the revenues to which bankers preferredto have their loans assigned” (Emperor Charles V, 108).

containment in the western Mediterranean impossible. The competitionbetween Charles and Francis, and the bureaucracies such monarchiessustained, fostered the new international system of sovereign states. Thisnew system would have its winners and losers based on the acquisitionof spoils, the exploitation of local populations, and the utilization of nat-ural resources.198 Although the Habsburgs failed to maintain the entiretyof the empire they inherited from Charles, they adhered to Castiliantradition, fostered a global federation of independent town councils, andcontinued to fight the Islamic republics of the Barbary.199 The Habsburgswould have many enemies, especially among other early modern empires(Ottoman, Portuguese, French, English and Dutch) and they defendedtheir empire by supporting military and naval technologies, buildingfleets, colonial cities, and fortifications.200 Producing artillery and can-non and providing them with the range of supplies, Spanish policy mak-ers instated a wide-scale military defense system of urban fortificationsalong the borders and contested areas. Offensives were sometimes inthe cards, such as the campaigns of Tunis in 1535 and Algiers in 1541,but establishing strongholds with access to local produce and resourcesoffered the best protection.

In retrospect, Charles’s grand strategy had been the preservation ofhis judicial authority over his Burgundian and Trastámara inheritance,and he sustained his composite empire by means of his judicial respon-sibilities and executive duties. At the regional level, the parliamentarybodies of the Low Countries, Naples, and Castile—the major sourcesof Charles’s revenue—responded to Charles’s fiscal demands with cal-culated self-interest and local concerns rather than any preoccupationwith Charles’s grand strategy and Habsburg dynastic priority (althoughCastile, probably because it had more invested in Charles’s Castilianreconstruction program of the 1520s, ended up footing the major billsof his imperialism).201 Charles did not, especially after the comunero civil

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202 On the issue of Spanish imperial administration and the bureaucracy as “not clearlydefined,” see Tamar Herzog, Upholding Justice: Society, State, and the Penal System in Quito,1650-1750 (Ann Arbor, 2004), 1-11, 8.

203 For sixteenth-century representations of Charles and his patronage of artists whodepicted him, consult Fernando Checa Cremades, Carlos V: La imagen del poder en elRenacimiento (Madrid, 1999). See also Charles’s notebook in which he wrote about diverseclassical authors and compared himself to the emperors of classical antiquity (AGS, Casay Sitios Reales, leg. 31, fol. 48).

wars, impose upon the community a comprehensive law code symptomaticof true modern states with their more repressive and disciplinary mech-anisms. Each Spanish kingdom, including those in the Americas, con-sisted of a vast network of diverse local constitutions, sustained by aninformal and “undefined” bureaucracy.202

Charles wanted to live up to the standards that the chroniclers hadestablished for the emperors and conquerors of the past, includingAlexander the Great, Scipio Africanus, Julius Caesar, Augustus,Constantine, Theodosius, Justinian, and Charlemagne.203 The legacy ofan imperial state under one ruler seemed sustainable, especially afterthe royalist victory in Villalar in April 1521 (the unity of Christendombecame less and less a possibility as the years passed by). Charles resolvedthe crisis of the comunero revolt by implementing comunero demands andgrievances. He acquired elements of a global empire from Spanish advi-sors, who taught Charles about the bureaucratic reforms established byFernando and Isabel. Charles implemented institutional and legal ini-tiatives in the 1520s, establishing committees and councils—of theHabsburg state, Aragon, Castile, Indies, Flanders, Inquisition, Crusade,and Finance—and negotiated a new constitutional platform with theCastilian parliament based on local needs. The federalist aspect of theSpanish empire was its bureaucracy, which supervised the appellatecourt system and the parliaments that determined tax rates and subsi-dies, made laws, and formulated policies. Charles implemented man-agement procedures for the bureaucracy, reformed the appellate courtsystem, devised a continental and transatlantic mechanism of audits (visi-tas and residencias), appointed chroniclers and cosmographers to explainand sketch Spanish expansionism, and propelled a fiscal mechanism inwhich new and existing royal municipalities would pay taxes directly tothe crown’s agents. In the end, Charles became Justinian, and gavePhilip the burdens and the opportunity to forge his own destiny.

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