The Geopolitics of the Middle East

Geography and History of the Middle East

What is Geopolitics?

The territorial dimension of global politics: The way in which geography influences the actions of nations and the exercise of power, in particular military power. It is also the power relationsbetween nations.

Until 2014, it was generally believed that geopolitics was in retreat, replaced by economic and cultural power, largely through the forces of globalization, technology and multinational institutions.

Putin changed that with his invasion of Ukraine. This act reaffirmed the notion of “spheres of influence” and the criticalityof geography in the thinking of states, particularly their sustained security. Like it or not, the state remains the dominant player in global politics. Global institutions and norms cannot compete.

A precept of geopolitics is that every state has two primary related concerns: its own security, and its desire to expand to protect its citizens and/or enhance their wellbeing. Every state wants hegemony over its own neighbourhood and as big an adjoining area as possible

The elements of power are geographic location, area, population, natural resources, economic strength, military power and most importantly, technological sophistication. The last can overcome vastly superior area and population.

Geography in the form of natural barriers, navigable rivers, a goodclimate, long coast lines, fertile soil and natural resources are all key determinants of power

The global political system is anarchic – no one is in charge, although presently, the United States plays a “global cop” role to a diminishing extent. All the international norms established by the United Nations post WWII, such as when resort to force is warranted, have been breached many times, including by the Western powers.

Geopolitics abhors a vacuum. The “natural state” is hegemony or order imposed in a region by a dominant player or system. Without this there will tend to be anarchy and violence.

Finally, geopolitics is amoral. It is about interests, not values.

Should we wish for the end of geopolitics, with a world governed by values rather than interests?

What is the Middle East?

The Middle East as a term is a colonial construct, but has gradually been accepted by most parties as defining a valid region.

It is a region defined by several natural barriers:o The Mediterraneano The Caucasus mountainso The Libyan and Iranian desertso The Black, Caspian, Red and Arabian seas

It is also limited by coming up against other civilizations, namelyIndia/Pakistan, Russia and European Christendom.

It is not entirely defined by religion although it is almost entirely Muslim. It is not entirely defined by ethnicity as it includes Arabs, Turks, Persians, Kurds, and Jews.

There are some areas that are contentious in terms of whether they are part of the Middle East:

o The South Caucasus countries of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia

o The Turkic Central Asian republicso The Maghreb countries of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, o Turkey, which is not Arab, has no oil and is a civilization in

its own right

Most geographers and historians view the Middle East to include Turkey, but to exclude the Maghreb, Central Asia and the South Caucasus

Geographically and historically, the heart of the Middle East is the Fertile Crescent (Mesopotamia and the Levant. Five braches thenreach out from this core:

o Egypto Anatolia (Turkey)o The Southern Caucasuso Persia (Iran)o The Arabian Peninsula

It is fair to say that the Middle East, despite its colonial nomenclature, represents a valid “civilization” reaching back to the dawn of human civilization

Is the Middle East a region in its own right, like for example, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Lain America, South Asia or China?

Ancient History – How relevant is it?

The Beginning – Ancient Mesopotamia and the Fertile Crescent

Called "the fertile crescent" because of its lush soil, the "crescent" of land mostly includes modern-day Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Israel-Palestine. (Some definitions also include the Nile River valley in Egypt.) People started

farming here in 9000 BC, and by around 2500 BC the Sumeriansformed the first complex society that resembles what we'd now call a "country," complete with written laws and a political system

The Phoenicians – The First Globalizers

The Phoenicians, who lived inpresent-day Lebanon and coastal Syria, from about 1500 to 300 BC, ran some of the Mediterranean's first bigtrading networks, and dominated the seas along withthe Greeks. Some sailed as

far as the British Isles, and many of them set up colonies in North Africa, Spain, Sicily, and Sardinia. This was one of the first of manyclose cultural links between the Middle East and North Africa – and why Libya's capital, Tripoli, still bears the name of the ancient Phoenician colony that established it.

The Kingdom of Israel

The original Kingdom of Israel and the Kingdom of Judah and their successor Jewish nations existed within the Levant for approximately 1200 years between 1100 BC and 100 AD before being finally subjugated by the Romans. During this period, various empires ruled over the territory, including the Assyrians, Babylonians and Persians. Zionists claim that a Jewish nation existed in the territory for almost the entire period from the Iron Age to the present, although almost entirely under the rule of various states and empires. It is true that Jewish settlements have always existed in what is now Israel, but the population totaled less than 10,000 from 1500 to 1800.

The rise of Islam and the CaliphateThis is a rough political map of the world in 750 AD, at the height of the Omayyad Caliphate ("caliph" means the ruler of the global Islamic community). This is to give you a sense of how vast and powerful the Muslim empire had become,

barely one century after the founding of the religion that propelled its expansion. It was a centre of wealth, arts, and learning at a timewhen only China was so rich and powerful. This was the height of Arab power, and owes its success to the binding and motivational force of religion. They created a unified Middle East, extending into North Africa and even Southern Europe

The Rise and Fall of the Ottomans

The Middle East in 1914

The Ottoman Empire is namedfor Osman, its first ruler in the early 1300s. From a tiny part of northwest Turkey it expanded for about 500 years — longer than the entire history of the Roman Empire — ruling over most of the Middle East, North Africa, and southeastern Europe for centuries. The empire, officially an Islamic state, spread the religion

in southeast Europe but was generally tolerant of other religious groups. It was probably the last great non-European empire until it began declining in the mid-1800s, collapsed after World War I, and hadits former territory in the Middle East divided up by Western Europe. The lines between French, Italian, Spanish, and British rule are crucial for understanding the region today – not just because they ruled differently and imposed different policies, but because the boundaries between European empires later became the official borders of independence, whether they made sense or not.

The Ottomans had tried to modernize in their last years, but it was case of too little too late, and the coup de grace was the choice of the wrong side in WWI. This was the last time Middle East had any kindof unified rule.

Would the Middle East be better off if the Ottoman Empire or some form of large successor entity had stayed intact?

The Modern Era

The Middle East today has been shaped by seven main factors: The Sykes-Picot agreement, the discovery of oil; the creation of the State of Israel; the cold war; the hegemony in the region of the United States; the Iranian revolution; and the Iraq invasion of 2003

The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916

Under this treaty, the UK and French (and Russian) Empires secretly agreed todivide up the Ottoman Empire's last Middle Eastern regions among themselves. Crucially, theborders between the Frenchand British "zones" later became the borders betweenIraq, Syria, and Jordan. Because those later-independent states had largely arbitrary borders that forced disparate ethnic and religious

groups together, and because those groups are still in conflict extremism in the Middle East. However, this is still disputed. What is not disputed is that the Arabs, who had supported Britain in the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire, were betrayed by Britain in the Sykes-Picot carve up and the opening up of Jewish immigration to Palestine, which was under direct British rule.

Is Sykes-Picot the source of much of the chaos in the Middle East?

The Discovery of Oil

Starting in 1908 in Persia and in the 1930s in Saudi Arabia, the discovery of oil was transformational in the Middles East’s modern history. It led to the strong interest of the Western powers, mainly Britain and the U.S., and the formation of companies, in league with local rulers, which would dominate the production of the most important resource in the world.

Through the 30s and particularly after WWII, the British and Americans reached deals with the local population whereby they would be given independence and ownership of the oil resources in return for granting de facto control over its extraction and globalmarketing to the Western governments and their oil companies, mainly Standard Oil of California, Texaco and BP.

The basic deal from WWII until more of less the present day is thatthe Western governments have supported whatever government has allowed them access to oil. Oil has had the effect of keeping corrupt, authoritarian governments in power, and holding back the kind of economic, social and political reform in the Arab world that had taken place in Turkey.

Independence and the Creation of Israel

During and after WWII, the Arab states achieved independence from Britain and France, including Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and Cyprus.

In Palestine, a struggle took place between the Arabs and Jews, culminating in British withdrawal and the UN partition of the country into Israel in the West and an Arab state in the East. Thiswas accepted by the Jewish side but rejected by the Arabs, who saw the creation of Israel as act of war, and the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Jews as an invasion, albeit under the auspices of Britain and the UN.

800,000 Palestinians were displaced from areas annexed by Israel. Asimilar number of Jews was expelled or fled from Arab countries after 1948, about two-thirds settling in Israel.

Despite many peace attempts, the Arabs are unwilling to accept Israel as a reality in the Middle East, and Israel is unwilling to permit a return of displaced Arabs to what is now Israel.

This is unquestionably a rallying issue for Arabs and other Muslimsin the region.

Was the partition of Palestine a good idea in retrospect?

The Cold War and Arab Socialism

After independence, many of the largest Arab countries, inspired bythe Soviet model of development, flirted with an Arab version of socialism, particularly Egypt and Syria. They actually united for aperiod as the United Arab Republic for the period 1958-1961.

Syria seceded because they felt dominated by Egypt. However, Egypt continued to seek a form of “Pan-Arabism”, based on socialist development principles. During this period, the Soviet Union playeda strong role in the region, seeing it as an opportunity to establish an area of influence, and to spread its ideology.

Of course, the U.S. was equally if not more active in the region, both because of oil and its support of Israel (although in its early years Israel was also supported by the Soviet Union).

The Pan-Arabism and Arab socialism was essentially destroyed by theArab’s humiliating defeat in the 1967 war with Israel. The six-daywar was pivotal moment in the region’s history. The failure of pan-Arabism and the socialist development model led to a vacuum that was gradually filled by nationalism and Islamism. Nasser’s failed play to unite the region gave way to a balkanization with all the associated instability.

The final nail in the coffin of Pan-Arabism was the Camp David peace accord between Israel and Egypt, which most of the other Arabcountries abhor to this day. In fact, the Egyptians do not really define themselves as Arabs, but as a distinct nation and civilization.

The Camp David Accords effectively gave victory in the region to the United States, but this was short-lived, lasting only to 1979 and the Iranian revolution.

U.S. Hegemony

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire the region was balkanized,and with the failure of Pan-Arabism, the hegemony of the U.S. in the region was essentially complete. This hegemony took the place of a local hegemony, and put the U.S. in the position as the guarantor of stability in the region.

The U.S. not only negotiated the Egypt-Israel agreement, but aligned itself strongly with Turkey, Iran, Saddam Hussein’s

Iraq, the Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain and most importantly, Saudi Arabia. The US. made sure that these countries were stable, even at the expense of supporting dictators

The Iranian revolution and the subsequent Iran-Iraq war blew a holein this order. The U.S. had an implacable enemy in Iran, who spreadits anti-U.S. ideology wherever possible. The U.S. supported Saddamin the in the inconclusive war with Iran, and was then forced into the first Gulf War to keep order in the region.

The use of Saudi-Arabia and other Muslim lands as a base to fight in the Gulf War was a major cause of anti-Western Islamic extremism, as was the U.S.’s unquestioning support of Israel

At the end of the day, the role of the U.S. as an imposer of order has failed.

The Iraq War

The final attempt (so far) at U.S. hegemony was the invasion of Iraq, which has created instability, strengthened Iran, and inflamed Arab nationalism and radical Islamism. Largely as a result, the region is in a state of chaos.

Many believe the U.S. and the West in general have consistently failed to understand the dynamics of the region and its peoples.

What could the U.S. have done differently?

The Influence of Oil

Is it really the crude, dude?

Is it a coincidence that the U.S. 5th Fleet, one of the most powerful naval forces in history, is based in Bahrain, in the Strait of Hormuz? This tells you about the geopolitical significance of oil.

Why did the Nazis invade the Soviet Union? Because they did not like communism? Wrong! Because they felt that the Soviet Union would prevent them from achieving their political and military aims? Wrong! They invaded because they needed the Azerbaijani oilfields in order to secure the necessary supply of oil to win WWII. They failed in this attempt and lost access to a critical warresource.

The first Gulf War is another example. The United States could not let an unreliable former ally, who had become an adversary, take control of the Kuwaiti oil fields and be a potential rival to SaudiArabia, a key U.S. ally, destabilizing oil supply. The invasion had

nothing to do with the U.S. protecting the sanctity of state sovereignty.

Every international order in early modern and modern history is based on an energy resource. Whereas the Age of Coal and Steam was the backdrop for the British Empire in the 18th and 19th centuries,the Age of Petroleum has been the backdrop for the American Empire from the end of the 19th to the early 21st centuries.

If the Middle East did not control 25% of the world’s oil reserves and production, and were not the lowest cost producer, it would be treated like sub-Saharan Africa, that is, not treated at all.

How important is oil in the geopolitics of the Middle East? Is it the overarching factor that determines policy and behavior?

ISIS and Iran

Why do you think the U.S. cares whether a tinpot group of Arabs create an Islamic State in Syria/Iraq? Is it because they abhor their ideology? Wrong! Is it because they fear global terrorism from this group? Wrong! They cannot allow a hugely unpredictable and hostile force to unsettle the region and even potentially take control of the region’s oil supply. Is the U.S. going to war over Boko Haram , the Central African Republic or Somalia? Exactly.

By 2030, 80 percent of China’s oil will come from the Middle East, and 90 percent in the case of India. (Japan and South Korea remain 100 percent dependent on oil imports, mostly from the Middle East.)As these countries grow in economic and political significance, theMiddle East will become more, not less, important in global affairs…..for a while.

At the moment, the security of this oil supply is provided by the United States, giving it huge leverage over China and India. At some point, China and to a lesser extent India will have to establish their own security of supply of Middle Eastern oil. This

is likely to create significant tensions with the U.S. unless the U.S. essentially vacates its Middle East security role.

The drop in the price of crude oil from about $100/bbl to $50/bbl has been largely engineered by Saudi Arabia as a geopolitical play to weaken Iran, its main competitor for power in the Middle East, and Russia, the main supporter of Syria, Saudi-Arabia’s enemy. Saudi Arabia sees Iran as its main existential threat, and believesit can win an oil price war and drive Iran into a budgetary crisis and prevent it from continuing to support Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas. The United States and Canadian oil industries are collateraldamage.

Further, the Saudi action is intended to remove Russia as an obstacle to Saudi Arabia and Qatar dominating the lucrative European natural gas market

The United States has changed the balance of oil power through its shale oil revolution, making it far less dependent on oil imports. However, the United States, even if fully independent of foreign oil, cannot permit instability in global oil markets which would seriously disrupt the global economy. Thus, the U.S. must protect Middle East oil flow, for the moment anyway.

Do you think Iran wants nuclear weapons to destroy Israel? Wrong, as they realize they would also be destroyed. Do you think that theUnited States cares whether Iran has nuclear weapons because it worries about Israel’s security? Wrong. Iran wants nuclear weapons to dominate the Gulf. The United States cannot allow Iran, an implacable enemy, to upset the balance of power in the Gulf and thus the security of world oil. Nuclear weapons would enable Iran to achieve hegemony in the Gulf and potentially dictate oil policy to the Gulf States and even Saudi Arabia.

Remember also that Iran wants nuclear weapons for defensive political reasons. It is outnumbered in the region by Sunni states.Nuclear enables it to achieve balance. Obviously it also needs nuclear weapons as a deterrent against Israel’s nuclear weapons

Are ISIS and Iran really the threats to global civilization they are being made out to be or is oil the primary issue motivating Western action?

In spite of all of the pressure from Washington and elsewhere to have him persuade Bashar Al-Assad to relinquish power, Putin is staying loyal to the isolated regime. It’s all about a major gas pipeline from Qatar through Iraq to the Mediterranean through Syria. This would bypass Russia’s pipeline and weaken its leverage over Europe. Assad has refused to let this pipeline proceed throughSyria, thus protecting Russia’s position. Further, Assad has agreedto an alternative pipeline from Iran that would supply Europe, but under Russia’s management.

The Syrian war is largely about who will control Syria, and throughit, access to the European gas market. It will either be Iran/Russia or Saudi-Arabia and its allies, including Qatar and theUAE. Without this issue, the sides in the Syrian war would lose financial support and the war would dramatically reduce its intensity.

Still wondering about why Russia supports Syria?

Why is renewable energy a threat to Israel’s long-term security?

Why did the U.S. facilitate the creation of the State of Israel? Because it believed in a homeland for the Jewish people? Because ofcollective global guilt over the Holocaust? Wrong on both counts. The U.S. created and has supported the State of Israel to establisha client state with strong military capability in the world’s most important region. Of course, in recent years, it has also been to get political donations from the American Jewish community.

If oil and gas become insignificant in the global energy picture, the Middle East becomes Zimbabwe, and Israel becomes of little geopolitical importance. At that point, its political support from the U.S. evaporates. Renewable energy that could ultimately replaceoil and gas would thus place Israel alone in facing its Arab and

Iranian adversaries. Of course the good news for Israel is that theArabs and Iran would very soon have little money for arms, but without U.S. support Israel would be very lonely in a hostile region. All this will not happen for maybe 30 years, but it will eventually happen.

The other factor affecting Israel’s position is that relatively soon, the overwhelmingly main customers for Middle Eastern oil willbe China, India and Japan. The question is whether they will have as much interest in ensuring Israel’s security as does the United States. They may see a better strategy as being to support their suppliers. Remember that China, Japan and India do not have Jewish political donors.

Should Israel be building stronger alliances with China, Japan and India, the future customers?

The Sunni-Shia Divide

How important is the Sunni-Shia Divide?

The divide in Islam between Sunni and Shia goes back to the death of Mohammed the argument about the succession to the leadership of Islam.

This led to the establishment of two main distinct branches of Islam, although there are several other sub-branches of the two main sects and smaller branches.

Historically, the leadership of Sunni Islam has been in Saudi-Arabia, with Mecca and Medina as the main spiritual centres. Leadership of Shi’ism is in Iran, with the main spiritual centre inQom.

Of the total global Muslim population of 1.6 billion, only about 200 million are Shia, with 1.4 billion Sunni. The Shia live almost entirely in four countries: Iran, Iraq Pakistan and India, althoughthere are smaller groups in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain amongst others.

Country Total population

Shia population

Shia of total(%)

Iran 68.7 million 61.8 million 90%

Iraq 26.8 million 17.4 million 65%

Saudi Arabia 27.0 million 2.7 million 10%

Lebanon 3.9 million 1.7 million 45%

Kuwait 2.4 million 730,000 30%

Bahrain 700,000 520,000 75%

Syria 18.9 million190,000 (+2.8 million)2 1% (+15%)

The United Arab Emirates 2.6 million 160,000 6%

Qatar 890,000 140,000 16%Source: Nasr: ‘When the Shiites Rise’.

Islam has been dominated by the Sunni, although the Sunni themselves are subdivided into many sects and the approach to religion is quite different in, for example, Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

The Shia have practically always been the oppressed in Islam and, partly for this reason, are usually perceived as the more politicized of the two strands. This makes them a potential threat in the new geopolitical situation in the eyes of the Sunni Arab regimes in those countries that have a Shia population, either a minority (Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, most small Gulf states, Yemen and to some extent Jordan) or a majority (Bahrain and Iraq)

The Sunni domination is not just through numbers, although that is important, but through the long-term religious leadership of Mecca,somewhat analogous to the leadership in the Christian world of the Vatican.

In general, how much of a role does religion play in geopolitics? Is it a major motivating factor?

Shi’ism went through a period of relative dormancy when Iran, the centre of the branch, was under the secular leadership of the Shah and his ascendants, and under U.S. control. The revival of Shi’ism can be traced to the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the accession to power of Ayatollah Khomeini. From that point, Iran defined itself in far more religious terms.

The first major clash between the two branches in the modern era was the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988. This began when Iraq invaded Iran via air and land on 22 September 1980. It followed a long history of border disputes, and was motivated by fears that the Iranian Revolution in 1979 would inspire insurgency among Iraq's long-suppressed Shia majority as well as Iraq's desire to replace Iran as the dominant Persian Gulf state.

A major motivating factor for the war was control of the Shatt-al-Arab waterway on the Persian Gulf, an important channel for both nations’ oil exports. However, after the Iranian revolution, the Pan-Islamic movement stimulated by that revolution threatened Saddam Hussein’s Arab nationalist views. The Sunni-Shia animosity contributed to the conflict, but deeper political issues did as well.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq, and its loss of both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, has led to a dramatically altered geopolitical situation in the Middle East. Iran has been able to accelerate its ambition of being the dominant power in the region, a position it held historically before the emergence of the Ottoman Empire, one that is realistic in light of Iran’s area, population and superior state of development.

The Sunni-ruled Arab states, and Saudi Arabia in particular, are increasingly challenged by Iran in the race for regional power. A region that has traditionally been ruled by Baghdad, Damascus and Cairo sees its fate falling into the hands of Washington, Tel Aviv and Tehran. Having to choose between the United States, the currentregional hegemon, and Iran, the Sunni Arab states prefer the former. Sunni-led Arab states are also discovering that their security interests increasingly converge with those of Israel.

The talk about a Shia revival at the regional level is essentially a response of the United States, the Sunni states and Israel to thenew geopolitical situation. The long-term desire for regional supremacy of Iran has become increasingly manifest in the post-Saddam Middle East. As a response, the United States has resorted to a strategy of geopolitical containment and it counts on the support of all its allies in the region to achieve this. It is critical to these players to prevent Pan-Islamism, so a divide and rule strategy is essential.

It is in the interests of the U.S. and its allies to maintain an arbitrary divide of ‘Sunni states’ and ‘Shia states’ or ‘moderates’and ‘radicals’. This strategy is aimed primarily at containing Iran’s power and strategic ambitions.

The rhetoric on all sides has created a real rise in sectarianism that may play a role in shaping events, particularly in states thatare weaker, such as Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. In a way “the genie isout of the bottle” and it will be hard to put it back. It may burn itself out but it will take time and those who see an advantage in stoking it will have to stop

However, it is hard to conclude that the prime motivating force in Middle Eastern events is religious sectarianism rather than the ambition for elimination of colonialism, and for power over land, resources, access to key oceans, control over key waterways and control over geographies that provide military advantage.

In the long term, this power game can possibly lead to a regional system divided into two spheres: the Shia and the Sunni – led by Iran and Saudi Arabia respectively. If this is the case, the UnitedStates and its Sunni allies will benefit from this regional dichotomy in the short term. In the long term, a sectarian divide is not beneficial for regional stability.

Iran’s goal is to have sufficient power to force the other players to accept its policy of an Islamic revolution, not necessarily Shi’ism, but a rejection of the West, including Israel.

Is the conflict in the Middle East primarily driven by the Sunni-Shia divide or is that divide masking the real struggle to prevent a region-wide Islamic RevolutionThe Arab Spring

What are the likely long-term consequences of the “Arab Spring”?

The Arab Spring was a series of popular uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East, triggered initially in Tunisia by the self-immolation of a street vendor.

This act set off a revolt in Tunisia against a corrupt and authoritarian government, followed by similar uprisings in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, all authoritarian governments, as well as in Iraq.

The governments in Egypt and Libya fell, while in Syria, the excessive use of force resulted in a violent reaction, ultimately leading to civil war, in which 220,000 people have been killed and millions displaced. In Bahrain, the Shia majority rose up against the Sunni minority. The Gulf Cooperation Council sent in troops to help put down the revolt, in some cases using torture and murder. In Yemen, the government changed but with little change in policy. This government has been overthrown and current Yemen has no unified government.

In Tunisia, the transition to a new government has been peaceful and the country has a liberal constitution and is stable. It is thesuccess story of the Arab Spring. Egypt, after the failed democratic experiment of the Muslim Brotherhood, is back to being run by the generals. Libya has two competing governments, in Tripoli and Tobruk respectively. Tribal militias and jihadist groups have taken advantage of the power vacuum. Most notably, radical Islamist fighters seized Derna in 2014 and Sirte in 2015 inthe name of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

Protests in Iraq by the Sunni minority led to government change, some reforms and the release of political prisoners. However, by this time ISIS had gained traction.

On the positive side, the Arab Spring triggered democratic and economic reforms in Jordan and Morocco without significant uprising.

There are three different readings of the impact of the Arab Spring:

o One is that the revolutions have unleashed forces in the region that cannot be reversed in that the people found their voice and forced the regimes into change and/or brutal crackdown. Several governments were removed. The invulnerability of authoritarian regimes has been shattered. Next time, the outcome will likely be more democratic power tothe people. The power of social media to facilitate change wasdemonstrated and it will be used again.

o A second is that the Arab Spring has unleashed negative forcesin the form of jihadist movements that were previously kept under tight control. This will result in disorder in the region for a long time as national governments, with international support, try and stop these movements from gaining ground. Democratic reform in these circumstances is a dream.

o A third is that the Arab Spring failed and that, mostly, the dictators have remained in power and will do for the foreseeable future. The aspirations of the people for democratic and economic reform will be thwarted indefinitely

Which of these narratives of the Arab Spring do you most agree with?

The Geopolitical Consequences of the Arab Spring

The Sunni Arab countries have moved closer together to contain the disorder resulting from the revolutions, and to counter the influence of Iran

Iran has lost in the sense that Syria, its ally has almost disintegrated, but it is clear that no settlement in Syria will be reached without Iran’s agreement, thus reinforcing Iran’s power.

Also, the chaos in Iraq has strengthened Iran’s hand there, making Iraq highly dependent on Iraq to provide order and help defeat ISIS.

The United States is the biggest geopolitical loser. The order in the region, in which it was effectively the regional hegemon has been destroyed. The ability of the U.S. to call the shots in the region is no more. It’s reputation as a supporter of the authoritarian regimes has been damaged. It will likely even be forced to make a deal with Assad to try and end the civil war in Syria, and will have to include Iran in these negotiations.

Turkey has lost in that it chose the “wrong” side in Egypt, and theKurds, with whom they have fought an ongoing war in Turkey, may gettheir own state from part of Iraq and Syria. Turkey has been shown to be pro-Islamist (soft Islamist, not ISIS), with serious consequences for NATO and its relationship with the U.S. and Israel. A new Turkey-Qatar axis seems to have emerged.

The Turks and the Sunni Arab nations, particularly Saudi-Arabia, are more at odds than they have been in a long time, making stability in the region difficult. In fact, it is possible that theTurks and Iranians will find more common cause, despite the fact that one is Sunni and the other Shia. The three-way rivalry betweenSaudi-Arabia, Iran and Turkey makes for a highly unstable geopolitical scenario, with each player jockeying for influence andpower, and attempting to bring other players into its sphere of influence.

In summary, the pre-Spring geopolitical order in the Middle East was the U.S. in charge, with its allies, Egypt, Israel, Turkey and Saudi-Arabia, with Iran and its allies Syria and Hezbollah as a relatively weak opponent, particularly since Syria would not actively act against U.S. interests.

The new geopolitical situation is two major factions, namely U.S.- supported Saudi-Arabia and Egypt, with Israel also under the U.S. security umbrella; and Russia-supported Iran, Iraq, Syria and Hezbollah. There are also two significant wild cards: Turkey, in

close alliance with Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood in several countries; and Jihadists, particularly ISIS, which aims to create anew state. Finally, the Kurds are also a stand-alone group seeking self-determination.

This is a highly unstable situation that likely cannot stand. Thereis a power vacuum created by the end of the U.S. order in the Middle East. The question is what new order will emerge and how.

Was the Arab Spring transformational? Should we hope for further freedoms for the people of the Middle East, or would continued dictatorships be a safer option?ISIS

What is ISIS and Why Does it Exist?

Major General Michael K. Nagata, the Special Operations commander for the United States in the Middle East, admitting that he had hardly begun figuring out the Islamic State’s appeal. “We have not defeated the idea,” he said. “We do not even understand the idea.” Yet we shall explain all.

This description in the March 15 issue of the Atlantic: “their state rejects peace as a matter of principle; that it hungers for genocide; that its religious views make it constitutionally incapable of certain types of change, even if that change might ensure its survival; and that it considers itself a harbinger of—and headline player in—the imminent end of the world.”

An alternative interpretation is that it is a bunch of out-of-control adolescents from around the world with no adult supervision.

Its rise to power is less like the triumph of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (a group whose leaders the Islamic State considers apostates) than like David Koresh or Jim Jones wielding absolute power over not just a few hundred people, but 8 million.

The Islamic State believes in returning society to 7th Century Islam, with all that means – in law, society, the role of women andmore. It therefore believes in the destruction of modernity

wherever it exists – in the Middle East and beyond. It is the most fundamentalist, absolutist Islamic sect that has so far emerged this century.

Despite its rejection of modernity, paradoxically the Islamic Statehas a highly organized administrative and military structure and makes better use of the internet than almost every developed nationgovernment or political party. This is not just a bunch of wild-eyed radicals

It has attracted psychopaths and adventure seekers, mostly from thedisaffected populations of the Middle East and Europe. But the religion preached by its most ardent followers derives from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam.

The late Edward Said, possibly the most influential scholar of Islam and the Arab world made it clear that the roots of modern-dayIslamic fundamentalism is tied up with the conditions in which these ideologies arose—the bad governance, the shifting social mores, the humiliation of living in lands valued only for their oil.

However, there is also a pure ideological element to ISIS. They arepreaching and acing out what strict adherence to Islam literally demands. They revel in the purity of their interpretation and practice of the religion.

ISIS has been compared to the Khmer Rouge in its nihilism. However,the KM were the official government of a recognized nation state and took heir seat at the UN, something ISIS would never do. They totally reject the world order.

What differentiates ISIS from your common or garden jihadist is that they have territory and aspire to govern. They basically want to create a state from at least Iraq to Istanbul, although they saythey want more. ISIS is not the next version of Al Qaeda, and counter-terrorism strategies will not defeat them. Although it usesterrorism as a tactic it is not really a terrorist group.

ISIS has 30,000 fighters, holds territory in both Iraq and Syria, maintains extensive military capabilities, controls lines of communication, commands infrastructure, funds itself, and engages in sophisticated military operations. If ISIS is anything, it is a pseudo-state led by a conventional army.

ISIS came into being largely thanks to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. After Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was essentially wiped out in 2006, it renewed itself inside U.S.-run prisons in Iraq, where insurgents and terrorist operatives connected and formed networks—and where the group’s current chief and self-proclaimed caliph, AbuBakr al-Baghdadi, first distinguished himself as a leader.

According to Gideon Rose in Foreign Affairs, March, 2015: “…three new factors came into play: increasingly inept and sectarian rule by the Shiite-

led government, increasing detachment on the part of Washington, and increasing violence in Syria. Together, these kindled the glowing embers of the left-for-dead Iraqi jihadist movement. Elements of the group formerly known asal Qaeda in Iraq resurfaced as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS; gained a foothold in the badlands of eastern Syria; and eventually conquered large swaths of western Iraq to boot, bringing death, destruction, and fanaticism in their wake”

Should the U.S. have detected the formation and growth of ISIS and stopped it before it became a significant force? What does it say about the U.S. and other Western powers that they completely missed it? What is the geopolitical significance of ISIS?

The answer to this is not yet clear, but it could range from negligible to transformational.

On the negligible side, it is clear that no state supports ISIS, and therefore there is little chance of ISIS creating a coalition of states pursuing its objectives.

However, there are relatively weak states that could succumb to an ISIS invasion. These include Jordan and Lebanon. This is not likelybut is conceivable. If this happened, it would create a massive threat to many other nations, including Saudi Arabia and Israel, and could cause a major war in the Middle East, with unforeseeable consequences. It could cause the fall of the Saudi government whichwould open up massive opportunities for Iran and Turkey to effectively control the region. This would be transformational.

A more likely geopolitical consequence of ISIS is the creation of an axis of cooperation between the U.S., Iran and Turkey. The latter two are the most capable militarily of stopping ISIS in its tracks. Such an alliance could lead to serious negotiations about how to end the war in Syria. This is a positive scenario, although it may not be liked by Saudi Arabia or Israel, as it would give clout to its sworn enemy, Iran, and its more subdued adversary, Turkey. Given recent events between Israel and the United States, and the results of the Israeli election, it could result in a more

balanced U.S. policy to the Middle East, with Israel having less favour.

Another scenario is that Turkey and Iran effectively contain ISIS without actually working together. This would give Iran greater power in Iraq and continue their influence in Syria. Turkey would merely remove the threat of ISIS on its southern border, but would not gain influence. The Syrian War would end to be settled on termsfavourable to Iran. Israel would be a loser by having a stronger Iranian presence on its border.

A final scenario is that ISIS gradually dies out through being unable to sustain its capacity to expand or even retain its territory. It is not clear how likely this is, but if it happened over the next year or two, it would mean little change in the geopolitics of the region, and it would be more or less “business as usual”

What is the most likely scenario resulting from ISIS and what should we hope for?

The Syrian War

What caused the Syrian war and where does it stand now

The modern Syrian state was established after World War I as a French mandate, and represented the largest Arab state to emerge from the formerly Ottoman-ruled Arab Levant. It gained independencein April 1946, as a parliamentary republic. The post-independence period was tumultuous, and a large number of military coups and coup attempts shook the country in the period 1949–1971. Between 1958-61, Syria entered a brief union with Egypt, which was terminated by a military coup.

For the last 40 years, under rule of the Baathist party, Syria has been a one-party dictatorship. In fact, since independence, Syria has never been a democracy. For the last 45 years the country has been ruled by the al-Assad family.

The main “opposition” has been Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood. In the late 1970s, an Islamist uprising by the Muslim Brotherhood was aimed against the government. Islamists attacked civilians and off-duty military personnel, leading security forces to also kill civilians in retaliatory strikes. The uprising had reached its climax in the 1982 Hama massacre, when some 10,000 – 40,000 people were killed by regular Syrian Army troops.

Syria actually participated in the first Gulf War coalition againstSaddam Hussein. Since then, however, Syria has had deteriorating relations with the West.

A key issue motivating politics in Syria is that the country is ruled by Alawite Shia, despite the fact that the majority of the population is Sunni. The Alawites control the key cities, the main economic assets and the military.

When the Arab Spring erupted in early 2011, a significant protest movement emerged in Syria. This was strongly supported by the West and brutally resisted by the Assad government. What the West failedto understand was that the uprising would create the opportunity for Islamist forces to come out from underground and seek power.

By 2015, the progressive, democratic Syrian freedom forces have been pushed into a small area of Northwest Syria by the Assad government with the help of Iran and Hezbollah. Al-Qaeda and related groups such as Al Nusra and the Khorasan network, also control parts of this area including the largest city, Aleppo. The Kurds have taken control of large swaths of the North and Northeast, and ISIS controls the large and sparsely populated desert area in the East.

The general view now is that Assad will survive, albeit controllinga smaller territory, and that the rest of Syria will be divided into a Kurdish area and a Sunni area, possibly controlled by ISIS.

Current military situation: Red: government, Green: rebels, Yellow: Kurds (Rojava), Grey: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, White: al-Nusra Front; Brown: disputed areas (for a more detailed map, see Cities and towns during the Syrian Civil War).

Did the West misjudge the impact of weakening Assad? Should they have supported him or just stayed out of it altogether?

What are the geopolitics of the Syrian war?

While geopolitics may not have started the Syrian war, they have now become a key dimension of it, to the extent that it has become a proxy war both regionally and globally.

Regionally, on the side are Iran, the Shi’ites of Iraq (including the government) and Hezbollah, the de facto rulers of at least partof Lebanon. Iran provides Assad with funding and weapons.

On the Sunni side are Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States in particular, but also less actively, Jordan, Egypt and Turkey. However, this support is complicated by the concerns that Islamist Sunni Jihadists would take control, destabilizing the region and threatening Sunni dictatorships. Thus, some of the Sunni governments are ambivalent. Saudi-Arabia and the Gulf States are clearly anti-Iran and will do whatever it takes to prevent an Iran-dominated Syria.

The Gulf States, particularly Qatar, have been accused of funding extreme Islamist movements, including those involved in Syria such as Al Nusra. The role of the Gulf States is murky. On the one hand they want stability at home, but they seem to be funding jihadi activity elsewhere.

The regional battle is part of the broader struggle for hegemony inthe region. Until the Iraq war, this was not an issue, but Iran nowhas far more power and is perceived as a huge threat by the Sunni countries.

The global dimension is largely a struggle for influence between the U.S. and Russia, with China also involved peripherally. Russia and China are both using the Syrian War as another opportunity to deny the U.S. hegemony as part of the broader agenda of weakening the U.S.’s influence globally.

However, Russia has far more specific reasons to support Syria, mainly access to the Mediterranean port of Tartus for military use,and even more to prevent the use of Syria as a transit route for a gas pipeline from the Qatar gas fields to serve Europe, which wouldweaken Russia’s stranglehold of gas supplies to Europe. Instead, Russia wants to see a pipeline from the Iranian gas fields through Syria. This would be controlled by Russia.

The U.S. would like to see the Syrian War end without Iran having strong influence, but recent events with ISIS threatening to make Syria a major base have led the U.S. to be less hostile to Assad staying in power. At the moment, no outcome of the Syrian war is good for the U.S. and the West. If Assad wins, the Iranians have

influence. If Assad loses, radical Sunnis will likely have control.A lengthy stalemate results in large tracts of territory controlledby ISIS and/or other radicals.

Looking longer-term, a possible scenario is a formal partition of Syria as part of a broader Middle East rearrangement. Possibly, theSunni parts of Syria and Iraq with Lebanon and the north would be aKurdish state, combined with Iraqi Kurdistan.

The alternative longer-term picture would be a combined Iraq, Syriaand Lebanon under the de facto control of Iran.

What should we hope for as an end to the Syrian War? What is most likely?

Turkey and the Kurds

Is Turkey the logical dominant power of the Middle East?

The historical context of Turkey is firstly that it was the governing centre of the Ottoman Empire and also the home of the Caliphate until it abolition in 1924. The Caliphate was, for centuries, the main organizing force of Sunni Islam, so effectively, Turkey (as the Ottoman Empire) was the centre of SunniIslam.

A corollary of the Ottoman Empire is that the Turks ruled over the Arabs. This was the backdrop to the Arab liberation movement depicted in Lawrence of Arabia. The Arabs were desperate to obtain freedom from the Ottomans and achieved this as a result of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after WWI. (However, as we know, the Arabs were immediately betrayed by Britain and France.)

Another key historical factor is that secularism was a key principle behind creation of the modern Turkish state in 1922. Thiscontinued until the election of the current President (formerly Prime Minister) Erdogan in 2003. Erdogan has taken Turkey in the direction of re-establishing Islam at the centre of Turkish life, with strong opposition from secular elites.

Turkey should be a bastion of stability in the Middle East, and to a large extent it is. It is a functioning democracy, despite Erdogan’s tendency to autocratic rule. It has a functioning civil society, a large population of almost 80 million and it has a strong economy, with a GDP per capita (PPP) of about $20,000. Turkey also has a large and strong military. Turkey is an importantmember of NATO.

A complicating factor is that because of the Ottoman history, the Arab Middle East would never accept Turkish leadership, so Turkey can only play a balancing and influential role.

Turkey, under Erdogan has chosen to advocate for a new Middle East order dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, which Turkey sees as an effective transnational Islamic network, but not one that is “jihadist”. The West and the Middle Eastern autocrats in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States (other than Qatar) strongly disagree with this as it would eliminate their power base.

Geopolitically, Turkey is staking out positions on many fronts thatare anti-U.S. and anti-West. This is partially a reaction to Turkeynot being welcomed into the EU and also an attempt to establish Turkish leadership over the Turkic peoples who stretch from Turkey,through Central Asia and into Western China. The Middle East is almost an afterthought for Turkey, other than wanting to prevent instability there from affecting Turkey, and wanting to prevent theformation of a Kurdish power base that would include Turkish Kurds.

For the meantime, Turkey will play a pragmatic, relatively low key role in the Middle East, seeking stability above all else, but not playing an activist role. If push comes to shove, it will tend to align with anti-Western forces such as Russia, with whom Turkey hasestablished an alliance. Turkey will have a soft anti-Israel stance, but will not align directly with Iran. Erdogan dislikes thecurrent regimes in Saudi-Arabia and Egypt but will not take a strong position against them. Their main ally is Qatar but this will be a non-active alliance.

Turkey’s global ambitions are to one of the leading non-aligned nations in the world, with strong influence across Central Asia. They will work with all major powers on a case-by-case basis. On the Middle East they will let the chips fall as long as they do notnegatively affect Turkey.

Can Turkey play an important role in stabilizing the Middle East?

Who are the Kurds and why are they significant?

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The Kurds are an ancient ethnic group that has inhabited an area straddling Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey for at least 1,500 years. They have a distinct language and culture. Most are Sunni Muslim, but some are Shia, and some are even Christian and animist. The Yazidis are a Kurd sect.

In total there are 35-40 million Kurds today, with about 15 millionin each of Turkey and Iran. Iraq has about 5 million Kurds, Syria 2million. The Kurds represent one of the four main ethnic groups in the Middle East, the others being Arabs, Persians and Turks.

The Kurds have been fighting for their own country for over a century. With the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, they were promised

a homeland but the global powers reneged on this under pressure from Turkey, and they were left out of the division of the Ottoman Empire.

Since then the Kurds have been fighting wars of liberation in Turkey, Iraq and Syria. They have had most success in Iraq, where after the first Gulf war, they were given a more or less autonomousregion in northern Iraq. Under the pressure of the ISIS threat, Assad has acknowledged Kurdish control over parts of northern Syria. The Kurds have been fighting an insurgent war against Turkeyfor decades, which has so far been inconclusive.

The Kurds are significant because they occupy territory taken or threatened by ISIS and represent one of the few fighting forces capable of resisting ISIS, as they have done in Kobane in northern Syria. The Turks, Syrian and the U.S. have been forced to work closely with the Kurds in the campaign against ISIS.

It is possible that the Kurds will obtain their own state in at least Iraq and Syria as part of their role in ultimately defeating ISIS (if this happens). They would probably play a role in stabilizing that region.

The argument against a united Kurdistan is that further fragmentation of the Middle East might prevent the kind of integration that ultimately would help bring peace and development to the region.

Should the Kurds get their own country or would it be preferable to have pluralistic countries incorporating minorities such as Kurds, Yazidis, Christians and Jews?

Egypt

Whither Egypt? Is it still a power?

Egypt is one of the oldest civilizations on earth, having had a continuous presence in the Nile basin. Egypt is today one of the

largest countries in the Middle East in area and the largest in population, at 88.2 million people. It has a substantial and diversified economy of $1trillion (PPP) and a per capita GDP (PPP) of $11,400, making it a middle-income country. Its Human Development Index is .628 or Medium. The income distribution is amongst the most equal in the developing world, although there is ahigh level of poverty

Egypt is located pivotally between the Middle East and North Africa, and this together with its size, has made it the critical country tying the Arab world together for centuries.

The Arab League, the main pan-Arab political organization, is headquartered in Cairo and its Secretary-General has traditionally been an Egyptian.

Egypt has, since the mid-1970s, been a strong ally of the U.S. and a “cold ally” of Israel. The country has been a military dictatorship since 1953, other than the brief flirtation with democracy after the Arab Spring. Egypt obtains significant militaryaid from the U.S.

Geopolitically, Egypt is “in play”. As the U.S. diminishes its involvement in the Middle East, Egypt is developing strong relations with China and Russia. From a geographic point of view, Egypt’s natural alignment is with Europe. The EU is by far Egypt’s largest trading partner, and this will increase. While the relationship with the U.S. is critical, it is not as sustainable asthat with Europe, and depends on U.S. interest in the region, whichis declining.

If the EU takes a strong BDS position vis-à-vis Israel, Egypt will be in a difficult position. It will be torn between its European economic relationship and its U.S. military relationship.

The U.S. also has criticized Egypt’s poor human rights record. Although it supported the Arab Spring and the ouster of Mubarak, itquickly reversed this posture once the Muslim Brotherhood became

the government. Calls by the U.S. for improvements in human rights for the Egyptian people ring hollow.

The Arab world still looks to Egypt for leadership in foreign affairs, although it does not always follow. If Egypt shifts away from a strong U.S. alliance, this may signal a broader shift in theMiddle East. Regionally, Egypt is strongly aligned with the Sunni nations other than Turkey and Qatar, both of which supported the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt also has poor relations with Iran, given its anti-Sunni posture.

In summary, how Egypt responds to the changing geopolitical landscape, particularly the falling U.S. involvement in the Middle East and a rising interest by the EU, China and Russia, may dictatehow the Arab world in general responds. Egypt is thus important to the geopolitics of the Middle East.

Will Egypt drift away from its U.S. relationship and become more Europe centric and alsoperhaps more interested in relationships with China and Russia?

Israel and Palestine

What underlies the struggle between Israel and the Palestinians? The lands that currently make up Israel and the Occupied

Territories were part of the Ottoman Empire until the end of WWI. Then the territory became known as Palestine under a British mandate. In 1947 the land was partitioned by a UN vote between a Jewish state and an Arab state.

The biblical Kingdom of Israel existed in these lands, including the West Bank until the second nation of Israel was defeated by theRomans in the 1st century AD. The Jewish peoples scattered mostly toEurope. The Central and Eastern European Jews became the Ashkenazi sect of Judaism, while the Iberian Jews became the Sephardis, the other main Jewish sect. As a result of persecution around the 15th century, the Sephardis fled mostly to North Africa and the Middle East but also Southern Europe and even India and the Far East.

The Jews in modern Palestine were relatively few in number, totaling only about 2,000 in 1800, 25,000 in 1882, 50,000 in 1900 and 85,000 in 1915, at most about 15% of the population. Palestine,despite being the location of ancient Israel, was not an easy placeto live, being a poor agrarian society, other than on the coast, where a trading economy existed, with greater affluence.

Larger numbers of Jews migrated to Palestine before and after WWI, not as formal immigrants but as settlers who had purchased land, mostly from absentee Ottoman and Arab landowners.

In 1917 the Balfour declaration gave British approval to a “national home for the Jewish people”, although perhaps not a stateper se. The intent is still disputed.

The Palestinians were excluded from the post-WWI peace talks and deals were cut, through fierce lobbying by the global Zionist community to permit Jewish migration and purchase of land.

After WWII, the State of Israel was established through a successful UN resolution. Palestine was partitioned between Israel and the West Bank which was eventually incorporated into Jordan. Obviously, the Holocaust played a role in this. However, the legitimacy of the State of Israel rests heavily on biblical roots.

There is little doubt that the Arabs came to view this resolution and the mass migration of Jews to Israel as an act of war. The creation of Israel and the subsequent war between the Arabs and Israel resulted in mass flight of the Palestinians to neighbouring lands, where they were mostly very poorly treated.

Israel established a ”right of return” for Jews worldwide to migrate to Israel. No such permission was allowed to the Arabs who had fled.

Subsequent to the initial UN resolution, Israel has expanded its territory on several occasions and there are those who want to see

greater expansion. Expansion has been a key dimension of Israel’s policy, for security and resources, as well as religious reasons.

Israel would prefer that the Palestinians go away and be absorbed into other Arab countries. So far this has not happened, partially because they are not accepted and partially because they want theirprevious territory back.

The Palestinians, on the other hand, have never accepted Israel’s right to exist, given that the creation of the country, from their point of view, was essentially an invasion.

Was the partitioning of Palestine a mistake? Should it just have been a single country with all the people - Arabs, Jews and others – living in it?

Why does Israel need the Occupied Territories?

Historically, the political entity or peoples occupying the area that is present day Israel have had control over the entire region up to the Jordan River, namely Israel and the Occupied Territories.

There are three reasons for this:o Security. There is no natural defense to the east of Israel

other than the Jordan river and the Jordanian Highlands. If the area to the west of the Jordan river is occupied by another entity or peoples, Israel is vulnerable. Israel lacks the strategic depth unless it controls the land all the way tothe Jordan river.

o Environmentally. Israel resides in a water-challenged region. Although Israel has done an excellent job of managing water, it cannot do so if it lacks access to the headwaters of the Jordan river and aquifers that are at least partially in the Occupied Territories.

o Economically. While less compelling, the area between the Jordan and the Mediterranean represents a natural economic entity. The peoples of the coastal plain are naturally complemented by those living in the agricultural interior.

For these reasons, Israel feels compelled to occupy the West Bank and ultimately absorb it into Israel. However, it cannot do so and give Palestinians living there political rights, unless it accepts that Israel/West Bank become a full democracy with political rightsfor all.

There are several scenarios for the future of Israel/Palestine:

o Two State Solution: Under this scenario, the Occupied Territories would become a Palestinian state, roughly in the territory left after the 1967 war, with land swaps to take settlements into account. This scenario is unlikely and becoming less likely every year, given the large numbers of settlements, the complexity of the land swaps required, the restrictions Israel will place on true sovereignty for any Palestinian state and because Israeli political opinion will not permit it. The Palestinians may unilaterally declare theirown state, with global support, but it would be a state in name only, with Israel controlling it in many ways. Israel maybe forced to negotiate a more substantive Palestinian state, but it is difficult to imagine that this state would be viableunless it economically integrated with Israel. As noted above,the most logical state is one including both Israel and the West Bank. Overall, the window for a two state solution is likely already shut.

o Continued Occupation: This is the status quo, with Israel denying Palestinians political or basic human rights, and building more and more settlements. Israel’s strategy here is to hope that eventually the Palestinians give up and accept occupation or just leave the territory. So far, the Palestinian have shown no signs of doing either, and global opinion is not likely to support it. The BDS (Boycott, Divest and Sanction) campaign would get stronger. The level of violence in Israel would increase significantly, and Israel would become even more of a security state.

o One State Solution: This could, and likely will evolve from the present situation when the Israeli government formally admits that it will never accept the two -state solution, as it more or less did in the recent election. This would

initially, perhaps for a decade or two, be a state with political rights only for citizens of Israel. However, the Occupied Territories would be fully integrated into Israel. Global action against this scenario would be intense, with a high level of BDS. Eventually, as in the case of South Africa,this would collapse and a true single state would emerge, withpolitical and human rights for all. However, there would be no“Jewish State” per se, although Jewish elites would dominate this integrated state, as is the case of whites in South Africa. This scenario would be difficult to achieve because ofresistance by the Israeli right. However, it may be forced on Israel eventually, perhaps 10-20 years from now. The questionis whether it would be achieved peacefully.

Which scenario for Israel/Palestine is most likely?

What are the geopolitics of the Israel-Palestine situation?

Since its inception, the Israel-Palestinian conflict has been part of a bigger geopolitical game. Initially, both the U.S. and Soviet Union supported the creation of Israel in order to gain influence in the Middle East, and in the latter case, also for ideological reasons.

From the early 1950s, the Soviets aligned themselves with the Arabsbecause they saw an opportunity to expand their ideology to the region as Arab countries, notably Egypt and Syria, embraced socialism. Strangely, this was the only era in which the U.S. adopted a somewhat even-handed approach to the Israel-Arab conflict, although they still favoured Israel as a bulwark against Soviet influence

From 1967 onwards, U.S. support for Israel became unquestioned, andSoviet support for the Arabs became the norm. However, the U.S. influence in the region was far stronger than any other power, because the region was of critical importance to the U.S.

The end of the cold war saw Soviet influence further diminish, suchthat geopolitically, the Middle East was under the sole domination of the U.S. which became the prime influencer of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The U.S. orchestrated peace talks at various points, suchas Oslo (1993 onwards), Camp David (2000) and the abortive John Kerry attempt of 2013-2014.

The current “peace process” is being orchestrated by the “Quartet”,namely the U.S., EU, UN and Russia. This has gone nowhere.

Given the complexity of and threats within the Middle East in general, and domestic politics, it is unlikely that the U.S. will do much to address the Israel-Palestine issue during Obama’s remaining term. However, Obama is going to change the tone of U.S. relations with Israel. He may withhold a U.S. veto over UN votes for a Palestinian state. Also, the nature of Jewish support for Israel in the U.S. is changing, with less unquestioned support, particularly amongst younger Jews.

Russia has re-entered the picture, with alliances with Iran and Turkey. It is possible that Russia will gradually have a bigger influence in the Middle East and be part of a global coalition to pressure change by Israel. The EU, while not a big influencer in foreign affairs, is already strongly for a Palestinian state. The EU could change the game with a strong BDS campaign in response to Netanyahu’s recent statements. Israel is heavily dependent on imports from and exports to EU nations, and an effective BDS campaign would hurt Israel, perhaps seriously. (Europe makes up 44%of Israel’s exports, compared with 12% to the U.S.)

Looking at the bigger picture, oil politics are changing. The biggest customers of Middle East oil are now China, Japan and India. The U.S. is oil self-sufficient. Gradually, the U.S. interest in the Middle East is declining as it faces the China challenge, an assertive Russia, an increasingly independent Latin America and a whole set of unaligned powers such as India, Indonesia, Brazil and Turkey. None of these countries views Israel in a particularly positive light. In short, the U.S. need to support Israel unquestioningly as an ally for energy reasons is

diminishing, and there are other nations who are more likely to want to keep oil suppliers happy.

Paradoxically, it is some of these oil suppliers who are emerging as supporters of Israel, particularly Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, as part of the struggle against Iranian hegemony and because they see Israel as a bulwark against radical Islamism. Nevertheless, Israel faces an implacable enemy in Iran and an emerging enemy in Turkey. These are the two biggest powers in the Middle East today.

The picture that is emerging is global isolation of Israel.

Will geopolitics change the Israel-Palestine picture in the next 10 years?Iran-Saudi Competition

What does Iran really want and how should the West act towards Iran?

According to Stephen Kinzer in the Boston Globe, January 18, 2015: “In a region full of fake, made-up countries, one Muslim power is sure to survive: Iran. It is the opposite of a fake country. Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia are less thana century old. Iran has existed — more or less within the same boundaries, with more or less the same language — for 2,500 years. Colonialists never managed to divide it, and it stands today as an island of stability in a volcanically unstable region.”

Similarly, Robert D. Kaplan, one of the world’s leading geopolitical analysts, in Real Clear World on March 18, 2015 describes Iran as follows: “The external behavior of Iran's regime is simply moredynamic and more effective than that of any other Muslim regime in the Middle East. Iran has constructed thousands of centrifuges. Tehran has trained and equipped Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shiite forces in Iraq and Yemen, and it has propped up Syria's embattled president. Turkey and the Arab world appear sleepy-eyed in comparison. Iran acts. The other Muslim countries struggle to formulate responses, and when they do, they are still less effective than the Iranians”.

Kaplan goes on to make the point that Iranian success derives from the fact that it is more than a state: it is both a civilization and includes a “sub-state”, namely a large group of highly

committed believers with a clear ideology and the capacity to project this ideology. This is of course the Revolutionary Guard, described by Kaplan as a “lethal and innovative force”. It consistsof 125,000 military personnel, as well as 90,000 paramilitary forces and 300,000 reservists.

Other than a nuclear attack, Iran’s military position is impregnable. Even the U.S. would almost certainly be unable to defeat Iran on Iranian territory.

Iran also is a large country in a unique and highly privileged geographic position, along the east-west transit route from the Middle East to India and beyond. It also controls access to the critically important Straits of Hormuz.

The Iranian ideology is anti-West and anti-Israel. It is informed by Shi’ite Islam as well as resentment for Western actions over thelast 100 years, particularly the initial exploitation of oil wealthand the CIA coup that removed nationalist leader Mohamed Mossadegh from office in 1953. However, according to various analysts the real Iranian agenda is to protect Shi’ism and prevent Western domination and efforts at regime change.

The Iranian state is obviously bolstered by massive oil and gas reserves, which, despite sanctions, brings Iran significant foreignrevenue. Iran’s population is 78 million and it has a GDP (PPP) of $1.3 trillion and a per capital GDP (PPP) of $16,500. Its human development index is “high”, and its level of inequality is relatively low. Iran already has one nuclear reactor.

All of this is to say that Iran is a formidable player by almost any standard. Economic sanctions have made life difficult but have not remotely brought the country to its knees. The West has to livewith Iran whether it likes it or not.

Iran has been a winner result of Middle Eastern events in recent years. The pivotal event was the Iraq war, which largely destroyed Iraq as a functioning country and put the Shi’ite majority in power, under the influence of Iran. Shi’ite groups under Iranian

influence are major players in Syria, Lebanon and Yemen and also possibly in Bahrain where a Shi’ite majority is under Sunni rule.

Iran is in a situation in which it will either reach a nuclear control agreement with the West or likely obtain nuclear weapons. If the former, then the geopolitical alignment against Iran will change, with more normal relations between Iran and the West. If the latter, Iran will dominate the Middle East and clearly be able to confront its Sunni rivals in various ways. It would almost certainly not use its nuclear deterrent against conventional attack.

The West deplores Iran’s ideology and actions, but it is in fact a relatively predictable player with well-understood goals. Geopolitical analysts actually see it as a stabilizing force in theMiddle East because it confronts jihadi groups such as ISIS. Israel’s own security leadership views Iran as an exaggerated threat. The Israeli government uses Iran as a tool to keep the U.S.supporting Sunni dictatorships that implicitly support Israel.

There are voices in Israel and the West that believe there should be a rapprochement with Iran beyond just signing a nuclear deal, asthey see Iran as a country that can prevent Middle Eastern chaos. They see Iran as having more legitimacy than Saudi and Gulf monarchies that export radical ideology while having the benefit ofU.S. protection.

The counter argument is that Iran cannot be trusted and that its agenda is annihilation of Israel and domination of the Middle East.However, According to Pat Buchanan, a conservative U.S. commentator, there is no reason for Iran to want nuclear weapons when they are on a path to achieve their objectives without them.

Should the West have a more balanced approach to the Middle East, building a constructive relationship with Iran?

What about Saudi Arabia?

Saudi Arabia has, for several decades, been the global leader in oil markets, not always in production quantity, but in its low-costproduction and its ability to swing global oil markets, as it is byfar the biggest oil exporter. Only Russia is even remotely close.

Saudi Arabia has only existed as a country since 1932 but it is thehome of the holiest sites of Islam, giving it a special place in the global Muslim community, particularly amongst Sunni Muslims.

The country has a population of 30 million, a GDP (PPP) of $1.65

trillion and a per capita GDP (PPP) of $54,000, making it a very rich country. It has a “very high” Human Development Index, indicating that its wealth is used to benefit the population.

However, the Kingdom officially practices a Wahhabism, a very conservative form of Islam, and exports this religious ideology across the Sunni world. Even more extreme Salafists also are present in Saudi society, and these groups are seen as having givenrise, financing and support to Al-Qaeda and other jihadi groups. This is generally known in the U.S. but not publicly acknowledged.

Human rights, particularly women’s rights in the Kingdom are severely constrained, far more so than in Iran, where it is mainly political rights that are limited.

Since its creation, Saudi Arabia has been a vassal of the United States, relying ofn a U.S. security umbrella and aligning its foreign policy with U.S. interests. Because of its immense wealth, Saudi Arabia is a huge player in global financial markets, again tying it tightly to U.S. interests.

Some analysts see Saudi Arabia not so much as a country but as an oil producing dependency of the United States. Interestingly, SaudiArabia was at one time an adversary of Israel, but now has similar foreign policy objectives, namely the retention of the Sunni dictatorships in the Middle East, and the demonization of Iran and other Shi’ite states. Saudi Arabia funnels large sums to the Sunni dictatorships to promote Wahhabism, and to fund military spending

to keep them in power. However, elements within Saudi Arabia also fund the jihadis.

Saudi Arabia has the highest percentage of military spending to GDPin the world, more than 10% (the U.S. is about 4%). It has a standing army of 200,000.

Saudi Arabia is generally regarded to have lost influence in the Middle East because of the growing ascendancy of Iran. The two countries, in addition to their religious differences, have fundamental differences in foreign policy. The Saudis are content being closely tied to the U.S., while Iran takes a strongly independent stance. Both countries are exporting their form of Islam, although in Iran’s case, this is more of a defensive motivation given Shi’isms minority status and history of being marginalized and oppressed in the Muslim world.

The Iraq and Syrian conflicts are seen as being proxy wars between Iran and Saudi Arabia, as is the civil war in Yemen. Most analysts do not see peace and stability in the Middle East until Saudi Arabia and Iran reach some rapprochement.

Interestingly, until the Iranian revolution, Iran and Saudi Arabia co-existed more or less in harmony. This was largely because both were tied closely to the U.S., but more particularly because the Shah had submerged Shia identity under modernization. Shi’ism in the Middle East was until 1979 highly marginalized. The Iranian revolution changed that, bringing the two countries, and their respective allies, into sharp confrontation.

Why should the West continue to be aligned with Saudi Arabia? Does this represent idealism, protection against an Iranian threat or a desire to retain the status quo in the Middle East?

The External Players

The U.S.

Since WWII, other than a limited Soviet disruption, the U.S. has effectively ruled the Middle East. It has provided a security guarantee, placed governments in power, removed governments from power, created the State of Israel and made war on numerous occasions.

Of course, this has been justified on the basis of spreadingdemocracy and ensuring stability and peace, but it has mainly beenabout securing oil supply.

It seriously miscalculated the situation in Iran in the latter daysof the Shah, leading to its complete break from perhaps the most significant Middle Eastern country. It is now desperately trying tonormalize this situation.

It made perhaps the biggest foreign policy error of the last 60 years with its invasion of Iraq.

It totally missed the Arab Spring and its flawed reaction to this has allowed outright chaos in the region.

The U.S. no longer needs Middle Eastern oil, although it does need oil to flow for the sake of the global economy.

U.S. Middle Eastern policy is in shreds. There is no longer a coherent policy other than “don’t do stupid stuff”, which might have been a good idea starting 60 years ago. The current policy is to retain some balance of power in the Middle East, whereby no regional hegemon emerges, and to intervene as minimally as possibleto limit chaos. The U.S.’s Israel policy of a two state solution was at one time rational but is probably no longer viable.

The Iranians, sworn enemies, are making gains. Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen are in a state of chaos. Two of these are major oil suppliers. Thus the U.S. has to check this by supporting the Saudis, Gulf States and Egypt.

Russia

Russia retains influence in the Middle East, mostly with Iran and Syria. This is partially an attempt to disrupt U.S. influence in the region, but is also an attempt to retain access to the Mediterranean and influence gas pipelines. It should be noted that the Russia could transit land forces through Azerbaijan, Iraq and Syria to the Mediterranean if such territories were weak or friendly, which they now are.

Russia’s geopolitical agenda is clearly to push back on U.S. hegemony and to create a multi-polar world, in which Russia is one of the major power centres. As a result, Russia takes opposing positions to the U.S. Russia’s support for Iran and Syria reflects this. In addition, Russia has a long historical relationship with Syria, through the cold war.

Russia clearly does not want to see radical Islam gain ground givenits problems with its own Islamist groups in its southern republicsof Chechnya and Dagestan, so this is a further reason to support Syria and Iran against ISIS.

It is unlikely that Russia will expand its influence in the Middle East, and it may lose some influence if there is a rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran, but most likely it will remain Iran’s strongest global ally.

China

China has little historical political relationship with the Middle East. Like Russia, it is obstructive of U.S. hegemony in the region, using its Security Council veto to block U.S. resolutions against Iran.

However, China’s interest in the region is mainly energy and economic opportunity. China has just overtaken the U.S. as the largest importer of oil. It sources just over half its oil from theMiddle East, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Oman, the UAE and Kuwait. It obtains the rest from several other countries. China’s position as a large oil importer from the region will give it

increasing interest and influence in the region. So far it has avoided taking strong positions on political matters in the region,and this is likely to remain the case.

China also sees a significant opportunity in the Middle East market. China is building a rail link from Western China through Central Asia to the Middle East. China is investing large sums on infrastructure across the Middle East and is exporting large volumes of consumer goods to the Middle East, largely through Dubai, and then on to other countries.

While Saudi Arabia is critical to China as its largest oil supplier, much of China’s expanding role in the region is linked toIran and its larger geopolitical importance. China-Iran trade rose from $400 million in 1994 to $11 billion in 2008 and finally to $50billion in 2012. Fifty percent of Iran’s total trade is now with China, Iran’s third largest trading partner.

Since the early 1990s, China has been helping Iran build and rebuild infrastructure projects such as highways, subways, factories, dams, ports, airports, shipyards, and energy projects, some of which were severely damaged during the Iran-Iraq war and the Iraq War. One of the few countries to have violated the US-led sanctions against Iran, China opposed tougher sanctions pushed by the United States to curtail Iran’s oil exports.

One added benefit for China in dealing with Iran is to exploit its favourable geographic location. Bordering the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, Iran can serve as an essential geographic bridge to China’s efforts to secure energy resources in Central Asia and the Middle East (see map ), a critical locational influence Robert Kaplan calls “the Iranian pivot”.

China has stayed more or less neutral in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and managed to earn a constructive role in the eyes of both Palestinians and Israelis

China’s large and growing economic footprint will give it growing geopolitical influence in the region, over time possibly superseding that of the U.S.

What would be the implications of China being the main geopolitical power influencing the Middle East?