the education of israel's negev beduin: background and prospects

Th d t n f r l N v B d n: B r ndnd Pr p tIsmael Abu-Saad

Israel Studies, Volume 2, Number 2, Fall1997, pp. 21-39 (Article)

P bl h d b nd n n v r t PrDOI: 10.1353/is.2005.0046

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21

Ismael Abu-Saad

The Education of Israel’s NegevBeduin: Background and Prospects

INTRODUCTION

THE EDUCATION OF BEDUIN-ARAB tribes has historically posed a uniquechallenge, especially given their nomadic/semi-nomadic lifestyle. Duringthe last half century, Beduin life throughout the Middle East has undergonemany changes. This is particularly true for the Beduin-Arabs of the NegevDesert in southern Israel, whose social, economic and political life has beenaltered quite radically since the establishment of the state of Israel. Thisarticle reviews the development of the educational system for the NegevBeduin-Arabs over the past Wve decades in relation to their changing envi-ronment, and evaluates its eVectiveness in meeting the new challenges ofeducating this community.

TRADITIONAL BEDUINSOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND EDUCATION

Arabs of the Middle East have developed three predominant settlementpatterns from which they also take their identity: town dwellers [medani],villagers [qarawi], and desert-dwellers or Beduin [badwi]. Desert, villageand city have been intimately related to each other in Arab society culturally,socially, and economically. Though the Beduin constitute only a small anddeclining proportion of the Arab population, they have played an impor-tant role in creating the values of Arab civilization, as well as holdingimportant economic functions.1 Traditionally, the Beduin adapted to theirharsh desert environment by engaging in pastoral nomadism, and thus theyserved the vital role of the stock-breeders of the Middle East. Nomadicpastoralists have been classiWed into two types: nomads, who depended

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22 • israel studies, volume 2, number 2

totally on their animals (camels, goats and sheep); and semi-nomads, whopracticed a combination of agriculture and herding.2

Traditionally, the social and political organization of the Beduin com-munity was tribal. The tribe was a state-like form of political organizationwhich was based on kinship of a common ancestor and which had a deWniteterritory.3 Though the tribe also typically included a number of non-bloodrelated extended families, it was deWned as a single unit through universalrecognition of the leadership of the Sheikh and his Beit [family]. The triballeadership remained within the family of the Sheikh, making the politicaland social organization of the Beduin ascriptive rather than achievement-based. While the Beit was the basic economic unit, the Hamula [extendedfamily], the Rubah [subtribe], and the Ashireh [tribe] were organized prima-rily to serve the tribal community’s interests of mutual self-defense, collec-tive pasture rights, and migrations.4 The functions of the Sheikh were: 1) toallocate pasture and coordinate migration; 2) organize raiding; 3) settledisputes; and, 4) represent his tribe or any member of his tribe in importantmatters against the sedentary people or other tribes.5

This paper deals with the Beduin tribes of the Negev Desert in south-ern Israel, who have inhabited this area since the 5th century A.C.6 Themajority of them derived their subsistence from herding and seasonal culti-vation.7 Historically, mutual self-defense in the Negev was maintained bylocal balances of power between opposing tribes. After the tribal war of1890, tribal land boundaries remained Wxed until the 1948 war, by whichtime the Beduin of the Negev numbered approximately 100,000, and wereorganized into 95 tribes.8

The Beduin tribes of the Negev were divided into three hierarchicalsocial classes according to their origin: a) true Beduin (nobles); b) Fellaheen(peasants), and 3) A’beed (blacks). The true Beduin, who originally camefrom the Arabian desert, made up the tribe’s leadership class, and owned thevast majority of the lands. The Fellaheen came from villages on the fringes ofthe desert, and joined the Beduin tribes generations ago. They worked theland of the true Beduin as sharecroppers. The third group, the A’beed, wereoriginally brought from Africa as slaves of the Sheikh’s family, althoughslavery was abolished long ago.9

Traditionally, most of Beduin education was not formalized, but wasrather acquired through actual observation and participation in the processof day-to-day life. There was no deWned curriculum to be artiWcially ac-quired, nor were there any unnecessary drills. According to Jamali,10 theBeduin were not interested in learning about things that did not touch their

The Education of Israel’s Negev Beduin • 23

lives. Instead, the informal system of education they developed was veryeYcient in preparing Beduin youth for the life they were to lead.

In addition to this broadly-based informal education, there were lim-ited opportunities available to boys for obtaining formal education. Themost common of these were the traditional Muslim schools called Kuttab,which usually functioned in a tent around the sheikh’s residence. Modestfees were charged for attending these schools, and the services were notutilized by all, but rather by the boys of those fathers who saw a value informal education. Classes were usually comprised of about 20 boys, roughlybetween the ages of 5 and 12, who were taught to memorize the wholeQuran by sheer repetition. In addition, they learned reading, writing, andthe precepts of Islam. The Quran was generally the only text book and slatesand slate pencils were the only materials. Some arithmetic was later addedto this curriculum, which was clearly religious and moral in content. TheKuttab teachers (called Khatib) were elderly males with no qualiWcationsother than moderate literacy and orthodox piety. The teachers lived as apermanent guests of the tribe to which they were attached and wouldmigrate along with the tribe. They usually lived in the guest section of theSheikh’s tent where they were provided with food, shelter, and coVee.11

Toward the end of this period, there were also a few Western-styleschools in the area which were set up during the British Mandate, but it wasusually only the sons of the tribal sheikhs who had access to such educa-tional opportunities.12

Thus, prior to the establishment of the state of Israel, there were severalforms of education available to Beduin children, all of which helped tomaintain the social, economic, and political status quo. All Beduin childrenreceived an informal education that was very well-suited to preparing themfor the roles they were to take on as adults; and for most Beduin, this was theonly form of education they considered essential for their children’s future.Some boys also received a traditional Muslim (Kuttab) education, whichhelped to reinforce the religious mores of the society, in addition to provid-ing them with basic literacy and math skills. Broader, western-style educa-tional opportunities were also available to the sons of the tribal elite whorepresented the future leadership of the society.

This background provides the context for examining the social andeducational changes that have taken place since the establishment of thestate of Israel. The changes in Negev Beduin-Arab society and the concur-rent development of the educational system under Israeli rule can be di-vided into two periods: 1) the establishment of the state of Israel and the


Military Administration (1948–1966); and, 2) the end of the Military Ad-ministration to the present.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAELAND THE MILITARY ADMINISTRATION (1948–1966)

In 1948, with the establishment of the state of Israel, the traditional social,economic and political order of the Negev Beduin-Arabs was radicallydisrupted. Their numbers were reduced from 100,000 to 11,000.13 The vastmajority Xed or were expelled by the Israeli authorities, and went to theGaza Strip, Egypt, the West Bank, and Jordan;14 They were not allowed toreturn to their homes and lands, and as a result, the Negev Beduin-Arabcommunity was split between three countries (Israel, Egypt, and Jordan).Of those tribes remaining in the Negev, many of which were split andfragmented, only 19 tribes received oYcial recognition from the Israeligovernment.15 The sheikhs of these tribes were given semi-oYcial status bythe government and served as the local liaisons between the governmentand the members of their tribes.

The Israeli authorities took control of most of the land in the Negev, sothe Beduin remaining in the Negev lost the freedom to move around withtheir herds and cultivate their lands.16 Twelve of the 19 tribes were removedfrom their lands, and the whole population was conWned to a specially-designated Restricted Area in the northeastern Negev, representing only10% of the territory they controlled before 1948.17 As one Beduin sheikhstated:

. . . the land expropriation and the forced expulsions without compensation orthe right to return . . . brought the Beduin to a situation which [was] diYcultboth psychologically and materially, and to a lack of security unlike anythingthey had previously known.18

The Negev Beduin were also placed under military administrationuntil 1966, as were all other Arabs in Israel. The Military Administrationmeant, among other things, that they could not return to and cultivate theirlands, they were isolated from the Arab population in other parts of Israel,and they needed special permits to leave their designated sections of theRestricted Area to look for jobs, education, markets, etc.19 During thetenure of the Military Administration, the authorities took great care toprevent the migration of the Beduin out of the Restricted Area. Beduin men


who were given permits to work in the Jewish sector were not allowed tobring their families with them, thus ensuring their return to the RestrictedArea. Even within the Restricted Area, a Beduin of one tribe could not visitthe area of another tribe without the permission of the Military Governor.20

The Beduin community’s economic and socio-political bases weredramatically altered during this period. Due to the loss of their lands andmobility, it became impossible for the majority of Beduin to maintain theirtraditional livelihood of herding and seasonal cultivation. The traditionaltribal leadership, with its functions of providing for the defense, the collec-tive pasture rights, and the migrations of the community, also becamevirtually irrelevant. The restrictions imposed by the Israeli governmentrepresented a form of forced sedentarization, which virtually ended theirsemi-nomadic way of life.21

The Beduin’s traditional forms of education were also severely dis-rupted by these changes. The formal schools were closed or rendered inac-cessible when the Beduin population was moved to the restricted area.22 Inaddition, the loss of land and restricted mobility greatly reduced the viabil-ity of the informal education that had prepared Beduin children to take ontheir adult roles in the work of herding and agriculture. Nor was theeducation provided in the Kuttab schools suYcient to prepare Beduin youthfor integration into the modern, industrialized Israeli labor market.

Under the new Israeli government, a law was passed in 1949 makingeducation compulsory and mandating that every child receive free elemen-tary schooling (from the ages of six to thirteen). The state was obliged toprovide trained teachers, salaries, and facilities. It was also responsible forcurricula.23 However, the new Israeli institutions were busy with the ab-sorption of Jewish immigrants, and thus, inevitably, schools for Arabs werenot a priority.24 This was especially true for the relatively widely-dispersedNegev Beduin population. From the perspective of the Israeli educationalauthorities (which did not diVer much from that of other sedentary authori-ties that had ruled over the Beduin in the past), the Beduin were seen asoutsiders rather than as an integral part of the society, and, consequently,the educational services provided to them were very minimal.25 For most ofthe Negev Beduin tribes, a whole generation had no access to formaleducation.26

Initially, there was little interest in the new Israeli schools among theNegev Beduin tribes, many of which had received promises that they wouldbe allowed to return to their lands and former way of life.27 Thus, during theearly stage of Israel’s statehood, attendance of government schools was low,and nothing was done to enforce the Compulsory Education Law. The vast


majority of schools had only four grades, and the average number of pupilsper school was 40.28 In 1956, there were only 350 Beduin students enrolledin schools, out of a population of 2,000 school-age children. By the end ofthe school year, only 220 students were still attending school (representinga 37% dropout rate within one year), and all of them were boys.29 The issueof girls attending school was especially problematic. Traditionally, femaleswere restricted to the world of the extended family and carried out many ofthe responsibilities of the household economy (i.e., herding; milking andprocessing milk products; making the animal hair and wool into carpets,tents, mattresses and pillows; harvesting crops; etc.). They were also consid-ered the “bearers of the family honor,” and thus, their families preferred notto risk their reputations by allowing girls to travel alone and mix with malesfrom other tribes.30 Therefore, there was much more reluctance among theBeduin over sending their daughters to school than over sending their sons,especially when schools were far away.

During the period of the Military Administration, the students whowanted to obtain a high school education had to attend schools in thenorthern Arab villages because there were no high schools for Arabs in theNegev. It was only feasible for a few students to pursue this option becauseof the high cost and the diYculties in obtaining a permit to leave their area.

Thus, education basically suVered a regression for the Negev Beduinduring this period. The traditional education was either disrupted or lost itseYcacy for preparing Beduin children for adult life in their new context. TheIsraeli government was slow in establishing public schools for the Beduin,and the Beduin themselves initially showed very little interest in this newform of education, since its relevance was not immediately apparent tothem.

END OF MILITARY ADMINISTRATION TO PRESENT

The Military Administration over Arabs in Israel was lifted in 1966, andshortly after that the War of 1967 marked another period of change. Withthe lifting of the Military Administration, the Negev Beduin were broughtinto greater contact with broader Israeli society, where economic and socialstatus were determined more by education and individual achievementthan by background. The vast majority of the Beduin became dependentupon working in the Jewish sector, primarily as unskilled laborers, sincethey had lost their lands and traditional livelihoods.31


Furthermore, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, substantial changestook place as a result of Israeli government plans to resettle the entire NegevBeduin population into seven urban-style towns (Tel-Sheva, Rahat, Arara,Kseifa, Segev Shalom, Hura, and Laqyia). The oYcial government rationalefor establishing these towns was to “modernize the Beduin” and providethem with services more eYciently;32 however, the transfer of the Beduin tourban settlements also coincided with other government aims for the devel-opment of the Negev. As a Jewish Israeli commentator stated:

The transfer has a triple purpose: 1. to redress the ratio between Jews andArabs in underpopulated areas; 2. to provide land for [Jewish] settlement anddevelopment programmes; 3. to release more beduin manpower for labour inthe Jewish economy.33

This concentrated settlement policy was designed to serve as an oYcialtool for transforming Beduin land into state-owned land.34 Once the Beduinlost the means of engaging in an agricultural livelihood, more Beduin laborbecame available for the Jewish economy.35

The urban settlement program has been controversial, especially givenits radical departure from the Beduin’s traditional way of life. While themajority of governments in the Middle East have developed programsencouraging the Beduin to settle, they have, for the most part, been basedon some combination of agriculture and livestock raising, rather than onthe urbanization of the population.36 The provision of modern services(such as running water, electricity, community schools, and health clinics,etc.) was used as an incentive to attract Beduin to the towns. To theirdisadvantage, however, these towns lacked basic infrastructure and servicesfound in modern, urban settlements of comparable size in the Jewish sector,such as internal sources of employment, public libraries, recreational andcultural centers, internal and external public transportation networks, sew-age systems, etc.37 Thus, this settlement program, which the governmenthas been pursuing for nearly 30 years, has had limited success. As of 1994,only 58% of the Negev Beduin population of 88,300 lived in the plannedtowns, while 42% continued to live in spontaneous tribal settlements.38

There are a number of reasons for state’s slow progress in implement-ing its settlement plan: 1) the structure of Beduin society, culture, andlifestyle were not taken into consideration when urban-style towns wereplanned for them; 2) the Beduin were not included in the planning process;3) the planned towns were built with a substandard level of infrastructure


and services; and, 4) the outstanding land claims of the Beduin remainedunsettled. Since, according to Israeli law, it is nearly impossible for theBeduin (who primarily bought and sold land on the basis of oral rather thanwritten contracts) to prove their land ownership in court, physical presenceon their lands is virtually the only hope they have of maintaining their landclaims. Moving to the towns, in many cases, involves either an oYcial or defacto surrender of land claims.39

The following statement by Bailey summarizes the major critiques ofthe government’s settlement policy:

Today the state seeks to settle the entire Beduin population in the seven towns,in which most do not want to live. Whereas 280,000 Jewish citizens live in 114communities in Israel’s southern district, [88,300] Beduin citizens, accus-tomed to space, are to be conWned to a few towns, without economic base, andbecome a pool of cheap labor. OYcials assert that they do not want to “waste”land on Beduin. . . . The government argues that only in large settlements canit provide the Beduin with education, health care and social welfare. The claimis baseless. The Beduin towns, where 40,000 of the former nomads alreadydwell, suVer from the lowest level of such services in the country.40

The spontaneous settlements, in which the remaining 42% of theNegev Beduin live, are not developed. As unplanned (i.e. illegal and unrec-ognized) settlements, they are denied services such as paved roads, publictransportation, electricity (and in many cases running water), telephoneservice, community health facilities, etc. In addition, the people are deniedlicenses for building any sort of housing. All housing is considered illegal,and is subject to demolition proceedings.41 Nevertheless, the inhabitants ofthese communities, most of whom are still living on their traditional lands,would prefer to be settled where they are in agricultural villages, rather thanmoving into the urban towns.42 The government, however, oVers the Bedu-in no alternatives.

Despite the government’s stated aims of improving and “moderniz-ing” the lives of the Beduin through its resettlement program, the NegevBeduin community still has the lowest socio-economic status of any groupof Israeli citizens. Compared to the Israeli average, they have twice as manychildren and half the per capita income and living space.43 The averageBeduin family size is 9–10 persons, and 60% of the community is under theage of 19. Their annual population growth rate is estimated at 4.5%, whichis one of the highest in the world. The total population is expected tonumber 100,000 to 130,000 by the end of the century.44 The unemploy-


A Beduin teacher and 12th graders in a math lesson, 1968.(Courtesy of the Israel Government Press OYce)

A lesson for Beduin girls in Kfar Jarrish, 1971. On the wallsare phrases in Hebrew from the Bible, “Honor thy Father and Mother”

(also found on the walls of the classroom on the front cover)and “They that sow with tears will reap with joy.”

(Courtesy of the Israel Government Press OYce)


ment rate among Negev Beduin is nearly double the Israeli average, andthose Beduin who are employed are concentrated in low-status, low-payingoccupations such as construction, driving and unskilled labor.45

All of the forces aVecting the development of the Negev Beduin since1966 have also had their impact on the educational system. Several develop-ments led to increased demands for formal education from the Beduincommunity. First, as the Beduin were more extensively exposed to modernJewish society and became involved in its economy, the importance offormal education became more apparent to them. Second, they were able tohave more contact with the Arab villages and towns in other parts of Israel,in which the educational system was better established.

Third, following the War of 1967, the Negev Beduin were able to visittheir relatives and tribesmen who ended up in the West Bank and Gaza Stripfor the Wrst time since 1948. The Beduin who remained in the Negev foundthat many of their counterparts in the Occupied Territories were educatedand had become teachers, doctors, lawyers, etc., while the vast majority ofthose in the Negev had had little or no access to education and remainedilliterate.46 Since women had also attended school in the Occupied Territo-ries, intermarriage between these two previously separated segments of theBeduin community resulted in educated women from the West Bank andGaza Strip, coming to live in the Negev.47 These contacts had a tremendousimpact on the dynamics of the Negev Beduin community and led them tosending their children, girls and boys, to school in greater numbers.48

As the demand for education grew, the Israeli government openedmore schools and free education gradually became more available to theBeduin community.49 By the late 1960s, the Ministry of Education andCulture had established elementary schools for all of the major tribal settle-ments in the Negev. In 1969, the Wrst high school for the Beduin in theNegev was opened.50 In 1972, free compulsory education was extended twoyears throughout Israel to include the ninth and tenth grades (ages 14–15).51

By the end of the 1970s, two more high schools were built for the NegevBeduin in government-planned settlements. As of the 1994–95 school year,there were 27,100 students in the 45 Negev Beduin schools, of which 35 wereelementary schools, three were intermediate schools, 3 were comprehensiveschools (7–12 grades), three were secondary schools (9–12 grades), and onewas a non-academic trade school.52 Ten of the elementary schools werelocated in spontaneous tribal settlements and were considered “temporary”by the government. The remainder of the elementary schools, and all of theintermediate, comprehensive, secondary, and trade schools were located inthe government-planned towns and were considered “permanent.”


The “temporary” schools were established in the spontaneous tribalsettlements from which the government plans to remove the people. Theyare mostly housed in tin, wooden, or concrete buildings with insuYcientclassroom and oYce space. In general, they do not have in-door plumbingor electricity, although some are found next to water pipes or electric lines.As a rule, these schools are not expanded and are poorly maintained. Giventhe lack of electricity, they are poorly equipped and suVer from a completelack of audiovisual, computer, laboratory and sports equipment.53

This situation is part of an oYcial policy to encourage the Beduin-Arabs to move into the government-planned settlements.54 An educationoYcial stated that:

the government is reluctant to develop schools for temporary settlementsbecause they want the beduin to move to permanent areas. The beduin tend tomove when the schools are relocated. If they don’t then the children simplydon’t go to school.55

According to the law, the government is responsible for providing Beduinchildren with education; however, in the development of the educationalsystem for the Beduin, it has subordinated this responsibility to its goal ofconcentrating the Beduin-Arab population in designated settlements.

Permanent schools have only been established in government plannedsettlements. In general, they have tended to be better equipped than tempo-rary schools, but still lag far behind the standard of Jewish-Israeli schools.Most of the permanent schools are housed in modern buildings and haveelectricity and in-door plumbing, but they do not have suYcient laborato-ries, libraries, or other teaching materials. In addition, most of these schoolsare also overcrowded since the developers cannot keep up with populationgrowth and increasing enrollment.56

The issue of teaching staV for the Negev Beduin schools is also prob-lematic. Until 1976, the overwhelming majority of teachers in Beduin-Arabschools were recruited from the northern Arab villages, since the Beduincommunity could not provide them. Now 60% of the teachers are Beduin-Arab, and the remainder are non-Beduin-Arabs.57 This situation developedbecause the Negev Beduin-Arabs experience a scarcity of local teachers,while the northern Arabs in Israel have a surplus of teachers. Thus, theMinistry of Education and Culture made it obligatory for Arab graduates ofteacher training institutions to work in Beduin schools for a period of 2–3

years. This “solution” is far from ideal, as it only partially solves the problemof supplying schools with manpower, and then results in a very high turn-


over rate. The young Arab teacher’s college graduates from the North arenot experienced, and as soon as they gain a few years of experience, theytend to go back to their own villages in the North.

Local Beduin-Arabs are a more stable, but less educated, group ofteachers. Many were hired by the Ministry of Education during times ofextreme teacher shortages, and have only a high school education. Very fewof them have furthered their education. Since the opening of a separate classfor the Beduin in the teacher training institution in Beer-Sheva in 1976, thissituation has improved, but the percentage of non-local teachers still re-mains quite high. The number of Beduin-Arab graduates from the Teacher’sCollege is only about 30–35 per year, which does not even keep up with thenatural growth of the student population, and is clearly not enough tosigniWcantly increase the overall percentage of local teachers.58 According to1994 Ministry of Education records, 23% of the teachers in the Beduinschools are unqualiWed.59

The number of female teachers in the Beduin schools of the Negev islow and only a few of them are of Beduin origin. Most of them teach lowergrades. For example, the kindergarten staV is entirely female. The higher thegrade, the lower the number of female teachers, with very few teaching inhigh schools. Sex roles in this traditional society, for the most part, stillmaintain that men are to work outside the home and support their families,while women are to stay at home. Women are also not perceived as havingthe authority needed to educate children, so that their entrance into theteaching profession has not been welcomed by all.60 In a community wheresexes are separated, this creates a diYcult situation for female students insecondary schools. They Wnd themselves in an almost completely maleenvironment, which is an unfamiliar situation for them. The shortage oflocal teachers with professional training, as well as of female teachers,remains a serious problem for the Negev Beduin schools.

Regarding Beduin personnel in administrative positions in the South-ern District, there are three general supervisors, two of whom are local, andone who is an Arab from the North. They are responsible for providingoverall supervision for all of the Beduin-Arab schools in the SouthernDistrict. None of the specialized supervisors (who oversee the teaching ofsubjects such as math, the sciences, languages, history, geography, socialstudies, music, sports, etc. from the elementary through secondary levels)are Beduin. All of these supervisors are Jewish, and are rarely if ever seen inthe Beduin-Arab schools.61 In addition, school counselors are very inequita-bly distributed. At the elementary school level, there are 69 counselors inthe Jewish schools of the Southern District, and none in the Beduin schools.


At the intermediate school level, there are 48 counselors in the Jewishschools and three in the Beduin schools.62 As happened in many areas ofIsrael, when the Arab educational system was decentralized, the Depart-ment of Arab Education was liquidated without organized eVorts to fullyintegrate Arab schools into the respective district oYces. Thus, although theBeduin educational system is formally an integral part of the SouthernDistrict, it does not receive an equitable share of the services.

All of these factors, in combination, have led to very poor studentretention and academic success rates in the Negev Beduin schools. About70%–80% of Negev Beduin children drop out before completing highschool, in comparison to 13.4% and 47.5% dropout rates in the Jewish andbroader Arab sectors, respectively.63 According to Ministry of Educationdata, 80% of girls drop out before completing high school, even in thegovernment-planned towns.64 For girls, the most drastic drop occurs dur-ing the transition from elementary to intermediate school; while for boys,the most drastic drop occurs during the transition from intermediate schoolto high school.65

Several factors contribute to the high drop-out rates. First, as a rela-tively new institution in Beduin society, the schools are not accepted by all,and little or nothing has been done by the Ministry of Education to addressthis important social problem. Beduin schools have come to representinstitutions attempting to diVuse modernization within a traditional com-munity. The emphasis on achievement, as opposed to tribal aYliation andstatus, is a major revolution in the Beduin way of life. For example, the trueBeduin who used to represent the tribal leadership and the highest echelonof Beduin society, continue to consider the other two groups of Beduin (theFellaheen and the A’beed) of lower status, despite the fact that, since theestablishment of the state of Israel, the lifestyles, traditions, and generaleconomic status of these three groups no longer diVer.66 While traditionalconcepts are dominant at home, schools impose a diVerent and contradic-tory set of concepts on the students. The major burden of bridging the gapbetween the conXicting values is placed on school administrators and teach-ers, who have not received any special training for dealing with this. Thus,in most cases, the links between the school and the community are veryweak.

Second, much of the school curriculum, which is set by the Ministry ofEducation, is not relevant to the background of Arab students, especially atthe high school level. The Arab high school curriculum in Israel places moreof an emphasis on Hebrew and Zionist studies than on Arabic language,culture, and history.67 Furthermore, Brown reported that the Arab school


curriculum in Israel emphasizes the creation of acceptance of Zionism anddiminution of the sense of Arab identity, alienating Arab students.68 Littleattention is given to Arab culture, especially its contemporary politicalconcerns. This emphasis in itself lowers the relevance of the educationalexperience for Arab students to the point of seriously estranging them fromschool.

A third problem is the validity of the matriculation exams, whichrepresent the successful culmination of high school and are a basic require-ment for pursuing higher education. Teacher-student interaction in Arabschools depends heavily on memorization and rote learning and under-standing, while the matriculation exams rely more on higher levels ofanalysis, synthesis, and application.69 Thus, the evaluation of Arab highschool students’ achievement is based on skills in which they have not beentrained.

Matriculation is considered one of the most important indicators ofacademic success because it is a basic requirement for going on to highereducation. Figure 1 contains the percentage of those who succeed on thematriculation exams from the same age group for Jews, Northern/CentralArabs, and Negev Beduin-Arabs from 1990 to 1995.


The data reveal that students in the Negev Beduin schools lag far behindboth Jewish and Arab students in other parts of the country. Since it is sodiYcult for Negev Beduin-Arabs to succeed in the matriculation exams,their incentives for completing high school (which is of little value withouta successful matriculation) are lowered.

As a consequence of the poor quality elementary and secondary educa-tion and the high drop-out rates, very few Negev Beduin-Arabs are able toobtain higher education. As of 1993, there were only 135 Negev Beduinuniversity undergraduates or graduates, and 163 university students.70 Thiscomes to approximately two university graduates per 1000, which is farbelow the Israeli national average of 80 per 1000.71 Only four of the 135

Beduin-Arab university graduates and eight of the 163 university studentswere females. All of the female graduates and students were in the Humani-ties and Social Sciences, with the exception of one student who was in theWeld of Health Sciences (nursing).

Thus, while accessibility to education has improved greatly over thelast 30 years for Negev Beduin-Arab children, the quality and success rate ofthe Beduin schools remains very low. Many aspects of the physical andqualitative development of the educational system have not received thesupport and attention they require, given the crucial importance of educa-tion to the successful adjustment of the Negev Beduin-Arab community tothe new context in which they now live.

DISCUSSION

Negev Beduin-Arab education prior to 1948 consisted primarily of an infor-mal system that was very eVective in preparing semi-nomadic Beduin chil-dren for adult life. There were limited opportunities for males, particularlyif they were not from the tribal elite, to obtain formal education. Since theestablishment of the state of Israel, the Negev Beduin’s semi-nomadic wayof life has come to an end, and they are instead being settled into urbantownships and integrated into the Israeli labor market. Over the last Wvedecades, the Israeli government has established more schools, making for-mal education much more accessible, especially to the Beduin living in thegovernment-planned towns. However, the student retention and academicsuccess rates in these schools are the lowest in the entire country. Not onlydo they lag far behind the Jewish sector, they are also quite far behind therest of the Arab sector, in which the schools are better established and thereare suYcient numbers of qualiWed teachers. The student drop-out rates of


over 70%, and matriculation success rates of only 6% in the Negev Beduinschools indicate that the educational system is largely failing to prepareBeduin youth for the challenges they must face in their new socio-economiccontext. Many serious developmental needs must be addressed if the eY-cacy of this education is to be improved, including:

•equalization of the material and human resources in the Negev Beduinschools with those in Jewish schools so as to provide students with the skillsand abilities they need for successful integration into the Israeli labor market;

•training of suYcient numbers of local Negev Beduin-Arab teachers to pro-vide a qualiWed staV that can improve the level of education, and that is alsoable to understand the community’s needs and problems vis-à-vis the formaleducational system;

•revision of school curricula and text books to make them more relevant toArab culture and identity, and, in particular, to the radical social upheaval theBeduin community is undergoing;

•creation of special educational programs, which involve parents, to improvestudent retention in school; and,

•provision of special training for administrators and teachers that will equipthem to deal with the diYcult issues of better integration of school andcommunity.

NOTES

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4. D. Chatty, “The Pastoral Family and the Truck,” in P. Salzman (ed), WhenNomads Settle: Processes of Sedentariztion as Adaptation and Response (New York,1980).

5. S. Yacoub, Sedentarization and Settlement of the Nomadic Populations in Se-lected Arab Countries: A Preliminary Survey, American University of Beirut, Facultyof Agricultural Sciences (Beirut, 1971).

6. Penny Maddrell, The Beduin of the Negev, Minority Rights Group Report No.81 (London, 1990).


7. Maddrell, The Beduin of the Negev; J. Shimoni, Arabs of the Land of Israel,Human Relations Area Files (Tel-Aviv, 1947) [Hebrew].

8. Gazi Falah, “Israel State Policy towards Beduin Sedentarization in the Negev,”Journal of Palestine Studies, 18(2) (1989) 71–90; Maddrell, The Beduin of the Negev.

9. Emmanuel Marx, The Beduin of the Negev (Manchester, UK, 1967).10. M. Jamali, The New Iraq: Its Problem of Beduin Education, Teachers College,

Columbia University (New York, 1934).11. Abdul Latif Tibawi, Arab Education in Mandatory Palestine (London, 1956).12. M. Berman, “Social change among the Beersheba Beduin,” Human Organi-

zation, 26 (1967) 69–76; Tibawi, Arab Education in Mandatory Palestine.13. Salim Alafenish, “Processes of Change and Continuity in Kinship Systems

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14. Ian Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel’s Control of a National Minority(Austin, TX, 1980); Maddrell, The Beduin of the Negev.

15. Falah, “Israel State Policy towards Beduin Sedentarization in the Negev.”16. Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State.17. Falah, “Israel State Policy towards Beduin Sedentarization in the Negev.”18. Lustick, Arabs in the Jewish State, p. 13.19. Marx, The Beduin of the Negev.20. Ibid.21. Clint Bailey, “Dispossessed of the Desert,” The Jerusalem Report, 26 January

1995, p. 54; Falah, “Israel State Policy towards Beduin Sedentarization in the Negev.”22. Maddrell, The Beduin of the Negev.23. Ismael Abu-Saad, “Toward an Understanding of Minority Education in

Israel: The Case of the Beduin-Arabs of the Negev,” Comparative Education, 27

(1991) 235–42; Majid Al-Haj, Education, Empowerment, and Control: The Case of theArabs in Israel. (Albany, NY, 1995).

24. Maddrell, The Beduin of the Negev.25. Shlomo Swirski, Education in Israel: Schooling for Inequality (Tel-Aviv, 1990)

[Hebrew].26. Maddrell, The Beduin of the Negev.27. Ibid.28. Personal interview with an elderly Beduin teacher, February 1985.29. Shlomo Swirski, Education in Israel; Yosef Visitz, “Education for Arab Chil-

dren in Israel,” Afakim, 11 (1957) 267–8.30. Maddrell, The Beduin of the Negev.31. Abu-Saad, “Toward an Understanding of Minority Education in Israel.”32. L. Hazleton, “Forgotten Israelis,” New York Review, 29 May 1980, pp. 26–8;

Maddrell, The Beduin of the Negev.33. Quoted in Maddrell, The Beduin of the Negev, p. 8.34. Falah, “Israel State Policy towards Beduin Sedentarization in the Negev.”35. Maddrell, The Beduin of the Negev.


36. D. Frenkel-Horner, “Planning for the Beduin,” Third World Planning Review,4(2) (1982) 159–76; Mohammad Ebrahim, Problems of Nomad Settlement in theMiddle East with Special Reference to Saudi Arabia and the Hardh Project, Ph.D.Dissertation, Cornell University, Department of Geography (Ithaca, NY, 1981); D.Eichelman, The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach (Englewood CliVs, NJ,1981); L. El-Hammamsy and J. Garrison, Human Settlement in New Lands: TheirDesign and Development (Cairo, 1979); Kasasbeh, Agricultural Settlement in Jordan;N. Al-Saleh, Some Problems and Development Possibilities of the Livestock Sector in SaudiArabia: A Case Study in Livestock Development in Arid Areas, Ph.D. Dissertation.University of Durham, Department of Agriculture (Durham, NC, 1976; D. Cole,Nomads of the Nomads: The Al-Murrah Beduin of the Empty Quarter (Chicago, IL,1975); F. Bahhady, “Recent Changes in Beduin Systems of Livestock Production inthe Syrian Steppe,” in J. Galaty, D. Aronson, P. Salzman and A. Chouinard (eds),The Future of Pastoral Peoples, International Development Research Center (Ottawa,1981) 258–66; I. Kaplan, Area Handbook for Somalia (Washington, DC, 1977);Yacoub, Sedentarization and Settlement of the Nomadic Populations.

37. Ismael Abu-Saad, “Beduin-Arab Education in the Context of Radical SocialChange: What Is the Future?” Compare, 25(2) (1995) 149–60; Joseph Ben-David,The Urbanization of the Nomadic Beduin Population of the Negev, 1967–1992 (Jerusalem,1993) [Hebrew]; Bailey, “Dispossessed of the Desert.”

38. Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel (Jerusalem, 1995).39. Maddrell, The Beduin of the Negev.40. Bailey, “Dispossessed of the Desert,” p. 5441. Maddrell, The Beduin of the Negev.42. Bailey, “Dispossessed of the Desert.”43. B. Roth, Key Statistics from the 1983 Census, unpublished report of Shatil/New

Israel Fund (Jerusalem, 1989).44. Joseph Ben-David, The Condition of Negev Beduin (Jerusalem, 1991) [He-

brew].45. Maddrell, The Beduin of the Negev.46. Abu-Saad, “Toward an Understanding of Minority Education in Israel.”47. Ismael Abu-Saad, The Relationship between Organizational Climate and Teach-

ers’ Job Satisfaction in the Beduin Schools in the Negev Region, M.A. Thesis, Depart-ment of Education, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (Beer-Sheva, 1985) [He-brew]; Joseph Ben-David, “1988 Elections: The Negev Beduin,” Israel Studies, 3,(1990) 26–32.

48. Abu-Saad, “Toward an Understanding of Minority Education in Israel.”49. Ibid.50. Arie Reichel, Yoram Neumann and Ismael Abu-Saad, “Organizational Cli-

mate and Work Satisfaction of Male and Female Teachers in Beduin ElementarySchools,” Israel Social Science Research, 4(2) (1986) 34–48.

51. Sami Mar’i, Arab Education in Israel (Ithaca, NY, 1978).52. Amram Melitz, Changes in the Beduin Education System, Southern District


OYce, The Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport (Beer-Sheva, Israel, 1995)[Hebrew].

53. Abu-Saad, “Beduin-Arab Education in the Context of Radical Social Change”;Maddrell, The Beduin of the Negev.

54. Personal interview with OYcials of the Ministry of Interior, March, 1980;Avinoam Meir, “Pastoral Nomads and Dialectics of Development and Moderniza-tion: Delivering Public Educational Services to Israeli Negev Beduin,” Environmentand Planning D: Society and Space, 4 (1986) 85–95.

55. Quoted in Maddrell, The Beduin of the Negev, p. 16.56. Abu-Saad, “Beduin-Arab Education in the Context of Radical Social Change.”57. Melitz, Changes in the Beduin Education System.58. Personal interview with Beduin Supervisor, February, 1990.59. Amram Melitz, Implementation of the Compulsory Education Law, Southern

District OYce, The Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport (Beer-Sheva, Israel,1994) [Hebrew].

60. Mar‘i, Arab Education in Israel.61. Personal interview with Beduin-Arab School Principals, November, 1989.62. Personnel Data in Education for 1995–96, The Ministry of Education, Culture

and Sport (Jerusalem, 1995) [Hebrew].63. Ismael Abu-Saad, “Challenges Facing the Beduin Schools in the Negev,”

presented at the Conference on Beduin Education in the Negev, The FloersheimerInstitute Policy Studies, Beer-Sheva, Israel, 13 June 1995 [Hebrew]; Central Bureauof Statistics, Statistical Abstract ; Israel Shor, “The Dropout Rate in Beduin SchoolsReaches 75 Percent,” Al-HaMishmar, 29 April 1994, p. 13 [Hebrew]; Knesset Investi-gatory Committee on Beduin Issues in Israel, Knesset 13 (Jerusalem, 1996).

64. Abu-Saad, “Challenges Facing the Beduin Schools in the Negev.”65. Abu-Saad, “Beduin-Arab Education in the Context of Radical Social Change.”66. Alafenish, “Processes of Change and Continuity.”67. Yohanan Peres, A. Ehrlich and N. Yuval-Davis, “National Education for

Arab Youth in Israel: A Comparison of Curricula.” Race, 12(1) (1970) 26–36; Mar‘i,Arab Education in Israel; Al-Haj, Education, Empowerment, and Control.

68. S. Brown, “Two Systems of Education,” Index on Censorship, 15(3) (1986) 36–7.69. Mar‘i, Arab Education in Israel.70. Ismael Abu-Saad, “Higher Education among the Indigenous Beduin-Arabs

of the Negev: The Last Frontier,” presented at the International Conference onRegional Development: The Challenge of the Frontier, University of California-Los Angeles and Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, held at Ben-Gurion Univer-sity, Beer-Sheva, Israel, 27–30 December 1993.

71. Roth, Key Statistics from the 1983 Census.

the education of israel's negev beduin: background and prospects

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