the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers: social and psychological...

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JohnWilliamson

The disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration of child soldiers:social and psychologicaltransformation in Sierra Leone

JohnWilliamson

This article gives an overview of the processes of

disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of

child soldiers in Sierra Leone. In contrast to many

other situations, in Sierra Leone there has been an

e¡ective, integrated response involving a large

number of civil society organizations and

committees as well as the government. Nine areas of

intervention were identi¢ed as having contributed

to successful family and community reintegration:

community sensitization, formal disarmament and

demobilization, a period of transition in an Interim

Care Centre, tracing and family mediation, family

reuni¢cation, traditional cleansing and healing

ceremonies and religious support, school or skills

training, ongoing access to health care for those in

school or training, and individual supportive

counselling, facilitation and encouragement. Most

children who have been demobilized appear to be

doing as well as other children in their community.

Keywords: child soldiers, Sierra Leone,reintegration

The people of Sierra Leone su¡ered morethan 10 horri¢c years of war, and childrenwere both among the principal victims, aswell as some of the main perpetrators of vio-lence.This article considers what became ofdemobilized child soldiers once the ¢ghtingstopped in 2001.1My personal re£ections onwhat has unfolded for them are framed by aconversation that took place a few years

t © War Trauma Foundation. Unauthor

earlier, in1998,whenthewarwasgoingstrongwith no end in sight. I was in the country’scapital, Freetown, to help consider howthe United States Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID) could respondthrough itsDisplacedChildrenandOrphansFund (DCOF) to the war’s impacts on chil-dren. A colleague, Marie de la Soudiere, hadjust returned from talking with residents ofcommunities heavily a¡ected by the war,andIaskedherabouttheprospectsforthechil-dren from those communities who had beenabducted and turned into ¢ghters to ever gohomeagain.Shesaidthatpeopleinthosecom-munities, who had seen the atrocities thesechildren had committed, had indicated thatthey never wanted to see them again, and iftheydid, theywouldprobablykillthem.Thenshe saidthat, even so,wehadto¢ndawaythatthose children could gohome.2

Most of the child soldierswho survived to theend of the war were eventually able to gohome, and this article describes the chal-lenges that hadtobe overcome, andthe inter-ventions that made it possible. In the end,98% of the children demobilized werereunited with one or both parents, older sib-lings, or relatives (United Nations Children’sFund (UNICEF), 2004). Despite this highrate of reuni¢cation, some of those whoreturned home migrated to other areassubsequently rather than reintegrate locally.

ized reproduction of this article is prohibited.185

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The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers: social and psychological transformation in

Sierra Leone

Intervention 2006, Volume 4, Number 3, Page 185 - 205

This drift to otherareaswas likely in£uencedby the desire to ¢nd livelihoodopportunities,as well as avoiding the hostility, stigma, anddiscrimination faced in their home commu-nities by those who had been with one of therebel groups. Also, many girls who had beenassociated (through abduction or of theirown volition) with one of the ¢ghting forceswere frequently excluded from the formaldemobilization process. The girls receivedno assistance, at least initially, and foundreturning home di⁄cult or impossible. So,the results for child soldiers in Sierra Leonehave been mixed, including both signi¢cantsuccesses aswell as failures, andthere ismuchto learn fromboth.The information presented is drawnprimar-ily from USAID/DCOFassessment visits toSierra Leone in 2002 and 2005 in which Iparticipated (Williamson & Cripe, 2002;Williamson, 2005)3. The reports on thosevisits were based on numerous discussionswith personnel who had been engaged inplanning and implementing demobilizationand reintegration services for former childsoldiers in the country and included: visitsto project sites; interviews with a few formerchild soldiers; extensive reviewof documentson the situation; and interventions. Thisarticle also presents and draws from some ofthe ¢ndings of an unpublished follow-upstudy of former child soldiers carried out inSierra Leone by the International RescueCommittee (IRC) with USAID/DCOF sup-port. Some comparisons are also made with¢ndings of research in Mozambique thathas assessed the situation of a group offormer child soldiers over16 years (Boothby,Crawford & Halperin, 2006).

The warMultiple coups, unrest, economic and socialdecline, corruption, bad governance, andpower grabbing characterized the ¢rst three

ht © War Trauma Foundation. Unautho186

decades of thisWest African country’s inde-pendence. The turbulence escalated in 1991,when a small band calling itself the Revolu-tionary United Front (RUF) invaded easternSierra Leone from Liberia and launched acivil war known globally for its viciousnessand brutality.The declared aims of the RUF,which were completely contradicted by theirsubsequent actions, involved ending corrup-tion andbringing peace to the country.The RUF’s strategy was characterized byabducting children during village raids.Sometimes, these children were forced tocommit atrocities against their own familyor others in the village to instill in them thesense that they could never return. Many ofthe girls abductedwere abused sexually, withsomeeventuallybecoming‘bushwives,’ infor-mally attached to a single adultmale comba-tant. Some of the RUF’s most brutal acts,like the abductions and the chopping o¡ ofhands and arms, were widely covered in theinternational media.No one knows with any certainty how manychildren were abducted during the 12 yearsof war in Sierra Leone. However, based oninformation from the government and childprotection groups, UNICEF has reportedthat 8466 children were o⁄cially documen-ted as ‘missing’ between 1991 and 2002; andit believes that girls accounted for over halfof this number. In 1999 alone, 4448 childrenwere reported as missing.The con£ict went through various stages,includinga coupby the national army, diplo-matic and peacekeeping involvement by theEconomic Community of West AfricanStates and the mobilization of local civildefence forces (CDF). The RUF, the CDF,and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Coun-cil (formed by coup participants) all madeextensive use of child soldiers.4 A peaceagreement was signed in Lome¤ in 1999, anda peacekeeping operation, the United

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Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAM-SIL), was established. Military interventionin 2000 by the British government ¢nallybrought an end to the ¢ghting, and a processof disarmament, demobilization, and reinte-gration (DDR) was re-started in 2001.Though brie£y derailed twice by violence,the disarmament and demobilization stagesended inJanuary 2002.One analyst has made a persuasive case thatunderlying the con£ict in Sierra Leone wasa pattern of control of resources by a fewleaders, and the social and economic subser-vience of youth, as well as their marginaliza-tion and alienation from mainstreamsociety and political structures (Richards,1996). The future stability of Sierra Leonemay likely depend on whether the largemajority of youth will ¢nd access into thenexus of education, skills training, andemployment.Youngpeople,whomtheauthormet, consistently stressed how highly theseopportunities are valued. Ensuring theaccess of former child soldiers to these oppor-tunitieswasacriticalpartof thereintegrationphase of the country’s DDR process5.

The disarmament anddemobilization of children inSierra LeoneTherecruitmentof children intogovernmen-tal armed forces or other armed groups is il-legal under international law.6 Childrenshould notbe recruited, andwhere they havebeen, they should be demobilized as soon aspossible, regardless of whether or not a for-mal peace agreement has been reached.UNICEF and most child-focused non gov-ernmental organizations (NGOs) agreedthat DDR for children should be separatefrom any adult DDR process and tailored tothe particular needs of both boys and girls.The demobilization of child soldiers tookplace in Sierra Leone during various stages


of the war, with UNICEF and other civilsociety actors negotiating the release ofchildren, and assisting their family andcommunity reintegration whenever theyfound it possible. The National Committeefor Disarmament, Demobilization andReintegration (NCDDR) reported that atotal of 6845 children were demobilizedduringandafter the con£ict in Sierra Leone.Of these children,189 childrenwere demobi-lized in 1998 primarily through specialinitiatives, and another 1982 were demobi-lized between the years1999 and 2000. FromMay 2001 through January 2002, 4674 weredemobilized through the general DDR pro-cess. This article focuses primarily on theactivities in 2001and 2002.The peace process in Sierra Leone estab-lishedacrucialprecedent regardingchild sol-diers. The Lome¤ peace accord was thepeace agreement that speci¢ed that childcombatants would be given particular atten-tion and handled di¡erently than adults ina demobilization and reintegration process.Written guidelines for children’s disarma-ment, demobilization, and reintegration inSierra Leone were established by theNCDDR (NCDDR Technical Committee,2000).They were implemented, however, bya variety of actors on the ground, includingmilitary observers and the personnel ofvarious national and international childprotection NGOs with the support ofUNICEF. Various donors supported thechild-focused aspects of the DDR, with thelargest amountcoming fromUSAID/DCOF,followed by the European Union, and theGerman National Committee for UNICEF.In May 2001, when demobilization resumedafter an interruption by ¢ghting, there wasconsiderable pressure to disarm all comba-tants as rapidly as possible. Decisions aboutthe speci¢cs of when, where, and how dis-armament and demobilization would be


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carried out within a speci¢c areawere some-times (of necessity) taken quickly, and childprotection NGOs often had to move veryquickly in order to be able to play a role inthe process. It was sometimes di⁄cult forthemtogainaccess toareasweredemobiliza-tionwas to take place.There were also manylogistical constraints, as much of the coun-try’s limited infrastructure had beendamaged or destroyed by the war.Despite the speci¢cations in the guidelinesregarding how children were to be screenedand processed, implementation was at timesad hoc and varied considerably in the varioussites involved. Although the guidelines pro-vided for particular NGO roles regardingchildren in the DDR process, in practice,some military observers did not recognizethis. One reason was the rotation of peace-keepers, some of which did not have therelevant preparation for the aspects of theirjob related to demobilizing and separatingchildren. Consequently, after disarmamentanddemobilization, itwas sometimes necess-ary for UNICEFand child protection NGOsto negotiate the release of children to theorganizations designated as responsible fortheir reintegration.Demobilized adults were entitled to receivecash stipends and skills training, while chil-dren were assisted with family reuni¢cationandhadachoicebetweenaccess to educationor skills training, but were not eligible forcash payments. This was based on the viewthat if children were given cash, their com-mander might easily take it, and that theyshould instead receive services in-kind(Brooks, 2005). Consequently, it was necess-aryduringdisarmament anddemobilizationboth to determine who had actually beenassociatedwitha¢ghting force (andwas thuseligible forbene¢ts) andwhether youthswereabove or below the age of 18. Some children,however, resisted this and insisted that


they were adults, and child protectionpersonnel were involved in determiningwhether and individual was a child or anadult.Another failingof theprocess inSierraLeonewas the inconsistent implementation of theguidelines regarding weapons. The guide-lines speci¢ed that any children who hadbeen associated with a ¢ghting force were tobe demobilized and entitled to the assistancefor former child soldiers, regardless ofwhether they had been ¢ghters or ever car-riedaweapon. Some peacekeepers, however,imposed a weapons tests and required chil-dren as well as adults to present a weaponand demonstrate operational familiaritywith it.This hadthe e¡ect of excludingmanychildren fromtheDDRprocess, inparticulargirls, who often had been abducted by theRUF and used to carry loads, do domesticwork, and other support tasks. Many girlshad been sexually exploited as well.

Interim Care CentresAs soon as children were demobilized, theywere physically separated from adult sol-diers. Some children, in particular thosewho had been with the CDF, had not lostcontact with their family and were able toreturn directly to their home. Others weretakentoan InterimCareCentre (ICC)man-aged by one of the child protection NGOs.These were generally located some distancefrom the demobilization site. A total of 5038demobilized child soldiers passed throughthe ICCs before they were closed. Anadditional 2166 separated children who hadnot been with one of the ¢ghting forces butwho needed tracing assistance also passedthrough the ICCs before they were closed(UNICEF,2004). Physically separating childsoldiers from commanders and adult mem-bers of their group was essential to breakingthe links of control.


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Once the demobilization process began,ICCs became the primary base for activitiesto trace surviving family members and helpchildren to begin the transition back to civi-lian life and childhood. Many children onlycame to consider family reuni¢cation as apossibility after they reached the ICCs,through the work of the NGOs carrying outdocumentation, tracing, and family reuni¢-cation. The RUF had sought to instill thefeeling in abducted children that they couldnever go home because of the violence theyhad been forced to carry out against theirfamilies or home communities.This was oneway to reduce the likelihood of their tryingto escape and to bind them to the insurgentgroup.As amatter of policy, the length of stay in anICC was intended to be limited to no morethan six weeks. One concern, based on someof the experiencewith smaller groups of chil-drenwho had been released at various timesduring the war, was that keeping childrenfor too long would habituate them to institu-tional life and impede subsequent familyreuni¢cation and community reintegration.Most of the childrenwho could not be reuni-¢ed within six weeks were placed in fostercare (while tracing continued), or, for thosewho were older, allowed to live in smallgroups with some supervision.While relatively brief, the period of tran-sition in an ICC was an important breakbetween years spent with the ¢ghting forcesand the return to family and community.Activities focused on a return to normal life,such as a regular schedule, chores, classes,play, artwork, singing and learning cultu-rally appropriate behaviour. Most childrenpassed through the ICCs in under the six-week limit.Therewasonly verylimitede¡ortto provide formal Western therapy by oneinternational NGO, which provided servicesto less than100 children from1999 to 2001at


two ICCs.The consensus amongmostorgan-izations working with former child soldierswas that such treatment was neither necess-ary nor appropriate.

Reuni¢cation and reintegrationInadditiontogender, thereweremanydi¡er-ences among the children associated withthe ¢ghting forces.Notonlywere someactivecombatants and others not, many had beenabducted, while others were the children ofadult combatants. Some were anxious toreturn home, while others considered thatimpossible.Yet, as indicated above, 98% of the childrendemobilized were reunited with one or bothparents or with relatives.This apparent suc-cess with reintegration was not achievedeasily. Patient sensitization work in commu-nities, tracing and family reuni¢cation,mediation with families, traditional cleans-ing ceremonies, access to formal educationand skills training, and supportive attentionto the former child soldiers contributed to aremarkable transformation of the children,their families, andtheircommunities. Incon-trast to earlier hostility toward the return offormer RUF child soldiers, during my visitto Sierra Leone in 2002, community mem-bers spoke eloquently about their forgivenessfor these children because they understoodthat they had been forced to do what theydid. The reintegration work was supportedby USAID and other donors; coordinated,monitored, and facilitated by UNICEF, andimplemented by national and internationalNGOs. But the real heroes of the process,the ones who have been on the front lineand made it work, have been the SierraLeonean sta¡, community leaders, grass-roots volunteers, and resilient children.Reintegration, in terms of social acceptance,was easier for children who were part of theCDF.Duringthewar,mostof themremained


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in their community, orcloseby.Other villageresidents regarded these children as protec-tors. Ironically, though, a large number ofthe children who were with the CDF wereexcluded from the demobilization process,apparently for political reasons. They were,thereby, prevented from taking part in theeducational and training opportunities thathave been provided to other formerchild soldiers.It was a di¡erent story for the children withthe RUF. During the war and its immediateaftermath,manycommunitieswere not will-ing to accept children who had been withthe RUF. Many of these children had beenforced to kill family members or neighboursand had been living in the bush and ¢ghtingfor ¢ve or more years. The RUF convincedthe children that, because they had killed,they could never return home again and thisbecame an integral part of turning them into¢ghters.They also used drugs to reduce inhi-bitions. Many of the amputations and otheratrocities committed during the war werecarried out by formerly abducted children,and many community members expressedonly hatred and fear of these children andsaid they never wanted to see them again.Even the NGO personnel of the ICCs wereinitially targets of community hostilitybecause of the presence in a centre with chil-drenwho had been with the RUF.The RUFand other insurgent groups some-times physically labelled abducted childrenby carving the initials of the group into theirskin ^ RUF, AFRC, or EX SLA (formermembers of the Sierra Leonean Army).These letters were cut into various parts ofthebody, including the forehead, chest, arms,and back both as a means of terrorizing thechildren and preventing their escape. Afterthe war, child protection agencies identi¢edalmost 100 such children. In 2001, USAID/DCOF provided a funding to UNICEF for


a sub-grant to the International MedicalCorps for plastic surgery and other medicalservices to remove these scars or tattoos onthe children.Due largely to the patient sensitizationworkdone by Sierra Leonean personnel of childprotection NGOs, the vast majority of thechildren who had been with the RUF wereeventually able to reunite with family mem-bers and return to their communities. Muchof this work was done prior to the beginningof the formal DDR process. Because therewere multiple cease¢re agreements inter-rupted by ¢ghting, children’s disarmamentand demobilization was subject to variousstarts and stops during the war.While childprotection sta¡ members were waiting foropportunities to proceed with DDR, someused the time productively in sensitizationwork in communities that they could access.Community sensitization was one of themain elements that enabled child soldiersto eventually return home. Other measureswere individual caring and supportiveattentionandcounsellinggiven to the formerchild soldiers by child protection NGOpersonnel. Further key elements included:mediation with families, traditional cleans-ing ceremonies arranged by communities,and ensuring access to education or training.The combined results of these elements werechanges among the children, their families,and their communities. Reintegration hasnot been successful for all former childsoldiers, but what has been accomplished isa remarkable contrast to what seemedpossible during the war.

The missing girlsDespite the successful reuni¢cation andreintegration of the demobilized children, aserious failing of DDR in Sierra Leone wasthat a large number of girls who had beenassociated with the ¢ghting forces did not


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come through the process. UNICEF, whichplayed vitally important leadership andadvocacy roles throughout the preparationfor, implementation of, and follow-up ofDDR for children, has said; ‘in hindsight,thebiggest crack intheDDRsystemwas gen-derbias, toomanygirlsandyoungwomen fellthrough and never received any bene¢ts’(UNICEF, 2004).No one can say with certainly how manygirls were abducted during Sierra Leone’scivil war and how many should have comethrough the DDR process. UNICEF docu-mented 8466 cases of ‘missing’ (andpresum-ably abducted) children between 1991 and2002 and estimated that at least half of themwere girls. A total of 6845 children weredemobilized through the formal DDR pro-gram. Of these demobilized children, 92%wereboys andonly 8%were girls (UNICEF,2004).Onestudy foundthat46%ofthegirlswhohadbeen excluded from DDR in Sierra Leonecited not having a weapon as the reason fortheir exclusion (McKay&Mazurana, 2004).Although the procedures established for theidenti¢cation and demobilization of childsoldiers did not require them to turn in aweapon, in practice, many girls were appar-ently turned away because they did not haveone. In addition to the weapons tests, whichwere sometimes imposed, other factors alsoresulted in girls not being demobilized andhaving no access to reintegration services.Somegirlswerenotallowedbytheircomman-ders, or ‘bush husbands’, to go through DDR.Many kept themselves out of the process outof fear or shame.A studyof girl soldiers deter-mined that many of the girls who had beenwith the CDF were simply not allowed topresent themselves for DDR (McKay &Mazurana,2004).Of the girls who kept themselves out of theprocess, some were afraid of the ¢ghters and


took the ¢rst opportunity to leave, returninghome or just getting away. Some avoidedthe process because they did not want to bestigmatized by family or community mem-bers for having been associated with a rebelgroup. Somealso fearedthatbeing identi¢ed,as part of a rebel ¢ghting force would leadto prosecution, or other penalties. A consult-ant for UNICEF, who assessed the situationof young women and girls formerly associ-atedwith ¢ghting forces, concluded that fearand shame kept more of them out of the pro-cess than the criteria related to weapons(Coulter, 2004).Themajorityof youngwomenandgirls inter-viewedby thisUNICEFconsultant indicatedthat they either escaped, or otherwise left,the men with whom they had been forced tolive during the war. Most had not come toaccept these forced relationships and leftwhen they had a chance (Coulter, 2004).However, some of the formerly abductedyoung women and girls did remain withtheir ‘bush husbands,’either due to a¡ectionor simply through an unawareness of betteralternatives.In its 2002 review of USAID support forthe reintegration of former child soldiers inSierraLeone,DCOFidenti¢edbothsuccesses,primarily with boys, and the problem of girlslargely being left out of the DDR process(Williamson & Cripe, 2002). In response,USAID/DCOF provided additional funds toUNICEFandIRCtoaddress theneedsofgirlsandyoungwomenwhohadbeen abducted asgirls, as well as for the continuation of thereintegration assistance that included boys.UNICEF used that funding to initiate ‘TheGirls Left Behind’project (2004^2004).Finding these girls after the war ended andthey had dispersed, however, was a chal-lenge. Methods that UNICEF’s partnersused to identify formerly abducted girls inthe ‘Girls Left Behind’ project included


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seeking the assistance of local religious andother community leaders and collaborationwith women’s groups, youth groups, drop-incentres, andcommunityChildWelfareCom-mittees. At least one organization used radioannouncements e¡ectively. Once youngwomen and girls had been identi¢ed, theyoften helped identify others within the targetgroup.Videowasusedto recordandexchangemessages between formerly abducted girlsand their families, and this proved to be aninnovative tool to convince these youngwomen that they could return home.Of the714youngwomenandgirls included inthe Girls Left Behind project, 494 wantedassistance tracing their families, and 424wereultimately reunitedwitheither immedi-ate or extended family members, thoughmany decided eventually not to remain withthem. Some did not remain because theywere stigmatized by members of the com-munity due to their former association(though forced in most cases) with a rebelgroup. A UNICEF report indicated thatamong girls; ‘many testi¢ed that althoughtheir parents and other immediate familymembers were happy to receive them, com-munity reactions were not always positive.Many girls were subjected to verbal abuse,beatings and exclusion from communitysocial life’ (Whittington, 2005).Even if they chose not to stay in their homevillage, enabling these girls and youngwomen to re-establish connection with theirfamilies is likely to prove important in thefuture in a country where family is the defactosocial safety net. Now they can go homeagain, even if they decide not to live there.Also, an important lesson for future DDRprocesses was that there should be a sub-sequent means for former child soldiers, inparticular girls, to access reintegration ser-vices that are not dependent on the willing-ness of their commanders to present them.7


Nine critical elements ofreintegrationUSAID/DCOF provided funding for thereintegration of child soldiers in SierraLeone1998^2004 andmade periodic visits toobserve activities and provide technical sup-port.The¢ndingsbelowaredrawnprimarilyfrom DCOF assessments in 2002 and 2005.Nine areas of intervention were identi¢ed ashaving contributed to successful family andcommunity reintegration: community sen-sitization; formaldisarmamentanddemobili-zation; a period of transition in an ICC;family tracing, mediation and reuni¢cation;traditionalcleansingandhealingceremonies,and religious support; school or skills trainingof adequate quality and duration; ongoingaccess to health care, particularly for war-related conditions, for those in school ortraining: individual supportive counselling,encouragement and facilitation; and ane¡ective collaborative approach.

Community sensitizationAtrocities carried out during the war by theRUF were an e¡ective terror tactic. Com-munity members feared and hated them,including the abducted children who hadbeen forced to participate. As stated above,during thewar, a common sentiment in com-munities and among displaced populationswas that they never wanted to see thesechildren again, and if they did, they wouldwant to kill them. On the other hand,childrenwhohadbeenpart of theCDF, weregenerally seen to have been protecting theircommunities and were readily acceptedback after the war.Thiswasthecontext inwhichNGOsbegantowork for family reuni¢cation and com-munity reintegration of demobilized childsoldiers. Before it was possible to reintegratechildrenwhohadbeenwiththeRUForotherinsurgent groups, careful sensitization work


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wasneeded.Duringthe startsand stops intheDDR process, Sierra Leonean NGOperson-nel used the delays to do sensitization workin accessible communities. Local chiefs andtheir counsellors were key initial points ofentry into communities. NGO personneldiscussed the situation of the former childsoldiers with these traditional leaders, stres-sing that these children had been abductedand forced by adults to become part of theRUF or other groups. Eventually, chiefsallowed them to approach key people in thecommunity, such as civil authorities, reli-gious leaders, heads of male and femaleinitiation societies, teachers, CDF leaders,the community’s Mammy Queen (who isanelectedrolemodelwithinthecommunity),youth leaders, medical personnel, and com-munity-based organizations doing devel-opment work. These leaders, in turn,in£uenced other local residents. Once ICCswere established, their sta¡ also wenthouse-to-house in surrounding areas to gen-erate community acceptance of the children.Some centres shared their facilities, such asrecreational equipment or a rehabilitatedwell, with neighbours, which also helpedchange attitudes.The community sensitization process thatnational IRC personnel described to meincluded a highly participatory, two-dayworkshop with leaders and in£uential indi-viduals ineachtargetedcommunitythattheycould reach.The focuswas onpeacebuildingand con£ict resolution. Community partici-pants were asked to identify local causesand traditional ways of resolving con£ict.They discussed forgiveness and acceptance,and then were asked to develop a role-playof rebels attacking a town, abducting chil-dren, giving them drugs, and forcing themto ¢ght. During the debrie¢ng following therole-play, participants were asked what theyhad seen and experienced in real life.


Typically, this was the point in the work-shops when attitudes visibly began tochange. The IRC personnel discussed howto help children during a crisis with theparticipants.Theyexplainedtheservicesthatchildren separated from ¢ghting forceswould receive. At the end of the workshop, alocal Child Protection Committee wasformed. In turn, these village-level commit-tees helped organize and conduct similarworkshops at the section level, and extendthe sensitization process.Community sensitization opened the doorand helped make reintegration possible, butit was not done in all communities. DuringDCOF’s 2005 assessment, it was reportedthat those who had been reuni¢ed withparents or relatives were more likely toremain in the community if it was a com-munity where sensitization work had beendone. Similarly, the Mozambique child sol-diers’ study also found community sensitiz-ation to have been a contributing factor thatfacilitated the reintegration of child soldiersin that country (Boothby et al., 2006).

Formal disarmament anddemobilizationFormer combatants gathered at designatedcantonment sites for disarmament duringpreviously announced dates for formaldisarmament anddemobilization.Thedisar-mament process included screening to deter-mine whether those present were actuallyassociated with the armed group presentingitself. In some cases, commanders includedrelatives and others in the hope of obtainingdemobilizationassistance.Also, someadoles-cents wanted to be demobilized as adults sothey could receive direct cash assistanceand claimed to be above the age of 17. SierraLeonean social workers of child protectionNGOs interviewed children and thosethey suspected were still children. Their


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knowledge of history of the con£ict enabledthem to assess whether a child actually hadbeen inthebushwiththearmedgroup.Apro-tocolwasdevelopedtoguideageassessments.Going through a formal process markingtheir transitionback to civilian life was a sig-ni¢cant step toward reintegration for thoseassociated with ¢ghting forces, and inparticular, for children. In many respects,successful DDR is aprocess of identity trans-formation. It formally recognizes the rolethat aggressors have played and providesthem an opportunity to take up a new roleas a civilian. In addition to handing overarms and being screened, often there was aceremony to mark the transition to civilianlife. The demobilization process was animportant step in towards reintegration,and was distinct from the following, morelengthy period of weeks in an ICC.

A period of transition within anICCThe time spent in an ICC provided a crucialopportunity for children to rest ^ physically,emotionally, psychologically, socially, andspiritually ^ and re£ect on their lives. Mostchildren were gradually able to let downtheir guard and think about how to rebuildrelationships that hadbeenbroken, to reviewthe positive things they learned during theseparation from families, and re£ect onwhat kind of life they would like to have inthe future. The follow-up study describedbelow (See ‘A Reintegration Study’) foundthat ex-RUF child soldiers who had gonethrough an ICC before returning homewerebetter adjusted than those who had gonedirectly home. The psychosocial supportprovided intheICCsappearstobe importantand was oriented toward normalizationof daily life and expressive activities.The fol-low-up study found that the ICCs did makea di¡erence.


However, some girls reported sexual harass-ment at ICCs, either by male residents orvisiting adult combatants. It would be advi-sable in future DDR operations to establishseparate centres for boys and girls, withexceptions made to allow siblings to remaintogether.

In the town of Makeni, I met with a young man

who had formerly been with one of the fighting

forces and asked him about his experience in an

ICC following his disarmament and demobiliza-

tion. His few weeks in the centre, where non-for-

mal classes were part of the program, were his

first exposure to education. He described this

experience as ‘moving from darkness into the

light.’He had never previously attended school

and said that he had not understood what

educationwas before. In the three years after leav-

ing the ICC he had passed the first six primary

grades and desperately wants to continue his

education.

Family tracing, mediation, andreuni¢cationWhen the DDR process began in earnest inMay 2001, the need for rapidtracing to locatefamily members increased dramatically,and the child protection NGOs respondedwell to the challenge. Tracing and familyreuni¢cation had been carried out as waspossible during the war, and the necessaryforms and basic systems had already beendeveloped by the tracing network of NGOs,UNICEF, andtheMinistryof SocialWelfare,Gender, andChildren’sA¡airs (MSWGCA).Parents and relatives were not necessarilywilling to allow children to return immedi-ately. Family mediation was necessary, inmany cases, on behalf of the children whohad been with the RUF. Providing infor-mation about the support that childrenwereentitled to receive, to enable them to returnto school or obtain skills training, was also a


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part of the process of preparing for a child’sreturn.Communitysensitization, tracing,andfamilymediation made family reuni¢cation andcommunity reintegration possible. Return tothe family is probably the single most im-portant aspect of the healing process for for-mer child soldiers, and agencies attempted todo this as quickly as possible. This was alsoone of the ¢ndings of the longitudinal studywith former boy soldiers in Mozambique(Boothby et al., 2006). As noted above, 98%of the children demobilized in Sierra Leonewere eventually reunited with parents, closefamily members, or relatives, though somesubsequentlymigrated to other areas.Additional sensitization andmediationworkwas often required at the time of reuni¢ca-tion and in the days andweeks that followed.In some cases con£icts, occasionally serious,arose and further mediation was necessary.Some of this was done by NGO personnel,but in manycases it was carried out bymem-bers of the community’s own Child Protec-tion Committee. Such committees weremobilizedbymembers of the National ChildProtection Network, which was organizedby UNICEF in conjunction with theMSWGCA.Child protection NGOs made follow-up vis-its to monitor reuni¢ed children, but theywere generally unable to do so as often ascalled for in the standards developed by theChild Protection Network. The dramaticincrease in the demands on agency sta¡members for tracing, transfer of children,reuni¢cation, and making foster placementsprevented consistent follow-up. The studyreportedbelow (See‘AReintegrationStudy’)found that follow-up visits that were madehad a signi¢cant, positive in£uence on chil-dren’s adjustment. An important lesson fordonors and implementing agencies in futureDDR processes is that as the process of


tracing and family reuni¢cation continues,more agency personnel and transportationcapacity are required to continue reunitingchildren, monitoring their well-being, andintervening where necessary. In SierraLeone, follow-up was inadequate becauseinadequate resources were provided, notdue to a failure to recognize the need. Infuture DDR programs, it will be importantfor implementing organizations to be realis-tic in their program design and timeline,and for donors to recognize the operationalnecessity for providing an increasing levelof resources to ensure that consistent follow-up canbe done.Community-based reintegration activitiesorganized by Child Welfare Committeesand Children Clubs facilitated the reinte-gration of reunited children within theirfamilies, communities, and peer groups.Periodic follow-up visits by NGO socialworkers focused largely on strengtheningthe capacities of parents, caregivers, andcommunity members to help returned chil-dren to adjust to life in the community andto play normal social roles. Ensuring oppor-tunities for children to return to school orreceive skills training was a major factor insuccessful reintegration.This notonlyhelpedchildren to establish a new identity, it alsoincreased their acceptance by family, com-munity members and peers.Follow-up visits by child protection NGOscontinued until a child was adequatelyreintegrated and his or her situation wassimilar to that of other children in the samecommunity. Some children were still receiv-ing monitoring visits when I visited SierraLeone in 2005. Child Protection Committeecriteria indicate that children would beremoved from the monitoring caseload ifthey had been home for more than a year;were in school, skills training, or working;and there were no abuse concerns.


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An important lesson from Sierra Leone isthatongoingmonitoring shouldgiveparticu-lar attention to children ‘reunited’ withextended familymemberswhowerenot theirprevious guardians. By 2005, children whowere reunited with one or both of theirparents tended to be doing well, but manyother children who were reunited withextended family members were having pro-blems. Some of them were being treated asdomestic servants, which is consistent withtraditional patterns of child fostering in theregion. Before placing a separated childwithan extended family member, careful screen-ing is necessary aswell as apublic agreement(involving the family and local leaders) thatthe childwill be cared for onapar with otherchildren inthehousehold.Aperiodof regularmonitoring is also required.An important complement to periodicmonitoring visits by NGO personnel hasbeenthe e¡orts ofChild ProtectionCommit-tees, through which community membersand leaders take responsibility for ongoingmonitoring of reunited and other vulnerablechildren.Muchof the e¡ectiveness of reuni¢-cation and reintegration has been due to theidenti¢cation, monitoring, and protectionroles of community committees.As indicatedabove,when itbecameapparentin 2002 that many girls had been left out ofthe formal DDR process, USAID/DCOFprovided additional funding to enable childprotection agencies to identify formerlyabductedgirls andtoassist themwithtracingand family reuni¢cation.

Traditional cleansing andhealing ceremonies andreligious supportA number of organizations involved withthe reintegration process have stressed theimportance of traditional cleansing cere-monies to successful family and community


reintegration. In somecases, childprotectionNGOs helped communities to obtain theitems needed for such ceremonies, butfamilies and communities arranged therituals themselves. Such ceremonies appearto have increased community acceptance ofthe children as well as enable the children tofeel acceptable. This was con¢rmed by thestudy whose ¢ndings are reported below inthe section, ‘A Reintegration Study.’ Thelongitudinal study in Mozambique alsofound traditional cleansing ceremonies tohave been an important factor in the reinte-gration of former child soldiers there, contri-buting to their sense of acceptability and‘vital for rebuilding community trust andcohesion’ (Boothby et al., 2006).Traditional cleansing ceremonies, or otherhealing rituals, have been supported byseveral organizations as part of their assist-ance to young womenwho had su¡ered rapeand other forms of sexual violence. Whilesensitization had helped community mem-bers over time to understand that suchviolence had not been the ‘fault’of the girls,the cleansing ceremonies appear to haveplayeda signi¢cant role intheir reintegrationprocess. The Christian Children’s Fund, forexample, has reported assisting1000 formergirl soldiers to reintegrate in Sierra Leone,and that the project supported cleansingceremonies for many of them, where thegirls and communities concerned felt itwas important (Shereef, Davidson, Hayes,Kostelny & Wessells, 2005).Based on reports by agencies working withchildren and ¢eldwork (Utas, 2005), it isappropriate to consider that traditionalcleansing and religious (both Christian andMuslim) ceremonies can aid the healing ofthose who have survived violence or abuse.Alcinda Honwana’s book, Child Soldiers in

Africa, provides extensive information onthe ways in which traditional cleansing


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JohnWilliamson

rituals proved helpful in the reintegration offormer child soldiers in Mozambique andAngola (Honwana, 2006). However, it is alsonecessary to recognize that some traditionalpractices are harmful. Consequently, it isnecessary for an organization to determinewhat a practice involves before encouragingor supporting its use.

School or skills training ofadequate quality and durationBoth‘hardware’and‘software’ issues requiredattention in re-establishing education forchildren in Sierra Leone. Rehabilitatingand building new structures and providingmaterial inputs were important, but teachertraining and involving communities in thebuilding, rehabilitation and management ofschools was equally, if not more, importantto re-establishing and sustaining schools.With support and guidance from UNICEF,three educational programmes were imple-mented during the DDR:
� T
t ©

he Rapid Response Education Project pro-vided six months of preparation to enablechildren to return to school.

� T
heCommunityEducation InvestmentProgram
was designed to enable former child sol-diers to return to school. It operatedthroughout the country, implemented byNGOs and funded by UNICEF. For eachdemobilized child that a school enrolledthe school administration was able tochoose one of three kits designed to assist200 students for a year: (1) learningmaterials for students (e.g. exercise books,pens, pencils), (2) teaching materials,(e.g. chalk, blackboard paint, pens), or (3)sports and recreational equipment. Inreturn for acceptinga former child soldier,teachers, administrators, and fellow stu-dents bene¢ted, not just the former childsoldier. This facilitated social acceptancein schools and communities. The only

War Trauma Foundation. Unauthorize

direct assistance provided to former childsoldierswasauniformandbookbag,whichwere seenas necessary to place themonanequal footingwith other students.

� C
omplementary Rapid Response for Primary
Schoolswasa‘catch-up’program foradoles-cents with little or no education whowanted to go to school. It enabled partici-pantstocomplete sixyearsofprimaryedu-cation in three years and met some of theunique needs of adolescents who had lostseveral years of schooling due to thewar.

InKenemaDistrict in 2002 theDCOF teammet

with a16 yearold boywhohad recentlybeen reuni-

fied with his family after spending five years ‘in

the bush.’He decided to return to school rather

than enter a skills training program because he

was eager to learn. Some of his friends had chosen

skills training over school, but he recognized that

they could not read instructions, which made it

difficult for them to master their vocation and

earn a living. He felt that there would be time

later to learn a skill, but it was important to first

to learn the basics. He was in Class 4 and had

been elected class prefect. His favourite subjects

were science and English, and he said that he

would like to be a doctor when he is older, so he

can help people in his country.

Demobilizedchild soldierswhowere15 yearsof age andoverhadthe optionto choose skillstraining instead of going to school. Agricul-tural assistance packages were anotheroption that some chose. Skills’ training wasoften preferred by those who either felt tooold to return to school, or the more urgentpriority of generating an income. Appren-ticeships were the primary method used toprovide skills training to demobilized childsoldiers in Sierra Leone.The skills training component in SierraLeone helped channel former child comba-tants in productive, normalizing activities

d reproduction of this article is prohibited.197

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Sierra Leone


that helped them readjust to civilian andcommunity life. Each child who opted forskills training was assigned to a mastertradesperson. Popular skills areas included:tailoring, tie-dying cloth, hairdressing, andcarpentry. Some apprentices lived with theartisanandhis orher family.TheWorld Bankhas reported that for demobilized soldiers,apprenticeship training and micro-enter-prise support are most likely to be e¡ectivein leading to employment than centre-basedvocational training (World Bank, 2002).However, after the completionof apprentice-ships in Sierra Leone, little support was pro-vided with ¢nding jobs or initiating micro-enterprise activities other than the provisionof tools. This is probably a signi¢cant short-coming.Also, more young people were trained insome skills than it appeared local economiescould absorb. Little or no market analysiswas done to determine which skills o¡eredthe best prospects for employment in di¡er-ent parts of the country. While vocationaltraining programs may meet short-termneeds to keep adolescents active in produc-tive activities, they are not a guarantee oflonger-term productive employment. Anyselection of skill areas for training should bebased on a market analysis carried out byan experienced researcher. It is also import-ant for a reunited adolescent’s family to bepart of the process of deciding what type ofskills training she or he should select becausetheywill haveabetterunderstandingofwhatskills have local economic potential, andbecause they have a stake in the adolescentbecoming an economically productive partof the family.Yet another issue is that trainingin a technical skill often was not, itself, su⁄-cient. Literacy and numeracy trainingshould have been available as well, for thosein apprenticeships, as these are basic skillsapplicable in all areas of work.


Another lesson learned in Sierra Leone wasthat apprenticeship training requires carefulplanning; a structured curriculum for theachievement of speci¢c, measured levels ofkey skills over a speci¢c period of time; andmonitoring of the progress and safety oftrainees. Skills training courses should be ofan adequate duration and intensity to enabletrainees to learn and use marketable skills.Also, an agency responsible for a trainingprogram shouldwork with graduates to helpthem secure both a safe place to live and toengage inaneconomicactivityafter thecom-pletion of training. Of the respondents instudy primarily of adult combatants demobi-lized in Sierra Leone, 54 percent said thatmore support should have been providedin ¢nding jobs after apprenticeships and47 percent recommended a longer period oftraining (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2004).Both school and skills training were seen asimportant by former child soldiers partici-pants, in part because they were seen asenhancing their future employment pro-spects, but equally important was theirvisible participation in structured learninghelpedalter theway that they were regardedby community members. Studying to pre-pare forthe futureenhancedtheiracceptancebecause community members could see thattheyhadmadeatransition frombeingachildsoldier and were working actively towardbecoming a productive member of the com-munity. Participation in education or train-ing appeared to be an important aspect ofthe process of identity transformationbegunduring disarmament and demobilization.

Ayoungwomanwithwhom Imet also inMakeni

was a trainee in a skills training program for

CaritasMakeni. Shehadformerlybeen associated

with one of the fighting forces. She was wearing a

pink and black uniform that all the trainees in the

same program were wearing. It was significantly


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JohnWilliamson

importanttoher thatotherpeople inhercommunity

could see from her uniform that she was in a

training program and that this showed she wanted

to play apositive role in her community.

Whether SierraLeone remains at peacemaywell depend on ensuring ongoing opportu-nities for education, training, and employ-ment opportunities for youth. From thecommunity to the ambassadorial level, thosewith whom I met in 2005 consistentlyexpressed this concern. Likewise, partici-pants in the study cited above, of primarilyadult ex-combatants, said that educationwas the top priority for the government ofSierra Leone to address (Humphreys &Weinstein, 2004).A ¢nding of the study in Mozambique, how-ever, provides a signi¢cant counterpoint.Accessto educationwasnotan important issuefor most of the child soldiers included in thatlongitudinal study. Their priority was toengage ‘immediately in farming and otherincome-earningopportunities to enable themto earn money for a‘wife and family’ insteadof returning to school’ (Boothby et al., 2006).Alessontobedrawnfromthisdi¡erenceisthatcareful situation analysis, including consul-tation with the target group, is essential toplanning an e¡ective reintegration.

Ongoing access to health care,particularly for war-relatedconditions, for those in school ortrainingHealthserviceswereanobviouspriority intheICCs, with some demobilized child soldiershaving lived for years in the bush, beenwounded, or subjected to repeated sexualabuse and exploitation.The infants or youngchildren of female students or traineesoften had acute health problems as well.Frequently, health issues could not beadequately resolved during the weeks in an


ICC. Providing access to health servicesbeyondthosethatmightor,more likely,mightnot be available in a village, was importantforthesubsequentperiodofeducationortrain-ing. Some organizations did not make ade-quate provision for access to health services.

Individual supportivecounselling, encouragement,and facilitationA UNICEF consultant who evaluated theUSAID/DCOF-funded services for the ‘GirlsLeft Behind’project reported that 35% of theparticipants interviewed said that the thingsthat they most appreciated about the projectwere the counselling, friendships and en-couragement they received (Whittington,2005). Supportive counselling was importantduring the di⁄cult transition in the ICCs,when making good choices about whatskill training to select, when facing hostilitywithin the community, or when strugglingto generate incomewith the skills learned.

An e¡ective collaborativeapproachThe groundwork for the e¡ective demo-bilization, reuni¢cation, and reintegrationwork done in Sierra Leone was laid over aperiod of years. UNICEF provided criticallyimportant leadershipregardingchildprotec-tion. It helped the Government to play itsroles more e¡ectively and to develop coordi-nationand standards of goodpractice amongthe many local, national, and internationalNGOs involved in the identi¢cation andcare of separated children, tracing, familyreuni¢cation, demobilization of child sol-diers, and community reintegration.A strikingaspect of the response to separatedchildren and demobilized child soldiers inSierra Leone, in contrast to many othercon£ict-a¡ected countries, has been thee¡ective, integratedsystemofchildprotection


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services involving a large number of civilsociety organizations and committees as wellasthegovernment.Geographicresponsibilityfor tracing and family reuni¢cation wasdivided among selected NGOs. Requests totrace parents or relatives were sent by theorganization responsible for the areawhere achild was to the one responsible for the areawhere familymemberswerethoughttoreside.UNICEFassisted the MSWGCA to convenea Child Protection Committee (which even-tually became an ongoing Child ProtectionNetwork) involving national and inter-national NGOs concernedwith child protec-tion. The Network developed guidelines forthe care and protection of children in ICCs.UNICEF,aspartof theNationalCommissionfor DDR, helped develop guidelines for theway children were to be treated during theDDRprocess.The guidelines encouraged protection of allvulnerable children, including combatants,street children, and separated children.Theyalso recognized the particular risks faced bygirls. They identi¢ed family reuni¢cation astheprincipal factor in the social reintegrationof child soldiers, but theyalso recognizedthatsimply tracing family members and sendingchildren home would not be enough. Inacknowledging that some children hadparticipatedinattacksorcommittedatrocitiesagainst their home villages, they highlightedthat special e¡ortswouldbe requiredto facili-tate their acceptance. These e¡orts mightinclude community sensitization and media-tion by advocates for the children, and theinvolvement of traditional and religious lead-ers. It also cited the socioeconomic distressofmanycommunitiesandfamiliesasabarrierto family reuni¢cation and reintegration.

Some key lessonsThe demobilization process in Sierra Leonehas yielded important lessons that other


countries embarking on disarmament anddemobilization should consider:
� C
riz

hild soldiers can be combatants or non-combatants, aswell asbothboys andgirls.Cease¢re and peace agreements, as wellas DDR procedures must re£ect this.

� O
ngoing communication among keyactors and child-focused advocacy isessential throughout a DDR process.
� T
he training of peacekeepers or militaryobservers must include speci¢c attentionto procedures and considerations regard-ing children.
� G
irls and young women associated with¢ghting forces are at high risk of beingexcluded fromaDDRprocessand speci¢cattention shouldbegivento ensuringtheirinclusion when the process is plannedand implemented.
� I
t is important to recognize and givehumanitarian attention to young adults(male and female) who were abducted orotherwise forced as children to becomepart of a combatant group.
� A
fter a DDR process, there should be away for formerchild soldiers, inparticulargirls, to access reintegration services thatis not dependent on actionbeing taken bytheir former commanders.
� C
ontingencieswillarise during thecourseof a DDR process, and procedures andtraining should allow for on-the-grounddecisionmaking in keepingwith keychildprotection and human rights principles.The standing of UNICEFand designatedchild protection NGOs should be recog-nized as parties to such decision-making.
� C
ultural and other constraints a¡ectrecognition by child soldiers that familyreuni¢cation may be an option, as wellas their receptivity to consider it. Activecommunication e¡orts are needed toaddress these issues. Video and tape-recorded messages from former child
ed reproduction of this article is prohibited.

Copyright ©

JohnWilliamson

soldiers who have successfully returned totheir home can be a useful tool inthis process.

� B
efore‘reuniting’a separatedchildwithanextended family member, careful screen-ing is necessary, also apublic agreement isrequired that the childwill be cared foronaparwithotherchildren inthehousehold,and careful follow-up monitoring isnecessary.
� T
horough situation analysis, includingconsultation with the target group, isessential to planning e¡ective reinte-gration services.
� S
electionandplanning foranyskills train-ing and livelihood support activitiesmust be informed by a technically soundmarket analysis.
� A
pprenticeship training requires carefulplanning; a structured curriculum forthe achievement of speci¢c, measuredlevels of key skills over a speci¢c periodof time; and monitoring of the progressand safety of trainees.
� P
ersonnel and transportation capacitymust increase during the process of trac-ing and family reuni¢cation to permitadequate follow-up visits for monitoringand, as necessary, intervention.
� R
ather than prescribe speci¢c child pro-tectionactions to a community, it isbest toraisequestions for itsmembersto consider.For example: ‘What can we do to helpchildren who have been abducted andinvolved in ¢ghting to assist them settleback into the community?’ ‘What canwe do to protect our children in a time ofcrisis?’
A reintegration studyUSAID/DCOF provided funding for longi-tudinal research in Sierra Leone to assessthe psychosocial adjustment and socialreintegration of young people who had been

War Trauma Foundation. Unauthor

associated with the RUF (Betancourt,Pochan, & de la Soudie' re, 2005).8 The studycompared children who had come throughone of the ICCs, in 2001or 2002, run by IRCwith children who had been with the RUFbut who had returned home on their ownaccord without receiving special assistance.The ¢ndings of this unpublished studysuggest that the services provided by theICCs, as well as traditional cleansingceremonies, facilitated reintegration. Theyalso suggest lower rates of depression andanxiety among children who had reunitedwith one or both parents.Baseline information was collected in 2002from 260 children who had been with theRUF and come through an ICC. Thechildren’s caregivers were also interviewed.A comparison sample was collected in 2003of 135 children and youth, formerly with theRUF, who had returned home directly. Nodi¡erence was found in exposure to violencebetween the former RUF children who hadcome through an ICC and those who wentdirectly home. Those who carried out theresearchgave careful attentionto conductingthe study in keeping with ethical standardsregarding research with children.Data collected from these children includeddemographic information, exposure to war-related violence, family separation, socialsupport, and psychosocial adjustment. Thelatter was based on standardized measuresthat had been adapted through an extensiveprocess involving Sierra Leonean children,adults, educators and child-care specialists.9

In 2002, the average age of the children was15.1years, and 78%of themhadbecomepartof the RUFat age12 or less.The follow-up study was done in 2004. Thisproduceddata from140 children (81%male,19% female) who had received assistancethrough ICCs and participated in the base-line study. In the comparison group, who


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Intervention 2006, Volume 4, Number 3, 5 - 205

had returned home directly, interviews werecompleted for 129 children (49% male, 51%female). Adjustments were made for genderand age when comparisons were made. Inaddition to repeating the collection of infor-mation gathered during the baseline study,information on exposure to violence wascollected in greater depth, as well as moredata on mental distress, services received,participation in traditional cleansing, andthe communities in which children wereliving.10

Findings. Among those who had comethrough the ICCs (the intervention group),no changes in psychosocial wellbeing wereidenti¢ed when 2002 and 2004 data werecompared, which was taken as an indicationof stability.Withadjustmentsmade forgenderand age, those in the intervention grouphad signi¢cantly lower scores for hostilityand depression, and higher pro-social scoresthan those who returned home directly fromthe RUF.There was no signi¢cant di¡erence betweenthe intervention and comparisons groupsregarding participation in a traditionalcleansing ceremony. However, those whohad taken part in such a ceremony had sig-ni¢cantly higher scores for family accep-tance, pro-social behaviour and con¢dence,than those who had not.Follow-up visits in the community by anNGO were signi¢cantly more frequentamong former RUFchildren who had comethrough an ICC, than among those whohad gone directly home. Signi¢cantly, visitsbyanNGOwereassociatedwithhighercom-munity acceptance, wellbeing, and lowerpost-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)scores. Also, the presence of services by anNGO in the community was associatedwithlower scores for hostility, depression andPTSD, and higher scores for con¢dence andpro-social behaviour.


Living with one or both parents was associ-ated with greater family acceptance andlower scores of both depression and anxiety.Community acceptance was also associatedwith lower depression and anxiety scores.No di¡erences in family or communityacceptance were found, however, betweenthe intervention group and those who wenthome directly. Familyacceptancewas associ-ated with higher pro-social and con¢dencescores. Those who reported experiencingdiscrimination within their community hadhigher scores for hostility, anxiety, anddepression.

The core of reintegration:psychological and socialtransformationGiven the horrendous experiences of childsoldiers, prior to the DDR process it wouldhave been easy to assume that their child-hood had been lost forever and that reinte-gration into their families and communitieswouldbeimpossible.However,whathashap-pened suggests a more hopeful story. Mostchildrenwho have been demobilized appearto be doing as well as other children in theircommunity, whether they are living withtheir immediate family, extended family, infoster care, or in supervised independent liv-ing. Most were able to return to school, orlearn a trade.The reintegration of former child soldiersinto families andcommunities has essentiallybeen a process of psychological and socialtransformation. Children who had beeninstrumentalized and committed atrocitieswith the RUF had come to see themselves asmembers of that group who could never gohome again. For them to be able to do sorequired a transformation of their identityfrom being a child soldier into being anacceptable member of a community. Theyhad to come to see themselves di¡erently.


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JohnWilliamson

Their families and communities also hadto see them di¡erently, which helped estab-lishand reinforce theirownchanged identity.The longitudinal study in Mozambiquemade a similar observation: ‘the transform-ationof self-image frombeinga‘child soldier’tobecoming‘like everyone else’was a criticalaspect of successful reintegration’ (Boothbyet al., 2006).As this article suggests,many factors contrib-uted to these psychological and social trans-formations. Some young people did leaveagain for the city streets, economic opportu-nities, or simply to get away from what theyfound to be an unacceptable situation. How-ever, even in these cases, they have re-estab-lished links to their families. Seen from theperspective that prevailed during the war, itis remarkable that the majority of formerchild soldiers in Sierra Leone have beenreintegrated back into their families andcommunities.

ReferencesBetancourt, T., Pochan, S. & de la Soudie' re, M.

(2005). Psychosocial Adjustment and Social Reinte-

gration of Child Ex-Soldiers in Sierra Leone, Draft:

Wave II Follow-Up Analysis, International

Rescue Committee. http://www.usaid.gov/

our_work/humanitarian_assistance/the_funds/

pubs/war_a¡ected_kids.html.

Boothby, N., Crawford, J., & Halperin, J. (2006).

Mozambique child soldier life outcome study:

Lessons learned in rehabilitation and reinte-

gration e¡orts. Global Public Health, 1(1), 87-107.

Brooks, A. (2005).The Disarmament, Demobilization

and Reintegration of Children Associated with the

Fighting Forces. UNICEF West and Central

Africa Regional O⁄ce.

Coulter,C. (2004).Assessmentofthe ‘GirlsLeftBehind’

Project for Girls and Young Women Who Did Not


Enter DDR. Draft consultant’s report to

UNICEF Sierra Leone.

Honwana, A. (2006). Child Soldiers in Africa. Phila-

delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Humphreys, M. & Weinstein, J. (2004).What the

Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Sierra

Leone,June^August2003. http://www.columbia.

edu/�mh2245/Report1_BW.pdf.

McKay, S. & Mazurana, D. (2004).Where are the

Girls? Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda,

Sierra Leone and Mozambique:Their Lives During

andAfterWar. International Center forHuman

Rights and Democratic Development, Mon-

tre¤ al.

NationalCommittee forDisarmament,Demobili-

zation and Reintegration (NCDDR)Techni-

cal Committee (2000). Guidelines for Assisting

Children from the Fighting forces in the Disarma-

ment, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme.

Richards, P. (1996).Fightingfor theRainforest,Heine-

mann.

Shereef, Abdul C., Davidson, J., Hayes, M.,

Kostelny, K. &Wessells, M. (2005).The Reinte-

gration of FormerlyAbducted Girls and GirlMothers

in Sierra Leone: Sealing the Past, Facing the Future.

Christian Children’s Fund’s contribution to

Meeting the Challenges: Inter-AgencyWork-

shop on the Reintegration of Children A¡ec-

ted by Armed Con£ict in West and Central

Africa,7^10th February 2006, Saly ^ Senegal.

UNICEF (2004). From Con£ict to Hope: Children in

Sierra Leone’s Disarmament, Demobilisation and

Reintegration Programme.

UNICEF (2005). The State of the World’s Children

2006, New York. http://www.unicef.org/

publications/index_30398.html.


http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/the_funds/pubs/war_affected_kids.html



http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/Report1_BW.pdf



http://www.unicef.org/publications/index_30398.html


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Utas, M. (2005).Traditional healing of young sexual

abuse survivors in the aftermath of the Sierra Leone

Civil War, unpublished study for UNICEF

Sierra Leone.

Whittington, S. (2005). The Impact of Con£ict on

Women and Girls in West and Central Africa and

the UNICEF Response, UNICEF. http://www.

unicef.org/publications/index_25262.html.

Williamson, J. & Cripe, L. (2002). Assessment of

DCOF-Supported ChildDemobilization andReinte-

gration Activities in Sierra Leone, Displaced Chil-

dren and Orphans Fund of the USAgency for

International Development. http://www.

usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/

the_funds/pubs/reportlst.html.

Williamson, J. (2005). Reintegration of Child Soldiers

in SierraLeone:January 31 ^ February 9, 2005,Dis-

placed Children and Orphans Fund of the

US Agency for International Development.

http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_

assistance/the_funds/pubs/reportlst.html.

World Bank (2002). Child Soldiers: Prevention,Demo-

bilization and Reintegration, Con£ict Prevention

and ReconstructionUnit Social Development

Department, Dissemination Notes, No. 3.

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRA

NETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/214578-

1111661180807/20486529/CPRnotes3-Draft2-

web.pdf.

1 The author’s views expressed in this publication

do not necessarily re£ect the views of USAID or

the United States Government.2 At the time of this conversation, Marie de la

Soudie' re was doing a consultancy for UNICEF.

She became the Director of Children A¡ected by

Armed Con£ict Unit of the International Rescue

Committee and in that capacity helped to shape

a number of the interventions described in this

article.


3 The primary focus of the 2002 and 2005DCOF

visits to Sierra Leone was demobilization, and

many of the children with whom we talked were

former soldiers. However, in keeping with the

standard DCOFapproach, we did not ask them

to talk about their experiences during the war.To

have done so in a short interviewandwithout pro-

vision for follow up support would have been

potentiallyharmful to the childrenand, therefore,

unethical. Insteadwe focusedontheir experiences

during and after the disarmament and demobili-

zation process.4 The term,‘child soldier’ is used in this article in

keeping with the de¢nition included in the Cape

Town Principles: ‘any person under 18 years of

age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular

armed force or armed group in any capacity,

including but not limited to cooks, porters, mes-

sengers, and those accompanying such groups,

other than purely as family members. It includes

girls recruited for sexualpurposesand forcedmar-

riage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child

who is carrying or has carried arms.’ ‘CapeTown

Annotated Principles and Best Practice on the

Prevention of Recruitment of Children into the

Armed Forces and Demobilization and Social

ReintegrationofChild Soldiers inAfrica,’adopted

by the participants in a symposium convened by

UNICEF, CapeTown,30 April 1997.5 Despite the country’s signi¢cant natural

resources and excellent agricultural potential

mostof theapproximately ¢vemillionSierraLeo-

neans live in poverty. The country’s under-¢ve

mortality rate is theworst in theworld,male adult

literacy is only 40% and female literacy is 21%,

the gross national income per capita is only $200.

The primary school attendance ratio is 43% for

boys and 39% for girls (UNICEF, 2005).6 While there are some di¡erences among them

regarding the age below which children cannot

be recruited, international legal instruments that

make provisions against the recruitment of

children include the1977 Protocols of the Geneva

Conventions, the 1989 Convention on the Rights




http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/the_funds/pubs/reportlst.html





http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/214578-1111661180807/20486529/CPRnotes3-Draft2-web.pdf




Copyrigh

JohnWilliamson

of theChild, theOptional Protocol to theConven-

tion on the Rights of the Child, the Statute of the

International Criminal Court, and the Inter-

national Labor Organization’s Convention182.7 There are inherent tensions underlying policy

and ¢eld decision about who is screened in or out

of aDDRprocess, and it is important to recognize

these. Humanitarian actors tend to view the pro-

cess primarily fromahuman rights, humanneeds,

and/or fairness perspective. Peacekeeping forces

are likely to see the issue primarily in terms of get-

ting arms out of the hands of as many combatants

as quickly as possible in order to stop the con£ict

and secure the peace. Also, donor governments

and organizations have legitimate concerns that

the process be as e¡ective as possible in screening

outcivilianswhomay try topose as ¢ghters to gain

access to the assistance. In Liberia, for example,

the number of adults who came through its DDR

process far exceeded the previously estimated

numberofmembers of thecombatantgroups. Fail-

ure to do e¡ective screening so can overwhelm

available resources.

It should, therefore, be recognizedwhenplanning

and implementing a DDR process that there are

competing perspectives and values and that there

is inherent tension among them.While there are

no simple solutions for reconciling these di¡er-

ences, an essential step is to acknowledge that they

exist, and throughout the planning and imple-

mentation stages to seek continually to keep them

in balance.8 The full study report is available on the DCOF

Web site: http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/huma-

nitarian_assistance/the_funds/9 This adapted scale was originally developed by

Colin MacMullin and Maryanne Loughry. Its


use was reported in ‘Investigating Psychosocial

Adjustment of Former Child Soldiers in Sierra

Leone and Uganda,’ Journal of Refugee Studies

(2004) 17(4): 460-472.

10 The additional instruments used in the 2004

follow-up study included the Child War Trauma

Questionnaire, which was reported on in M.S.

Macksoud&J.LAber (1996).‘Thewarexperiences

and psychosocial development of children in

Lebanon.’Child Development, 67: 70-88 as well as a

reduced version of the PTSD-RI. Post-Traumatic

Stress Disorder Reaction Index Revision

(PTSD-RI) (Pynoos, R. S., Rodrigues, N., Stein-

berg, A. S., Stauber,M., and Frederick, C. UCLA

PTSD Index for DSM-IV child version. Los

Angeles, CA: UCLA PsychiatryTrauma Service;

1998.) and The Hopkins Symptom Checklist/SF-

25 (Derogatis, L. R., Lipman, R. S., Rickels, K.,

Uhlenhuth, E. H. and Covi, L. The Hopkins

Symptom Checklist (HSCL): a self-report symp-

tominventory.BehavorialScience.1974Jan;19(1):1-15.

JohnWilliamson (MSW) is SeniorTechnical

Advisor for DCOFof the United States Agency

for International Development and has worked

for UNHCR and the Christian Children’s Fund

as well as consulting for UNICEF and other

organizations. Contact information: DCOF,

North Tower, Suite 700, 1300 Pennsylvania

Ave, NW,Washington, DC 20004, USA.

E-mail: [email protected]

LynneCripe, formerlywithDCOFand currently

with CAREUSAas SeniorTechnical Advisor^

Sta¡ Support, also made signi¢cant contri-

butions to the article as co-author of the 2002

DCOFreport, on which parts of it are based.


http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/the_funds/

http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/the_funds/

mailto:[email protected]

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