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The Sarkozy’s decision-making process

The reintegration of France in NATO’s integrated military command

Travail réalisé par

Guillaume FRANCOIS & Sandra VAN LINTHOUDT

LSPRI 2080 – Foreign Policy Analysis Tanguy Struye

Année académique 2014-2015 Master 2 en Relations Internationales, orientation diplomatie et résolution de conflits

Références portfolio : n°2 Adresses html : http://tinyurl.com/qaymgut ; http://tinyurl.com/npt5far

Faculté des sciences économiques, sociales, politiques et de communication (ESPO)

Ecole des Sciences Politiques et Sociales (PSAD)

- Ce travail tend à analyser le processus de décision de Sarkozy concernant la réintégration de la France dans la structure intégrée du commandement de l’OTAN. L’analyse se fait sur plusieurs niveaux : le niveau individuel, national et systémique. Le but du travail est d’étudier les différents facteurs (émotions, comportements, valeurs du décideur, mais aussi le contexte international) et les différentes personnes qui ont influencé Sarkozy sur la question de l’OTAN. - France, Sarkozy, OTAN, decision-making, foreign policy.

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1 INTRODUCTION : HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

FRANCE AND NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO – is a political and military organization born

on 4th April 1949. It is a regional organization, which means it only concerns States in a specific

geography area : Europe and North America. The treaty was signed by twelve States : five

European countries (Belgium, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom),

the United States of America, Canada, and five other European countries invited (Denmark,

Italy, Island, Norway and Portugal).

The goal of this organization was to assure the security of those countries after the World War

II in a context of emergency of the cold war. The idea was to gather the western States against

the expansionist policy of the Union Soviet Socialist Republics – USSR.

Despite France was one of the most important components of the NATO Charles de Gaulle

decided to leave NATO’s integrated military command in 1966. It was the result of a lack of

confidence in NATO in the 1950’s due to several issues : the pressure of the American

government in the case of the European Defence Community, the Suez crisis, the American

support to the movement of decolonization, the nuclear issue, etc. The decision was officially

taken in 1966, but France is still a member of NATO : it “only” concerns the integrated military

command. Concerning France’s decision the American President Lyndon B. Johnson said : “As

our old friend and ally, her place will await France wherever she decides to resume her leading

role”1. But despite this declaration decades passed without any evolution of the situation.

The situation started to change under Mitterrand’s presidency. With the renewal of the tensions

in the cold war, Mitterrand claimed in the 1980’s that the Atlantic solidarity was essential. He

sent strong signals from France to NATO, especially in the Euromissile crisis, and the military

cooperation started to strengthen.

This rapprochement of France and NATO continued under Chirac’s presidency and it

materialized under Sarkozy’s presidency. There are three key moments. First in 1994 when

France accepted the creation of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) which are force

packages placed under Atlantic commandment. Then in 1995 Chirac claimed his intention to

reinsert France in NATO : even if he did not achieve his objective it was a strong signal sent to

NATO. And the third key moment was in 2002, in the summit of Prague, Chirac accepted

France’s participation to the new NATO Response Force – NRF.

In 2007 Sarkozy announced several times in public speeches his wish to achieve this process

of France’s reintegration in NATO’s integrated military command. And it became a reality in

2009, the year of the 60th birthday of NATO.

In this paper, we will analyze the Sarkozy’s decision-making concerning the reintegration of

France in NATO’s integrated military command. Firstly, we will make you a little summary of

the diverse steps in the decision-making. Secondly, we will study the decision-making process

1 M. Vaïsse, « La France et l’OTAN : une histoire », in Politique Etrangère, 2009, vol. 4, p. 864.

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at three levels : the individual level, where we deepen the Sarkozy’s cognition, and so his

emotions, attitudes, values and behaviours ; the national level, where we focus on the French

national system, the advisers and the way the decision is taken at the Elysée ; the systemic level,

where we consider the consequences of the international context on this foreign policy decision.

Finally, the conclusion will summarize the most important elements of the paper and finishes

on an open question : is the French decision-making really democratic ?

2 THE REINTEGRATION OF FRANCE IN NATO’S INTEGRATED

MILITARY COMMAND : CHRONOLOGY AND STEPS

First we have to keep in mind the fact that France was already present in more than 80% in the

NATO’s military structure, including commandment operations and NATO Response Force.

So even if Sarkozy took this decision to return to NATO’s integrated military command, it was

not a complete revolution concerning the relationship of France and NATO ; it was “only” the

final step of a process started earlier, a symbolic step.

Once elected President, Sarkozy claimed his attachment to NATO and to the affiliation between

France and the United States of America. In 2008 he took the decision to send military

contingents in Afghanistan. It was seen in the USA as a positive signal.

During different presidential communications he officialised his intent of normalization

between the two parts, but the reintegration has to be followed by different conditions. Sarkozy

wanted to fight the lack of transparency related to the Alliance and wanted more cooperation

between NATO and the European Union. He also claimed as conditions that France has to keep

its entire freedom and autonomy : France is the only one to choose if she sent its military

contingents or not, she will not place any military resources under NATO’s commandment in

time of peace, and furthermore France will only reintegrate the integrated military command if

she receive a places in the most higher instances of direction in this structure. The official

announcement was made in 2009 as we said before. This was for the official version.

But in reality everything was planned earlier. 27th June 2007, Levitte (Sarkozy’s Diplomatic

Adviser) organized a reunion in his office with the Army Chief, the head of the personal staff

of the president, a member of the ministry of the Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic adviser of

the minister of defence. He announced them that maybe France will return to the NATO’s

integrated military command : but they were not fooled and they understood that the decision

was already taken. And the decision was taken by Sarkozy and his advisers, Levitte in

particular.

But to avoid to be accused of alignment on the American policy and to be accused of negligence

towards a symbol of European sovereignty (the European defence), Sarkozy and Levitte

decided two things. First they chose to not reintegrate NATO right now under Bush’s

presidency, but to wait to the next American president. Secondly they decided to take benefits

from France’s presidency of the European Union to have a perfect pretext to reintegrate NATO.

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By pretending to defend European interests, France have the perfect pretext to reintegrate the

Alliance.

This tendency to work with his personal advisers (leaving the ministers out of the decision-

making process) is very present with Nicolas Sarkozy. As we can see here concerning the

reintegration of NATO in particular but also in the whole of the Foreign policy in a large way.

3 INDIVIDUAL LEVEL2

At the individual level, many things explain the decision of Sarkozy to proceed to the

reintegration of France in NATO’s structure. We will figure out them by analyzing the

Sarkozy’s cognition : his traits, values, attitudes and emotions.

3.1 A TROUBLED CHILDHOOD Sarkozy doesn’t really have a happy childhood, and this justify a part of his temperament today.

His maternal grandfather is a Greek Jew that escapes of a slaughter. Son of a Hungarian

aristocrat immigrant, he has a name with foreign consonance, but he is raised in a traditional

French way with his two brothers.

In addition to his foreign name, his parents are divorced (something not very frequent at this

time) and he is rather small. All of these makes him the perfect target for the mockery of his

comrades : he feels uncomfortable at school and becomes really complexed.

3.1.1 Brawler, fearless and energetic boy

Faced with these teasing, the little Nicolas develops a brawler and imperious behavior, which

was not discouraged neither by his very liberal mother, nor by his absent father. He never learns

to manage his negative emotions. That certainly boosts him to believe aggressive force is a way

to get what he wants. Besides this, he is a child already fearless and active. He can not stay a

long time in place. Despite the divorce of this parents, Nicolas didn’t have a lack of parental

love, at least on the maternal side : he is still today very close to his mother.

3.1.2 The bad and complexed student is changing

In primary and secondary school, Nicolas Sarkozy is not a good pupil and fails his 6th class. His

hyperactive tendency explains a bit these school results. When he becomes a teenager, he is still

small compared to the others at his age, a bit plump with a thin voice. That is these complexes

that will be a motor for him to move forward : he will put the energy and the will to compensate

them. Henceforth, everyone should see his success to not see his weaknesses : he turns into a

compensatory narcissist. He enters in a law school and is quickly interested in politics.

2 The most part of the section is coming from :

P. De Sutter, Ces fous qui nous gouvernent : comment la psychologie permet de comprendre les hommes politiques,

Paris, Les Arènes, 2007, pp. 205-248.

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3.2 BASIS : THE MILLON’S METHOD To understand the personality of Sarkozy, and the factors that play a role in his decision-making

for the NATO issue, we will use a study made by Pascal De Sutter and Aubrey Immelman

through the Millon’s model. “The personality profile yielded by the MIDC was analyzed on the

basis of interpretive guidelines provided in the MIDC and Millon Index of Personality Styles

manuals. Sarkozy’s primary personality patterns were found to be Ambitious/exploitative and

Dominant/controlling, with secondary features of the Conscientious/dutiful,

Outgoing/gregarious, Dauntless/adventurous, and Contentious/resolute patterns”3. We will

complete the results of this study by two other methods : the CIA method and the non-verbal

method.

3.2.1 An ambitious-dominant profile

The Sarkozy’s personality was analyzed from 12 axes, each representing a trait and its

proportion present in Sarkozy4.

Then, each one was translated in a graphic in function of its percentage of presence in the

Sarkozy’s personality5.

3 P. De Sutter, A. Immelman, “The Political Personality of French President Nicolas Sarkozy”, in Psychology

Faculty Publications of the College of Saint Benedict and Saint John’s University, 2008, p. iii. 4 P. De Sutter, A. Immelman, “The Political Personality of French President Nicolas Sarkozy”, in Psychology

Faculty Publications of the College of Saint Benedict and Saint John’s University, 2008, p. 5. 5 P. De Sutter, A. Immelman, “The Political Personality of French President Nicolas Sarkozy”, in Psychology

Faculty Publications of the College of Saint Benedict and Saint John’s University, 2008, p. 7.

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This enables us to see that two traits are mainly present in the personality of Sarkozy, namely

ambition (2) and domination (1A). His profile is typically an ambitious-dominant profile, like

many political leaders that came to power “by themselves”.

“Leaders with prominent ambitious personality traits are likely to be

motivated by power, pragmatism, ideology, and self-validation, in

descending order of importance. As extremely confident, often arrogant,

individuals with a strong belief in their talents and their leadership ability,

power is an obvious motivator for their leadership behavior”6.

The ambitious side of Sarkozy is also at the base of his desire to transform the society and of

his strong narcissism (cf. the point about “inventive vs. compensatory narcissist”). Contrary to

many other political leaders, he never hides this trait to anyone and assumes it completely. His

principle interest is to achieve the goals he sets. He puts loads of energy for his own political

ends.

The dominant profile of Sarkozy show us he is relatively strong asserting, controlling and

aggressive. Other features of this profile present in the French leader is the fact he is strong-

6 P. De Sutter, A. Immelman, The Political Personality of French President Nicolas Sarkozy, in Psychology Faculty

Publications of the College of Saint Benedict and Saint John’s University, 2008, p. 18.

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willed, competitive and especially sensitive to reproach or deprecation. One of his biggest

problem on the emotional plan is lack of self-control. Furthermore, visually he often give the

impression to be nervous and agitated.

3.2.2 Inventive vs. compensatory narcissist

A consequence feature of an ambitious personality is narcissism, but also inventiveness and

imaginativeness. In the case of Sarkozy, we deal with a compensatory narcissist personality :

the narcissist behavior comes from an insecurity and/or a weakness feeling. The reasoning and

cognition of this kind of people is the following, according to Horney and his successors7 :

“Je dois être exigeant avec moi-même, je dois être aimé, je suis tellement

imparfait que je dois être approuvé d’autres manières, je dois dominer la

vie, j’ai besoin de reconnaissance et d’admiration, je dois donner tout le

temps le meilleur de moi-même, j’ai besoin d’être utile ou indispensable aux

autres, je dois être un « personnage » hors du commun, je recherche toujours

la meilleure manière de guider et contrôler la vie, je dois transformer le

monde autour de moi pour confirmer ma propre personnalité […] ”.

This aspect « compensatory narcissist » of his personality leads him to be inventive. Like in the

theory of Duroselle, we can oppose this inventive trait to the rigid one. Sarkozy is innovative

and alertness. He is particularly attentive to the skill, the performance and the excellence. He

hates that things are done a certain way just because it has always been done this way : he keeps

an independent and complex view on the world and has a desire to break with what has been

done.

« Sur le plan international, la personnalité inventive de Sarkozy lui

permettra de marquer des points. Il n’aura pas peur d’innover et il est

probable que son esprit d’indépendance lui permette de ne pas s’aligner sur

des positions rigides ». Le type de personnalité de Sarkozy le portera, selon

Etheredge, à « être flexible, pragmatique et ouvert à un grands choix

d’initiatives inédites en politique étrangère »8. Ces sujets « préconisent le

changement, cherchent à bouger les choses […] sont intéressés par

l’amorce de nouveaux programmes en vue d’un leadership international et

de progrès coopératifs dans une large variété de domaines » »9.

The decision for France to join NATO is linked to this facet of the Sarkozy’s personality. In a

certain way, Sarkozy wants to break with the decision made by the de Gaulle, and more broadly,

with previous actions in foreign affairs related to United States. Moreover, taking this decision

7 T. Aaron Beck and M. Arthur Freeman and Associates, Cognitive Therapy of Personality Disorders, Guilford

Press, New York, 1990. 8 Pour les propos de Etheredge, voir :

L. S. Etheredge, « Personality effects on American foreign policy, 1989-1968 : a test of interpersonal

generalization theory », in American Political Science Review, 1978, n° 72, pp. 434-451. 9 P. De Sutter, Ces fous qui nous gouvernent : comment la psychologie permet de comprendre les hommes

politiques, Paris, Les Arènes, 2007, pp. 246-247.

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allows him to draw attention on his person and to leave a trace of his presence in France’s

history.

3.3 OPPORTUNISTIC AND ELUSIVE A big reproach made to Sarkozy is his elusive side. He tends to hold unpredictable positions,

especially in foreign affairs. We can not really say he follows an approach or an own principle

in this area. According to Duroselle, the decision-making style of Sarkozy has an opportunistic

tendency. He adapts his decisions to the contexts and to the expected gains. For boldness,

intrepidity and profit, he does not hesitate to make changes in its political positions.

3.4 « AMERICAN DREAM » Finally, the last trait present in Sarkozy that helps us to understand his decision-making process

concerning NATO is his identification to American values (namely political ones) and people.

He describes himself as an American self-made man and wants to be the architect of

reconciliation between France and the United States. Rejoin the NATO’s integrated military

command is the first step to achieve this goal. Being close to the Bush family helps him to

negotiate with the United States for the France’s return in NATO.

4 STATE LEVEL

4.1 PRESIDENTIALIZATION As established in the Constitution of the 4th October 1958 introducing the 5th Republic, the

French political system is based on a regime of semi-presidentialism. Which means that the

executive power has two leaders : the President (directly elected by the universal suffrage for

five years) and the Prime Minister, which leads the government.

In theory, the roles are well defined : the president define the guidelines of presidency and

mainly care of foreign policy with his minister of foreign and European affairs. On his side, the

Prime Minister handles the domestic policy and monitors the execution of the programme by

the members of the government.

However, during Sarkozy’s mandate, a kind of presidentialization appeared : Sarkozy was

deciding, governing, orienting French policies, etc. There is a real centralisation of the decision-

making in the president’s hands. This is a clear consequence of his authoritarian personality :

he wants to have everything under control. In this way of thinking and despite big differences

between them, we can establish a parallel between Nicolas Sarkozy and Charles de Gaulle :

they were the two most powerful presidents of the 5th French Republic.

This presidentialization means that the biggest part of the important decisions comes from the

president, and so also by his close entourage : he is surrounded by a team of personal advisers,

who has globally the total confidence of the President. In the French political system the team

surrounding the President is called the “presidential cabinet”. Under Sarkozy, this team is

composed by 12 advisers. Every president has his own cabinet and during Sarkozy’s mandate,

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this team of advisers is really powerful : we assist to the establishment of a “bis” government

at the Elysée, to the detriment of the different ministers. The “burning” issues are at this time

directly handled by the Elysée.

4.2 THE “BIS” GOVERNMENT Sarkozy and his personal cabinet meet every morning at 8.30. Those reunions are the real place

where decisions are taken and where major policies are decided. According to Johnson’s theory

about group structure, Sarkozy organizes his decision-making process in a collegial system :

president is at the heart of the decision-making, surrounded by his team of advisers, his in-

group. Discussions are also informal and direct action is favoured over a long bureaucratic

procedure. Nearly everything comes from the President and his advisers, the ministers and the

government are just present to apply decisions taken by the direct entourage of the President.

Sarkozy uses a close-decision system : only the inner’s circle of the advisers is authorised to

access to the decision-making process.

The government is set aside to the profit of the cabinet : more especially, the prime minister,

François Fillon, is set aside to the profit of the general secretary of the cabinet, Claude Guéant,

and the minister of foreign affairs, Bernard Kouchner, to the profit of the diplomatic adviser

and Sherpa, Jean-David Levitte. These two men are truly the two arms of Sarkozy, and at the

heart of all strategic decisions.

4.2.1 Claude Guéant & Jean-David Levitte Claude Guéant is the general secretary of the presidential cabinet at the Elysée. He is the real

conductor of French policies : between 2007 and 2010, he is the one who reunite the staff,

animates the debate and bring permanently new ideas to the president. Calm, precise,

obsessively hard worker, Guéant is the keystone of the system established by Sarkozy. He often

has the use to assign to himself diplomat cases about Africa and Middle East (and so

Afghanistan). We don’t know his real implication on the Sarkozy’s decision on France’s

reintegration in NATO’s structures. However, as being a major member of the inner circle of

the president, we can affirm he has an influence somewhere in the decision-making of Sarkozy

about this.

Jean-David Levitte played a more concrete role in the decision-making of NATO issue. He

integrated the presidential cabinet just after Sarkozy’s election as diplomatic adviser and is

considered as one of the best diplomats in France. Before this role, he was an ambassador in

Washington and permanent representative of France in the United Nations. He has so a good

approach on American affairs, which undeniably serves to orientate Sarkozy on the case. He

has also strong Jew origins, and has influence the president in his foreign policy regarding

Israel. As the president Sarkozy, Levitte wants to break out with the “static” policy of Chirac-

Villepin by linking up France with Israel and the United States. He argued to the president for

a return in the integrated NATO’s structures.

4.2.2 Jean-David Levitte versus Bernard Kouchner Even if Bernard Kouchner was the Minister of the Foreign and European Affairs, Levitte is

taking the decisions and deciding the orientations. As expected by the theoretical system,

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Kouchner and Levitte are supposed to work together. But in the facts it is absolutely not the

case : just like Guéant is taking over the Prime Minister, the Foreign Affairs are dominated by

Levitte and Kouchner has just to apply Levitte’s decisions. Furthermore the two men are very

different on the ideological side. Levitte is a defender of Chirac’s ideas. He has the sobriety of

a professional of the diplomacy. While Kouchner has passionate positions, member of the

Socialist Party and who has the reputation to fight for the Human Rights (he is the co-founder

of “Médecins sans frontière”). So it is hard for those two so different persons to work together.

« On avait rarement vu un tel abaissement du ministre des Affaires

étrangères et une telle importance des conseillers, Jean-David Levitte pour

les relations internationales, Claude Guéant pour l’Afrique, voire pour les

discussions avec la Syrie, court-circuitant le Quai d’Orsay, ou en tous cas

son ministre »10.

4.2.3 Levitte in the decision-making process concerning the reintegration of NATO Despite nothing was said about that in Nicolas Sarkozy’s electoral campaign, reintegrate the

NATO’s integrated military command was one of the objectives of Sarkozy. Levitte plaid an

important role in this decision. It is imperative to explain all what happened to really understand

the mechanism leading to the official reintegration of France in 2009 and to understand the role

Levitte plaid in this affair.

Levitte and Sarkozy established a plan to plan the reintegration of France. First, they realized

that a too fast come back would be seen as too “americanist” and opposed to European interests.

Indeed, the political process towards a European defence was on its way and France plays a big

role in this. Furthermore, it is a very important point in the French diplomacy since 1998 for

the French elite politic, right and left. Thus they realized it would a mistake to reintegrate NATO

prematurely.

So Levitte and Sarkozy decided to deal with both issues (NATO and European defence) in the

same time. They planned to pretend that the comeback in the NATO’s integrated military

structure would be related to concessions concerning the European defence. But those

concessions in favour of the European defence was not precise. The idea was to get something

just to justify the reingration of France in NATO. However they tried to get the support of allies

for a headquarter : it should be a great realization, a great strong symbol, even if it just a pretext.

Levitte started playing his role of Diplomatic Adviser and came to London to meet Gordon

Brown, the English Prime Minister. Brown was first not opposed to this idea, but the English

national context ruined the context : very popular so far, Brown dropped in the polls and the

elections are not far. So it was hard – even impossible – for Brown to appear as too Europhile.

He agreed for little realizations concerning the European defence but not for a headquarter : “it

is a red lign”11 he said about the headquarter.

10 J.-C. Cambadélis, « Nicolas Sarkozy est partout, la France est nulle part », in Revue internationale et stratégique,

2010, vol. 1, n° 77, p. 78. 11 V. Jauvert, Otan: révélations sur le retour de la France, L’Obs (Affaires étrangères, le blog de Vincent Jauvert),

2009, http://globe.blogs.nouvelobs.com/archive/2009/04/03/otan-histoire-secrete-du-retour-de-la-france.html

(page consultée en ligne le 15 décembre 2014).

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But Levitte did not abandon his plan. After London, he tried to get the support of Washington.

To get the favours of the American government, he made a clever manoeuvre : by sending 700

French soldiers in Afghanistan, Georges W. Bush announced in a summit in Bucarest in 2008

that he accepted to support the European defence. Washington also declared that the

construction of a headquarter for the European defence was a possibility. But Brown was still

opposed to this project and Sarkozy decided to abandon this idea.

Concerning NATO no evolution was seeing the light. Sarkozy was asking for France for some

important and strategic places in the commandment : Germany and the United Kingdom refused

categorically. A German official declared :

« Comment les Français, qui nous ont craché dessus pendant des années,

ont-ils pu croire un instant que nous allions nous réjouis de leur retour dans

l’Otan et leur céder nos places comme ça, pour leurs beaux yeux ? »12.

So despite the ability of Levitte and despite first initial positive advancements, in the spring of

2008, Sarkozy was nowhere : neither concerning NATO (no important commandments) nor

concerning the European defence (no headquarter). So how to make sure that French people

will aaccept the reintegration of NATO, which was the initial objective ? Once again Levitte

demonstrated his ability in diplomatic affairs. October 2008 he got the approval of Washington

to let to France two American commandments. But it was just a discussion, nothing was signed.

France has to wait the installation of the new President Barack Obama. Present in the United

States the day after Obama’s election, Levitte met his American counterpart, the general Jones

(former NATO’s big boss). Jones accepted officially to give France two American

commandments.

This time, it is enough to announce to the government and to the population the decision to

reintegrate NATO. In fact those two commandments will appear to be absolutely not important

:

«Le QG de Norfolk, SACT, est une sorte de think tank censé diffuser les

nouvelles pratiques militaires américaines auprès des Européens. C'est

tout» (…) «Lisbonne n'a réussi qu'à mobiliser deux bulldozers espagnols

que les autorités pakistanaises ont finalement refusés »13 said a French

official.

In a brief conclusion concerning Levitte, we can through this decision-making process what we

explained earlier : we assisted under Sarkozy’s mandate to a presidentialization of the French

political regime. From the beginning to the end of the process, everyghing turns around Sarkozy

and his personal advisers (Levitte in this case). The ministers and the government are not really

consulted and have to apply the decisions taken by Sarkozy and his presidential cabinet.

12 Idem. 13 Idem.

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4.3 FRANÇOIS FILLON François Fillon, French prime minister under Sarkozy, didn’t play a huge role in the decision-

making about NATO : we see it, such as Kouchner, we was surpassed in its function by the

Sarkozy’s close advisers.

However, even if he didn’t be in the president’s confidence for the decision-making, he

influences a bit this last one. After the firm president’s decision to join NATO, and also after

the “historical” meeting of 2007, Fillon insists and puts pressure on two dimensions of the

decision :

- He is behind the decision of delaying the entry of France in NATO’s structure until the

election of the new American president, in 2009.

- He affirms the necessity to link the return in NATO to the EU’s defence : France will

rejoin completely NATO if she gets progress in Europe of Defence during her rotating

presidency.

4.4 OUT OF THE GAME Many actors was completely out of this decision-making process. These people belong to the

out-group and they did not have access to the discussion and debate, because of the close

decision system.

Firstly, the ministers, Kouchner (foreign affairs minister) and Morin (defence minister)

normally responsible for these matters didn’t play any role on this issue. Others actors, such as

the army chief, the head of the personal headquarters of the president, the political director of

the foreign affairs minister and the diplomatic adviser of the minister of defence, only play a

ceremonial role : they all know the decision was already taken by the president before their

meeting, in 2007.

Finally, the parliament and the army, in a global way, was not consulted on the issue. The

parliament is generally ignored and ignores the issues of foreign affairs. For its part, the military

structure couldn’t say anything on the NATO case. Furthermore, the army is strongly divided

on this issue in function of this component (air, earth, marine) and of the generations.

5 SYSTEMIC LEVEL

After the parts about the individual level (focusing specifically on the decision-maker, Nicolas

Sarkozy in this case) and about the State level (concerning the organization of the French

national political system), we are going to deal in this last part with the systemic level. The

systemic level is related to the international system.

The international system is about the interaction between international actors (States,

international organizations, etc.). According to R. Aron’s definition, the international system is

:

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« Un ensemble constitué par des unités politiques qui entretiennent les unes

avec les autres des relations régulières et qui sont toutes susceptibles d’être

impliquées dans une guerre générale »

Another definition is coming from S. Hoffman :

« Le système international est un réseau de relations entre les unités de base

de la politique mondiale qui se caractérise par des objectifs qui poursuivent

ces unités et des tâches qu’elles accomplissent ainsi que par les moyens

utilisés pour atteindre ces objectifs et exécuter ces tâches »

The international context has a significant impact on the decision-making process of the

reintegration of France in NATO.

First we can outline the fact that the political centre of gravity tends to move towards Asia.

States such as China or India are serious challengers for a country like France in the competition

of power. Facing the increasing European weakness (on the economical side, on the military

side, etc.) the USA are moving their interests towards Asia. There is thus a need for France to

reaffirm her connection with Washington and NATO seems to be the good way to do that.

Other elements can explain the development of closer ties between France and the USA. In this

global world, the threat of radical Islamism implies a deeper collaboration with Washington –

the world’s greatest power. Then the need of strengthening for the European defence. Sarkozy

did not want to see the development of the European defence in opposition to the United States.

He wanted a development in a cooperation with Washington, through NATO. By reaffirming

the relationship between France and the USA in the NATO, it is a way to defend the European

interests. And of course, for Sarkozy, France has to play a big role in the European construction.

So national interests are strongly related to regional interests which are themselves related to

international context.

To finish this part concerning the systemic level, we can notice that Sarkozy affirms his

continuity with Charles de Gaulle’s thought about the place of France in the international

system. De Gaulle claimed :

« C'est parce que nous ne sommes plus une grande puissance qu'il nous faut

une grande politique, parce que, si nous n'avons pas une grande politique,

comme nous ne sommes plus une grande puissance, nous ne serons plus

rien »14.

The decision of comeback to the NATO’s integrated military command is in this way of

thinking : there is a need for France to (re)affirm herself in the international system.

14 Entretien avec Philippe de Saint Robert en avril 1969 (extraits des Septennats interrompus, Laffont, 1975, page

18) in de Gaulle, le souverain, t. 3, de Jean Lacouture, éditions du Seuil, page 286.

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6 CONCLUSION

As explained in this work, different elements have to be analysed to understand the comeback

of France in the NATO’s integrated military structure. On the individual level we have

considered Nicolas Sarkozy’s personal and psychological aspects. It helped us to understand

his way of thinking, his vision of the world and how he takes decisions. On the state level we

put into light the trend to presidentialization under Sarkozy’s mandate : this is strongly related

to Sarkozy’s mentality who needs to control everything and who needs to affirm himself. This

presidentialization was accompanied by a domination of the presidential cabinet on the

government. Advisers like Guéant and Levitte has much more powers than Fillon and

Kouchner. The decisions are taken by the President’s personal advisers and the government has

to apply those decisions. Finally, the last part was related to the international system : the

systemic level. We underlined the wish of France to (re)affirm herself.

We will finish this work with an open question : was this decision-making process really

democratic ? Indeed, the comeback of France in NATO was not present in the electoral program

of Sarkozy. Furthermore, the decision and the decision-making were relating to few people :

not democratically elected but chosen by the President himself. Thus all the power was

concentrated in the hands of a little group of person. The major part of this decision was decided

behind the scene. Sarkozy is not of course the only decision-maker who is acting like that, but

when personal advisers have some much power in the political system it raises the questions of

legitimacy and democracy.

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