the determinate 'content' of authenticity
TRANSCRIPT
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Keith Stephen Brady
7th June 2016
THE DETERMINATE ‘CONTENT’ OF AUTHENTICITY
§1. Introduction
Heidegger avers that his descriptions (in Being and Time) of Dasein's everyday mode of
Being are ethically neutral. In fact, he clearly warns us, in §34, that his interpretation of
phenomena is ‘purely ontological in its aims, and is far removed from any moralizing
critique of everyday Dasein.’ (Heidegger, 1962, pp.210-211; italics mine)1 This suggests
that any attempt to draw ethical conclusions from an analysis of the
authenticity/inauthenticity distinction would be futile. Heidegger appears to associate ethics
with the positive sciences (i.e. with forms of ontic inquiry), all of which he takes to be ‘less
primordial’ than ontological inquiry, and so, as it is in the context of fundamental ontology
that the authenticity/inauthenticity distinction is thematized, any concern about the possible
ethical implications of this distinction might be considered misplaced (or even irrelevant).
Nevertheless, I would here like to argue that if the ‘transition’ from inauthenticity to
authenticity involves, not only a change of ‘form’, but also a change of determinate
1 Heidegger does suggest, however, that Being and Time might contain an ‘original’ (or fundamental) ethics: ‘If the name "ethics," in keeping with the basic meaning of the word ethos, should now say that "ethics" ponders the abode of man, then that thinking which thinks the truth of Being as the primordial element of man, as one who ek-sists, is in itself the original ethics.’ (Heidegger, 1993, p.258)
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‘content’, it might be possible to show that the ‘transition’ to authenticity is not without
behavioural consequences and, therefore, not necessarily ethically neutral.
Before proceeding, however, it may be apposite to briefly sketch out how this ‘form’ and
determinate ‘content’ might be construed. By ‘form’ I mean the manner in which Dasein
relates to and thereby understands its own existence, where this ‘self-relation’/‘self-
understanding’ can be authentic, in which case it will be ‘genuine’ and ‘true’, or inauthentic,
in which case it will fail to be ‘genuine’ and ‘true’ (see §2 for a gloss of these terms). By
determinate ‘content’ I mean that on the basis of which the decisions which ‘shape’ the
actual life lived out by a concrete individual are made.2 If the ‘transition’ to authenticity,
as presented in Being and Time, involves only a change of ‘form’, as is sometimes
maintained,3 the actual lives lived out by authentic Dasein and inauthentic Dasein could be,
ceteris paribus, indistinguishable, with the only significant difference being how authentic
and inauthentic Dasein relate to and thereby understand their respective lives. However, if
this ‘transition’ also involves a change of determinate ‘content’ (even if only as a
concomitant of the requisite ‘formal’ change), there might then be some significant
‘concrete’ difference (over and above any ‘formal’ difference) between an authentic life and
an inauthentic life which precludes their being indistinguishable. In §3 I will explicate and
support what I take to be Guignon's argument (in his ‘Heidegger's “Authenticity” Revisited’
(1984)) that (i) Dasein's ‘heritage’ is that from which a determinate ‘content’ for authentic
understanding is derived, and (ii) the distinction between ‘heritage’ [Erbe] and ‘tradition’
(see BT, §74) provides the basis for an explanation of (a) the distinction between authentic
2 This should not be conceived as ready-to-hand, but as something analogous to a framework of guiding principles.3 This is suggested by Wisnewski: ‘Heidegger offers no clues as to the content of an authentic life [but rather] an account of what structural features authenticity will involve.’ (Wisnewski, 2012, p.65)
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and inauthentic factical possibilities, and (b) authentic Dasein's being able to distinguish
between such possibilities. I will then propose that (i) and (ii) provide adequate justification
for the claim that (iii) the authenticity/inauthenticity distinction is not without ethical
implications. In §4 I will examine these implications and suggest that (iv) some form of
ethical relativism seems unavoidable.
§2. The ‘form’ of authenticity4
Heideggerian authenticity [Eigentlichkeit], although highly distinctive, contains traces of a
somewhat similar notion found in Kierkegaard and prefigures the existentialist conceptions
of authenticity developed by Sartre and de Beauvoir.5 According to Kierkegaard, ‘[t]he self
is a relation that relates itself to itself’ (Kierkegaard, 1980, p.13), and to become authentic (or
‘what one really is’) is for this ‘self-relation’ to become a more ‘genuine’ relation. This
involves committing oneself passionately to that which gives meaning and identity to one's
life, namely God. For Heidegger, however, authenticity does not involve any (explicit)
reference to religious commitment, but rather a commitment to, and taking responsibility for,
one's own existence as one's own. According to Sembera, authenticity describes not only the
state of Dasein's being ‘genuine’, i.e. existing as itself, understanding its own possibilities as
such, but also its ‘true’ state of being, i.e. existing in conformity with an accurate
understanding of the ontological structures of existence. (Sembera, 2007, pp.144-145) If I
have an accurate understanding [Verstehen] of the ontological structure of my existence, the
4 ‘Inauthenticity’ does not distinguish a lesser ‘degree’ of Being (both ‘authenticity’ and ‘inauthenticity’ describe ‘positive’ ontic-existentiell modes of existence). (Heidegger, 1962, p.40)5 A precursor notion can also be found in Rousseau. For more recent developments see: Taylor, Sources of the Self (1989); Ferrara, Reflective Authenticity (1998).
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way I relate to myself will be ‘genuine’ and ‘true’ (i.e. authentic), and I will project myself
understandingly and ‘resolutely’ towards the future and ‘take a stand’ on, not just what I am,
but who I am (who I am as ‘already-having-been’; who I can be). The authentic-self is a self
which has taken hold of itself as itself (‘in its own way’). (Heidegger, 1962, p.167) This
means that I must understand myself in terms of my existential structure and take
responsibility for, by becoming the ground of, my own possibilities. I must face up to my
own finitude [Endlichkeit] in the mode of ‘anticipatory resoluteness’6 and recognize the
unitary wholeness of my existence as temporal.7 ‘Understanding is either authentic,
originating from its own self as such, or else inauthentic’ and ‘can be either genuine or not
genuine.’ (Heidegger, 1962, p.186) If my understanding originates from my own self, it will
be ‘genuine’, and I will exist in accordance with my own nature, i.e. authentically. If, on the
other hand, my ‘self-understanding’ is not ‘genuine’, not authentic (if it does not originate
from my own self as such), I will remain lost to myself (‘fleeing’ from authenticity, from my
own Being-in-the-world) in the ‘average understanding’ of ‘everydayness’ (informed by ‘idle
talk’ and ‘curiosity’ and characterized by ‘ambiguity’—the existential characteristics of
Dasein's ‘fallenness’).8 This will be to exist in the mode of inauthenticity [uneigentlichkeit],
which might be characterized as a form of ‘self-ignorance’. In this mode, I will exist, not as
myself, but as ‘just-another-(any)-one’—ignoring the ‘true’ ontological structures of my
existence and thereby failing to understand my possibilities as ‘mine’. Accordingly, the
‘formal’ distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity would appear to be explicable in
terms of the manner in which Dasein relates to its own existence (its own Being), i.e. the 6 i.e. the authentic mode of ‘care’ [Sorge], the Being of Dasein 7 The unity of ‘Temporality’ [Zeitlichkeit], i.e. Dasein's temporal structure as ‘care’, is the condition for the unity of the existentiale.8 ‘Fallenness’ [Verfallenheit] is one of Dasein's ontological existentiale, and, therefore, it ‘does not express any negative evaluation; [it] signif[ies] that Dasein is proximally and for the most part alongside the "world" of its concern.’ (Heidegger, 1962, p.220)
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manner in which Dasein understands (the structures of) its own existence and (more
important for my purposes here) its own possibilities as such.9 Nevertheless, as the key
methodological role of authenticity is to provide a foundation for fundamental ontology (see
§3), and as fundamental ontology requires an ontic foundation, we must now look to the
possibility of there being, in addition to an authentic ‘form’ of ‘self-understanding’, a
determinate ‘content’ for authentic understanding (of Dasein's factical possibilities). How,
and from where, could such ‘content’ be derived?
§3. The determinate ‘content’ of authenticity
According to Guignon, Heidegger draws a distinction ‘between the “Authentic self” and the
“Anyone” [das Man] as existentialia, on the one hand, and “authentic Being-one's-self” and
the “Anyone self” as existentiell modifications, on the other.’ (Guignon, 1984, pp.329-330)
Our essential being consists of both the ‘Anyone’ and the ‘Authentic self’, with the former
being ‘the source of all possibilities, both authentic and inauthentic’, and the latter ‘[t]he
“formal” structure of Dasein's existence as a temporal “happening”.’ (Guignon, 1984,
pp.332-333) Heidegger states that:
[B]ecause Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very
Being, ‘choose’ itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself [...] But
only insofar as it is essentially something which can be authentic [...] can it have lost
itself and not yet won itself. As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity [...]
9 Due to limitations of space, and as my main concern here is the effect the ‘transition’ to authenticity has on the range of possibilities open to Dasein, I will not focus directly on ‘conscience’, ‘guilt’, ‘anxiety’, and ‘Being-towards-death’. Also, I will leave untouched the question of a ‘third mode’ of existence (i.e. indifference).
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are both grounded in the fact that Dasein in general is characterized by mineness.
(Heidegger, 1962, p.68; italics in the original)
Only because Dasein is characterized by ‘mineness’ [Jemeinigkeit], the authentic
characteristic par excellence, is it essentially something the existentiell modification of which
can be authentic or inauthentic, and so, as Guignon maintains, the ‘Authentic self’ (the
‘potentiality’ for both authenticity and inauthenticity) would appear to be one of Dasein's
essential existentialia. Dasein exists as always-already-projecting itself towards its ownmost
potentiality-for-being-itself, for Being-a-whole—its existence lies in its ‘being-already-
ahead-of-itself’—but Dasein is also, and coequally, a thrown-projection,10 i.e. it is, in its
essence, ‘ “already-in” a specific cultural and historical context which provides [it] with the
determinate range of possibilities that shape [its] “facticity”.’ (Guignon, 1984, p.331)
Dasein's being ‘already-in’ a specific cultural and historical context means that ‘resolute
existence cannot be disengaged11 from the public world’, and so the ‘Anyone’ must be
understood as ‘the source of all possibilities, both authentic and inauthentic’ (Guignon, 1984,
p.333) and, consequently, as one of Dasein's essential existentialia. The following passage is
adduced in support of this:
In resoluteness [Entschlossenheit] the issue for Dasein is its ownmost ability-to-be
which, as something thrown, can project itself only upon definite factical possibilities.
Resolution does not withdraw itself from ‘actuality’ but discovers first what is
factically possible [...] by seizing upon it in whatever way is possible for its ownmost
ability-to-be in the Anyone12, (Heidegger, 1962, p.346; Guignon's italics)
10 ‘Thrown-projection’ is Heidegger's formal definition of ‘care’.11 I feel that ‘disengaged’ must here imply ‘disengaged tout court’; otherwise the authenticity/inauthenticity distinction would seem overly reduced. 12 ‘They’ in Macquarie, J. & Robinson, E. trans.
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Even a resolute (and thereby authentic) Dasein, so Heidegger informs us, must first discover
the factical possibilities of its ownmost ability-to-be in the ‘Anyone’. But we now face a
problem: if it is the (existential) ‘Anyone’ (our everyday ‘actuality’) which provides both
‘authentic Being-one's-self’ and the ‘Anyone self’ (our existentiell modifications) with their
possibilities, then the factical possibilities available to ‘authentic Being-one's-self’ might
appear to be no different to those available to the ‘Anyone self’. Therefore, identifying some
significant difference between authentic and inauthentic possibilities now seems requisite.
Despite their sharing the same provenance, they must be distinguishable, but what could such
distinguishability consist in? Guignon argues that although the ‘Anyone’ is ‘the source of all
possibilities, both authentic and inauthentic’, it is also that which ‘levels down our
possibilities and keeps us from facing up to our unique responsibility for our lives.’
(Guignon, 1984, pp.333-334) Accepting the first claim seems unproblematic (our
possibilities, even in the mode of authenticity, must have their source in our everyday
‘actuality’, in our ‘facticity’—in how we have been ‘thrown’13), but accounting for the way in
which the ‘Anyone’ levels down the very same possibilities of which it is the source seems
not so straightforward. Guignon initially suggests that it is only the way in which we relate
to such possibilities that is significant:
It would appear, then, that authenticity is not so much a matter of the ‘content’ of a
life as it is of the ‘style’ with which one lives. The distinction between authenticity
and inauthenticity seems to hinge not on what one is in the sense of what specific
possibilities one takes up, but rather of how one lives. (Guignon, 1984, p.334; italics
mine)14
13 i.e. how we are ‘situated’, subject to ‘attunements’ 14 I am here taking Guignon's ‘style’ to be relevantly similar to my ‘form’.
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This explanation, however, in that it fails to explain how authenticity can provide an
adequate foundation for fundamental ontology (for an understanding of the meaning of
Being), proves to be somewhat unsatisfactory:
If authenticity refers solely to the ‘style’ of a life, then the concept will not be able to
fulfil its methodological role of providing a foundation for fundamental ontology. For
if all possibilities of understanding are drawn from the Anyone, and if the Anyone's
understanding of what it is to be is shot through with misinterpretations and
misunderstandings, then there appears to be no way in which becoming authentic can
provide us with a deeper grasp of the meaning of Being. (Guignon, 1984, p.334)
As fundamental ontology must have an ontic foundation (BT §4), it is necessary that such a
foundation be ‘accessible’ to understanding in its authenticity, and this will require Dasein's
being able to ‘grasp’ its authentic existentiell possibilities as authentic. If authenticity were
only a matter of ‘form’, understanding would fail to have an authentic determinate ‘content’
in virtue of which the difference between authentic and inauthentic possibilities might be
discerned (all possibilities as such would be ‘neutral’). Consequently, if authenticity is to
provide us with a deeper grasp of the meaning of Being by providing a foundation for
fundamental ontology, we will need to locate a ground for the distinction between authentic
and inauthentic possibilities in the ‘Anyone’ (i.e. in the source of such possibilities). But how
might this be achieved?
The solution, according to Guignon, is to be found by going back to the source of
Dasein's self-interpretation, i.e. through an account of its historicity. As stated above, the
source of the factical possibilities through which we interpret ourselves (and our world) is the
‘Anyone’; however, we can appropriate our possibilities in two opposed ways: either as
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‘heritage’, or from ‘tradition’. The determinate ‘content’ of our self-understanding can be
simply accepted inauthentically from ‘tradition’, in which case our possibilities will appear
‘levelled-down’, or it can be taken over (from the ‘Anyone’) authentically as ‘heritage’, in
which case the full range of possibilities will become available to us. ‘Authentic existence
has a determinate “content” for its understanding because it has penetrated the traditional
interpretation of its current world in order to retrieve the enduring ideals and aims of its
“heritage”.’ (Guignon, 1984, p.337; italics mine) This reading is corroborated by Braman
when he points out that ‘the meanings and values that constitute the givenness of Dasein's
Being-in-the-world have become reified and hardened by tradition’, but through the recovery
of its heritage Dasein is able to ‘expose the sources of its ways of being’ and ‘clarify its
possibilities ....’ (Braman, 2008, pp.21-22; italics mine) This is what it means for Dasein to
have an authentic sense of historicity. ‘The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to
itself, discloses current factical possibilities of authentic existing [...] in terms of the heritage
which that resoluteness, as thrown, takes over.’ (Heidegger, 1962, p.435; italics mine) It is
by coming-back-to-itself resolutely that Dasein is able to take over, as ‘heritage’, its current
factical possibilities of authentic existing and reject those (inauthentic) possibilities which
only seem appealing through an ambiguous ‘average understanding’ of the ‘general situation’
[Lage].15 Existing in accordance with an accurate understanding of the ontological structures
of one's existence ‘snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which
offer themselves as closest to one [...] and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate.’
(Heidegger, 1962, p.435) It is the retrieval of our ‘heritage’ which provides a determinate
‘content’ for an authentic understanding of the factical possibilities through which we
interpret ourselves (and our world) and which allows us to discern which possibilities (from
15 opposed to the authentic ‘concrete’ Situation [Situation]
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the available range) are authentic and which inauthentic. My current factical possibilities of
authentic existing are those which emerge ‘for-me and as-mine’ directly from the depths of
my ‘history’ and which, as ‘authentic Being-one's-self’, I am able to ‘repeat’,16 whereas
inauthentic possibilities are those which have been ‘levelled-down’ by the ‘Anyone’ and
merely glitter on the surface of ‘everydayness’. In grasping my ‘heritage’, I grasp ‘a matrix
of possible ways of living, [i.e.] the menu of existentiell possibilities from which [I] must
choose’ (Mulhall, 2005, p.186), and, in doing so, I can either (1) understand myself ‘in terms
of those possibilities of existence which “circulate” in the “average” public way of
interpreting Dasein today [and which] have mostly been made unrecognizable by ambiguity
[although] they are well known to us’ (Heidegger, 1962, p.435; as cited in Mulhall, 2005), or
(2) understand myself in a way that ‘discloses current factical possibilities of authentic
existing, and discloses them in terms of the heritage which that existence, as thrown, takes
over’ (Heidegger, 1962, p.435).17
If this reading is convincing, it should now be clear that the ‘transition’ to authenticity
involves both a change of ‘form’ (explicans: the manner in which Dasein in the existentiell
mode of ‘authentic Being-one's-self’ relates to and thereby understands its own existence is
different from that of Dasein in the existentiell mode of the ‘Anyone self’) and a change of
determinate ‘content’18 (explicans: that on the basis of which Dasein in the existentiell mode
of ‘authentic Being-one's-self’ makes its ‘life-shaping’ decisions19 is not the same as that
16 The term ‘repetition’ [wiederholen] is used by Heidegger to describe Dasein's (interpretive) reappropriation of its factical possibilities.17 This entire sentence is adapted from Mulhall, 2005, p.186, first paragraph. 18 Caveat: As the ‘catalyst’ for the ‘transition’ to authenticity appears to be the change of ‘form’ (of ‘self-relation’/‘self-understanding’), the change of ‘content’ must be seen as a concomitant of this formal change—nevertheless, there still appears to be adequate justification for claiming that the ‘transition’ to authenticity involves a both change of both ‘form’ and determinate ‘content’.19 i.e. the determinate ‘content’ of authentic understanding, namely ‘content’ derived from ‘heritage’
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pertaining to Dasein in the existentiell mode of the ‘Anyone self’20); furthermore, as the way
in which Dasein understands its possibilities will affect (to a significant degree) how it
chooses and, eo ipso, what it actually does, the actual ‘concrete’ lives lived out by authentic
and inauthentic Dasein will not, ceteris paribus, be indistinguishable. But a life is not lived
out in isolation. Choosing to live a certain kind of life implies making choices which will
have an impact on the lives of others, and making such choices means making moral
choices.21 Therefore, becoming authentic can be seen to affect not only how we choose to
live but also our moral decisions, and consequently it will have ethical implications.
Admittedly, this line of reasoning might be thought to fall more on the side of the
amplificatory than the exegetical. However, as I am aiming here to explore the consequences
of the ‘transition’ to authenticity, I believe that a certain amount amplification is justified
(and possibly requisite).
§4. The Authentic Spectre of Relativism22
Before we assess any potential consequences of the ‘transition’ to authenticity, it will be
important to ask whether that which is taken over as ‘heritage’ (i.e. the current factical
possibilities of authentic existing) should be understood as value-neutral in itself, or whether,
for Heidegger, there is some sense in which ‘taken-over-as-heritage’ = ‘better’. Despite the
avowed ethical neutrality of Being and Time, there is (in §74) the suggestion of an equation
of ‘heritage’ with ‘goodness’ when Heidegger states that ‘[i]f everything “good” is a
20 i.e. ‘content’ derived from ‘tradition’ 21 N.B. I am assuming here that it is uncontroversial to equate choices which have an impact on the lives of others with moral choices. 22 borrowed from Lawrence Schmidt
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heritage, and the character of “goodness” lies in making authentic existence possible, then
the handing down of a heritage constitutes itself in resoluteness.’ (Heidegger, 1962, p. 435)
It might be objected, however, that ‘the Good’, for Heidegger, is not necessarily equatable
with moral goodness. When discussing the ‘Good’ [ἀγαθὸν], in Plato, Heidegger insists on
rendering agathon as ‘suitable’ [tauglich] (Heidegger, 2002, p.77) and thereby attempts to
distance the term from any sense of moral goodness. Agathon, according to Heidegger,
should be understood ontologically, as a (‘suitable’) way of being, not ethically. Discussing
Heidegger's interpretation of agathon in Aristotle, David Webb asserts that:
The agathon is ‘ontological’ in character insofar as it speaks of a ‘way of being’
proper to a given being: namely, that way of being which would constitute the telos of
such a being. The agathon therefore determines as ‘good’ the accomplishment of an
activity or movement, regardless of what that movement may be: the good is ‘being-
at-an-end’, or ‘fulfilment’. This determination of the agathon is therefore purely
formal, wholly without positive ethical content. (Webb, 2009, p.24)
As the agathon is not a being with a determinate character, it is not a prakton. ‘The agathon
therefore has no direct ethical interpretation: it does not yield a specific goal or orientation
for action.’ (Webb, 2009, p.24) The agathon is simply the ‘fulfilment’ of a ‘suitable’ way of
being. However, if ‘goodness’ implies ‘suitability’ (i.e. a way of being proper to a given
being), then every ‘suitable’ way of being, for Dasein, can be associated with a ‘heritage’
(see BT, p.435); moreover, to say that one way of being is more ‘suitable’ than another is to
make a positive judgement about the way of being deemed more ‘suitable’. Therefore, there
is still a sense in which Heidegger is implying that (authentic) ‘heritage’ is ‘better’ —than
(inauthentic) ‘tradition’—for Dasein (as a source of its self-interpretation and ways of being).
This, to my mind, still contains (quasi-)‘ethical’ overtones, for if Heidegger is recommending
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‘suitable-ways-of-being’ over ‘unsuitable-ways-of-being’, i.e. if he thinks of the former as
‘better’ for Dasein, this ‘recommendation’ appears to involve a value judgement about how
we ‘grasp’ our possibilities and ultimately about the actual decisions we make and the kinds
of lives we live out as a result, and any value judgement concerning the latter would appear
to have ethical significance. Furthermore, as the ‘heritage’ associated with my ‘cultural
history’23 may differ, in important respects, from that of yours, what I consider a ‘better’ way
of being may not correspond with what you consider ‘better’, suggesting perhaps that
Heidegger's understanding of ‘suitability’ involves some form of cultural relativism.
However, as there seems to be adequate justification for claiming that the ‘transition’ to
authenticity is not without ethical implications, we must now explore these implications in
light of Heidegger's equation of ‘suitable-ways-of-being-for-Dasein’ with its ‘heritage’ in
order to see what species of ethics might be lurking in the ontological shadows of
Heidegger's thought. Does Heidegger's seeming cultural relativism bespeak an ethical
relativism?
According to Wisnewski, in his 1924-25 lectures on Plato's Sophist, Heidegger identifies
phrónesis24 with conscience, which might allow us to understand his account of wanting-to-
have-a-conscience as ‘at least analogous to the resolution of the phrónimos25 to find arête26 in
all action—to be resolved to find arête despite not knowing, in advance, what situations will
emerge and how precisely to deal with these situations.’ (Wisnewski, 2012, p.65) Wanting-
to-have-a-conscience, so Heidegger maintains, ‘brings one without illusions into the
resoluteness of “taking action”.’ (Heidegger, 1962, p.358) This might allow a parallel to be
23 The ‘communal’ aspect of Heidegger's ‘heritage’ could invite comparison with Hegel's notion of Sittlichkeit. 24 practical wisdom25 one who is prudent/wise26 virtue/excellence
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drawn between ‘authentic Being-one's-self’ (‘guided by’ authentic understanding, and
‘wanting-to-have-a-conscience’) and the phrónimos (whose práxis is ‘guided’ towards arête
by phrónesis), suggesting a possible way of defending Heidegger against the charge of
relativism. A major problem with this line of defence, however, is that even if we are
resolved to find arête in all action, this may not guarantee that actions judged commendable
from our ‘cultural perspective’ are judged similarly from a broader (or different) perspective,
if only for the reason that there seems to be no obvious way of ‘immunizing’ our conception
of arête against relativism; furthermore, if arête is that towards which phrónesis guides us,
then any relativistic tendencies inherent to our understanding of arête will, or so it seems
reasonable to assume, affect the aim of phrónesis. My being resolved to find arête in all
actions might not guarantee that actions I deem commendable are actions that you would
deem commendable because my ‘heritage’ will determine (to a significant degree) how I
construe arête (if I am to remain authentic), and the determinate ‘content’ of authentic
understanding derived from the ‘heritage’ associated with my ‘cultural history’ may differ
significantly from that of yours. Insofar as the determinate ‘content’ of authentic
understanding reveals to me my authentic factical possibilities, the determinate ‘content’ of
authentic understanding will determine in which actions I find arête, simply because any
understanding of arête at odds with authentic understanding would surely fail to be authentic.
This prospect is very worrying indeed. If the determinate ‘content’ of my authentic
understanding derives from my ‘heritage’, and if this inclines me towards racism, for
example, this might permit me to commit racist acts while remaining in the mode of
authenticity and, worse still, understand such behaviour as the acting out of authentic
possibilities.27 The ‘transition’ to authenticity appears to have consequences for our dealings
27 Whether or not one could find arête in such acts is a question I will not try to answer here.
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with others and therefore ethical implications, but by linking authenticity to notions such as
‘heritage’ and ‘goodness’ (however the latter is construed), Heidegger seems to allow (what
might be considered) morally reprehensible behaviour to be justified as authentic.
A major problem, according to Volpi, is that Heidegger's ontologization of práxis,28 i.e.
his understanding of práxis as the being of existence, isolates it from any frame of reference
beyond itself. It is ‘constituted in such a way that it becomes an original ontological
determination, self-teleological, independent, and self oriented: a hoù héneka, Worumwillen.’
(Volpi, 2007, p.43) Unlike póiesis,29 práxis, as Heidegger construes it, has its ‘for-the-sake-
of-which’ within itself and is closed ‘within a solipsistic horizon that deforms its practico-
political configuration.’ (Volpi, 2007, p.44) I believe, however, that Volpi is only half
correct here. Although the horizon of ‘authentic Being-one's-self’ may be, in a sense, closed-
off to the inauthentic ‘public dimension’, it is not closed-off to those authentic possibilities
which, despite having their source in the ‘Anyone’ (see §3), are disclosed to Dasein
through the retrieval of its ‘heritage’. Authentic-Dasein's retrieval of its ‘heritage’ defines its
horizon by ‘opening it up’ to the possibility of authentic ways of being. The isolation of
authentic existence from a broader, more universal ‘public dimension’ might leave ‘authentic
Being-one's-self’ bereft of any sort of ‘common’ ethical frame of reference30 other than that
which the ‘Authentic self’ hands down to ‘authentic Being-one's-self’ as its ‘heritage’,
but Volpi's claim that Dasein is therefore closed within a solipsistic horizon seems to be an
overstatement. In fact, Heidegger seems to rule out such a reading when he proclaims that
‘the loyalty of existence to its own Self31 [...] is [...] a possible way of revering the sole
28 a kind of human activity the goal of which is the action itself29 a kind of human activity the goal of which is production30 some kind of Moralität31 i.e. ‘resoluteness’
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authority which a free existing can have—of revering the repeatable possibilities of
existence.’ (Heidegger, 1962, p.443; italics mine) These ‘repeatable possibilities of
existence’ are the authentic possibilities Dasein hands down to itself as its ‘heritage’.
Therefore, it would not seem to be the case that Dasein is entirely closed ‘within a solipsistic
horizon’ as Volpi claims. Be that as it may, as the only ‘ethical’ frame of reference available
to ‘authentic Being-one's-self’ would appear to be (the enduring ideals and aims of (see §3))
Dasein's ‘heritage’, ‘authentic Being-one's-self’, or so it seems, will have a greater
vulnerability to ‘ethical myopia’ than the ‘Anyone self’ (the latter having recourse to a more
universal frame of reference).
This conclusion, however, might appear to conflict with certain of Guignon's claims
explicated in §3. According to Guignon's (1984) reading, there is a sense in which the
enduring ideals and aims of Dasein's ‘heritage’ are in fact non-relative to Dasein's particular
‘cultural history’. It would seem that such ideals and aims possess a certain ‘primordiality’ in
virtue of which the culturo-historical boundaries marked by ‘traditions’ are transcended.
Nevertheless, this seems to require access to the kind of ‘foundational principles’ that
Heidegger associates with an inauthentic interpretation of Dasein's Being-in-the-world.
Therefore, although I agree with Guignon that the retrieval of Dasein's ‘heritage’ provides
authentic understanding with a determinate ‘content’, allowing authentic-Dasein to
distinguish between authentic and inauthentic possibilities, I do not agree that this gives
Dasein access to non-culturally-relative ideals and aims. Our ‘heritage’ itself must be
culturo-historical; otherwise, Heidegger's stipulation that all meaning is context-dependent
would fail to be all-encompassing. If we are to remain within Heidegger's hermeneutic
circle, there appears to be no authentic way of insulating the ideals and aims of our ‘heritage’
Brady 17
from relativism. Authentic-Dasein cannot have recourse to the arbitration of established
ethico-religious systems, because an established ethico-religious system is susceptible of
being labelled inauthentic on account of its having its source in the ‘average understanding’
of ambiguous ‘everydayness’—simply accepting the ‘universal truths’ of ethico-religious
systems is associated with the ‘levelling-down’ of Dasein's possibilities by ‘tradition’.32 It
might nevertheless be suggested that authentic-Dasein's ‘resoluteness’ could function so as to
‘steer’ deliberation and thereby provide authentic decision-making with a ‘guiding principle’,
but Heidegger warns against this, telling us that ‘resoluteness’ is nothing but a resolution that
‘projects itself understandingly’, that only the resolution itself can say on what it is resolved.
(Heidegger, 1962, p.345; italics mine) As the ‘resoluteness’ of a resolution depends on our
understanding, and as the determinate ‘content’ of authentic understanding derives from our
‘heritage’, that on which our ‘resoluteness’ is resolved will be greatly influenced by and
inextricably intertwined with the particular values of our ‘heritage’. Consequently, the
‘object’ of our authentic resolution may turn out to be ‘ethically unpalatable’ for those whose
do not share this ‘heritage’.
§5. Conclusion
32 The ‘authentic’ Kierkegaardian ‘Knight of Faith’ would surely be considered inauthentic by Heidegger's lights.
Brady 18
When Heidegger joined the NSDAP on May 1, 1933 I believe that he was acting
authentically. This was the ‘actualization’ of an existentiell possibility disclosed in terms of
the ‘heritage’ which his ‘resoluteness’ had taken over (as his own)—the decision to act in
this way was informed by the determinate ‘content’ of an authentic understanding. This
seems to have been a ‘concrete, historical manifestation of authentic, resolute existence.’
(Wolin, 1990, p.35) In choosing an ‘authentic historical destiny’, Heidegger chose his
‘hero’, but had he instead remained inauthentic (and constrained by the conventions of
‘traditional’ morality)33 he may have been less responsive to ‘the summons toward an
authentic historical destiny’ and less inclined to see Germany's National Revolution as ‘the
ontic fulfilment of the categorical demands of historicity.’ (Wolin, 1990, p.65) Heidegger's
‘political mistake’ could be viewed as nothing more than naïveté; moreover, it might be
suggested that when he joined the NSDAP he was not in fact acting authentically. But
Heidegger clearly believed that Nazism embodied an authentic potentiality-for-Being of the
Volksdeutsche 34, and if anyone can be said to have had a perspicuous and profound
understanding of his notion of authenticity, it was surely Heidegger himself.
To conclude, although Heideggerian authenticity might serve as an ‘existential lifeline’
for those drowning in the murky waters of everyday anonymity, due to its moral ambiguity
and seeming ethico-political ‘adaptability’, I am inclined to view it, despite its merits, as a
‘relativistic’ and potentially dangerous ‘philosophical device’.35
33 As Volpi notes, ‘It was Hannah Arendt [...] who decisively criticised this reductive aspect of Heidegger’s rehabilitation of práxis, and reversed [...] the direction of the Heideggerian recovery. What in Heidegger is marked by inauthenticity, i.e. the public dimension, becomes for her the authentic dimension par excellence.’ (Volpi, 2007, p.44) 34 This is evident in his address to the Freiburg Institute of Pathological Anatomy, August 1933.35 a term borrowed from Papineau
Brady 20
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