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Keith Stephen Brady

7th June 2016

THE DETERMINATE ‘CONTENT’ OF AUTHENTICITY

§1. Introduction

Heidegger avers that his descriptions (in Being and Time) of Dasein's everyday mode of

Being are ethically neutral. In fact, he clearly warns us, in §34, that his interpretation of

phenomena is ‘purely ontological in its aims, and is far removed from any moralizing

critique of everyday Dasein.’ (Heidegger, 1962, pp.210-211; italics mine)1 This suggests

that any attempt to draw ethical conclusions from an analysis of the

authenticity/inauthenticity distinction would be futile. Heidegger appears to associate ethics

with the positive sciences (i.e. with forms of ontic inquiry), all of which he takes to be ‘less

primordial’ than ontological inquiry, and so, as it is in the context of fundamental ontology

that the authenticity/inauthenticity distinction is thematized, any concern about the possible

ethical implications of this distinction might be considered misplaced (or even irrelevant).

Nevertheless, I would here like to argue that if the ‘transition’ from inauthenticity to

authenticity involves, not only a change of ‘form’, but also a change of determinate

1 Heidegger does suggest, however, that Being and Time might contain an ‘original’ (or fundamental) ethics: ‘If the name "ethics," in keeping with the basic meaning of the word ethos, should now say that "ethics" ponders the abode of man, then that thinking which thinks the truth of Being as the primordial element of man, as one who ek-sists, is in itself the original ethics.’ (Heidegger, 1993, p.258)

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‘content’, it might be possible to show that the ‘transition’ to authenticity is not without

behavioural consequences and, therefore, not necessarily ethically neutral.

Before proceeding, however, it may be apposite to briefly sketch out how this ‘form’ and

determinate ‘content’ might be construed. By ‘form’ I mean the manner in which Dasein

relates to and thereby understands its own existence, where this ‘self-relation’/‘self-

understanding’ can be authentic, in which case it will be ‘genuine’ and ‘true’, or inauthentic,

in which case it will fail to be ‘genuine’ and ‘true’ (see §2 for a gloss of these terms). By

determinate ‘content’ I mean that on the basis of which the decisions which ‘shape’ the

actual life lived out by a concrete individual are made.2 If the ‘transition’ to authenticity,

as presented in Being and Time, involves only a change of ‘form’, as is sometimes

maintained,3 the actual lives lived out by authentic Dasein and inauthentic Dasein could be,

ceteris paribus, indistinguishable, with the only significant difference being how authentic

and inauthentic Dasein relate to and thereby understand their respective lives. However, if

this ‘transition’ also involves a change of determinate ‘content’ (even if only as a

concomitant of the requisite ‘formal’ change), there might then be some significant

‘concrete’ difference (over and above any ‘formal’ difference) between an authentic life and

an inauthentic life which precludes their being indistinguishable. In §3 I will explicate and

support what I take to be Guignon's argument (in his ‘Heidegger's “Authenticity” Revisited’

(1984)) that (i) Dasein's ‘heritage’ is that from which a determinate ‘content’ for authentic

understanding is derived, and (ii) the distinction between ‘heritage’ [Erbe] and ‘tradition’

(see BT, §74) provides the basis for an explanation of (a) the distinction between authentic

2 This should not be conceived as ready-to-hand, but as something analogous to a framework of guiding principles.3 This is suggested by Wisnewski: ‘Heidegger offers no clues as to the content of an authentic life [but rather] an account of what structural features authenticity will involve.’ (Wisnewski, 2012, p.65)

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and inauthentic factical possibilities, and (b) authentic Dasein's being able to distinguish

between such possibilities. I will then propose that (i) and (ii) provide adequate justification

for the claim that (iii) the authenticity/inauthenticity distinction is not without ethical

implications. In §4 I will examine these implications and suggest that (iv) some form of

ethical relativism seems unavoidable.

§2. The ‘form’ of authenticity4

Heideggerian authenticity [Eigentlichkeit], although highly distinctive, contains traces of a

somewhat similar notion found in Kierkegaard and prefigures the existentialist conceptions

of authenticity developed by Sartre and de Beauvoir.5 According to Kierkegaard, ‘[t]he self

is a relation that relates itself to itself’ (Kierkegaard, 1980, p.13), and to become authentic (or

‘what one really is’) is for this ‘self-relation’ to become a more ‘genuine’ relation. This

involves committing oneself passionately to that which gives meaning and identity to one's

life, namely God. For Heidegger, however, authenticity does not involve any (explicit)

reference to religious commitment, but rather a commitment to, and taking responsibility for,

one's own existence as one's own. According to Sembera, authenticity describes not only the

state of Dasein's being ‘genuine’, i.e. existing as itself, understanding its own possibilities as

such, but also its ‘true’ state of being, i.e. existing in conformity with an accurate

understanding of the ontological structures of existence. (Sembera, 2007, pp.144-145) If I

have an accurate understanding [Verstehen] of the ontological structure of my existence, the

4 ‘Inauthenticity’ does not distinguish a lesser ‘degree’ of Being (both ‘authenticity’ and ‘inauthenticity’ describe ‘positive’ ontic-existentiell modes of existence). (Heidegger, 1962, p.40)5 A precursor notion can also be found in Rousseau. For more recent developments see: Taylor, Sources of the Self (1989); Ferrara, Reflective Authenticity (1998).

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way I relate to myself will be ‘genuine’ and ‘true’ (i.e. authentic), and I will project myself

understandingly and ‘resolutely’ towards the future and ‘take a stand’ on, not just what I am,

but who I am (who I am as ‘already-having-been’; who I can be). The authentic-self is a self

which has taken hold of itself as itself (‘in its own way’). (Heidegger, 1962, p.167) This

means that I must understand myself in terms of my existential structure and take

responsibility for, by becoming the ground of, my own possibilities. I must face up to my

own finitude [Endlichkeit] in the mode of ‘anticipatory resoluteness’6 and recognize the

unitary wholeness of my existence as temporal.7 ‘Understanding is either authentic,

originating from its own self as such, or else inauthentic’ and ‘can be either genuine or not

genuine.’ (Heidegger, 1962, p.186) If my understanding originates from my own self, it will

be ‘genuine’, and I will exist in accordance with my own nature, i.e. authentically. If, on the

other hand, my ‘self-understanding’ is not ‘genuine’, not authentic (if it does not originate

from my own self as such), I will remain lost to myself (‘fleeing’ from authenticity, from my

own Being-in-the-world) in the ‘average understanding’ of ‘everydayness’ (informed by ‘idle

talk’ and ‘curiosity’ and characterized by ‘ambiguity’—the existential characteristics of

Dasein's ‘fallenness’).8 This will be to exist in the mode of inauthenticity [uneigentlichkeit],

which might be characterized as a form of ‘self-ignorance’. In this mode, I will exist, not as

myself, but as ‘just-another-(any)-one’—ignoring the ‘true’ ontological structures of my

existence and thereby failing to understand my possibilities as ‘mine’. Accordingly, the

‘formal’ distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity would appear to be explicable in

terms of the manner in which Dasein relates to its own existence (its own Being), i.e. the 6 i.e. the authentic mode of ‘care’ [Sorge], the Being of Dasein 7 The unity of ‘Temporality’ [Zeitlichkeit], i.e. Dasein's temporal structure as ‘care’, is the condition for the unity of the existentiale.8 ‘Fallenness’ [Verfallenheit] is one of Dasein's ontological existentiale, and, therefore, it ‘does not express any negative evaluation; [it] signif[ies] that Dasein is proximally and for the most part alongside the "world" of its concern.’ (Heidegger, 1962, p.220)

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manner in which Dasein understands (the structures of) its own existence and (more

important for my purposes here) its own possibilities as such.9 Nevertheless, as the key

methodological role of authenticity is to provide a foundation for fundamental ontology (see

§3), and as fundamental ontology requires an ontic foundation, we must now look to the

possibility of there being, in addition to an authentic ‘form’ of ‘self-understanding’, a

determinate ‘content’ for authentic understanding (of Dasein's factical possibilities). How,

and from where, could such ‘content’ be derived?

§3. The determinate ‘content’ of authenticity

According to Guignon, Heidegger draws a distinction ‘between the “Authentic self” and the

“Anyone” [das Man] as existentialia, on the one hand, and “authentic Being-one's-self” and

the “Anyone self” as existentiell modifications, on the other.’ (Guignon, 1984, pp.329-330)

Our essential being consists of both the ‘Anyone’ and the ‘Authentic self’, with the former

being ‘the source of all possibilities, both authentic and inauthentic’, and the latter ‘[t]he

“formal” structure of Dasein's existence as a temporal “happening”.’ (Guignon, 1984,

pp.332-333) Heidegger states that:

[B]ecause Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very

Being, ‘choose’ itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself [...] But

only insofar as it is essentially something which can be authentic [...] can it have lost

itself and not yet won itself. As modes of Being, authenticity and inauthenticity [...]

9 Due to limitations of space, and as my main concern here is the effect the ‘transition’ to authenticity has on the range of possibilities open to Dasein, I will not focus directly on ‘conscience’, ‘guilt’, ‘anxiety’, and ‘Being-towards-death’. Also, I will leave untouched the question of a ‘third mode’ of existence (i.e. indifference).

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are both grounded in the fact that Dasein in general is characterized by mineness.

(Heidegger, 1962, p.68; italics in the original)

Only because Dasein is characterized by ‘mineness’ [Jemeinigkeit], the authentic

characteristic par excellence, is it essentially something the existentiell modification of which

can be authentic or inauthentic, and so, as Guignon maintains, the ‘Authentic self’ (the

‘potentiality’ for both authenticity and inauthenticity) would appear to be one of Dasein's

essential existentialia. Dasein exists as always-already-projecting itself towards its ownmost

potentiality-for-being-itself, for Being-a-whole—its existence lies in its ‘being-already-

ahead-of-itself’—but Dasein is also, and coequally, a thrown-projection,10 i.e. it is, in its

essence, ‘ “already-in” a specific cultural and historical context which provides [it] with the

determinate range of possibilities that shape [its] “facticity”.’ (Guignon, 1984, p.331)

Dasein's being ‘already-in’ a specific cultural and historical context means that ‘resolute

existence cannot be disengaged11 from the public world’, and so the ‘Anyone’ must be

understood as ‘the source of all possibilities, both authentic and inauthentic’ (Guignon, 1984,

p.333) and, consequently, as one of Dasein's essential existentialia. The following passage is

adduced in support of this:

In resoluteness [Entschlossenheit] the issue for Dasein is its ownmost ability-to-be

which, as something thrown, can project itself only upon definite factical possibilities.

Resolution does not withdraw itself from ‘actuality’ but discovers first what is

factically possible [...] by seizing upon it in whatever way is possible for its ownmost

ability-to-be in the Anyone12, (Heidegger, 1962, p.346; Guignon's italics)

10 ‘Thrown-projection’ is Heidegger's formal definition of ‘care’.11 I feel that ‘disengaged’ must here imply ‘disengaged tout court’; otherwise the authenticity/inauthenticity distinction would seem overly reduced. 12 ‘They’ in Macquarie, J. & Robinson, E. trans.

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Even a resolute (and thereby authentic) Dasein, so Heidegger informs us, must first discover

the factical possibilities of its ownmost ability-to-be in the ‘Anyone’. But we now face a

problem: if it is the (existential) ‘Anyone’ (our everyday ‘actuality’) which provides both

‘authentic Being-one's-self’ and the ‘Anyone self’ (our existentiell modifications) with their

possibilities, then the factical possibilities available to ‘authentic Being-one's-self’ might

appear to be no different to those available to the ‘Anyone self’. Therefore, identifying some

significant difference between authentic and inauthentic possibilities now seems requisite.

Despite their sharing the same provenance, they must be distinguishable, but what could such

distinguishability consist in? Guignon argues that although the ‘Anyone’ is ‘the source of all

possibilities, both authentic and inauthentic’, it is also that which ‘levels down our

possibilities and keeps us from facing up to our unique responsibility for our lives.’

(Guignon, 1984, pp.333-334) Accepting the first claim seems unproblematic (our

possibilities, even in the mode of authenticity, must have their source in our everyday

‘actuality’, in our ‘facticity’—in how we have been ‘thrown’13), but accounting for the way in

which the ‘Anyone’ levels down the very same possibilities of which it is the source seems

not so straightforward. Guignon initially suggests that it is only the way in which we relate

to such possibilities that is significant:

It would appear, then, that authenticity is not so much a matter of the ‘content’ of a

life as it is of the ‘style’ with which one lives. The distinction between authenticity

and inauthenticity seems to hinge not on what one is in the sense of what specific

possibilities one takes up, but rather of how one lives. (Guignon, 1984, p.334; italics

mine)14

13 i.e. how we are ‘situated’, subject to ‘attunements’ 14 I am here taking Guignon's ‘style’ to be relevantly similar to my ‘form’.

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This explanation, however, in that it fails to explain how authenticity can provide an

adequate foundation for fundamental ontology (for an understanding of the meaning of

Being), proves to be somewhat unsatisfactory:

If authenticity refers solely to the ‘style’ of a life, then the concept will not be able to

fulfil its methodological role of providing a foundation for fundamental ontology. For

if all possibilities of understanding are drawn from the Anyone, and if the Anyone's

understanding of what it is to be is shot through with misinterpretations and

misunderstandings, then there appears to be no way in which becoming authentic can

provide us with a deeper grasp of the meaning of Being. (Guignon, 1984, p.334)

As fundamental ontology must have an ontic foundation (BT §4), it is necessary that such a

foundation be ‘accessible’ to understanding in its authenticity, and this will require Dasein's

being able to ‘grasp’ its authentic existentiell possibilities as authentic. If authenticity were

only a matter of ‘form’, understanding would fail to have an authentic determinate ‘content’

in virtue of which the difference between authentic and inauthentic possibilities might be

discerned (all possibilities as such would be ‘neutral’). Consequently, if authenticity is to

provide us with a deeper grasp of the meaning of Being by providing a foundation for

fundamental ontology, we will need to locate a ground for the distinction between authentic

and inauthentic possibilities in the ‘Anyone’ (i.e. in the source of such possibilities). But how

might this be achieved?

The solution, according to Guignon, is to be found by going back to the source of

Dasein's self-interpretation, i.e. through an account of its historicity. As stated above, the

source of the factical possibilities through which we interpret ourselves (and our world) is the

‘Anyone’; however, we can appropriate our possibilities in two opposed ways: either as

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‘heritage’, or from ‘tradition’. The determinate ‘content’ of our self-understanding can be

simply accepted inauthentically from ‘tradition’, in which case our possibilities will appear

‘levelled-down’, or it can be taken over (from the ‘Anyone’) authentically as ‘heritage’, in

which case the full range of possibilities will become available to us. ‘Authentic existence

has a determinate “content” for its understanding because it has penetrated the traditional

interpretation of its current world in order to retrieve the enduring ideals and aims of its

“heritage”.’ (Guignon, 1984, p.337; italics mine) This reading is corroborated by Braman

when he points out that ‘the meanings and values that constitute the givenness of Dasein's

Being-in-the-world have become reified and hardened by tradition’, but through the recovery

of its heritage Dasein is able to ‘expose the sources of its ways of being’ and ‘clarify its

possibilities ....’ (Braman, 2008, pp.21-22; italics mine) This is what it means for Dasein to

have an authentic sense of historicity. ‘The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to

itself, discloses current factical possibilities of authentic existing [...] in terms of the heritage

which that resoluteness, as thrown, takes over.’ (Heidegger, 1962, p.435; italics mine) It is

by coming-back-to-itself resolutely that Dasein is able to take over, as ‘heritage’, its current

factical possibilities of authentic existing and reject those (inauthentic) possibilities which

only seem appealing through an ambiguous ‘average understanding’ of the ‘general situation’

[Lage].15 Existing in accordance with an accurate understanding of the ontological structures

of one's existence ‘snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which

offer themselves as closest to one [...] and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its fate.’

(Heidegger, 1962, p.435) It is the retrieval of our ‘heritage’ which provides a determinate

‘content’ for an authentic understanding of the factical possibilities through which we

interpret ourselves (and our world) and which allows us to discern which possibilities (from

15 opposed to the authentic ‘concrete’ Situation [Situation]

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the available range) are authentic and which inauthentic. My current factical possibilities of

authentic existing are those which emerge ‘for-me and as-mine’ directly from the depths of

my ‘history’ and which, as ‘authentic Being-one's-self’, I am able to ‘repeat’,16 whereas

inauthentic possibilities are those which have been ‘levelled-down’ by the ‘Anyone’ and

merely glitter on the surface of ‘everydayness’. In grasping my ‘heritage’, I grasp ‘a matrix

of possible ways of living, [i.e.] the menu of existentiell possibilities from which [I] must

choose’ (Mulhall, 2005, p.186), and, in doing so, I can either (1) understand myself ‘in terms

of those possibilities of existence which “circulate” in the “average” public way of

interpreting Dasein today [and which] have mostly been made unrecognizable by ambiguity

[although] they are well known to us’ (Heidegger, 1962, p.435; as cited in Mulhall, 2005), or

(2) understand myself in a way that ‘discloses current factical possibilities of authentic

existing, and discloses them in terms of the heritage which that existence, as thrown, takes

over’ (Heidegger, 1962, p.435).17

If this reading is convincing, it should now be clear that the ‘transition’ to authenticity

involves both a change of ‘form’ (explicans: the manner in which Dasein in the existentiell

mode of ‘authentic Being-one's-self’ relates to and thereby understands its own existence is

different from that of Dasein in the existentiell mode of the ‘Anyone self’) and a change of

determinate ‘content’18 (explicans: that on the basis of which Dasein in the existentiell mode

of ‘authentic Being-one's-self’ makes its ‘life-shaping’ decisions19 is not the same as that

16 The term ‘repetition’ [wiederholen] is used by Heidegger to describe Dasein's (interpretive) reappropriation of its factical possibilities.17 This entire sentence is adapted from Mulhall, 2005, p.186, first paragraph. 18 Caveat: As the ‘catalyst’ for the ‘transition’ to authenticity appears to be the change of ‘form’ (of ‘self-relation’/‘self-understanding’), the change of ‘content’ must be seen as a concomitant of this formal change—nevertheless, there still appears to be adequate justification for claiming that the ‘transition’ to authenticity involves a both change of both ‘form’ and determinate ‘content’.19 i.e. the determinate ‘content’ of authentic understanding, namely ‘content’ derived from ‘heritage’

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pertaining to Dasein in the existentiell mode of the ‘Anyone self’20); furthermore, as the way

in which Dasein understands its possibilities will affect (to a significant degree) how it

chooses and, eo ipso, what it actually does, the actual ‘concrete’ lives lived out by authentic

and inauthentic Dasein will not, ceteris paribus, be indistinguishable. But a life is not lived

out in isolation. Choosing to live a certain kind of life implies making choices which will

have an impact on the lives of others, and making such choices means making moral

choices.21 Therefore, becoming authentic can be seen to affect not only how we choose to

live but also our moral decisions, and consequently it will have ethical implications.

Admittedly, this line of reasoning might be thought to fall more on the side of the

amplificatory than the exegetical. However, as I am aiming here to explore the consequences

of the ‘transition’ to authenticity, I believe that a certain amount amplification is justified

(and possibly requisite).

§4. The Authentic Spectre of Relativism22

Before we assess any potential consequences of the ‘transition’ to authenticity, it will be

important to ask whether that which is taken over as ‘heritage’ (i.e. the current factical

possibilities of authentic existing) should be understood as value-neutral in itself, or whether,

for Heidegger, there is some sense in which ‘taken-over-as-heritage’ = ‘better’. Despite the

avowed ethical neutrality of Being and Time, there is (in §74) the suggestion of an equation

of ‘heritage’ with ‘goodness’ when Heidegger states that ‘[i]f everything “good” is a

20 i.e. ‘content’ derived from ‘tradition’ 21 N.B. I am assuming here that it is uncontroversial to equate choices which have an impact on the lives of others with moral choices. 22 borrowed from Lawrence Schmidt

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heritage, and the character of “goodness” lies in making authentic existence possible, then

the handing down of a heritage constitutes itself in resoluteness.’ (Heidegger, 1962, p. 435)

It might be objected, however, that ‘the Good’, for Heidegger, is not necessarily equatable

with moral goodness. When discussing the ‘Good’ [ἀγαθὸν], in Plato, Heidegger insists on

rendering agathon as ‘suitable’ [tauglich] (Heidegger, 2002, p.77) and thereby attempts to

distance the term from any sense of moral goodness. Agathon, according to Heidegger,

should be understood ontologically, as a (‘suitable’) way of being, not ethically. Discussing

Heidegger's interpretation of agathon in Aristotle, David Webb asserts that:

The agathon is ‘ontological’ in character insofar as it speaks of a ‘way of being’

proper to a given being: namely, that way of being which would constitute the telos of

such a being. The agathon therefore determines as ‘good’ the accomplishment of an

activity or movement, regardless of what that movement may be: the good is ‘being-

at-an-end’, or ‘fulfilment’. This determination of the agathon is therefore purely

formal, wholly without positive ethical content. (Webb, 2009, p.24)

As the agathon is not a being with a determinate character, it is not a prakton. ‘The agathon

therefore has no direct ethical interpretation: it does not yield a specific goal or orientation

for action.’ (Webb, 2009, p.24) The agathon is simply the ‘fulfilment’ of a ‘suitable’ way of

being. However, if ‘goodness’ implies ‘suitability’ (i.e. a way of being proper to a given

being), then every ‘suitable’ way of being, for Dasein, can be associated with a ‘heritage’

(see BT, p.435); moreover, to say that one way of being is more ‘suitable’ than another is to

make a positive judgement about the way of being deemed more ‘suitable’. Therefore, there

is still a sense in which Heidegger is implying that (authentic) ‘heritage’ is ‘better’ —than

(inauthentic) ‘tradition’—for Dasein (as a source of its self-interpretation and ways of being).

This, to my mind, still contains (quasi-)‘ethical’ overtones, for if Heidegger is recommending

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‘suitable-ways-of-being’ over ‘unsuitable-ways-of-being’, i.e. if he thinks of the former as

‘better’ for Dasein, this ‘recommendation’ appears to involve a value judgement about how

we ‘grasp’ our possibilities and ultimately about the actual decisions we make and the kinds

of lives we live out as a result, and any value judgement concerning the latter would appear

to have ethical significance. Furthermore, as the ‘heritage’ associated with my ‘cultural

history’23 may differ, in important respects, from that of yours, what I consider a ‘better’ way

of being may not correspond with what you consider ‘better’, suggesting perhaps that

Heidegger's understanding of ‘suitability’ involves some form of cultural relativism.

However, as there seems to be adequate justification for claiming that the ‘transition’ to

authenticity is not without ethical implications, we must now explore these implications in

light of Heidegger's equation of ‘suitable-ways-of-being-for-Dasein’ with its ‘heritage’ in

order to see what species of ethics might be lurking in the ontological shadows of

Heidegger's thought. Does Heidegger's seeming cultural relativism bespeak an ethical

relativism?

According to Wisnewski, in his 1924-25 lectures on Plato's Sophist, Heidegger identifies

phrónesis24 with conscience, which might allow us to understand his account of wanting-to-

have-a-conscience as ‘at least analogous to the resolution of the phrónimos25 to find arête26 in

all action—to be resolved to find arête despite not knowing, in advance, what situations will

emerge and how precisely to deal with these situations.’ (Wisnewski, 2012, p.65) Wanting-

to-have-a-conscience, so Heidegger maintains, ‘brings one without illusions into the

resoluteness of “taking action”.’ (Heidegger, 1962, p.358) This might allow a parallel to be

23 The ‘communal’ aspect of Heidegger's ‘heritage’ could invite comparison with Hegel's notion of Sittlichkeit. 24 practical wisdom25 one who is prudent/wise26 virtue/excellence

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drawn between ‘authentic Being-one's-self’ (‘guided by’ authentic understanding, and

‘wanting-to-have-a-conscience’) and the phrónimos (whose práxis is ‘guided’ towards arête

by phrónesis), suggesting a possible way of defending Heidegger against the charge of

relativism. A major problem with this line of defence, however, is that even if we are

resolved to find arête in all action, this may not guarantee that actions judged commendable

from our ‘cultural perspective’ are judged similarly from a broader (or different) perspective,

if only for the reason that there seems to be no obvious way of ‘immunizing’ our conception

of arête against relativism; furthermore, if arête is that towards which phrónesis guides us,

then any relativistic tendencies inherent to our understanding of arête will, or so it seems

reasonable to assume, affect the aim of phrónesis. My being resolved to find arête in all

actions might not guarantee that actions I deem commendable are actions that you would

deem commendable because my ‘heritage’ will determine (to a significant degree) how I

construe arête (if I am to remain authentic), and the determinate ‘content’ of authentic

understanding derived from the ‘heritage’ associated with my ‘cultural history’ may differ

significantly from that of yours. Insofar as the determinate ‘content’ of authentic

understanding reveals to me my authentic factical possibilities, the determinate ‘content’ of

authentic understanding will determine in which actions I find arête, simply because any

understanding of arête at odds with authentic understanding would surely fail to be authentic.

This prospect is very worrying indeed. If the determinate ‘content’ of my authentic

understanding derives from my ‘heritage’, and if this inclines me towards racism, for

example, this might permit me to commit racist acts while remaining in the mode of

authenticity and, worse still, understand such behaviour as the acting out of authentic

possibilities.27 The ‘transition’ to authenticity appears to have consequences for our dealings

27 Whether or not one could find arête in such acts is a question I will not try to answer here.

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with others and therefore ethical implications, but by linking authenticity to notions such as

‘heritage’ and ‘goodness’ (however the latter is construed), Heidegger seems to allow (what

might be considered) morally reprehensible behaviour to be justified as authentic.

A major problem, according to Volpi, is that Heidegger's ontologization of práxis,28 i.e.

his understanding of práxis as the being of existence, isolates it from any frame of reference

beyond itself. It is ‘constituted in such a way that it becomes an original ontological

determination, self-teleological, independent, and self oriented: a hoù héneka, Worumwillen.’

(Volpi, 2007, p.43) Unlike póiesis,29 práxis, as Heidegger construes it, has its ‘for-the-sake-

of-which’ within itself and is closed ‘within a solipsistic horizon that deforms its practico-

political configuration.’ (Volpi, 2007, p.44) I believe, however, that Volpi is only half

correct here. Although the horizon of ‘authentic Being-one's-self’ may be, in a sense, closed-

off to the inauthentic ‘public dimension’, it is not closed-off to those authentic possibilities

which, despite having their source in the ‘Anyone’ (see §3), are disclosed to Dasein

through the retrieval of its ‘heritage’. Authentic-Dasein's retrieval of its ‘heritage’ defines its

horizon by ‘opening it up’ to the possibility of authentic ways of being. The isolation of

authentic existence from a broader, more universal ‘public dimension’ might leave ‘authentic

Being-one's-self’ bereft of any sort of ‘common’ ethical frame of reference30 other than that

which the ‘Authentic self’ hands down to ‘authentic Being-one's-self’ as its ‘heritage’,

but Volpi's claim that Dasein is therefore closed within a solipsistic horizon seems to be an

overstatement. In fact, Heidegger seems to rule out such a reading when he proclaims that

‘the loyalty of existence to its own Self31 [...] is [...] a possible way of revering the sole

28 a kind of human activity the goal of which is the action itself29 a kind of human activity the goal of which is production30 some kind of Moralität31 i.e. ‘resoluteness’

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authority which a free existing can have—of revering the repeatable possibilities of

existence.’ (Heidegger, 1962, p.443; italics mine) These ‘repeatable possibilities of

existence’ are the authentic possibilities Dasein hands down to itself as its ‘heritage’.

Therefore, it would not seem to be the case that Dasein is entirely closed ‘within a solipsistic

horizon’ as Volpi claims. Be that as it may, as the only ‘ethical’ frame of reference available

to ‘authentic Being-one's-self’ would appear to be (the enduring ideals and aims of (see §3))

Dasein's ‘heritage’, ‘authentic Being-one's-self’, or so it seems, will have a greater

vulnerability to ‘ethical myopia’ than the ‘Anyone self’ (the latter having recourse to a more

universal frame of reference).

This conclusion, however, might appear to conflict with certain of Guignon's claims

explicated in §3. According to Guignon's (1984) reading, there is a sense in which the

enduring ideals and aims of Dasein's ‘heritage’ are in fact non-relative to Dasein's particular

‘cultural history’. It would seem that such ideals and aims possess a certain ‘primordiality’ in

virtue of which the culturo-historical boundaries marked by ‘traditions’ are transcended.

Nevertheless, this seems to require access to the kind of ‘foundational principles’ that

Heidegger associates with an inauthentic interpretation of Dasein's Being-in-the-world.

Therefore, although I agree with Guignon that the retrieval of Dasein's ‘heritage’ provides

authentic understanding with a determinate ‘content’, allowing authentic-Dasein to

distinguish between authentic and inauthentic possibilities, I do not agree that this gives

Dasein access to non-culturally-relative ideals and aims. Our ‘heritage’ itself must be

culturo-historical; otherwise, Heidegger's stipulation that all meaning is context-dependent

would fail to be all-encompassing. If we are to remain within Heidegger's hermeneutic

circle, there appears to be no authentic way of insulating the ideals and aims of our ‘heritage’

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from relativism. Authentic-Dasein cannot have recourse to the arbitration of established

ethico-religious systems, because an established ethico-religious system is susceptible of

being labelled inauthentic on account of its having its source in the ‘average understanding’

of ambiguous ‘everydayness’—simply accepting the ‘universal truths’ of ethico-religious

systems is associated with the ‘levelling-down’ of Dasein's possibilities by ‘tradition’.32 It

might nevertheless be suggested that authentic-Dasein's ‘resoluteness’ could function so as to

‘steer’ deliberation and thereby provide authentic decision-making with a ‘guiding principle’,

but Heidegger warns against this, telling us that ‘resoluteness’ is nothing but a resolution that

‘projects itself understandingly’, that only the resolution itself can say on what it is resolved.

(Heidegger, 1962, p.345; italics mine) As the ‘resoluteness’ of a resolution depends on our

understanding, and as the determinate ‘content’ of authentic understanding derives from our

‘heritage’, that on which our ‘resoluteness’ is resolved will be greatly influenced by and

inextricably intertwined with the particular values of our ‘heritage’. Consequently, the

‘object’ of our authentic resolution may turn out to be ‘ethically unpalatable’ for those whose

do not share this ‘heritage’.

§5. Conclusion

32 The ‘authentic’ Kierkegaardian ‘Knight of Faith’ would surely be considered inauthentic by Heidegger's lights.

Brady 18

When Heidegger joined the NSDAP on May 1, 1933 I believe that he was acting

authentically. This was the ‘actualization’ of an existentiell possibility disclosed in terms of

the ‘heritage’ which his ‘resoluteness’ had taken over (as his own)—the decision to act in

this way was informed by the determinate ‘content’ of an authentic understanding. This

seems to have been a ‘concrete, historical manifestation of authentic, resolute existence.’

(Wolin, 1990, p.35) In choosing an ‘authentic historical destiny’, Heidegger chose his

‘hero’, but had he instead remained inauthentic (and constrained by the conventions of

‘traditional’ morality)33 he may have been less responsive to ‘the summons toward an

authentic historical destiny’ and less inclined to see Germany's National Revolution as ‘the

ontic fulfilment of the categorical demands of historicity.’ (Wolin, 1990, p.65) Heidegger's

‘political mistake’ could be viewed as nothing more than naïveté; moreover, it might be

suggested that when he joined the NSDAP he was not in fact acting authentically. But

Heidegger clearly believed that Nazism embodied an authentic potentiality-for-Being of the

Volksdeutsche 34, and if anyone can be said to have had a perspicuous and profound

understanding of his notion of authenticity, it was surely Heidegger himself.

To conclude, although Heideggerian authenticity might serve as an ‘existential lifeline’

for those drowning in the murky waters of everyday anonymity, due to its moral ambiguity

and seeming ethico-political ‘adaptability’, I am inclined to view it, despite its merits, as a

‘relativistic’ and potentially dangerous ‘philosophical device’.35

33 As Volpi notes, ‘It was Hannah Arendt [...] who decisively criticised this reductive aspect of Heidegger’s rehabilitation of práxis, and reversed [...] the direction of the Heideggerian recovery. What in Heidegger is marked by inauthenticity, i.e. the public dimension, becomes for her the authentic dimension par excellence.’ (Volpi, 2007, p.44) 34 This is evident in his address to the Freiburg Institute of Pathological Anatomy, August 1933.35 a term borrowed from Papineau

Brady 19

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