the claim from adoption

THE CLAIM FROM ADOPTION

THOMAS SéBIRK PETERSEN

ABSTRACT

In this article several justifications of what I call `the claim fromadoption' are examined. The claim from adoption is that, instead ofexpending resources on bringing new children into the world usingreproductive technology and then caring for these children, we ought todevote these resources to the adoption and care of existing destitutechildren.

Arguments trading on the idea that resources should be directed toadoption instead of assisted reproduction because already existing peoplecan benefit from such a use of resources whereas we cannot benefitindividuals by bringing them into existence are rejected. It is then arguedthat a utilitarian argument proposed by Christian Munthe that supportsthe claim from adoption in some situations should be rejected because thesupport it offers does not extend to certain situations in which it seemsmorally obvious that resources should be expended on adoption ratherthan assisted reproduction. A version of the Priority View improves uponMunthe's utilitarianism by supporting the claim from adoption in thecases in which Munthe's argument failed. Some allegedly counterintuitiveimplications of the Priority View are then discussed, and it is concludedthat the Priority View is more plausible than utilitarianism.

In a concluding section on policy issues it is argued that, even thoughthe claim from adoption can be justified in a variety of situations, it doesnot follow that, in these situations, governments should direct resourcesaway from assisted reproduction and towards adoption.

INTRODUCTION

Many people believe that resources spent on assistedreproduction could be better spent elsewhere. It is commonlyclaimed that resources used to create and care for new childrenin developed countries ought instead to be devoted to the

Bioethics ISSN 0269-9702Volume 16 Number 4 2002

ß Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2002, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UKand 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

adoption and care of existing, and often destitute, children.1

This claim I will refer to as the claim from adoption.In a world like ours the claim from adoption has considerable

intuitive appeal. It seems morally absurd that advancedtechnology and other valuable resources should be committedto bringing new children into the world when many children whoare in need of help already exist. Consider the followingcomment made by a majority of members of the Danish Councilof Ethics ± a comment that I believe captures the moral intuitionsof many people:

. . . [A] proportion of the majority adopt a global population-policy viewpoint and in this light find it irrational or morallyodd that western societies should use infertility treatment,because in an overpopulated world there are many childrenwho need to be adopted. It would be more desirable for societyto [create] `incentives' [for] the childless to adopt childrenwho have been born or to take them into care. Instead ofcreating new children by means of advanced technology, someof the children already born could be given a proper chance inlife.2

This paper has three aims. The first is to clarify the conditionsunder which infertile or sub-fertile individuals who want a childshould opt for assisted reproduction (henceforth AR) ratherthan adoption. The second is to discuss critically some of themoral principles that can be used to justify the claim fromadoption. This examination will bring out some problems thatbeset widely held views in moral philosophy. It will also suggestways in which we might solve these problems. The third aim,which is more practical, is to discuss whether, where the claimfrom adoption is sound, governments should devote resources toadoption instead of AR.

Arguments designed to show that we should favour adoptionover AR, because already existing people can benefit from ouractions whereas we cannot benefit individuals by bringing them

1 See e.g. D.N. James. Artificial Insemination: A Re-examination. Philosophyand Theology 2 1988; Summer Issue; and The Danish Council of Ethics. 1995.Assisted Reproduction ± a report. The Danish Council of Ethics: 10, 58.

2 The Danish Council of Ethics, op. cit. note 1, p. 58. I have added theparenthesis in order to make it clear that the comment is a moral comment. Cf.the following passage: `. . . assisted reproduction . . . seems somewhat oddmorally in view of the fact that the world is globally beset by overpopulation,and there are numerous children around the world with no parents to take careof them' (ibid, p. 10).

354 THOMAS SéBIRK PETERSEN

ß Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2002

into existence, are the subject matter of the second section.These arguments are rejected, and in the following two sectionsalternative justifications of the claim from adoption arediscussed.

In the third section, a utilitarian argument presented by theSwedish philosopher Christian Munthe is examined. Althoughthis argument supports the claim from adoption in somesituations, it is eventually rejected because the support it offersdoes not extend to certain situations in which it seems morallyobvious that resources should be expended on adoption ratherthan AR.

In the fourth section several versions of a view known as the`Priority View' are evaluated. It is argued that one version of thisview ± a version that assigns increasing value to benefits as theyfall to those less and less well off ± supports the claim fromadoption in the cases in which Munthe's utilitarian argumentfails.

However, this version of the Priority View entails two allegedlycounterintuitive conclusions that have been largely neglected inthe literature: (i) ceteris paribus we ought to bring an individualinto existence assuming that it will have a life worth living insteadof bringing about an equal increase in the welfare of an individualwho already exists and has a life worth living. (ii) Again, ceterisparibus, we ought to decrease the welfare of an existing individualin order to benefit a new individual. Assuming that the quantityof welfare the new individual enjoys is the same as that of whichthe existing individual is deprived and that the existing individualwill have a life worth living after the reduction. It is brieflyexplained that these conclusions can be regarded either as astrength or as a weakness of the Priority View, depending on whatkind of situation is in question. Unsurprisingly, the issue turns onhow well off the existing individual is already. Intuitively, at least,the diversion of resources from an existing individual to thecreation of a new human life is easier to justify where the formeris thriving than it is where he or she is enduring a very low level ofwell-being.

Finally, I will argue that, even where the claim from adoptionseems (with certain provisos) to be correct, it does not obviouslyfollow that governments should immediately withdraw resourcesfrom AR in order to spend more on adoption.

In short, then, if the arguments in this paper are true it willfollow (i) that an individual can benefit from coming intoexistence; (ii) that individuals considering expending resourceson AR and the care of a new child ought, in some situations, to

THE CLAIM FROM ADOPTION 355


direct these resources to the adoption and care of a child alreadyexisting; (iii) that a version of the Priority View supports theclaim from adoption more successfully than does utilitarianism;and (iv) that governments should not automatically transferpublicly financed resources spent on AR to adoption, even wherethe claim from adoption is sound.

CAN SOMEONE BENEFIT FROM BEING BROUGHT INTOEXISTENCE?

A superficially attractive argument for the claim from adoptioninvolves the following premise:

Negative SymmetryIt cannot benefit or harm an individual to be brought intoexistence.3

Note that advocates of this claim usually accept:

The Narrow Person-Affecting PrincipleOne outcome, X, is morally worse (or better) than another, Y,if and only if X is worse (or better) for someone.4

Faced with the choice, those who accept this person-affectingrestriction and negative symmetry should elect to adopt ratherthan use AR ± assuming, of course, that the child will be better offadopted than not adopted. To commit resources to bringing anindividual into existence by AR would, ceteris paribus,5 be wasteful,because that individual could not benefit from coming intoexistence.

However, it would appear that few people are willing to acceptnegative symmetry. For if you hold that an individual cannot beharmed by being brought into existence, then you must accept

3 For a view like this, see D. Heyd. 1992. Genetics: Moral issues in the creation ofpeople. Berkeley & Los Angeles. University of California Press: chs. 1 and 4. Forcriticism of Heyd's view, see N. Holtug. On the Value of Coming into Existence.Journal of Ethics (forthcoming); and my Generocentrism ± a Critical Discussionof David Heyd. Philosophia Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 2001; 28: 411±423.Negative symmetry can be contrasted with what I call below positive symmetry; thelatter says that an individual can benefit or be harmed by coming into existence.

4 Heyd, op. cit. note 4, p. xi.5 All the examples considered in this paper are to be understood as

governed by ceteris paribus clauses: so in considering an example's moralsignificance, factors which amount to contingent variations should be ignored. Isometimes use the phrase ceteris paribus as a reminder of this workingassumption, but often, for stylistic reasons, I have chosen not to crowd thetext with it.



that we need not worry morally about the effect assisted (orconventional) reproduction would have on any offspring itproduces! But even a superficial look at the ethical debate aboutsuch techniques as AR shows that the potentially harmful effectof the technology on children is exactly what many people areworried about.6

Furthermore, I take it for granted that it is wrong to bring anindividual that will live in terrible pain into existence ± becausethe individual is thereby harmed. The wrongfulness of suchactions, together with the worry mentioned above, indicates thatone element of negative symmetry ± namely, the element thatsays that an individual cannot be harmed by being brought intoexistence ± ought to be rejected. It may be right to say that anindividual cannot benefit by being brought into existence, butthe assertion that an individual cannot be harmed by beingbrought into existence appears to be incorrect.

These considerations might encourage one to accept a kind ofasymmetry that seems both more plausible and better matchedwith people's intuitions:

The Asymmetry of Benefit and HarmWhile it cannot benefit an individual to be brought intoexistence, an individual can be harmed by being brought intoexistence.

If we accept this asymmetry and impose the narrow person-affecting principle we arrive at the following position:

Moral AsymmetryCeteris paribus, while we have a moral reason not to bring anindividual into existence whose life will be of negative value, wehave no moral reason to bring an individual into existencewhose life will be worth living.7

Once again, then, adherents of moral asymmetry who areconfronted with a choice between adoption and AR shouldceteris paribus choose adoption ± assuming again that the children

6 Compare e.g. The Danish Council of Ethics, op. cit. note 1, p. 64.7 Advocates of moral asymmetry like this include J. Narveson. Utilitarianism

and new Generations, Mind 1967; 76: 62±72; and Narveson. 1978. Future Peopleand Us. In Obligations to Future Generations. R.I. Sikora and B. Barry, eds. USA.Temple University Press; and C. Wolf. 1997. Person-Affecting Utilitarianism andPopulation Policy: Or, Sissy Jupe's Theory of Social Choice. In Contingent FuturePersons. N. Fotion and J.C. Heller, eds. The Netherlands. Kluwer AcademicPublishers; and W. Glannon. Genes, Embryos, and Future People. Bioethics1998; 12: 187±211.



will benefit from being adopted. Resources devoted to bringingan individual into existence by AR would be wasted, because thatindividual could not benefit from coming into existence and willnot be harmed by not being brought into existence. (Note thatan impersonalist can accept the negative symmetry, or theasymmetry of benefit and harm, but reject the moral asymmetry.The impersonalist can hold that our moral reason for bringingan individual whose life will have positive value into existencerests, not on the fact that this individual will benefit from beingbrought into existence, but on the fact that the existence of thisindividual, as a `container' of welfare, will make the world a betterplace.8)

Many people appear to accept this asymmetry, but it is deeplypuzzling and has unacceptable implications.

First, it is difficult to see why we should accept the moralasymmetry. I assume that the moral reason against bringing anindividual into existence with a life that is not worth living has todo with the harm the individual will endure. However, if it countsas a moral reason against bringing an individual into existencethat this individual will experience severe harm, then, on the faceof things, it seems just as plausible to claim that there is a moralreason to bring an individual into existence who will experiencethe benefit of a life worth living.9 What could the relevantdifference between the two cases be?

To cater for the moral asymmetry, some have argued that if weproduce an individual with a life that is not worth living, thisindividual can complain that it has been conceived. On the otherhand, if we do not produce an individual with a life worth livingthat individual will never be in a position to complain.10 But this

8 Advocates of impersonalist consequentialism include e.g. D.W. Brock.The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic Harms ± The Case of WrongfulHandicaps. Bioethics 1995; 9: 269±276 ; T. TaÈnnsjoÈ. Who are the Beneficiaries?Bioethics 1992; 6: 288±296. Note that those who impose a person-affectingrestriction on morality need not accept moral asymmetry. They can claim, likeHeyd, that, everything else being equal, we have no moral reason not to bringan individual into existence, since an individual cannot be harmed or benefitedby being brought into existence. Alternatively they can claim that, everythingelse being equal, we have a moral reason to bring an individual into existencewhose life will be worth living, because a person can benefit (or be harmed)from coming into existence.

9 See D. Parfit 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford. Clarendon Press: note 32, pp.525±526. For a similar argument, see S. Rachels. Is it Good to Make Happy People?Bioethics 1998; 12: 104±105.

10 See e.g. Narveson (1967) pp. 70±71 and Narveson (1978) pp. 43, 50 and55±56, op. cit. note 8, and Wolf op. cit. note 8, pp. 112±13, 115.



description of the alternatives is unfair, as there are still otheralternatives ± alternatives that have not been mentioned. Wecould just as well say that if we bring into existence an individualwith a life worth living, this individual could be grateful for thefact that it has been conceived.11 So this explanation leaves uswith the problem of explaining why we should only be concernedwith complaints and not with gratitude.

Another attempt to explain the moral asymmetry would be this:we could accept that an individual can benefit or be harmed bybeing caused to exist, but insist that harm and benefit are morallydifferent in that, while we have a moral reason to prevent harm, wehave no moral reason to promote benefit. Once again, however,this view leaves us with the difficulty of explaining why only harmmatters morally. It also implies that I have no moral reason tobenefit others (e.g. by raising a finger) even where nobody wouldbe harmed by my effortless benevolence.12 This is absurd.

Note, further, that a variant of the above-mentioned viewclaiming that while we have a reason to benefit someone we havea much stronger reason to prevent harm cannot explain the moralasymmetry. For the moral asymmetry holds that we have no (notless) moral reason to bring an individual into existence that has alife worth living.13

Secondly, the moral asymmetry seems also to give the wronganswer in non-identity cases. Consider, for example, a teenager,Linda, who is considering when to have a child. She can try to getpregnant with the intention of having a child now (call this childN, for `now'). Or she can wait and have a child in 10 years time(call this child L, for `later'). Assume (i) that N and L are distinct,non-identical individuals; (ii) that L will have a much better lifethan N because Linda will be in a better position to take care ofL; and (iii) that N will have a life worth living.

Most reasonable people would claim that Linda ought to waitand have L because L's life would be better than N's. However,adherents of the moral asymmetry thesis who accept the person-affecting principle cannot explain why Linda ought to wait. No

11 See T.L.S. Sprigge. Professor Narveson's Utilitarianism, Inquiry 1968; 11:337±338; Parfit, op. cit. note 10; N. Holtug. Utility, Priority and Possible People.Utilitas 1999; 11: 34; McMahan, op. cit. note 8; and P. Singer. 1998. PossiblePreferences. In Preferences. Fehige/Wessels, eds. Berlin. Walter de Gruyter: 384±385.

12 For a similar argument, see J.P. Griffin. Is happiness Morally MoreImportant Than Happiness? Philosophical Quarterly 1979; 29: 47±55.

13 M. Zimmerman made me aware of these two ways of explaining moralasymmetry.



matter what she chooses, no one will be harmed. It is thusindifferent which child Linda brings into existence.

Supporters of moral asymmetry are well aware of this problemand want to give the right answer in such non-identity cases.Narveson, for example, copes with the problem by introducingthe following line of thought: `. . . if they the parents have achoice of which child to produce they ought to produce thehappier one, other things being equal'.14

To make room for this approach one could insist that themoral asymmetry and the person-affecting principle areessentially correct, but hold that the latter does not apply innon-identity cases. One could then claim that in non-identitycases we should apply an impersonal comparative principle that saysthat it is worse to cause one person to exist than to cause anotherbetter-off person to exist instead.15 According to this approach itwould be worse if Linda had child N, not because it would beworse for N to come into existence, but because a comparisonbetween the prospect of two possible lives tells us that child L willbring more well-being into the world than child N.

This position is certainly an improvement, but those who wishto operate with moral asymmetry nevertheless face furtherproblems, as we shall see.

Thirdly, in certain cases the moral asymmetry in combinationwith the impersonal comparative principle implies that theèqually as good as' relation is intransitive. If this relation weretransitive it would follow from the fact that A is equally as good asB and that B is equally as good as C, that A is equally as good as C.But in what way does the combination of moral asymmetry andthe impersonal comparative principle violate the principle oftransitivity?

Consider again a young woman, now named Belinda. Belindais wondering whether or not she should have a child and, if shechooses to go ahead, what kind of child she should have. Of thethree alternatives below, she needs to ask which is morally thebest thing to do. So èqually as good as' stands here for èqually asmorally good as' ± or as I shall say, more simply, às morally goodas'.

A. Not having a childB. Having a child now (with the total welfare of 5)C. Having a child in 10 years (with the total welfare of 10)

14 Narveson, op. cit. note 8, (1978) pp. 55±56, parentheses added.15 Glannon, op. cit. note 8, takes this approach.



Now if we apply moral asymmetry and the impersonalcomparative principle, the following comparisons emerge. A isas morally good as B, since ceteris paribus we do not have a moralreason to bring an individual into existence. A is also as morallygood as C, for the same reason. But C is better than B, because insuch cases we ought to follow the impersonal comparativeprinciple. This rules out transitivity. For according to theprinciple of transitivity, if A and B are equally good, and A andC are equally good too, it follows that C is as good as B.

In short, the prospects for those who resort to moralasymmetry look grim. If they accept the impersonal comparativeprinciple they run into intransitivity; and if they do not acceptthis principle they run into the non-identity problem.

Tooley's approach

Adherents of moral asymmetry can explain the moral asymmetrywith which we are concerned and give us the right answer in non-identity cases, while at the same time evading intransitivity, bydrawing on elements of Michael Tooley's moral theory.16 Inorder to explain this apparent strength of Tooley's approach, Imust first set out his position in detail.

Tooley accepts the following general principle of wrongdoing:

(S) An action is prima facie wrong if and only if either it involvesa failure to fulfil an obligation concerning some individualwhen it was possible to do so, or it makes it the case that therewill be some individual with respect to whom there will be anobligation that cannot be fulfilled.17

As an example of a prima facie wrong act Tooley mentions asituation in which John makes a promise that he fails to keep.Unless there were exceptional circumstances, John will haveacted wrongly because he will have failed to fulfil an obligationregarding an individual. If it had been impossible for John tokeep his promise, he might have been excused. He could beexcused, for example, if he did not know before making thepromise that he would be unable to keep it. On the other hand,had he known that he would be unable to keep his promise, hewould have done something wrong. This seems fair enough.

16 M. Tooley. Value, Obligation and the Asymmetry Question. Bioethics 1998;12: 120. See Tooley. 1983. Abortion and Infanticide. Oxford. Oxford UniversityPress: Sec. 7.43 & 7.46 for more detail.

17 Tooley (1998), ibid., pp. 121±122.



Where we know that we cannot keep a promise, it is prima faciewrong to make that promise.

Let us now turn to our moral obligations to individuals we canbring into existence. Consider the moral assumption that:

T1: Every individual has a right to a life worth living.18

Given this assumption, principle (S) implies the following: toknowingly create an individual with a life of negative value isprima facie wrong, since in that case there would be created anindividual who would have a right that could not be respected.However, there is nothing `wrong with failing to produceadditional happy people, since in that case there is no individualwith respect to whom one has either failed to fulfil an obligation,or knowingly created an obligation that one is unable to fulfil'.This is Tooley's rationale for the asymmetry.19

But, to return to the case with Belinda, as both children inalternative B and C will have lives that are worth living, Tooleycan give the right answer only if he elaborates T1 in a certain way;and this is precisely what he does when offering the followingprinciple of equal opportunity:

T2: Every person has a right to an equal chance of enjoyingthose natural resources, both environmental and genetic, thata person living in his society might enjoy, and that makes itpossible for one to lead a satisfying life.20

By advancing T2, Tooley puts himself in a position to arguethat, if she has chosen to have a child, Belinda should not bringabout alternative B. She should not do so because she will not beable to fulfil the obligation sketched in T2 regarding this child,even if it will have a life worth living. On the other hand, bybringing C into existence she will be able to fulfil the obligationsketched in T2. Thus if she is obliged to choose between B and C,Belinda should bring child C into existence.

So in non-identity cases like the one with Belinda, at least,Tooley's approach comes up with the right conclusion. It alsoavoids the earlier problem of intransitivity. A Toolian can makethe following claims. First, A is morally better than B, because inB, unlike in A, there will exist someone with respect to whomthere will be a T2 obligation that cannot be fulfilled. Second, A isas morally good as C, because neither alternative involves

18 Ibid.19 Ibid.20 Ibid.



someone being wronged: at least, both A and C are permissible.Third, C is morally better than B, because in B, unlike in C, therewill exist someone with respect to whom there will be a T2obligation that cannot be fulfilled. Obviously, these three claimsaccord with the principle of transitivity.

But despite these advantages, there seem to be seriousproblems with Tooley's approach. In combination (S) and T2imply that it is prima facie wrong that poor people in richcountries have children ± if, at least, we assume that in thesecircumstances these children would have a less than equal chanceof enjoying, for example, environmental resources. However, if achild will have a life worth living, despite lacking an equal chanceof enjoying those resources, it seems unacceptable to claim thathis or her parents have failed to fulfil an obligation towards thatchild merely by having him or her. It is implausible to hold thatthese parents should not have such a child because they know thatthey will not be able to fulfil their T2 obligation regarding it.21

At any rate, if I were the child of such parents, I would be gladthat they had failed to fulfil the T2 obligation. Had they done so,I would not be alive and living a life worth living!22

Tooley is well aware of this objection. He believes that it can beanswered if we distinguish between cases where the couple'spoverty is caused by unfair social arrangements and those whereit is not.23 In essence he claims that if the couple's poverty iscaused by unfair social arrangements, they should not bepenalised further by not being permitted to have children.However, if their poverty is caused by their own choice of lifestyle,they ought not to have a child.

Should we accept this manoeuvre of Tooley's? I believe not.The problem is that Tooley's manoeuvre preserves the possibilitythat it will be wrong, in some situations, for poor couples to havea happy child. So in a sense the original objection remains. Notealso that Tooley's manoeuvre seems irrelevant to the issue athand. It is not clear why it is acceptable to violate the T2 rights ofchildren if the violation is caused by unfair social arrangementsthat penalise the violator. This is rather like saying that it isacceptable for a person to make a promise he knows he will notkeep if the circumstances that prevent him keeping the promiseare the result of the fact that he lives in an unfair society.

21 Rachels, op. cit. note 10, p. 98.22 See Parfit, op. cit. note 10, p. 364 for an argument of this kind. Cf. Rachels,

op. cit. note 10, pp. 96±99.23 Tooley, op. cit. note 19, p. 121.



Furthermore, it is not at all clear that Tooley has given theright reason for claiming that alternative C is better than B.Tooley's reason for saying that Belinda ought to chose C over Bapparently has nothing directly to do with the fact that C wouldbring about more welfare for the child in it than B would bringabout for the child in it. It focuses exclusively on the questionwhether Belinda will fulfil a right concerning access to resourcestowards her child. However, unequal access to resources mightyet yield equal welfare: a person without an equal chance ofenjoying the resources mentioned in T2, might nonethelessactually enjoy as much or more welfare than someone who hassuch a chance. This suggests that Tooley's approach delivers theright answer for the wrong reason.

That Tooley's reason for choosing C instead of B is not what weare after becomes clear when we consider other cases. Consider acase where the choice is between (i) bringing a child intoexistence who would be happy but whose right to an equalchance of enjoying T2 resources would not be fulfilled, and (ii)bringing a child into existence who would be less happy(although still have a life worth living) but whose right to anequal chance of enjoying T2 resources would be fulfilled.

Let us flesh out these alternatives a little. Imagine a situation inwhich Bo and Derek are considering where (geographicallyspeaking) to have a child. If they have the child in their owncountry, it will have an equal chance of enjoying the T2resources, but because their country is poor it will also have alow total sum of welfare. On the other hand if they choose tohave the child in another country, it will not have an equalchance of enjoying the T2 resources, but because this country isvery rich it will have a high sum of welfare. In such a case Tooley'sposition obliges us to say that it is better to have the child that isworse off. But this conclusion runs counter to the whole purposeof cases, like the one involving Belinda, which involve the non-identity problem. For the purpose of these cases is to help uselaborate principles which sanction and explain decisions toavoid less happy children where more happy children are (as itwere) available.

The moral symmetry

Suppose, then, that we reject both negative symmetry and moralasymmetry. Pretty clearly, if we do this we should explore thebearing, on AR and adoption, of the following theoreticalcommitment:



Positive SymmetryComing into existence can benefit or harm an individual.24

Together with the narrow person-affecting principle, thiscommitment yields the following moral symmetry:

Moral SymmetryCeteris paribus, we have a moral reason not to bring anindividual into existence whose life will be of negative value(because such a life is harmful to the person who experiencesit); but we also have a moral reason to bring an individual intoexistence whose life will be worth living (because a life worthliving benefits the person who experiences it).

If we combine the moral symmetry with a wide person-affectingprinciple ± which says that one act, X, is morally better (or worse)than another, Y, if and only if the net benefit for the individualsaffected by X is greater than that for the individuals affected byY25 ± we arrive at a position that allows us to explain why Belindaought to choose child C instead of B (this cannot be explained byuse of the narrow person-affecting principle). From this position,furthermore, we are not obliged to claim that it is wrong for poorparents in a rich country to have a happy child. Nor need weaccept that, in some situations, we ought to choose to have a lesshappy child when a happier child was, as it were, available. Thiscombination of principles will, then, deliver the right answers in awide variety of cases involving the non-identity problem.

Finally, this position does not involve unwelcome intransitivityof the kind we have recently discussed. Given it, if B is a betteroutcome than A (because no child benefits in A, but a childbenefits in B), and C is a better outcome than B (because thechild in C will benefit more that the child in B), then obviously Cwill be a better outcome than A.26

24 For arguments for positive symmetry, see e.g. Holtug, op. cit. note 4; Parfit,op. cit. note 10, Appendix G; and Rachels, op. cit. note 10, pp. 104±105.

25 See Parfit, op. cit. note 10, p. 396.26 One might claim that, in combination with total act-utilitarianism, moral

symmetry implies what Parfit (op. cit. note 10) in chap. 17 has called the`Repugnant Conclusion'. It implies that we ought to bring an enormousamount of people into existence ± all of whom will have lives barely worth living± instead of benefiting already existing people if this is the only way to maximisethe total sum of welfare. It can be argued cogently, however, that the RepugnantConclusion is not repugnant: see TaÈnnsjoÈ , op. cit. note 9.



A UTILITARIAN ARGUMENT

So far I have rejected what I have described as a superficiallyattractive argument for the claim from adoption. This argumentfavoured adoption over procreation on the grounds thatreproduction cannot benefit those it brings into existence,whereas adoption can benefit already existing individuals. Inwhat follows, however, we shall see that the claim from adoptioncan be defended by arguments which eschew the negative andthe moral asymmetry and embrace the positive and/or the moralsymmetry.

In this section I will discuss a utilitarian argument for the claimfrom adoption adapted from the work of the Swedishphilosopher Christian Munthe.27 By `utilitarianism' I refer towhat is sometimes called total act-utilitarianism. According to thiskind of utilitarianism an agent is morally required to act so as toensure that the greatest total quantity of welfare is produced.

Munthe does not argue directly for the claim from adoption.He argues for the more general claim that we should transferresources that would otherwise have been spent on the care ofnew children (no matter how they are brought into existence) toadoption or donation. I suggest that we put the option ofdonation aside and focus on adoption.

Munthe's reasoning can be described as follows.28 Consider acouple ± say, Kate and David ± who want a child and are facedwith the following two options. They can either conceive andhave a child in the conventional way or adopt. (Let us call theconventionally conceived child Ronald and the adopted childQuambo.) Ronald's whole life will be +10 on a positive welfarescale, where the more welfare above 0 an individual has had in hislife, the better that life has been for him. But if Kate and Davidhave Ronald, Quambo will still exist and his whole life willcontain a total welfare of ÿ1 on a negative welfare scale, wherethe more negative welfare below 0 an individual has had in hislife the worse that life has been for him. If Kate and David adoptQuambo, Quambo will enjoy the same resources that would havebeen enjoyed by Ronald; and because of that Quambo will have a

27 C. Munthe. 1992. The End of Life in Its Beginning (in Swedish). Stockholm.Thales: 440; and Munthe. The Argument from Transfer, Bioethics 1996; 10: 27±42. For an argument close to Munthe's see J. Ryberg. 1996. Infertility Treatmentand Overpopulation. Topics on Population Theory. Dissertation. University ofCopenhagen: 102.

28 Munthe does not specifically say how much welfare the children have orwill have.



life of approximately the same welfare value as Ronald's.29 IfQuambo is adopted Ronald will not exist.

Munthe would argue that Kate and David ought to adoptQuambo. They should do so, according to Munthe, because,assuming everything else is equal, this alternative will producethe greatest quantity of welfare: to spell this out, the difference isbetween +10 (the welfare of Quambo's life) and +9 (the welfareof Ronald's life at +10 and the welfare of Quambo's life at ÿ1).

However, imagine a second case, like the one just mentionedexcept that here, despite enjoying the same resources as Ronaldwould have enjoyed, Quambo has a life with a total welfare ofonly +9. In a case like this utilitarians like Munthe would beindifferent as to whether Kate and David ought to conceive Ronaldor adopt Quambo, because the total quantity of welfare would bethe same either way. Here, then, the utilitarian argument fails tosupport the claim from adoption.

This attitude sees to me wrong. Intuitively ± and putting asidequestions about why Quambo is less enterprising in his use ofresources ± Kate and David should adopt in this second case.However, the only plausible argument I can offer in favour of theclaim from adoption here is one that appeals to the idea thatbenefits which accrue at lower levels count for more in theassessment of the overall good than benefits which accrue athigher levels.30 This idea, at least, appears to explain whyQuambo's adoption would be called for even where it producedno greater overall welfare than Ronald's conception andQuambo's resulting neglect.

THE PRIORITY VIEW

I want now to explore the idea sketched at the end of the lastsection further. A view known as the Priority View explains whyQuambo should be adopted in the second case. At the same timeit supports the claim from adoption in situations in which casesutilitarianism gives an intuitively plausible answer; and it is alsomore plausible than other distribution-sensitive principles, suchas egalitarianism, which tend to be vulnerable to the so-called`levelling-down objection'.31 It can be stated like this:

29 Throughout this article I assume that, where a child has a life of negativevalue, this is due to a lack of resources.

30 This kind of moral reasoning should not be confused with the empiricalprinciple of diminishing marginal utility (see below).

31 For the view that some versions of egalitarianism, unlike the Priority View,are vulnerable to the levelling-down objection, see Parfit. 1998. Equality and



The Priority View: In calculations of the overall good, benefits tothe worse off should count for more than benefits to the betteroff.32

Before applying this view to the second Quambo case, I want tomake a few comments. First of all, we shall not need to make thisexplicit as the discussion proceeds, but the Priority View concernsharms as well as benefits.33 That is, if benefits to the worse offcount for more than benefits to the better off, in terms of overallgoodness, then harms to the worse off must count for more thanharms to the better off, in terms of overall badness.

Second, it might be objected that the Priority View cannot beapplied in the evaluation of benefits that possible people willexperience if they are actualised, because possible people ±people who do not exist ± cannot be better off in the senseimplying that something is good for them. However, even if oneaccepts that possible people cannot qua possible people be betteroff in this sense, the Priority View can take into account benefitsto individuals who merely might be brought into existence. Theexistence of Ronald, for example, can be said to be better thanhis non-existence because his existence would contain a positiveamount of welfare whereas his non-existence would contain nowelfare.

Unlike utilitarians, Prioritarians can give us the right answer inKate and David's choice in the second case. According to thePriority View, Kate and David ought to adopt Quambo ratherthan conceive Ronald even though the total sum of welfare in eachalternative is the same because the increase in welfare involved inQuambo's adopted life counts for more than the same increasein welfare involved in Ronald's life. Quambo moves from a lifethat is not worth living (ÿ1) to a life that is well worth living (+9).

Priority. In Ideals of Equality. A. Mason, ed. Basil Blackwell. L.S. Temkin (1993.Inequality. Oxford. Oxford University Press) and I. Persson (1997. Equality,Priority and person-affecting value. In Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. TheNetherlands. Kluwer Academic Press: 23±39) have defended egalitarianismagainst the Levelling-down objection. For criticism of Temkin, see N. Holtug.Egalitarianism and the levelling-down Objection. Analysis 1998; April: 166±174.

32 For a formulation like this, see Rabinowicz. 2001. Priotarianism andUncertainty: On the interpersonal Addition Theorem and the Priority View. InExploring practical Philosophy ± From action to values. Egonsson, Josefsson,Petersson and Rùnnow-rasmussen, eds. England. Ashgate: 139±165. The firstperson to formulate this version of the Priority View appears to have been S.Scheffler. 1982. The Rejection of Consequentialism. Oxford. Oxford UniversityPress: 31±32, although Scheffler uses the term `distributive consequentialism'.

33 Persson, op. cit. note 34.



This counts for more than Ronald's otherwise identical movefrom no life (0) to a life worth marginally more than Quambo's(+10).

The Priority View is superior to utilitarianism, then. However,Prioritarians differ over how much priority one should assign tobenefits at lower levels. One view is:

The Absolute Priority ViewIn calculations of the overall good, benefits to the worse offshould be given absolute priority.

This view implies that even small harms and benefits to people atthe lowest level cannot be outweighed by any greater ± perhaps,much greater ± benefits at higher levels.

Absolute Prioritarianism handles the second Quambo casesatisfactorily. We should nevertheless reject it. To see this, supposenow that Kate and David can only adopt one of two children, Bobor Berta. If neither child is adopted Bob's life will contain totalwelfare of 0 and Berta's life will contain total welfare of +1. If Bobis adopted his life will contain welfare of +1. On the other hand, ifBerta is adopted her life will contain welfare of +10.

Clearly, if Kate and David adopt Bob, Bob will have totalwelfare of +1 and Berta will have total welfare of +1. Equallyclearly, if Kate and David adopt Berta, Bob will have total welfareof 0 and Berta will have total welfare of +10. Now according to theAbsolute Priority View there is no doubt that it is better to adoptBob than it is to adopt Berta: we should give absolute priority tobenefits at lower levels. However, if you do not feel convinced bythis assessment, that might be because you believe that smallbenefits at lower levels should not always outweigh great benefitsto the better off.

Support for this latter view emerges in the following objection:if the Absolute Priority View is true it would be better ceterisparibus to benefit the worst off individual in the world in thesmallest way than to benefit all other individuals in the entireuniverse so that they live extremely happy lives from now untileternity. This is absurd.

The Absolute Priority View has few (if any) supporters. SomePrioritiarians34 have retreated to a more modest position,namely:

34 Cf. Parfit (1998), op. cit. note 34: `This priority is not, however, absolute.On this view, benefits to the worse off could be morally outweighed bysufficiently great benefits to the better off,' p. 12.



The Gradualist Priority ViewIn calculations of the overall good, we should gradually assignmore moral value to benefits the lower the level is at whichthey fall.35

It will be clear, I hope, that Gradualist Prioritarians are no longerobliged to accept that Bob's adoption would be better thanBerta's. Gradualists can also deny that benefiting the worst offindividual in the world marginally would be better thanbenefiting all other individuals in the universe dramatically.

Modifying Gradualism

Unfortunately, however, Gradualism has a number of impli-cations that many people will find highly counterintuitive. In thissection, drawing on the work of the Danish philosopher, NilsHoltug, I will examine two such implications.36

First, Gradualism implies that it is more important, morally, tobring a child with a life that is worth living into existence than it isto secure an equal increase in benefits for an existing child with alife just worth living. Thus, imagine that Kate and David have thefollowing two alternatives: either they can conceive a child,Ronald, who will enjoy a life that contains welfare of +9; or theycan choose not to have Ronald, and instead adopt Quambo and,using the same resources as they would have used on Ronald,cause Quambo to live a life with welfare of +10. If he is notadopted by Kate and David, Quambo will have a life with welfareof +1.37 According to Gradualists, Kate and David shouldconceive Ronald. They should do so because benefits that fallat lower initial levels of welfare count for more than the samebenefits when they fall at higher initial levels. Here both Ronaldand Quambo stand to enjoy an increase of nine units of welfare,but Ronald starts from a lower level (0) than Quambo (+1), soRonald's nine units count for more. Many people would say thatthis verdict is wrong. They would insist that Kate and David oughtto benefit Quambo, who has a life barely worth living, instead ofbenefiting Ronald by bringing him into existence.

35 Broome. 1992. Weighing Goods. Oxford. Blackwell: 216±217; Holtug, op. cit.note 12, pp. 20±21.

36 For the claim that the Priority View would imply the RepugnantConclusion in a way that seems more problematic than the total principle,see Holtug, op. cit. note 12, pp. 32±35, especially p. 32.

37 Note that this example is not unrealistic. Adopted children might well bemore happy: they might be able to appreciate their good fortune more fullythan any new child would be, for example.



Second, Gradualism would imply that in some situations weought to decrease the welfare of an existing individual in order tobenefit a new person. The situations in question are, forexample, those in which, first, the quantity of welfare the newindividual enjoys is the same as that of which the existingindividual is deprived; and second, the existing individual willhave a life worth living after the reduction.38

This implication generates what Holtug has called the`troubling conclusion', namely: that `we sometimes should causepopulation growth even if it causes everyone, including us (thepresent generation), to live at a significantly lower level of well-being than the one we are at now'.39 We can illustrate thisconclusion as follows. Imagine a case in which, again, Kate andDavid have adopted Quambo, securing for him a life containingwelfare of +10. Kate and David are now wondering, however,whether to expend nearly all of their resources on the care of anew child, Ronald ± something that will ensure that the welfareRonald enjoys in his life will be +9 while at the same timeensuring that Quambo's welfare will be reduced from +10 to +1.On a Gradualist view, Kate and David ought to have Ronald,because for Gradualists Ronald's increase in welfare from 0 to +9will matter more than Quambo's decrease in welfare from +10 to+1. But once again, many people would say that Kate and Davidshould not have Ronald. Kate and David should continue todevote themselves to Quambo alone.

In the remainder of this section I will discuss two Gradualistresponses to the pair of objections just outlined. The first of theseis to modify Gradualism so that neither objection applies. As afirst thought, one might suggest that something like thefollowing condition needs to be imposed:

The Actualist ConditionIn calculations of overall goodness, benefits and harms toactual individuals count for more (by a certain factor) thanbenefits and harms to possible people.

If we combine this with Gradualism we get:

Actualist GradualismWe can benefit and harm individuals by bringing them intoexistence; but in calculations of the overall good, benefits andharms should (a) gradually count for more the lower the initial

38 Holtug, op. cit. note 12, p. 33.39 Ibid.



level of welfare at which they fall, and (b) count for more (by acertain factor) when they accrue to actual people than they dowhen they accrue to possible people.

Actualist Gradualism neuters the first objection to Gradualism weconsidered, because once it is accepted the increase in the levelof welfare of an existing individual (who has a life worth living)counts for more than an equal benefit brought about by theexistence of a newly conceived individual. Actualist Gradualismalso allows us to deal with the second objection. For if it iscorrect, the fact that the welfare of an already existing individualwill not be reduced by n units will count for more than the factthat a newly conceived individual would enjoy n units of welfare.

However, although Actualist Gradualism complies with manypeoples' intuitions on these matters, we should not accept it. Whyshould the harm we inflict on people by causing them to existmatter less than the harm we do to actual people? The actualistcondition could be used to show that we ought to bring childreninto the world even when we know that they will have livesinvolving only intense pain. This would be justified, for example,where actual people would benefit (perhaps only a little) fromscientific studies of these intensely suffering children.

Another problem with Actualist Gradualism is that it fails tohandle the two situations described at the opening of the section`A utilitarian argument' adequately. This brings us to the secondstrategy.

The idea that Kate and David should conceive a new child iscounterintuitive in the case described ± i.e. where Ronald'swelfare rises from 0 to +9 but Quambo's welfare is therebyprevented from rising from +1 to +10. But it is not at all obviousthat this counterintuitive status carries over into all situations.40

In cases where we have a choice between benefiting a person whois living an extremely good life or conferring the same benefit ona newly conceived individual it does not seem wrong to benefitthe new child. The existing person already lives an extremelygood life, after all. Benefiting the new child is clearly what weought to do.41

40 Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen made me aware of this point.41 One could claim that Actualist Gradualism does not have these

implications because benefits to extremely well off people would count verymuch less; but Actualist Gradualism might have these implications if the factordetermining that actual people count for more than possible people is weightyenough to outweigh the smaller moral value we should ascribe to extremely welloff people.



It is an attraction of Gradualism that (unlike utilitarianism andActualist Gradualism) it underwrites this intuitive conviction.Moreover, almost the same thing can be said about the secondsituation we examined ± the one generating Holtug's troublingconclusion. For it is not at all obvious that the troublingconclusion is troubling in all situations. Consider a case in which(a) we must choose between preserving the welfare of an alreadyexisting person who is living an extremely good life or bringing anew individual into existence; (b) the benefit of bringing the newindividual into existence equals the reduction in welfare of theexisting individual; and (c) the latter individual has a very goodlife after the reduction. Here it does not seem counterintuitive tobenefit the new child. Benefiting the new child again seems to bewhat we ought to do. It is a further attraction of Gradualism that(unlike utilitarianism and Actualist Gradualism) it underwritesthis intuitive conviction.

AGAINST REPRODUCTION?

If we accept that it is often the case that we ought to adopt, doesthis show that governments in developed countries should stopdevoting resources to AR, or outlaw AR, and thus create anincentive for adoption?

Ryberg has argued that the answer to this question is negativebecause such a policy would in fact be counterproductive,making for a worse outcome.42 According to Ryberg we can seewhy such a policy would make things worse if we make thealternatives available to people wanting a child more explicit.They can either adopt, or try to have a new child, or choose tohave no child at all. And if we rank those alternatives according tothe utilitarian or Prioritarian justification of the claim fromadoption and only focus on the welfare of the child in question,we get the following ranking.43

1. No new child and adoption (or donation) of an alreadyexisting (destitute) child.

42 Ryberg, op. cit. note 30, p. 107.43 Assuming that the following empirical assumptions are true: (i) children

exist who have lives that are not worth living; (ii) some children who have livesof negative value are available for adoption; and (iii) a child with a life ofnegative value would ± if given the same resources as a new child would enjoy ±have a life with total welfare approximately equal to, or better than, that of anew child.



2. A new child and no adoption (or donation) of an alreadyexisting (destitute) child.

3. No new child and no adoption (or donation) of an alreadyexisting (destitute) child.

If resources were withdrawn from AR, in order to encourageadoption, some people asking for infertility treatment wouldprobably adopt, since this would be their only chance of having achild. But some would not. They would instead choose not tohave children at all ± and presumably they would not donate theresources they would have used on their own genetic child.However, that choice would result in the realisation of the worstalternative of those available to them. But would it be a likelychoice? I don't know, but probably some would make it becausethey would want to have their own children, individuals towardswhom they have a strong feeling of genetic linkage.44 Maybe theywould want to spend their money on something other thandonation. Equally, they might not be able to adopt because oflegal regulations or because they could not afford it. In Denmark,for example, there are general (and prejudiced) rules that theremust be no more than a 40-year difference between the age of theadopter and the age of the child, and that the applicants mustnot be homosexual. To qualify as adoptive parents several furtherconditions concerning the applicants' social condition, healthstatus, motive for adopting and attitude towards children mustalso be met. In short, then, the policy of withdrawing resourcesfrom AR would likely push some couples away from alternative 2and towards 1 but certainly also towards 3.

I am, however, not convinced that withdrawing resources fromAR would make for a worse outcome as Ryberg claims.45 Thatquestion, so far as one can tell, can only be answered by empiricalinvestigation. What matters here, of course, is what percentage ofthose opting out of alternative 2 would shift to 1 or 3, and howthe benefits resulting from a 2-to-1 shift will in practice comparewith the deterioration resulting from a 2-to-3 shift. As it is difficultto determine what the consequences of this policy would be, it isarguable that governments should use other, preferably lessdramatic and more evidence-based, incentives to encourageadoption and donation. They could, for example, make thingseasier by imposing fewer conditions on those applying to adopt,or by rewarding people who adopt a child.

44 These observations suggest that, all things considered, 2 ranks above 1.45 Ryberg, op. cit. note 45.



Finally, for independent reasons, I think governments shouldhesitate before withdrawing resources from AR. For, even thoughthe claim from adoption can be justified, we need to bear inmind that the comparison between adoption and procreation byAR is not the only relevant comparison when we are thinking aboutwhere to direct resources. It is, for instance, not clear that ARrepresents worse value for money than many other forms ofhealth-care paid for within the public healthcare system.Moreover, it is plausible to claim the resources devoted to ARmight yield a much better result than those directed to, forexample, publicly financed theatres, television or space projects.So even if a government accepts that we should do more forexisting destitute children and redirects resources towards thatend, it is not at all obvious that the best results (i.e. the bestvalue/welfare for money) will be achieved if they put theredirection of resources from AR first on the list. Alternatively,governments could make adoption easier by, say, making therules that govern it less rigid, and by making it less costly.

CONCLUSION

In justifying the claim from adoption, it has been argued that weshould reject negative symmetry and moral asymmetry, andinstead accept positive symmetry. We should accept theGradualist Priority View rather than the Absolute Priority View,Actualist Gradualism or utilitarianism. It has also been suggestedthat, even though the claim from adoption can be justified, giventhe way the world is, this does not necessarily show thatgovernments actually should redirect AR resources to the careof destitute children already existing in developing countries.*

ThomasSøbirkPetersenUniversityof CopenhagenNjalsgade80DK-2300CopenhagenS.Denmarkthompet@hum.ku.dkwww.hum.ku.dk/fpr/1024/f/tch/code/tp.htm

* Special thanks to Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen for detailed and constructivecriticism on the ideas in this paper. Thanks also to Roger Crisp, Krister Bykvis,Nils Holtug, Klemens Kappel, Karsten Klint Jensen, Christian Munthe, TimMulgan, Michael Norup, Paul Robinson, Jesper Ryberg and Peter Sandùe forvery useful commentary. Finally I would like to thank an anonymous Bioethicsreferee for useful comments.



the claim from adoption

Documents