Mariusz Fryc Col. PhD, Armed Forces Supervision Department

National Security Bureau

Disclaimer. Presented thoughts reflect only the author's personal opinion

Garmisch-Partenkirchen, May, 4 – 2016

The 12 steps that NATO should take to reassure its eastern Alliance members

The Alumni Scholarship Program

From Wales to Warsaw and beyond. NATO’s strategic adaptation to the Russian resurgence on the eastern flank of Europe

Main thesis:

• Despite implementation of significant security measures NATO capabilities and actions are still insufficient to adequately face current level of uncertainty and challenges on the Eastern side of Europe and reassure its members.

Key questions:

• To what extent NATO has been able strategically adopt to the new security circumstances?

• What NATO should do next to deepen a sense of security of the eastern NATO members facing Russian classical military threats as well as hybrid approaches?

Russia’s hybrid warfare with Ukraine and the West

• Imposed a total strategy, employed in an indirect way, and thus without the application of substantial military force in an overt way.

• Implemented the full range of a variety of means, both material and immaterial, military and non-military, legal and illegal

• In direct and indirect manner

• Managed to keep warfare below the level of classical war

Hybrid relating Strategic Risk for Eastern NATO nations

• Eastern NATO members strategic risk

• keeping aggression below the threshold of international war and the level requiring NATO’s reaction

• Non-linear approach would be very problematic for NATO to respond – non-military threat

• Difficulties in reaching a political-military consensus among Alliance how to respond collectively to such threat

• Lack of consensus how to respond/ or any delays might lead to undermining an article 5 unity of Alliance collective defence.

NATO Readiness Action Plan (RAP) 1/1

• Increased the number of fighter jets on air-policing patrols over the Baltic States

• Deployed fighter jets to Romania and Poland

• Commenced regular AWACS surveillance flights

• Conducted maritime patrol aircraft flights along NATO eastern borders

• Conducted intensified maritime patrols in the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean

• Deployed ground troops to the eastern parts of the Alliance for training and exercises on a rotational basis

ASSURANCE MEASURES - immediate increased military presence and activity for assurance and deterrence in the eastern part of the Alliance.

NATO Readiness Action Plan (RAP) 1/2

ADAPTATION MEASURES - changes to the Alliance’s long-term military posture and capabilities to enable it to respond more quickly to emergencies wherever they arise.

• Strengthen the NATO Response Force (NRF) to be more responsive and capable

• Enhance NATO’s Standing Naval Forces with more ships • Establish multinational NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) on the

territories of the eastern Allies to enable force activation and demployment

• Raise the readiness and capabilities of the Headquarters Multinational Corps Northeast (MNC NE) in Poland to enhance its role in potential NATO operations on the eastern flank

• Pre-position military supplies on the territory of eastern Allies for trainings

• Improve NATO’s ability to reinforce eastern Allies through preparation of national infrastructure, such as airfields and ports

• Update defence plans for Eastern Europe • Halt cuts in defense spending and gradually increase its level to

the expected 2% of GDP over the next decade

NATO Response Force (NRF) Transformation

• The Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF)- a brigade combat sized-group consisted of several thousand soldiers including a substantial land component backed by air, maritime and special forces’ units

• VJTF consists of three to up five maneuver battalions and remain in 5 or 7 days’ notice

• One battalion to be ready to deploy within 2 to 3 days

• A synchronization and reception of the VJTF on Eastern Europe’s territories to be fulfilled by NFIUs.

• June 2015, NATO decided to strengthen NRF up to 40,000 troops form the 13,000 level.

• SACEUR has been authorized to prepare forces in advance for potential crisis reaction

• MNC NE to reach full operational capability as a high-readiness headquarters till next NATO summit and be able coordinate the NFIUs functions and command VJTF

• In 2016, to reach its full operational status VJTF concept is going to be tested through number of exercises

• The final VJTF examination prior NATO summit to demonstrate an ability of force deployment on the NATO’s eastern theater.

NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs)

• September 2015, all new six NFIUs had become active with the aim to reach its operational status prior NATO meeting in Warsaw.

• The Joint Force Command (JFC) – Naples (Italy) took operational control of NFIUs established in Bucharest (Romania) and Sofia (Bulgarian).

• The NFIUs in Riga (Latvia), Tallinn (Estonia), Vilnius (Lithuania) and Bydgoszcz (Poland) were subordinated to MNC NE.

• Two additional NFIUs are going to be set up in Slovakia (2016) and Hungary (2017)

Multinational Corps Northeast (MNC NR)

• The MNC NE to reach full operational capability as a high-readiness headquarters till next NATO summit and be able coordinate the NFIUs functions and command VJTF

• For 2018, MNC NE would be able command NRF and lead combine defensives operations on a large-scale on the northeastern flank of the Alliance.

Multinational Division South-East (MND SE)

• In December 2015, due to expansion of Russia military potential in the Black Sea region as well as militarization of annexed Crimea, NATO set up a Multinational Division South-East (MND SE) in Romania.

• The headquarter was designed to facilitate command of allied forces deployed in the southeastern part of Europe.

• Decisions about what forces will be subordinated to the MND SE are to be taken after the Warsaw summit

• The command is expected to reach its initial operational capabilities in 2016, and a full operational capabilities in 2018

NATO multinational rotation force

• In February 16, NATO decided to beef up military presence through the establishment of a multinational force rotation

• The US administration plans to increase spending on the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) till 3.4 billion USD for the 2017 fiscal year

• If approved, about 2.8 billion USD is to be allocated to the US Army in Europe

• In February 2017, the Army plans; • to deploy an additional, rotational armored

brigade combat team on the European theater, • bolster prepositioned stocks to have there one set

of combat-ready equipment sufficient to support another armored brigade, if deployed;

• Division HQ and necessary enablers.

• By the end of 2017, the US Army wants to have a continuous presence of three fully equipped army brigade combat teams in Europe

NATO’s strategic risk on the eastern flank

• All NATO actions and implemented countermeasures had managed to some extend glued unity and solidary of Alliance and significantly reassure vulnerable eastern nations on potential Russia’s classical military threats and hybrid actions.

• As long as Russia will be execute its neo-imperial policy and strategy and tests NATO credibility the main concern of the flank NATO countries, especially the Baltics one still remains partially solved

Russian Military Posture in the Kaliningrad Oblast

• Russia’s deployed forces and A2/AD capabilities in the Kaliningrad Oblast go far beyond the defensive needs of that particular region.

• Russia’s A2/AD capabilities can deny freedom of access and manoeuvre to NATO forces in the air, at sea and on land, in the whole Baltic operating environment.

• A2/AD capabilities include the most advanced air defence mobile systems (S-400 Triumf / SA-21 Growler with an operational range of up to 400 km) and dual-capable mobile short-range ballistic missile systems (Iskander-M / SS-26 Stone with an operation range of up to 500 km) that are able to cover large portions of the territory of Poland and the Baltic states, as well as the Baltic Sea.

K. Stoicescu, H. Praks, Strengthening the Strategic Balance In the Baltic Sea Area, RKK, ICDS, March 2016.

RAND Key findings: • Russian forces are to reach the outskirts of

Tallinn and Riga between 36 and 60 hours

• 27 maneuver battalions in a short-warning attack to occupy either Estonia and Latvia

• 7 Estonia’s and Latvia’s battalions are extremely light, lack tactical mobility, and are poorly equipped for fighting against an armored opponent.

• The strategic goal of the invasion was to demonstrate NATO’s inability to protect its most vulnerable members and divide the alliance

• Such a rapid defeat would leave NATO with a limited number of options

• Having a force of about seven brigades, including three heavy armored brigades—adequately supported by airpower, land-based fires might prevent such an outcome.

D. A. Shlapak and M. W. Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1253/RAND_RR1253.pdf

The 12 steps that NATO should take to reassure its eastern Alliance members

1. Leverage internal solidarity and strategic empathy

• Due to Russia’s actions a NATO’s perception to some extend has been united

• The main divergence in perception is how to deal with Russia

• Discrepancy is noticeable not only at the government’s levels but also among western society

• In 2015, 58% in Germany, 53% in France and 51% in Italy respondents were against sending their soldiers to defend NATO members such as Poland or the Baltic states if they were attacked by Russia.

• A lack of consistent NATO’s strategy towards Russia

• This challenge calls for leveraging internal solidarity and strategic empathy to better understand (feel) each other.

57% in Germany, 2016

• Punishment-based functions on the premise that West/NATO will be able to defeat an adversary through devastating counterattack, including the potential of nuclear response.

• Allies „punishment” deterrence strategy needs to be rethinking and updated.

• Moscow increasingly uses its nuclear posture as a means of messaging

• flying nuclear-capable bombers (TU-95) • deployments to Kaliningrad Oblast a nuclear capable tactical

missiles (Iskander) • a nuclear episodes in conventional exercises at the Baltic region

• Concerns about Russian compliance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty

• cruise missiles meet the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km

• NATO has to develop courses of action how to respond

• RUS intimidations tactics need to be evaluated in NATO’ nuclear doctrine

2. Develop two prong deterrence strategy - Punishment-based & Deterrence by denial 1/2

• Deterrence by denial seeks to make it physically harder for an opponent to attack because the overall costs he is going face due to his actions will exceed expected gains

• Deterrence by denial embracing sizable force presence, anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) concept and capabilities as well as a long-term resistance approach prioritizes territorial defense mindset, strategy, capabilities, structure and forces.

• NATO Strategic Concept needs to be revised & updated

• Changes ought to reflect an appropriate doctrinal iterations and amendment of contingences and stand defense NATO plans either

2. Develop two prong deterrence strategy - Punishment-based & Deterrence by denial 2/2

• Any potential conflict there with Russia would left the West/NATO with a strategic dilemma - risk a war on large scale with a nuclear power, or lose credibility

• SACEUR - force benchmark in that region is 10:1 for Russia

• An absence of necessary defenses capabilities will likely provoke Russia for further NATO’s credibility testing

• Rotational NATO brigade at current security status seems to be insufficient for adequate deterrence

• US strategy towards Europe assumes limited, rotational forward presence and is based on strategic deployment from USA continent in the event of a conflict

• ERI – temporary solution - funded through the annual budget

• It calls for greater involvement of the Eastern NATO members on securing themselves

• NATO should deploy at least two rotational combat ready brigade-sized components, one in the Baltics and one in Poland close to recognized the “Suwałki gap” weakness with long-term tendency to have at least one brigade in the Baltics as permanently stationed force.

3. Beef up ground forces in the Baltics region

• NATO has to shift its air-doctrine from an air policing concept to a comprehensive air defense one.

• To preserve its air dominancy has to rebuild air defence to a multi-layered, medium-range, and fully integrated system with air combats, surface-to-air components, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems as well as air-space assets

• NATO to conduct high-velocity operations and provide sufficient air-support to the forces on the ground

• Baltics states have to intensified modernization processes by acquiring air and missile defence assets and actively participate in “smart defence programs” like NATO Missile Defence, Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) or NATO Air Policing.

4. Set up air dominance in the NATO northeastern corner

• To secure sustainability of extended Alliance force posture on eastern NATO nations territories as well as protect smooth flow of reinforcement for the pre-positioned forces on the theatre, NATO members on the Eastern flank have to step up their efforts to improve a necessary infrastructure

• Eastern flank NATO members have to invest in Host Nation Support (HNS) capabilities, military installations, including aerial and sea ports of debarkation, depots, and other facilities needed for the basing and sustaining troops and its training.

5. Strengthen Host Nation Support military infrastructure

• Alliance intensification of the exercises hasn’t removed the NATO-Russia "exercise gap"

• It remains in terms of a scale and swiftness. • In February 2014 - 150,000 troops • In September 2014, in Vostok-14 -155,000 troops.

• This asymmetric status should be neutralized by keeping NATO military exercises on the relatively highest level of intensity

• RUS organizes “snap” military maneuvers without notice. • In December 2014, Moscow had launched, without

any notice, an unexpected exercise in Kaliningrad Oblast involving 9,000 troops

• While NATO is keeping transparency policy towards its military exercises, Alliance authorities should decide to organize no-notice exercises, as deterrence means

6. Authorize to conduct no-notice NATO exercises

I. J. Brzezinski, N. Varangis, The NATO-Russia Exercise Gap, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/the-nato-russia-exercise-gap

• NATO has to improve a decision making process at least at operational level. • signs indicting conflict (crises) might not be

recognized in advance • NATO response decision is rested on consensus

of its members that needs time to debate and deliver

• SACEUR has been given authority to initiate preparation of VJTF deployment, but the movement of troops is still up to NATO’s political authority.

• to give SACEUR more competences, flexibility, responsibilities not only prepare and activate Allies reaction forces, but also to deploy them on NATO’s theater • might work as NATO’s deterrence posture • might let the reaction forces to act more

preventively • give SACEUR permission to conduct “snap”

exercises as deterrence tool

7. Empower SACEUR’s to speed up force reaction

U.S. Army General Curtis M. Scaparrotti to be 18th SACEUR on May 4, 2016

• Sweden and Finland are a valuable contributing NATO’s partners

• Equally concerned about Russian’s military resurgence

• NATO have to remain strong relationships with both nations in terms of exercise, trainings, and capability building • should improve with both nations’ processes of

information and intelligence sharing and leverage the current level of operational awareness

• capabilities building Allies should put emphasis on developing assets including intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance, electronic warfare, and precision engagement

• deepened cooperation in such domains like countering propaganda, disinformation, cyber defense and strategic narratives

8. Intensify military cooperation with non-NATO Baltic counties

• Strengthening of the eastern flank cannot take apart without the EU

• Both have to mutually reinforcing and complementing each other in terms of actions, procedures, structures, competences and capabilities

• A new EU Global Strategy should emphasize integrated, comprehensive, and synchronized cooperation with NATO with an accent on how to cope with hybrid threats

• NATO should invite EU to be part of work concerning different types of crisis-response options in order to share common knowledge, experience, and best practices

• Cooperation has to distinctively address non-military dimensions like business, financial, media, cyber or energy as an important concern of hybrid impact

• Both have to put also coordinated and distinctive emphasis on cybersecurity, strategic communications, border control, enhanced information and intelligence sharing

• Both have to pair their a unique capabilities and start dispelling disinformation & propaganda

9. Leverage comprehensive cooperation with EU to successfully cope with hybrid threats

• Despite facing existential threats from Russia Eastern flank NATO nations have to mobilize themselves to reassure the southern flank nations’ security

• Bearing in mind that current trends show probability of increase of refuges coming to Europe they have to be ready to back the stabilization efforts in the southern neighborhood of Europe, support anti-ISIL coalition campaign, and finally support Turkey’s security, if unexpectedly it would require to be defended

10. Show a full solidarity with the southern flank

• NATO decisions to halt cuts in defense spending and gradually increase its level to the expected 2 percent of GDP over the next decade only slightly contributed to meet that goal.

• 21 Allies halted or gradually reversed declines in defense investment in 2015

• In 2015, up to 10 nations did not exceed the level of 1% and up to 16 nations the threshold of 1.2 % of GDP of their defence spending.

• There are only 5 NATO members meeting 2% benchmark (Estonia, Great Britain, Greece, Poland and USA)

• It’s unlikely that in the next decade more than half of NATO countries will double their defense budgets

• Strategic implications for the future of Alliance

• In the short term perspective could further irritate U.S. authorities and interfere with RAP operationalization

• in the long term could affect, and even reduces NATO political-military ambitions and significantly restrict execution of Allies full mission spectrum.

• Eastern NATO members, those especially demanding building permanent garrisons on their soil should work as an example for the rest of Alliance in fulfilling 2% demand

11. Accomplish 2 percent defense spending pledge

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• The current status of relation between the West/NATO and Russia is hazardously progressing from hybrid phase warfare to a limited military one

• To stop that process NATO has to engage with Russia in constructive dialog

• NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg assurance that there is little chance of a return to “business as usual” cooperation with Russia

• The last NATO-Russia Council meeting (April, 2016), after almost two years of pause, signals that NATO wants to resume political dialogue with Moscow

• It should be noted that such negotiations make sense only if NATO do it from a position of strength. • Diplomacy without deterrence will be always seen by

Moscow as a NATO/the West weakness • NATO has to continue strengthening the Alliance's military

presence on the eastern flank, and at same time engaging its diplomacy has to come up with solution that enable to fully implement the Minsk Agreements, improve military transparency and reduce potential military risks

12. Resume constructive dialog with Russia

Main key findings

1. Alliance has to leverage its internal solidarity level and strategic empathy in terms of reassuring each other.

2. It should develop two prong deterrence strategy based on punishment as well as denial concept.

3. It has to carry on beefing up ground forces in the Baltics region up to two rotational combat ready brigade-sized components with long-term tendency to have at least one brigade permanently stationed in the Baltics states.

4. It ought to set up its air dominance over that Baltic region

5. It has to improve HNS infrastructure able to absorb fast and massive alliance enforcement.

6. Alliance authorities seeing Russian no-notice approaches should decide to organize the similar one (no-notice) and to conduct if necessary, as deterrence means

7. NATO has to empower SACEUR’s with new competency, mainly to speed up force reaction and conduct no-notice exercises.

8. Alliance has to intensify military cooperation with Baltic non-NATO counties

9. NATO has to intensify comprehensive cooperation with UE to successfully cope with hybrid threats

10. Eastern flank NATO nations has to show either its full solidarity with the NATO southern flank suffering from ongoing migration crisis.

11. All nations has to show its determination in accomplishing 2 percent defense spending obligation.

12. NATO has to resume and conduct constructive dialog with Russia to work on de-escalation of the current security situation.

Garmisch-Partenkirchen, May 4 - 2016

Thank you for attention

The Alumni Scholarship Program

Mariusz Fryc Col. PhD, Armed Forces Supervision Department

National Security Bureau

Disclaimer. Presented thoughts reflect only the author's personal opinion