Deception1

The Language of Interpersonal Deception:

Falsification, Equivocation, and Concealment

David B. Buller and Judee K. Burgoon

Department of Communication

University of Arizona

Tucson, AZ 85721

Paper presented at the 4th International Conference on Language and Social

Psychology, Santa Barbara, CA, August 1991.

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And after all, what is a lie? 'Tis but the truth in masquerade.

--Byron, Don Juan

(1818)

...a lie which is half a truth is ever the blackest of lies, ... a lie

which is all a lie may be met and fought with outright, But a lie which

is part a truth is a harder matter to fight.

--Tennyson, The Grandmother

(1864)

No mask like open truth to cover lies, As to go naked is the best

disguise.

--Alain Rene Le Sage, The Double Dealer

(1694)

The folly of mistaking...a torrent of verbage for a spring of capital

truths...is inborn in us.

--Paul Valery, Introduction to the

Method

of Leonardo da Vinci

(1895)

A truth that's told with bad intent, Beats all the lies you can invent.

--William Blake, Auguries of Innocence

(1789)

For centuries, poets have waxed lyrical about the means and ends of

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verbal deception. Social scientists have been more faint-hearted. Being

cautious, we propose to enter this relatively uncharted territory by

delineating the characteristics of three different types of verbal deception,

reviewing possible linguistic means for accomplishing these forms of

deception, and previewing a program of research we are undertaking to

investigate the nature and effects of the language of deceit.

Background of Problem

Over the course of several studies, we have been developing an

interpersonal theory of deception. Most research has taken a unidirectional

approach to deceptive communication: Deceivers transmit signals which

receivers passively absorb. This research focuses largely on psychological

processes underlying deceivers' behavior to identify reliable clues to

deception. In this approach, deceivers and receivers have little agency when

it comes to communication. Changes in deceivers' behavior arise from

involuntary psychological processes such as arousal, emotional reactions, and

cognitive complexity to "leak" deceptive intent through channels over which

deceivers have little control (Ekman & Friesen, 1969, 1974; Zuckerman,

DePaulo, & Rosenthal 1981; Zuckerman & Driver, 1985). Receivers are

considered little more than passive participants, usually acting as observers

rather than active conversationalists. Their sole purpose is to sort among

the verbal and nonverbal aspects of communication to discern who is telling

the truth and who is deceiving (Burgoon, 1989). Researchers do not seem to

Deception4

acknowledge that receivers react to deceivers messages, that these reactions

alter the communication exchange and, perhaps, deception's success.

While this approach has provided information on deception, it has not

provided a full accounting of this common communication event. We believe

that an interpersonal theory of deception that emphasizes the communication

exchange between deceivers and detectors, as well as the psychological

processes both experience, is needed to completely understand deceptive

communication. In developing an interpersonal theory of deception, we are

striving,

"to explain the interplay between deceivers and detectors who

communicate with multiple motives, who behave strategically, whose

communication behaviors mutually influence one another to produce a

sequence of moves and countermoves, and whose communication is

influenced by the situation in which the deception transpires" (Buller,

Strzyzewski, & Comstock, 1991).

Importance of Verbal Behavior. One fact that has emerged from our work

is that while nonverbal communication is an integral part of deceptive

communication, restricting the focus to nonverbal communication misses a great

deal of the interplay in deceptive conversations. For example, we recently

showed that the nature of recipients' verbal probing questions (i.e., whether

they communicated acceptance of the sources' message or skepticism) affected

sources' perceptions of suspicion and subsequent behavior in deceptive

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conversations (Buller et al., 1991). Anecdotal evidence from our most recent

studies has also affirmed the importance of verbal behavior in deception.

when we ask participants to review their own videotaped experimental

interactions and describe what they were attempting to do, they frequently

described verbal strategies and impressions of verbal behavior.

The language of deception has not been entirely overlooked in the past.

A handful of studies have explored such variables as timed the length of

verbal responses (Harrison, Hwalek, Raney, & Fritz, 1978), counted words

(Dulaney, 1982), computed words per time unit (Riggio & Friedman, 1983),

counted various types of referential phrases (Knapp et al., 1974), and

recorded judgments of plausibility (Riggio & Friedman, 1983). Unfortunately,

many behaviors which these researchers labelled as verbal behavior are usually

classified as nonverbal (e.g., response length and tempo). Moreover, there

seems to be no underlying conceptual organization to the linguistic elements

examined in these studies. They are not linked to particular deception forms

or strategies (e.g., fabrication, half-truths), nor is there much notion as to

whether these verbal behaviors are purposive or functional or whether they

"leak" information about involuntary cognitive responses during deception, as

Ekman and Friesen (1969, 1974) have suggested that nonverbal behaviors often

do.

The language of deception has also been a implicit concern for scholars

considering the alternative forms that deception can take. The typologies

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that have been advanced over the last 16 years (Buller & Burgoon, in press;

Hopper & Bell, 1984; Metts & Chronis, 1986; Metts & Hippensteele, 1987;

Turner, Edgley, & Olmstead, 1975) have differentiated the amount and

sufficiency of information, the degree of truthful information, and the

relevancy of information, all of which have linguistic implications. Still,

no systematic examinations of linguistic differences between alternative

deception strategies have been undertaken.

With these concerns in mind, we have embarked on a programatic

investigation of the language of interpersonal deception. What we will

present today is our conceptualization of how various deception strategies can

be differentiated linguistically and our first efforts to discern which

linguistic means deceivers actually display.

Deceiver Perceptions of Deception Strategies

Deception Strategies

Before considering the language of deception, we need to identify the

different forms of deception that can occur. Most deception research has

focused on one type of deception, namely lying (Hopper & Bell, 1984; Knapp &

Comedena, 1979; Kraut, 1980; Miller, Mongeau & Sleight, 1986). Knapp and

Comedena (1979) in their early review of deception research found that the

definition guiding the majority of studies could be expressed as "the

conscious alteration of information a person believes to be true in order to

significantly change another's perceptions from what the deceiver thought they

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would be without the alteration" (p.271). Two key elements undergird such a

definition. First is the notion of a symbolic exchange with all its

associated communicative competencies and dyadic interdependence. Second is

the element of purposeful intent on the part of the sender to engender a false

belief. These concepts remain cornerstone elements of virtually all current

operational definitions of deceptive communication. However, falsification

of factual information is only one communication form that possesses these

elements. "A wider view of deception includes not only lying but also

pretense, hypocrisy, 'BS', teasing, kidding, hoaxes, concealment, and so

forth. A comprehensive theory of deception cannot rest solely upon lies"

(Hopper & Bell, 1984, p. 287-288).

Type of deceptive communication may be an important moderating factor in

a range of research issues concerning deception. A major limitation of many

deception studies, then, is their failure to consider alternative forms of

deception. One reason for this oversight may be the emphasis on "lie

detection" to the exclusion of questions regarding the selection, behavioral

manifestation, and the relative success of alternative deception strategies.

A variety of contextual factors (level of suspicion, relationship type) would

also be expected to affect the processes mentioned above. Yet other forms of

deception, such as equivocation, have been found to be more prevalent in daily

interaction (Bavelas, 1983).

In response to this limitation, recent investigations have attempted to

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describe and employ different forms of deceptive communication and, to a

lesser extent, assessing their relative occurrence (Ekman, 1985; Miller et

al., 1986; Bradac, 1983; Hopper & Bell, 1984; Metts & Chronis, 1986; Metts and

Hippensteele, 1987; Turner, Edgley, & Olmstead, 1975). Two relatively

detailed, empirically- derived typologies of deceptive communication have been

developed. Hopper & Bell (1984) identified six forms--lies, masks, unlies,

crimes, fictions, playings, based on evaluation, detectability, and

premeditation. Fictions and playings (make-believe, joke, tease) were

relatively distinct from the other types based upon their more positive

evaluation (harmless, socially acceptable). The category lie included

"dishonesty" and "untruthfulness"; masks included "evasion" and "concealment."

The category unlies was characterized by "false implication" and "misleading"

and appear to refer to indirect methods of deception as opposed to deception

through explicitly-stated lies.

Turner et al. (1975) also developed a typology based upon analysis of

verbatim dyadic conversational records. They identified lies (i.e.,

contradictions) and exaggerations (more or modified information via

superlatives) as two specific forms of the more general class of distortion.

Secrets (absent information) and half-truths (less or modified information via

subordinates) were identified as two forms of the more general class of

concealment. The authors report that across 870 statements made by 130

respondents, 35% were forms of distortion strategies, while 32% were

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concealment strategies. The authors reported that the choice of deceptive

acts is affected by the motive for deception, whether the deception is

premeditated, the time available to plan, the consequences of being detected,

and anticipated success. A final form of deceptive communication was

identified by the authors and labeled "diversionary responses." The key

element in this form is not contradictory information but the use of topic

changes and irrelevant statements, which may represent strategies which

Bavelas (1983) considers equivocation. They reported that diversionary

responses were the most prevalent single form of information control (32%),

perhaps because the "interactional risks of discovery are not as great" (pg.

77).Perceived Dimensions Differentiating Deceptive Strategies

One way to bring conceptual coherence to the linguistic and nonverbal

features that distinguish different types of deception is to analyze the

perceptual dimensions that serve to discriminate various deception strategies.

Bavelas, Black, Chovil, and Mullett (199) and McCornack (1991) share our view

that we may gain more insight into deception strategies by analyzing them

dimensionally rather than categorically. McCornack (1991) proposes analyzing

deceptions according to degree of adherence to Grice's (1976) conversational

maxims of quantity, quality, manner, and relevance. The Quantity maxim

specifies that messages should be as informative as is required; the Quality

maxim, that they should be truthful; the Relation maxim, that they should be

relevant; and the Manner maxim, that they should be brief, orderly, and clear.

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His maxims coincide nicely with the dimensions along which we believe

array different deception strategies can be arrayed. The Quality maxim

implicates the degree of truth or falsity, which has been the primary

dimension along which most deceptions have been conceptualized. The Quantity

maxim implicates the degree of completeness and informativeness of a message.

Completeness may be somewhat different than informativeness, as a deceptive

message may give the appearance of being sufficient to the circumstances

(i.e., complete) and yet withhold significant information. The distinction

here may be between syntactic or structural completeness--the degree to which

a message is a well-formed utterance that meets the minimal requirements for a

response--and semantic or content completeness--the degree to which all

pertinent information is shared. Deceptive messages may be incomplete and/or

uninformative. The Relation maxim implicates dimensions of relevance and

directness. Again, a message may be syntactically direct--appearing to be a

grammatically coherent sequel to a previous utterance--or semantically

relevant--providing content that is related to the previous utterance.

Deceptive messages may be indirect and or irrelevant. Finally, the Manner

maxim implicates dimensions of succinctness, consistency, and clarity. A

message may obfuscate by being either overly verbose (the standard politican's

ploy of verbalisms) or overly brief. A deception may entail inconsistencies

between verbal statements or between verbal and nonverbal behaviors. Finally,

deceptive messages may introduce either syntactic or semantic ambiguity. The

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former obfuscates by producing answers that are undecipherable because of the

language or sentence structure used; the latter obfuscates by presenting

information that could be interpreted multiple ways or that equivocates.

These various dimensions can be used to differentiate three common deception

strategies: Falsification, Concealment, and Equivocation.

Falsification

Lying or falsification usually refers to the assertion of facts and/or

feelings which are untrue because they directly contradict, or distort the

truth (Turner, Edgley, & Olmstead, 1975). Hopper and Bell (1984) further

characterize falsification as relatively verbal, direct, clear, and easy to

detect (as compared to other forms investigated). Thus, falsification can be

conceived of as direct, relevant, clear, and false, yet usually a seemingly

complete response.

Concealment

Recent definitions further distinguish falsification, or telling false

information, from withholding true information. This type of deception, often

labeled as omission (Ekman, 1985), concealment (Metts & Hippensteele, 1987),

and secrets (Bradac, 1983; Hopper & Bell, 1984) relies on concealing

significant facts or feelings that would have to be disclosed in order to be

completely honest. Bradac (1983) suggests that concealment has three primary

characteristics: (1) The deceiver is not uttering true belief A, (2) This non-

utterance is deliberate, and (3) Belief A is relevant to the receiver in this

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context. A critical distinction between concealment and lying, then, may be

that of not telling the "whole truth" versus telling an "untruth." Both Ekman

(1985) and Metts and Hippensteele (1987) found support that people generally

prefer concealment to falsification when they decide to deceive. These

definitions indicate that concealment is characterized primarily by its

incompleteness. It is uncertain, however, how concealment typically varies in

directness, relevance, clarity, or truthfulness.

Equivocation

In recent years, there has been growing awareness of, and interest in,

the use of strategically ambiguous and equivocal forms of communication to

control information (Bavelas, Black, Chovil, & Mullett, 1990; Bowers, Eliot, &

Desmond, 1977; Eisenberg, 1984; Williams & Goss, 1973). Used strategically,

equivocation involves some degree of intent to deviate from or mask facts and

feeling by being using vague language, being indirect, or creating messages

which "allow for multiple interpretations on the part of receivers"

(Eisenberg, 1984, p. 230). According to Bavelas and her colleagues, equivocal

messages fails to (a) be clear in content, (b) provide a direct answer to an

explicit or implicit question, (c) identify a clear originator of the message

(d), and identify a clear target of the message. Thus equivocation can be

characterized as indirect, irrelevant, unclear, and somewhat truthful. This

is consistent with Turner et al.'s (1975) diversionary responses but extends

the concept to include intentionally unclear and ambiguous messages.

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The extensive work of Bavelas on equivocal communication has found

strong support for the pervasive use of ambiguous communication, particularly

in interpersonal conflict avoidance situations (Bavelas, 1983; Bavelas &

Chovil, 1986; Bavelas, Black, Chovil, & Mullett, 1990). Across more than

twenty experiments, equivocal messages were elicited more than ten to one over

clear "truths" or clear "untruths" (falsifications). Bavelas et al. found

that equivocation is perceived as overwhelmingly truthful, so like Turner et

al.'s (1975) diversionary responses, it may be considered a less risky form of

deception.

Linguistic Substrategies and Tactics in Deception

The dimensions underlying deception strategies that we have outlined so

far focus exclusively on the perceived information value of messages. Another

way to distinguish strategies from one another is according to the actual

verbal and nonverbal behaviors that are enacted. We believe that changes in

nonverbal and verbal behavior can be distinguished according to whether they

are enacted strategically--to enhance the deceiver's image, reduce the chances

of detection, or minimize the harm in detection--or nonstrategically, as

involuntary responses such as anxiety, negative affect, and incompetent

performances that accompany deception. We have recently proposed grouping the

potential deception tactics into four classes of substrategies and three

classes of nonstrategic behavior, with the latter category including much of

what is referred to as "leakage" by other researchers (Ekman & Friesen, 1969,

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1974; Zuckerman et al., 1981). The substrategies include the following: (a)

uncertainty and vagueness, (b) nonimmediacy, reticence, withdrawal, and

involvement, and (c) disassociation, and (d) image-protecting behavior. The

nonstrategic, leakage categories include (e) revealing arousal and

nervousness, (f) signalling negative affect, and (g) resulting in incompetent

performances. We feel these classes represent a good starting point for

organizing a comparison of the linguistic differences among fabrication,

concealment, and equivocation. In our current investigation, we focused on

two strategic--uncertainty and vagueness and nonimmediacy and involvement--and

two leakage forms--arousal and nervousness and negative affect, to reduce the

complexity of our task.

Uncertainty and Vagueness

Bavelas, Black, Chovil and Mullet (1990) proposed that communicators will

use vague, ambiguous and equivocal messages in avoid-avoid conflict situations

(i.e., situations in which all alternatives are undesirable). Many deceptive

interactions take place in this type of situation and may lead the deceivers

to chose deliberately vague messages. For example, when a friend asks whether

you approve of her behavior and you disapprove of it, you may find it

undesirable to tell the truth because it would hurt your friend's feelings.

At the same time, you may consider deception undesirable as well because it

violates the trust in the relationship. Bavelas et al. (1990) argued that

many "reply" responses, typical of deceptive interactions, take the form of

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indirect speech acts that lack specificity. That is, these messages are vague

and provide information that indirectly answers the question or is irrelevant

to the question. An indirect answer to the question about your friend's

behavior might be, "Not many people can get away with that sort of behavior."

Weiner and Mehrabian (1968) argued that one method for providing indirect

responses is the increased use of modifiers and qualifiers, more leveling

terms and less specific references. A few studies provide evidence that

deceivers use more modifiers and qualifiers (DePaulo, Stone & Lassiter, 1985;

Dulaney, 1982; Wiener & Mehrabian, 1968; Zuckerman, DePaulo & Rosenthal,

1986), more other references (Knapp et al., 1974), more leveling terms (Cody,

Marston & Foster, 1984; DePaulo et al., 1985; Knapp et al., 1974; Zuckerman,

DePaulo, et al., 1986), and fewer specific references (Cody et al., 1984).

Thus we expected that equivocation would include several forms of these

indirect speech acts. What was not known is whether such indirect speech acts

occur when communicators attempt to fabricate or conceal information.

Fabrication would seem to be a less acceptable form of communication because

it violates the conversational maxim of truth. Therefore, communicators who

fabricate information may enact some indirect speech forms. However, the fact

that the fabrication is sanctioned by the experimenter may reduce

communicators' concerns over the reprehensibility of deception and reduce the

use of indirect speech acts. It seems less likely that indirect speech acts

will arise when communicators are attempting to conceal information.

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Concealment does not violate expectations for truthful discourse, so it may

not create the avoid-avoid situation which triggers indirect speech acts.

Nonimmediacy and Involvement

Nonimmediate language is used by communicators to partially disassociate

themselves from messages that create conflict (Wagner & Pease, 1977). As

noted, such conflict might occur during deceptive communication when both

truthful and deceptive responses are undesirable. Weiner and Mehrabian (1968)

proposed a typology of message variables indicative of nonimmediacy including

(1) more indirectness (increased spatial and temporal modifiers), (2) changes

in denotative specificity (increased leveling terms, decreased self

references) and (3) changes in lexical discreteness (decreased group

references, increased

differentiating and frequency modifiers/qualifiers). Several studies have

found evidence for nonimmediate message behaviors on the part of deceivers.

Deceivers use more leveling or inclusive terms (Cody et al., 1984; DePaulo et

al., 1985; Knapp et al., 1974; Zuckerman et al., 1986), use more indirect

forms of expression and exhibit greater lexical discreteness as evidenced by a

higher number of modifiers and qualifiers (DePaulo et al., 1985; Dulaney,

1982; Wiener & Mehrabian, 1968; Zuckerman et al., 1986), and use more other

references and fewer self references (Knapp et al., 1974). Cody et al. (1984)

also found a difference in the use of study-specific references but they

reported fewer leveling terms.

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The very nature of conversation requires involvement by both parties, but

Knapp et al. (1974) suggested that deceivers try to disassociate themselves

from their deceptions. Nonimmediacy or a lack of involvement has been seen in

several studies of deception, especially in the nonverbal channels (see Buller

& Burgoon, in press, for a review). However, Buller et al. (1991) recently

found that when subjected to probing, deceivers increased their involvement,

at least nonverbally (Buller, Strzyzewski & Comstock, 1991). King and Sereno

(1984) argued that communicators attempt to modify the content of a

conversational message to make the message more appropriate relationally by

the use of tag questions. When subjected to probing, deceivers may use more

tag questions to signal involvement as well as allay the suspicions of the

prober.

Almost all of these findings stem from studies on fabrication, so it

seems most likely that nonimmediate verbal forms would be most likely to arise

when that strategy is employed. However, several nonimmediate forms are also

indirect speech acts, so nonimmediacy may be evident in equivocation, as well.

(We take up the issue of multi-functionality in a following section.)

Arousal

One of the most commonly cited sources of leakage during deception is

physiological arousal. Arousal arises from detection apprehension and from

negative affect experienced during deceptive acts. One of the problems in

studying arousal indicators during deception is separating arousal induced by

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deception from arousal that stems from other sources. For instance, Burgoon

and Hale (1983) have suggested that simply having to communicate causes

arousal, especially in trait-reticent people. Thus shy or introverted

individuals may display more arousal cues, regardless of whether they are

deceiving. Also, some situations like testifying in a court of law can

produce arousal in even the most gregarious individuals.

Several language indicators of arousal have been suggested. Bradac et

al. (1979) argued that the intensity of one's language (degree of deviation

from neutrality) decreases as arousal increases. In a review of studies on

emotions and interpersonal language use, Bowers, Metts and Duncanson (1985)

posited that lexical diversity decreased and metaphor/imagery and maledicta

(profanity and disparaging remarks) increased as arousal increased.

Consistent with this, Knapp et al. (1974) found evidence that deceivers used

more disparaging remarks. Although there are no empirical data to guide the

way, one form of intense language that may indicate arousal, the use of humor,

seems a likely candidate for further investigation. Elliott (1966) and Hodgart

(1969) argued that satire, and by extension humor, is used by individuals in

arousing situations.

If we are correct in positing that fabrication, equivocation, and

concealment differ in the amount of anxiety they arouse in communicators who

use them, then we should witness differences in language intensity, lexical

diversity, metaphor, maledicta, and humor. It would seem that fabrication

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would engender more arousal, as equivocation and concealment may be considered

less detectable or less reprehensible if detected.

Negative Affect

Another common source of leakage during deception is affect or emotional

reactions, especially negative ones. In many instances, deception produces

negative affect, because it is socially less acceptable and presents risks to

the communicator (Buller & Burgoon, in press; Ekman & Friesen, 1969; 1974;

Zuckerman et al., 1981; Zuckerman & Driver, 1985). Wagner and Pease (1977)

proposed that interactions which create a conflict for a communicator will

produce negative feelings and be indicated linguistically by (1) higher

linguistic type to token ratios, (2) more phrases of negation and (3)

increased modifiers and qualifiers. In a true linguistic sense, a type-token

ratio refers to the ratio of class category words (the type) to particular

members of that class (the tokens) (Jackendoff, 1990). Cody et al. (1984)

found that deceivers made more nonspecific place references (types) and fewer

specific place and person references (tokens). Kuiken (1981) found that

deceivers used more negation.

Studies of the communication of negative affect also have found that the

language is more grammatically complex (Collier, Kuiken & Enzle, 1982; Osgood

& Hoosain, 1983). Increased grammatical complexity produces greater lexical

diversity as evidenced by the increased use of modifiers and qualifiers

(Carpenter, 1981; Dulaney, 1982). Several studies have found evidence that

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deceivers use greater lexical diversity (Carpenter, 1981; Cody et al., 1984;

Dulaney, 1982; Knapp et al., 1974; Todd-Mancillas & Kibler, 1979).

Finally, communicators experiencing negative affect may use fewer self-

references and disagreeing statements (Leary, Knight, & Johnson, 1987;

Schlenker & Leary, 1985). Similarly, Knapp et al. (1974) argued that changes

in the use of referencing in deceptive conversations is an indicator of

negative feelings and they reported that deceivers use more other references

and fewer self references.

Thus negative affect during deception is likely to result in higher type

token ratios, more lexical diversity, and a change in referencing. The use of

negation also may change, but it is unclear whether negation will increase as

suggested by Kuiken or whether it will decrease because communicators avoid

disagreeing statements as Leary et al. and Schlenker and Leary proposed.

Multi - dimensional Functions of Language Behaviors

One of the problems with specifying which linguistic behaviors will

change during deception is that some linguistic forms can serve several

functions or signal several cognitive processes. Take for instance indirect

speech acts. In past studies, they have been considered forms of nonimmediacy

by deception researchers, but Bavelas' work suggests that their primary

function in deceptive conversation may be to create vagueness and uncertainty.

Another possibility is that nonimmediate speech indicates affect (Bradac,

Bowers, & Courtwright, 1979). Further, it is often difficult to distinguish

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between cues that indicate arousal from those which are linked to negative

affect, as arousal is an integral part of emotional reaction (Buck, 198x;

Winton, 1990).

The task for researchers is to determine which function is being served

by a particular linguistic form or which cognitive process is being leaked.

For some cues, this is easier, because they take different forms depending on

which function or process is occurring. For instance, lexical diversity

should increase in response to negative affect and but decrease in response to

arousal. However, for other linguistic forms, it is more difficult to sort

out their role in deception. For example, increased other references and

decreased specific references can communicate vagueness or nonimmediacy, as

well as indicate negative affect. This is another reason why investigating

communicators' perceptions of deception strategies is critical. These

perceptions will provide insight into some of communicators intentions and

feelings when enacting the fabrication, equivocation, and concealment. By

knowing this information, we hopefully will be able to sort out whether

particular linguistic forms arise to serve one function or another, or are

associated with cognitive changes such as arousal and affect.

Preliminary Data

Experimental Methods

Preliminary data on our conceptualization of the linguistic form of

deception is drawn from our most recent experiment on deception. In this

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experiment, forty adults from the Tucson community were recruited to our

laboratory for an experiment supposedly on interviewing skills. These adults

were attracted to the lab by an offer of free advice on communication and came

from the county courthouse jury room, local Toastmaster's clubs, and the

Tucson Job Core.

When they arrived at our lab, participants were told that we were

interested in how accurately people portray themselves to others. They were

instructed to engage in a brief interview with a person who was ostensibly

another participant, but who in reality was an experimental confederate. In

this first interview, participants were instructed to be completely open and

honest when answering the questions, which were of the type typically asked in

job interviews. The confederate was trained to control the interview by

asking questions in a preset order and in a prescribed working. Participants

were videotaped during the interview which was permitted to last eight

minutes.

Following this first interview, participants were told that they would

be engaging in a second interview with another participant (who once again was

a trained confederate). Participants told that sometimes it is not in one's

best interest to tell the whole truth and that we wanted them to practice

their skill at adapting to these situations. They were instructed to answer

truthfully to the first two questions in the upcoming interview and then alter

their answers by either giving completely untrue answers (fabrication), giving

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vague, indirect, unclear or ambiguous answers (equivocation), or giving

answers that withhold, omit, or avoid relevant information (concealment).

Finally, some subjects were told to give answer that fall short of the truth,

but were not told exactly how we wanted them to do this (general deception),

to see what deception strategies they would enact.

The second interviewer covered the same questions, except for a new

question which required a spontaneous answer. The participant was also

videotaped during this interview which lasted for eight minutes.

Following this interview, participants completed a post-test measuring

their impressions of their communication during the second interview. Then,

participants reviewed the videotape of their two interviews and responded to a

series of open-ended and Likert-type questions describing their behavior. The

Likert-type questions asked participants about their perceptions of the

completeness, sufficiency, directness, clarity, relevancy, vagueness,

plausibility, difficulty, comfort, amount of truth, and amount of information

given in their answers to three of the questions in the second interview:

"What is the meanest thing you've ever done?"; "Tell me about your home life

when you were growing up."; and "What types of people seem to 'rub you the

wrong way'?".

Subsequently, we had trained coders count self-references,

group-references, leveling terms, modifiers/qualifiers, and humor

(specifically sarcasm, anecdotes, and "making light"). These behaviors were

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selected because they could be easily coded directly from videotapes, avoiding

the need for transcripts.

Perceptions of Deception Strategies

Linguistic Differences in Deception Strategies