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TECHNICAL REPORT -.

RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH ASSESSMENT

I

M67 MORTAR SIGHT UNIT:

(REVISION " A")

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Richard W. FilszarLawrence J. D'Arles

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5 October 1995- -- - . . . -. - _ - _ . . - . . -

U.S. Army' Armament Research Development and Engineering Center~ ~ ' ~"

Radiation Protection OfficeSafety and Ammunition Division

9603110365 950531

YD "YPDR J

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INTRODUCTION '4

This report is a revision to a previous! radiological healthassessment of potential incidents involving tritium vial failuresin the M67 Mortar Sight Unit, dated 17 February 1995.- The reasonfor the revision is to reassess the potential for dose uptake-

; based to a large degree on the findings from drop tests conductedon both the bare, as well as containerized, M67 Sight Unit in lateAugust 1995, as part of an overall ANSI N540. testing regiment thatwas performed on the Sight Unit. Particulars regarding this ANSI. testing can be found in a separate report specifically on thattopic, dated lo oc4- M95

The M67 Sight Unit (photograph at TAB A) . will be fielded on the'120mm Mortar System. The 120mm Mortar System is designed aseither a towed.or_ carrier version. TABS B and C depict the towed-and carrier versions respectively. The towed version is emplacedt

/ in the open as depicted at TAB D, while the carrier can beemplaced either in the open (TAB D) , or in a M1064 armored

i personnel carrier as depicted at TAB E. Operationally, the 120mm6- . mortar system is transported in a stowed configuration with the

| Sight Unit removed from the mortar and placed in a protective-

carrying case. The case is either fiberglass or nylon with a foamliner designed to protect the Sight Unit. The case is depicted at.

i TAB'F. To emplace the mortar in the open, the crew must first-,

emplace the baseplate and tripod assemblies, and then attach themortar tube. Once the mortar tube is fully stabilized, the Sight-,

~ Unit is attached. Similarly, the Sight Unit can only be placed onI, the 120mm_ mortar inside the M1064, armored personnel-carrier:when,4 3= 'the overhead doors are open. These overhead doors cannot be~'

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closed completely'without rembving the Sight Unit, even with the~

mortar cranked to.its_ lowest: rest position inside the. vehicle..

3 (Note that inside the M1064', the baseplate for' the. mortar isreplaced by a. rotating aluminum base permanently. affixed to the-'-

' floor of the vehicle). Upon completion of the mission the SightUnit is removed, and replaced into its protective carrying casebefore the mortar tube is removed from the baseplate / tripodassembly . (outdoor use) . The' operator's manual requires that theSight Unit be inspected for tritium lamp breakage prior to

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attachment to the mortar tube, and again upon' completion of themission.

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The M67 contains 12 tritium vials. The schematic at TAB Gidentifies the vials and their location. The information.is |

summarized below. ,

Location / Description # Vials Activity Each Activity Total,

1. Elbow Telescope 2 0.4 Ci 0.8 Ci

2. Level Vials 2 0.05 Ci 0.1 Ci,.

1 3. Scale Indices 3 0.03 Ci 0.09 Ci'' 4. C. Elevation Scale 1 1.1 C1 1.1 Ci

! 5. F. Elevation Scale 1 0.7 Ci 0.7 Ci6. C. Azimuth Scale 1 1.0 Ci 1.0 Ci

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7. F. Azimuth Scale 2 1.0 Ci 2.0 C1

5.79 Ci'

Total Sight Contents 12 Vials ---------------

The M67 Sight Unit is an evolution of the M64 and M64A1 Sight |

Units currently fielded to the Army, and employs identical lamps !

with the exception of the reticle lamps and the course elevationscale lamp. The M64 Sight Unit has been fielded with the 60mmamortar system, whereas the M64A1 Sight Unit has been fielded with-

the 81mm mortar system.r

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ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY*

The radiological health assessment is primarily dependent uponthe number and type of tritium vials which could be expected to

! break if the sight unit is dropped, and the manner in which they /. break. This can be defined as type of failure and extent offailure.

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I No-other forms of stress that the Sight Unit may experience -

i during fielding, such as reduced pressure, air temperature_

extremes,-thermal shock (dry' air, or water immersion),- or8 vibration, as well as.that of ballistic shock during firing, are

expected to result in damage / breakage to the tritium vials. This'

7; is based on the results from appropriate ANSI N540 type tests,with the Sight Unit tested either in or out of its carrying case'

in conjunction with printed field instruction, as well as numerous.shock tests (actual 120mm mortar ' firings, in addition to

-machinery-simulated shocks to the M67 sight unit). , ,

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Type of Failure:- -

Damage to the vials could vary from a crack which increases' tritium leakage but does not immediately release the total contentof the gas, to simple glass breakage'which would immediatelyrelease 100 percent of the tritium gas but would not release anyof the phosphor in dispersable form, to a crushing of the vialwhich would release all of the gas and make the phosphor and itsbinder available for contact in a dust-like form. Thesepossibilities can be described as type of failure.

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~ Failure Type #1: Slow leakage from vials,

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Failure Type #2: Immediate release of all tritium gasj Failure Type #3: Immediate release .of all tritium gas and

direct access to the phosphor-and binder;

i Extent of Failure:

i Each of these' failure modes also must consider.the number ofvials damaged, because this changes the amount of tritium.

; available_for release. Based on the design of the Sight Unit, the I'

vials contained in the fine elevation scale, fine azimuth scale, |and elbow telescope are most vulnerable to damage if the Sight_

Unit is dropped on.a-flat surface. However, should the Sight Unitbe' dropped onto an;" edged", small protruding (ex. , bolt) , or. pointed type surface, then any of the vial-containing locationscould be struck directly.

ANSI impact or drop testing had been conducted in August 1995on two M67 Sight Units, each in either a fiberglass or nylonstorage container. Twenty random drops were conducted on each ofthe Si'ght Units in their respective container from a height of onemeter above a solid, flat steel plate, followed by two random'-~ ~drops from a: height of two meters.- No tritium vials on theseunits experienced any cracking or breakage, as confirmed by apost-ANSI testing 24-hour soak test. Based on these findings, itcan be concluded that no tritium vial cracking or breakage is-Lexpected if the Sight Unit is dropped from a height of severalfeet (i .e . , ' at least 6-1/2 feet) onto a hard, flat surface, whilestored within its storage container. In addition, though~not

~

tested, it is surmised that no breakage or cracking would occur ifthe container struck a non-flat protruding-type surface from a

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height of several feet.. ,

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Impact testing was'~also conducted on a third.M67 Sight, Unit.This Sight-Unit was' dropped bare from a height of one meter, _onto'

the solid, flat steel plate. However, these drops (a total of20)' were performed in a controlled (aligned) fashion so as to try,

- to impact on each- of ten different edges . (or areas) of the site.These one meter drops progressed from those locations believed tobe least,.to finally most-vulnerable-to tritium vial-breakage'upon.

direct impact. A drop was made at each determined location twicebefore dropping began on the next location. 'This'i,s believed tobe a very conservative test on the durability of the Sight Unit,since the apparent most vulnerable 11ocations (i.e., fine elevationscale, fine azimuth scale, and elbow telescope)-were the locationswhere the last one meter drops were conducted (i.e., drops 15-20) .Those three locations had already been indirectly " jolted" or" shocked" at least 14 times before being impacted directly, andyet still experienced no tritium vial cracks or breaks. It cantherefore, be reasonably surmised that if the bare M67 Sight Unit

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a is dropped on a flat, hard surface such as the steel base plate on* the towed 120mm mortar _ system, or the floor, or_ rotating aluminum^

base.of the M1064 armored personnel carrier from a height of onemeter or less, that no tritium vial cracks or breaks might -be

; expected. In fact, the Sight Unit would injall. probability bei -taken out of service anyway,_ after one or two accidental dropsi' from that height onto a flat surface, not .because of damage ta) thei vials, but due to damage ~to mechanical parts on the site, makingL it inoperable, as was evidenced when conducting the bare drop

{ tests on the M67 unit.

! Only one of-two planned bare drops was then conducted on this*

Sight Unit from a two meter height onto the flat steel plate. -Thedrop was a random free-fall. It was decided not to conduct asecond two meter drop (22d drop overall on.that site unit) . because

6 the tritium vial became directly exposed at the Fine Elevation'Scale knob, when part of the plastic scale broke off at time of4

' impact. A post-24-hour soak test of this Sight Unit revealed thatI no cracks cnr breakages of the tritium vials had occurred during

( the 21 drops.2

| Though this third M67 site unit had not gone through any other| ANSI-type tests, it did withstand a rigorous Impact test ~.~A .

P 'second drop at two~ meters would quite possibly have resulted-in--- --

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the exposed vial breaking. However, a Sight Unit such as,this, ''

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is- with a knob missing part of its scale, would not be functional%NA ""n

anymore, and would be repackaged in its stora,ge container for.leventual turn-in, rather than continue to'be used-and potentially ;

|y~ dropped again.d6y

, _Although no tritium vials cracked or-broke during the bare drop

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' "m test of that one M67 Sight Unit, it can be argued that a. fraction'f a.1 'of an inch either way from how it landed during the two meter' drop ;

( - might have resulted in breakage of the vial for the Fine Elevation'

Scale ~knobi Whether or not similar structural damage and possible- !$ ' tritium vial breakage would be likely to occur _during a bare drop i

from a more credible maximum height-of about 55"-60" is not known.~

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! This measurement was taken inside an M1064 with the Mortar set atp its highest reasonable elevation, and the height at which the

Sight Unit would be.while being attached to'or removed from the-site extension-rod-(see TAB H). In addition, it could be argued.

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| that even at lesser heights, a_ vial on.a Sight. Unit.might possibly_.~

I break if it hits a non-flat surface. Again, as evidenced,in.both-TAB H, and directly observed when assessing the make-up of the - - - - -

tvehicle, there are a number of such surfaces with which a dropping'-

Sight Unit could come in contact. These include the corners of.

ammo boxes on the floor, sharp edges on the mortar stand, and the1

: edge of the turntable, as well as the edges of the portable metalsteps (two high) used inside the vehicle (O ~) .

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Based upon these considerations, an assessment will be made ofpotential dose uptakes in the event a vial should break. Theseassessments will be made under relatively open air conditions(i.e., outside during use with towed version; inside M1064 withoverhead doors open and ramp down), that should.be considerednormal-type use for this commodity. A conservative assessmentwill also be made under a condition where a vial breaks inside aM1064 when all hatches / doors are closed, and it is not feasible toleave the vehicle. This latter scenario appears to be plausiblefor those circumstances where the Sight Unit has been removed fromthe mortar still attached to the extension rod, hatches / doors /ramps are closed in preparation for transit, and attempts thenmade to re-stow the Sight Unit in its storage container when theSight is subsequently dropped.

As a result of the findings from the ANSI N540-type impact droptests, it would not be expected that more than one location on thesite would experience vial breakage, if it occurred at all. Forthe purpose of this assessment, three degrees of failure will beconsidered. Case A will be the least serious, with only one ofthe smallest vials affected (Vial #3, Scale Indices). Case B willrepresent failure of Vial #5, Fine Elevation Scale.- Based on thegeometry of the Sight Unit, this appears to be a reasonablefailure mode. Case C will represent a failure of Vials #7, FineAzimuth Scale (two vials). This appears to be a worst caserealistic scenario. The amount of tritium available for release neach case is identified below:

Extent of failure A: 0.03 Ci release

Extent of failure B: 0.70 Ci release

Extent of failure C: 2.00 Ci release

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METHODOLOGY-

This assessment will define total uptake for each of the ninescenarios identified above, based on the following assumptions:

a. The inhalation rate used will be the " moderate work"breathing rate of 25 liters per minute (ICRP/1977).

b. All radiological materials uptake will be via ;

inhalation and skin absorption (primarily from direct handling of iIthe device, as well as to a much lower degree, by submersion in

tritium-laden air) . For purposes of this study with reference tothe NRC footnote for 10 CFR 20.103 (a) (1), it will be assumed thatthe intake of tritiated water vapor by inhalation and percutaneous !

absorption through skin contact with the air are equal (i.e.,

inhalation uptake x 2) for determining total dose without contactwith the phosphor / binders.

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3 content is in thec. Eighty-five percent of the total Hgas phase, and released during vial breakage, of which two percent(1.7 percent of total tritium content) is tritiated water vapor.Assume no conversion of tritium gas to tritiated water during time jof exposure to the postulated gas release..

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The vender presently contracted to manufacture the tritium vialsfor the M67 site unit has stipulated that its tritiated watervapor content at' time of filling is less than one percent. ;

| However, an evaluation by Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., of lI tritium vials from previously fielded U.S. Army lensatic l

compasses, revealed that up to two percent of tritiated watervapor-was found in the gas upon vial breakage.1 Followingmanufacture of the vial, a portion of the tritium gas interactswith the phosphor, and the binder (used to attach the phosphor to .-the glass wall in the tritium vial), as well as with surface. ;

| impurities, to produce tritiated water and other tritiated,

! compounds.2 In..another study by Brookhaven National Laboratory,.of |'

several commercial building exit signs ranging from two to 13 .

years old, tritiated. water content in the gas phase was found torange from two percent to 14.5 percent.8 The highest percentages

, of tritiated water vapor were in the older signs. It must be" noted, however, that another study not yet published, detecting

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i much lower tritiated water concentrations in vials, calls into- question the Brookhaven findings. Since, at-this time, it is not

h known:whether increases in tritiated water content with age is aninherent property of the design, or whether simply better controls |in the manufacturing of those exit signs could have minimized the >tritiated water content, the two percent concentration measured inthe lensatic compasses will be:used in this assessment. f.y

!'j d. ' Fifteen percent of the total tritium content is adsorbed in --i,

the phosphor / binder coating on the inner walls of the vial (s) in jthe form ofs tritiated water.< This is considered an intermediate. 1

( value since in the' literature it is reported that anywhere:from |

L- five to 20 percent of the tritium is eventually adsorbed onto the J

; phosphor / binder coating with the amount evidently dependent to i

some degree on the surface to volume ratio of the vial.1,2d The j

greater this ratio, as would be found with the size vials used for j

the M67 Sight Unit, the more tritium adsorption.- j

e. Two scenarios.of tritiated water vapor intake will beanalyzed: ten percent inhaled'by an individual, and that minimumamount expected to be inhaled if uniform mixing in air occurredright at the time of gas release within a closed M1064. Thesecond scenario will assume no acute uptake right at the time ofvial breakage, and continued occupancy within the vehicle with nohatches / ramps or doors opened. Since there is no mechanicalventilation (also assume vehicle not moving) inside an M1064,

assume one complete air change every 15 minutes.2 Using theseassumptions, a person would inhale the equivalent of about 53

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percent of the actual initial airborne concentration (with uniformmixing) within the vehicle over the 15 minute period in which thetritium-laden air were considered present. In addition, the lossof available tritium in the air due to its inhalation by the otherthree crew members (four-man crew) is considered negligible forthe purpose of these calculations, since ths four crew memberscombined would inhale only about 1.5 percent of the air inside thevehicle each minute (i.e., interior air volume of M1064 -$3(6.92 x

3 5 310' cm ; total inhalation rate of four crew members - 1 x 10 cmper minute).

The ten percent value is used as a worst case scenario where theSight is dropped in a small enclosure, such as the M1064 with alldoors / ramps shut, and a soldier is directly over (i.e., veryclose) the Sight when it is dropped. Both scenarios areconsidered here to be realistic and plausible in a closed area. 1

For an open area (outside or with the overhead doors of the M1064 )iopen) the potential uptake from inhalation and percutaneous air

absorption is expected to be of a much less degree. In addition,if the vehicle were closed up but moving, the resultant forc.edventilation would cause an air change much sooner than the 15 ;

minutes estimated above and, therefore, the airborne dose |

contribution would be proportionately less than that presented~

here,

f. Two scenarios of skin contact will be analyzed. The worstcase scenario will be 100 percent available tritiated water in thephosphor adhesive absorbed via skin contact by one individual.This is a conservative estimate; however, the potential exists forsome formidable dose uptake should phosphors be exposed andimproperly handled by an individual. A recent mishap at FortBragg adds credence to this assumption because approximately 360mrem dose uptake was received by an individual who handled thephosphors from a broken M1A1 collimator. It has also been notedthat cross contamination of devices containing broken tritiumvials is caused by movement of the tritium that remains behind onthe phosphors. A ten percent absorption will also be analyzed asa more realistic assumption under normal conditions.

g. Conversion from projected tritium activity uptake tocommitted dose equivalence will be determined by multiplying theactivity in microcuries by 0.063 mrem /uCi.5 ,

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ANALYSIS

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Soldier Exposure Based on Failure Type and Extent(10 Percent in Air Uptake /100 Percent Uptake'by Hand Contact)

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Failure Type,

#1 #2 #3 );

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Extent of FailureA Negligible Negligible 0.29 rem

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B Negligible 0.15 rem 6.77 rem-i

C Negligible 0.43 rem 19.33 rem I|

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Soldier Exposure Based on Failure Type and Extent(Minimal Uptake in Air /100 Percent Uptake by Hand Contact)

Failure Type#1 #2 #3.

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Extent of Failure I'

A Negligible Negligible 0.29 remJ

B Negligible 0.04" rem 6.66 rem i,

C Negligible 0.12 rem 19.02 rem i

Soldier Exposure Based on Failure Type and Extent(10 Percent Uptake in Air /10 Percent Uptake by Hand Contact)

Failure Type*

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#1 #2 #3

Extent of FailureA Negligible Negligible 0.03 rem

B' Negligible 0.15 rem 0'81 rem- --.

C Negligible 0.43 rem 2.32 rem

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Soldier Exposure Based on Failure Type and Extent(Minimal Uptake in Air /10 Percent Uptake by Hand Contact)

Failure Type#1 #2 #3

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Extent of FailureA Negligible Negligible 0.03 rem

B Negligible 0.04 rem 0.70 rem

C Negligible 0.12 rem 2.01 rem

ASSESSMENT

As can be seen from the above matrices, the extent of potentialtritium dose uptake is dependent upon the specific vial inquestion, the extent of failure, the scenario under which thefailure occurs, proximity to the vial in relation to breathingzone at time of breakage, as well as the method used in directlyhandling the cracked or broken item. If an individual should

y handle an item that has just experienced a crack, the tritiumuptake and resultant dose will be negligible. In addition, shouldan individual properly handle a broken item for the minimum amountof time, while wearing protective gloves, the tritium uptake andresultant dose should again be negligible. A review of thematrices reveals that the greater dose under these scenarios comesfrom improper direct handling of the M67, as opposed to the uptakethrough inhalation and skin absorption (air submersion).Therefore, in order to keep doses as low as reasonable achievable(ALARA), provisions should be in place in the field to haveprotective gloves and storage bags (at least two) readilyavailable for.use. One may argue that.to simply direct thesoldier not to handle the dropped item would prevent thatpotential form of uptake. However, the possibility exists,as evidenced by the ANSI N540-type drop tests, that the M67 may -

not have experienced any tritium-related damage, but yet stillwould be taken out of service unnecessarily.

On the other hand, in the event total vial breakage hasoccurred, and there are no' provisions to bag the item, in turnseparating it to some degree from the environment, those in theimmediate surroundings would be unnecessarily exposed to thetritiated water vaporizing over time, in addition to crosscontaminating surrounding surfaces. Though the dose uptakethrough inhalation under these circumstances would probably benegligible, the cost for deconning the surrounding surfaces at alater time could be substantial.

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The projected dose uptakes from airborne exposure to tritiumunder these scenarios is not significant from a radiologicalhealth standpoint. However, in several instances, the regulatorynon-occupational limit of 100 mrem per year could be exceeded. Inkeeping with ALARA, the likelihood of attaining those doses wouldbe substantially lessened in a number of instances provided fieldprocedures were in place to minimize exposure time if possible-(1.e., evacuate vehicle; inove away upwind; open overhead doors,ramps, etc. if need to stay onboard, etc.).

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Durability (Shock) Testina: Durability testing hasdemonstrated that the tritium vials are not subject to breakage -'

during firing of the mortar system.

Mode of Operation: Other than when it is to be used, the SightUnit is required to be stowed in its fiberglass or nylon storagecontainer. The Sight U - is the last item to be placed on themorcar tube prior tv fir g, and the first item to be removed fromthe mortar tube after cotyletion of firing at a given location.It is, therefore, expected to be in its storage container morethan ninety percent of the time while fielded.

Based on the results from the ANSI N540-type tests conducted onthe M67 while stowed inside either the fiberglass or nylon cases,vial cracking / breakage is not expected to occur during normaltransportation or storage conditions, or if inadvertently droppedfrom several feet. In addition, a damaged vial is also notexpected if a bare M67 Sight Unit is dropped from several feetonto a flat, hard surface, also based on the limited, thoughrigorous testing that had been conducted. If vial damage is tooccur, it might only be if direct contact is made with a non-flat" edged"-type surface, or possibly from a height that is greaterthan several feet.

Test Incident With M64: Durability of the M64 to dropping.hasbeen documented thru a test incident which occurred early in the120mm Mortar development process. On 20 October 1986, during areliability test for the XM121 carrier version of the 120mm mortar -

system, a M64 Sight Unit fell off the weapon a total of four timesdue to poor fit of the bipod dove tail. This occurred at round#115, #135, #139, and #145. The sight was reinstalled each time,.and there was no visible damage. The sight was checked for lampbreakage by visual i~,pection, and by checking for loss of-illumination. At the end of the day, the sight was returned tostorage and received a full swipe survey which showed no tritiumcontamination. Three days later, on 23 October 1986, the samesight unit was again involved in reliability testing on the XM121.During this~ test, the sight unit fell off the weapon because of afailure to the mount. Because of this failure,the sight unitcould not be reinstalled, and was returned to storage whereanother swipe survey was conducted, and no contamination noted.This represents five separate drops of an M64 Sight Unit onto themetal floor of the carrier from a height slight 3y higher than theroof of the carrier--about 4'.

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CONCLUSION

The M67 Sight Unit includes 5.79 Ci of tritium, and undercertain accident scenarios may expose soldiers to levels oftritium which would allow an internal dose is excess of the 100mrem / year non-occupational dose limit presently assigned to thesoldiers who would handle the M67.

Based on the similarity to the M64 Sight Unit, the field-

history of the M64 Sight Unit, the durability testing as well as |

ANSI N540-type testing of the M67 Sight Unit, and the guidance /cautions / warnings present in the technical manuals for thiscommodity, it is believed that the frequency of accidents whichcould expose the soldier to levels in excess of 100 mrem should be jrare.

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REFERENCESI

1 Internal Correspondence,2 May 1988, Evaluation of U.S. Army Lensatic Compass TritiumSources, J. A. Tompkins, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc.2 Traub, R. J. and G. A. Jensen, June 1995, Tritium Radioluminescent Devices Health & SafetyManual, PNL-10620, Battelle Pacific I#orthwert Laboratory.8 Bowerman, B. S. and C. J. Czajkowski, June 1990, Determinetion of the Chemical Form ofTritium in Self-Luminous Signs, NUREG 5574/BNL NUREG 52238, Brockhaven NationalLaboratory.4 Small Business innovation Research (SBIR) Program Proposal, Self luminousMicrospheres: The Next Generation Radioluminescent Light Source,30 September 1994,Encapsulight, Inc., Maplewood, NJ5 The Health Pysics and Radiological Health Handbook, Revisied Edition,1992, Scinta Inc.,Silver Spring, MD

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M67 SIGHT UNITRADIOLUMINOUS LAMP

LOCATION '.

.

ELBOW TELESCOPE ( fRETICLE ( j}.,* . . . .P/N 9356141(2) {

"

.O.4 Ci EACH \ /

|

A SE AZlMUTH

P/N 117337.36(1)b 1.0 Ci yL /q,

ls e CCARSEFINE A2IMUTH ELEVATION |

' SCALE SCALE -|P/N I|733744-2(2) * ,NO 8" S35S'7 "' !

'-

1.0 Ci EACH ,fo D

/ 4 g29 [t 1.1 Ci4

6 '\0 \%g \. . ..

.

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$'s Q/. . . _

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[ SCALE. __,s

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INDICIES

\ g- P/N 11733738($

[ O.03 Cl EACH

~N ..LEVEL VIALS '

P/N 11729510-1 (2) [N,_- 6j~( ,

t 0.05 Ci EACH --'

.

FINE El.EVATION F'

SCALE- G

P/N il733744-l(l)-

0.7 Ci,

TOTAL TRITIUM PER SIGHT UNIT 5.79 CURIES 7d' 4. - _- . . . _. _. _ __ - . . - _ - .- _

a.9h6 44JhM Jh h *X 4 andia.madh malsh8,Cm. ar AJ 4-mm 6manha-.- - - - - _ ._

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M67 SIGHT UNITRADIOLUMINOUS LAMP

LOCATION. .

-

O-

ELBOW TELESCOPE ( jRETICLE ( j. , .,

P/N 9356141(2) ('

_O.4 Ci EACH \

,- <'

s.

'

SE A MUTH

P/N II73 36(l) li

': 1.0 Ci / g,,

h r COARSEa,

i FINE AZIMUTH U) ELEVATIONj ~ SCALE SCALE -

! P/N 11733744-2(2) 4 BN 9356170fik,

i 1.0 Ci EACH D1,1CI~,

\; -

-'

6 '10 -

N hj,,,, --.

|- 'k -

SCAL' '

.

' N ,) INDICIES'

-

f 3 EA

e ,\ . e.

LEVEL VIALS '

| P/N ||729510-1 (2) /\,_- f'

,'

O.05 Ci EACH (.

FINE ELEVATIONi SCALE /,

P/N ||733744-l(l)-4

! O.7 Ci

i TOTAL TRITIUM PER SIGHT UNIT 5.79 CURIES h_ - _. . _ -- - . - .. .

...

. . -.

.

1. , G-

i /1 AMMUNITION, !

STOWAGE~

4

f a'' m-

: 45 - s a v; _)V@W'^ e ,

| ; 6.-< '

th- M1064:4 '

||| AMMUNITION1

MORTAR TOMGE'

I TURNTABLE RIFLE RACK

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,mTOV 20 '95 03:45PM AMSMC OAY D P,2* g

*

Keyf

i t

M67 SIGHT UNIT QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM !,

'

.

Generah The U.S. Army is responsible for the design, development and production of jthe M67 sight unit. 'Ihe Program Manager for Mortars Systems acts as the Army lead in '

iall M67 actions. The U.S. Army ARDEC provides technical support directly to the i

Program Manager on the M67; this support includes Quality Assurance support. TheArmy controlls all of the specifications of the M67 thru the Technical Data Package '

ODP). A non-government contractor, Hughes-Leitz,is on contract with ARDEC to |'

produce the M67 sight units to be in compliance with the TDP. As such, the Quality '

Assurance Program for the M67 is a combination of government and contractor -activities. Details of the program,in accordance with Regulatory Guide 6.9 follow.

;

1. Organization:Army Contractor i

iM67 Product Manager

'!I l '

M67 QA Director M67EngineeringProject Officer. !

i I || M67 QA Manager }|-

Aanx:

M67 Product Manager: The Product Manager acts as the Chief Executive Officer for all | |

actions involving the M67. This position contro11s all funding and scheduling. Any '

issues which cannot be resolved at the working level are raised to this position.i

M67 Engineering Project Officer: The Engineering Project Officer is in charge of allgovernment day-to-day engineering activities. Those include production schedules,testing, design changes, failure analyses, etc.. Any and all technical activities arecontrolled by this position. '

,

M67 Quality Assurance Director: The QA Director is responsible for the overalldirection of the QA program. This position <aversees the activities of the QA manager,reviews periodic QA audits and insures t overall effectiveness of the QA program.

,

.

M67 Quality Assurance Manager: The QA Manager is in charge of all government day- i

to-day quality assurance activities. These include review and acceptance of allcontractor QA reports, evaluation of all contractor waiver / deviation requests,review / acceptance of ieyv s of independent contractor enspection ivyvi s, etc..

Contractor General details of the ce. tractor organization are detailed in the 'Ifughes- !Leitz Quality Assurance Manual" r.nd specific M67 QA activities are detailed in thei

'

tm -20-1995 14:46 95% P.02

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'NOV 20 '95 03:46F?1 AMSMC QAT D P. 3 I-.

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contractor's " Quality Program Plan - M67 Mount and Telescope". Both of thesedocuments are attached.

t

i

2. Personnel:fI

&my: All army F..snnel supporting the M67 program must comply with normalCivil Service personnel regulations. As such, they must meet minimum requirements tobe accepted into the technical positions and all record must be maintained by the Army.None of the Army personnel perform any industrial activities and thus no spacinhd

.

training /cornneahns asre required. ,

-

IContractor: Contractor information is provided in the attached contractor documents; i

"Hughes Imitz Quality Assurance Manual" and " Quality Program Plan - M67 MountIand Telescope". i

|

3. Equipment: | |1

! !

kmy: Not applicable, the Army does not perform any industrial operatica.. | I'

:Contractor: Contractor information is provided in the attached contractor documents; '

"Hughes-Leitz Quality Assurance Manual" and " Quality Program Plan - M67 Mountand Telescope".

.

4. Design and Document Contml: I:

I&my: The Technical Data Package (TDP) provides detailed specifications anddrawings which fully define the M67 sight unit. Any and all changes to the TDP mustbe submitted to the Army through the Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) process and '

receive Army approval prior to implementation. The contractor cannot make anychanges without prior appmval from the Army. The M67 Pmduct Manager chairs theConfiguration Control Board (CCB) and has final decision authority on all design

;

ichanges. 'Ihe Product Manager,in coordination with the Army Radiation Safety |community, will make the determination as to whether or not any change has the I !

potential to impact radiation safety. If the Product Manager determines that the change |will impact radiation safety the NRC Registration Office will be notified and requested |to evaluate the change prior to incorporation of the change into production. The Army |Configuration Management Piva is detailed in MIL-STD-973.

I

Contractor: Contractor information is provided in the attached contractor documents;"Hughes-LeitzQuality AssuranceManual"and "QualityProgramPlan-M67 Mount

3

I

and Telescope".

I

5. Material and Service Procurement: '

;

Anny: Not applicable, the Army does not pericie any industrial operations. |.

I

tOJ-20-1995 14:46 94% P. 03

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t _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ . _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-.j

,{~ ^ ~

NOV 21 '95 04:34PM W EMC OAP D P.2 '

,

Contractor: Contractor information is provided in the attached contractor documents;"Hughes-Isitz Quality Assurance Manual" and " Quality Program Plan -M67 Mountand Telescope".

6. Inventory:

Annx: When Army takes possession from the contractor, items of supply containingradioactive material are inventoried, and maintened in secure storage areas inaccordance with Army regulations.

Contractor: Contractor information is provided in the attached contractor documents; |"Hughes-Leitz Quality Assurance Manual" and " Quality Program Plan - M67 Mountand Telescope".

7. Production Procedures and Processes:1

Army: Not applicable, the Army does not perform any industrial operations.

Contractor: Contractor information is provided in the attached contractor documents;"Hughes-Leitz Quality Assurance Manual" and " Quality Program Plan - M67 Mount '

and Telescope".

8. Inspection and Testing: i

i !

Army: The M67 is covered by the military specification Mil M-71027 titled SightUnit M67: 9356182. The two major sub-assemblies are covered by Mil-M-71028for the Mount, Telescope: 9356166 and M11-M-71029 for the Telescope, Elbow:9356181. These specifications, along with the Quality Assurance Provisions(QAPs), derme the inspection and test requirements and are included in theTDP. All sources require an incoming inspection, all potted lamp assembliesrequire subassembly QA testing, the final product must undergo Lot AcceptanceTesting for quality and the final product must pass a quality audit by anindependent testing laboratory. At all times the Army is informed of the resultsof the testing and retains final decision authority as to acceptance of the ;

hardware. The inspection and test requirements for production are summarizedbelow;

a. Tritium lamo. The lamp manufacturer must certify that the lamps areregistered with the NRC and that ANSI-N540 testing has been conducted. QualityAssurance Provisions (QAPs) within the contract require the Sight Unit manufacturerto perform an inconing inspection of the lamps to include brightness / decay,temperature test (-800F - =1600F) and a soak test,

b. Potted lamp assemblies. Quality Assurance Provisions (QAFs) within thecontract require that each potted lamp assembly be tested to insure that there is no

.

HOV-21-1995 14:33 93. P.02

, . . . . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - . . . _ . _ . _ _ _ , . _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ - _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ . __

NOV 20 '95 03:47PM AMSMC OAT p P. 5 .~

.

i

evidence of physical failure of the tritium lamps due to exposing the potted lampassembly to 800F and +1600F for a period of 8 hours at each temperature. After testingto these levels the potted lamp assembly will be analysed for contamination by

,

piirfu.udng a swipe and for brightness by p.Jw.uing a luminocity check. This testing i

is done on a lot-by-lot basis. For lots of 125 or less 100% of the potted lamp assemblieswill be tested; for lots of greater than 125, the inspection will be done on 125 pottedlamp assemblies perlot,

c. Full-up Sight Unitt. The contract calls for Lot Accmy' nee Testing (LAT) for the-

Sight Units. LAT is defined by MIL-M 71028A for the mount and MIL T-71029A for theElbow Telescope. LAT is required for each lot produced. Sample size for LAT is 3samples for each 50 units produced or each months production run, whichever is less,

iThe actual test mquirements are defined in the above mentioned Military Specifications -

and am summarized below.,

Vibration: For both the mount and the telescope vibrate at a constant frequency of30 cycles per second with an amplitude of 1/16 inch (1/8 inch total excursion) for aperiod of 5 min.

:

Shock: Ii

The telescope shall be shocked 6 times in each of 2 positions; objective tube inthe horizontal plane and objective tube in the vertical plane. The shock shall be 300 g'sfor 1 millisecond and have a sine wave pulse.

i

I

The mount shall be shocked 6 times in each of 3 positions. With the mounting'

dovetail in the horizontal plane it shall be shocked 6 times at 300 g's for 1 mminamndand have a sine wave pulse. With the mounting dovetail in the vertical plane with itsaxis at 450 and 2250 he shock shall be 200 g's for 1 millisecond and have a sine wavetpulse.

'

l

Temperature: The mount and telescope shall show no evidence of physical failuresuch as separation, glas vial breakage, cr casting failure after haveing been exposed andthermally stabalized at -500F and +1600F. i )

Tritium diffusion: The telescope shall be subjected to 24 hour submersion. There i

must be less than 50 nanocuries per day radioactive content in the water. This testing isdone after both the shock and vibration testing. .

Tritium contamination: For both the mount and the th e swipe testing isydone to insure surface contamination is below 1,000 dpm/100 sq. em.. This test is doneafter both the shock, vibration and temperature testing.

;

d. O=H v Audit. The contract requires that a random sample of 8t '

mounts and 8 elbow telescopes from each production lot be submitted by thecontractor to an independent testing laboratory for contamination testing. The '

tOJ-20-1995 14:47 94% P. &3

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TOV 20 '95 03:48PM AMSMC QAT D P.6 ',-

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independent testing laboratory performs both the testing and analysis of the :

samples. ;

9. Nonconforming Materiah '

|

Army: Not applicable, the Army does not perform any industrial operations. |

Contractor: Contractor information is provided in the attached contractor documents;"Hughes Leitz Quality Assurance Manual" and " Quality Program Plan - M67 Mountand Telescope',.

|!

10. Packaging and Transpo tation:

Gengral: & M67is shipped from the manufacturer to an Army Depot. & Depot willship to and receive from individual field units.

1

Army: The TDP provides packaging drawings which define a specific packaging'

method which includes marking and labeling. All shipments from the Depot to field j,

units comply with this standard packaging. Field units are instructed to ship the M67in iits original shipping container when shipping back to the Depot. Generic informationconcerning radiation shipments is provided to the field. All field units have DutyOfficers assigned as Radiation Protection Officers responsible to insure that all radiationsafety requirements am complied with. Depot are only allowed to ship to field unitsassigned 120mm Mortar Systems. These units have received sperh1M training inhandling the M67 sight unit and are provided full Operator's manuals and i

Maintenance manuals for the M67 sight unit. '

!

Contractor: Contractor information is provided in the attached contractor documents; .

"Hughes-Leitz Quality Assurance Manual" and " Quality Program Plan - M67 Mount iand Telescope''.

|

11. Deviations and Customer Coraplaints: -

i

Army: Prior to acceptance of the M67 from the contractor the Army has detailed jprocedures for the evaluation / acceptance of any M67 sight unit which deviates fromthe TDP. This is accomplished thru the contract waiver / deviation piucse and ensuresthat items are not accepted with any radiation safety concerns. Once the M67 is in the i

field there are several mechanisms available to address customer complaints h .

Army has a program whereby the customer subtrdts an Equipment Improvement, ,

Report (Elly if they perceive any problem with the equipment. Wre is also a! !

Malfunction Investigation Pmgram wherby a central investigation team is sent toinvestigate individual field malfuntions. Lastly, once the M67 is fielded it will beincluded in the Army Radioactive Surveillance Test Program. & purpose of this

IlI

IIOlp-20-1995 14:48 94% P.06

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|J

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'' '= e ,,

i

! program is to test a small quantity of each radioactive fielded item annually todetermine the item's condition. Checks are made of both depot and field stock which

'

incledes swipe testing of the item to determine contamination. If any field problems areidentified the Army will act to correct the problem. '

i

Contractor: Contractor information is provided in the attached contractor documents;'

,

"Hughes-Leitz Quality Assurance Manual" and " Quality Program Plan - M67 Mount,

andT& :epe".-

!

12. Audits:1.

Army: Government audits are conducted periodically by the local DLA quality:

assurance representative.

Contractor: Contractor information is provided in the attached contractor documents;"Hughes-Leitz Quality Assurance Manual" and " Quality Program Plan - M67 Mountand Telescope".

13. Records and Documentation:

Army: All documentation obtained thru the QA Program is maintained in acconiance '

with the Modern Army Records Keeping System (MARKS)..

Contractor: Contractor information is provided in the attached contractor documents;''Hughes-Imitz Quality Assurance Manual" and " Quality Program Plan - M67 Mount '

and Telescope".

.

Prepared by: James E. Elliott I t. Ab/VReviewed by:M67QA Ma er w#

'

Approved by: M67 QA Director h= s-V fI u 48> f fA-

OY

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tO)-20-1995 14:48 94% P.07