state sovereignty and political legitimacy

The Pacific Review, Vol. 17 No. 3 2004: 423-450 D Routledgeg ^ Taylor 6. Francis GroL

State sovereignty, political legitimacyand regional institutionalism in theAsia-Pacific

Shaun Narine

Abstract Regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific have been of limited efficacy.Asian members of organizations such as ASEAN and APEC have insisted thatthese institutions not infringe upon their sovereign rights. The basic norms, rules,structures and practices supporting these organizations have, to varying degrees,reflected this concern. A number of factors contribute to explaining this regionalreluctance to create effective multilateral institutions. This paper argues that thesingle most important factor is the concern of most East Asian states with do-mestic political legitimacy. Drawing on the work of Muthiah Alagappa and Mo-hammed Ayoob, the paper demonstrates that a significant majority of the statesof East Asia see themselves as actively engaged in the process of creating coher-ent nations out of the disparate ethnic, religious and political groups within thestate. As a result, these states are reluctant to compromise their sovereignty toany outside actors. Indeed, the regional attitude towards multilateral institutionsis that they should assist in the state-building process by enhancing the sovereigntyof their members. As an exceptional case, Japan has encouraged regional institu-tionalism, but it has also been sensitive to the weaknesses of its neighbours, andhas found non-institutional ways to promote its regional interests. The incentivesto create effective regional structures increased after the Asian economic crisis,but Asian attempts to reform existing institutions or create new ones have beenundermined by the issues connected to sovereignty. East Asian states recognizethat they can best manage globalization and protect their sovereignty by creating

Shaun Narine is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at St Thomas University, NewBrunswick, Canada. Dr Narine has written extensively on issues of Asia-Pacific regional insti-tutionalism and has published articles in numerous books and journals, including Asian Survey,Pacific Affairs, The Pacific Review and Giobai Governance, His most recent article, in AsianPerspective, discusses the problems of financial institutionalism in the Asia-Pacific. Dr Narineis also the author of Explaining ASEAN: Regionaiism in Southeast Asia,

Address; Department of Political Science, St Thomas University, 51 Dineen Drive, Fredericton,NB, Canada, E3B 5G3. E-mail: [email protected]

The Pacific ReviewISSN 0951-2748 print/ISSN 1470-1332 online © 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd

http://www.tandf.co.uk/journalsDOI: 10.1080/0551274042000261524

424 The Pacific Review

and cooperating within effective regional institutions. However, their ability to createsuch structures is compromised by their collective uncertainty about their domesticpolitical legitimacy. In the emerging international environment, being a legitimatesovereign state may be a necessary prerequisite to participating in successful regionalorganizations.

Keywords ASEAN; APEC; Asia-Pacific regional institutions; sovereignty; legiti-macy; institutional reform; Asian economic crisis.

Introduction

In the post-Cold War period, the Asia-Pacific region experienced economicand political uncertainty and upheaval. In response, Asia-Pacific states calledfor new institutional structures to manage regional confiict and economic re-lations. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) respondedto these calls by strengthening its institutional structures and expanding itsmembership (Acharya 1995; Leifer 1996; Chalmers 1997; Narine 1997).̂Asian states promoted the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)forum to facilitate the economic integration of the region (Hellman andPyle 1997; Maclntyre 1997). However, in the aftermath of the Asian eco-nomic crisis of 1997-99, these institutions are faltering. Moreover, while thecrisis has given rise to new institutions, the states of the Asia-Pacific cannotagree on what form regional organizations should take and how effectivethey should be (Bessho 1999).

This paper argues that uncertainty about domestic political legitimacy inmost Asia-Pacific states is the key variable explaining their reluctance to cre-ate strong regional institutions. This concern with legitimacy underpins theregion's determination to defend the traditional Westphalian principles ofstate sovereignty. Asian states, almost uniformly, reject the idea that regionalinstitutions require a 'pooling' of state sovereignty. Instead, they believe thatregional institutions should enhance - not challenge - the sovereignty of theirmember states (Higgott 1997: 177). This focus on sovereignty is a manifes-tation of a deeper concern: Asia-Pacific states are involved in the processof state-building, i.e. creating national identities out of disparate ethnic, re-ligious and linguistic communities. So long as states remain engaged in thisprocess, they are unwilling - and perhaps unable - to create strong regionalinstitutional structures.

Many analysts argue that new transnational forces are undermining thetraditional role of the state and conventional notions of sovereignty (Moonand Chun 2003; Beeson 2003). In a volatile global environment, Asia-Pacificstates may best advance their interests by participating in regional institu-tions wherein they can pool their political and economic resources. However,the fact that there may be a compelling argument to create more authori-tative regional institutions does not create the capacity to do so. How ef-fectively and collectively Asia-Pacific states can react to global forces may

S. Narine: Sovereignty, legitimacy and institutionalism 425

depend on their coherence as states. Globalization may be creating pressureson Asia-Pacific states to which they are incapable of responding.

The paper's argument is developed into ten sections. The next sectionreviews some of the causes of institutional weakness in the Asia-Pacific.Section three sets the theoretical basis for the paper by combining the workof Muthiah Alagappa and Mohammed Ayoob to explain the importance oflegitimacy and sovereignty to the states of the Asia-Pacific. Section four con-siders some of the effects of globalization on the reactions of regional states.Section five reviews the status of political legitimacy among the countriesof East Asia, giving special consideration to Japan's approach to regionalinstitutions. Sections six and seven consider ASEAN and APEC and illus-trate the extent to which these institutions have, historically, emphasizedsovereign concerns. The next two sections assess regional efforts at institu-tion building in the aftermath of the Asian economic crisis. Finally, the paperconcludes with a review of the main points.

Explaining institntional weakness in the Asia-Pacific

There is a debate within the literature over the nature of regional institu-tionalism in the Asia-Pacific. Some analysts argue that the Asian focus onconsensus-building, non-confrontational interaction and non-binding insti-tutional structures refiect a distinctly Asian cultural approach to institutions.Accordingly, Asian institutions should be evaluated differently from insti-tutional structures developed in the Western world (Acharya 1997, 2003;Ferguson 2001). This paper argues that Asian institutions are inherentlyweak. The processes they follow are indicative of the different perspec-tives of Asian states, and their inability to agree on common, overrid-ing interests. These processes help to smooth regional relations, but theydo little to redefine state interests, or alter the order of state preferences(Kahler 2000).

Regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific are limited for a variety of rea-sons. There is a weak sense of community within the region and, therefore,little on which to build strong institutions. This weak sense of communityis attributable to a number of factors. The Cold War exacerbated brutalconflicts in East Asia. The United States exercised its regional dominanceby promoting bilateral ties between itself and regional allies, and discour-aging Asian states from forming organizations of their own. This tendencywas reinforced by the American view of Asians as racial inferiors (Hem-mer and Katzenstein 2002). In addition, and as a reflection of history, theless powerful states of the Asia-Pacific have been wary of creating institu-tions that could be dominated by Japan or China. Throughout the 1980s and1990s, intra-Asian trade picked up considerably. Nonetheless, it is unbal-anced in terms of its distribution, and is largely focused around the activi-ties of a few major states, particularly Japan. Moreover, even though intra-Asian trade has grown, Asia's economic interaction with the United States


- and other, outside trading partners - remains critical to its economic well-being, reinforcing external linkages and undermining regional institutionaldevelopment.

The legacy of colonialism is crucial to explaining the shape of regionalinstitutions. Historically, every East Asian country, with the exception ofThailand, was colonized or dominated by foreign powers. Even Japan de-veloped in response to the fear of colonization and was later conquered bythe Allied Powers at the conclusion of the Second World War. Colonialismoriented the colonized countries, politically and economically, toward theirimperial masters rather than each other, a separation that continued for cen-turies (in some cases) until after the Second World War. The experience ofcolonialism created or reinforced within the regional states a strong senseof nationalism and a powerful commitment to the ideals of Westphaliansovereignty (Moon and Chun 2003: 111). Nonetheless, the countries of theregion remained divided - both internally and from each other - by ethnicity,languages, religion and culture. Under these conditions, most Asia-Pacificstates have been preoccupied with creating viable, politically legitimate gov-ernments. This concern is the most important factor in determining how farregional states are prepared to go in creating and encouraging effectiveregional institutions.

If Asian states are reluctant to sacrifice sovereignty to regional institutions,they should be equally wary of larger, global institutions. However, globalinstitutions and regional institutions differ in important respects. In general,the larger state memberships and disparate interests encompassed by globalstructures mean that they are less intrusive and less coherent than smallerregional structures. Global institutions do not have the same historical bag-gage and security issues, noted above, that arise with regional institutions.Moreover, the need for Asian states to participate in the global system oftenmeans that they have little choice but to join the international regimes thatdefine the fundamental rules of the system. While Asia-Pacific states mayhave little control over international regimes, they do have control over theirself-created regimes, and they are unwilling to accord too much power tosuch regimes when they do not have to do so.

Political legitimacy and state sovereignty

The theoretical foundation for the following discussion of Asia-Pacific re-gionalism draws on Muthiah Alagappa's discussion of the quest for politi-cal legitimacy (and, therefore, 'moral authority') among Southeast Asianstates and Mohammed Ayoob's complementary theory of 'subaltern re-alism'. Alagappa's work explores the nature of political legitimacy. Ay-oob's subaltern realism explains how domestic political efforts to build vi-able states in the developing world shape the international relations of theaffected states and reinforce their commitment to the Westphalian conceptof sovereignty (Alagappa 1995a, b; Ayoob 1995,1998,2002).


Alagappa and the quest for legitimacy

The central obstacle to greater regionalism in the Asia-Pacific is the questfor political legitimacy, or the 'right to rule' (Alagappa 1995). According toAlagappa:

Political legitimacy may be defined as 'the belief in the rightfulnessof a state, in its authority to issue commands, so that the commandsare obeyed not simply out of fear or self-interest, but because theyare believed to have moral authority, because subjects beheve theyought to obey.' The legitimation of power relies on the conviction ofthe governed that their government (whether democratic, monarchic,communist, theocratic, or authoritarian) is morally right and they areduty-bound to obey it. In the absence of such conviction there can onlybe relations of power, not of authority, and political legitimacy will becontested.

(Alagappa 1995d: 2)

Alagappa explains 'legitimacy' as consisting of four core elements: sharednorms and values, conformity with established rules for acquiring power,proper and effective use of power, and consent of the governed.

A command-obedience relationship may be defined as legitimate ifthe political order in which it is rooted is based on shared norms andvalues, if the government in concern acquired power in conformity withestablished rules, if that power is exercised within prescribed limitsfor the promotion of the community's collective interest and if thegoverned have given their consent to the incumbent government.

(Alagappa 1995a: 15)

Alagappa posits a hierarchical relationship between these elements, with thenormative component as the most fundamental due to its ability to influenceprocedure, performance and consent (though changes in any of these ele-ments can undermine the legitimacy of the state). Shared norms and valuesneed to be created within a state and accepted by the governed. This involvesa process of either imposing the ideology of the dominant group upon therest of society or implementing a process of 'transformation' whereby theideologies of the subordinate groups are 'disarticulated', their relevant ele-ments then 'rearticulated' into the dominant ideology (Alagappa 1995:17).The successful creation of shared norms also requires the dominant ideol-ogy to incorporate elements of culture and history. 'To the extent that powerholders are successful in fusing all elements into a collective will and ap-pear to represent the general interest, the government and the regime itrepresents will be perceived as legitimate' (Alagappa 1995a: 18). Variousindicators - such as conflict over the dominant ideology, the use of force to


secure compliance and the degree of public support for the government -signify the extent to which norms and values are or are not shared withina society. Successful states enjoy mutually constitutive relations with theirsocieties; they create national identities, centred around the state, out oftheir disparate parts (Migdal 1998; Jackson 2001). Finally, legitimacy existsalong a continuum; a state is not simply legitimate or illegitimate but is moreor less legitimate, and may vary in this quality over time and circumstances(Alagappa 1995a: 25). For the purposes of this discussion, a 'strong' stateis one that enjoys high levels of legitimacy; a 'weak' state is one that doesnot (Buzan 1991). The 'capacity' of the state - i.e. the bureaucratic expertiseand resources necessary to govern effectively and control society - is not afactor.̂

Alagappa notes that ethnic/religious nationalism is often the source ofconflict in the developing world. In East Asia, he argues, these disputesare not quite as common or fractious as in many other developing regions,but they are still significant sources of conflict. Alagappa attributes muchof the conflict over legitimacy in Southeast Asian states to 'the newness ofthese states as modern states and to the lack of shared values for politicalorganization' (Alagappa 1995c: 57). To differing degrees, every SoutheastAsian state is still trying to establish its political legitimacy. As we shall see,this concern is also present in much of Northeast Asia.

Mohammed Ayoob and subaltern realism

Mohammed Ayoob's theory of 'subaltern realism' complements Alagappa'sdiscussion of state legitimacy. Subaltern realism draws on three traditions:the classical realism of Machiavelli, Hobbes and other theorists who wereoriginally concerned with explaining how to create stable domestic politicalstructures; historical sociology, particularly the literature pertaining to stateformation in Europe 'when states were at a similar stage of state makingthat most Third World states find themselves today'; and the normativeinsights of the English School of international relations, especially HedleyBull's analysis of the expansion of international society (Ayoob 2002: 39).̂Ayoob argues that most states in the developing world are preoccupied withinsecurity. In contrast to traditional interpretations of international security,however, the insecurity of the developing world emanates from confiictsthat are internal to the states. Developing world states are trying to createterritorially defined states out of disparate ethnic, religious, hnguistic andother groups. This primary domestic concern is the most fundamental factordefining how these states approach their international relations, and requiresstates to exercise a full range of sovereign powers (Ayoob 1995,1998:31-54;Werner and De Wilde 2001).

Sovereignty is a complex and contested concept (Bartelson 1995:12-52).Jackson defines 'sovereignty' as 'a legal institution that authenticates a poht-ical order based on independent states whose governments are the principal

5. Narine: Sovereignty, legitimacy and institutionalism 429

authorities both domestically and internationally' (Jackson 1999:10). Jack-son emphasizes that the essence of sovereignty in a society of states is thatthe state exercises final and absolute political authority in the political com-munity, with 'authority' understood as the right to rule (ibid.: 11). In recog-nizing this authority, states agree to not intervene in each other's internalaffairs (Krasner 1999:20-1). Jackson distinguishes authority and autonomy.Sovereignty ensures that authority lies in the state, but other factors de-termine the state's autonomy. A state's decision to enter agreements thatlimit its autonomy is not a loss of sovereign power but rather an exercise ofsovereignty. What is important is that the state's right to make such decisionsis accepted both domestically and internationally, and that it is not coercedby outside forces (Krasner 2001: 5-6).

This traditional understanding of sovereignty is logically and legally co-herent, but does not capture the full range of what 'sovereignty' implies tothe developing world. To the states of the Asia-Pacific, authority withoutautonomy is an empty sovereignty (Clapham 1999: 103). This distinctionis best understood by utilizing Krasner's elaboration of the definitions ofsovereignty. According to Krasner:

The term sovereignty has been commonly used in at least four differ-ent ways: domestic sovereignty, referring to the organization of publicauthority within a state and to the level of effective control exercisedby those holding authority; interdependence sovereignty, referring tothe ability of public authorities to control transborder movements; in-ternational legal sovereignty, referring to the mutual recognition ofstates; and Westphalian sovereignty, referring to the exclusion of ex-ternal actors from domestic authority configurations. These four mean-ings of sovereignty are not logically coupled, nor have they covariedin practice.

(Krasner 2001: 6-7)

Krasner underlines that the 'norm of autonomy [is] the core of Westphaliansovereignty' (Krasner 1999: 8). Thus, Westphalian sovereignty is depletedby any loss of state autonomy (ibid.: 20).

To put subaltern realism into Krasner's terms, these aspects of sovereigntyrelate to each other hierarchically. Third World states are most concernedabout establishing domestic sovereignty, which includes control and au-thority within the state. International legal, Westphalian and interdepen-dence sovereignty are most significant in so far as they facilitate domesticsovereignty. No sovereign state is ever fully autonomous; thus, sovereigntyis always qualified by political and economic realities (Krasner 1999: 1-9). Nonetheless, Asia-Pacific states remain committed to the ideal of West-phalian sovereignty, even though this may often be unattainable.

Since the end of the Second World War, most conflict in the world systemhas occurred within states. The few interstate conflicts that have occurred


have usually originated as domestic conflicts within the warring parties. Al-most every war in the post-Second World War era has been fought withinthe developing world. These internal disputes have usually involved contestsover the nature and authority of the state. Different groups have fought forindependence from, or special consideration within, the state. Sometimesdifferences over the organization of the political and economic systems ofthe state have motivated violent confrontation. In all cases, the legitimacyof the state - i.e. the right of the government to rule - has been at issue.

Within the Western world, the processes of state-building occurred overcenturies, involved frequent wars and civil strife, and often entailed the geno-cide and/or subjugation of indigenous peoples. The end result has been strongstates that are politically stable and economically prosperous. Industrializedstates enjoy the support of the great majority of their populations, whichaccept the legitimacy of the governing institutions. Orderly transfers of gov-ernment are a regular feature of popular democracies. The legitimacy of thestate lies in the institutions of the state itself. Industrialized states continueto redefine themselves and their relationships with their citizens as new is-sues emerge. However, their fundamental legitimacy means that these issuescan be addressed and negotiated within the structures of state power (Doty1996:121-47).

In most of the states of the developing world, by contrast, institutionallegitimacy is either contested or fragile. The experience of the industrializedworld indicates that creating legitimate, stable states based upon societalconsensus about shared values and political ideals is a long, difficult pro-cess - one greatly complicated by the interconnectedness of the modernworld. Ayoob's argument implies that the concerns with political legitimacyin Southeast Asia (and extended to the rest of East Asia) identified byAlagappa are the central factors influencing the Asia-Pacific's approach toregional institutionalism and state sovereignty.

We must consider the possibility that Asia-Pacific states may create strongregional institutions in order to assist the state-building process. The creationof the European Community (EC) may be an historical example of this ap-proach. Milward argues that the European Community 'saved' the Europeannation-state (Milward 1992:21-45). During the inter-world war period, manyEuropean nation-states lost their political legitimacy through their inabilityto provide social and economic security to their people. In the post-SecondWorld War period, European states were faced with the same problem. Toreclaim their legitimacy and save themselves, they needed access to greatereconomic and political resources to provide the necessary foundations ofthe welfare state and to help them govern transnational economic forces.European states could only do this by working together within transnationalinstitutional structures. The European Community and its successor, theEuropean Union, are examples of authoritative regional structures, createdby necessity, which strengthened the nation-state, albeit at the cost of someeconomic and political autonomy. If European state-building was furthered


by a powerful regional institution, could the same logic apply within theAsia-Pacific, particularly under the pressure of globalization?

There are many substantive differences between the European and Asianexamples. Western Europe existed as a coherent economic entity long be-fore the creation of the EC; the US encouraged European integration, andprovided the security and stability under which Western Europe could re-solve its differences (Dinan 1994: 9-68). For the purposes of this paper, themost significant distinction is that many Asian states are in the first stages ofbuilding national identities, in contrast to the European states, most of whichwere trying to rebuild political/national identities that had been estabhshedthen undermined by social/economic upheaval and war. Europe was at amuch more advanced stage of the state-building process when it establishedthe EC.

The influence of globalization

A final issue to consider is how the states of the Asia-Pacific have reactedto the influence of globalization, an international phenomenon character-ized by the spread of Western economic and political values and structures.Globahzation has the potential to complicate the logic of subaltern realismby presenting new forces and possibilities that must be managed during thestate-building process. To some extent, Asia-Pacific states have had to altertheir expectations of sovereignty in response to the forces of globalization.However, these responses have been shaped by the demands of domesticstate-building.

The ASEAN countries have not rejected economic globalization and itsassociated institutions. In fact, until recently, most of the ASEAN countriesenthusiastically embraced economic globalization precisely because of theirbelief that this process can, in fact, further their sovereign capabilities. AsAcharya argues.

Globalisation has been used not just to augment the power and positionof states in the international system, as may be expected from a con-ventional international relations perspective, but more importantly, toensure regime security and legitimacy. And it is the latter which hasbeen a more fundamental concern in shaping attitudes and responsestowards globalisation.

(Acharya 2000:1-2)

Globalization allowed the ASEAN states access to economic resourcesthat enabled them to develop their economies and improve national stan-dards of living. These states were wilhng to compromise autonomy in someareas - such as the economy - if they could gain overall political legiti-macy, but they also sought to limit their exposure to international forceswhen they perceived those forces as threats to regime control. Whether or


not they can continue to manage globahzation in this way remains to beseen.

Aihwa Ong argues that economic globalization has directly affected thesovereignty of selected Southeast Asian states by forcing them to make com-promises in how they exercise their sovereignty. This process is embodied in'graduated sovereignty':

There are two aspects to graduated sovereignty: (a) the differentialstate treatment of segments of the population in relation to marketcalculations, thus intensifying the fragmentation of citizenship alreadypre-formed by social distinctions of race, ethnicity, gender, class andregion; (b) the state-transnational network whereby some aspects ofstate power and authority are taken up by foreign corporations locatedin special economic zones.

(Ong 2000: 57)

Ong studies Malaysia and Indonesia as examples of states employing 'grad-uated sovereignty'. International market forces and the need to remain in-ternationally competitive mean that these states favour the economic andpolitical development of certain segments of their populations over, and atthe expense of, other segments. Citizens of the same country are subjectedto different 'gradations of governing', with those groups already at the bot-tom of the pre-existing racial/ethnic/gender hierarchy subject to military andpolitical oppression while the state-selected elites are provided with everyadvantage (Ong 2000: 62). In Malaysia, ethnic Malays are promoted by thestate at the expense of the Chinese and Indian populations. Islam is utilizedas a binding nationalist ideology for the Malays. Women and immigrants aremaintained as a source of cheap labour. The state is assimilating indigenouspopulations which, while ethnically Malay, are pursuing traditional hfestylesat odds with government goals. In Indonesia, under Suharto, the militaryused its power to 'discipline' the cheap labour (mostly young women) work-ing in special industrial zones. State corporatism extended special economicand political treatment to selected elites. At the same time, the state pro-moted the colonization of the Indonesian archipelago by ethnic Javaneseand introduced policies to assimilate other ethnic groups and economicallyexploit tribal lands.

The second aspect of 'graduated sovereignty' refers to 'the rise of produc-tion and technological zones which have required certain legal compromisesin national sovereignty' (Ong 2000:66). 'Economic triangles' are productionzones designed to attract foreign business and investment. They cut acrossseveral states. Malaysia and Indonesia (in collaboration with Singapore)have negotiated regulatory authority with the corporations operating inthese zones, and ensure labour peace by restraining worker activism.

Ong argues that graduated sovereignty is a compromise of Westphaliansovereignty necessitated by globalization. However, as noted above, a state'sdecision to compromise its Westphalian sovereignty can strengthen the state

S, Narine: Sovereignty, legitimacy and institutionalism 433

in other important areas. Moreover, state sovereignty/autonomy is neverabsolute and always involves some compromise of sovereignty. Graduatedsovereignty describes a strategy particular to the era of globahzation de-signed to take advantage of international economic opportunities to increasestate resources and, ultimately, political legitimacy. Taken as a whole, grad-uated sovereignty is a state-building strategy. The use of state power toadvantage certain classes and ethnic/racial groups: the forced assimilationof indigenous people and the colonization/economic exploitation of theirlands; the construction of national ideologies - these policies are mirroredin the history of state-building in the Western world. Many of these strategiesmay exacerbate existing tensions. Nonetheless, the overall goal of the gov-ernments in Malaysia and Indonesia is to create coherent national identitiesand domestic political sovereignty, the primary concerns of state-building.Globalization alters the strategies that these states must employ in achiev-ing this larger goal, and it may affect their ability to achieve the goal, but itdoes not alter the goal itself.

The global context in which the developing world is now trying to de-velop is far different than the international environment that defined theera of state-building for the successful modern industrialized states. Tradi-tional strategies of political violence are less acceptable today than in thepast. However, new strategies of state- and nation-building which involve theaccommodation (as opposed to suppression) of disparate elements within astate may create states that are radically decentralized and weak in termsof governmental control of the instruments of power. These states may nothave the capacity to manage the forces of globalization. If so, the interna-tional community itself must be prepared to create and maintain rules andstructures that make allowance for these political realities. However, there islittle evidence that the international community can develop the ideologicalconsensus and multilateral institutions necessary to accommodate the de-veloping world in this way (Narine 2002c: 269-71). Moreover, Asia-Pacificstates remain strongly committed to the ideal of the strong state; they are notinterested in alternative political forms despite, perhaps, the need for suchalternatives (Oksenberg 2001: 87). Thus, the states of the Asia-Pacific - inkeeping with the expectations of subaltern realism - confront globalizationby trying to use global forces to further the state-building process.

Ultimately, globalization may require Asia-Pacific states to modify theirstate-building strategies. Eventually, this may include trying to build strongregional structures and pooling sovereignty to achieve regional goals. How-ever, the fact that this may be the best strategy in dealing with global forcesdoes not make it automatically attainable. The European experience mayindicate that states first need to possess, at the least, coherent national iden-tities before they can loosen their hold on sovereignty and create powerfulregional institutions. If this is the case, then the global forces pushing Asia-Pacific states towards regionalism are also preventing them from attainingthe qualities necessary to create strong regional structures.


An overview: political legitimacy and the states of the Asia-Pacific

A quick survey of states in Southeast Asia illustrates the fragility ofmost countries' state structures (Ling 2001: 288-317). To differing degrees,the governments of ASEAN countries are accorded a performance-basedlegitimacy from their citizens. The citizens' support of the government restsupon the state's ability to implement policies that create economic pros-perity. When economic prosperity is compromised, citizens become muchless supportive of the state. Ethnic, religious and political tensions that mayhave been dormant during economic good times bubble back to the politicalsurface in bad times.

The government of Singapore is in full control of the state and the mech-anisms of power. The state is heavily involved in economic regulation andthe provision of housing and basic welfare. It enjoys a high level of supportand acceptance among the general population. Despite these advantages,the government discourages and intimidates political opposition. Singaporeis open to economic globaUzation, but carefully manages globalization's po-litical and social effects. It justifies its actions by emphasizing threats toSingapore from its Malay neighbours (Leifer 2000a; Dent 2001). Issues ofethnicity are of deep concern within Singapore. As part of its effort to main-tain and justify its control, the Singaporean state has tried to construct anethnic identity based around Confucian values. This identity is, in many ways,entirely artificial, with relatively little resonance even in Singapore's Chinesepopulation (Lawson 1998:114-34). What emerges is a picture of a state thathas remarkable capacity, yet is still unsure of its own internal legitimacy(Khong 1995; Hamilton-Hart 2000; Mutalib 2000; Narine 2002c).

Similar stories about the complex relationship between state and societyare common in Southeast Asia. Malaysia enjoys a political stability that isbased upon ethnic coalition politics. The authority of the Malaysian stateis closely tied to the ethnic Malay majority's support of the ruling party.Politically disadvantaged minorities may accept the state, but they do not,as yet, see it as fully 'legitimate' (Case 1995; Collins 1998; Nathan 1998;Weiss 1999). In the Philippines, the state struggles with entrenched classdifferences and separatist actions in different parts of the country (Moradaand Colher 1998; McKenna 2002). Myanmar is torn by ethnic warfare andpolitical unrest, and the state actively oppresses its people in order to retaincontrol (Tin 1998; Rajah 2002).

Indonesia is, perhaps, the most important example of the weak state inSoutheast Asia. Indonesia's institutional weakness affects the prospects ofregional organizational development in the Asia-Pacific. Indonesia's size(216 million people) means that its political dissolution could affect theentire region. For decades, the Suharto regime and the Indonesian Armyenforced a tentative stability in Indonesia, reinforced by the relative eco-nomic prosperity of the 1980s and 1990s. The economic crisis of 1997-99brought about radical change in Indonesia. Today, the country is engaged in a


confusing experiment with genuine representative democracy, and must facerevitalized separatist movements and volatile ethnic and religious tensions(Brown 2002; Wee 2002). It is too early to tell whether or not Indonesia willbe able to hold together. However, the fact that the state is challenged by somany internal divisions is indicative of its inherent weakness (Crouch 1998;Leifer 2000b; Anwar 2001; MacDonald and Lemco 2001).

Other ASEAN states face slightly different issues. Thailand is a countrywhere the idea of the nation is part of the pubhc consciousness. The state isbolstered by the unifying symbol of the monarchy and is relatively ethnicallyhomogeneous. However, the legitimacy of the government in power hasbeen an issue of contention in the past, and may be again. Thailand is stillevolving a societal consensus on the nature of the state and its relationshipto society (Satip 1995). Similar dynamics may be at work in countries hkeVietnam and Cambodia, where the legitimacy of the state is not seriouslychallenged by competing ethnic demands, but the people's support of theruhng government is questionable (Ninh 1998).

The states of Northeast Asia face somewhat different issues than mostSoutheast Asian states. South Korea is not divided by ethnicity, and hasemerged as a vibrant democracy. At the same time, it is divided by issuesof class, economics and pohtical power. For much of its post-Second WorldWar history, the South Korean state was at odds with its civil society, and therelationship between the two remains uncertain even today (Moon 1998).Taiwan's governing institutions appear to enjoy high levels of popular legiti-macy. However, there are significant tensions within Taiwan between 'main-land Chinese' and the indigenous Taiwanese nationahsts, and these tensionsmay challenge Taiwan's institutional stability. Taiwan's constant struggle forinternational recognition, and its antagonistic relationship with China, meanthat it has a complex response to regional institutions. Taiwan wishes to par-ticipate in these structures in order to enhance its legitimacy, but its securityconcerns dictate that it limit its vulnerability to outside pressures (Cliff 1998).

China is a country contending with a wide variety of problems. The state isconcerned about the possibihty of Muslim insurgency in the West and is alsopreoccupied with assimilating Tibet. The country is overwhelmingly HanChinese, but this does not prevent many people from questioning the legiti-macy of the government. China's overall economic development has broughtmassive social disruption and corruption and undermined the legitimacy ofthe ruling Communist party. It has also provided provincial governmentswith the incentives and resources to defy Beijing's central control. China'sinternal structural weaknesses, combined with its history of invasion and hu-miliation by the West (and Japan), create a powerful incentive to hold ontoits sovereignty. Traditionally, China has also been suspicious of multilateralinstitutions, fearing that they might be used to 'gang up' on China (Segal1994,1999; F.-L. Wang 1999; J. Wang 1999; Harrison 2001). In recent years,China has grown skilled at using multilateral structures to further its policyobjectives, but its basic concerns with multilateralism remain the same.


Japan merits special consideration. It is the one Asian state that appearsto be strong, in every sense of the term."* The state's institutions enjoy thesupport of the vast majority of its citizens. Japan comes close to ethnic ho-mogeneity. Japan's situation is odd, however, in that it appears to be likeother Asian states in rejecting strong regional institutional structures. Thisbehaviour seems to contradict the logic of this paper's argument. A signif-icant example of Japan's assertion of its sovereignty is its decision to rejectEarly Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization (EVSL) in APEC, a decision madeto protect politically sensitive Japanese economic sectors from internationalcompetition. The decision effectively derailed APEC and forced negotia-tions over regional trade liberalization into the World Trade Organization(WTO) (Ravenhill 2000). Japan's decision to block EVSL was applaudedby other Asian states that were concerned about APEC becoming an overlyintrusive regime.

Japan's approach to regional institutionahsm refiects its own unique posi-tion and concerns. Katzenstein suggests that Japan may not promote formalregional institutions because much of its infiuence in the Asia-Pacific is de-rived from informal business relationships, or 'network power' (Katzenstein1997: 1-44). Japan does not need binding institutional structures when itis able to achieve its foreign policy/economic goals through less concretemechanisms. Kato carries the argument a step further by exphcitly arguingthat Japan has resisted Asian regionalism because its industrial networksactually depend upon global economic interdependence (Kato 2000: 35-87). However, Japan's relationship to regional institutionalism is complexand sometimes contradictory. Throughout the post-Second World War era,Japan often attempted to create regional structures. However, it found thatother Asian states remained deeply distrustful of its leadership aspirations,given their historical experience of Japanese imperiahsm and Japan's unwill-ingness to deal with its regional history. Japan was also constrained by theinfiuence of the US. At the same time, however, Japan was highly instru-mental in creating most of the governmental or semi-governmental regionalstructures that did develop, such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB)and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC). Krauss arguesthat APEC, an organization often characterized as an Austrahan initiative,actually originated with Japan. Once again, however, Japan was aware ofhow other states would interpret its initiatives, so it prompted Australia tointroduce and promote the concept (Krauss 2000). Finally, Japan's regionalinitiatives have explicitly accounted for the political fragility of its regionalneighbours (Doner 1997:199). Part of the reason that Japan has not pursuedstrong institutions is because it recognizes the hmitations and vulnerabilitiesof the weak states surrounding it.

This analysis suggests that the situation of overall regional weakness has af-fected Japan's efforts to create regional structures. Also important, however,are the effects of Japan's historical relationship with its neighbours, its se-curity and economic relationships with the United States, and the reahty of


Japanese economic dominance in the Asia-Pacific. These factors are com-pounded by the lack of a sense of regional identity

The example of ASEAN: putting sovereignty first

Much of the contemporary discussion of ASEAN focuses on the extentto which ASEAN has successfully created a regional identity in SoutheastAsia (Acharya 2001). The evidence that ASEAN is the foundation of astrong regional identity is unconvincing (Nischalke 2000). ASEAN's limitedabihty to create such an identity is an expression of an inherent tensionbetween state sovereignty and regionahsm. ASEAN's members designedit to maintain and promote Westphalian notions of sovereignty. There arenumerous examples of ASEAN's members acting in ways that underminethe unity and principles of the organization, but there are also examplesof ASEAN, the institution, accepting the compromise of its stated goals inorder to accommodate the sovereign concerns of its members.

From its inception, ASEAN was a non-aggression pact between its mem-bers and represented a political united front against communist insurgency.Creating space for its members to construct themselves as states was animportant part of its initial mission (Narine 2002b: 9-38). ASEAN pro-moted a vision of regional order that emphasized the importance of na-tional sovereignty, non-intervention in members' internal affairs, and af-firmed Southeast Asia's right to be free of the intervention of the great pow-ers. At the same time, however, most member states perceived ASEAN'sdeclaratory positions as potential impediments to their actual pursuit of se-curity and sovereignty. The realization of the sovereign ideal, symbolized byASEAN, was often not the most effective way to protect sovereignty.

ASEAN's institutional initiatives and practices were adapted to fit - or,at least, not conflict - with its members' self-interests. For example, theASEAN Declaration of 1967 states that the removal of foreign militarybases from Southeast Asia is a long-term goal for ASEAN. However, mostof the ASEAN states depended upon security guarantees from outside pow-ers (i.e. Britain and the US) to protect their sovereignty. They required thatthe Declaration be ambiguous and not specify a time period in which toachieve this goal. Similarly, ASEAN's Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutral-ity (ZOPFAN), emerged as the result of political compromise. ZOPFAN wasintroduced by Malaysia, which wanted Southeast Asia to be 'neutralized' bythe agreement of the great powers. The other ASEAN states rejected theMalaysian proposal, again because most of them relied on their externalallies for security. Indonesia, which defined China as the major threat to theregion, refused to endorse a plan that would legitimize a Chinese role in re-gional affairs. The ZOPFAN that emerged from ASEAN's deliberations wasa long-term goal. It imposed no real limitations upon its members (Hanggi1991; Narine 2002b: 19-22). The ASEAN way is a corporate decision-makingprocess which encourages consultation and consensus building. Members are


not pressured to take decisions that might be in conflict with their nationalinterests. Finally, ASEAN has kept the ASEAN Secretariat, which managesthe group's activities, understaffed and overworked, ASEAN's major initia-tives are conceptualized within ASEAN secretariats based within the foreignministries of each member state. The control of the ASEAN decision-makingprocess is kept within the individual states.

In the post-Cold War period, ASEAN has added four new members(Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Burma) and increased the scope of its ac-tivities by creating the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEANFree Trade Area (AFTA), These efforts were, in part, designed to maintainand enhance ASEAN's effectiveness as a voice for Southeast Asia, Part ofASEAN's appeal to its new members, however, was the promise that theorganization could improve their international standing while guaranteeingthat, as a matter of principle, it would not interfere in their internal affairs.

These promises were challenged by the Asian economic crisis. The crisismade it clear that ASEAN's ability to deal with regional economic upheaval -which was already very hmited - was contingent on its capacity to address thedomestic policies of its members, ASEAN's refusal to reconsider the prin-ciple of non-intervention, however, effectively paralysed the organization(Sharma 1998; Wesley 1999), This issue is addressed in more detail below.

Regional institutional development in the post-Cold Warperiod: APEC

There are three pillars of APEC: trade liberalization, trade facihtation andeconomic/technical cooperation. The 'Western' members of APEC - theUnited States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand - have focused uponAPEC's trade liberalization agenda as the primary interest of the organi-zation. To these countries, APEC is mostly about lowering trade barriersacross the Asia-Pacific region (Aggarwal and Morrison 1998).

Most of the Asian states of APEC view trade facilitation and eco-nomic/technical cooperation as being the more important aspects of theorganization. Most Asian countries have strongly opposed the idea thatAPEC become a legally binding, strongly structured institution, ASEAN,specifically, did not want its own institutional pre-eminence challenged byanother regional body. In addition, Asian states do not want APEC to forman exclusive trade bloc; they want to maintain their access to the largerworld. The Asian countries do not want APEC to become an instrumentof American economic and political pressure. The Asian states considerAPEC to be an exercise in community building. They are quite happy tohave the organization remain a 'talk-shop' for the foreseeable future. EvenJapan, as evidenced by the earlier discussion of its response to the EVSLinitiative, does not want APEC to become too powerful. By contrast, theWestern states will only consider APEC to be a 'success' if it results in tradehberalization agreements.


These basic disagreements about APEC's purpose and function have un-dermined the organization's effectiveness. APEC has referred some of itsown programmes and initiatives to the World Trade Organization (WTO)because of the WTO's greater ability to promote regional trade. This abdi-cation of responsibility is directly attributable to APEC's reliance on volun-tary compliance with unilaterally defined commitments and its inability toaddress issues of domestic political economy, restrictions designed to protectstate sovereignty (Ravenhill 1999).

One of APEC's major limitations is its lack of a driving force to providea coherent vision for the organization. This limitation has been promotedby the Asian members. In 1995, Asian members were at the forefront of thedecision to dissolve the APEC Eminent Persons' Group, which had been in-strumental in promoting the trade liberalization agenda. The Asian countrieshave also been instrumental in keeping the APEC Secretariat weak and lim-ited in what it can do. APEC members wanted to avoid a large bureaucracy,but the greatest concern of Asian governments was that 'an [APEC] inter-national secretariat not impinge on their sovereignty' (Ravenhill 2000:326).

The Asia-Pacific in an era of globalization:the effects of the economic crisis

In 1997, the Asian economic crisis brutally acquainted the states of the Asia-Pacific with their vulnerability in the global economy. The economic crisisshook the region to its very foundations, and took more than two years toresolve. Its effects are still being felt (Jomo 1998). The crisis revealed signifi-cant weaknesses in the Asian economies, but it also demonstrated that EastAsia was susceptible to international investor panic, and that the regionalstates were inextricably interconnected. This situation also demonstratedthat existing Asian institutions were incapable of dealing with regional eco-nomic upheaval (Wesley 1999; Harris 2000; Webber 2001; Narine 2002a).If regional organizations wanted to be effective instruments in the future,they would need to be more structured and binding; this would require thattheir member states 'pool sovereignty'. Despite the logic of this argument,Asian institutions have not become markedly more capable of dealing withregional issues. APEC has taken some small steps towards addressing re-gional financial issues, as evidenced by the Manila Framework (discussedbelow) but has otherwise been almost invisible, at least on the economicfront. ASEAN's efforts at reform have been more substantial but remainunproven.

During the crisis, prominent ASEAN statesmen proposed that ASEANreform its methods to allow for greater organizational intervention withinmember states. ASEAN's inability to act effectively during the crisis signif-icantly undermined its credibility. Its failure to address Indonesian actionsin East Timor and the situation with regional 'haze' caused by Indonesianforestry practices contributed to the decline in ASEAN's international


reputation. Combined, these situations should have convinced ASEAN'smembers of the need for serious reform. However, only Thailand andthe Philippines advocated substantive reform. ASEAN's other membersstrongly opposed any attempt to change the organization's established prac-tices. They argued that ASEAN's durability was directly attributable to itsrefusal to force its members to make unpleasant concessions and choices(Haacke 1999).

Subsequent events seemed to prove these 'realists' correct. In a compro-mise to appease Thailand's advocacy of reform, ASEAN agreed to allow'enhanced interaction' between its member states. This policy permitted in-dividual ASEAN members to criticize - outside of ASEAN's structure -other members engaged in activities that directly affected the well-being ofother ASEAN states. Enhanced interaction was tested almost immediatelyby Malaysia's handling of the Anwar Ibrahim situation. Anwar, Malaysia'sformer deputy prime minister, was arrested and jailed on charges of sexualmisconduct and corruption. While in prison, he was physically assaulted.Indonesia and the Philippines criticized Malaysia, expressing support forAnwar and outrage at his treatment. The Malaysian government respondedby questioning the legitimacy of the Indonesian government of the dayand indicating that it might consider supporting Muslim insurgency withinthe Philippines. This reaction harkened back to the tensions of the pre-ASEAN era, underlined the fragility of regional relations, and emphasizedthe continuing importance of the non-intervention principle (Haacke 1999;Ramcharan 2000).

ASEAN's dealings with Myanmar have caused some observers to claimthat ASEAN has begun to reconsider its principle of non-intervention.ASEAN admitted Myanmar in 1997, despite Myanmar's reputation as abrutally oppressive state. ASEAN argued that it could 'constructively en-gage' Myanmar and exert a positive infiuence towards reform. Despitethese claims, ASEAN's international reputation has suffered as a resultof Myanmar's membership. Moreover, 'constructive engagement' seems tohave had little effect. On 30 May 2002, the military government of Myanmardetained political opposition leader (and Nobel Peace Prize winner) AungSan Suu Kyi, after an attack on her supporters that may have killed dozensof people (Bangkok Post, 3 July 2002). Ms Suu Kyi's detention, and theviolent circumstances of her capture, elicited condemnation from the inter-national community, and resulted in Japan (Myanmar's chief aid donor) sus-pending further aid. Under international pressure, ASEAN issued a 'land-mark rebuke' to Myanmar, calling for the 'early lifting of restrictions placedon... Aung San Suu Kyi' (Globe and Mail online, 17 June 2003). MalaysianForeign Minister Syed Hamid Albar claimed that ASEAN was now dealingwith issues long considered taboo, and that 'ASEAN has reached a stageof maturity' (ibid.). Such declarations are probably premature, however.It remains to be seen how far ASEAN can afford to go in pushingMyanmar. Advocating serious intervention into a member state's affairs is


a Pandora's Box that ASEAN cannot risk opening (Beng, Asia Times, 26June 2003).

At its best, ASEAN helps its members promote the state-building pro-cess. As noted above, global forces challenge states' state-building objec-tives. Regional states would likely be willing to sacrifice some sovereigntyin order to create more effective regional institutions, if by doing so theybetter protected their remaining sovereignty from the infiuence of disrup-tive global forces and furthered their state-building strategies. There remainobstacles to this approach. First, the ability to enter binding agreements andsuccessfully implement them usually requires that a state have considerablecapacity, i.e. the bureaucratic expertise and resources necessary to governeffectively. Institutions cannot be successful if member states lack the abilityto implement agreements. Many Southeast Asian states actually have fairlylimited capacity; this is one of the reasons that they were fast to embraceeconomic liberalization, which calls for reduced state involvement in theeconomy.̂ Second, an institution's potential is a crucial variable in shapingits development. In the case of ASEAN, no amount of reform could makeit capable of withstanding the kind of economic crisis that East Asia facedin 1997. ASEAN's members lack the economic resources necessary to bea credible buffer against future crises. Thus, to the ASEAN states, reform-ing the institution to make it more binding, yet still unable to protect themfrom economic disruption, would not be an acceptable trade-off for theirsovereignty.

The limitations of ASEAN, however, do not prevent Asia-Pacific statesfrom attempting to create other institutions that would be more effectivein facing future crises, as exemplified by the debate over creating an 'AsianMonetary Fund' and the present effort to structure the 'ASEAN Plus Three'(APT).

New institutional structures in the Asia-Pacific

At the height of the economic crisis, Japan proposed the creation of an AsianMonetary Fund (AMF) (Narine 2001, 2003). This initiative was stronglyopposed by the United States and the IMF; China and South Korea also,initially, opposed a proposal that would enhance Japanese infiuence in theregion. The states of Southeast Asia generally supported the idea, believ-ing that an AMF would disburse loans without violating the sovereigntyof its Asian members, or would at least be sensitive to the political andeconomic circumstances of its client states. The overall opposition to theinitiative was too great, however, and Japan allowed it to fail. Nonethe-less, the AMF idea continues to resurface in the aftermath of the crisis.China and South Korea now support the idea, and the newly-formed APT(which consists of the ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Ko-rea) may be an embryonic AMF. Nonetheless, there remain huge obstaclesto instituting such a regional organization, most of them focused around


strategic uncertainty and unresolved tensions between the major Asianplayers.

Initially, the Manila Framework addressed the failure of the AMF idea.APEC initiated the Manila Framework at its 1997 meeting. The ManilaFramework allows for a cooperative financial mechanism to supplement In-ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) disbursements; enhanced economic andtechnical cooperation, particularly to strengthen domestic financial systemsand regulatory capacities; and a regional financial surveillance mechanism.The framework remains extremely limited, however, lacking any formalstructure or guaranteed funding (Chang and Rajan 2001:105).

The APT first met in 1996 as a coordinating meeting between Asian foreignministers in preparation for the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) (Stubbs2002: 442). The economic crisis of 1997, combined with the failure of theIMF and other regional institutions in managing the crisis, provided the APTwith the opportunity and impetus for development (Narine 2003). Stubbsargues that 'the APT now has the potential to become the dominant regionalinstitution in East Asia' (Stubbs 2002: 441). Measures undertaken by theAPT, specifically the 'Chiang Mai Initiative' (CMI), have been the mostsubstantial undertaken by any multilateral organization to deal with futureAsian economic crises.

The CMI was a multilateral agreement worked out between the financeministers of the APT, at their meeting in Chiang Mai, Thailand, on 6 May2000. It has been described as

... the first and significant step in official financial cooperation forthe whole region, better enabling the region to cope with potentiallydisruptive currency fiuctuations and international capital movements,so that the countries within the region can protect themselves fromvolatile and unpredictable capital movements.

(Chaipravat 2001: 991)

The ASEAN countries subsequently agreed to expand the size of the ex-isting ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA), designed to transfer foreign re-serves between ASEAN states, from US$200 million to US$1 billion. Bilat-eral currency swap agreements between Japan and three neighbours (SouthKorea, Malaysia and Thailand) amounting to US$6 billion were signed in2001. These steps may, ultimately, lead to a regional financial arrangement(RFA). Beyond upgrading the ASA, the plan calls for the creation of Two-Way Bilateral Swap Arrangements (TBSA) whereby China, Japan and SouthKorea can offer each other financial support in time of need, followed bya series of swap agreements between the other APT states. Over time, theAPT states, with the aid of a better-institutionalized APT economic mon-itoring and surveillance unit, will make decisions on requests for fundingfrom member states. Chaipravat's hope is that within the foreseeable future,'regional financial cooperation and institutionalization will have grown to


a point where a common currency area will become a viable and realisticoption for East Asia' (ibid.: 993). The finance ministers and central bankgovernors will have the final say on 'the modalities, sizes, mecha-nisms, operating procedures, rules and regulations of East Asia's RFA(ibid.).

However, these assessments fail to account for the real and serious polit-ical difficulties that complicate the development of the APT/RFA. Most ofthese difficulties originate in the region itself. Unresolved tensions and rival-ries between China and Japan complicate the question of political leadershipin the APT and block the development of an effective regional financial in-stitution, at least for the foreseeable future (Narine 2003). Another concernis whether or not conditionality should be attached to APT/RFA loans. Thisconcern touches directly on issues of sovereignty.

Even an APT/RFA sensitive to the political and economic realities of itsmember states would need to attach some conditionality to its loans. Oth-erwise, the RFA would face the prospect of wasting considerable resourceson states that might be following unsound economic policies and practices.The same considerations would apply to any swap agreements that may nowexist between Asian states. The prospect of an APT setting conditions onits members is controversial in Asia precisely because it would be a majorviolation of state sovereignty, however 'sensitive' those conditions might be.The difficulty that an Asian institution would have in forcing conditionalityis precisely the reason that Lee Kuan Yew, the former prime minister ofSingapore, argued that the IMF would need to continue its activities in Asiabecause it was an outside actor and could force Asian states to make changesthat no other Asian actor could demand (Narine 2002b: 185). The politicalvolatility of one Asian state, or set of states, setting conditions on others isan issue that loops back into the question of leadership: if the AMF wasdominated by any of the regional powers, it would risk being regarded as animperial extension of the dominant regional actors by the region's weakerstates. This is an especially sensitive issue, given the historical legacy of Japanand modern concerns with a rising China.

A new regional structure that is wrestling with issues of sovereignty andstate weakness is the ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP). The ASP is meantto oversee the economies of ASEAN and provide early warning of any prac-tices or indicators that might contribute to future economic disruption. TheASP remains in a very preliminary stage. Even so, its initial efforts to mon-itor the ASEAN economies have run into the refusal of many ASEANstates to share information with the ASP. These states are afraid that sen-sitive industrial and other information will end up in the hands of competi-tors in other ASEAN countries. The states also lack the capacity to forcecompanies that may not want to share information to do so. The ASP hasrun into both the limitations of state capacity and the concerns of ASEANstates with national competitive advantage (Ariff 2001; Furtado and Storey2001).


Conclusion

This paper argues that most Asia-Pacific states are preoccupied with buildingstate legitimacy and domestic institutions. They are committed to traditionalWestphalian sovereignty as the organizing principle of the international sys-tem and understand regional institutions as sovereignty-enhancing mecha-nisms. As a consequence, Asia-Pacific regional institutions are comparativelyweak structures of limited effectiveness. This paper is not arguing that statelegitimacy is the only variable of consequence in explaining the difficultiesthat the Asia-Pacific has had in creating strong regional institutions. Even iflegitimacy were not an issue for most states, the other obstacles to greaterregional institutionalism - strategic and historical suspicions, the role of theUnited States, the lack of regional community feeling - would still persist.However, it would be far easier for Asia-Pacific states to cooperate - espe-cially under the infiuence of external threats and globalization - if so many ofthem were not preoccupied with the state-building process. Even if there area few regional states that are not overly concerned with state-building andpolitical legitimacy, they are too few to make a regional institution viable.Given these facts, the kind of loose, consensus-oriented regional institutionsthat evolved in the Asia-Pacific were well-suited to their environments. How-ever, these institutions are proving inadequate in a globalized world.

The states of the Asia-Pacific are in a difficult situation. The logic of glob-alization and the recent experience of the economic crisis imply that statesmust work together within larger institutional structures if they wish to pro-tect their sovereignty. However, cooperating successfully may first requirea level of sovereign control and unifying national identity that many statesare still trying to create. In the emerging international environment, be-ing a strong, legitimate, sovereign state may be a necessary prerequisite tobuilding the foundation of a successful regional organization (Mattli 2000).States must first have a firm grip on the levers of sovereignty before theycan loosen their hold. New international forces may be forcing states toaccept new responsibilities. However, if states lack the capacity and the in-ternal unity necessary to manage these new responsibilities, then they areleft in a more difficult situation than before. Globalization could promotethe collapse of domestic structures. This being said, the best prospect forinstitutional development in the Asia-Pacific is still that states believe thatregional institutions can assist the state-building process.

Notes

1 ASEAN encompasses all the states of its self-defined 'Southeast Asia'. Theseare: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines,Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

2 This understanding of the relationship between 'state capacity' and strong vsweak states draws on Buzan's distinction between strong states and strong powers.Buzan emphasizes political legitimacy as a defining quality of strong states; strong


powers may possess the capacity to oppress and control society without enjoyingpopular legitimacy. Migdal equates strong states with the state's ability to controlsociety, though he also argues that a state's strength ultimately lies in its ability toshape the norms and rules of society (Migdal 1998: 26).

3 For a critical evaluation of subaltern realism, see Barnett (2002: 49-62).4 Interestingly, Peter Drucker notes that Japanese do not see their society as being as

strong as outsiders do. The Japanese remember their experience with CommodorePerry's incursion in 1853. That experience led to the Meiji Restoration. Theyalso remember being conquered after the Second World War. To them, Japanesesociety is fragile, and requires the protection and support of the state (Drucker1998).

5 However, weak capacity has no necessary connection to legitimacy. Migdal notesthe durability of states with very little capacity (Migdal 1998). Singapore standsout as a state with considerable capacity but uncertain legitimacy.

References

Acharya, Amitav (1995) 'ASEAN and Asia Pacific multilateralism: managing re-gional security', in Amitav Acharya and Richard Stubbs (eds) New Chal-lenges for ASEAN: Emerging Policy Issues, Vancouver: University of BritishColumbia Press, pp. 182-202.

(1997) 'Ideas, identity, and institution-building: from the "ASEAN way" to the"Asia-Pacitic way"?'. The Pacific Review 10(3): 319-46.

(2000) "Globalisation, sovereignty and the state in Asia', paper presented tothe 41st ISA Convention, 14-18 March, Los Angeles, California.(2001) Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, London:Routledge.

(2003) 'Regional institutions and Asian security order', in Muthiah Alagappa(ed.) Asian Security Order, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 210-40.

Aggarwal, Vinod and Morrison, Charles (eds) (1998) Asia Pacific Crossroads: RegimeCreation and the Future of APEC, New York: St Martin's Press.

Anwar, Dewi Fortuna (2001) 'Insurgencies and communal conflicts: governance andsecurity in Indonesia's plural societies', in Andrew T. H. Tan and KennethBoutin (eds) Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia, Singapore:Select Publishing, pp. 349-76.

Alagappa, Muthiah (1995a) 'The anatomy of legitimacy', in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.)Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,pp. 11-30.

(1995b) 'The bases of legitimacy', in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.) Political Legit-imacy in Southeast Asia, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 31-53.(1995c) 'Contestation and crisis', in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.) Political Legit-imacy in Southeast Asia, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 54-65.

(1995d) 'Introduction', in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.) Political Legitimacy in South-east Asia, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 1-8.

(2003) 'Constructing security order in Asia: conceptions and issues', in MuthiahAlagappa (ed.) Asian Security Order, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,pp. 70-105.

Ariff, Mohammed (2001) 'Trade, investment, and interdependence', in Simon S. C.Tay, Jesus P. Estanislao and Hadi Soesastro (eds) Reinventing ASEAN,Singapore: ISEAS, pp. 45-66.


Ayoob, Mohammed (1995) The Third World Security Predicament, Boulder, CO:Lynne Rienner.

(1998) 'Subaltern realism: international relations theory meets the Third World',in Stephanie G. Neuman (ed.) International Relations Theory and the ThirdWorld, Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 31-54.

(2002) 'Inequality and theorizing in international relations: the case for subal-tern realism'. International Studies Review 4(3): 27-48.

Barnett, Michael (2002) 'Radical chic? Subaltern realism: a rejoinder'. InternationalStudies Review 4(3): 49-62.

Bartelson, Jens (1995) A Genealogy of Sovereignty, Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-sity Press.

Beeson, Mark (1993) 'Sovereignty under siege: globalization and the state in South-east Asia, Third World Quarterly 24(2): 357-74.

Bessho, Koro (1999) Identities and Security in East Asia, Adelphi Paper No. 325,London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, March.

Biersteker, Thomas J. and Weber, Cynthia (1996) 'The social construction ofstate sovereignty', in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds) StateSovereignty as Social Construct, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,pp. 1-21.

Brown, David (2002) 'Why might constructed nationalist and ethnic ideologies comeinto confrontation with each other?'. The Pacific Review 15(4): 555-70.

Buzan, Barry (1991) People, States and Fear, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.Case, William (1995) 'Malaysia: aspects and audiences of legitimacy', in Muthiah

Alagappa (ed.) Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia, Stanford, CA: StanfordUniversity Press, pp. 69-107.

Chaipravat, Olarn (2001) 'Towards a Regional Financing Arrangement in East Asia',The World Economy 24(8): 989-994.

Chalmers, Malcolm (1997) 'ASEAN and confidence building: continuity and changeafter the Cold War', Contemporary Security Policy 18(1): 36-56.

Chang, Li Lin and Rajan, Ramkishen S. (2001) 'The economics and politics of mon-etary regionalism in Asia', ASEAN Economic Bulletin 18(1): 103-18.

Clapham, Christopher (1999) 'Sovereignty and the Third World state', in RobertJackson (ed.) Sovereignty at the Millennium, Maiden, MA: Blackwell,pp. 100-15.

Cliff, Roger (1998) 'Taiwan: in the dragon's shadow', in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.)Asian Security Practice, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 288-314.

Collins, Alan (1998) 'The ethnic security dilemma: evidence from Malaysia', Con-temporary Southeast Asia 20(3): 261-78.

Crouch, Harold (1998) 'Indonesia's "strong" state', in Peter Dauvergne (ed.) Weakand Strong States in Asia Pacific Societies, Canberra: Allen & LJnwin, pp. 93-113.

Dent, Christopher M. (2001) 'Singapore's foreign economic policy: the pursuit ofeconomic security'. Contemporary Southeast Asia 23(1): 1-23.

Dinan, Desmond (1994) Ever Closer Union?, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.Doner, Richard F. (1997) 'Japan in East Asia: institutions and regional leadership',

in Peter Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi (eds) Network Power, Ithaca, NY:Cornell University Press, pp. 197-233.

Doty, Roxanne Lynn (1996) 'Sovereignty and the nation: constructing the bound-aries of national identity', in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds)State Sovereignty as Social Construct, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,pp. 121^7.

Drucker, Peter F. (1998) 'In defense of Japanese bureaucracy'. Foreign Affairs 77(5):68-80.

5. Narine: Sovereignty, legitimacy and institutionalism AAl

Ferguson, James (2001) 'New forms of Southeast Asian regional governance: from"codes of conduct" to "Greater East Asia', in Andrew Tan and Kenneth Boutin(eds) Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia, Singapore: Select Pub-lishing, pp. 122-65.

Furtado, Xavier and Storey, Jim (2001) 'Peering into darkness: evaluating theprospects for an economic and financial monitoring and surveillance mech-anism in the Asia Pacific region', unpublished paper.

Haacke, Jurgen (1999) 'The concept of flexible engagement and the practice of en-hanced interaction: intramural challenges to the "ASEAN way"', The PacificReview 12(4): 581-611.

Hamilton-Hart, Natasha (2000) 'The Singapore state revisited'. The Pacific Review13(2): 195-216.

Hanggi, Heiner (1991) ASEAN and the ZOPFAN Concept, Singapore: Institute ofSoutheast Asian Studies.

Harris, Stuart (2000) 'Asian multilateral institutions and their response to the Asianeconomic crisis: the regional and global implications'. The Pacific Review 13(3):495-516.

Harrison, Henrietta (2001) Inventing the Nation: China, London: Arnold Press.Hellman, Donald and Pyle, Kenneth B. (eds) (1997) From APEC to Xanadu,

Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.Hemmer, Christopher and Katzenstein, Peter J. (2002) 'Why is there no NATO

in Asia? Collective identity, regionalism and the origins of multilateralism'.International Organization 56(3): 575-607.

Higgott, Richard (1997) 'De facto and de jure regionalism: the double discourse ofregionalism in the Asia Pacific', Global Society 11(2): 165-83.

Jackson, Richard (2001) 'The state and internal conflict', Australian Journal of Inter-national Affairs 55(1): 65-81.

Jackson, Robert (1999) 'Sovereignty in world politics: a glance at the conceptual andhistorical landscape', in Robert Jackson (ed.) Sovereignty at the Millennium,Maiden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 9-34.

Jomo, K. S. (ed.) (1998) Tigers in Trouble: Financial Governance, Liberalisation andCrises in East Asia, London: Zed Books.

Kahler, Miles (2000) 'Legalization as strategy: the Asia-Pacific case'. InternationalOrganization 54(3): 549-71.

Kato, Kazo (2000) 'Open regionalism and Japan's systemic vulnerability', in PeterKatzenstein (ed.) Asian Regionalism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell East Asia Series,pp. 35-87.

Katzenstein, Peter (1997) 'Introduction: Asian regionalism in comparative perspec-tive', in Peter Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi (eds) Network Power, Ithaca,NY: Cornell University Press, pp. \-AA.

Khong, Cho-Oon (1995) 'Singapore: political legitimacy through managing con-formity', in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.) Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia,Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 108-35.

Krasner, Stephen D. (1999) Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press.(2001) 'Problematic sovereignty', in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.) ProblematicSovereignty, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 1-23.

Krauss, Ellis S. (2000) 'Japan, the US, and the emergence of multilateralism in Asia',The Pacific Review 13(3): 473-94.

Lawson, Stephanie (1998) 'Confucius in Singapore: culture, politics, and the PAPstate', in Peter Dauvergne (ed.) Weak and Strong States in Asia Pacific Societies,Canberra: Allen & Unwin, pp. 114-34.

Leifer, Michael (1996) The ASEAN Regional Forum, Adelphi Paper No. 302, London:International Institute for Strategic Studies, July


(2000a) Singapore's Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability, London:Routledge.

(2000b) 'The changing temper of Indonesian nationalism', in Michael Leifer(ed.) Asian Nationalism, London, Routledge, pp. 153-69.

Ling, Ooi Giok (2001) 'Governance in plural societies and security: management ofinter-ethnic relations in Southeast Asia', in Andrew T. H. Tan and KennethBoutin (eds) Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia, Singapore:Select Publishing, pp. 288-317.

MacDonald, Scott B. and Lemco, Jonathan (2001) 'Indonesia: living dangerously'.Current History 100(645): 176-82.

Maclntyre, Andrew (1997) 'South-East Asia and the political economy of APEC,in Garry Rodan, Kevin Hewison and Richard Robison (eds) The Politi-cal Economy of Southeast Asia, London: Oxford University Press, pp. 225-47.

Mattli, Walter (2000) 'Sovereignty bargains in regional integration', InternationatStudies Review 2(2): 149-80.

McKenna, Tom (2002) 'Saints, scholars and the idealized past in Philippine Muslimseparatism'. The Pacific Review 15(4): 539-53.

Migdal, Joel (1988) Strong Societies and Weak States, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-versity Press.

(1998) 'Why do so many states stay intact?', in Peter Dauvergne (ed.) Weak andStrong States in Asia-Pacific Societies, Canberra: Allen & Unwin, pp. 11-37.

Milward, Alan S. (1992) The European Rescue of the Nation-State, Berkeley, CA:University of California Press.

Moon, Chung-In (1998) 'South Korea: recasting security paradigms', in MuthiahAlagappa (ed.) Asian Security Practice, Stanford, CA: Stanford UniversityPress, pp. 264-87.

and Chaesung Chun (2003) 'Sovereignty: dominance of the Westphalian con-cept and implications for regional security', in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.) AsianSecurity Order, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 106-37.

Morada, Noel M. and Collier, Christopher (1998) 'The Philippines: state versussociety?', in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.) Asian Security Practice, Stanford, CA:Stanford University Press, pp. 549-78.

Mutalib, Hussin (2000) 'Illiberal democracy and the future of opposition inSingapore', Third World Quarterly 21(2): 313^2.

Narine, Shaun (1997) 'ASEAN and the ARF: the limits of the "ASEAN way"', AsianSurvey 37(10): 961-78.

(1998) 'ASEAN and the management of regional security'. Pacific Affairs 71(2):195-214.

(2001) 'ASEAN and the idea of an "Asian Monetary Fund": institutional uncer-tainty in the Asia Pacific', in Andrew Tan and Kenneth Boutin (eds) Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia, Singapore: Select Publishing,pp. 227-56.

(2002a) 'ASEAN in the aftermath: the consequences of the East Asian economiccrisis'. Global Governance 8:179-94.(2002b) Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia, Boulder, CO:Lynne Rienner.(2002c) 'The state in Southeast Asia: state sovereignty and communities ofidentity and state sovereignty in a globalizing world', in Helen Lansdowne,Philip Dearden and William Neilson (eds) Communities in Southeast Asia:Challenges and Response, Victoria: Centre for Asia Pacific Initiatives, pp. 253-71.

(2003) 'The idea of an "Asian Monetary Fund": the problems of financial insti-tutionalism in the Asia Pacific', Asian Perspective 27(2): 65-103.


Nathan, K. S. (1998) 'Malaysia: reinventing the nation', in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.)Asian Security Practice, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 513-48.

Ninh, Kim (1998) 'Vietnam: struggle and cooperation', in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.)Asian Security Practice, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 445-76.

Nischalke, Tobias Ingo (2000) 'Insights from ASEAN's foreign policy co-operation:the "ASEAN way", a real spirit or a phantom?'. Contemporary Southeast Asia22(1): 89-112.

Oksenberg, Michel (2001) 'The issue of sovereignty in the Asian historical context',in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.) Problematic Sovereignty, New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, pp. 84-104.

Ong, Aihwa (2000) 'Graduated sovereignty in South-East Asia', Theory, Culture andSociety 17: 55-75.

Putzel, James (2000) 'Social capital and the imagined community: democracy andnationalism in the Philippines', in Michael Leifer (ed.) Asian Nationalism,London: Routledge, pp. 170-86.

Rajah, Anand (2002) 'A "nation of intent" in Burma: Karen ethno-nationalism,nationalism and narrations of nation'. The Pacific Review 15(4): 517-37.

Ramcharan, Robin (2000) 'ASEAN and non-interference: a principle maintained'.Contemporary Southeast Asia 22(1): 60-88.

Rapkin, David P. (2001) 'The United States, Japan and the power to block: the APECand AMF cases'. The Pacific Review 14(3): 373^10.

Ravenhill, John (1999) 'APEC and the WTO: which way forward for trade liberal-ization?'. Contemporary Southeast Asia 21(2): 220-37.(2000) 'APEC adrift: implications for economic regionalism in Asia and thePacific', The Pacific Review 13(2): 319-33.

Satip Sukatipan (1995) 'Thailand: the evolution of legitimacy', in Muthiah Alagappa(ed.) Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia, Stanford, CA: Stanford UniversityPress, pp. 193-223.

Segal, Gerald (1994) China Changes Shape: Regionalism and Foreign Policy, AdelphiPaper No. 287, London: Institute of International and Strategic Studies, March.(1999) 'Does China Matter?', Foreign Affairs (September-October): 24-36.

Sharma, Shalendra D. (1998) 'Asia's economic crisis and the IMF', Survival 40(2):27-52.

Singh, Bhubinder (2002) 'ASEAN's perceptions of Japan: change and continuity',Asian Survey 42(2): 276-96.

Stubbs, Richard (2002) 'ASEAN Plus Three: emerging East Asian regionalism?',Asian Survey 42(3): 440-55.

Tin Maung-Maung Than (1998) 'Myanmar: preoccupation with regime survival, na-tional unity and stability', in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.) Asian Security Practice,Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 390-416.

Wang, Fei-Ling (1999) 'Self-image and strategic intentions: national confidence andpoUtical insecurity', in Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang (eds) In the Eyes oftheDragon, Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 21-46.

Wang, Jianwei (1999) 'Managing conflict: Chinese perspectives on multilateral diplo-macy and collective security', in Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang (eds) In theEyes ofthe Dragon, Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 73-96.

Webber, Douglas (2001) 'Two funerals and a wedding? The ups and downs of region-alism in East Asia and Asia-Pacific after the Asian crisis'. The Pacific Review14(3): 339-72.

Wee, Vivienne (2002) 'Ethno-nationalism in process: ethnicity, atavism and indi-genism in Riau, Indonesia', The Pacific Review 15(4): 497-516.


Weiss, Meredith (1999) 'What will become of reformasi? Ethnicity and changingpolitical norms in Malaysia', Contemporary Southeast Asia 21(3): 424-50.

Werner, Wouter G. and De Wilde, Japp H. (2001) 'The endurance of sovereignty',European Journal of International Relations 7(3): 283-313.

Wesley, Michael (1999) "ITie Asian crisis and the adequacy of regional institutions'.Contemporary Southeast Asia 21(1): 54-73.

state sovereignty and political legitimacy

Documents