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Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture in Shaping Future Relations Author(s): MARTIN STUART-FOX Source: Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 26, No. 1 (April 2004), pp. 116-139Published by: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25798674Accessed: 16-06-2015 01:25 UTC

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Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 1 (2004): 116-139 ISSN 0219-797X

Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture in

Shaping Future Relations

MARTIN STUART-FOX

Despite the position of the United States as de facto global hegemon, China is a rising power in the world. As Chinese

power grows, the projection of Chinese influence will be felt most acutely in Southeast Asia. Whether to accommodate, contain or resist China will depend on future developments that none can foresee, including Chinese ambitions, the policies of other international players (the U.S., Japan), and the cohesion or fragility of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). This paper argues that in deciding how best to deal with China, two factors that will influence the countries of Southeast Asia are their own long histories of bilateral relations with China and their own differing conceptions of how foreign relations should be conducted. This is to argue that history and culture are central to any understanding of the likely future shape of China-Southeast Asia relations. Only by taking history and culture into account will analysts be in a position to predict how the mainland and maritime states of Southeast Asia are likely to respond to a more powerful, confident and assertive China.

Introduction: China's Regional Ambitions

China has strategic interests and goals that it is determined to pursue, even in the face of U.S. opposition.1 These are summed up in the two

phrases that recur again and again in discussions with Chinese officials: to overcome the "century of humiliation" that China suffered at the hands of the West and Japan from the First Opium War to the

116



Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture 117

proclamation of the People's Republic (PRC) in 1949; and in the process to regain China's "rightful place in the world".2 But what is that "rightful place"? Chinese leaders are not so unrealistic as to hope to recreate a new sinocentric world order with China as global hegemon in place of the United States. They do, however, want China to be recognized as one of a small and select group of great powers responsible for shaping the international world order.3

For China to regain its "rightful place", it must remain united (one lesson of Chinese history is that the Middle Kingdom was weak when divided) and avoid any loss of territory (in Tibet, Xinjiang or elsewhere). It is determined, therefore, to regain Taiwan. A primary goal for China is to remain economically and militarily strong. But to be a world

power, China must exercise influence beyond its frontiers, and that means particularly in the ring of neighbouring states that China has historically sought to dominate (at least to the extent that these states take primary account of China's security and strategic interests). In the view of China's leaders, only America stands in the way of these

strategic goals. It does this in two ways: by preventing the return of Taiwan to China (the last galling reminder of the century of humiliation); and by limiting the influence of China internationally, particularly through its military presence in East and Southeast Asia.

Southeast Asia is important for China for several reasons. Perhaps the most strategically significant is that Southeast Asia, especially the

mainland as opposed to the maritime states, provides potentially the most fruitful and receptive region for the projection of Chinese influence. For as long as Korea remains divided and the U.S.-Japan alliance is in

place, the American military presence is too strong in Northeast Asia.4 In Central Asia, Xinjiang offers a weak base for the projection of Chinese

power, for there China is in competition with Russia, political Islam and a growing American presence. Despite China's long friendship with Pakistan, South Asia will always be dominated by India. So this leaves Southeast Asia, a region where historically, Chinese influence has been considerable, and to which many Chinese have migrated over

the centuries. Moreover, it is an economically vibrant region in close communication with China's coastal provinces, the powerhouse of China's own rapid economic development. It is obviously tempting for

Beijing, therefore, to attempt to draw Southeast Asia into a recognizably Chinese sphere of influence.5

China consistently denies any ambition to act as a "regional hegemon"; but such denials ring somewhat hollow in the light of

history. Any historical atlas of East Asia graphically shows the extent to which Chinese territory has expanded over the centuries. Claims by Chinese officials and historians that China has been expansionist only



118 Martin Stuart-Fox

when ruled by non-Chinese dynasties (Mongols, Manchus), in contradistinction to the peaceable Han, are ingenuous at best. Tang and Ming armies marched into Central Asia and Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese in particular have been on the receiving end of a succession

of Chinese invasions. Han Chinese have never shown much

compunction about ruling non-Han Chinese peoples, which they justified by a conception of China's mission civilisatrice that long pre dates any European equivalent.6 To this day, China remains an "empire state", with a policy towards subject peoples that is, despite its proclaimed minorities policy, essentially assimilationist, as it always has been historically. This tough-minded realist characterization of

China today needs to be tempered, however, by reference to another side of its relations with neighbouring peoples and powers, and that is the genuinely moral dimension that historically has infused China's view of the world and its relations with other polities. To this I shall return below.

Just how the rising power of a more nationalistic and confident China will be accommodated by the countries of Southeast Asia will

depend, of course, on how the great powers respond, especially the United States and Japan. It will also depend on whether the countries of Southeast Asia are able to present a common front in dealing with

Beijing. ASEAN now groups ten members. For thirty years after ASEAN was first formed in 1967 (by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), Indonesia was its centre of political gravity and de facto leader; but the combination of economic crisis and the

collapse of the Soeharto regime has seriously undermined Indonesia's

leadership in ASEAN. ASEAN-5 solidarity was forged through support for Thailand as the frontline state opposing Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia after 1979. ASEAN-10 would be less likely to agree on a common response to a threat from China directed against, say, Vietnam, in the event that dialogue and diplomacy broke down.

The success of ASEAN has been to bring Beijing to deal with Southeast Asia on a multilateral basis. But although ASEAN has been

remarkably successful in its diplomacy and has gone some way towards

developing a regional security community, it still lacks the internal cohesion required to resist China. Like that other great power, the United States, China prefers to pursue its regional ambitions through bilateral means, and Beijing continues to be assiduous in developing bilateral relations with Southeast Asian states.7 The question is, therefore: how are the states of Southeast Asia, severally and together, likely to

respond to Chinese ambitions to become more influential in the region, even in the face of American opposition? The answer must take account




of how both sides perceive the world and how best to ensure their respective strategic and security interests.

My contention is that the relationship between China and Southeast Asia will inevitably be deeply influenced by both history and culture, difficult though these are to factor into international relations theory. Only thus will it be possible to predict the likely responses of the nations of Southeast Asia confronted by the growing might of China.

Extending Theory If the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington taught us anything, it is surely that people see the world in very different ways. What is less obvious, except in the case of irrational

tyrants, is that states do too. Insofar as the strategic goals of states

embody the aspirations of political leaders and elites, they also embody their different views of the world. The compromises and agreements that are regularly worked out between states tend to obscure these

differences, however, for it is an easy assumption to make that the other side sees the world in a similarly "rational" and "realistic" way. This is

particularly the case where there are great disparities of power, for there is little incentive for the powerful to make much effort to understand the weak. Moreover, the practice of international relations tends to take little account of cultural differences, which are notoriously difficult to pin down as causes of misunderstanding and conflict between states. Yet agreements in international relations are often little more

than temporary accommodations to be honoured only until relations of

power change. This is because in many cases they fail to reflect a

genuine meeting of minds, due not so much to unstated reservations on one or both sides (the Machiavellian explanation), but to an inability to understand how situations or events could be differently construed.

States sometimes act in irrational ways; "irrational", that is, in terms of the rational decision-making and game theory models beloved

by the realists in assessing likely outcomes. This could be due to the

pursuit of purely selfish or corrupt interests by a powerful elite (for example, the purchase of expensive defence equipment by an

impoverished state, either for a ruling elite to remain in power, or

obtain monetary reward); or be driven by ideology (as when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, thereby committing Germany to a war on two fronts). But there are other cases the explanation of which require

more searching investigation into the influence of culture and history (as, for example, the decisions leading up to the outbreak of the Third Indochina War between Vietnam and Cambodia and China and Vietnam,




where Cambodian paranoia with regard to Vietnam and a history of

poisonous relations between the communist parties of both countries led the Khmer Rouge regime to provoke and attack its much larger and stronger neighbour).8 Too often such cases are dismissed as exceptional, rather than recognized as paradigmatic.

Theoretical attempts to understand relations between states have become far more sophisticated than unreconstructed realism, however. Neorealists now compete with neoliberals to take account of the

complexities of foreign policy decision-making and the multiple factors affecting international relations.9 But we need to go further in recognizing the role that cultural and historical factors play in influencing the ways in which states interact. Recent theoretical approaches point to the way ahead, notably those collected under the banner of what has been called "conventional constructivism", which attempts to understand the world, as opposed to the "critical" variety, which attempts to

change it.10 Two useful constructivist concepts that take seriously the role played by ideas, norms and expectations in international relations are "regimes" and "strategic culture". Neither is theoretically comprehensive, but together they suggest how we might conceptualize and interpret the influence of history and culture on relations between

states, the better to predict likely future responses to changes in the international environment.

Regime theory attempts to explain why in the potentially anarchic realm of interstate relations, where no supra-state coercive force or

"global policing" exists to punish states that refuse to abide by international conventions and law, states by and large nevertheless do act in reasonable and law-abiding ways, particularly with respect to

specific issues such as international trade, or the treatment of refugees.11 Regimes are institutional arrangements based upon agreed principles, norms, rules and procedures (practices more generally), which then form the model for expected and acceptable state behaviour. States

cooperate in regimes not just because it is in their interest that other states should accept the same principles and obligations enshrined in the international agreements they underwrite,12 but also because foreign policy elites justify acting on behalf of states by claiming to adhere to certain moral principles. Regime theory thus attempts to take account of the assumptions and expectations of reciprocity that are shared even

by foreign policy elites representing very different cultural traditions.

Strategic culture takes more specific account than neorealists do of the ways in which cultural factors influence decisions, but only insofar as these relate to national security. In particular, it refers to the beliefs, values and goals that influence the use or threat of force in relations between states. In the words of one recent study of strategic




culture in the Asia-Pacific region, the concept assumes that states or

nations hold to

a distinctive and lasting set of beliefs, values and habits regarding the threat and use of force, which have their roots in such fundamental influences as geopolitical setting, history and political culture.13

Strategic culture recognizes that states do not threaten or use force on

the basis just of realist assessments of likely success based on the calculus of respective available force levels. Other, cultural factors enter into strategic thinking and decision-making, which must be taken into account if we are to understand why states act in the way they do in response to circumstances.14 These factors include the socialization and education of leaders and the broader decision-making elite; the

worldview, moral principles, and historical experience they are taught and believe; the political culture within which they operate; the geopolitical situation as they perceive it; and how they understand the

interrelationship between internal and external security considerations.

Regime theory, strategic culture and other constructivist approaches help us to conceptualize and explain aspects of interstate relations that

go beyond the simple calculus of material power. Together they offer richer, more nuanced, approaches to international relations and point to ways in which we might include culture and history in our

understanding of bilateral relations between China and the countries of Southeast Asia.

The core underlying influence on the way states and nations relate to one another is how their leaders understand the world. "Worldview"

comprises both how the world is constituted (believed to be in a descriptive sense) and should be constituted (in an ideal and prescriptive sense). It includes, in other words, notions of cultural identity and

worth as well as national interests and goals. Worldview shapes cultural

beliefs, while its temporal dimension defines our conceptions of time and history. Both culture and history contribute significantly to how we think about ourselves as communities or nations, and how we think about others, using what metaphors and analogies, drawing upon what

prejudices and stereotypes, and in this way exert significant influences on foreign affairs decision-making. Culture also influences international relations through the politics of personal ambition and competition for

power (the importance of hierarchy, status and "face"), and the

functioning of national institutions (parties, parliaments, ministries of

foreign affairs, etc.)

Strategic culture rightly takes note of the influence of cognitive and historical factors, as well as geopolitical relationships, on decision

making, but only in relation to the use of force. But since military




options only come into play when peaceful relations between states

have broken down, what we need is a conceptual framework that includes both peace and war. We need to understand how each state and nation has historically developed its own foreign relations culture,

including not just strategic and military considerations (under what circumstances force is deemed a legitimate or necessary response), but also how peaceful intercourse with other states should normally and

properly be conducted (including diplomacy, cultural exchange, trade, and the treatment of foreign nationals).15

Analysis of such influences on the behaviour of states and nations towards each other reveals many of the presuppositions underlying decision and action. Unless we have clear contrary evidence, we should assume that the world views, and hence the foreign relations cultures, of two polities differ in important ways. This was certainly the case for China and the classical kingdoms of Southeast Asia (with the exception of Vietnam), just as it was for the European powers and China in the 19th century. Yet in the case of the former, it proved possible to reconcile

respective worldviews through what we may term implicit bilateral relations regimes. These were more informal than issue-focused regimes, but they too rested on shared principles, norms and expectations, and

required rules to be followed. In large part these rules were determined

by China, but they came to be accepted by ruling elites throughout Southeast Asian as defining expected behaviour on both sides in relation to issues of diplomacy, security and trade. We can understand how bilateral relations regimes came about by comparing the cognitive assumptions embedded in worldviews, systems of values, perceptions of strategic interests, and interpretations of historical relationships of the states that are party to each regime. Where these coincide, the conduct of relations between two states will often not require shared commitments to be spelled out, for they will be taken for granted

?

which may cause some astonishment to those who do not share them. An example would be the willingness of certain Southeast Asian states

(Thailand, Burma) to make use of "family" metaphors in referring to their relations with China,16 while other states (Indonesia, the

Philippines) would eschew such language. These two conceptual tools ? foreign relations culture to refer to

the assumptions embodied in worldview in relation to which polities (today nation-states) understand and conduct their relations with other

polities, and bilateral relations regime to refer to the compromise set of

(often implicit) norms, understandings and procedures which two

polities come to accept in conducting relations with each other ?

enable us to understand why historically relations between China and Southeast Asia took the form they did.




Until the 19th century, China, by virtue of its size and power, both economically and militarily, was able to impose its uncompromising

worldview to construct what amounted to a hegemonic international order covering all aspects of its relations with other polities. The question is: why did Southeast Asian kingdoms go along with this? Did they do so for purely pragmatic reasons in order to promote profitable trade? Were there other reasons that had to do with security, both internal and external, or status? Or were Chinese demands not resented because they could be accommodated within Southeast Asian views of the world, and so were not considered outrageous in the way they seemed to be to 19th century European envoys? As we shall see, to such

questions history and the cultural presuppositions embedded in worldview provide answers that also shed light on contemporary relations.

Towards the end of the 19th century, China was forced to come to terms with an entirely different international order, based on a very different view of the world and how relations between states should be conducted. This was a world of competing empires, in which the Chinese empire attempted to claim some standing, until humiliated by the West and Japan. Yet, thanks largely to the mutual antagonism of its

opponents, the Chinese empire remained essentially intact. Even after the fall of the Qing dynasty, though it lost its hegemonic influence in Southeast Asia, China continued to rule over non-Chinese peoples beyond its core cultural area (Mongols, Tibetans, Uighurs). It was in this sense that China constituted an "empire-state".

This was a difficult transitional period, even after China became a republic, for the world system of nation-states was itself evolving. Only after the Second World War, when countries in Southeast Asia became independent, did the United Nations as a forum of nominally equal sovereign states come to embody what we take for granted as the

contemporary world order. It was in this context, in which the Peoples' Republic of China after 1949 was initially a pariah state excluded from the UN, that relations between the new China and the newly independent states of Southeast Asia had to be fashioned. The first stages of this process were complicated by the continued presence of former colonial powers, by the U.S. military presence in the region, by China's revolutionary ambitions, and by the internal politics of Southeast Asian nations. The later stages are still in the process of

being worked out. What their form will be into the 21st century is

unclear, though it is possible, in the light of history and political culture, to discern some key trends.

It is impossible in this brief article to do more than sketch the changing relations between China and Southeast Asia. Over the course




of more than a millennium, China as unified empire (for most of the time) and Southeast Asia comprising a collection of principalities, kingdoms and eventually nation-states, evolved their own individual

foreign relations cultures ? covering diplomatic, economic, cultural,

political, and strategic contacts.17 Over this same period both sides

developed bilateral relations regimes that rested not just on a coincidence of interests and a degree of compatibility between worldviews, but

increasingly on shared historical experience. It is my contention that these cultural and historical factors continue to impact upon contemporary relations between China and Southeast Asia. If we wish to predict the likely ways in which the nation-states of Southeast Asia are likely to respond to a more powerful and assertive China in the

future, we must take such factors into consideration.

Culture and History

We must begin with worldview. While the worldviews of dominant

political elites change over time, some elements remain remarkably stable. The reason for this is partly that they tend not to be subjected to critical scrutiny. The English philosopher R.G. Collingwood called these "absolute presuppositions", the bedrock assumptions (axioms)

upon which entire structures of cognition rest. Upon these depend the "relative presuppositions" that constitute basic beliefs about divinity, self, society, and the natural world, and how these interrelate.18

Relations between China and Southeast Asia go back over two thousand years. For most of that time, relations between successive Chinese dynasties and the various kingdoms and principalities of Southeast Asia were conducted according to Chinese-imposed rules,

constituting what has been called the Chinese, or sinocentric, world order.19 This world order, often referred to as the "tributary system", rested on a set of assumptions about the ideal structure of social

relationships, which was itself grounded in Chinese cosmology; that

is, on the relationship believed to exist between Heaven, Earth and humankind. This Chinese worldview took time to evolve. Its roots go back to the Shang and Zhou dynasties, while its elaboration owes much to Confucius, Mencius and the eclectic philosophers of the later Han dynasty.

Key aspects of the Chinese worldview are essential for any understanding of China's historical relations with Southeast Asia. A first point to note is that all humankind was believed to partake in a

single hierarchical social order, presided over by the emperor of China, the Son of Heaven. A second point is that it was the will of Heaven, as a moral force, that this social order should reflect the divine cosmic




harmony; that is, that human society should function as harmoniously as the natural world (in accordance with the Dao). A third point is that it was taken for granted that Chinese civilization was superior to all others. Let me expand briefly on each of these as they affected China's view of, and relations with, the non-Chinese world.

The emperor did not simply stand at the apex of Chinese society, he was the point of contact between the heavenly macrocosm and the

earthly microcosm.20 The sacrifices he performed at the temples of Heaven and Earth were essential to ensure Heaven's blessing. Any moral shortcomings on his behalf would provoke Heaven's displeasure, as revealed by signs and portents (floods, earthquakes, etc.). Social chaos and rebellion might either be a severe warning, or even indicate that the dynasty had lost the mandate of Heaven to rule ? not just the

Middle Kingdom, but "all under Heaven" [tian-xia). Given this cosmic

role, the Son of Heaven was the unique and only universal ruler, whom all other subsidiary rulers had perforce to recognize. The hierarchical social order over which the emperor presided thus extended beyond the Middle Kingdom to encompass all barbarian realms.

In a cosmic sense, harmony {ho) depended on maintaining a

proper balance between the universal principles of yin and yang. In a

social sense, as Confucius taught, it required everyone to fulfil the social role allotted to them.21 The link between the two was ensured

by the moral power, "virtue" (de), of the emperor. Universal recognition of this power was essential to extend the ideal social harmony of the

Middle Kingdom to include neighbouring kingdoms. Barbarian kings were appointed "pacification superintendents" with mandarin rank.22 Their task was to ensure that peace prevailed along ill-defined frontiers. Should war break out between them, they could expect a visit from a

Chinese envoy who would admonish them to mend their ways, for

any breakdown in social harmony was always believed to be due to moral failure.

There was thus a moral dimension to China's traditional foreign relations. It was the moral duty of the emperor to extend his benevolence to "all under Heaven", and that meant to extend the benefits of Chinese civilization. That this civilization was superior to all barbarian ways went without saying. Any refusal to acknowledge this was therefore

perverse, just as was any defiance of the emperor's will. Chinese policy towards internal or frontier minorities was thus strongly assimilationist and inherently expansionist. Opposition to Chinese expansion and assimilation was punished, but the punishment was justified in moral terms. While such justification could be cynically self-serving, the fact that it had to be framed in terms of Confucian morality could not help but influence how policy decisions were decided upon and endorsed.




Punishment applied above all to frontier barbarians. Those from further afield were inscribed within the Chinese world order by being instructed in the finer points of ritual submission. Whenever Chinese

dynasties were strong all contact with foreign powers, even for purposes of trade, were required to take the form of official "tributary" missions, led by envoys who duly performed obeisance and offered gifts to the Son of Heaven, which in Chinese eyes constituted recognition of his

superior status. The early kings and kingdoms of Southeast Asia went along with

this Chinese-imposed world order not because they shared its underlying assumptions, but for the practical purpose of trade.23 Their view of the world was very different, shaped as it was by Indian (Hindu or Buddhist) beliefs about the workings of karma and the transitory nature of human existence and human institutions. Differentials of power, in their view, were contingent and shifting, to be accommodated until things changed ? as they inevitably would. Chinese pretensions and power were

politely recognized as current reality, not as the immutable expression of Heaven's will.

Tribute provides an important case study of differing Chinese and Southeast Asian perceptions. In Southeast Asian kingdoms, tribute was

designed, like taxation, to transfer wealth, in the form of valuable local

products (gathered, grown, mined or manufactured), to the capital and centre of power. All that regional rulers received in return were status and protection. In "tributary" relations with China, however, the emperor regularly returned gifts of greater value, as proof of his benevolence and

largesse. Such "equal" exchanges were interpreted by Southeast Asian rulers in quite a different light from the tributary relations they imposed on their subordinates. What for the Chinese was ritual submission to the Son of Heaven was for Southeast Asian rulers a ritual of polite diplomacy required as a condition of trade. In this way incompatible worldviews could be reconciled within a mutually acceptable bilateral relations regime.

The tributary relationship with China did carry with it moral

obligations on both sides. In return for the acceptance by tributary kingdoms of the Chinese world order, China was obligated to conduct fair trade and provide formal protection. The emperor's benevolence in

allowing trade flowed from the power of his virtue, which had been

symbolically recognized by the act of submission. Moreover, all tributaries were treated equally, as "children" of the emperor. Family

metaphors were often used to describe the relationship. But family relations for the Chinese and for Southeast Asians were always hierarchical ? father to son, husband to wife, older brother to younger




brother (there is no word for "brother", tout court, in Chinese or most

Southeast Asian languages).24 Each knew where the other stood. Over the centuries, China and the kingdoms of Southeast Asia

learned to deal with each other. They developed, in other words, a set of procedures and expectations that were never jointly endorsed in the form of a written treaty, but which nevertheless provided the basis for

mutual accommodation and intercourse. The envoys of powerful Southeast Asian rulers kowtowed before the Chinese emperor, while the rulers themselves politely refused invitations to make the pilgrimage to the Chinese capital. With the exception of certain emperors of Vietnam

(see below), only minor potentates from trading ports like Brunei and the Malacca Sultanate, ever presented themselves in person to

acknowledge Chinese suzerainty. As the only state in Southeast Asia that had been for over a

thousand years a province of the Chinese empire, Vietnam was always acutely aware of the threat China posed to its national independence. This was because several new Chinese dynasties sought to demonstrate their power by reconstructing the empire at its greatest extent. For this

reason, Chinese armies invaded Vietnam far more often than any other Southeast Asian kingdom. On each occasion the Vietnamese fought doggedly to defeat them, on Vietnamese soil ? only to be faced with the prospect of another invasion to exact revenge for the defeat of the first. The only way to prevent this was to re-inscribe as a tributary in the Chinese world order, by sending a delegation to acknowledge the new emperor. Gracious reception of the delegation placed Vietnam once

again under the nominal protection of China, and so reduced the risk of invasion ? until a new dynasty took power. So a pattern developed in Sino-Vietnamese relations ? a bilateral relations regime

? which both sides well understood. It was a regime with mutual obligations: Vietnam sent tributary missions to China, while China extended nominal protection to Vietnam. As late as 1879, the Vietnamese emperor Tu Due called upon China as Vietnam's suzerain power for assistance in suppressing bandits

along their common frontier, at a time when France was rapidly putting an end to Vietnamese independence.25

The Changing World Order

The first European traders in East Asian waters had no alternative, if

they wanted to trade, but to accept the Chinese world order. Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch envoys performed the triple kowtow before Qing emperors. Not until Lord Macartney's mission of 1793 did a European ambassador refuse to kowtow.26 This did not prevent the Chinese from




implying that he had, in order to preserve China's established foreign relations culture ? a pretence that was kept up almost to the end of the

Qing dynasty. There was no escaping the fact, however, that power relations

were rapidly changing. The European world order was replacing that of China in Southeast Asia, a shift clearly recognized by King Chulalongkorn of Siam, the last independent Southeast Asian state, when he abrogated his tributary recognition of Chinese suzerainty in

1882.27 Chinese influence in Southeast Asia had reached its nadir,

though the late Qing did try to compensate by turning to the overseas Chinese.

Republican China under the Guomindang (GMD) was too

preoccupied with internal conflict and then the war with Japan to do

much to recover lost Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. The entire

region remained under European domination, except for Thailand, and

Bangkok refused to establish diplomatic relations, despite Chinese

urging. All that the GMD could do was to target overseas Chinese in

competition with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a strategy that alarmed both colonial authorities in Southeast Asia and indigenous elites. Republican Chinese relations with the region were complicated still further by a nationality law that claimed all descendants of a

Chinese father as Chinese. It would take the PRC three decades to solve the problem of the overseas Chinese, by eliminating any possibility of dual nationality through declaring all overseas Chinese to be citizens of their countries of residence.28

The victory of the CCP was supposed to inaugurate a whole new

age in China's relations with the rest of the world. In fact, several key components of the worldview implicit in China's traditional foreign relations culture carried over into the Chinese Marxist-Leninist worldview. One was a preoccupation with status based on the hierarchy of power. China has always had difficulty seeing itself as just one of a

number of nominally equal nation-states. China might treat visiting heads of mini-states with scrupulous attention, just as it did the envoys of minor tributaries (for all barbarians were equal before the Son of

Heaven), but this did not in any way lessen the superior status of China itself. The PRC, in its chaotic swings of foreign policy under Mao

Zedong, never deviated in two matters: in attempting always to play above its league as a major power alongside the United States and the Soviet Union; and in portraying itself always as the natural leader (of

revolutionary movements, the Third World, etc.).29 The desire to lead was related to a second component of traditional

Chinese foreign relations culture that carried through to the PRC: a conviction of the superiority of Chinese example. The Chinese revolution




was the model for all others to follow. The patronizing superiority with which Chinese mandarins lectured visiting envoys found its parallel in the insufferable way senior communist officials lectured visiting foreign communist delegations, not least those from Southeast Asia.30 In turn this related to a third carry-over component: the moralistic dimension in Chinese foreign policy. Policies as diverse as coexistence, anti

hegemonism, or "equal benefit" trade policy have tended to be

proclaimed as moral principles, with moral fervour.31

Underlying these parallels has been the structural similarity between the authoritarian and hierarchical dictatorship exercised by the CCP and the equally authoritarian and hierarchical Confucian mandarinate. The role of history and economics may be radically different in the Confucian and Marxist-Leninist worldviews, but not beliefs about how

power should be concentrated and exercised, and by whom. The CCP came to power just as Western imperialism was

withdrawing from Southeast Asia. This provided Beijing with an opportunity the Republic of China had never had, to develop new

bilateral relations regimes with independent states throughout the region. But the process of decolonization, though brief and amicable in the case of Burma, was accompanied by more or less protracted violence

everywhere else. China's support for anti-colonial revolutionary movements, particularly in Malaya and Indochina, made it difficult to establish satisfactory relations with newly independent governments still beholden to the West for their security under the aegis of the new regional hegemon, the United States. The distinction developed by Beijing between government-to-government and party-to-party relations, while it allowed China some flexibility in juggling revolutionary rhetoric and diplomacy, engendered understandable suspicion. Not until well into the era of Deng Xiaoping was this dichotomy finally dispensed

with as an element complicating bilateral relations regimes. New bilateral relations regimes did, however, gradually develop.

Burma, the first Southeast Asian nation to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, was a good example. In effect, Burma resuscitated elements of its traditional paukpauw (sibling) relationship that accorded China seniority, and thus status, within a presumed common family of states in which each took account of the interests of the other.32 Strict Burmese neutralism reinforced Chinese security along its long and porous southwestern border, in return for Chinese non-intervention in Burma's chaotic internal affairs, in particular minimal material (as opposed to

rhetorical) support for the Burmese Communist Party. New bilateral relations regimes were also established with Sukarno's

Indonesia and Sihanouk's Cambodia, neither of which, because of their narrow leader-to-leader basis, survived changes in regime. In Indochina,




Beijing was first to recognize the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

(DRV). But Sino-Vietnamese relations were soured by Beijing's great power play at the Geneva Conference of 1954, which left the Vietnamese Communists with only half the country, thus setting the stage for the Second Indochina War.33 Throughout the period from 1950 to 1975, moreover, China's own disastrous policies (the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath) ensured that relations with Southeast Asia remained fraught with tension.

The period from the ceasefire agreement between the United States and Vietnam early in 1973 to the death of Mao in 1976 marked a major shift in China's relations with Southeast Asia. American military disengagement from Vietnam signalled, in effect, American military withdrawal from all of mainland Southeast Asia. The subsequent American closure of bases in the Philippines merely confirmed what

everyone in the region knew: never again would American ground forces be committed to the defence of mainland Southeast Asian states, not even to Thailand, with which the United States maintained a

formal security pact. In quick succession in 1974 and , 1975, three members of the staunchly anti-communist Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, established diplomatic relations with the PRC. Indonesia was more

hesitant, while Singapore waited for Jakarta. At the same time three Southeast Asian states ? Vietnam, Cambodia

and Laos ? became communist. The opportunities for expanded Chinese influence in Southeast Asia were thus obvious. The only thing that circumscribed these opportunities to some extent was the continuing context of the Cold War. By the end of 1978, however, when Vietnam invaded Cambodia, China was ready to take advantage of the situation. It was China, far more than either ASEAN or the United States, which orchestrated both Cambodian resistance to the Vietnamese occupation and the timing of the solution to the "Cambodian problem".34

The impact for China-Southeast Asia relations of the collapse of the Soviet Union was two-fold: it removed yet another outside power, and it enabled China to re-establish relations with Vietnam on Beijing's terms. The sequence of events, from China's brief border incursion to

"punish" Vietnam for invading Cambodia (use of the term itself evokes China's traditional foreign relations culture) to normalization of relations a decade later, awoke powerful historical memories for both countries.

When Vietnamese forces blunted the Chinese offensive, Hanoi declared

victory. But this had happened before. Only Soviet support allowed Vietnam to avoid what it eventually was forced to do after that support was withdrawn: ensure its own security by apologetically re

acknowledging China's superior status, symbolically demonstrated by




the visit of Vietnam's top leaders to China to conclude the normalization

process. The historical precedents may not have been obvious to Western

observers, but they certainly were to both participants.35 The reforms of Deng Xiaoping and his 'four modernizations' placed

China in a strong position to weather the collapse of communism in

Europe and the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Economic growth and trade had taken precedence over political brinkmanship and ideological posturing in China's relations with the world. Beijing had at last realized that increased national wealth provided the best basis for military modernization, a development whose implications were not lost on Southeast Asian elites. Add to this the CCP's increasing appeal to Chinese nationalism and China's steadfast claim to all the islands in the South China Sea, and the "threat" of increased Chinese influence in the region becomes evident.

What stands in the way of de facto Chinese hegemony in Southeast Asia is, of course, the United States ? not as a committed regional player as it was dining the Second Indochina War, but as the sole global superpower determined to remain as such. This is at present enough to thwart Chinese ambitions, much to the annoyance of Beijing, but will it suffice in the longer term if a China growing stronger pursues its national interests more aggressively? How will the nation-states of Southeast Asia respond, both to China and to the United States? The answer to such questions must, I maintain, take account of both culture and history, as these influence the foreign relations cultures of the various states and their bilateral relations regimes with China.

The Future Shape of China-Southeast Asia Relations

At present China is pursuing what has been aptly called a "calculative

strategy"36 to attain its longer-term strategic goals of reunification

(inclusion of Taiwan) and corresponding prevention of disintegration of the empire-state (as happened to the Soviet Union), national security in the face of hostile powers (notably the United States), and return to its "rightful" place in the world (recognition of great power status). The

key elements of this strategy are rapid economic growth through promotion of a market economy; preservation of an amicable international environment; avoidance of conflict while modernizing

military capability; and expansion of China's international influence

through both bilateral and multilateral means. To this end China has shown itself prepared to act as a good

international team player. Beijing has cooperated in the "war on terror", been constructive in the United Nations and other international forums, has been fair in resolving minor differences over land borders (for




example, with Vietnam ? at least in the sense that the agreement did not transfer large areas to China) while reserving its claim to all the islands of the South China Sea, and has promoted freer trade (by joining the WTO, and by signing a free trade agreement with ASEAN). But how long will this last? What might derail Beijing's current strategy?

One thing, of course, would be a collapse of control by the CCP, to which the "calculative strategy" itself might even contribute. Regional leaders, the military, or a growing wealthy middle and professional class may demand more political say; or growing disparities in wealth

may create massive social unrest. If the CCP did lose power, this would

only be in the context of political and social turmoil, which would be likely to provoke an unprecedented movement of population, particularly into Southeast Asia. This would be highly destabilizing, and very likely result in regional conflict.

Another possibility is that China's very economic success could

provoke regional tensions. Increasingly, direct foreign investment that

previously went to Southeast Asia is being diverted to China, while the flow of cheap Chinese goods into Southeast Asia undercuts local

manufactures. Both of these are adding to already high levels of

unemployment in the region. The two most likely reasons why the "calculative strategy" might

be discarded, however, are because China itself for nationalistic reasons

decides to embark on some strategic adventure (such as invading Taiwan, or seizing the Spratly Islands), or conversely because the United States

again decides that China, rather than terrorism, poses the greatest threat to Washington's global hegemony and adopts a more aggressive attitude towards her (as the present Bush administration appeared ready to do

upon taking office). The first of these possibilities would directly challenge the United States in the case of Taiwan, and probably lead to

war; or in the case of the Spratlys threaten international sea lanes

(though Beijing could issue assurances in that regard). In the case of a

Chinese invasion of Taiwan, Southeast Asian states would attempt to remain neutral; in the case of the Spratlys they would be more likely to recoil into the arms of America.

But could the ASEAN states remain neutral in a conflict between America and China? They would certainly try. And would they present a common front in opposing any unilateral Chinese seizure of islands in the South China Sea? This is rather less likely, given the international tensions such a move would provoke. A third question is more

immediate, in the light of current American strategic thinking: how would the countries of Southeast Asia be likely to respond to American

attempts to limit Chinese power, to constrain or contain longer-term Chinese great power ambitions?




Historically Southeast Asian states have shown themselves reluctant to join balance-of-power coalitions. The South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) only ever had two Southeast Asian members (Thailand and the Philippines) at a time when American power dominated the region. Indonesia feared foreign entanglement, while Burma did not want to antagonize China. ASEAN, its members have been keen to reiterate, is not such an organization. Balance of power is a Western conception, useful in a politically divided region like Europe where a coalition of smaller powers could counter a larger one. But

historically it was never part of strategic thinking in Southeast Asia, which has always had to face the overwhelmingly preponderant power of China. Southeast Asian kingdoms, with the fleeting exception of three Tai principalities in the late 13th century, never made common cause against China. Rather they preferred to ensure their security by enrolling as good tributaries in the Chinese world order, and relying on the obligations that entailed on the part of China.

Even if faced with a militarily aggressive China, it is unlikely that any mainland Southeast Asian state would join a U.S.-led coalition ?

if only because they would know that there is very little likelihood that American troops would ever be committed to their defence. Far more

likely is that each would draw upon its own historical relationship with China (for each a significant dimension of its bilateral relations

regime with Beijing) in the light of its own foreign relations culture to assure its own security.

Burma and Vietnam have historically defeated invading Chinese

armies, only to ensure their security by re-inscribing in the Chinese world order. This was in no way humiliating: it was a sensible course of action. The modern Sino-Burmese bilateral relations regime has worked well for both countries. Burma obtained non-interference, and China a peaceful frontier. More recendy Burma has been able to disregard Western threats of sanctions, while China has expanded trade and

gained access to the Bay of Bengal.37 For Vietnam, the failure of its Soviet policy provides a telling historical lesson: China is always next door and must be dealt with on its own terms. The Vietnamese understand the Chinese better than anyone else in Southeast Asia, for

they share much of the Chinese worldview. Tough self-reliance has

proved their best course of action. As for Thailand, it shares no common border with China, but a

central component of Thai foreign relations culture has always been to

"go with the strength" as the best means of preserving Thai security and

independence. Bangkok was a close ally of Britain in colonial times, of

Japan during the Second World War, and of America immediately after it. These days, Thai diplomats and academics claim that Thailand




enjoys the best relations with China of any country in Southeast Asia, despite its security arrangement with the United States. Thailand will not join a coalition opposed to China, and the Chinese know it. As for weak and vulnerable Laos and Cambodia, they have always looked to China more as a protector against powerful neighbours (Thailand and

Vietnam) than as a threatening great power. The situation for the maritime states (in which I include Malaysia

and Singapore, as well as the Philippines, Indonesia and Brunei) is not so clear-cut. Singapore, as a wealthy Chinese island in a Malay sea, has

always been careful not to get out of step with its neighbours, and is

unlikely to serve either as an advanced garrison for China or a lone bastion for America, despite providing facilities for U.S. warships. Brunei, despite its historic trading links with China, will also take its lead from its neighbours. Malaysia too has a long history of trading ties

with China (mainly via Malacca). The Malay elite has pursued closer economic ties with East Asia in preference to the West. Indeed now

Malaysia vies with Thailand in claiming to have the friendliest relations with Beijing.38 Kuala Lumpur would thus be unlikely to side with the United States in a confrontation with China (especially if the former was perceived to be anti-Islamic).

The Philippines bilateral relations regime with China is relatively weak, lacking as it does both historical depth and the cultural components of the mainland states. The trading regime with Manila

was conducted under Spanish auspices and involved overseas Chinese, not Filipinos. Only the Sulu Archipelago had historical trading links comparable to Brunei or Malacca, but Sulu did not then fall under any Philippine jurisdiction. The Philippines after independence developed much closer relations with Taiwan than with the PRC. Moreover the

Philippine ruling elite is Catholic with cultural ties to Europe and to Latin America, and no historical memories of being part of a sinocentric world order. If history constitutes a dimension of Philippine foreign policy culture, it favours links with the United States, as a former

colony, in common resistance to Japan, and in joint security arrangements. Of all the ASEAN states, the Philippines is the most

likely to support America in a confrontation with China. Manila's

primary concern in such a situation would be that doing so would break ASEAN solidarity.

That leaves Indonesia, the largest and most populous state in Southeast Asia, formerly the centre of political gravity of ASEAN, but now weakened by internal conflict and division. Indonesia, more

particularly the trading ports of Java and Sumatra, has a long history of relations with China. The conversion of most of what is now Indonesia to Islam did not weaken these trading links so much as strengthen




equally important links to India and the Persian Gulf. The Muslim worldview sat uneasily beside the pretensions of the Son of Heaven, but from the 17th century relations with China were brokered by the

Dutch, not the sultans of Central Java. Moreover, independent Indonesia saw itself as inheriting the historical and cultural legacy of the Java centred kingdom of Majapahit, rather than the divisive competition of the trading ports.

Briefly under Sukarno independent Indonesia entered into close relations with the PRC, each in the belief that it was the leader of "newly emerging forces" in the world.39 It was a relationship that could not last. Under Soeharto, Indonesia established itself as de facto leader of ASEAN: the "ASEAN way" was in large measure the Javanese way. This placed Indonesia in direct competition with China for influence in the region. Jakarta was highly suspicious of Chinese intentions, and it

was not until 1990 that diplomatic relations were finally re-established. With the fall of Soeharto, ASEAN lost the cohesion that a strong Indonesia had provided, but the Indonesian elite did not lose the belief that Indonesia should rightfully be primus inter pares among the ASEAN states. Given its deep-rooted suspicions of China, its large population and its Islamic heritage, Indonesia still stands as probably the principal opponent to increased Chinese influence in Southeast Asia ? provided it does not break apart. Any break-up of Indonesia could, of course,

only benefit the extension of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. Indonesia's opposition to China does not, however, make it a

natural ally of America. After independence, Indonesia never joined any U.S.-led coalition: it always saw itself as a neutral regional leader, not a Cold War follower. Despite being a secular state, Indonesia retains strong ties with the Muslim world, and shares with it a lurking distaste for American policies and culture. For these reasons, Indonesia would not easily join an American-led confrontation with China.

Moreover, it would be more reluctant than the Philippines to undermine ASEAN solidarity.

Conclusion: Southeast Asia's Responses to a Rising China

So how are the states of Southeast Asia likely to respond to the rising power of China in the face of U.S. determination to maintain its

unchallenged position of the world? Will they side with the world superpower? Certainly not in the case of the mainland states, and

probably not in the case of Malaysia and Indonesia. Possibly the U.S. could construct an offshore coalition of states to contain China, running from Japan through Taiwan, the Philippines

? excluding Indonesia ?

to Australia, perhaps even with visiting rights in nominally neutral




Singapore. But Washington cannot hope to sign up ASEAN as a bloc, no matter how great suspicions are of China.

If the United States sought to contain a more bellicose China

through constructing a de facto balance-of-power alliance, ASEAN would break apart. Even if China unilaterally resorted to force in

seizing some or all of the islands of the South China Sea, ASEAN would be unlikely to hold together, particularly if the Taiwan issue had already been resolved by political means, through some variant of the "one country, two systems" formula. This would leave each country to

work out its own salvation ? with either Beijing or Washington. In both scenarios, therefore, the ensuing crisis would more likely divide rather than unite ASEAN, for the mainland states, including Thailand

and, with extreme reluctance, Vietnam, would side with China. This would not just be because of geography, but also because history and culture predispose the countries of Southeast Asia to draw on their own experience of the benefits of due deference to status in working out their relations with China.

This preference of the countries of Southeast Asia to deal with China in their own way can be labelled accommodation, and denounced as weakness, but as a response it needs to be understood. Though the ASEAN states may prefer to deal with China as a group, it is upon their bilateral relations regimes that they will ultimately have to rely

? and these are deeply influenced by history and culture. Southeast Asian leaders are thus likely to give China what they believe the Chinese want

? due deference, status as a great power, recognition of China's interests even while pursuing their own ? in return for non-interference in their internal affairs and fair trading relations. These are what China

traditionally provided. This would be to trade on the moral dimension of Chinese foreign relations culture, which realists would consider

something of a weak reed. But Southeast Asian states taking this course would do so on a stronger basis than realists might realize. For to accept de facto Chinese hegemony would not imply neglecting military preparedness. As in the past, any Chinese invasion would be vigorously resisted ? after which due acceptance of Chinese hegemony would

again need to be symbolically re-established.

NOTES 1 It is easily forgotten, amidst the clamour of the "war on terrorism", that before

11 September 2001, the Bush administration viewed China as the principal threat to continuing American global hegemony in the 21st century. A temporary

commonality of interest ? China is eager to suppress Islamic-driven Uighur nationalism in Xinjiang

? has reduced overt antagonism, but only in the short




term; the American radical nationalist strategy of preemptive elimination of whatever

might be considered a threat to U.S. global domination has implications for China that Beijing can hardly have missed.

2 I am particularly grateful to the many officials and scholars, too numerous to name,

in both Beijing and ASEAN capitals who have kindly given me their time over the years to discuss China's relations with Southeast Asia.

3 The list mentioned several times in discussions in Beijing comprised the U.S., the EU, Russia, India, Japan, and of course China.

4 Even if the United States were to withdraw completely from Northeast Asia, Japan would resist being drawn into China's orbit, as it always did historically; while a reunified Korea, though it would want to cultivate good relations with Tokyo,

would probably accept de facto Chinese hegemony. 5 Thammy Evans, "The PRC's Relationship with the ASEAN Regional Forum:

Realpolitik, Regime Theory or a Continuation of the Sinitic Zone of Influence System", Modern Asian Studies 37 (2003): 737-63, in which she argues that

Chinese reasons for joining are best understood in neither neorealist nor neoliberal

terms, but rather as a continuation of the hierarchical way China has always viewed

and conducted international relations.

6 See Geoff Wade, "Chinese Imperial Expansion during the Early Ming: Two Examples", paper presented at the International Convention of Asian Scholars,

Noordwijkerhout, 1998, p. 3.

7 Beijing's New Security Concept does, however, operate on both bilateral and

multilateral levels, always, as in China's membership of the ASEAN Regional Forum, in China's national interests (see Evans, "The PRC's Relationship with the

ASEAN Regional Forum"). 8 This is the subject of an excellent study by Stephen J. Morris, Why Vietnam

Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes of War (Stanford, Calif.:

Stanford University Press, 1999). 9 See David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1993). 10 Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory",

International Security 23 (1998): 171-88. Other approaches include the notion of

"securitization" developed by the so-called Copenhagen School, which focuses on

the way elites identify and politicize security issues, and "human security", which

focuses on the welfare of individuals. For a discussion of these in the Southeast Asian context, see William T. Tow, "Alternative Security Models: Implications for

ASEAN", in Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asiat edited by Andrew

T.H. Tan and J.D. Kenneth Boutin (Singapore, Select Publishing, 2001), pp. 257-85.

11 It is arguable that the United States's overthrow of the Taliban and subsequent

preemptive strike strategy does introduce a new coercive element to police the

behaviour of at least smaller and weaker states. 12 See Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,

1983); Volker Ritter, ed., Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young and Michael Zurn, "The

Study of International Regimes", European Journal of International Relations 1 (1995): 267-330.

13 Ken Booth and Russel Trood, eds., Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region (London: Macmillan, 1999), p. 8 (italics in original).

14 See Alastair Iain Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture", International Security 19 (1995): 32-64; and Colin S. Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back", Review of International Studies 25 (1999): 49-69.




15 See Haacke's more limited conception of "diplomatic culture". Jiirgen Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects (London: Routledge/Curzon, 2003).

16 See, for example, the response of Thai prime minister, Kukrit Pramoj, when asked

why the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Thailand and China had

proceeded so smoothly. (Quoted in Michael Vatikiotis, "Ties That Bind", Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 January 1996.)

17 1 have sketched this history in more detail in Martin Stuart-Fox, A Short History of China and Southeast Asia (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2003).

18 R.G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940),

pp. 31-47.

19 Still the best study is John King Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968) upon which much of the following account is based.

20 See Aihe Wang, Cosmology and Political Culture in Early China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

21 Analects 12.11. A good translation is Simon Leys, The Analects of Confucius (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).

22 Appointments were noted in the Ming Shi. (I am most grateful to Geoff Wade for making his translations of the Ming Shi available to me.)

23 Tribute and trade were not sharply differentiated for Southeast Asian rulers, and

their conception of tribute as not just submission, but also the transfer of resources

to the centre, was very different from the Chinese conception of tribute as symbolic

recognition of superior status. I have tried to sort out these differences in A Short

History of China and Southeast Asia, pp. 32-35.

24 Even friend to friend, the only one of the five Confucian relationships that is not

obviously hierarchical, entailed recognition of status and obligation. 25 Yoshiharu Tsuboi', L'empire vietnamienne face a la France et a la Chine (Paris:

L'Harmattan, 1987), pp. 263-64.

26 See James L. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney

Embassy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), and John E. Wills, Jr., Embassies

and Illusions: Dutch and Portuguese Envoys to K'and-his (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard

University Press, 1984). 27 Sarasin Viraphon, Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade, 1652-1853 (Cambridge,

Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 236-37.

28 The 1909 Qing Nationality Law, based on the principle of jus sanguinis, descent through the male line, was endorsed by the Republic of China under the Guomintang. Not until the Nationality Law of 1980 did the People's Republic of China finally put an end to dual nationality.

29 There is a vast literature on the foreign policy and foreign relations of the PRC, but

see, for example, John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993).

30 See, for example, O.A. Westad, et al., eds., 77 Conversations Between Chinese and

Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977, Working Paper no. 22, Cold War International History Project (Woodrow Wilson International Center,

Washington, D.C., 1998). 31 See Chih-yu Shih, China's fust World: The Morality of China's Foreign Policy

(Boulder, Colo.: Lynn Rienner, 1993). 32 See Daw Than Han, Common Vision: Burma's Regional Outlook (Washington D.C.:

Georgetown University Press, 1988). 33 Chinese policy during the First and Second Indochina Wars has been much studied.




Two important recent publications are Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists'

Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956-1962 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1997), and Zhai Qiang, China and the Vietnam Wars: 1950-1975

(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). 34 Robert S. Ross, "China and the Cambodian Peace Process", Asian Survey 31 (1991):

1169-85.

35 As the author discovered in several interviews and discussions in Beijing and Hanoi.

36 The term is used and the concept developed in Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 2000).

37 Bertil Lintner, "Arms for Eyes: Military Sales Raise China's Profile in Bay of Bengal", Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 December 1993, p. 26; Donald M.

Seekins, "Burma-China Relations: Playing with Fire", Asian Survey 37 (1997): 525

39.

38 Claims to enjoy the best relations with China were made in interviews with academics and officials conducted by the author in both Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur.

39 See the introductory background chapter of Rizal Sukma, Indonesia and China:

The Politics of a Troubled Relationship (London: Routledge, 1999).

Martin Stuart-Fox is currently Professor of History at the University of

Queensland, Brisbane, Australia.



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