political instability in southeast asia

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při výzkumu MEO, reg.č. CZ.1.07/2.4.00/31.0027

Political Instabilityin Southeast Asia

Political Instabilityin Southeast Asia

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Tiráž

Název: Political Instability in Southeast AsiaRESAREAS – the Cooperation Network for Research of Non-European AreasEditor: Tomáš PetrůVydavatel:Vydala Univerzita Hradec Králové, Filozofická fakulta, katedra politologieTisk: ASTRON studio CZ, a.s., Veselská 699, 199 00 Praha 9 – LetňanyRok a místo vydání: 2013, Praha

Political Instability in Southeast Asia

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Introduction

This book of proceedings is based on several papers presented at the seminar Political Instability in Southeast Asia, organized by the Department of Asian Studies and the Center of Asia-Pacific Studies at Metropolitan University Prague on April 19th, 2013. This relatively small academic gathering was held as part of the series of workshops organized in the framework of the RESAREAS project, officially entitled the Cooperation Network for Research of Non-European Areas. This was the third seminar of the series and had originally been entitled Political Instability in Asia. Interestingly, all the papers which responded to our Call for Papers dealt with the region of Southeast Asia. Our team, based around the Department of Asian Studies at MUP, took this as a good omen that our efforts and area of focus – i.e. a concentration on Pacific Asia with a strong dedication to Southeast Asian affairs in our research and teaching activities – is heading in the right direction.

Therefore, focusing on Southeast Asia in this little edited volume makes it both more specifically focused and realistic. Furthermore, of course, this region deserves much more attention than it is actually getting. And I daresay this statement bears even more validity in Czechia as well as within post-Communist Central Europe in general. The simple fact is that Southeast Asia has so far been heavily understudied in the Czech Republic. This is something of a paradox since Charles University and other notable institutions have had a long tradition of (mainly linguistic) Oriental Studies programs such as Indology, Sinology, as well as Japanese and Korean Studies. Also Middle Eastern Studies there and at the Oriental Institute of the Academy of Science of (still regarded geographically, if not always culturally, as part of Asia) have been well established for decades. Palacký University in Olomouc and Masaryk University in Brno also have departments which give lectures on East Asian languages and cultures.


However, there has never been a single Department of Southeast Asian Studies of any sort in this country. The only “representatives” of the region, so to speak – Vietnamese and Indonesian Studies (the latter renewed after a 14-year break) – are struggling for existence and acknowledgement at the Faculty of Arts of Charles University, with the Vietnamese program being affiliated with the Institute of the Far East, while future Indonesianists work under the guidance and umbrella of the Institute of South and Central Asia, where neither of them really belongs. Not mentioning that both of the programs have been officially operating under the guise of Ethnology since neither of them has (enough) professors and/or associate professors to secure their accreditation in their appropriate fields either as linguistic-cultural programs or area studies. One of the very few institutions in Czechia where Southeast Asia is studied as a region is Metropolitan University Prague, which is materialized within the graduate program of Asian Studies and International Relations.

Nevertheless, as a positive note, there is a growing interest in this vital region inside as well as outside the academe. It may be discerned, inter alia, in the recent trend of Czech foreign policy when quite a few top delegations have headed to this territory in the last two years, including the former president Klaus visiting Malaysia and Indonesia in July 2012, the visit of the Minister of Trade and Industry to Vietnam, Thailand and Myanmar in 2012 and the official journey of the Minister of the Environment to Malaysia, also in 2012. Furthermore, the new Czech president Miloš Zeman recently invited his Philippine counterpart Benigno Aquino III for a top-level encounter in 2014. In sum, it appears that, generally, Czech politicians are finally beginning to acknowledge the importance of large and geopolitically strategic countries such as Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, though it may be primarily in the economic sense. Speaking of economic affairs,


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it seems, quite positively, that a number of Czech traders have already done so.

There is also a discernible trend in the tourism industry which is heavily promoting some of the countries of the region. While Thailand and Indonesia have been on the Czech travelers´ list for quite a while, nowadays Malaysia and the Philippines are strongly promoted as new, exciting destinations. The Philippines even became a partner for the Czech beauty pageant, since part of the contest took place in the archipelago.

However, even the academic sphere has been gradually turning more attention to the region of Southeast Asia, which represents a geostrategic crossroads of the Asia-Pacific and the Eastern Hemisphere in general. The attention usually comes from the field of international relations and geopolitics, which tend to study mainly two issues: a) the multilateral conflict in the South China Sea, b) the current political transformation in Burma/Myanmar. I agree that this orientation makes perfect sense, since both pose highly topical and in many ways pressing security issues, but I personally somewhat suspect that the trend of studying the South China Sea has much more to do with the rising role and threat of China rather than a sheer interest in Southeast Asia. Of course, the role and importance of China as a rising power cannot be overlooked and that is also why Western powers are also in a rush to strengthen their position in Myanmar to outbalance China s influence in the country. But, I believe, though I may be wrong, that the current trend of prioritizing China leads to a sort of obsession which consequently leads to overlooking other countries. One of the contributors to this publication, Lada Homutová, has probably to come a similar conclusion for she verbally sighed into her paper, upon facing the lack of literature on the internal workings in Vietnam, that Vietnam


is (and, of course, other countries of Southeast Asia are also) just as interesting as China. I could not agree with her more.

Therefore, we have tried, in our afore-mentioned workshop and this book of proceedings, to have a closer look at other security issues in Southeast Asia, which do not receive as much media and academic attention as e.g. China s aggressive campaign in the South China Sea, but which, in our view, are just as pressing and topical. It is interesting to note that the public perception of the region may vary to a great degree, which of course depends on one s background. Economic experts and believers in economic development of Pacific Asia may therefore tend to underestimate or even dismiss the security problems, concentrating on the promising macroeconomic figures of second-tier Asian tigers such as Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia, whose economic growth sees them increasingly modernized, industrialized and interconnected. Managers in travel and the tourism industry may in turn stress these nations´ hospitality, their fantastic climate, nature, landmarks, sights and cuisine.

Nevertheless, this region, despite its ever-more positive image in the outside world does suffer from a series of conflicts which pose or may pose a threat to domestic and in a few cases (not speaking of the complex and multilateral South China Sea conflict per se) also international security and stability. If we attempt to create a complete list, it might be fairly long. Let me therefore attempt to list at least the most pronounced ones:

• the current ethno-religious conflicts (Buddhist Burmese and Arakanese vs. the Rohingya and other Burmese Muslims)

• the prolonged separatist wars in Myanmar


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• the Malay-Muslim insurgency in the deep Thai South

• the Thai-Cambodian territorial dispute over the Preah Vihear Temple

• the prolonged rift between the royalists (yellow shirts) and the populists (red shirts) in Thailand

• the decade-long Muslim separatism in Southern Philippines

• the revived Sabah dispute and the invasion of the “Sulu sultanate army” into Malaysia

• the autonomy / separatism issue and general human rights´ issues in Indonesia s West Papua

• the radicalization of Islamic groups in Indonesia (attacks on religious minorities etc.)

• the growing authoritarianism in Cambodia – the leader s nationalist aspirations possibly becoming a threat to power balance in Indochina

• the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia over Sipadan-Ligitan and Ambalat – in relation to undersea blocks

While these abundant issues may differ thoroughly in their intensity and causes, the very realization of the complexity of the security situation immediately provides a different outlook of Southeast Asia, one that is much more complex and balanced: not only a region with image of economic dynamism and promises, with great potential in natural resources, modern technologies as well as tourism, but also one of ongoing conflicts, some of which may not have easy solutions at all. Though the authors are not necessarily pessimistic, they do not always offer a vision of a bright future.

To keep in line with the modest scope of this publication, we have decided to present one high-profile case (the issue of Myanmar s ethno-


religious conflict on the background of the country s political and economic opening, which was excellently explained in the keynote paper by Professor Wolfram Schaffar), and three arguably lower-profile, yet equally significant conflict issues, two of which have a military character (the Thai-Cambodian dispute over the Preah Vihear temple and the Muslim insurgency in the Southern Philippines), while one is primarily of a political character and if unresolved it might also threaten the political stability of the country (the issue of factionalism in Vietnam). Thus, this selection also provides an interesting and balanced overview of the security situation in Southeast Asia, with two cases having a clear international dimension (the Thai-Cambodian conflict and the Lahad Datu Stand-off, connected with the Muslim insurgency in Mindanao, renewing old tensions between Malaysia and the Philippines), while the case of Vietnam is a purely domestic affair. The situation in Myanmar and the Southern Philippines may also seem to belong to the category of intra-country problems, which is rather misleading, for instability in Myanmar and the Philippines creates further international problems. As Richard Turcsányi explains in his paper on the Thai-Cambodia conflict, Thailand has also occasionally responded with military force to solve the Myanmar-caused inflow of drugs and migrants. As for the Southern Philippines, Malaysia has not only offered mediation in the talks between Manila and the Islamic insurgents, but has also been arguably involved in their support. Most topically, however, due to the linkage of the insurgency in the Philippine South to the Sabah dispute, recently revived by the invasion of Sulu Sultanate militants into Sabah (that is, from the Philippine territory into the territory of Malaysia), the issue has also gained a pronounced international character, as explained in the fourth paper by Vojtěch Bublík.

Different as they may seem, all the causes of instability we have tried to analyze do share one distinct feature. Though some of them have been


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sparked by grass-root differences (Buddhist vs. Muslim communities etc.), all of them have been played on or exploited by the national-level authorities, and the same applies to their solutions. So, the ethno-religious clashes in Myanmar intensified when what was probably some army generals, disapproving of the democratic discourse, sent bulldozers and trucks with provocateurs to raze mosques in Muslim neighborhoods and apparently spread the conflict out of the problematic Arakan as far as central Myanmar where no conflict had been previously. Similarly, Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen as well as his Thai counterparts exploited the military border conflict for gains in domestic politics and deliberately fuelled the dispute, instead of trying to solve it. Also, the Philippine central government (the incumbent as well as previous cabinets) and their policies could be seen as one of the major sources of trouble in the South since they did not address the grievances properly. The incumbent president Benigno Aquino III, however, is doing his best, walking a fine line in his dedication to resolve this decade-long separatist war for good, though his efforts have been somewhat marred by the activities of the obscure and officially defunct Sulu Sultanate. A principally similar situation seems to have occurred in Vietnam, because as the Vietnam Communist Party is the sole political actor, the responsibility to break the dead end of political immobilization, caused by its factional character, lies in its very own hands.

At this point, as the volume s editor, I would like to cordially thank all the contributors, namely Professor Wolfram Schaffar, Richard Turcsányi, Lada Homutová and Richard Bublík for their great contributions and cooperation working on this volume, their presentations at the workshop and sharing their ideas and knowledge. My appreciation also goes to Stanislav Myšička, lecturer at the University of Hradec Králové and also a colleague within the REASAREAS project, for his inspiring remarks. I hope that this book of proceedings will


become a solid foundation for a full monograph in a near future. Also, it is my hope that this modest project will fill a certain gap in the literature on the politics and security in Southeast Asia in Czechia and perhaps students as well as aficionados of this fascinating area will find it useful.

In Prague, October 22, 2013

Tomáš Petrů


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Political Reform, The Rule-of-law and Ethnic Violence in Myanmar

Wolfram SchaffarDepartment of Development StudiesUniversity of Vienna, AustriaandKoninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (KITLV)Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies Leiden, Netherlands

Abstract

Since the elections of 2010 in Myanmar and since president Thein Sein has come to office, the process of political, economic, and social opening has surprised most analysts. The speed of the reforms is accelerating and there are signs that by now the reforms cannot be reversed and have developed a self-enforcing dynamism. However, there are also severe problems accompanying this opening which have surfaced in the form of communal violence between Muslim and Buddhist communities, the outbreak of ethnic tensions, such as in the Kachin state, as well as sometimes violent demonstrations and strikes.

According to many analysts, these problems are signs of underlying social tensions which have been there for a long time and which have surfaced since the new government has loosened its authoritarian grip on power and people enjoy the freedom to articulate themselves and get organized.

While it is undisputable that many problems of present day Myanmar have historic roots, this paper will focus on a different explanation. It will be argued that the present problems of communal violence, ethnic


and social unrest are exacerbated by a specific tension between the political sphere on the one hand, and the dynamics of the social and economic transformation on the ground on the other hand. As for the political sphere, it will be argued that firstly, political actors show a strong orientation towards the 2015 elections and are already behaving like in an election campaign. Secondly, political actors – politicians, but also NGOs and activists – can be characterized by the ideological and strategic orientation towards a fuzzy discourse of the rule of law.

Because of these characteristics, the political actors fail to address what can be called ‚problems of daily life‘: economic and social problems which people on the ground are facing as a result of the economic opening. Moreover, the orientation towards the rule of law obscures underlying conflicts of interests and prevents social movements and political actors from finding systematic and sustainable solutions for problems in connection with the transition process.

1. Introduction

Since the elections of 2010 and since President Thein Sein took office, Myanmar has been going through a dynamic process of political and economical opening which surprised all analysts as well as those who were involved in the process in Myanmar itself. Within the background of the long history of authoritarianism, it initially seemed unclear whether this process is sustainable or whether it might be reversed soon. This question appears no longer relevant. Although it must be kept in mind that the military is still the most dominant force in the country and that it is tightly controlling the transition process, it seems that the reforms and the speed at which they have been happening have brought about a self-enforcing dynamism which can no longer be stopped easily (Cheesman, Skidmore, Wilson 2010, 2012, Effner 2013).


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However, the process is in danger of getting derailed form another side. The opening is accompanied by more and more conflicts on the ground and outbreaks of violence: In June 2011, a 17-year long cease-fire accord between the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Burmese government was broken and severe and unexpectedly costly battles continued for one and a half years without any sign that the conflict could be decided by military means (Farelly 2012). More than 100,000 civilians have been displaced by the fighting (ICG 2013), and the number of casualties amounts to some 1,000. Several rounds of peace negotiations failed during 2012 and were followed by an escalation of the fighting. It was only in early 2013 that a new round of talks with the active participation of the Chinese and other international actors led to any success and brought about a new ceasefire agreement (ICG 2013).

These clashes fitted into the picture of old ethnic conflicts that have been simmering for decades at the country‘s periphery, where armed insurgency groups have been fighting against the central government for decades. Just as disturbing as these incidents was the outbreak of communal violence. In the Northern Rakhine State at the border of Bangladesh, around 100 people died and some 80,000 were displaced in violent clashes between Muslim Rohingyas and Buddhist Arakanese. Clashes also occurred in Inner Burma in the town of Meiktila where more than 100 people died. A Buddhist mob was burning down whole quarters and chased Muslims through the streets under the eyes of the police standing by. In total, these conflicts have the potential to derail the reform process and the violence, more and more, has been shaping the international perception of the process of opening (Vreize 2013). However, the connection between the reforms and the new wave of conflicts is described rather uniformly. The prevailing analysis is that ethnic and intra-communal tensions are ‚ghosts from the past‘, old problems inherited from former times. The idea is that the old


government had successfully suppressed these problems, while with the opening, the old conflicts are now coming to the surface. As a BBC commentator put it „[the ethnic conflict] is out in the open now, and spreading quickly in the new climate of freedom which was supposed to move the country towards a better, kinder future.“ (BBC 4 April 2013, What is behind anti-Muslim violence?).

This view can be criticized from various sides. Firstly, it conveys a certain essentialism of ethnicity. By stressing that ethnic conflicts as having been there for centuries, and which have only been suppressed by authoritarian rule, this view describes ethnicity as a naturally given fact. On a theoretical level, this essentialist view can be criticized as neglecting the constructive nature of ethnic boundaries as much as it neglects the political, social and economical processes and interests which are behind the construction (South 2008). Secondly, this mainstream view on ethnic conflicts in Myanmar presupposes that multi-ethnic societies are conflict prone. Ethnic diversity is seen as a burden that carries the permanent danger of slipping into violence. This implicitly supports the view of the military government who has legitimized its authoritarian rule exactly by saying that it needs a strong hand to contain ethnic struggles and hold the union together. Thirdly, the mainstream view sees the reason for ethnic tensions predominantly in the past. Starting from the genesis of ethnic groups in the pre-colonial past, the influence of the colonial ethnic policy, until the times of the military government – ethnic tensions tend to be explained by distant historic processes. As for the present situation in Myanmar, it is mostly the previous government that is blamed. The idea is that the authoritarian rule has simply suppressed the conflicts and by doing so created a high pressure which is being released now. Any connections to the current political and economic transformations are ignored and the outbreak of ethnic conflict is seen as collateral damage of the present opening.


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It is clear that ethnic conflicts have a long history in Myanmar. Many studies have analyzed the processes by which concepts of ethnicity were introduced by the British colonial government, and how they were used to exacerbated ethnic differences in a divide-and-rule manner in order to control the country. A telling example are the Karen, one of the largest minorities in Myanmar, counting between 2 and 5 million people who are split into various subgroups and are living in different regions and states. The process of forming a Karen identity was closely connected to the colonial government as well as to Baptist and other Christian missions. Missionaries developed the Karen writing system in the early 19th century, and through the missionary schools, Karen received Western education while many Buddhist Burmese did not have access to any kind of Western/modern schooling system. Categorized as a ‘martial race’ by the British authorities, the Karen also had preferred access to the colonial army and police forces. This caused the first violent clashes when Karen, loyal to the British, fought against Burman independence forces at the times of the Japanese occupation and during the struggle for independence (Smith 1999, South 2008). Although the armed struggle of the KNU can be traced back to the times of colonialism, the construction of an identity and ethnic nationalism does not necessarily lead to violent conflicts, as Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung (2012) points out. In her studies on the ‘other Karen’, Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung argues that the majority of Karen have lived peacefully among the Burman population, and although Buddhist as well as Christian Karen share the same strong ideas of ethnic nationalism, it was only a small fraction who took up arms and engaged in the decade-long insurgency.

While it can not be denied that the current ethnic conflicts in Myanmar have a historic dimension, the case of the Karen shows that historic processes are complex and can not account for the emergence of an


armed conflict in a straightforward way. This article will focus on the connection between the current economic and political opening process in Myanmar and highlight the influence of the present political and economic opening on the emergence and development of ethnic conflicts.

2. Economic Opening

The process of economic opening in Myanmar has to be distinguished from the process of political opening. As a result of the pro-democracy movement in 1988, the government of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) under General Ne Win had to step down. When in 1990 the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) later State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) took over, this change was a continuation of the authoritarian military governments, but it meant a change in the economic policy. The new junta turned away from socialist-style economic planning and embraced a liberalization and opening of many economic sectors. However, since the reforms were dominated by military elites they resulted in oligarchic structures rather than a real liberalization. Due to the economic sanctions of the West, foreign investment came mainly from China and led to a situation where Myanmar and its elites became more and more dependent on Chinese capital.

For the West, Myanmar did not play an important role, politically nor economically. Also for its biggest economic partner, China, Myanmar was not a high priority (Li 2012, Sutter 2012). For a long time, Chinese policy towards Myanmar was not decided at the level of the central government but on the provincial level in Yunnan (Workshop of TNI, spring 2012). The most important economic operations, gem trade and access to natural resources in the border areas, were a local issue


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(Egreteau 2012) and embedded in security and anti-drug policy (Kramer - Woods 2012). The importance of Myanmar has changed fundamentally only with the onset of the economic crisis in 2008. Europe and the USA who had insisted on strict sanctions against the Burmese military on the international level were hit by the crisis. China could escape the direct influence of the economic downturn. China’s economic boom, however, is endangered by the falling demands from the EU and the USA and by ecological and social distortions inside the country. One explanation for the opening process highlights that the Myanmar government wanted to achieve the lifting of sanctions by the West in order to balance out the heavy weight of Chinese investment. This plan neatly matched the interest of the EU and the USA who were looking for new markets and access to resources in order to find a way out of the crisis. Moreover, the opening of Myanmar also suited the geostrategic intention to contain the emerging super power of China and delimit its sphere of influence.

This is the background in which Myanmar succeeded to get priority attention as a cooperating partner – in the West as well as in China (Sun 2012, Li 2012). Investment fairs are luring visitors with undiscovered energy reserves in Myanmar. Mineral resources, agrarian products and wood, as well as a marked over 60 million consumers and labour force reserves have propelled the expectations of the investors. Myanmar’s position between two big emerging markets, China and India, promises sustainable growth. All this has changed Myanmar into a favored investment destination overnight. (critically Boot 2013).

The change of perception can be seen at the international engagement in Special Economic Zones (SEZ). The most ambitious project has been launched in Dawei, where a deep sea port and a direct land connection to Bangkok is planned (Naruemon et al. 2012). When the project ran


into financial problems and was in danger of failing, the Thai government repeatedly intervened and supported it due to the projects’ strategic importance for bilateral relations. Another reason for the Thai government’s support was the competition with a similar project in Kyaukphyu, where also a harbor, a pipeline and a motorway into Yunnan is planned by a Chinese consortium. In early 2013, Japanese investors signed contracts for a special economic zone in Thilawa and entered the race of bilaterally supported investment projects (Slodkowsi 2012). Apart from these large projects, new investors are also targeting the border region of Thailand and China. The vicinity of large markets promises to be a profitable site for a SEZ and to attract foreign investment in the sector of labor intensive production. (Maung Shwe 2011, The Bangkok Post 2013)

The engagement in a SEZ mirrors the general pattern of investment flows. The biggest proportion is coming from Asia, whereas investment from Western countries is only marginal (Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development 2013). As for the economic sectors, according to Myanmar sources for the year 2011, cited by the OECD, the largest investments have been channeled into the energy sector (almost 50% of all investments). This was followed by the oil and gas sector (over 30%), and only smaller amounts were invested into production (4%) (OECD 2012, Bissinger 2012a, 2012b for a different picture). The most recent reports, however, point to a large increase in investment in production sectors such as garment industries (The Irrawaddy 2013a).

Another aspect of the economic opening is the intertwining of investment with political authorities. In the border areas, where armed ethnic forces were granted administrative and economic competences in cease-fire accords, licenses for logging and mining were granted through unclear channels by provincial governors, local military


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authorities, local ethnic paramilitary authorities, or by more than one of these authorities (Callahan 2007, Meehan 2011, Woods 2011). Also in central Myanmar, where the authority of the central government was uncontested, licenses were granted by different ministries, which were controlled by different factions of the army. According to the reports about the current investment into the SEZ, these structures of military, ex-military elites and para-military actors are still a decisive factor in getting access to resources and for the success of investment projects (Slodkowski 2012).

The large and quick influx of investment leads to deep social distortions. Above all, Chinese investment in the border areas, the grab of land, the exploitation of energy reserves through newly built power plants, pipelines, mines and the beginnings of investment into the productive sector leads to far reaching social change and distortion (Kramer - Woods 2012). The scale and character of these distortions is largely undocumented since the government and the administration lacks the capacity to keep reliable statistics on social change. Only the increasing incidents of wilds strikes, violent protests in the processing factories in the North of Yangon (Nyein Nyein 2012), demonstration at the sites of big investment projects, or the frequent ethnic and communal conflicts can give an idea of the scale of the conflicts.

3. Political opening

The current political opening is a more recent development than the economic opening and it has come about in a very peculiar way. For a long time, the words ´Burma/Myanmar´ and ‘democracy’ have appeared to be a contradiction in terms. The country had the dubious distinction as one of the longest-enduring and most brutal military dictatorships. Neither the pressure by pro-democracy movements from


inside the country, nor economic sanctions that were imposed on Myanmar by the international community following the suppression of these movements by the junta seemed to have had any effect. This situation led to a number of studies that tried to make sense of the exceptional long rule of the military and looked for an explanation for Myanmar’s exceptionalism in a specific political culture (Hingst 2003, Smith 1999) or in the specific role of the military in the political system (Callahan 2004). Some authors went as far as claiming that the concept of democracy is alien to Burmese culture (Zöllner 2012).

From a comparative perspective, however, empirical studies show that democratization processes are rarely smooth or move in a single direction without ruptures but are rather marked by regular setbacks and interruptions (Tilly 2007). However, despite backlashes, many authors have argued for a general trend towards democracy in global history. From this perspective, democratization across countries and regions shows a specific pattern and seems to come in waves. Whereas this has been noticed by several authors, the periodization of the different waves vary considerably from author to author, the most well known being the study by Huntington (1991) who distinguishes among three waves. The first wave, he identifies in the 18th and 19th century when the USA, France and UK as well as Italy and Germany took steps toward a democratic political system. This wave was, according to Huntington’s periodization, followed by a backlash which saw Fascism rising in Spain, Italy and Germany. However, the next wave was marked by an even larger amplitude. With the end of WWII and the defeat of Fascism, a large number of countries acquired a democratic system. Also, for most former colonies that gained independence, democracy was the political system of choice. However, after yet another backlash which saw the establishment of military dictatorships in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and other parts of the world, Huntington’s focus lies on


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what he calls the ‘Third Wave of Democratization’ that he perceived as a major trend at the time of writing his book. According to his study, this democratization processes started in the mid 1970s in Portugal, Spain and Greece and moved on via the fall of military regimes in Latin America in the early 1980s to the regime change in the socialist world beginning of the 1990s. Under the impression of this trend, he suggests that this third wave is the final breakthrough of global democracy (Huntington 1991). Twenty years later in time, however, this optimism seems to have been proved wrong by various setbacks - especially in the post-socialist world where the fall of the socialist one-party systems often paved the way towards an oligarchic style of government. Still, the concept of waves of democracy is very appealing and inspired analyses of later trends. Thus, it can be argued as to whether the so-called color revolutions which saw large scale popular uprisings in post-socialist countries - starting with the revolution in Serbia in 2000, via the Rose Revolution in Georgia 2003, the Orange Revolution in 2004 in Ukraine toward the Tulip Revolution in Kirgizstan and the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon 2005 - constitute another, maybe fourth wave of democratization. Along the same lines, but from a different camp of political science, the so called Left Turn in Latin America might constitute a fourth wave since it came with constitutional reforms in Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador. And last but not least, the idea of a wave of democratization can capture the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011, which shattered the authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and other countries in the Arab world.

Seen from this perspective of waves and backlashes, the development in Burma/Myanmar does not appear to be isolated or exceptional. Actually, we can find reflections of each wave inside Burma as well. In 1935, when Burma was still a British colony, the Burma Act reacted to widespread public discontent and demonstrations in the early 1920s


and introduced a two-chamber parliament with a fully elected lower house. Although this form of tutelary democracy can not count as a real democratization, it can be argued that it is a reflection of the general normative consensus in the political discourse of its time which forced the colonial governments to make democratic concessions – albeit in a form that defined people in the colonies as not yet ready for full democracy.

A clear reflection of the second wave can be seen in the democratic system which was introduced with independence from Britain in 1948. This mirrors the zeitgeist of the time when fascism was defeated and with the founding of the UN and the establishment of a new system of international institutions, democracy was established as the only game in town. In Burma, however, the democratic period only lasted until the coup d’état in 1962 which brought General Ne Win to power who introduced a military rule in disguised as a socialist one-party system.

As for the later waves of democratization, the 1988 uprising which ousted the socialist government of Ne Win government and pressed the military to hold elections in 1990, was perceived as part of the democratization processes in the socialist world – a prototypical instance of Huntington’s ‘Third Wave’. However, this revolutionary momentum failed to bring about a sustained regime change and the military took back the political power and has been remained in office ever since. In this respect, too, Myanmar does not seem to be an isolated case. In many ex-socialist countries, the political change of the early 1990s did not lead to a consolidated democratic system but rather to an oligarchic system. Consequently, the Buddhist monks’ demonstrations in late 2007 became known as the ‘Saffron Revolution’ and were interpreted as Myanmar’s version of a color revolution. As in the other countries of the post-socialist world, the demonstrations followed


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a specific script and some of the key actors reflected the involvement of institutions that were also supporting the uprisings in other countries (Schaffar 2008).

Contrary to studies that treat Burma as an isolated polity and focus on a culture of authoritarianism, the history of democracy movements show that Burma was well connected to global trends and actors. As far as people having continuously called for a more democratic system, Burma is not exceptional or unique. However, it is unique in the sense that the current situation was coined by the harsh suppression and development following the 1988 democracy demonstrations. This large movement – initially led by the students but then spread out over large parts of society – mobilized for political and economic reforms and succeeded in ousting the Burmese Socialist Programme Party government led by Ne Win. The pressure from the streets was also strong enough to push for general elections in 1990. Despite the repressions which the military used to discourage oppositional parties, the newly founded National League for Democracy under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi won a landslide victory. However, the serious social unrest and the riots which accompanied the protests of these years were used as the pretext for the military to hold on to power with the justification that only a tightly controlled, rule-based and ordered process can lead to real democracy. In the following years, the front between the NDL and the military became more and more insurmountable: The NLD and most opposition politicians in exile demanded the recognition of the election results of 1990 as the foundation for a dialog. The military rejected this categorically and insisted that a rules-based transition to democracy has to start with drafting of a new constitution.


3.1. The present democratization process

Although the years since 1988 saw occasional uprisings and protests – the most recognized being the Saffron Revolution of 2007 – the present democratization is a strictly controlled top-down process which seems to entail no concessions to the NLD or to any other political or social force. The process was also not triggered by a natural disaster or an economic crisis. Rather, it appears to be an administrative act without the visible involvement of any social movement. This detail is important because it means that firstly, neither the military regime nor the present government, which is close to it, suffer from an acute crisis of legitimacy – unlike governments in countries that were hit by an acute economic crisis shaking the government – such as Soeharto s Indonesia in 1997/1998. Secondly, no opposition force can claim legitimacy to lead the reform process on the basis of a successful social mobilization – unlike in Egypt where political forces are referring to the ousting of Mubarak and claim to represent ‘the revolution’ of the ‘the people of Tahrir Square’.

A concrete plan of how the military wanted to facilitate the transition to democracy was formulated as a ‘road map to democracy’ in 2003 by the then Prime Minister Khin Nyunt. It consisted of a seven step plan that defined the way to draft a constitution and hold general elections. Internationally as well as by actors inside Myanmar, this road map was not taken seriously, since it lacked any concrete time frame and since its initiator, Khin Nyunt was ousted from his office and arrested shortly after the proclamation of the plan. The road map was rather seen as a public relations offensive by the military to legitimize the ongoing military rule and to secure the dominance of the economic elites with military background or backing. This is why the constitution drafting process – when it was started in 2004 – was boycotted by large portions


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of the group of political actors. However, the present opening appears as the result of a tenacious and in large parts completely untrustworthy process which goes back to the road map.

The objections against the plan were also the consequence of the frequent and arbitrary use of violence by the regime whenever their control of the political process was challenged. The insistence on a rule-based transition even went so far that the military did not yield and stuck to the date for the referendum of the new constitution, although the cyclone Nargis had caused unprecedented devastation in the Delta region and in the capital just one week earlier.

The political opposition and democracy activists were split on the drafting process and the referendum. Those groups which had decided not to boycott the constitutional process did so with a characteristic stance which until today has still coined the positioning and strategy of many actors. Firstly, the whole process was seen as a preliminary development – as the inception of democratization but not as real liberalization. This means that the constitution of 2008 and the general elections of 2010 which are presented by the government as the fulfillment of the democratization process, is seen as an incomplete intermediate step which has to be overcome at a later stage by real liberalization. Secondly, this process, as incomplete and flawed as it might be, was acknowledged as the only option that might bring about at least some change.

3.2. The elections of 2010 and 2012

Since the last elections, this stance has further intensified. In the run-up to the elections in November 2010, there was still a visible movement which demanded a boycott of the elections (Mizzima 2010, Lawi Weng


- Wai Moe 2010, Effner 2010). This positioning followed the established pattern that actors and organizations of Burmese in exile and the NLD demanded a boycott and would only engage in a reform process after economic sanctions and isolation politics had resulted in a regime change. Those who engaged in the elections, did so knowing that firstly the elections would be manipulated; secondly that the results would only be accepted if the military wins, and thirdly that – given the decade-long stalemate - there was no alternative. A thin ray of hope was that through accepting the rules of the game set by the military, the stagnation could be overcome and a process could start unfolding which – beyond the tight planning of the military – might unleash a dynamism of its own and trigger future liberalization.

Although the USDP – the party close to the military – won the vast majority of the votes, presumably through manipulation, the hope for change was fueled when Thein Sein came to power. He gave a strong indication of his willingness to reform the style of politics when he stopped a highly contested development project – the Mitsone dam in Kachin state. The hope for change was further nourished when in 2012 by-elections were held and international organizations were invited to monitor (Lidauer 2012). Ever since then, the skeptical stance towards the democratization process changed to the contrary and the international community applauded the reforms. It has to be kept in mind, though, that the by-elections did not bring about a change in the power balance. Although the NLD won a landslide victory, the elections were held to fill only 44 out of 260 seats in parliament. This is why critical voices pointed out that the euphoria of the international community about the symbolic and merely cosmetic changes is somewhat naive and effectively legitimizes the actual powers.

Still, the by-election had far reaching consequences for the political


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landscape: Firstly, with Aung San Suu Kyi taking part in it, the present constitution was legitimized and the strongest political force which had boycotted the process so far had now bought into it. Since then, no relevant political force has been calling for a boycott any longer. Secondly, it created a great expectation and came with promise: If people adhere to the rules set by the government, then a real democratization might be reached. The magic date is the general elections of 2015. Under the impression of the last round of voting, most analysts expect that the NLD will win in 2015 as clearly as they did at the by-elections in 2012.

With the orientation towards the 2015 elections and the acknowledgment of the present powers that be, the current period is perceived as an interregnum, and this perception influences the positioning and strategic behavior of the actors. It is the reason for the internal dynamics of the political system. This situation can be described as a ‘racing standstill’. On the one hand, politicians try to use the public sphere of the newly established media to become known and to establish their profile. This means that politicians are present at certain social hot spots and they are receptive to the problems of the people. On the other hand, unpopular problems that are not suitable for developing a positive profile are systematically ignored. A telling example is Aung San Suu Kyi’s hesitation to react to the violence against Rohingya in Rakhine (McLaughlin 2013). Campaigning for the next general elections has already begun and politicians care for their public reputation more than for effective problem solving.

On the other side, since most people expect a fundamental shift of the power in parliament away from the USDP – the party close to the military - towards the NLD. This is why many oppositional politicians tend to delay fundamental projects or in order to achieve different and


more favorable results under the anticipated new parliament. Sometimes laws are formulated in a very general fashion in order to shift as many concrete regulations as possible to implementation provisions as this also leaves room for maneuvers after the election. This strong orientation towards the next election and the caution that governs most politicians´ behavior, is summarized in the characterization of Aung San Suu Kyi’s strategy towards constitutional change.

“[She is] preparing for constitutional change, hopefully after 2015, and maintaining a relationship of trust with the army to ensure that they support the constitutional change that is needed for Burma to become a democratic state. And I understand why she [Aung San Suu Kyi, Anmerkung WS] feels that that’s important. Because the great prize in Burma, for anyone who has been fighting for democracy in Burma, is a change in the constitution.” (Tom Malinowski, cited in Prasse-Freeman 2013a)

3.3. Orientation towards the rule of law and rule compliance

Another feature of the current situation is a characteristic orientation towards the establishment and enforcement of the rule of law. ‘Rule of law’ is ubiquitous in the present political discourse (Prasse-Freeman 2013a, 2013b). The NLD announced its central political campaign under this motto and Aung San Suu Kyi has been appointed chair of an official state commission of the rule of law. In a recent statement on communal violence in Meiktila she stressed that the lack of the rule of law was the root cause of ethnic and communal tensions. Interestingly, the ruling USDP is drawing on the concept as well. An official of the government told activists working on the problem of land grabbing that this issue will be solved by the rule of law. And finally, the USDP can claim to do nothing else but follow the rule of law principles when they insist on


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a rules-based top-down democratization process. In the words of Laclau, one can characterize the concept of the rule of law in the present day political discourse in Myanmar as a floating signifier. It is highly under-specified, and defining its content is a process of construction of political hegemony (Laclau 1996).

The orientation towards the rule of law has multiple reasons. It corresponds to the international trend of rights-based development (Hamm 2001, Nussbaumer 1998, Sen 2004, Arbor 2008, Banik 2005) which has become an influential paradigm in different development institutions and organizations. Krever (2010), Humphreys (2010) and Ebenau (2012) criticize the turn of development theory towards toward a focus on rights as enforcement of neoliberal principles. On the supra-national level, this trend goes hand in hand with tendencies that have been analyzed as New Constitutionalism (Hirschl 2004, Gill 1998, Guth 2013, Unterberger 2012).

The ideological character of these programs, which push for a specific understanding of the rule of law, mirrors the orientation of the actors who were involved in Burma for a long time. Since 1988, Myanmar was treated as a delayed transition country. The NLD as the most prominent opposition force took a position as a civil rights movement – just as the movements in Central and Eastern Europe did end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. Thus the obvious cooperation partners for the democratic opposition were foundations and organizations like Endowment of Democracy, the Einstein Institute, or the Friedrich-Naumann Stiftung.

The orientation towards the notion of the rule of law, however, is not imposed by outside actors. It also meets a very central demand of people in Myanmar themselves. After years of authoritarian rule, people


demand for more rule-based and transparent procedures. During the decades of the military rule, political decisions were also taken in the form of laws and rules. However, the legislative process as well as the interpretation and application of law was personalized and appeared as arbitrary rule. The attractiveness of the notion of the rule of law lies in the promise to make state actions calculable and hold the state accountable for arbitrary decisions.

3.4. The rule of law and control of the political process

Beyond the ideological orientation towards the rule of law, the concept also influences the strategic orientation and the behavior of the political actors. The question about the rules of the game of political contestation receives much attention and this can be explained by historical experience. In the past, political movements and activists have been the target of harsh political suppression. Moreover, most activists have first-hand experience of imprisonment and abuse. Massive intimidation of political activists is fresh in the memory as many activists have just come out of jail in the wake of the recent amnesty. Many are still suffering from the consequences of their prosecution in their personal lives such as the prohibition to exercise their professions and the interruption of their academic or professional careers. In the peripheral areas, the experience of a decade-long civil war adds to this. Compliance with the rules of the game, thus, is a strategy of self-protection. The danger to get arrested of even killed is still quite real in the present situation as is shown by the experience of activists working on land rights or other sensitive issues (Naw Say Phaw Waa 2012).

Apart from self-protection, compliance with the rules of the game has also become morally charged. Since in the past, the military has used political chaos as a pretext for intervention, a political strategy outside


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the limits of the rules set by the government is perceived as danger to the fragile transition process. Among those who engage constructively in the reform process, compliance to the rules of the game has become a political as much as a moral consensus. This question, however, is highly contested and different opinions regarding the political strategy are the reason for massive conflicts within the groups (LRC 2012).

What makes this question so controversial is the fact that the definition of the rules of the game - first and foremost regulations for the registration of NGOs and associations, unions, the media etc. - is used by the government to contain the opposition and to control the emerging civil society. The present regulations for the registration of NGOs stem from the time after the 1988 uprising and give the authorities far-reaching competences. The registration process is complicated and costly and in the current situation, it is sometimes unclear what government authority is in charge of which step of the registration (Saha 2011). For unions, there are new rules which regulate the foundation of labor associations as well as strikes. Characteristically, the new law does not only define the freedom of association. It also draws the limit of this right and defines the sanctions which are imposed if someone trespasses the strike rules (BBC 2011).

Many local NGOs have worked without registration for a long time. This exposes them to arbitrary actions by the authorities. Being registered, however, also exposes the NGO to the grip of the authorities. For example, as it is not allowed for officially registered NGOs to get politically engaged, many NGOs working on environmental issues could not take part in the campaigns against the Mitsone dam. A reform of the registration law has been worked on since last year (Shwe Yee Saw Myint 2012). However, this law seems to be one of those political initiatives that have been deliberately delayed (Nyein Nyein 2012b).


The characteristics of the current political situation in Myanmar can be summarized as follows: Although the power balance in Myanmar has not changed fundamentally, the current political process that is initiated and controlled by the USDP is welcomed by actors inside and outside the country. Especially the international community is euphoric about the current political opening. Inside the country, however, the political actors are cautious and orientated towards the 2015 elections when a major shift in the power balance is expected. On the one hand side, this makes them avoid potentially controversial issues. On the one hand, the political actors show a strong orientation toward a fuzzy concept of the rule of law. Ideologically, the rule of law is used by different sides as a mantra and it serves as a floating signifier and a fuzzy promise for a problem-solving policy. On the other hand, adherence to the rules of the political game, set by the USDP, has become a moral imperative as well as a means of self-protection.

Most importantly, the peculiar rationality that governs the behavior of the political actors and which shapes the processes of the political opening is out of tune with the economic opening. Firstly, the economic opening started much earlier with the abolishment of the socialist system in 1990. Secondly, it proceeds at a higher pace since the stakeholders inside Myanmar as well as the investors from outside are fully embracing the new investment opportunities (The Irrawaddy 2013b). The legislature to regulate investment has taken a long time, and finally provisions that could have restricted the role of the investors and secure political regulation have been watered down (The Irrawaddy, 2013a). Thirdly, the liberalization process during the past two decades that happened under the military junta has given rise to personalized business networks that control further economic processes. In the areas of the country’s periphery, elites of the ethnic insurgence groups have used the umbrella of cease-fire agreements to start lucrative


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businesses. The political system which is just evolving now is not powerful enough to install regulations that might restrict the interests of the powerful elites. Moreover, despite the promising opening, the political system does not yet function in such a way that it could channel social grievances into the political process (Prasse-Freeman 2012).

4. Ethnic violence in the light of the recent economic and political opening

The ethnic and religious conflicts which are surfacing in Myanmar right now are often mentioned in the same breath as other transitional countries, and they are analyzed following the same pattern. The central idea is that the former authoritarian governments have suppressed the underlying tension and prevented different groups from articulating these conflicts. In the wake of the liberalization, this suppression is now lifted and the pressure breaks out in form of violent conflicts (BBC 2013).

This interpretation rests on an essentialist idea of ethnicity and on the assumption that ethnicity is inherently conflictive. In the case of Myanmar, however, one can argue that the economic and political transition itself is closely and systematically connected to the dynamism of ethnic conflicts. The example of two notorious ethnic problems, the Karen and the Kachin conflict, show the complexity of this connection. On the one hand, it is exactly the new economic and political opportunities that have helped to bring about a ceasefire agreement between the Karen National Union (KNU) and the central government in 2011. This has put an end to the decade-long armed insurgency. On the other hand, the same political and economic opening is connected to the breakdown of the cease-fire agreement with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) although it had been in place for 17 years and was acclaimed as one of the most successful.


4.1. The Karen conflict

The armed insurgence of the Karen National Union dates back to the times of the independence struggles in the 1940s. After the failure of the Panglong conference in 1947 which was supposed to lay the foundation for the federal union of Burma, dissatisfaction about the size of a Karen federal state and the question of future independence was the reason why the KNU took to the arms. The battle of Insein in 1949 where KNU troops were defeated in a Karen populated area North of Yangon, mark the onset of a decade-long civil war. The main site of the conflict has moved with the times - it started with battles in the Delta region and North of Yangon, later shifted to a guerrilla war in the Mountains along the Thai border to which the troops had retreated. The conflict has also changed its character and was fuelled not only by the problems in the Karen populated areas alone but also was connected to the dynamism of other conflicts in central Burma. After the crack-down on the 1988 movement, the area controlled by the KNU served as safe havens for Burman political activists and members of the oppositional parties who fled Rangoon. After the elections of 1990, it was in Manneplaw, the headquarters of the KNU, where the elected parliament convened and formed a parallel government. After the fall of Manneplaw in 1995 and the subsequent intensification of the military campaigns of the Burmese army, hundreds of thousands of Karen fled across the Thai border and the refugee camps on the Thai side developed into the major support bases of the KNU. Inside the camps, humanitarian help, political activism and religious missionary activities began to merge and the Karen political and religious activists in Burma, Thailand, the USA and Europe formed a transnationally organized network (Horstman 2011). For many years, the Karen organizations formed a crucial part of the Burmese exile network that supported the strict economical sanctions of the West against the Burmese government (South 2008, 2011).


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Apart from these vocal and well-connected networks, the situation on the ground in the Karen populated areas developed in a different direction. One example is the intra-Karen splits that came about in the course of the radicalization of the KNU. During the 1990s, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) defected from the dominantly Christian KNU, negotiated a cease-fire agreement and made it possible for the Burmese military to defeat the KNU’s headquarters in Manneplaw (Horstmann 2011). Another example is the development outside of insurgency areas where the majority of the Karen population is living in stable and peaceful coexistence with the Burmans (Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung 2012). These groups joined in the political processes accompanying the constitutional drafting between 2004 and 2008. In the run-up to the elections in 2010, a number of Karen parties were founded that claimed to represent the Karen: Kayin People’s Party, the Karen State Democracy and Development Party, the Plone-Swor Democratic Party, and the Kayin Democratic Party. Finally, inside the USDP and the NLD, members with a Karen background are organizing themselves in order to work for the Karen cause.

In the background of the decade-long civil war and the split between the armed insurgence groups around the KNU on the one hand, and the groups that opted for a constructive engagement with the new system, it is remarkable that the cease-fire negotiations between the KNU and the central government went on swiftly and successfully (BBC 2012). The peace process is currently being discussed by various Karen organizations and parties, and after the termination of warfare, there is an atmosphere of positive change in the Karen region (Saw Thein Myint 2013).

One explanation for the historic breakthrough can be seen in the fact that it is connected to one of the ambitious infrastructure projects, the


SEZ and the deep sea port in Dawei. The project rests on the plan to connect to the Bangkok region via a new road and a pipeline to serve as a short cut to avoid the time-consuming route through the Strait of Malacca. The road and the pipeline, however, are leading through Karen-controlled territory and without a reliable peace process, neither the construction nor the use of the passage would have been possible. It is assumed that the KNU was pushed into cease-fire negotiations by both the Myanmar as well as the Thai government who both perceive this project as highly important for future development. The Myanmar government was able to draw on the successful incorporation of various Karen groups into the political reform process. Moreover, during the past years the Burmese military was able to achieve small but continuous successes against the KNU due to its brutal four-cuts anti-insurgency strategy (Smith 1999). Thailand was also in a powerful bargaining position towards the KNU since it had tolerated the KNU operations inside the refugee camps for a long time. Apart from the pressure, however, it seems to be the case that the KNU was also bought into the project with the promise of getting a share of the new economic gains (Saw Kapi 2012, Saw Yan Naing, and Kyaw Kha, 2013). Following the logic of earlier ceasefire agreements, negotiated by Khin Nyunt with various ethnic groups in the 1990s, the ceasefire with the KNU obviously comprised administrative as well as economic guarantees.

Thus, the dynamics that laid to an end of the hitherto longest civil war in modern history - the Karen insurgency in the mountains of Western Myanmar - was closely connected to the political and economic opening process in lowland Myanmar. Firstly, the plans for a large economic project in Dawei that was supported bilaterally by the Myanmar and the Thai government, made it necessary to include the KNU that controlled the hinterland of the SEZ. Secondly, an inclusive political process that led to the establishment of Karen ethnic parties and Karen networks


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inside the Burman dominated major parties laid the foundation for a political process.

In how far this peace process will be sustainable is yet to be seen. Apart from the economic gains that might trickle down someday in future, people in the Karen state are suffering from the long-term effects of a decade-long conflict. Thousands have been driven off their land and deprived of their livelihood. Much of the farmland is either inaccessible because of landmines, or it is now being used for other commercial or infrastructure purposes. These fundamental problems have not been addressed systematically in the cease-fire agreement. Until recently, the KNU played the role of the most powerful representation of Karen interests – at least symbolically (Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung 2012). If the KNU is getting too close to the Burmese government and loses its role and credibility, conflicts concerning access to land and development issue are likely to re-erupt through different channels.

4.2. The Kachin conflict

It is exactly this situation of re-eruption seems to have happened in the Kachin state. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has a history of armed struggle against the Burman government that goes back in history almost as far as the KNU insurgency. Differently from the KNU, however, the KIA was among those ethnic insurgency groups who negotiated a cease-fire agreement with Khin Nyunt in the 1990s and was granted the right to maintain their own administrative and military infrastructure as well as access rights to resources in certain areas. In Kachin, the government followed a divide-et-impera strategy and also acknowledged other Kachin armed groups by cease-fire agreements including access rights to economic resources, such as a breakaway group of the KIA, the Kachin Defense Army (KDA) or the New Democratic


Army-Kachin (NDAK) that used to be part of the Burmese Communist Party. What evolved was a network of overlapping state and para-state authorities (Callahan 2007) that were constantly contesting the control over natural resources. Concessions for logging and jade mining, for example, were granted by more than one authority and led to conflicts over the distribution of gains between the different Kachin groups. Woods (2011), Meehan (2011) and Schaffar (2008) interpret these arrangements as a means of state-building by the central government. Due to progressive cooption and corruption of the ethnic authorities, the central government could acquire more and more competences in the areas previously controlled by the ethnic insurgency groups and complete a process of state building.

At the same time, the umbrella of the ceasefire agreement granted political space for the establishment of NGOs that started development projects. The Shalom as well as the Metta Foundation have their origin in the Kachin state. Through the cooperation of foreign donors, they developed into the largest and most capable actors in the NGO business in Myanmar. For some while, thanks to the work of the NGOs, the infrastructure in Myitkyina, the capital of the Kachin state, was of better quality than in Yangon, as far as the electricity supply was concerned.

The cease-fire agreement also made possible systematic access to natural resources that were hitherto inaccessible. First and foremost Chinese capital invested in logging and jade mining, and a lucrative cross-border trade of jade, gem stones and timber started to boom during the 2000s (Farelli 2012). The Myanmar government welcomed the trade as an opportunity to circumvent the economic sanctions imposed from the West (Egreteau 2012). Another important development was connected to opium substitution programs driven by Chinese security interests. Here, the Chinese government supported a market-


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driven approach and encouraged investment in rubber and other kinds of commercial plantations in the border region (Kramer - Woods 2012). Both developments were implemented with the support of Kachin elites who profited from concessions on mines and land. The local population, however, was marginalized since the Chinese investors hired workers from China rather than form the local areas. Thus, many Kachin were not only driven off their land, but also did not profit from the commercial exploitation of the new projects.

The deepening discontent with Chinese funded projects is the background on which opposition to the Myitsone dam mobilized. Like many other examples, this mega project for energy production was predominantly financed by Chinese investment and was planned to deliver energy to Yunnan rather than to local consumers. That the new president Thein Sein stopped the project after social unrest unfolded during 2010 and 2011 not only shows his new style of politics but also is a sign of the magnitude of the social distortions that accompanied the development projects under the cease-fire agreement in Kachin. The immediate trigger of the outbreak of violence between the KIA and the government troops, however, was a project very similar to the SEZ and deep seaport in Dawei. In Kyaukpyu, in the state of Rakhine, another SEZ and deep seaport is planned with Chinese investment. As in the South, this Northern project is part of an East-West economic corridor where a new road and a pipeline will connect the SEZ to Yunnan in China. Exactly as with the KNU, the road and pipeline to Yunnan will cross KIA controlled territory, and it was the ambition of the Burmese government to secure this infrastructure project that led the army to incur into KIA territory.

The strong reaction and the sustained fighting from the side of the KIA have taken the government troops by surprise. Obviously, the Burmese


army had underestimated the military strength of KIA as well as the open and clandestine support of the population for the new insurgency. The new fighting has also called into question the analysis of Woods (2011), Meehan (2011) and Schaffar (2008) who have argued that the cease-fire accords were an effective means of state consolidation.

Farelli (2012) argues that the fighting has led to a rehabilitation of the KIA in the eyes of the Kachin population despite the fact the many KIA leaders were discredited by their role in other development projects. The KIA managed to channel discontent over the social and economic marginalization away from their own involvement towards the government and enjoyed rising support from informal networks throughout Kachin as well as from Kachin networks abroad.

What has led to this situation which gave the Kachin conflict dynamics towards new confrontation along ethnic lines? Here the dynamics of the political sphere has to be taken into account. Tensions between the KIA and the government began to mount in 2010 (Farelli 2012). While tensions were already on the rise, the government tried to control Kachin influence by the use of the registration process: Despite several attempts, no party which had explicit Kachin background was admitted to the 2010 elections. Thus, almost none of the influential leaders of the civil arm of the KIA and also no other Kachin representative was incorporated into the newly formed political system (Farelli 2012). When the fighting broke out in June 2011, the conflict was left to be solved by the army. Neither the president, nor Aung San Suu Kyi got involved into the conflict (Randolph 2013). Aung San Suu Kyi seemed to have followed the strategy as outlined above: In order to play on the safe side for the upcoming elections in 2015, she decided not to take sides with an ethnic minority force that might turn out to be unpopular among the Burmese electorate. Secondly, as the KIA is an outlawed organization, she might


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have opted to stay away from the conflict for reasons of self protection. Due to her behavior, however, she has lost much of her credibility and is no longer welcome at the peace talks (Lawi Weng 2012, Hindstrom 2013). Thus, another potentially helpful player who could have positively influenced the peace talks has been neutralized.

Finally the orientation toward the rule of law proves unsuitable for this kind of conflict. What is at stake are projects that have deprived thousands of people of their livelihood (Kanbawza Win 2013). However, these projects have been planned and concessions have been granted in a situation of overlapping authorities under the umbrella of the cease-fire agreement (Callahan 2007, Eleven Myanmar 2013). What is at stake are different interpretations of land rights, customary law and concessions. In this situation of legal pluralism, the concept of the rule of law does not help. What needs to be addressed are questions of the distribution of wealth, inclusion into economic development and the nature and aim of development projects.

Since the ban of Kachin political leaders from the formal political processes in the regional parliament in Myitkyina as well as in the national parliament in Yangon, the door for an inclusive and constructive involvement of Kachin groups in the formal political processes has been closed. Kachin opposition has been driven to political actions outside parliament and the result is a cycle of new ethnic confrontation that intensifies the ethnic division in an area where for the past 17 years processes of ethnic inclusion and coexistence have been under way (Farelli 2012). Meanwhile, new rounds of peace talks have resulted in a cease-fire accord (Aung Zaw 2013, ICG 2013). The agreement was made possible by more and more active intervention by the Chinese government who used their bargaining power vis à vis the Myanmar government as much as vis à vis the KIA to push both sides to end the


fighting in order to prevent further loss of ground of Chinese investment in the Kachin state. It remains to be seen, in how far the new agreement will last and how the peace can be used to solve the problems inherited from the times of the last cease-fire period as well as the new acute problem of some hundred thousand displaced people.

Conclusion

Myanmar is going through a phase of rapid economic and political opening. After years of stagnation this reform process is welcomed by the population and is applauded by the international community. The process, however, is fragile and the biggest danger seems to be coming from communal and ethnic violence. These problems are commonly explained as collateral damage of the liberalization process – in the sense that old primordial structures that had been suppressed by the authoritarian regime are now coming to the surface in the wake of the opening. Contrary to this view, this article took up the example of the Karen and the Kachin conflict and argued that the dynamism of the conflicts is closely connected to the opening process itself. Specifically, the top-down nature of the reforms has brought about a peculiar political system which lacks the capacity to channel social grievances and to regulate the processes that come along with galloping economic change.


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Thai-Cambodian Conflict over Preah Vihear Temple: The Sign of ASEAN’s Failure?

Richard TurcsányiDoctoral candidate and lecturer at Department of International Relations and European Studies, Masaryk University, BrnoEditor-in-Chief, Global PoliticsResearch fellow, Institute of Asian Studies, CENAA, Bratislava

Abstract

This paper deals with the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear temple and its surroundings. It is argued that the recent conflict escalation was not as much a result of mutual misunderstanding, but rather of deliberate policies of particular politicians on both sides attempting to exploit the case for domestic political goals. While both countries are members of ASEAN and thus signatory parties to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and ASEAN Chapter, ASEAN was not capable of solving the conflict. Instead, the UN Security Council and International Court of Justice have been consulted and the latter is expected to put an end to the argumentative part of the dispute by issuing the interpretation of its original judgment on the issue from 1962. It is proposed that from the ASEAN perspective, the scenario of judgment without resolution of the disputed territory should be preferred as this would return the dispute back to its pre-1962 status quo and the organization would get a second chance to deal with it. However, while it is far from certain that it would seize it this time and overcome its ‘inefficiencies’, it is probable that the court would assign the territory to Cambodia entirely. In both cases, ASEAN would possibly face rising doubts about its functionality and its proudly presented ‘ASEAN unity’ may find itself somewhat humiliated.


Introduction

While regional integration is becoming somewhat of a must in perhaps every corner of the world, not many cases are generally viewed as success stories. Quite clearly it is the European Union which is regarded as the primary case, followed usually by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) coming second, far ahead of other organizations worldwide. Although ASEAN has reached the point where it is perceived in international relations as (almost) a single actor, its internal dynamics are often overlooked and normally presented as ‘inefficiencies’ due to the ASEAN way. This paper is going to deal with the topic of conflicts between the ASEAN member countries using the example of the Thai-Cambodian territorial conflict. The aim of the paper will be to analyze the internal dynamics of the conflict and discuss its possible impacts on ASEAN unity and functionality.

The Thai-Cambodian conflict is the most serious conflict between two ASEAN countries and after more than 20 years the first and single one in the region of Southeast Asia which turned violent. At its center is the dispute over the ancient Preah Vihear temple and the surrounding 4.6 km² of territory which is located in the north of Cambodia and southeast of Thailand.

In this paper, I will begin with a detailed analysis of the conflict timeline, starting with roots in colonial times and ending with the current waiting period for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) interpretation of the original decision from 1962, which should come in late 2013. In the second section it will be argued that the conflict is not created and fuelled as much by misunderstandings and misperceptions between the actors involved, but rather by deliberate moves of politicians on both sides who exploit it for own domestic political purposes. As the next


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section demonstrates, this shows minimal considerations for the common ASEAN membership and also a highly limited role ASEAN can play in such a kind of dispute between its two members, each under pressure of certain political forces which have an interest in sustaining and even escalating the conflict. In conclusion, the two basic scenarios based on the potential ruling of ICJ will be discussed from the perspective of ASEAN as an organization and its overall goings-on will be assessed from the prism of handling this dispute.

The history of the dispute

Thailand and Cambodia have a long history of conflicts dating back as early as the 11th century when the Khmer Empire, regarded as a predecessor of modern Cambodia, ruled over most of mainland South East Asia, including present-day Cambodia and Thailand. The temple of Preah Vihear, which is at the center of recent border disputes, was built during the golden era of the Khmer Empire between the late 9th and 12th century and was enshrined as a Hindu temple as the predominant religion of the time, though it reflects some signs of Buddhism which was on the rise in this region in later periods (Roveda – Jacques 2012). While the temple is of Khmer origin, the borders changed repeatedly during ancient history and the temple was during some periods under the rule of the Kingdom of Siam, which is the ancestor of modern Thailand. The region around the temple on both sides of the border is inhabited by the people of a distinct ethnic group called Kui (also known as Kuay or Kuy) who live along both sides of the border, which makes it less relevant for either Thailand or Cambodia to claim the area on the basis of ancestral heritage (von Feigenblatt 2011).

The long period of decline of the Khmer Empire began in the 15th century, during which it was constantly losing territory to Siam. In the 19th


century France became involved in the relations between the two countries and while at first Siam recognized the French protectorate over the weakened Khmer Empire for the exchange of the territory including the location of the Preah Vihear temple, at the end of the 19th century the Kingdom of Siam had to pay for its sovereignty with territorial losses. The beginning of the current territorial dispute is dated to the time, when France and Siam settled their borders in the Boundary Treaty in 1904 and the Mixed Franco-Siamese Commission surveyed the border region in 1906 and 1907. As Siam at that time lacked technological capacities to produce maps, it asked France to do so (ICJ Case Concerning the Preah Vihear 1962: 20). This led to a production of maps depicting the borders which were presented to Siam in 1908. However, while the established principle of the border in the area around the temple in the 1904 treaty was to follow a certain watershed line and that would place the temple on today’s Thai side of the border; on a single map produced in 1907, so called Annex 1, the temple was depicted south of the borders and thus on the soil of modern-day Cambodia (Saikia 2011).

At the beginning of the 20th century the temple was administered as part of French Indochina. During World War II, when Japan occupied Cambodia, its war ally Thailand occupied the temple and surrounding regions, only to be obliged to return the territory after the war. Yet, again, after Cambodia won its independence in 1954 and France withdrew, Thailand took advantage of the situation and occupied the temple once again. This led finally to the emergence of the dispute and Cambodia turned to the ICJ in 1959 to decide on the sovereignty of the temple (Ciorciari 2009).

In the ruling before the court, Cambodia claimed that the temple is clearly located in Cambodian territory as a result of its depiction on the


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territorial maps from the time of the Franco-Siamese border commission and also as since then the temple was showed on numerous maps as laying in Cambodia, including maps printed in Thailand. There has been also no objection to this from Thailand until 1958. On the other hand, Thailand claimed that it is the principle of the 1904 treaty which should be followed and, accordingly, the temple is in Thailand. It also asserted that the line was only produced by one side of the commission and thus is not binding. Subsequently, Thailand never accepted that the temple belongs to Cambodia and if it did so, it was on a mistaken belief that line in the map was drawn in accordance with the principle established in the 1904 treaty (ICJ Case Concerning the Preah Vihear 1962).

The final decision of the court came in 1962 and it is this ruling which is at the center of today’s dispute. The court rejected Thai claims and ruled that as the result of Thailand accepting the map in 1908 and never raising any concern until 1958, it showed it had respected the line as it was. Even the possible error cannot be accepted as the reason to question the validity of the original line as drawn in the Annex 1 map. Furthermore, Thailand did later occupy the temple and it could not believe erroneously that it was in Cambodia and still occupy it at the same time (ibid).

While the court did decide that the temple belonged to Cambodia and even that Thailand was to return all the property it had taken out of it, Thailand has claimed ever since that the decision did not include the land around the temple, approximately 4.6 km², which has therefore remained disputed. It asserts, furthermore, that the court itself established that it had no jurisdiction over deciding the sovereignty issue over the land surrounding the temple and its decision and jurisdiction only applied to the temple itself (Pakdeekong 2009).


For nearly another 50 years the dispute seemed to cease existing with both countries dealing with more serious national security issues and with only a handful of initiatives between Thailand and Cambodia to finalize their border settlement. The situation changed prior to 2008 UNESCO listing. From the beginning, Thailand was supportive of Cambodia’s will to apply for the listing, although it made it clear that the joint submission would be preferable due to common cultural and historical background, proximity to the borders and also for the fears that UNESCO listing could be used by Cambodia to usurp the land which Thailand considered disputed. More specifically, Thailand was worried, that as the result of the temple being added into the UNESCO list, a certain buffer of protective zone would be created and this would swallow a large part of the disputed area in the temple’s proximity. Furthermore, due to geography conditions, any effective management of the temple requires Thailand’s participation and thus Thailand is the key stakeholder in the issue (Pakdeekong 2009: 235-236). In the end, Cambodia applied unilaterally, with the then Thai Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej still supporting the initiative in the Joint Communiqué from June 18, 2008. The dead turn was taken soon after when the Communique was declared null and void by the Thai Constitutional Court on July 8, 2008 due to Prime Minister supposedly lacking the authorization of parliament for such an act (Wagener 2011: 31-33).

In the next months, the conflict escalated with both sides deploying thousands of troops in the vicinity of the temple. In the conditions of disputed border lines and both sides conducting patrols, it remained only a matter of time until clashes would occur. The occasional exchanges of fire then materialized in October 2009, April 2009, January 2010, April 2010, June 2010 and February 2011, with the major escalation occurring between 22 April and 3 May, 2011. By that day at least 34 soldiers had died on both sides and more than 30 000 people were


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displaced from nearby villages (Wagener 2011: 32-33; International Crisis Group).

On April 28, 2011 Cambodia brought the dispute back to the ICJ asking for an interpretation of the original decision from 1962. The court issued the preliminary decision on July 18, 2011 demanding both sides withdraw their military not only from the immediate proximity of the temple but from a wider region and create a demilitarized zone (ICJ Provisional Measures 2011).

However, the real withdrawal never happened. Exactly one year after the preliminary decision was taken, both sides announced in July 2011 that as the beginning of the withdrawal, they would start to redeploy the troops. In February 2013 the foreign ministers met again, this time in the temple of Preah Vihear itself, and announced that they agreed on the redeployment of troops as police which would probably happen by the time ICJ would hold the oral hearing, which was scheduled for April 15-19, 2013. The final decision of the court is expected to come in late 2013.

The domestic politics in Thailand and Cambodia

It is widely accepted that the reason for prolonging of the conflict is not the lack of clarity of the legal state of affairs, but rather the fact that the conflict has been hijacked by various political forces within the involved countries. While the Thai side is blamed more frequently (see Barlow 2011: 4), Cambodia should equally be held responsible for the escalation.

It is vital to remember that the temple itself is not part of the recent legal dispute and both sides agree that as of the ICJ 1962 ruling, it is an


undisputable part of Cambodian territory. Therefore, only the territory around the temple is part of the current dispute. Yet the temple itself is a notable symbol for both Cambodian and Thai people and due to the mutually intertwined history and the long periods in which Siam administered the temple, there are significant parts of the Thai population who believe the temple actually belongs to them rather than to Cambodia. While the official position of the Thai government ever since the decision of 1962 has been to comply with the court’s decision, it nonetheless has kept the doors open. To cite the Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat, following the 1962 ruling, he announced publicly that “with blood and tears, we shall recover the PhraWihan1 one day” (Rand 2011). Yet the government under various circumstances of the time chose to accept the decision of the Court; it did so, however, with presenting a protest note which went on to read:

“[i]n deciding to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in the case concerning the Temple of PhraWihan, His Majesty’s government desires to make an express reservation regarding whatever rights Thailand has, or may have in the future, to recover the Temple of PhraWihan by having recourse to any existing or subsequently applicable legal process, and to register a protest against the decision of the International Court of Justice awarding to the Temple of PhraWihan to Cambodia” (cited in Pakdeekong 2009).

These two expressions only point at popular opinion of the time in Thailand, in which there was nearly unanimity about the question of Thai rightful ownership (Barlow 2011: 16). While Thailand now proposes that the 1962 Note is still valid, it counteracts the result of the Memorandum of Understanding which was agreed upon and signed by

1 Phra Wihan is the Thai version of the Cambodian name Preah Vihear.


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the Thai and Cambodian governments in 2000. In this document, which was an agreement on the borders between the two countries it was explicitly stated that both countries agree the results of the 1904 Treaty and consequent work of the Mixed Commission including the maps annexed are the bases of the border demarcation between the two countries.

Eventually, this ambiguous and changing position and the actual belief of the Thai population served as ample opportunities for certain political forces in Thai politics to gain additional support in domestic political battles. In recent Thai politics, two forces can be identified: the so called “yellow shirts” and the “red shirts”. The latter group supports the ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, while the former is backed by the monarchy and urban elite and enjoys large support from the Thai military (Chachavalpongpun 2009). It can be clearly identified that during the rule of the yellow shirts the Thai stance towards Preah Vihear temple was more nationalist, while red shirts, whose leaders also enjoy friendly ties to Cambodian leaders, were the initiators of cooperative mechanisms and continued developing friendly ties with Cambodia. This perspective is generally confirmed when looking upon the timeline of the escalation. The conflict started in 2008 and culminated in 2011 which almost exactly overlaps with the rule of yellow shirts, in which a beginning of the escalation was to a large extent caused by the rejection of the red shirts’ Prime Minister Communique accepting the Cambodian unilateral application to UNESCO and the de-escalation was shortly proceeded by the Thai parliament elections which took place in July 2011 and which brought the current Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra to the post in August 2011. Clearly, the issue of Preah Vihear has given the ‘yellow shirts’ an opportunity to present themselves as the real protectors of the Thai nation while the other side should be discarded as collaborators.


On the other hand, Cambodia has its own domestic political dynamics which equally motivate its leaders to seek a theme which would help them to form strong public support. Volatile Thai politics and ambiguous stance towards issues like the PreahVihear temple serves as a theme and it has allowed Cambodian leaders to create the atmosphere of national insecurity together with the pride of cultural heritage. Cambodia is by far the weaker party in the conflict in most of the aspects and in any large scale military encounter it could not hope to score any points against the much more populous and developed Thailand with much stronger military might and even enjoying the status of being a U.S. strategic ally (Chanlett-Avery – Dolven 2012). However, Cambodia is advantaged in the dispute as it holds the favorable ruling of the ICJ 1962 which by definition is final and has become international law.

As was presented before, Thai internal politics are extremely volatile and particularly the issue of Preah Vihear temple is one of the most popular topics for nationalist segments which have prevailed during certain time periods. However, Cambodian long-time Prime Minister Hun Sen may be held responsible for responding to the nationalists’ calls and even provoking them. To start with, the recent escalation began with the unilateral application for the UNESCO listing in 2008. Hun Sen opted for the unilateral move instead of the joint submission as was proposed from the Thai side and, moreover, he did do so in times of another volatile period in Thai politics, just two years after the military backed coup deposed the former Prime Minister and election winner Thaksin Shinawatra, who enjoyed close relations with Hun Sen, yet was accused at home by the nationalist forces of compromising on sovereignty issues. Furthermore, Hun Sen used unusually aggressive rhetoric and was talking about a “large-scale war” in the region, which was clearly an exaggeration in the situation when relatively minor


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clashes and random firing occurred from time to time. Another step which was perceived as an open provocation in Thailand at the time was his appointment of ousted Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra as his economic adviser in the year 2009, which happened even after Hun Sen arrived late for the ASEAN summit held in Thailand (see International Crisis Group 2011: 12). Finally, while not exactly a provocation, he sought third party involvement in the conflict from the beginning, which added fuel to Thai internal political turmoil and may have played into the hands of Thai nationalist forces.

Searching for evidence of motivation to escalate the conflict on the Cambodian side, we should definitely focus attention on Hun Sen, who has been the leader and Prime Minister of Cambodia since the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime and has overseen the complex process of the country s transformation and rehabilitation after the long period of war. There are more possible explanations for his interest in escalating the conflict. Wagener (2011) presents five reasons: firstly, the initial UNESCO status and consequent escalation happened only weeks before an election took place and the success of winning UNESCO status and the strong stance in the consequent escalation clearly helped to secure additional support among the population. Secondly, with the conflict escalating, Hun Sen was able to push for a rise in military spending for the 2009 budget and in this way to secure the loyalty of the army, his main supporter. Thirdly, it is said that Hun Sen s deliberate escalation of the conflict may have some linkage to proceedings of the tribunal with the late Khmer Rouge leaders, which according to many Cambodians is moving too slowly. As Hun Sen himself and a number of other persons in his cabinet were members of Khmer Rouge and only turned away in later years of their rule, it is very likely that the issue of the Preah Vihear temple served as a great opportunity for Hun Sen to divert the attention of the Cambodian public from the trials. Fourthly, Hun Sen may have


acted tough vis-à-vis Thailand to hide his alleged mismanagement of a border dispute with Vietnam. What is more, he may have even deliberately tried to strengthen the Vietnamese position as the leading power in Indochina by playing on the Thai internal political dynamics by pushing for the issue which clearly is a divisive one and it would weaken Thailand’s position in international affairs. The fifth explanation presented by Wagener is that Hun Sen may have used the conflict to hide the effects of the international financial crisis which were materializing in the region during that period. Moreover, yet another reason can be put forward and this is that during later military movements, Hun Sen’s son was said to lead the operation and soon afterwards was promoted to the rank of major general (Rand 2011). Thus, it can be suggested that Hun Sen may be trying to pursue a “North Korea-type” scenario by providing his son with an opportunity to gain both experience and a reputation in order to establish another family dynasty in East Asia.

To sum up, without attempting to decide who is to blame, both parties of the conflict showed that their internal politics motivated them to escalate the conflict, independently of the other side’s moves and choices. It is clear that for some leaders on both sides the issue of sovereignty over the Preah Vihear temple has meant an ideal opportunity to get some extra points over domestic political competitors rather than an ideological/legal dispute with another country which should be solved effectively.

ASEAN and the Thai-Cambodian conflict

From the beginning of the escalation in 2008 it seemed natural that ASEAN as the organization comprising both of the conflict parties should be the perfect mediator. During 2008 and 2009 it was made


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clear several times by then ASEAN chair Singapore as well as the other ASEAN member countries that ASEAN is willing to take up a mediating role between its two member countries; however, respecting the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs of its members, it would only act if asked to do so. In 2009 Thai foreign minister announced that he would present a road map to establish a universal mechanism to solve the territorial disputes among ASEAN members. This proposal was wholeheartedly accepted by the Cambodian foreign minister believing that this was an offer of a multilateral solution of the conflict. Yet, soon afterwards, the proposal was cancelled from the Thai side. The official explanation from the Foreign Ministry was that the Foreign Minister was misunderstood, yet the real explanation would be more likely that the policy change had not been sufficiently negotiated within the government. As a result, Thailand stuck to its policy of demanding a bilateral resolution between the two conflict claimants without outside interference, while Cambodia, quite the opposite, was working on bringing in a third authority (International Crisis Group 2011).

In 2010 the ASEAN chair position was held by Vietnam who did not pursue the issue primarily because of its preoccupation with the South China Sea tensions and therefore the next ASEAN involvement took place only when the dispute turned more violent in the beginning of 2011. In February 2011, after another Cambodian request, the issue was firstly discussed in the UN Security Council and the then Indonesian ASEAN chairman was invited to the event, which marked the first such visit of an ASEAN in the Security Council. While no specific resolution came out of the meeting, the Security Council did ask ASEAN to play a mediating role in the conflict between its two members. Following this, the Indonesian chair managed to broker a deal between the parties to accept the engagement of Indonesian observers in the area of the temple. This was firstly hailed as a big success of ASEAN and there was


a belief that this would effectively solve the issue (see van Nevel 2011). Yet soon after the negotiations between Thailand and Cambodia met with new difficulties and were halted altogether, allegedly because of Thailand sabotaging the move using various technical obstacles. In July 2011 the provisional measures were issued by the ICJ which also requested the engagement of the ASEAN observers. Yet as of today, however, no observers have been engaged and there are no signs it should happen any time soon.

It is clear that the conditions of the conflict violate the basic ASEAN principles for interaction between its members, as well as outside countries. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia from 1976 (2012) presents a basic normative document of ASEAN and the accession to it has become a requirement for new members of the organization. Among others, one of its main principles requires the member countries to revoke the use and threats of the use of force in international relations with other countries. Furthermore, the document includes a chapter titled “Pacific settlement of disputes”, which expects a formulation of a High Council as a dispute settlement body to which members should “take cognizance of the existence of disputes or situations likely to disturb regional peace and harmony” (Article 14). Yet the High Council has never been developed and remained mostly a concept to which parties have not made their disputes known (Weatherbee 2009: 130-131).

The ASEAN Charter from 2008 which establishes ASEAN as a legal entity devotes a specific chapter to dispute settlement. Article 22 of the Charter states two basic principles, being that “Member States shall endeavor to resolve peacefully all disputes in a timely manner through dialogue, consultation and negotiation”; and that “ASEAN shall maintain and establish dispute settlement mechanisms in all fields of ASEAN


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cooperation”. However, the subsequent, Article 23, states that “Member States which are parties to a dispute may at any time agree to resort to good offices, conciliation or mediation…” and that “parties to the dispute may request the Chairman of ASEAN or the Secretary-General of ASEAN… to provide good offices, conciliation or mediation” (emphases added).

It is clear now that the dispute between Thailand and Cambodia over Preah Vihear escalated into an open conflict in which both sides deliberately chose to use violence. As has been demonstrated, both sides followed their domestic politics and used the dispute to achieve domestic political goals. In the situation when at least one of the parties – in this case Thailand – did not agree to outside mediation; ASEAN with its current ‘dispute settlement mechanism’ remained basically toothless without any means to address the issue. The weaker side – Cambodia – pushed the case forward to the UN Security Council and repeatedly to the ICJ and, seemingly, this together with the new domestic political situations in both countries helped to terminate the violence, as opposed to the previous ASEAN limited involvement.

Conclusion

So what makes the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia so important that Amitav Acharya (2009: 155) would label it “perhaps the most serious threat to ASEAN’s internal peace”? After looking into Uppsala Conflict Data Program database (2013), the answer is not too clear. According to its data, in the year 2011, which has been the most deadly year since the 1970s, there were ‘only’ 28 casualties. The very same database lists other conflicts from the South East Asia region. To name just a few, the conflict in South Thailand’s province of Patani shows on average about 100 casualties a year during the past decade;


the conflict in Aceh province in Indonesia has also witnessed hundreds of fatalities before 2005; not to speak of other Indonesian conflicts which were even more deadly in their hey-days. Looking at the Philippines, a similar picture would appear with a deadly and long conflict in Mindanao Island and relatively the still worse situation would be in Myanmar (Burma) with its number of violent conflict between the government and some regions and also the ongoing clashes between the Buddhists and Muslims (Rohingya). The important difference, however, is that all these conflicts belong to a group of intra-state wars, thus they do not involve more ASEAN governments fighting against each other.

Speaking of interstate conflicts in the region, one might mention the conflict between Thailand and Myanmar in the border regions; the dispute between Singapore and Malaysia over Pedra Blanca together with their water source dispute; an old dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines over the latter’s Sabah claims; the dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia over the islands of Sipadan asnd Ligitan; and perhaps overlapping South China Sea claims among ASEAN members (see Weatherbee 2009: 137-145).

However, none of these inter-state conflicts meet the qualities of the conflict over Preah Vihear. In most cases, there have been threats of using force and even reported collisions of military boats (as was the case of Malaysia and Singapore in 2008), but by the end the countries had not opened fire on each other. In the case of the Thailand–Myanmar dispute, the Thais actually used violence, to which they probably resorted to in a more specific attempt to stop the border drug and migration inflow into Thailand (Bell 2003). In the case of the South China Sea, Vietnam on several occasions fired warning shots at Philippine boats in the late 1990s and early 2000s, while Philippine and Malaysian


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surveillance planes confronted each other over a disputed reef. This should be, however, perceived as part of rather complex dispute in which the claimant countries of ASEAN have been becoming gradually closer to each other and forming an increasingly more united opposition against China.

As explained before, throughout the Thai-Cambodian dispute around the Preah Vihear temple two ASEAN member states have acted deliberately to use the escalation of the conflict for its domestic political goals. In the history of ASEAN, this is an unprecedented case. What is a matter of a grave concern for ASEAN as an organization is that it was not allowed to intermediate between its two member countries, which moreover resorted to violence in the first place, and later on overrode ASEAN and went straight to the UN Security Council and the ICJ to seek resolution.

In the near future both sides of the conflict will be presented with the decision of the ICJ over its interpretation of the original decision from 1962. There are fundamentally two possible scenarios. First, the ICJ would announce that the area which Thailand has disputed has indeed not been covered by the decision and therefore it would remain in dispute. In this case, the two countries will return to the pre-1962 status quo and they will be expected to sort out the matter for themselves. In the second scenario, the ICJ would announce that the according disputed area is not disputed and has been covered by the original decision of 1962; i.e. it belongs to Cambodia. In this case, any legal case related to Preah Vihear and its vicinity would be legally terminated.

The two scenarios would bring different consequences from the perspective of ASEAN. In the former, there would still be a dispute and apparently there would not be any space for the ICJ resolution. In this


case, ASEAN would become, theoretically, again the ‘perfect mediator’ to sort out the dispute. Nonetheless, this would require at least the same will of ASEAN countries as before, if not larger, to push forward the establishment of the genuine dispute settlement mechanism in particular and to strengthen the ability of the organization to interfere in domestic affairs of its members states in general. However, there are no reasons why the member states should be more willing to do this step now if they have not been willing to do it ever before. In case ASEAN would not be able to transform in this matter, it is quite likely that the dispute would continue to exist for an unlimited time and periods of tensions and calm may change repeatedly, according to domestic situations in the related countries and their bilateral relations in general.

In the latter scenario, the dispute should be technically over, thus there would not be much left space for ASEAN. What is more, in case Thailand refuses to comply fully with the decision, ASEAN would not have any other choice than to support Cambodia, who would be legally in the right. This is clearly not what the organization wants to do – to side with one party in a dispute between its two member countries. Therefore, it may actually be proposed that this scenario would be less positive for ASEAN as an organization, as it would de facto mark the end of an unsuccessful handling of the dispute and it would effectively make it impossible to step back in if any kind of tensions appear.

Whereas neither of the two scenarios is a guarantee of a winning situation for ASEAN, the less welcomed scenario with the ICJ ruling that the area belongs to Cambodia is perhaps the more likely result, taking into account that even the Thai foreign minister has announced that he was not ‘confident’ his country would win the dispute at the ICJ. If this becomes the reality, it would basically mean that ASEAN is not able to


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address a dispute between its two members and prevent it from escalation. This would naturally transform into further doubts about the functionality of the organization and it would put into question its spirit of unity, which is a highly popular topic within ASEAN. And that is certainly not what the organization wants to communicate to the world, just two or so years before the establishment of the ASEAN Community in 2015.

Bibliography

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International Crisis Group (2011): Waging Peace: ASEAN and the Thai-Cambodian Border Conflict. Asia Report No. 215, Available on-line (http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/thailand/215%20Waging%20Peace%20--%20ASEAN%20and%20the%20Thai-Cambodian%20Border%20Conflict.pdf).

Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia on the Survey and Demarcation of Land Boundary (2000). In The Mirror, Vol. 15, No. 701 Available on-line at (http://www.cambodiamirror.org/2011/01/24/memorandum-on-cambodian-thai-border-issues-monday-24-1-2011/).

Nevel, Marily van (2011): The Thai-Cambodian border conflict: a growing role for ASEAN? European Institute of Asian Studies, EIAS Newsletter March/April 2011. Available on-line at (http://www.eias.org/sites/default/files/EIAS_2011-Mar_Thai-Cambodia_ASEAN.pdf).

Pakdeekong, Monticha (2009): Who Owns the Preah Vihear Temple? A Thai Position. In Journal of East Asia & International Law, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 229-237.

Patrick M. Cronin and Robert d. Kaplan (2012): Cooperation from Strength: The U.S. Strategy and the South China Sea. In Patrick M. Cronin (eds.): Cooperation from Strength. The United States, China and the South China Sea. Center for a New American Security. Available on-line at (http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_CooperationFromStrength_Cronin_1.pdf).

Pattaya Mail (2013): Thai Foreign Minister: Border dispute may not end in Thailand’s favour. January 6, 2013. Available on-line at (http://www.pattayamail.com/news/thai-foreign-minister-border-dispute-may-not-end-in-thailand-s-favour-20180).

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Press Release: Thai Foreign Minister gave press interview on the planned redeployment of military personnel, leading towards the implementation of the ICJ’s Order for provisional measures. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Kingdom of Thailand, July 17, 2012. Available on-line at (http://www.mfa.go.th/main/en/media-center/14/25144-Thai-Foreign-Minister-gave-press-interview-on-the.html).

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Shulman, Katherine (2012): The Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand): The ICJ Orders Sweeping Provisional Measures To Prevent Armed Conflict at the Expense of Sovereignty. In Tulane Journal of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 20, Spring, p. 555-570.

The ASEAN Way.ASEAN Anthem. Available on-line at (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=linTTWHu1YQ).

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Touch, Bora (2009): Who Owns the Preah Vihear Temple? A Cambodian Position. In Journal of East Asia & International Law, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 205-227.

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Weatherbee, Donald E. (2009): International Relations in Southeast Asia. The Struggle for Autonomy. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.


Factionalism in Vietnam and the Problems of Vietnamese Domestic PoliticsLada HomutováDoctoral candidate and lecturerDepartment of Political Science, Faculty of Arts, Charles University

Abstract

This paper argues that many problems of the central authority have their base in central factional dynamics. The article uses the factional model of Andrew Nathan which was elaborated on for use on China and applies this model to Vietnam. Evidence shows that central elites driven by factional dynamics are profit oriented, their relations are based on clientelist ties, sound political initiatives are rare, decisions are made by consensus which is difficult to achieve, consistent policy positions are instead burdens because it blocks the possibility of gaining the support of various influential groups. Central elites are increasingly driven by money politics and central politicians are not held accountable. As a result of all of tht which is written above Vietnam is trapped in political immobilism and unable to launch the needed political reforms which would help to deal with the problems of today’s Vietnam.

Introduction

Scholars on Vietnam are usually familiar with the situation in Vietnam’s international politics, especially the South China Sea dispute. However, much less attention is paid to the problems of domestic politics in Vietnam. This may be partially caused by the absence of both introductory and scholarly literature on that topic, by the lack of interest in Vietnam (as opposed to China) and also by the relative difficulty of getting the data which would support the research.


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This article, based on my own research of factionalism in Vietnam, attempts to contribute to the scarce sources on Vietnamese domestic politics while trying to show that, in many aspects, Vietnam is a country at least as interesting as China. This paper also seeks an answer to the question of how the practical political problems of today’s Vietnam are connected with the world of elites in general and with the patterns of conflict between Vietnamese elites in particular using the factional approach of Andrew Nathan which was elaborated on for use on China. This paper argues that the Vietnamese political arena shows many features of factional characteristics which in turn shapes the politics in Vietnam. The most salient characteristics include the limited conflict among elites, blocking the rise of a strong leader, the absence of political initiatives, corruption, a general blockage of politics and immobilism. Factional dynamics causes elites in Vietnam to be increasingly unable to govern the country and deal with the everyday problems of Vietnamese society which are accumulating under the surface. At the same time, the Communist Party in Vietnam is gradually losing its political authority.

This paper analyzes the characteristic features of factional dynamics in Vietnamese politics, evaluates its impact and tries to suggest the needed changes.

Background

Vietnam underwent radical changes in the 1980s and 1990s via a process known as Doi Moi2. The country opened up to the world, implemented

2 Doi Moi (economic renovation) was a series of economical reforms (towards a mixed economy with a strong shift to markets) announced by the Communist Party of Vietnam in 1986.


vital economic reforms, its authorities became less repressive and more predictable, etc. This development was accompanied by various challenges that arise from a combination of factors: the decline of ideology, openness, market swings, the increasing gap between the poor and the rich, a stronger civil society and increasing demands of people for better education, healthcare and working conditions etc. These can be partially said to be the common problems of all developing countries in Southeast Asia but Vietnam is specific at least in the combination of two things: 1) The monopoly of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) which represents not only power but also responsibility and accountability; 2) Vietnam´ s specific political culture which can be characterized as consensual and of a highly informal character. Both the consensual and informal aspects of Vietnamese politics are very problematic. The consensual character obviously slows and complicates making political decisions. The informal character then refers to the situation in which personal networks are more powerful than formal structures and institutions of the political system. Nevertheless, the Party often tolerates certain behavior which goes against formal and legal prescriptions simply because it helps in dealing with the problems.

Domestic problems in Vietnam

In Vietnam in 2012 there were two main areas that have been continu-ously posing problems to the Vietnamese government. Those were:

Economy

In 2012 President of Vietnam Truong Tan Sang acknowledged economical problems: “Our economic development is unsustainable and the balance of our macro economy unstable, while the quality of the growth rate,


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productivity, efficiency and economic competitiveness remains low,”...“Coupled by these weaknesses is the limitation in mobilization and effective use of available resources for development. Our economic growth tends to develop widely, though not deeply.” (Brown 2012). The key for understanding economic development and linked political issues rests in the process of economic reform itself. Experts on Vietnamese development economics agree that instead of a reform launched by the political decisions of the CPV, Vietnamese Doi Moi was rather a continuation and deepening of the informal processes that had occurred earlier and the CPV just stepped out of the watercourse as the water level was rising, in other words the CPV let the reform to happen (Fforde 2013, Gainsborough 2000, Pincus 2012).

The fore-mentioned informal processes emerged as a result of the lack of capital for industralization in the 1960s. State-owned enterprises and cooperatives´ engagement in “fence-breaking” – selling goods on the underground market became an everyday reality of the Vietnamese economy. Farmers often preferred working on small private plots (which was allowed by the system) rather than working in dysfunctional cooperatives. In sum, central planning (political administration) was very weak in Vietnam from the beginning.3

The current economic problems of Vietnam have been inherited from the development described above. The state sector (now driven by powerful national commercial interests) continues to be highly disobedient and the central government in Vietnam is unable to take

3 Jonathan R. Pincus emphasizes this fact and adds that since 1961 when the first Stalinist central plan was adopted until the reform heavy industry in Vietnam, the country was not developed and almost no apparatus of central planning established (Pincus 2012). This weakness of the central economical administration is still present in Vietnam today.


control of it. This is clearly visible when we look at the account of developments in 2007 given by Adam Fforde. In 2006 and 2007 Vietnam saw massive capital inflows (FDI). To avoid the Dong raising in value, the State Bank bought a large sum of American dollars, which in turn increased the liquidity of domestic Dong. The State Bank was under the pressure of large SOEs and banks and thus failed to take measures to prevent inflation which consequently accelerated to 22% in 2011. Adam Fforde concludes: in the inability of the economy to transform to competitive middle-income status, the key area is the area of bank restructuring and changes in state owned enterprises (SOEs) which appears impossible due to the lack of the effective authority of the Party (Fforde 2013).

In sum, the macroeconomic instability in Vietnam expresses itself in the cycle of inflation, followed by the devaluation of the currency. The state sector is the only one where political and economical interests are mixed, where economic turbulence can emerge and it is a sector which shows a high level of disobedience and which has a lack of control from the central Party. At this point it is important to stress that the same pattern (lack of control) can be seen in both politics and society.

A vibrant and demanding society

With the economical reforms and opening up of the country Vietnamese society has become an increasingly vibrant living organism with growing needs and interests. The young generation is especially “open” to the influences from the West and young people never miss the opportunity to go abroad. There is an increasing gap between the rich and the poor and a more open media that report on corruption scandals. A changing society means changing demands. There are several ways of accommodating them. The unreformed Party has so far chosen


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a strategy of tolerance with occasional interventions but it is perhaps just a question of time as to when demands will be voiced more loudly.

As has been hinted, it is the vital sectors of education, healthcare and labor which belong to the most pressing issues in everyday life of the Vietnamese society (Fforde 2013).

According to Oxford Analytica, the healthcare sector in Vietnam is facing fundamental challenges in terms of access, quality and effectiveness. After the commercialization of the healthcare service in public hospitals in the late 1980s a large part of the fiscal burden of healthcare shifted from the state to individuals. The Vietnamese government fails to provide needed regulation which would constrain corruption (bribes for healthcare services), stop the flight of healthcare providers from rural areas to the cities as well as prescribing expensive drugs by medical doctors under the pharmaceutical companies’ lobby (Oxford Analytica, September 27, 2011).

The main problems of the education sector result from the system’s insufficient quality, this does not allow university students to be successful in international competition. The level of teaching materials is generally low and there is a problem with foreign languages, especially English. Education also suffers the omnipresent problem of bribery and thus has better access for certain social groups. Adam Fforde emphasizes that Ph.Ds. are more often bought than earned (Fforde 2013).

The labor market has changed a lot since the introduction of economical reforms. The Vietnamese government made a lot of legal measures to reduce the negative impacts that accompanied the transition from a planned to a market economy. However, problems with labor are still


many. The Vietnam General Confederation of Labor as a representative institution of workers quite openly discusses in the media its problems and only a few of them stem from bad legislation. For example, strikes are obviously the problem of bad legislation, it is almost impossible to organize a strike legally because conditions for their legality are too rigid (Nguoi Lao Dong, October 5, 2011). Strikes are considered legal when they are organized and led by trade union (TU) leadership, but these leaders are paid by the employer and so they would clearly risk their own jobs or punishment if they promote the interests of workers (Lao Dong, November 12, 2011). Many problems of TU are not the matter of legislation, but rather the lack of leadership of grass-root trade unions, which often tends to be only theoretical. Also there is a problem of professional education among both TU cadres and workers, which causes that responsibilities and obligations to be unclearly defined etc. So when it comes to a labor dispute, no one knows exactly what to do and how to solve it. The official policy of the state is to support establishment of grass-root trade unions, which has been implemented to a degree, but these grassroots TU often prove dysfunctional, for no one wants to lead them (fear from the punishment from the side of employer) and no one wants to be a member (employees have to pay TU fees). Naturally, employers do not support TUs either, because they have to pay for it as well. Again, the main problems such as low wages, overly long work hours and an absence of work contracts, collective labor agreements, social insurance, etc. (The Saigon Times, August 4, 2010) are dealt with informally because it is not possible to deal with them formally. In sum, the state is not able to provide effective solutions to these problems. The crucial question to ask is why?

All the above mentioned problems have one thing in common: they are linked to the Vietnamese Communist Party, the sole political player in the system, which fails, however, to effectively address these grievances.


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The common feature that connects all the problems is the lack of control from the centre, the inability of the Party to implement its decisions and push for change. To examine the reason for this situation, we have to shift now to the heart of the problem: dynamics inside the central political arena.

The factional model and its explanation power

It seems very useful to look at the problems from the side of central elites. We tend to think that the main problem of Vietnam’s domestic politics rests in the Communist Party itself. The main questions are thus how the central elite’s behavior influences the crisis in Vietnam, how is it related to the informal sector and what needs to be done to deal with this situation?

We will argue in this article that it is a combination of the culture and structure (of the political relationships) that shapes central elites´ behavior and further feeds the grave economic and societal crisis. The central term of this article is factional dynamics in the CPV. Perhaps the most useful approach towards the study of elites in Vietnam is the factional approach, developed by Andrew Nathan for China, because unlike other models (above all Dmitter and Wu 1995) he built the model on implications of factional behavior.4 His structural explanation of factionalism based on a clientelist tie is a basic tenet of our work. Nathan elaborated an ideal model of the factional system which is characterized by fifteen key points. These characteristics show how it is the existence of factions which structures the political arena.

4 If we identify the characteristics of a system based on factional behavior we can avoid various mistakes and vague interpretations depending on our categorizations, such as dividing politicians into concrete factions based on their alleged political positions, relationships and ties.


As we will see at the end, using Nathan’s factional characteristics in Vietnam brings interesting results and interpretations.

A brief introduction of Nathan’s factional model

Every factional model basically works on clientelist ties. It is common for both China and Vietnam that things are being done informally, with the help of people that are a part of any person’s “network” (which means the network of people that can be mobilized in time when they are needed). Being an everyday reality, this principle is said to influence politics as well. In politics, there are resources such as positions, policies, money and relations that can be exchanged for support and other things. When this networking takes part inside the Party, we talk about factions. It is important to stress that factions based on clientelist ties are very fluid, numerous “members” of factions are expectedly members of more than one faction and they shift depending on what resources they can gain from being a member. Factions emerge, split and dissolve relatively quickly. All those characteristics stem from the clientelist tie itself: among the crucial characterizations of the clientelist ties are that they are relationships between two people based on the constant exchange of gifts or services through which the relationship is cultivated and it can be abrogated by the members at will and that it is not exclusive – which means that either member is free to establish other simultaneous ties so long as they do not involve contradictory obligations (Nathan 1973, p. 37).

There are several implications of that which is written above. First, it is extremely difficult to actually study factions, second, it is unlikely that there are only two or three factions in Vietnam or China.5 Third, it is

5 Many studies on both China and Vietnam tries to show that politicians are divided between reformers and conservatives. (Vuving 2010, Cheng Li 2005, etc.)


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literally impossible to categorize politicians into factions or make some rigid statements about political positions of elites in Vietnam (as in many other things political positions can also be, and in fact are, changed when it is in the interest of a given person). Four, factionalism can be useful when we leave our efforts to try to discover who is a conservative or a reformer, a modernizer or a rent-seeker and based on that in which direction the will country move. Instead, we should focus (as Nathan did) on what stems from the fact that the political arena is driven by factional dynamics.

Nathan elaborated the following fifteen characteristics6 of a factional political arena which can be amalgamated into the following set of ten characteristics:

1. Political conflict is limited because factions are limited in their power, factions develop a code of civility where we seldom see purges (killing, jailing or property confiscation).

2. Defensive political strategies predominate over political initiatives. When a faction does take a political initiative (in a situation when its power base is secure and rivals are off balance) it relies upon a surprise offensive and other factions react by making an alliance against the initiative. In terms of the factional

6 Nathan divided those characteristics into three groups. The first group of characteristics stems from the fact that factions are informal entities that enjoy less power than formal entities. The second set of characteristics of Nathan’s theory stems from the fact that factions consist of a series of clientelist ties and the last set of propositions characterizes the shape of the factional system.: 1. Power limitation of factions, 2. Clientelist ties, and 3. Size and shape of a factional system. In some cases we put the characteristics together and in one or two cases we omit a characteristic because of its relative lack of relevance for our analysis or its similarity with some other point. For the complete set of characteristics see Nathan 1973 and 1995, and Homutova (2012).


system this leads to the blockage of the emergence of strong leaders.

3. A factional system is characterized by constantly shifting alliances of factions. Those alliances cannot remain stable because “Today’s enemy may have to be tomorrow’s ally.”

4. There is a basic ideological consensus among factions but within the system doctrinal positions can be (and are) shifted in order to achieve particular goals. In the factional system it is a burden for a politician to promote one particular policy position it is better to be flexible to be able to join various factions.

5. Important decisions are made by consensus among factions. There is “a typical cycle of consensus formation and decline which characterizes factional systems. The cycle begins with a political crisis and ends with the action to solve the crisis.”

6. Politicians are not purged but factions try to “discredit their rivals which leads to the politics of personality in which rumor, character assassination, bribery and deception are used.” Connected with that is that factional system is characterized by doctrinalism where abstract issues of ideology, honor and face are used by factions to struggle for power while ideological and program distance between factions is in fact insignificant.

7. A factional arena is relatively small-scale (approx. twenty to forty factions). “This is so because in an arena with a very great number of factions, it will be in the interests of the factions to amalgamate, in order to defend against other factions doing the same thing.”


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8. Factions struggle over resources that should be allocated only among them, whenever there is some threat (outside force) all the factions unite together to preserve a factional system.

9. Since consensus is needed for decisions it is difficult to resolve issues because any decision could be more advantageous for one particular faction than for others. “The resulting failure of policy to move clearly in any one direction is what was called, in the French Third and Fourth Republics, immobilisme.”

10. “The immobilism of factional systems, the lack of extreme sanctions employed in their struggles, and their tendency to defend their existence against rival elites or external threats mean that they are in a certain sense extremely stable.” (Nathan 1973 and 1995).

We will now proceed to the application of the model to Vietnam. First, we have to specify the time period: since this thesis focuses on current politics, it seems logical to limit the search for cases that occurred in the time period from 1986 when reforms were launched up to the present day. The data presented in available literature will cover the evidence for the individual characteristics.

Vietnam: factional dynamics

Everyone who visited Vietnam noticed at some moment that personal networks are indeed an everyday reality in Vietnam. Douglas Pike writes about networks in his article about informal politics in Vietnam: “...the Vietnamese believe, one must establish a network (Americans would term this contacts) to cope with problems and challenges and to open doors for opportunity. Such bilateral relationships are existential and situational in that they can be altered to fit specific solutions” (Pike


2000, p. 273). In politics those networks can be called factions and we assume that their behavior is shaped by the characteristics written above. To test this assumption we will now proceed to the evidence.

We can test the first assumption about the absence of killing or jailing by watching the cases of senior politicians who were purged. Killing or jailing was indeed rare. Politicians in Vietnam are usually sacked. In fact there are several reasons why top politicians in Vietnam have been sacked: they either had opinions that were unacceptable, they were too ambitious or they had been corrupted. Among the most salient cases was the one of Trần Xuân Bách, a Politburo member who was sacked in 1990, officially for violating party discipline, but ostensibly for his “advocacy” of political reform (Abuza 2000, p. 8). Another known case was Nguyần Hà Phan, a member of the Politburo and deputy chairman of the National Assembly who was expelled from the Party in 1996, officially for “serious mistakes in his past work activities”. “Phan was in charge of the party’s economic commission and also of a special personnel commission charged with examining the suitability of delegates to the Eighth Congress. Shortly after Phan’s demise, his ideological and political mentor, senior Politburo member Dao Duy Tung, was reportedly placed under house arrest” (Far East and Australasia 2003, p. 1422). Some foreign media speculated that the real reason was linked to intense, high-level debate over the nation’s future course, and in particular over how far to push economic reform (Deseret News, Apr. 26, 1996).

During the 1900s and 2000s some corruption scandals led to the dismissal of Vietnamese politicians of high ranks. The most salient example was the “PMU18 scandal” at the beginning of 2006. “Earlier in the year the head7 of the Ministry’s Project Management Unit 18 had

7 Đào Đình Bình – Minister for Transport.


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been arrested and charged with misappropriating US$7 million from the budget to gamble on European football results. At the same time, the Deputy Minister of Transport was detained.” (Thayer 2007, p. 382). In this case, however, the fraud was evident.

For the study of factionalism the 1990s corruption case of Ngô Xuân Lộc is illustrative, the deputy prime minister who was connected with the Thang Long amusement park scandal in 1998. “...in December, the National Assembly dismissed Lộc from his state post and removed two deputies, one of being implicated in the Thang Long scandal and the other for negligence. (...) [In early 1999] as a result of the intervention of Đầ Mầầi, Ngô Xuân Lầc was rehabilitated. Shortly after the [Sixth] plenum, it was announced that Lầc was appointed special advisor to the prime minister for industry, construction and transport” (Thayer 2001, pp. 182-183). This case clearly shows how things can work if someone has the right connections. It also supports Nathan’s proposition.

In other cases, politicians were not re-elected or weren’t allowed to serve their second term, as a good example we can use the case of Lê Kha Phiêu: “At the Ninth Congress in April 2001, an alliance of all groups removed the much-disliked Le Kha Phieu as General Secretary” (Koh 2001b, p. 539). David Koh reported that the reasons for this step were several: in 2000 Phiêu suggested doing away with the Board of Advisers8 and the top politicians with influence on the Board reacted with a letter to the Politburo to denounce Phiêu. Among other reasons were that Phiêu often used intelligence to spy on other Politburo members and ộalso made many concessions to China in negotiations on the land border treatyộ (Koh 2001b, pp. 539-540). In the end he was not re-elected. This is a typical

8 Board of Advisors to the Central Committee.


example of how things can go smoothly without jailing or loud protests. In sum, politicians in Vietnam today are seldom jailed with the exception of obvious corruption cases that are publicized in the media as was the case of PMU18. This state of things in Vietnamese politics reminds us of the principle “balance of power”.9 A term commonly used in international relations and which can be applied here.

The second characteristic supposes defensive strategies predominating over political initiatives and the blockage of strong leaders. We should perhaps make a distinction between the overall political direction of the country which is decided consensually by the Party and formally approved at the National Congress and between particular policies that can be contested. The first useful term here is “statisation”, a process that occurred in Vietnam with the advancement of economic reforms. Political initiatives were conveyed from the Party to the state, this is one of the possible manifestations of the above points. Some part of the responsibility was formally devolved upon the state.

We can explain moderation in policy initiatives in terms of the secondary position of policy in Vietnam as it was reported by Gainsborough and Koh. The reason is simple, in the environment where personal networks are of crucial importance it is risky for any politician to take policy initiatives, because there is quite a big possibility that his preferred political position will be in contradiction with the policy preferences of the other important personalities in the system: “A leader who wants a smooth term would find it difficult to press for radical and quick changes and would want to avoid stepping on too many toes. This is an important dynamic in the leadership selection process” (Koh 2001b, p. 539). We will illustrate this in the next point (about the tendency to

9 With respect to factionalism this term was used by Avery Goldstein on China.


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block strong leaders) on the previously mentioned case of Lê Kha Phiêu. At the same time we will cover another point, the one about shifting alliances.

Lê Khá Phiêu was a potentially strong leader that was sacked after serving three years of a five-year term for the post of General Secretary. Zachary Abuza devoted a whole article to an analysis of the career of this politician, he writes: “Phieu was elected more or less by default, not because he had a large base of support or was able to cobble together a coalition of various factions. On the contrary, no faction was able to dominate the carefully and artificially crafted Politburo” (Abuza 2001, p. 4). Abuza explains several reasons for the downfall of Phiêu, among them one of the most important was Phiêu’s ambition: “Le Kha Phieu was an inordinately ambitious man. (...) First, there were widespread reports that Phieu tried to consolidate his power even more by changing Communist Party statutes so that he could concurrently assume the position of President and party General Secretary. (...) The second mistake Phieu made in his attempt to shore up his power, was to attempt to abolish the position of Advisor to the Central Committee, a position occupied by the former General Secretary Do Muoi, the former President Le Duc Anh and the former Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet. (...) Phieu’s mistake is not that he underestimated their continued influence and power, but that they could act in concert. Muoi, Anh and Kiet were never on the same ideological page” (Abuza 2001, pp. 13-14).

The third assumption “today’s enemy may have to be tomorrow’s ally” can be tested on a particular relationship between Lê Kha Phiêu and Lê Đầc Anh. At the beginning of Phiêu’s career he was Anh’s protégé. Phiêu served in Cambodia under the guidance of Anh and became the Political Commissar of the armed forces. At the Party Congress in 1996, Phiêu gained a high position in the Politburo thanks to Anhầs recommendation.


Later they became adversaries because of Phiêuầs steps aimed at the cancellation of the Board of Advisers where Anh held his position (Koh 2001b, p. 539). As a result Anh stepped into the alliance against Phiêu.

In sum, there are mechanisms that prevent a politician from acting on his own hook. Collective leadership is a principle that has been always emphasized in Vietnam and when this principle is threatened, the ad hoc coalitions of heterogenous politicians intervene to protect this basic setting.

This brings us to another point of Nathan’s characteristics, the fourth point about ideology. As we already wrote, Nathan is convinced that factions operate within a broad ideological consensus, there are ideological boundaries that cannot be crossed but within these boundaries doctrinal positions can be shifted (and are shifted) in order to achieve some particular goals. That is why politicians in Vietnam do not usually fit into categories such as conservative or reformist. It is a common situation that a politician who is said to be conservative undertakes some reformist steps and vice versa. One example is the most prominent reformer Nguyần Văn Linh who became General Secretary in 1986 and supported the introduction of the economic reforms. Later at the Sixth Plenum in March sided with the conservative elements in their call for a break in the Glasnost drive and he denounced “the excess of liberalization” (Bui Xuan Quang 1989, p. 8).

Martin Gainsborough mentions Lê Kha Phiêu, who is often referred to as a conservative was nevertheless associated with the call for democracy also in the political sphere (not only in the economic arena (Gainsborough 2007, p. 10). Examples are many, Đầ Mầầi was also reported as a generally conservative politician who advocated purely leftist economic policies in the 1970s then economic reforms in 1980s. It


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can be said that we usually find some inconsistencies within the alleged stance of the politician and his real steps. It is connected with opportunities and interests, and the shift from rigid ideologism to pragmatism. There are spoils that can be gained through the skillful maneuvering and politicians are aware of it.

Fifth, let us have look at the features of consensual decisions and the crisis-consensus cycle. Leadership in Vietnam regularly pronounces consensual policy-making as a basic principle of Vietnamese politics from the beginning of the existence of the CPV. Consensual policy-making is currently influenced by lobbying from various interest groups. In an article conveying the 2012 New Year message the Vietnamese Prime Minister of Vietnam acknowledged the surging influence interest groups have on the policy-making process. Prior to him Party General Secretary voiced the same concern (An Dien, Thanh Nien, 6 January 2012). We can think about how policies are shaped separately from what the outcome is. The outcome usually seems to be consensual. It suffices to look at the controversial decision of the Prime Minister about bauxite mining in the Central Highlands by a Chinese company. No government member came out against this decision. Yet at the same time, this decision caused massive protests, not only from the side of the common people but also from the National Assembly deputies. Naturally, in cases of important decisions the problems in reaching a consensus exist. For instance, when Vietnam and the United States reached the Bilateral Trade Agreement, Vietnam delayed the signing of the deal because of the absence of consensus: “The weakness of the country’s current [at that time] top leaders – VCP General Secretary Le Kha Phieu, Prime Minister Pham Van Khai, and President Tran Duc Luong – made it difficult for them to forge a consensus on such a controversial issue” (Manyin 2002, pp. 44-45). Consensual decision-making is important in Vietnam but the consensus is difficult to reach because of the interests and pressures that interfere in the process.


What about the consensus-crisis cycle? Let us consider the crisis in Vietnam in the 1970s. There are many interpretations of how it developed into the reform process. According to some scholars elites reacted to the emerging situation that was caused by a mixture of factors (economical decline, international development, domestic social problems, etc.). In other words it is problematic to say that reformers and conservatives reacted to a crisis with a consensus based on the agreement of the conservatives to give to the reformers a mandate to act. It is problematic because it leads us to the interpretation that the reform in Vietnam was actually in the hands of the elites and directed by them. But as we already said in the previous chapter, Martin Gainsborough and others would disagree.10 However, elites played some role, at least in terms of securing the economic transition. In his 2012 article Adam Fforde writes about three crises: The first one (1989-91) was successfully solved by the VCP who secured a transition to a rapid market-economy, and economic growth. The second one (1997) “showed that there was still enough residual authority in the system to exercise state power when a crisis demanded it.” But the third one (2007-?) is the most serious one because perhaps it cannot be solved without a political reform (Fforde 2012, pp. 15-19).

Bill Hayton wrote in detail about one particular part of the crisis (but the crisis of a different level than Adam Fforde writes about) in 2008 and how the Party succeeded in handling it. At that time it was the Party’s actions (an effective policy instead of corruption and faction-ridden politics) that warded off the crisis. To simplify the whole story there was a period of wild gambling on the market before 2008. State owned enterprises (SOEs) expanded their businesses in several areas,

10 For details on the interpretation of the reform in Vietnam, see Gainsborough 2010, p. 5-8.


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among the most popular were real estate, finances, oil and so on. The expanding of SOEs into those areas was allowed thanks to the advantages that SOEs enjoyed such as cheap loans, low interest rates, etc. “In April 2008, Prime Minister Dung publicly urged SOEs to limit their non-core business to 30 per cent of their total capital. The fact that the government was reduced to ‘urging’ SOEs to follow the law revealed the problems it was having in maintaining control. The SOEs didn’t listen; behind the scenes in-fighting raged. The government was forced to try a different route. The central bank, which had been giving to GCs11 an easy ride with low interests and a generous money supply, was ordered into line. Rates were raised and the flow of cheap money reduced. Protective umbrellas had been put away; the leadership had been impelled to act in the national interest. It worked, the economy cooled down and the crisis abated” (Hayton 2010, p. 21). But it doesn’t mean that everything was resolved, this was just one small victory, it suffices to look at the state of things now.

Presently in Vietnam we are the witnesses of the political crisis par excellence. Not only Western scholars but also top Vietnamese politicians recognize this crisis and write about it. The most obvious case was current General Secretary Nguyần Phú Trầng’s statement at the end of 2011 that “if the party wanted to remain in power, it must reform or die”. Among the most pressing issues are according to him: high inflation, high national and foreign debts, barriers that inhibit “leadership, management and administration”, besides “A number of party members lack proper discipline, are plagued by individualism, selfishness and opportunism” (BBC, 27 February 2012). This crisis needs to be dealt with, but the question is as to how. The main problem rests in party discipline and the absence of political reform. We will have to

11 GCs is an abbreviation for General Corporations.


wait to see what will happen. Related to the characteristics of the factional arena, the cycle of consensus-crisis can be blocked if some forces in the system will be unwilling to support political reform.

The sixth of the characteristics (trying to discredit opposition factional members through rumor, bribery or assassination) and doctrinalism (factional struggles in terms of abstract issues of ideology, honor and face).

In the Communist Review available online12 we can read that corruption, bribery, an extravagant life, waste and arrogance are said to be the evils that have to be stopped: “Those party members who degraded and made the mistakes, according to Lenin, should be expelled from the organization to make the party clean” (Nguyần Đầc Thầng, V.I. Lenin building., 14 June 2012). But in the concrete, there are cases in which we can never know the real reasons why particular politicians were punished (such as a moral failure or factional fighting). In any case evidence from Vietnam shows relatively numerous examples of politicians being sacked over some “moral shortcomings”, ranging from sexual harassment, hacking websites, gambling, having relations with sex workers, etc.

Some time ago Đầng Thầ Hoàng Yần, a wealthy Vietnam MP was sacked over a husband fraud claim and for making false declaration on her application to be a parliamentary candidate13 (Radio Netherlands Worldwide, 26 May 2012). Cases like this one can be found in the media,

12 Communist Review is available here: http://english.tapchicongsan.org.vn/Home/default.aspx.

13 Quoted from the report of Radio Netherlands Worldwide: “Yen, 53, also omitted to mention that she was a member of the ruling Communist party in her first application to be a parliamentary candidate, reports said.”


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often with speculation about the real reasons, the problem is we cannot confirm or deny that they are the result of factional fighting in Vietnam.

Doctrinalism is visible in Vietnam, for example when it comes to SOEs and their role in the Vietnamese economy. This source of money brings profits to many. There are politicians who are afraid of further shifts towards a market oriented economy which would perhaps lead to a curtailing of subsidies for SOEs. In practice this would mean that politicians would lose their money. In the public, however, this is packed into fear of undermining the “socialist foundations” (Manyin 2002, p. 45). Others who learnt how to gain profit from private companies would have the different rhetoric.

The seventh characteristic says that any factional arena will have from twenty to forty factions. It is not possible to confirm this or deny it due to insufficient information. But from the logic of the model (clientelistic ties, noded communication, flexibility in ideology and policy positions, etc.) this characteristic seems persuasive. Professor Adam Fforde quotes in his article about Vietnam from 2012 his professor Suzanne H. Paine: “At any point in time, the range of opinion within a ruling Communist Party is at least as great as that within the general population, and, at times of crisis, certainly greater” (Fforde 2012, p. 3). It is hard to believe that just two or three would attract followers.

The eighth characteristic seems to be difficult to confirm as well. When there is an inside threat that would be able to overthrow the system, all factions unite together, the same situation would be one in which an outside force would threaten the system. At this point the threat for the factions can be according to Nathan “foreign conquest, rebellion or military coup” (Nathan 1973, p. 50). None of these threaten Vietnam. We can only debate the threat of China. So far we do not have evidence of


increasing unity among the Vietnamese elites when it comes to China’s expansionism in Asia, but it is important to say that despite the South China Sea dispute, it is hard to imagine that China would really attack Vietnam with intent to conquer it.

The last two points (nine and ten) are important and they will be considered together. The extreme stability of the factional system may be attributed to immobilism, a lack of sanctions on elites and the tendency towards alliances. Nathan thinks that immobilism would be caused in the factional system by the absence of a clear policy in one direction. In Vietnam immobilism is partially caused by the factional fighting (there are long periods when politicians are trying to gain the consensus) and partially by the fact that when a policy is decided then there are problems with the implementation. Let us consider this step by step.

Brantley Womack in his article about Vietnam from 1997 identified the causes for political immobilism as the effect of a decade of economical reform. He wrote that economical reform was on one hand the most successful economic policy in the history of the Party but on the other hand it had many undesirable consequences such as a widening gap between the rich and poor, the need for decentralization that would be dangerous for the center and if applied it increases the disobedience at local levels, increasing dissatisfaction on the side of society, the difference between the young and old generation given the different environment where those generations grew up, etc. (Womack 1997, pp. 85-86). According to Womack those forces would, in a parliamentary regime, confront each other openly but in Vietnam: “such pluralism and confrontation is not permitted so interests outside the political class are pre-empted and if necessary suppressed, and interests within go through a private cycle of consensus and discipline known as democratic


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centralism” (Womack 1997, p. 86). Vietnam has a serious problem with immobilism, according to Adam Fforde it is caused by two other things: the breakdown of the internal Party hierarchy and the absence of the reform of formal political institutions (Fforde 2012). This immobilism doesn’t produce stability at all, it produces crisis.

In the previous part we tested Nathan’s factional model in Vietnam. We saw that many of his factional characteristics are present in Vietnam and for some of them it is not possible to decide whether they are present or not because of the lack of evidence. Nathan stressed that in a certain sense a factional system is extremely stable, but at the different level we can see increasing instability or even crisis. What can be concluded from the written above?

Conclusions

Firstly, we discussed the practical problems of Vietnam in two areas: the economy and society. We saw that the current problems are connected with the inefficiency of politics and the disobedience of various groups of actors: state actors, a demanding society, local politicians, powerful economical interests, etc. Then we searched for the causes of such a situation in the world of elites.

Implications of factionalism for the current political crisis

When we look at the factional characteristics we are immediately able to recognize various differences between the usual descriptions of factionalism in countries such as Vietnam or China as well as some important implications that stem from this model.

First of all there are prevailing Western patterns of thinking about


factions in countries like Vietnam: we tend to think that a faction is a rather rigid entity with clear goals and political positions. But in fact, the usual division of politicians in Vietnam or China into conservatives or reformists looses its meaning because factions are numerous and the political positions of their members are fluid depending on the opportunities available. That is why many top politicians in Vietnam are considered reformists while undertaking some conservative steps and other way round.

Second, we tried to show that Nathan’s structural definition of a faction based on a clientelist tie offers other explanations for factionalism: dynamics with certain characteristics which shape political behavior. We found out that Vietnam shows factional dynamics in which conflict between elites is highly limited. As a result the primary goal of elites is to preserve the factional system and profit from that setting. In such a system it is difficult to push through a consistent political direction because policies are commodities that can be exchanged for favours or support.

Third, a factional system as such creates a degree of stability, for the patterns of behavior of politicians are reproduced because elites have an interest in preserving this system. On the other hand, this system creates extreme instability because politics are not able to effectively deal with economical, social and political problems.

Fourth, as a result of the afore-mentioned causes, the Communist Party of Vietnam is losing its authority and has to deal with the increasing challenges. What can be a possible remedy for such a situation?


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A political reform? Sorely needed

Factional dynamics in Vietnam contributes to the unwillingness or inability to launch the needed political reform14 which would give not only formal but real power to the government and the state bodies (mainly the National Assembly), and which would also push for real decentralization and for clear relations of authority. Unreformed institutions have an impact on the efficiency of the political steps. A good example is the National Assembly. Formally this legislative body has a set of powers comparable to Western countries but when we look at the outcomes, the effect is almost non-existent.

Let us look at the three examples from 2010 which are usually presented as the cases of the increasing importance of the Vietnamese parliament. The first case was the rejection of the of Prime Minister Nguyần Tần Dũng’s proposal to build a high-speed rail line between Hanoi and Ho Chi Min City from 19 June, 2010. The plan was derailed when only 209 of the 493 deputies voted for the project in a ballot that required majority support (Steiglass 2010); The interpolation of the premier Nguyần Tần Dũng at the meeting of the National Assembly on 24 September, 2010 (Bình Nguyên 2010). A group of deputies was convinced that the Prime Minister should take the responsibility for the problems and the rising debt of Vinashin (Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group) – a state owned company that found itself close to bankruptcy due to the failures of the management. One of the deputies Nguyêần Minh Thuyêầt from Laầng Sần province even called for a vote of confidence and the establishment of a special commission of inquiry, but this proposal was rejected. (BBC VN, 12 November 2010); Last but not least the issue connected with

14 A suggestion that Vietnam needs a political reform comes from the works of prof. Adam Fforde (for ex. Fforde, 2012).


a live discussion in the National Assembly is bauxite mining in the Central Highlands area in Vietnam which involves the Chinese firm Chinalco (Than Pham 2009). Bauxite mining raised wide protests throughout the country, given the strategic position of the Central Highlands and the complicated relationship with China. However, those cases have to be judged against the evidence. It is often the case in Party-state relations that what in the beginning usually seems an important initiative or sign of autonomy ends with no political output. Chinese cooperation in bauxite mining was not prevented, the proposal for a vote of confidence was refused, the commission of inquiry in the Vinashin case was not established and Nguyần Tần Dũng was reelected Prime Minister. All those and other issues show that the space for real action from the side of state institutions is still blocked. The National Assembly is certainly not the only institution that has this problem, it suffices to look at the account of the Central bank which was not able to compel state-owned enterprises to obey its prescriptions. To sum up, Vietnam needs a reform of institutions which would include them gaining not only formal but also real power.

What is more, in reality (not formally) there are unclear relations of authority between institutions (Party and state) and unclear patterns of power and responsibility. That is why Adam Fforde calls Vietnam a country without a king. Vietnam needs to clarify the relations of authority between the Party and state bodies, central and local positions etc. Transparent relations of authorities also mean a transparent flow of responsibility and political accountability. At the level of everyday politics Vietnam clearly needs to take measures to limit corruption. Concrete political steps suggested by Adam Fforde and others such as restructuring the banking system and limiting the influence of SOEs are the issues that should commence the whole reform process.


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To sum up, Vietnam needs to go through a series of changes that would help to put the constraints on factional politics and thus give the politics credibility, control and efficiency.

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Islamic Insurgency in the Southern Philippines

Vojtěch BublíkGraduate Student at Asian Studies and International RelationsMetropolitan University Prague

This paper primarily focuses on the topic of separatism in the southern Philippines. Therefore, its main focus is not geographic aspects or the history of the archipelago. Nevertheless, I assume that a brief introduction of basic historical or geographical facts would be very helpful in order to enable a better understanding of the whole problem. Obviously, we will need to discuss religious aspects as well, because, similarly to Thailand (Liow 2006) and several other countries, this is the main root of the trouble in the southern Philippines.

The Philippines is an island nation in Southeast Asia. Its archipelago includes about 7100 islands with a total area of 300 000 square kilometers. It is located between 116° 40’, and 126° 34’ E. longitude and 4° 40’ and 21° 10’ N. Latitude. The archipelago has a tropical maritime climate – hot and humid. Average yearly temperature is about 26.6°C (79.88°F). The warmest month is May, while the coldest month is January. There are three seasons – tag-araw, tag-ulan and tag lamig. Tag-araw is the hot dry season or summer from March to May; tag-ulan is the rainy season from June to November; and tag-lamig is the cool dry season from December to February. From May to October, there is the southwest monsoon called hagabat, which brings rain. From November to April, there is amihan, the dry northeast monsoon.

Speaking of geographic aspects, the archipelago is surrounded by the South China Sea from the west, the Philippine Sea from the east, the Sulu Sea from the southwest side and the Celebes Sea in the south. The


Philippines has over seven thousand islands, so there are obviously more seas – for example the Visayas, Bohol or Camot. There is also a great many gulfs. The archipelago has three main divisions – Luzon, the Visayas and Mindanao. Luzon is the northernmost and also the largest island of the archipelago – its area is 104 688 square kilometers. A slightly smaller (104 530 square kilometers) is Mindanao, the southernmost island. Between Luzon and Mindanao lies the third principal division of the Philippines, the Visayas.15

The Philippines is home to nearly 97 million people, while the population density is about 308.0/km2. The population is distributed unevenly. The most significant population growth is in central and southern Luzon. Central parts of Luzon and the Visayas were overpopulated in the past. The residents were relocated to Mindanao and as a consequence, there were later vast conflicts.

The rest of the archipelago is inhabited by 8 other nationalities (Cebu, Visayas, Tagalogo, Waray-waray, Ilongo, Ilocan, Bikol, Dampangan and Dangasian). Of great importance are the first inhabitants of the archipelago, who were not Hispanized and influenced by Christianity –the Igorots and the Moro people. The Moros will be mentioned later, but it is important to say that they are a very significant minority because of their centralization and political establishment. The Moro people are divided into ten groups. The most significant of these are the Maguindanao and Maranaos-Ilanuno from Mindanao. Igorots are not the focal point of this paper, because they reside in the mountainous region of central Luzon and this paper is focused on the southern

15 Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí České republiky: Filipíny. Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí České republiky [online]. [cit. 2013-06-30]. Available at: http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/encyklopedie_statu/asie/filipiny/index.html


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Philippines. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that Igorots shared a similar fate with the Moro people, since they also fought against the Spanish and Americans.16

At this point, we should also cast more light on the issue of religion, for it is strongly linked to separatism. The Philippines and East Timor are the only two countries of Southeast Asia where the dominant faith is Christianity. More than 90% of the Philippine population is Christians (about 82 million). Generally, 85% of Filipinos adhere to the Roman Catholic church, about 5% to Protestant denominations, slightly over 5 % are Muslims (of the Sunni creed), mainly in the South. The other religious groups include: Evangelical churches 2.8%, Iglesia ni Kristo 2.3%, Aglipayan 2%, other Christian sects 4.5%, other 1.8%, unspecified 0.6%, none 0.1%.

The geographic distribution of Muslims is very interesting – they are traditionally located mainly in the south (areas of Sulu, Palawan and Mindanao), however, there is also a large Muslim population in the capital city of Manila. The distribution of Islam in the Philippines has a historic background and we will focus on it in the following chapter.

The spread of Islam and Christianity

Human settlement of the Philippines dates back to 67 000 years ago. But for our purpose we can start studying the history of the Archipelago from the fifteenth century onwards. At that time there was a huge amount of small political communities or family-binding based clans with different leaders – rajahs, sultans, lakans or datus (chiefs). Some of

16 http://pekiti-tirsia.cz/joomla/index.php/articles/filipiny/31-znovuzrozeni-narod-igorot-a-mor-umle-vytvoeni-filipinskeho-statu


them were united into municipal states based on the principle of thalassocracy – the rule over the sea and sea trading lanes. The rest of them were separate polities, such as Sulu or Maguindanao sultanates or the Maynila, Namayan or Tondo kingdoms. And it was at that time when Islam appeared in Southeast Asia (McAmis 2002, p. 18–24).

The most commonly accepted theory (Ricklefs etc.) is that the new creed first was brought to the region of Southeast Asia by Persian and Gujarati traders. The first records date to the 13th century, when it gained a foothold in northern Sumatra (the first sultanates of Perlak, Pedir and Samudra-Pasai). During the 14th century it reached the Malay Peninsula and in the second half of the 15th century Islam came to Java, from where it was spread further inland. Islam reached the Philippines in the 14th century, spread by traders from the areas of today s Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia. It is likely that the disseminators were of Arabic or other Middle Eastern origin, perhaps Malayized Arabs. The first area of the presence of Islam was Sulu and from there on it was spread to other islands (Šlachta, Burda, Holeček 2007).

Islam was spread by traders and proselytizers – in a non-violent way. Until then animism or the Indic religion prevailed in the Philippines, except for the Hinduized kingdoms such as those in which Tondo native religions were dominating. But due to the peaceful expansion of Islam, the native inhabitants of Maritime Southeast Asia often converted to Islam and modified it to the local value systems and cultural paradigms. In many cases we may talk of syncretism – Islam was mixed with animism and Hindu elements. It is highly possible that this method of distribution could convert the whole archipelago and Islam would have become the dominant religion in the Philippines as well. One of the most enthusiastic converters was Sharif Kabungsuan,17 who established the first Muslim

17 http://opinion.inquirer.net/39098/who-are-the-moro-people


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communities in the southern Philippines – especially in Maguindanao and Cotabo.

However, one historical event radically changed the course of history of the islands. In 1521 the Portuguese sailor Ferdinand Magellan, serving the king of Spain on his attempt to circumnavigate the globe, landed on the coast of a vast archipelago later to be named the Philippines. He was killed a month later during the battle of Mactan, but before that he had managed to make several agreements with local chieftains and declared the territory property of the Spanish king Philippe II. (The islands were named after him in 1543 by Ruy López Villalobos).

While other European colonial powers (Portugal, England, the Netherlands) sought primarily economical interests in the Southeast Asia, Spain took a somewhat different approach. Spaniards were making a great profit from their colonies in South and Central America, so their primary goal in the Philippines was evangelization. In other words, the spread of Christianity was their main mission in Southeast Asia.

As we have mentioned above, in the area of today s modern Philippines no state with central power had previously existed. There were only small traditional Austronesian polities headed by datus and these monarchs exerted power only over a limited area. The Spanish started with the archipelago s unification18 and their main device for that was Christianity. Religion enabled them to integrate and unite diverse communities as it ensured the Spanish legitimacy and worked as a unifying element.

18 http://internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/8A4B6AFE92D9BB82802570B700599DA1/$file/WP24_Web.pdf


The unification effort culminated with the defeat of rajah Sulayman III, the ruler of Maynila, in 1571, which materialized in the conquest of the commercial city they renamed as Manila. By then Islam was not distributed in Manila s vicinity but was instead more or less on the coast, also due to the ties with Brunei, and was also distributed in the south of the archipelago. The interior of the archipelago was still non-Muslim, thus representing a field ready for Christianization. The Spanish, upon gaining control of the former Maynila, managed to more or less de-Islamize this area, but they never could gain full control of the South, let alone Christianize the area, since Islam had already become strongly rooted there and had become part of the local identity.

The beginning of the conflict

During the pacification and unification of the archipelago, the Spanish faced great problems in the Islamized areas of the southern Philippines, namely Sulu and Mindanao. Their colonial rule lasted for about three hundred years, but their sovereignty in the South was only formal in nature. Practical sovereignty was never enforced. The Spanish conflicts with the Moros started soon after their conquest of Samar and Leyte in 1565. The Spaniards built a handful of coastal fortresses in the South but they were not able to spread their power any further inland. On the contrary, local Muslims were attacking their positions and tried to push them off of the island.

At this point, we should attempt to define the term Moro. Who actually are the Moro people? It was a name for local Muslim inhabitants coined by the Spanish. It was a summarizing term for linguistically heterogenous Muslims in the Southern Philippines, whose zealotry and aggressiveness proved very similar to the Moors. The Spanish, of course, had been familiar with these due to their centuries-long occupation of the Iberian


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Peninsula and the following encounters in North Africa. Thus, the long-term Arab occupation of Spain was the main reason for a virtually holy war the Spanish waged against the Moors. In the Philippines, too, there was a strong tension between the Moros and the Spaniards, though the term “Moor” did not have an insulting character. It was a summarizing one and included Muslims from Basilan, Mindanao, Palawan and the Sulu archipelago. It was simply a generic name for anyone who was Muslim.19

Nowadays the term Moro is used with pride as a national identifierer20. Moros are today dominant in Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. They are also in South and North Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, Davao del Sur, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga Sibugay and Palawan. The term Moro includes at least thirteen ethno-linguistic groups. They show a great degree of diversity, thus, their major unifying feature is Islam.21

The Spanish attacked the Moros quite often, but the Muslims were not able to unite themselves politically, let alone to create a long-lasting united state. They did form temporary alliances to repulse assaults, but after that they would always fall apart again. Moro units also had poor weapons and lacked any political or military coordination.

Apart from the resistance in Mindanao, there was also the Sulu sultanate and not even there could the Spanish claim their sovereignty. Only in 1876 did the Spanish conquer and occupy Jolo, the sultan s seat, in which

19 http://opinion.inquirer.net/39098/who-are-the-moro-people20 Sometimes the Malay-Spanish collocation bangsa Moro is used to denote this ethno-

religious group, which basically means a Moro nation since bangsa is a Malay word for a nation.



the sultan Jama ul-Azama signed a peace agreement in 1878 with the Spanish in return for the sultanate s autonomy within the realm of the Spanish Philippines. After the Spanish-American war, the defeated Spain was forced to sell the Philippines to the United States for 20 million USD. The territory also comprised “Moroland”, including the Sulu sultanate. Americans signed their own peace agreement and the independence of Moro was acknowledged. They also guaranteed the identity and integrity of the sultanate, in return Sulu acknowledged American sovereignty. But peace did not last for long. In 1903 Americans established the province of Moro. It contained the whole southern region and was under military administration. The main goal was to eliminate pirates and bandits. 22

The agreement with the Sulu sultanate was terminated in 1904. This led to the outbreak of a war, which lasted nine years (1904-1913). Two years later, in 1915, Americans forced the Sultan to surrender and hand formal power to the Americans. The following consolidation was quite slow, the sultanate was abolished in 1940 and its former islands were divided into the autonomous Philippines. It was definitely not a peaceful process. 23

Although the Sultan yielded formal power, he claimed he did so in favour of Americans, not the Philippines. Besides, on June 9th, 1921 fifty-seven Muslim leaders met and signed a petition, which contained a long list of discriminatory measures from the Spanish against the Moros and

22 ŠLACHTA, Mojmír, Tomáš BURDA a Milan HOLEČEK. Ohniska napětí ve světě. 1. vyd. Praha: Nakladatelství České geografické společnosti, 2007, 187 s. ISBN 978-808-6034-744.

23 VALACH, Jiří, original author Joseph FALLON. Pekiti-tirsia: Znovuzrození národů Igorotů a Morů - Umělé vytvoření filipínského státu. Pekiti tirsia [online]. [cit. 2013-06-30]. Dostupné z: http://pekiti-tirsia.cz/joomla/index.php/articles/filipiny/31-znovuzrozeni-narod-igorot-a-mor-umle-vytvoeni-filipinskeho-statu


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demanded the former sultanate be attached to the USA. However, the petition was ignored and the area remained a part of the Philippines. (This later caused the former Sulu sultanate problems. The government of the Philippines demanded part of Malaysia and their main argument was the former area of the Sulu sultanate, which included that area. It almost caused a war). However, neither the Americans nor Spanish managed to resolve the issues of piracy and later the separatism in Mindanao.

The beginning of southern Philippines’ separatism

The contemporary conflict started taking shape during 20th century and escalated in the 1950s. Until then one might say (except for the American intervention in Sulu), there was some kind of status quo. The Muslim community in the south was self-sufficient and did not influence the rest of the archipelago at all. Things had changed in the 1950s, when the government came with a colonization program for the southern Philippines.

Farmers from overpopulated lowlands in Luzon and the Visayas were lured to settle the South, where soil had not been used for agriculture, while cheap loans and low taxes were provided by the government. It was met with opposition from Muslim native inhabitants, because farmers from Luzon and Visayas were Christian. Muslims who had until then been a majority in Mindanao (about 80%), now became a minority (30%). As a result of that, they started a rebellion.

At first there were just protesting, but these soon turned into armed clashes. For example – In 1970 in Cotabo there was a conflict between the governmental army and armed Muslims and thousands of people were killed. The rebels lost, but some of them survived and retreated


into the forest. In hiding they came to the conclusion that a Muslim state needs to have a mandate. Thus, in 1970 the rebels declared Bangsamoro republic. It was not acknowledged, but its foundation helped to organize Muslim resistance and rebellion. The first groups and organizations were created and we will focus on them in the next chapter. 24

II.Separatist organizations

MNLF

A major problem in the southern Philippines, particularly in Mindanao, from the 1950s onwards was a number of separatist and terrorist groups, attempting to establish and expand an autonomous region.25

The eldest organization is the Moro National Liberation Front – the M.N.L.F., founded in 1972.26 A catalyst for founding an organization (and also for shaping the rebellion) was the Jabidah masacre (or the Corredigor incident). It was a massacre in which army units under the supervision of Ferdinand Marcos killed about 14-68 Muslim recruits (The figures differ substantially. Some sources mention hundreds of victims and the Sultanate of Sulu mentions thousands of dead Muslim


25 Currently, the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) is a projection of these attempts.

26 There are different dates for the establishment of the M.N.L.F. and the M.I.L.F. I am quoting ŠLACHTA, Mojmír, Tomáš BURDA a Milan HOLEČEK. Ohniska napětí ve světě. 1. vyd. Praha: Nakladatelství České geografické společnosti, 2007, 187 s. ISBN 978-808-6034-744.


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soldiers). The main reason was president Marcos´ plans to conquer Sabah. Arguably, it was part of the former Sultanate of Sulu. In 1888 the area became a British protectorate with the name of North Borneo and after 1946 it became a British colony. In 1960 during the national liberation movements the name was changed to North Borneo Sabah and the area gained temporary autonomous status. In 1963 Sabah was without full autonomy and was attached (as well as Sarawak and Singapore) to the federation of Malaysia. It should prevent attempts by Indonesia to get the whole of Borneo and the attempts of the Philippines to get Sabah, claimed as a former part of the Philippines).27

The operation was called Merdeka and there were special units trained for it.28 Their mission was to get Sabah back. The main goal was to infiltrate Sabah, start killing and create instability. Marcos supposed, that residents of Sabah would subsequently sympathize with the efforts of the Philippines, because of their Philippine origin (they came particularly from Mindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi). But this origin turned out to be double-edged. Even today it is not certain, what exactly happened during the Jabidah Masacre. But it is supposed, that Moro soldiers in AFR units refused to take part in the Merdeka operation, because they did not want to kill fellow Moros. Therefore they were executed.29 One of the founders of the MNLF was a political science student named Nur Misuari. At first the group was only a political party, but soon it expanded and an army faction was added. The main goal was to assure the establishment of the autonomous region of Bangsamoro (which can be translated as “Moro homeland”), which

27 Sabah‘s Heritage:A Brief Introduction to Sabah‘s History & History, Sabah Museum, Kota Kinabalu, 1992. resp. http://www.sabah.gov.my/mid/english/M_Sabah.htm

28 VONDRA, Pavel. Moro-moro no more. Working paper for MUP conference Islam, Society and Politics in Southeast Asia, March 11, 2011

29 http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2013/04/03/face-saving-solution-to-sabah/


would be independent of the supposedly tyrannical regime of president Marcos. This is where a change in the mindset of the rebels occurred. Misuari was one of a new generation of Muslims and they started to divide the terms “homeland” and “nation”. Their goal was not just the establishment of an autonomous region/independent state, but they also focused on the self-determination of the Moro people. 30

The Jabidah massacre was also an important impetus for the founding of another organization, later called the Muslim independence movement31, still later renamed as the Mindanao Independence Movement. But it was just a regional organization, which never spread further than the province of Cotabo. In 1968, another organization was founded which was completely different from the previous two – Ilaga (Rat). Members of Ilaga attacked Moros without punishment, because of support from regional governors, mayors and the army. References to this organization are seen from the 1970s onwards. Its activity led to the destruction of the MIM. There were three main reasons for this – the attacks of Ilaga, the inability to come up with a meaningful political platform and the inability to separate from its founder, governor Cotabo of the province of Udtog Matalam, who used MIM as a tool for increasing his political power. 32

On October 21st, 1972 a war for liberation was started between the MNLF and the Army of Philippines. Conflict attracted the attention of surrounding Muslim countries and the Organization of the Islamic

30 LIOW, Joseph Chinyong. Muslim resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines: Religion, Ideology, and Politics. Washington D.C.: East-West center Washington, 2006. ISBN 987-1-932728-47-7. Available at: www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/publications

31 http://opinion.inquirer.net/39098/who-are-the-moro-people32 http://pekiti-tirsia.cz/joomla/index.php/articles/filipiny/31-znovuzrozeni-narod-igorot-

a-mor-umle-vytvoeni-filipinskeho-statu


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Conference (O.I.C.). O.I.C. threatened to stop petroleum supplies from Muslim countries and used also diplomatic pressure to make Marcos start peace talks with rebels (the inability of president Marcos to repress rebellion was important as well). An important date is December 23rd, 1976 – the date of the Tripoli agreement. 33

MNLF demanded an autonomous region composed of 22 provinces. The Tripoli agreement covered only thirteen, nonetheless the MNLF accepted it. But the agreement lasted only four months. Then president Marcos made use of his political dexterity and discredited it34 (For example — he pushed in the media an article about decision-making. It contained the condition that only a referendum can determine the method of governance in the Philippines – it was against the whole Tripoli agreement and it was denied by 90% of the electorate). So, autonomy was not achieved but nevertheless, there was some progress. It was the first time ever that the government of Philippines admitted to the existence of an autonomous Muslim region.

Its establishment was still conditioned on a referendum. It took place in 1989 in 13 southern provinces and 9 privileged cities. Autonomy was voted for only by inhabitants of Muslim areas, but the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao was established nonetheless. Still, liberation fronts refused this solution and instead claimed the establishment of a Federal republic of Mindanao. It was not acknowledged, so the fighting continued until 1996 when the MNLF started negotiations with the

33 http://www.seasite.niu.edu/Tagalog/Modules/Modules/MuslimMindanao/tripoli_agreement.htm

34 VALACH, Jiří, original author Joseph FALLON. Pekiti-tirsia: Znovuzrození národů Igorotů a Morů - Umělé vytvoření filipínského státu. Pekiti tirsia [online]. [cit. 2013-06-30]. Available at: http://pekiti-tirsia.cz/joomla/index.php/articles/filipiny/31-znovuzrozeni-narod-igorot-a-mor-umele-vytvoreni-filipinskeho-statu


government and signed a peace agreement compromise in Jakarta. It was only formal because fights had not ceased. But it was an important moment for the MNLF which calmed its activities and the MNLF took over its influence and activities.35

There is one interesting fact about the MNLF. In 2010 the “United Nations Security Council Report”36was published, which contained a list of terrorist organizations and MNLF was not included. Nevertheless, we can only assume it would be included if there was the same situation as in the times of the MNLF’s most intense activities in the 1970s and 1980s.

MILF

Along with MNLF there was also the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the 1980s. The dates of its establishment differ (1981 – 1984), but voices demanding that there was need of a more radical fraction than the MNLF had been there since the discrediting of the Tripoli agreement in 1976-77. In addition the MNLF was criticized for tending towards Marxism more than Islamism37. Because of these facts, some people tried to change the situation. One of these people was Hashim Salamat, the vice-chairman of the MNLF Salamat who made a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1958 and later studied Islamic theology at the famous al-Azhar University. He was one of the loudest critics of MNLF s diversion from Islamism and in 1977 he tried change the course of the


36 UN Security Council Report, 23 April 201037 LIOW, Joseph Chinyong. Muslim resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines:

Religion, Ideology, and Politics. Washington D.C.: East-West center Washington, 2006. ISBN 987-1-932728-47-7. Available at: www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/publications


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organization.38 He claimed that resistance had taken a “fashionable and mass shape” and thus had lost its former essence39. Salamat and his fellows wanted Islam to be a main theme and also to be a way of life. He, with 57 other people, established “New leadership” to overthrow Nur Misuari and to change the course of the organization. However, they were not successful and Salamat was banished in 1977. He and his fellows left for Cairo and later founded their own organization there – the M.I.L.F.

The first years of the MILF were more likely about establishing organization than fighting for a Muslim state. But later MILF turned out to be far more radical. Thus, where the negotiating skills of the MNLF failed, the weapons and violence of the MILF were used (the Battle of Malmar, Battle of Basilan, Battle of Rajamuda, Battle of Buldon, Battle of Camp ‘Umar and a week-long war that occurred towards the end of January in 1999”40 are just a few examples)

They gained huge influence in 1996, when the M.N.L.F. reduced its activity and the M.I.L.F. became the leading organization in separatist efforts in the south. With 15 000 members (though they claimed to have 50 00041) it became the largest separatist organization in the Philippines. It strengthened itself in an organizational and ideological way and

38 Global Jihad: The 21st century´s phenomenon. [online]. [cit. 2013-06-30]. Available at: http://www.globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?id=1072


40 Seasite: rebel and separatist groups. Seasite.niu.edu [online]. [cit. 2013-06-30]. Available at: http://www.seasite.niu.edu/Tagalog/Modules/Modules/Separatist_Groups/rebel_and_separatist_groups.htm

41 ŠLACHTA, Mojmír, BURDA, Tomáš a HOLEČEK, Milan. Ohniska napětí ve světě. 1. vyd. Praha: Nakladatelství České geografické společnosti, 2007, 187 s. ISBN 978-808-6034-744.


established a connection with representatives of global terrorism. The organization resembled a guerilla group at first (bomb assaults and kidnapping civilians not for ransom, but in order to get medial attention. The Abu Sayyaf Group used similar methods later on). But recently the organization has undergone changes and in 2012 they presented themselves as negotiators and mediators of peace talks between the ARMM (and the southern Philippines in general) and the government. The date of the breaking point was 200342, when Hashim Salamat claimed that the organization was giving up terrorist activities and focusing themselves on political negotiations (however, the M.I.L.F. had been politically active before – for example in 1988 some of their representatives had won regional elections). Salamat soon died because of a heart attack and was replaced by Al-Hajj Murad Ebrahim. He maintained a new course for the organization and in 2005 he came from illegality in his activities in order to get involved in public negotiations43. There have been some peace talks too, but not all of them have been successful (there is still ongoing violence, however the M.I.L.F. denied it). Finally, in 2012 the MILF signed a peace agreement44, which remains to be broken as of yet (in contrast to previous agreements).

Although the M.I.L.F. was way more radical than the M.N.L.F., they asserted Jihad is not only a military matter. The main spirit was to exceed military characteristics and to not to spread Islam just by the sword. Besides waging a jihad, Hashim Salamat asserted the two main pillars of the movement to be da´wah (proselytization) and tarbiyyah (education, Liow 2006).

42 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/milf.htm43 http://www.globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?id=141144 http://ncronline.org/news/global/philippine-government-and-rebels-sign-peace-

agreement


120 | 121

The Abu Sayyaf Group

Even the MILF was not spared fractures within its organizations. The main reason was its connection to global Islamism in the 1990s. One part of the MILF wanted to continue in rebellion in the south of the Philippines, while the other part wanted to join in “holy war” (jihad) against all infidels (which means everyone who does not worship Islam). In 1991 the so-called Abu Sayyaf separated from the M.I.L.F. (we can translate it as “father of the swordsmith/bearer of the sword”45). It is the smallest of these separatist organizations (with about 400 members), but is notoriously known to definitely be the most brutal. They are well-known due to their assassinations, bomb assaults, kidnappings and torture of enemy soldiers and civilians (foreign journalists, members of the Red Cross...) and so on. In ten years, they have executed about 60 armed operations, which resulted in hundreds of victims. There is evidently completely different rhetoric apart from other separatist groups in the Philippines. The M.I.L.F. also claimed Jihad, but they used is as a tool to achieve a change of situation. Abu Sayyaf is using Jihad as an excuse for violence and its legitimation (Liow 2006).

The founder and first leader of the group was Abubakar Janjalani. He was born in the Basilan Island, one of the smallest and poorest regions in the south of the Philippines. He left for Saudi Arabia and Syria and studied theology and Arabic Studies there. This is where he probably started leaning towards an extremist version of Islam and jihad. In 1990 he came back to Basilan and established the group Abu Sayyaf there with his younger brother Khadafy (who was under his strong influence).

45 http://www.seasite.niu.edu/Tagalog/Modules/Modules/Separatist_Groups/rebel_and_separatist_groups.htm


Khadafy was arrested in 1995 for participation in the Bojinka plot (more in the following chapter) and after negotiations with the government he tried to persuade his brother to surrender. Abubakar strongly refused and he was killed in 1998. He was replaced by his brother Khadafy, who was killed in 2006 by the Philippine army (there are also sources claiming that the leader was the speaker of the organization, Abu Sabaya).46 Since then we have had no information about the leader of the organization. On the one hand it makes the fight against the group difficult, but on the other hand there is Abu Sayyaf, which is no longer coordinated and their actions are only the acts of individuals.

By the time MILF was using guerilla tactics and had had more military actions than political negotiations, Abu Sayyaf was their major ally (although they separated from them). The MILF and Abu Sayyaf were classified as terrorist organizations in the “United Nations Security Council Report”. Abu Sayyaf also occurs in the US list of terrorist organization from 2001.

Individuals

It is quite a paradoxical situation – one of the most brutal recent massacres in Mindanao was not caused by the notorious Abu Sayyaf Group, but by an action of an individual and his followers. After the MNLF reduced their activities, the MILF performed as a negotiator and Abu Sayyaf was weakened by lacking a strong leader, the biggest threat for security in the Philippines is individuals (or armed groups which follow them). They usually are oligarchs or representatives of local elites and their goal is not the autonomy of the region at all, but the expansion of their own power.

46 http://www.globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?id=826


122 | 123

As one highly brutal example, we can use the incident from 2009. An armed group in Maguindanao kidnapped and killed a group of journalists and politicians, who Had gone to register Esmael Mangundadatu for the election (he was not in convoy himself). At first, 21 bodies were found, but during another examination of the crime scene the count of the victims doubled. In the end, there were 53 corpses. However, this action was not carried out by any separatist group. The perpetrator of this mass murder proved to be Andal Ampatuan junior, the mayor of the city of Data Unsay. Esmel Mangundadatu was a challenger of his father Andal Ampatuan in the election. Ampatuan has been prosecuted and the trial is now under way.47

Individual struggles for power and clan-based conflicts are currently the biggest problem related to armed violence (because rebellion and separatism are more or less going to be solved). Gunfights and death threats have become a daily routine. However, among these tragedies, there was one somewhat funny case in terms of solving the situation in the village of Dodo in Mindanao. That is, local women threatened their husbands with sexual pressure (warning them they would not sleep with them as long as they keep fighting) and the men really stopped their armed struggle.48 But it is obvious that such a solution is quite exceptional and could work only on a village level. It is unthinkable this solution could work on a nationwide level, where money and power are involved. After all, governor candidate Esmel Mangundadat sent to his wife for his registration (and thus sentenced her to death) because he was too scared to do it himself.

47 http://zpravy.idnes.cz/politicka-strelba-ma-53-obeti-naridil-ji-zrejme-stoupenec-filipinske-prezidentky-gf6-/zahranicni.aspx?c=A091125_153641_zahranicni_stf

48 ibid


III. Links to global Islamism

The situation in the south of the Philippines was always a regional issue. Since the 1950s when migration from Luzon and the Visayas to Mindanao sponsored by the government there were no significant conflicts where surrounding countries could express support to separatists. From the point of view of global Islamism, the establishment of the M.I.L.F., M.N.L.F. or Abu Sayyaf was important in terms of creating trans-regional connections. Their representatives studied abroad and had contacts and links to global Islamism. Hashim Salamat, Abu Sabaya or the Janjalani brothers – all of them studied abroad, especially in Saudi Arabia and their stances and opinions were thoroughly molded there). But ideological support came from Libya and Malaysia as well.

Neighboring countries and Muslim countries first took the Mindanao conflict into serious consideration in 1972, when the MNLF started a war with government forces. The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) took action and on their fourth ministerial meeting set up a four-member committee. Its goal was to reveal the causes of the war and to suggest a possible solution. The committee members were Libya, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Somalia. During the fifth ministerial meeting the committee published their conclusions. The OIC defined the cause of war as a political issue and suggested talks and negotiation between Manila and the MNLF. They considered the request of the MNLF to create an independent Moro state, but in the end suggested the establishment of an autonomous region. One of the significant faces of negotiations was Muamar Gadafi, who strongly contributed to the arrangement of the second meeting between the Philippine government and the MNLF in Tripoli (the first round of talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, failed).


124 | 125

The next obvious link to global Islamism is the cooperation between Philippine terrorist groups and global Islamic terrorist organizations. We could divide this cooperation into three groups. The first form of support is ideological from organizations or states, which have declared jihad. The second form of support is material, financial or the training of units. Lastly, the third form of mutual organization of these groups is conducting terrorist strikes of global terrorist organizations in local regions, which the local cells help implement. 49

It was Jemaah Islamiyah which showed the greatest engagement – a terrorist group founded in the early 1990s (the most frequently published date being 1993). They fight for the establishment of an Islamic state in the area of southern Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei and the southern Philippines. Its existence and evidence of targeted and organized actions was confirmed in 2001. Back then Singaporean units thwarted their plans to attack navy targets.

This organization is responsible for attacks in all the mentioned countries. We can provide an example of suicide bombers in the Bali nightclub in 2002 with 200 victims. Bomb assaults were also caused between 2002 and 2005. Jemaah Islamiyah is not responsible only for bomb assaults, but they also trained separatists from the Philippines and supplied them with equipment and ammunition. In the early life of the organization, their main goal was to support the MILF and Abu Sayyaf (later they extended their activities to Al-Qaeda s actions in Sudan and Afghanistan. After Suharto descended from power, they turned more to Indonesia). But Jemaah Islamiyah was not the only



element training mujahideens from the Philippines, Saudi Arabia was also involved. The main reason was the good relationships between their representatives and the leaders of the MILF, MNLF or the Abu Sayyaf Group.50

As a joint regional action we can mention the “Bojinka plot”51 (although this action never materialized). The plan was to load explosives onto ten planes heading from Southeast Asia (especially Indonesia and the Philippines) to the USA and attack targets such as the Pentagon and the White house. The date of the action was set for January 22nd, 1995. The main organizers were Ramsi Yousef a Abdul Hakim Murad, who also invited the Abu Sayyaf Group. Although the action failed, links to global Islamism and terrorism were evident, just like the ideological dissension of terrorist organizations in the Philippines.

This conspiracy did not have much connection with the efforts to create an autonomous Muslim region or independent state in the Southern Philippines at all. It was basically an attack organized by Ramsi Yousef on the USA, which he deeply hated, as well as Israel. However, Abubakar Janjalani and Abu Sayyaf joined this plan and supported Yousef. This also casts some light on the ideological dissension within the Abu Sayyaf Group. Thus, there were two discourses – one wing struggling for the autonomy/sovereignty of Mindanao and a fraction supporting global jihad and war against infidels.

Speaking about links to global Islamism, there has been an interesting development in recent years. Abu Sayyaf showed from their




126 | 127

establishment links to Al-Qaeda and one of their leaders – Osama bin Laden (who claimed the Philippines as a place, where jihad should be supported). Rumors of confirmed links with the Abu Sayyaf Group and speculations about a connection to Al-Qaeda surrounded the MILF (there were speculations about bin Laden s visit to the MILF in 1997). The MILF never denied links to global Islamism, but after September 11th, 2001 they underwent a radical change in their Islamist discourse. After the terrorist attacks in the USA, the MILF remained aloof from Al-Qaeda and started denying any kind of previous cooperation or meetings. And after the killing of bin Laden MILF representatives refused to call him a martyr.

There is also one interesting fact. Although the conflict in the southern Philippines shares a similar characteristic with the conflict in Southern Thailand (possessing a Muslim minority with a majority of another religion as well), local terrorist organizations never cooperated, neither in a military way, nor for mutual ideological support. There is also no cooperation between the two minorities in the Philippines; the Moros and Igorots (although both of them demand autonomy and oppose Manila). 52

IV.The solution is quite interesting especially due to the approach to it in recent years. The problem is a matter of history over several centuries, nevertheless, in addition to combating pervasive corruption, the current administration of president Aquino corruption has set the solution of the Mindanao situation as a top priority. And since 2010 when he was

52 The main source for this chapter was LIOW, Joseph Chinyong. Muslim resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines: Religion, Ideology, and Politics. Washington D.C.: East-West center Washington, 2006. ISBN 987-1-932728-47-7. Available at: www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/publications


elected it seems like he has been quite successful. So why did previous negotiations fail while the current ones are successful?

To answer this question, we need to know the historical background to the conflict and also take into account the fact that, although religion plays a significant role in the conflict, the core of separatism is getting autonomy for the Moro region, not fighting against the infidels. This makes the conflict quite unique. Indeed, the founder of the MNLF. and later the leader of the ARMM Hashim Salamat claimed the same thing. Though he was considered a mujahideen, he claimed the conflict was a mainly political and historical problem, not primarily a religious one

(Liow 2006). But on the other hand, he considered jihad as a necessary means to create a separate Bangsamoro Republic. However, Salamat did not require the independence of the whole of Mindanao, but only those areas where Muslims were the majority. He wanted only Islamic communities following the word of the prophet Mohammed and having a lifestyle based on Islam to live in these places. He also wanted Sharia law and Sunni Islam to be applied.

It must be said that up until now there have not been any major efforts to resolve the conflict. The Spanish tried to connect Mindanao and the rest of southern Philippines to their territory. Their sovereignty was only de iure, not de facto, nevertheless they did not try to solve this problem. They had no tendency to negotiate with separatists and did not show any efforts to establish an autonomous or independent territory (though it was not under their control, they did not want to let it go). One of the few attempts at negotiation with the South Philippines was the agreement from 1878. The Sultan of Sulu Jama ul-Azam signed a peace agreement with the Spanish in exchange for the autonomy of the Sultanate. Americans were more successful at promoting their influence. At first they signed a peace agreement with the Sultanate of


128 | 129

Sulu, however they soon withdrew it and captured the sultanate. It is interesting that although the sultan gave up temporal power, he declared this act to be in favor of the Americans and not the Philippines.53 For this act comes great contempt for the government of the Philippines (and previously the Spanish government), which oppressed the Muslim minority. The historic background and frequent attacks on Muslim minorities led to fact that when the Moros tried to set up autonomy, it was strongly opposed and they demanded the establishment of an autonomous Bangsamoro state (the Homeland of Moros). But it is interesting that although Moros vehemently opposed colonialism, meaning therefore the Spanish and the Americans, it was the Americans who first united the south of the Philippines, even if only administratively (McKenna (1998) argued that Muslim opposition initially began staking itself out against U.S. colonialism and imperialism, not Spanish, but I think he has a far longer tradition for the conflict). But it was major progress, because Muslims in the southern Philippines were never able to unite54, except in the fight against a collective enemy (during times of peace it was possible that they would fight against each other). Muslims in the Philippines (and also in Southern Thailand – the region of Pattani) require the establishment of their own state or a highly autonomous region, under the auspices of the historical context. And they also claim that the central government runs the state, without any regard for them and their long traditions (Liow 2006).

Efforts to resolve the conflict began in the second half of the twentieth century and since then there have been several attempts. Let us combine the Spanish and the Americans. After all, there was no effort to resolve

53 http://pekiti-tirsia.cz/joomla/index.php/articles/filipiny/31-znovuzrozeni-narod-igorot-a-mor-umle-vytvoeni-filipinskeho-statu



any conflict to the satisfaction of both parties, they just tried to use their power to impose their domination. One of the first attempts at reconciliation could be considered the Tripoli agreement. It failed mainly due to the former president of the Philippines Ferdinand Marcos. Marcos, who came to power in 1965 advocated the same strategy as the Spaniards and the Americans. Against the Moros, who rebelled against the flow of Christians from other islands by intervening militarily. But he was not successful and therefore had to haphazardly start negotiations with them. But Ferdinand Marcos was a man for whom power was one of the most important things. At the beginning of his presidency, he presented himself as a democratic ruler, but then his authoritarian tendencies began to prevail. In 1972 his regime became a harsh dictatorship and he declared martial law. Negotiations on the Tripoli agreement took place in 1976, during this period. For Marcos it was unthinkable to lose even a bit of his power. And so he added various legal alterations to the agreement, which were highly disadvantageous for the Muslim side and thus the contract was unacceptable. Martial law allowed Marcos to intervene against separatists very severely, if they rebelled. And there was repression only against them. He also arrested his political opponents while facing political uprisings. 55

In such unstable times the solution of the Muslim autonomy issue was quite impossible, the more so because opposition of Marcos grew. Especially after 1983, when his opponent and major critic B. Aquino, returning from U.S. exile, was murdered. In 1986 Marcos was defeated by Aquino’s widow Corazon Aquino. Although Marcos refused to accept her victory, Aquino had the support of the army so Marcos eventually had to flee from the Philippines.

55 „Ferdinand E. Marcos“. Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved November 19, 2007.


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Aquino and her successors to the presidential post had to deal primarily with his sinister “legacy”. The government of president Marcos could be characterized by massive corruption, economic stagnation, and also a considerably widening gap in living standards between the rich and the poor. It may be claimed that the debts of the Marcos Era (his spendthrift wife Imelda Marcos also contributed) is still being repaid. After the overthrow of Marcos the priority of social and economic reforms were sorely needed and the situation in the South was sidelined. On the other hand, it would be unfair to say that the following presidents did not try to solve the conflict. After all, all Philippine heads of state have tried to deal with the Mindanao situation since 1970. But there is a difference between the ability to focus only on the solution of the conflict and being able to deal with it at the same time as various other problems. And such issues which divert attention from solving the conflict in Mindanao have been occurring almost permanently and much too abundantly. One of the biggest problems is pervasive corruption, family bindings (of the oligarchy) and clientelistic ties between politicians and across society in general. For example, the Maguindanao massacre, where Amptuan Andal Jr. organized an attack on a convoy of Esmael Mangundadaty, the rival of his father, has not been investigated yet. Furthermore, it is assumed that it will not ever happen. The alleged offender is being held prior to court, but the investigation has gone on for three years and there are assumptions that because of the friendship of the Amptuan family with former president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo the judgment will be never pronounced (or the investigation will be stopped).

Solving the situation of the autonomous region was also further complicated by the attacks of September 11th, 2001. The Philippines has been a great ally to the USA in Southeast Asia in modern history and after September 11th their cooperation has even intensified. Soon after


the attack the president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo offered Americans the use of the Philippine military and naval bases at will. This, however, led to increased activity of the NPA56 organization that has operated in the Philippines since 1969. It is the armed wing of the Philippine Communist Party and it fights, inter alia, against the presence of any U.S. troops in the archipelago. Similarly to the M.I.L.F. or Abu Sayyaf, they operated as a guerrilla group and the United States added them to the list of terrorist organizations in 2002. However, they were not as active as the Philippine separatist organization, so they were finally removed from the list in 2011. In the post September 11th 2001 aftermath, the tensions between Muslim societies and the West mounted and, unsurprisingly, many Moros began to perceive Bush s war on terror as a war against Islam. And as a result of that, many of the Mindanao Muslims took part in Afghanistan s operations.57

But let us return to the situation in the south of the archipelago. The first real signs of a solution appeared in 1996. During the presidency of Fidel Ramos an agreement did not solve the situation completely, but managed to somewhat dampen the activity of the MNLF, so in the southern Philippines there remained “only” two terrorist organizations. Equally important was the year 2003 when Hasim Salamat, the leader of the MILF organization, announced its transformation from a guerrilla and terrorist organization to a negotiator. In the same year the government of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed a peace treaty with the MILF, which included, inter alia, the establishment of the International Monitoring Team. It was created in 2004 and was tasked with monitoring violence in the Philippines.

56 http://www.seasite.niu.edu/Tagalog/Modules/Modules/Separatist_Groups/rebel_and_separatist_groups.htm



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The existing peace agreements mainly solved the following issues – problems of the police and internal security forces, the system of banking and finance, the civil service, education and legislative and electoral institutions, as well as having full authority to develop and dispose of minerals and other natural resources58. The road map included the signing of the agreement between the M.I.L.F. and the government in 2008, solving the territorial requirements: “Under the proposed memorandum of agreement on ancestral domain (MOA-AD), the planned homeland also referred to as the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) was to include the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (Sulu, Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan and Marawi City); six municipalities in Lanao del Norte; hundreds of villages in the provinces of Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Norte and North Cotabato, which voted in 2001 to become part of the ARMM; and parts of Palawan.”59

This time the agreement (which was to be signed and come into force on June 16th, 2008) was opposed not only by the separatists but also by the Christian population of the Philippines. They argued that an autonomous region could become an independent state and strongly protested the outcome of the talks. They submitted an appeal to the Supreme Court, which stopped the ratification of the agreement on August 4th, and on October 14th it deemed the agreement illegal (though the proportion of votes was very narrow – 8:7 against validation). Following this failure, the (so far) last wave of large clashes between Christians and Muslims erupted and caused 400 deaths, while 750,000 people lost their homes. Also the international monitoring committee had to leave the Philippines.

58 http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/285604/what-went-before-the-proposed-moa-ad59 ibid


However, this bloodbath did not mean the end of the peace process. The monitoring committee returned in 2010 and on August 11th, 2011 president Aquino and the MILF leader Murad Ebrahim secretly met in Tokyo. They agreed to hold further peace talks, which led to another proposal of a peace agreement. The main point of contention was the status of the ARMM (the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao). There was no agreement for a long time as to whether it should be a state, a sub-state entity or an autonomous region.

The latest progress (2012) was that both sides signed a document, also agreed upon by Christian leaders60 in the Philippines, which regulates the situation as follows:

“The new entity – Bangsamoro – will replace the present the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao – the ARMM. In addition, Bangsamoro will include those municipalities and barangays (village level administration) which voted for inclusion in the ARMM 2001 plebiscite. The Bangsamoro will also include the cities of Cotabato and Isabella, Basilan, as well as all other areas where there is a resolution of the local government or a petition of at least 10 per cent of qualified voters in favor of inclusion.

However, many challenges remain to be solved. Bangsamoro needs to establish a ministerial system, a Basic Law, a system for power sharing between the Central Government and Bangsamoro, Basic Rights and Wealth Sharing to mention a few. A temporary Transition Commission and a Bangsamoro Transition Authority as well as a third-party monitoring team of international bodies will be formed for the transition period.”61

60 http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/290812/bishops-support-mindanao-peace-agreement-says-retired-prelate

61 http://norcapweb.no/?did=9143838


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However, with the ARMM still in existence, there is a question over the funding of this area. In 2006, 98% of funds for the administration of the ARMM was paid for by the Philippine government (Šlachta, Burda, Holeček 2007). If the territory really intends to achieve independence one day, it should no longer rely on such help and it would be necessary to resolve this funding problem. This situation is therefore double-edged also for the central government. On the one hand, if the Muslim region became independent, the Philippine government would not have to pump such huge sums into the ARMM. On the other hand, Mindanao has huge sources of mineral wealth. This is also one of the main reasons why the Philippine government seeks to maintain the territory within the state and opposes any secession.

There are other extra arguments against a full autonomy. One of the major ones would be that the Philippines is an important maritime thoroughfare and as such is usually more easily controlled if under the jurisdiction of one state (although many important maritime thoroughfares are easily controlled by two or more states).

Only future development will show whether these estimations are relevant or not. What is of importance is that the peace treaty was signed. There are voices claiming it to be not so much a peace agreement, but rather a skeletal framework, which is a kind of outline for further negotiations. Whether it is so or not, the important thing is that the southern Philippines has currently stopped fighting. The question is whether peace will persist. Two factors speak in favor of positive development. The MILF has styled itself into the role of a negotiator and does not continue to participate in terrorist attacks. Secondly, the Abu Sayyaf Group is weakened, so if there are any attacks, they are more likely to be the actions of individuals acting on their own. One of the factors which should affect the current peace is whether or not


there will be another fission in the MILF faction (as it once did for Abu Sayyaf) and a new radical wing will be created. However, the situation seems fairly optimistic so far. The year of 2016 will be crucial, for then the proposed plans should be implemented62.

V.Problematic Sabah

There is no doubt that the Philippines is nowadays closer to resolving the separatist issue than ever before. However, a major obstacle to the peace appeared quite unexpectedly – the incident of February 11th, 2013, also known as the Lahad Datu Stand off. On that day, 235 armed men identifying themselves as the “Royal Security Forces of the Sultanate of Sulu and North Borneo,” sent in by Sultan Jamalul Kiram III, landed in Sabah, which they declared as a territory belonging to the Sultanate.

Although part of Sabah had arguably belonged to the Sultanate, the political commentators regarded the claims of sultan Jamalul Kiram III as ridiculous. The Sultanate lost its autonomy in 1917 and has been defunct ever since. Currently, its former territory is divided between Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.

But there is another problem. Immediately after intruders got into Malaysia territory, the leader of the MNLF Nur Misuari issued this warning: If the Malaysian government intervenes, it will not be without consequences. As mentioned in previous chapters, the MNLF inhibited its activity in 1996. However, if the MNLF began to be active again, it is not clear how it would be reflected in the agreement between the MILF

62 http://norcapweb.no/?did=9143838


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and the Philippine government.63

In addition, the conflict-solving plans from 2012 also include a mention of certain assistance from Malaysia. That is, a large Malaysian company was planning to establish palm plantations (The Philippines has excellent conditions for the growing of oil palms and thus for production of food oils. Paradoxically, it is more an importer of these foodstuffs rather an exporter). It means that agricultural cooperatives would be based in Mindanao which, thanks to cheap government loans and purchasing guarantees, would provide livelihoods for local people and also contribute to the state budget. But the question is whether in the case of a collision these plans would still be implemented, given the heightened tension between the two countries following the Lahad Datu Standoff. That would be a big blow to the peace process. However, there are also suspicions that the main initiator of the Lahad Datu Standoff is Malaysia. Allegedly, they want to destroy peace negotiations between the M.I.L.F. and the Philippines government, because they are afraid of the powerful ARMM and the Philippines. 64

In addition, some members of the media speculate that the real architect of this conflict is former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. The question is what she would gain from such an action. There were speculations that she was going to run again for the position of head of state (as well as the deposed former president Joseph Estrada). But as the situation is evolving, it is more probable that any such conflict would be favorable for her in the sense that it would distract media attention

63 http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/opinion/2013/03/16/lahad-datu-–-a-bizarre-crisis/

64 http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/sideviews/article/lahad-datu-conflict-claim-on-sabah-a-non-issue-arnold-puyok


from the trials over her corruption scandals.65 So it seems that the further positive development lies in the hands of the incumbent president Benigno Acquino III. Filipinos can thus only hope that he will use all his authority, diplomacy, wit and charisma to handle this situation now when he finally has a great chance to resolve the Mindanao conflict.

65 http://m.rozhlas.cz/cro6/komentare/_zprava/jan-fingerland-filipiny-jednou-nohou-v-miru--1125837


138 | 139

Complete list of sources:

LIOW, Joseph Chinyong. Muslim resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines: Religion, Ideology, and Politics. Washington D.C.: East-West center Washington, 2006. ISBN 987-1-932728-47-7. Available at: www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/publications

ŠLACHTA, Mojmír, BURDA, Tomáš a HOLEČEK, Milan. Ohniska napětí ve světě. 1. vyd. Praha: Nakladatelství České geografické společnosti, 2007, 187 s. ISBN 978-808-6034-744.

VONDRA, Pavel. Moro-moro no more. MUP konference Islam, Society and Politics in Southeast Asia, 11.3.2011

FRANCIA, Luis. A history of the Philippines: from Indios Bravos to Filipinos. 1st ed. New York: Overlook Press, 2010, 352 p., [16] p. of plates. ISBN 15-902-0285-6.

SCHIAVO-CAMPO, Salvatore a Mary P. JUDD. The Mindanao conflict in the Philippines: Roots, costs and potential peace dividend. 2005, s. 13. Available: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDS_IBank_Servlet?pcont=details&eid=000011823_20050328152733

I. Chapter

http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/cz/encyklopedie_statu/asie/filipiny/index.html

http://aktualne.centrum.cz/tema/filipiny_231/mindanao_4245/

http://filipiny.asean.cz/mindanao/

http://aktualne.centrum.cz/tema/filipiny_231/mindanao_4245/?type=clanek

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17038024

http://www.trust.org/alertnet/crisis-centre/crisis/philippines-mindanao-conflict

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-07/philippines-muslim-rebels-agree-on-peace-settlement-framework.html

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/world/asia/manila-and-rebel-group-take-step-toward-peace-plan.html?_r=0

http://ncronline.org/news/global/philippine-government-and-rebels-sign-peace-agreement

http://query.nytimes.com/search/sitesearch/#/Mindanao/since1851/allresults/1/allauthors/newest/


http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/290812/bishops-support-mindanao-peace-agreement-says-retired-prelate

http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2012/10/1007_01.html

http://norcapweb.no/?did=9143838

http://www.philstar.com/

http://www.philstar.com/search/google/o?query=mindanao&cx=017717946998805404809%3Az2og4mesldc&cof=FORID%3A9&sitesearch=

http://www.usfca.edu/uploadedFiles/Destinations/College_of_Arts_and_Sciences/Undergraduate_Programs/Peace_and_Justice_Studies/Student_Research/Philippines.pdf

http://internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/8A4B6AFE92D9BB82802570B700599DA1/$file/WP24_Web.pdf

http://opinion.inquirer.net/39098/who-are-the-moro-people

II. Chapter

http://asiasociety.org/countries/conflicts/origins-muslim-separatist-movement-philippines

http://www.seasite.niu.edu/Tagalog/Modules/Modules/Separatist_Groups/rebel_and_separatist_groups.htm

http://www.adl.org/terror/tu/tu_0404_philippines.asp

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Sayyaf

http://www.seasite.niu.edu/Tagalog/Modules/Modules/MuslimMindanao/tripoli_agreement.htm

http://pekiti-tirsia.cz/joomla/index.php/articles/filipiny/31-znovuzrozeni-narod-igorot-a-mor-umle-vytvoeni-filipinskeho-statu

http://www.luwaran.com/home/

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/milf.htm

http://www.globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?id=1072


http://zpravy.idnes.cz/politicka-strelba-ma-53-obeti-naridil-ji-zrejme-stoupenec-filipinske-prezidentky-gf6-/zahranicni.aspx?c=A091125_153641_zahranicni_stf


140

III. Chapter

http://www.oic-oci.org/page_detail.asp?p_id=52



IV. Chapter

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/285604/what-went-before-the-proposed-moa-ad

http://norcapweb.no/?did=9143838

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/290812/bishops-support-mindanao-peace-agreement-says-retired-prelate

http://ncronline.org/news/global/philippine-government-and-rebels-sign-peace-agreement

http://archive.adl.org/terror/tu/tu_0404_philippines.asp

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/world/asia/manila-and-rebel-group-take-step-toward-peace-plan.html?_r=2&

V. Chapter

http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2013/04/03/face-saving-solution-to-sabah/

http://m.rozhlas.cz/cro6/komentare/_zprava/jan-fingerland-filipiny-jednou-nohou-v-miru--1125837 http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/opinion/2013/03/16/lahad-datu-%E2%80%93-a-bizarre-crisis/

http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/sideviews/article/lahad-datu-conflict-claim-on-sabah-a-non-issue-arnold-puyok

http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/opinion/2013/03/04/lahad-datu-new-twist-new-threat/