shouldering the burden of utilitarianism
TRANSCRIPT
Categories / Philosophy / Uncommon Ground
Shouldering the Burden of
UtilitarianismB BRYAN DRUZIN
Review of The Moral Landcape: How Science Can
Determine Human Value, Sam Harri
New York: Free Pre, 2010.
Sam Harri et out an amitiou project for himelf.
Harri—a neurocientit and atheit who ha argued
militantl againt religiou elief—hope to meet
headon a common repone to the atheit poition,
that, a Dotoevk famoul put it, in the aence of
God anthing i permitted. The fear i that without
religiou elief to guide u, we are flung at once into
the quickand of moral relativim dipoeed of an
firm footing upon which to claim that anthing i trul
right or wrong. For a pulic intellectual who ha made
hi one uing religion a philoophical target
A N O N L I N E R E V I E W O F B O O K S
practice, thi i a logical move. Harri want once and
for all to vanquih the challenge of moral (and
cultural) relativim. Unfortunatel (and I mean that
incerel), the aault of moral kepticim upon the
notion of ojective moral truth cannot e watted
awa quite a eail a Harri implie.
Harri claim that we can appeal to cience to a
omething definitive aout moral truth. Harri hope
to peruade u that “there are right and wrong anwer
to moral quetion, jut a there are right and wrong
anwer to quetion of phic...” (p. 28). To make hi
cae, Harri mut commit along the wa what for
man i intellectual here. It ha long een the
poition of cience that the decriptive and the
precriptive pring from entirel eparate realm of
human experience. The thinking i that cience deal
onl with the decriptive—with fact. Science can tell
u what the fact are, ut it can never tell u what we
ought to do in a moral ene. Rather, the latter i the
excluive domain of religiou and philoophical
dicoure, a normative univere the morall indifferent
intrument of cience can never penetrate. Thi
poition i mot aociated with David Hume. Hume
argued that tatement of fact (“our mother gave
irth to ou”) can never lead to moral concluion (“o
ou hould e nice to our mother”). Yet againt the
caution of Hume, Harri attempt to prove that it i in
fact poile to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘i.’.
Harri i ver clear aout hi miion. To ue hi own
word: he i not merel aing that “cience can help
u get what we want out of life.” (p. 28) Harri i
arguing that cience can “help u undertand what we
hould do and hould want—and, therefore, what other
people hould do and hould want...” (p. 28) Thee are
ver different claim. The firt i uncontroverial and
rather oviou; the econd i impoile. Harri i
arguing for a “cience of moralit” (p. 27) that will
provide humanit with the necear toolkit to
dicover what i ojectivel right and wrong, and
pinpoint a univeral conception of human value. In
advancing thi cience of moralit, however, Harri
take enormou liertie in logic.
Harri’ Argument
Harri explain the core of hi argument a follow:
“Moralit and value depend on the exitence of
conciou mind—and pecificall on the fact that
uch mind can experience variou form of welleing
and uffering in thi univere. Conciou mind and
their tate are natural phenomena, full contrained
the law of the univere...Therefore, quetion of
moralit and value mut have right and wrong
anwer that fall within the purview of cience (in
principle, if not in practice). Conequentl, ome
people and culture will e right (to a greater or leer
degree), and ome will e wrong, with repect to what
the deem important in life.”[1] Then, drawing a
comparion to maximizing health in the context of
medicine (p. 37), Harri argue that “maximizing the
welleing of conciou creature… [i] the onl thing
we can reaonal value” (p. 11).
Harri i arguing that cience can identif ojective
value ecaue value i impl no more than rain
tate, and rain tate are a meaurale a an other
feature of the empirical world. Poitive rain tate are
the ver definition of good. Therefore, maximizing
poitive rain tate i an ojectivel good thing. I take
no iue with mot of Harri’ reaoning here. Linking
the concept of value with the welleing of conciou
creature i perfectl coherent—if value mean
anthing it mut e in relation to the conciou mind
that experience it. Likewie, if anthing i ad,
pointle mental uffering i a categoricall ad thing.
I agree that tate of concioune are natural
phenomena, and a uch, their undulation, in
principle, fall within the purview of empirical cience.
So far o good. The prolem i hi next move: the onl
thing we can value, Harri reaon, i maximizing the
welleing of conciou creature. Thi i a huge
normative uppoition imported into hi reaoning
and it i far from new. With minor adjutment in
preentation (he allow for an evolving conception of
welleing), Harri i impl giving u a ouped up
verion of Millian utilitarianim, one anchored to the
empirical wheelhoue of modern cience.
The Prolem
The prolem with thi i that, for all it intuitive
appeal, utilitarianim offer no clear jutification for
it foundational claim: that everone’ interet hould
count equall and that we cannot privilege ome
people’ interet—including our own—over the
interet of other. The nineteenthcentur utilitarian
Henr Sidgwick decried thi principle of impartialit
(rather poeticall) a “the point of view of the
univere.”[2] Yet utilitarianim provide no atifing
anwer to the quetion of wh we hould adopt thi
tance. The ugl foundational quetion at the heart of
normative ethic remain: wh not me over ou? Wh
doe our hunger count equall a m hunger? Wh i
our pain a terrile a mine? Utilitarianim fail to
properl deal with thi quetion—what we ma call
the prolem of ujectivit. Utilitarianim’ tronget
conceptual punch—that pleaure and pain i the ai
of value (thi hedonitic account of coure ma e
utituted with more elatic concept, uch a
preference atifaction, welleing, or human
flourihing)—doe not upport the propoition that
everone’ interet hould count equall. It doe not
follow from thi that we are morall oliged to
maximize the welleing (or what have ou) of the
greatet numer. That i a leap in logic. The
philoopher Simon Blackurn doe not mince hi
word: Thi "argument i o ad that the concluion
not onl fail to follow, ut actuall eem to
contradict the tarting point.”[3] If it i the experience
of pleaure and pain we are concerned with (or
whatever other utitute one wihe to ue), if thi i
the wellpring of value, there i no reaon to
univeralize the principle eond the cope of one’
own ujective experience, and thi i epeciall true if
the onl wa to maximize m welleing i at our
expene. The demand of impartialit impl doe not
track our experience of realit. So long a we remain
imprioned within the ujectivit of our own
experience, puhed and pulled preference, goal
and motivation that hape the private univere we
inhait, the identification of pleaure and pain a the
ai of value doe not get u anwhere.
Harri’ cientim doe nothing to advance the
dicuion. Harri want to ue empirical fact to
determine normative truth. However, the relativit
challenge that Harri mut defeat i (in it mot
popular form) the notion that moral judgement are
onl true or fale from the tandpoint of the individual
or a group of individual, and do not exit out there in
the empirical univere the ame wa a alad owl,
tornado, and hardcover ook. Moral value, the
relativit argue, i not aolute: moral judgement are
eentiall no different than m view that pitachio ice
cream i diguting. While m dilike of pitachio ice
cream ma e a perfectl meaurale rain tate, a
natural phenomenon full contrained the law of
the univere, thi till doe not how that pitachio ice
cream i ojectivel diguting. And converel, what
fact in the univere could poil how that I am
mitaken? What could e the foundation of uch a
claim? All the empirical data in the world on pitachio
ice cream—it flavour, precie texture, nut
compoition, etc.—can never prove that thi green goo
i ojectivel deliciou. Likewie, what are we to do if I
am impl unmoved the uffering of other? What
empirical data can ou produce to how that I mut
weigh the anguih of other equall with m own?
There i of coure an empirical anwer to the quetion
a to how to maximize the collective welleing of
humanit—no one i diputing thi. However, o long
a the prolem of ujectivit remain unolved, there
i no anwer to the quetion of wh we hould do o.
For Harri’ entire project to work, he mut firt olve
the prolem of ujectivit and how u wh we are
compelled to adopt the ‘point of view of the univere.’
How Harri trie to olve the Prolem
So how doe Harri propoe to do thi? The argument
he marhal i a follow. He ak u to imagine a
world “in which everone uffer a much a he or he
(or it) poil can.” (p. 39). He then argue: “a
univere in which all conciou eing uffer the wort
poile mier i wore than a univere in which the
experience welleing. Thi i all we need to peak
aout ‘moral truth’ in the context of cience. Once we
admit that the extreme of aolute mier and
aolute flourihing...are different and dependent on
fact aout the univere, then we have admitted that
there are right and wrong anwer to the quetion of
moralit.” (pp. 3940) He continue: “Grounding our
value in a continuum of conciou tate—one that
ha the wort poile mier for everone at it depth
and differing degree of welleing at all other point
—eem like the onl legitimate context in which to
conceive of value and moral norm.” (p. 41) With thi
wort poile mier argument, Harri appear to
elieve he ha delivered on hi promie to ridge the
factvalue divide, olved the prolem of ujectivit,
and directed u to a afe haven of ojective moral
truth. After all, who could den that a univere in
which all conciou eing uffer the wort poile
mier i ojectivel wore than a univere in which
the experience welleing”? Hitting normative rock
ottom eem to give u olid footing. Can we not a
with confidence that anthing we can do to ditance
our world from uch a tate would e an ojectivel
good thing?
The prolem with thi argument i that it arrive at
thi ‘ojective’ truth cheating. The thought
experiment give the impreion that it ha moved u
from the ujective to the ojective tance when in
fact it ha not. How? It doe thi muggling elf
interet into the propoition. With thi in place, an
alignment of interet i created that guarantee a
univeral conenu in preference. There are two
prolem with thi move.
Firt, conenu i not ojective moral truth. We
hould e clear on what Harri i not claiming in the
Moral Landcape. He i not arguing the merit of
normative conenu in a Rawlian ene. Harri i
peaking in the tronget metaphical term. (p. 28)
For Harri, moralit i a matter of ojective fact, the
conequence of rain tate eing empirical
phenomena. Hi wortpoilemier argument doe
achieve a limited normative conenu. But thi i not
Harri’ project. A powerful a it ma e (indeed
Rawl how u it theoretical trength) moral
conenu hould not e confued with moral realim.
The prolem with conenu i that it ha no ojective
purchae on anthing eond itelf, and a uch, can
diolve with the hifting and of group opinion.
Anone outide the conenu i not wrong in an
ojective ene—the are impl in diagreement.
Harri’ thought experiment doe not locate ojective
value—merel a fragile alignment of interet.
The econd (and more eriou) prolem with Harri’
reaoning i that even within thi apparent conenu,
there i in fact no conitenc in value. While we
would all agree that the wort poile mier for
everone i a ad thing, we would do o for widel
divergent reaon, ranging from perfect altruim to the
groet form of elfihne. The moment we leave the
protected confine of the tate of wort poile mier,
thi artifice collape and the great inconitenc in
value reappear. What we mitook a ojective value
wa merel the impreion of it.
An analog ma e ueful here. The poition that
Harri’ thought experiment thrut u into i
comparale to ailor adrift on a lifeoat. Clearl, all
of thee ailor would recognize that it would e a
poitive thing if everone on the oat had water to
drink, or a Harri inverel preent it: a lifeoat with
no water i ojectivel wore than a lifeoat with
water. Thu—Harri’ reaoning goe—there are
ojectivel right and wrong anwer to moral
quetion related to having water on a lifeoat. But
where doe thi get u exactl? While all of thee
ailor ma agree that having water i etter than not
having water, thi doe not ring u an cloer to
ojective truth. There i in realit till no unit of
value here, onl the appearance of it. To undercore
m point, let u aume that the Buddha and Idi Amin
are among thee ailor. Both the Buddha and Idi
Amin would certainl agree that having no water on
the lifeoat i categoricall ad, ut the would do o
for entirel different reaon. While the Buddha ma
e adopting thi poition from the utilitarian’ ‘point
of view of the univere’, having compaion for all
people on the oat and viewing the ituation from a
perfectl ojective tance, Idi Amin likel remain
tuck in the ujective tance, thinking of himelf. Yet
the Buddha and Idi Amin appear to e in perfect
moral agreement. What happened? The prolem i
that within Harri’ thought experiment, moral value
i never actuall identified, jut preference. Moral
deate egin when interet tart to collide—when
there i ome ut not enough water for all the ailor—
not when interet are comfortal aligned. Harri’
thought experiment doe not ring u an cloer to
ojective value—it merel achieve the illuion of it.
With one cup of water, thi illuion i hattered and
the profound moral incongruit etween the Buddha
and Idi Amin that wa preent all along come
uddenl into view.
And here come the trul difficult part. While we ma
find Idi Amin morall repugnant, we cannot provide a
rational account of wh Amin hould adopt an
ojective view of hi ituation. The inight that value i
reducile to rain tate tell u nothing aout wh Idi
Amin hould care aout the rain tate of other
people. Harri' thought experiment fail to olve the
prolem of ujectivit. The hard quetion in ethic
are all aout tradeoff—when pleaure for ome
caue mier for other. Harri promie to locate
tale ojective moral truth upon which we ma plant
our flag ut then never even enter the realm of
eriou moral deate.
Harri take other ta at the prolem of ujectivit
elewhere in the ook, ut hi logic fail to peruade.
For intance, he ak u to imagine there are onl two
people on earth, and then note that “while there are
wa for their peronal interet to e in conflict, mot
olution to the prolem of how two people can thrive
on earth will not e zeroum. Surel the et olution
will not e zeroum.” (p. 40) Given the unique ilical
predicament in which thee two people find
themelve, Harri i no dout correct in hi
aement. In thi ituation, thee two actor' interet
are aligned in that the can maximize their welfare
through poitive um cooperation rather than conflict.
He then continue: “Wh would thi difference
etween right and wrong anwer uddenl diappear
once we add 6.7 illion more people to thi
experiment?” (p. 41) If I ma anwer: it will diappear
ecaue actor are no longer directl dependent upon
each other in the ame wa and there are now illion
of zeroum game where actor can maximize their
individual interet at the expene of other while till
reaping the general enefit of human cooperation.
What Harri i doing here hould alert u to the deeper
fiure in hi reaoning more generall. Harri i
impl electing to view the welfare of thee two
people—or 6.7 illion people—equall. He i auming
the ‘point of view of the univere’ a hi tarting point.
Yet thi i egging the quetion: wh we mut move
from the ujective to the ojective tance i preciel
the iue at hand. Thi quetion i the ver eence of
ethical deate. Once we have decided on thi point,
the ret i reall jut ookkeeping.
Concluion
The Moral Landcape i a wellwritten and thoughtful
exercie in ecular moral realim, ut it attempt to do
omething far more amitiou—it purport to give u
the ai for a cience of moralit. While the utitle of
Harri' ook init otherwie, cience cannot
determine human value—it can do no more than tell
u how to et implement the value we alread have.
Harri i an exceptionall gifted writer and the ook i
well worth reading if onl for Harri’ literar
flourih. In that repect, I highl recommend The
Moral Landcape. Yet Harri’ rhetorical power allow
him to curate a converation that ocure the logical
gap in hi reaoning. The philoophical cornertone of
hi cae i impl an ofucating appeal to
'commonene.' I am urpried thi ecaue Harri
i uch an impreivel clear thinker. While I hare
Harri’ moral intuition, I cannot, if I am to remain
intellectuall honet with melf, pretend I am
peruaded hi reaoning. I am a elfhating moral
keptic eager to reach Harri’ concluion, ut I
impl cannot get there while operating within the
contraint of logic. Sadl, I mut decline thi
philoophical catnip.
Poted on 9 March 2016
BRYAN DRUZIN i an Aitant Profeor and Deput
Director of the LLM program at the Chinee Univerit of
Hong Kong where he teache legal philooph and
contract law.
[1] Sam Harri, A repone to Critic, The Huffington
Pot (Jan. 29, 2011), availale
at: http://www.huffingtonpot.com/amharri/a
reponetocritic__815742.html
[2] See Katarzna de LazariRadek, Peter Singer, The
Point of View of the Univere: Sidgwick and
Contemporar thic 133 (2014).
[3] Simon Blackurn, thic: A Ver Short
Introduction 76 (2001).