security assistance and border management
TRANSCRIPT
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Security Assistance and Border Management
Katarzyna Czerniecka and John Heathershaw
The European Union‟s Strategy for a New Partnership declares Central Asia‟s
security as one of its key interests, along with the region‟s stability, economic
prosperity, democratisation and inter-state cooperation. The Union‟s approach is
focused on „combating common threats and challenges‟, which are identified as
organised crime, drug trafficking, illegal migration and porous borders (EU 2007:
27). In short the EU has attempted to pursue „comprehensive security‟ (Moschini
2008) in its assistance to Central Asia. However, actions undertaken by the EU in the
politico-security sphere have to date focused almost exclusively on border
management, with the Border Management in Central Asia (BOMCA) programme as
its flagship initiative. This chapter argues that the EU‟s increasing focus on border
issues in Central Asia is founded upon the global and internal contexts of the EU
itself rather than the situation in the region. It is according to this very self-referential
process that threats are identified which, in crossing Central Asian borders, are
perceived to directly menace Europe. This approach may hinder the achievement of
the EU‟s stated broader objectives in the region. Securitizing borders and pushing for
increased border controls works against the objectives of EU‟s economic reform and
democracy promotion framework1, since it resources authoritarian regimes and harms
the human security of borderlands population. This fortifies Central Asian regimes‟
domination of their societies and, in turn, may increase the clandestine resistance
which they face.
We elaborate our argument over three sections. Firstly, we introduce EU security
assistance to Central Asia in terms of its global, European and Central Asian contexts,
focusing in particular on the EU‟s special interest in border management. Second, we
discuss EU border management assistance in terms of its strategic, financial and
programmatic aspects. Finally, we assess the impact of EU assistance and its future
prospects in the region.
SECURITY AND THE EU IN CENTRAL ASIA
In the 1990s Central Asia was practically absent from EU external policy and was not
listed on the EU‟s index of security concerns. The EU was deeply engaged with its
East European neighbourhood in terms of security and conflict management as well
as in terms of enlargement. The EU regarded the region as peripheral and perceived
its interests as limited (MacFarlane 2004: 131). Moreover, as its security policy was
still in its infancy, the EU did not regard Central Asia as a high priority. Despite
being recognized as a transit corridor for drugs- and people-trafficking as early as the
break-up of the USSR (Jackson 2006: 300), the EU initially refrained from
identifying Central Asia as the source of major threats in this domain. As a result, the
EU‟s political and especially security engagement in the region remained low.
Changing Global Contexts
However, due to changes in Europe‟s external environment, Central Asia became
significant for EU policy-makers. This new importance of the region was determined
by securitisation in two areas: energy (discussed by Götz in this volume) and,
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secondly, the apparently intertwined threats of terrorism, drugs and organised crime.
The significant increase in opium production in Afghanistan2 and the enhanced
inflow of heroin to Europe observed in the late 1990s (according to EU estimates
Afghanistan was the source of 80 percent of heroin on European markets [EU 2002:
18]) drew attention to the transit role of Central Asian states and led to demands for
EU engagement3. Since then Central Asia has been regarded as the main transit route
to Europe (MacFarlane 2004: 125). Additionally, an increase in drug-related crime
and a recognition of its transnational character (Redo 2004: 204) contributed to the
growing perception that the region poses a drug and crime threat to the EU (Pirseyedi
2000; Redo 2004). Against this background, the events of 9/11 catalysed a substantial
change in EU threat perception with regard to the Islamic world. As a result, the
Central Asian region started to be seen through the lens of counter-terrorism, which
further securitised drug trafficking and crime-related concerns. Whilst the coupling of
terrorism and crime as an inter-linked and increasing threat to the EU might now
seem common sense it is important to note that this perception has only emerged in
policy circles over the last decade.
According to this logic the Central Asia Strategy Paper 2002-2006 explicitly
identified the threat of terrorism and organized crime to Europe:
Islamic radicalisation has both domestic and regional dimensions (…)
Growing economic deprivation and the absence of legal channels for
expression and pursuit of legitimate political interests are contributing factors
to the politicisation of peaceful Muslims. (…) In Central Asia and the wider
region, terrorist forces and their support groups operate in close liaison with
transnational crime networks, smuggling drugs (…), arms and human beings.
(EU 2002: 9).
A similar assessment of the terrorist threat was confirmed in the 2003 European
Security Strategy (EU 2003: 3, 6). European officials repeated the axiom that
economic and political under-development and instability are the root causes of
terrorism (Youngs 2007: 13). Indeed, in this emerging discourse it was the very
volatility and fluidity of the perceived threat that constituted its danger to the EU and
its citizens. The EU strategy was quite explicit in drawing on the language of danger.
„Europe,‟ it argued, „faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less
predictable‟ (EU 2003: 3). It identified threats including terrorism, the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime
(EU 2003: 3-5). The 2007 “Strategy of a New Partnership” moderated its language
yet introduced new concerns such as „migration‟ with „both positive and negative
impacts‟ and specified „the international drug trade‟ as the key target of the fight
against organised crime (EU 2007: 15-16). What both strategies share is a concern
with increasing state capacity to control borders in Central Asia.
There are perhaps three global contexts which provide the background to the EU‟s
securitization of the Central Asian region: EU enlargement and its emerging role in
global politics; the linking of development with security in policy discourse; and, the
concomitant broadening of the concept of security in both practice and the academy.
These contexts have both historical and intellectual dimensions as advisors and
analysts sought to respond to perceived historical trends, such as globalisation, by
framing the EU in new terms. The Union found itself in the need to define new roles
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and responsibilities for itself in ways which would „approximate its external action to
“real” foreign policy‟ (Olsen 2004: 91).
Firstly, the European Union largely encouraged by its economic successes, its
widening to new policy areas through the 1990s and its enlargement to the East
started perceiving itself more and more in terms of a global actor. To Cameron, the
EU must respond to „a developing global consensus on the main security threats‟,
which „include failed states, terrorism, regional and ethnic conflict‟. Moreover, he
argues, „this is where the EU has certain advantage in that it can bring to the table an
impressive array of civilian and military instruments to tackle these problems‟
(Cameron 2007: 2). While enlargement to the East further confirmed Europe‟s self-
perception of a successful international player, Olsen noticed, that „the Third World
in general‟ became more and more important for EU‟s efforts to become significant
globally (Olsen 2004: 80-81; 96) . This line of thinking can also be applied to EU‟s
increased attention to Central Asia.
Secondly, EU policy should be seen in terms of what Duffield (2001) has
characterised as the merger of security and development (Tocci 2007, 2008). Pace‟s
representation of the EU as a self-hailed „force for good‟ (2008: 203) is also relevant
in this context as it indicates that threats to the EU are seen as matters for both
security policy and development policy (cf. Duffield 2001). Europe turned to linking
objectives of security with those of development cooperation. Poverty, not only in
EU‟s thinking but in more general development policy debates, came to be seen as a
factor contributing to insecurity (e.g. EU 2003: 2). Economic development failures
have also been interpreted as having a strong potential to fuel conflicts (Collier,
2004)4. The EU repeatedly claimed that it pursues development and security as
mutually-enhancing policy objectives (Youngs 2007: 3).
Finally, and accompanying its intertwining with the concept of development, has
been the broadening of the concept of security where a new range of threats has been
identified from the economic to the environmental. Along with concerns regarding
energy security, Europe has also paid attention to threats that affect regional stability.
While stability and conflict prevention, associated with hard security concerns, have
been identified in the Central Asia Strategy Paper 2002-2006, it would be difficult to
identify actions directed strictly at these objectives. Since 2006 Central Asia has been
covered by the Stability Instrument but to date scarce information is available
regarding its potential application. Similarly, the 2008 expansion of the mandate of
the European Union Special Representative‟s for Central Asia (EUSR) came to
include issues related to conflict prevention. Additional threats have been associated
with natural and ecological disasters (EU 2007: 14) whilst the EU also recognized the
need to assure food security (EU 2002: 7; EU 2006: 30).
Internal contexts of EU security policy
The EU‟s growing engagement in security cooperation with Central Asian states
emerges out of these contexts. Thus the EU‟s approach cannot be considered security
assistance in the traditional sense, and must be considered as an inter-subjective
construction of threats and responses. This is all the more true given two factors
specific to the EU: its incoherence and, secondly, its regionalism.
First, due to its multi-level system of governance the EU‟s approach is partly
determined by its inability to arrive at a common foreign and security policy. This
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„paralysis‟ led to broad references to policies pertaining to development cooperation
and security domains in terms of „comprehensive security‟.5 This can be observed in
EU policy documents including the European Security Strategy (EU 2003), the
Strategy for a New Partnership (EU 2007), Council Conclusions on Security and
Development (Council 2007), Towards an EU response to situations of fragility
(Com 2007b) and the Stability Instrument (EC 2006). This inability to develop a
singular CFSP also leads to a failure to prioritise and a conflation of issues of rather
different scales and kinds. The Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central
Asia 2007-2013 declares:
In the field of enhanced cooperation on foreign and security policy, particular
attention will be given to issues related to combating terrorism and WMD
proliferation, all forms of organised crime, including money laundering,
trafficking of human beings, drugs, trafficking of small arms and light
weapons (SALW), trafficking in WMD agents, materials and know-how, and
conflict prevention, with the focus in particular on the Ferghana valley. (EU
2006: 29).
This quotation illustrates that issues which in early 2000s tended to be described by
scholars of Central Asia as non-traditional security threats and challenges (Olcott and
Udalova 2000), and which security studies of the early 1990s would classify as „soft‟
or „new‟ security concerns (see e.g. Lindley-French 2005; Huysmans 2006: 15-20;
Swanstrom 2007: 6-9), have become increasingly incorporated into the mainstream of
EU‟s security thinking with regard to the region and dominated its approach in the
field.6 Yet despite this holistic framing, in practice the need for breadth to meet the
demands of the full-range of EU stakeholders has led to a focus on seemingly
uncontroversial areas such as border management. Border management is one of few
areas of security assistance which is considered to be in the general interest of all EU
members from those with orthodox national security interests to those with stronger
normative concerns, whilst at the same time being framed in terms as technical
assistance so as not to aggravate the recipient states of the region.
The second internal aspect of the EU which drives it security assistance to Central
Asia is its regionalist framing of international security. The EU recognizes Central
Asian security threats and challenges as common – for the region and for itself. Such
recognition, however, should be further problematized. While the EU identifies cross-
border trafficking as one of region‟s major problems, Central Asian governments
would be more cautious in classifying human trafficking as a security threat (see:
Jackson 2006: 303-305). Under the notion of common threats, Central Asia regimes
often include challenges to regime security such as terrorism and religious
fundamentalism (Ismailov and Jarabik, 2009: 3). Moreover, Central Asia states,
though not being drug producers themselves, have been classified and targeted on a
par with Afghanistan. This move provokes resentment and reinforces the perception
of EU‟s engagement as hypocritical (Jackson 2006: 303-305). Furthermore,
regionalism has been at the forefront of EU‟s perception of border issues and its
approach to border management policy (EU 2006: 3; EU 2007: 6). This is perhaps
understandable from the Euro-centric perspective. As the EUSR for Central Asia,
Pierre Morel, explained: „when dealing with broad common issues like energy or
customs and border control, all five [CA states] should be involved; otherwise
something is wrong from the very beginning‟ (EUCAM 2009: 4). However, such an
approach may prove ineffective in a region which has severe difficulties in
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developing regional cooperation in less sensitive areas than security (Allison 2008;
Torjesen 2008). Nevertheless, despite these apparent concerns, the promotion of
regional cooperation for border management and counter-narcotics has emerged at the
top of the agenda of EU security engagement in Central Asia. It is in light of these
global and internal contexts that the Union‟s security assistance programmes7 have
been formulated with an emphasis on border management.
EU SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES In December 2001 the General Affairs Council concluded that the EU activities in the
region should be broadened and include „border control and border management‟, as
well as support for drug-countering programmes (EU 2002: 3). The then EU External
Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner emphasised that the EU security
priority in Central Asia is strengthening border controls, especially the Tajik-Afghan
border (Megoran 2007). The main challenges identified by the Indicative Programme
2007-2010 included: weak border protection (especially after the 2006 completion of
the Russian withdrawal from the Tajik-Afghan border), the militarized approach
towards border security of Central Asian states, and a lack of coordination between
various regional agencies (Com 2007a: 14). In addition, migration has begun to
appear in EU documents dedicated to the region (e.g. Com 2007a) whilst the external
dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) has remained limited. However,
these policy objectives and challenges raise questions of the institutional and
conceptual models of border management followed by Central Asian governments
themselves. In short, in exploring EU assistance itself we must ask inter alia whether
Central Asia provides a conducive environment for the strengthening and reform of
border management.
EU security assistance is largely determined by shifting global discourses and the
internal composition and evolution of the EU itself. It can thus be considered much
less responsive to the largely military approach to border security of Central Asian
states. In the first years of their independence, Central Asian states (with substantial
assistance from the Russian Federation) continued a Soviet model of border security,
characterised by a predominantly military approach. Whilst organisational-
institutional structures have since been subject to change, it is questionable whether
conceptions of border security issues have undergone any substantial modification. In
Central Asia today border security continues to be viewed largely in military terms.
However, the institutions of border security arrangements vary somewhat in each
Central Asian state. While in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan border
management is performed by „border service‟ (pogranichnaya sluzhba), Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan continue the Soviet „tradition‟ of employing „border troops‟
(pogranichnyye voyska) to perform border security tasks. Differences are also
observed in the formal positioning of border forces within government. In
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan border security forces are subordinated to
authorities responsible for national security at the central level. In Kyrgyzstan and
Turkmenistan border services are formally more autonomous8. Both the formal and
informal institutions of border security and management state organs have influenced
the effectiveness of the EU‟s policy in the region. In these institutional terms, the EU
seems to neglect the impact of Soviet-type of border management organization on its
policy.
Framework and funding
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These military and para-military organizations are the partners, objects and recipients
of international support. EU assistance to Central Asia states is provided in line with
its instruments for cooperation with its wider neighbourhood. The general framework
for the EU-Central Asian states relations is provided by Partnership and Cooperation
Agreements (PCAs). As of mid-2009 the EU has individual PCAs with all five states,
although Tajikistan‟s and Turkmenistan‟s PCAs are still under ratification (EU 2006:
4). In line with these general agreements, EU security assistance to Central Asia has
been implemented according to three policy documents: i) Strategy Paper 2002-2006
and its Indicative Programme 2002-2004 for Central Asia (EU 2002); ii) The EU and
Central Asia Strategy for a New Partnership (EU 2007); and iii) the European
Community Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the period
2007-2013. Apart from these documents there are two Central Asia Indicative
Programmes for the periods 2005-2006 (Com 2004) and 2007-2010 (Com 2007a).
These documents specify the institutional and financial framework of this assistance.
Since 2002, the financial value of EU assistance to Central Asia has remained
significant. Between 2002 and 2006 27 million euros were assigned to border
management assistance, with projects covering areas of organized crime, border
management, migration and asylum management (EU 2006:18). According to EU
estimates, in 2007, Kyrgyzstan alone obtained border management assistance
amounting to 3.5 million euros9. For the years 2007-2013 an indicative budget of 719
million euros has been earmarked for Central Asia to be programmed at regional and
national levels10
. The Indicative Programme 2007-2010 foresees a total EC grant of
314 million euros for Central Asia under the regional Central Asian programme, out
of which 16 million euro is apportioned to border management, constituting 5 percent
of the amount for regional cooperation programmes (Com 2007a: 4). Similar amounts
should be expected for the years 2011-2013.
The institutional organisation of cooperation in the sphere of border security was
initiated in 2002 under the aegis of the Central Asia Border Security Initiative
(CABSI), a consortium of EU member states (including Austria, the UK, Finland,
France, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), as well as Croatia and the US as
independent observers. CABSI was an Austrian initiative and today remains under
Austrian and Central Asian states‟ lead11
. One year after CABSI‟s launch, border
management programmes were put under its auspices.12
CABSI continues to
organize annual meetings for the review of EU–Central Asia border cooperation
(from 2002 to 2006 held in Vienna, in 2007 the first meeting took place in Central
Asia – in Kyrgyzstan13
,in 2008 in Kazakhstan and in 2009 in Uzbekistan).
Border Management in Central Asia (BOMCA)
In 2003 CABSI launched BOMCA, its main project in the sphere of border
assistance. BOMCA is seen as a flagship EU regional programme and has been the
most significant EU intervention in border management to date (Matveeva 2006: 88).
Its headquarters are located in Bishkek and functions in cooperation with the UNDP
regional office. The programme has been divided in several phases with the current
7th
stage covering the years 2009-2010. The cumulated budget of BOMCA in 2003-
2010 amounts to over 25 million euro and will be supplemented by a 2 million euro
contribution by UNDP14
. For the eighth phase of BOMCA (years 2011-2012) the EU
foresees spending 8 million euro15
.
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BOMCA has evolved from assessment and training activities in its first stages,
through support to conduct institutional reforms, to the inclusion of strengthening
infrastructure capacity. The main rationale behind the programme is to demonstrate
the benefits of the EU integrated border management (IBM) approach for the
facilitation of trade and transit. The EU‟s declared objectives are the improvement of
regional cooperation in the sphere of border management, improved cross-border
movements, and strengthened border protection16
. The EU puts special emphasis on
Tajik and Kyrgyz border management services not least because the two states seem
to be relatively receptive to EU involvement (which might be owed to the fact that
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the two Central Asian states most dependent on
international assistance). As discussed below, this quite pragmatic consideration
might conceal the fact that these states are especially lacking the preconditions
necessary to directly benefit from such assistance.
BOMCA is a technical assistance programme with a focus on training. The
programme was proposed by the Austrian Interior Ministry as a response to the
events of 9/11, and, in its first version, as a medium-size programme for the Ferghana
Valley (Matveeva 2006: 88). Initially, BOMCA consisted of 12 projects aimed at
improving legal and organizational framework of local border services, by developing
capacities regarding border posts (including common border posts), developing data
access and exchange, and improving social conditions of border personnel17
.
Although undertaking some anti-land mine projects, BOMCA is not directed at local
communities themselves. Instead it focuses strictly on state organizations: border
security services and border troops. In mid-2003 a training element was added18
and
in May 2004 BOMCA was merged organisationally with the EU-financed CADAP19
,
although their aims remained separated. The emerging challenge for the EU in its
border security assistance to Central Asian states is the need to coordinate the efforts
not only with border services, but also with customs services and regional anti-drug
agencies. Since 2003, training has been the primary aspect of the BOMCA
programme with the aim of introducing the EU‟s border security model to Central
Asia20
. The first of many regional border management courses for Central Asian
border staff was organized in November 2003 in Bishkek21
. BOMCA methodology
has since this time slowly evolved from training the border services staff to training
of trainers as well as familiarisation and acquaintance visits to EU states. For
example, „Train-the-trainers‟ workshops were organized in Kazakhstan in October
2008, April and June 200922
. In December 2008, 28 participants from CA states took
part in a study tour to Poland in order to familiarize themselves with the functioning
of EU external borders and visit the European Borders Agency, FRONTEX23
. EU
activities included also the training of airport border personnel and custom services
organised in February and May 200924
. Such training activities provide the clearest
evidence of the self-referential nature of BOMCA and other programmes with a
strong normative dimension. The proffering of an EU model for Central Asia implies
that „you ought to be more like us‟.
Given the substantial EU resources involved, the extent of the involvement of Central
Asian border guards in BOMCA has been significant, whilst the direct impact on
border management remains unclear. According to EU estimates, about 750 border
staff in Tajikistan and 240 members of Kyrgyz border service were trained in 2005,
using the “train-the-trainers” method25
. Notwithstanding the apparent efficiency, the
effectiveness of training-the-trainers method must be questioned. The scope of
trainings and their duration are relatively limited. In comparison, the Russian
8
Federation organizes regular one-year courses for representatives of Central Asian
border forces, with several hundred border personnel in attendance annually.26
Doubtless aware of these limitations, BOMCA managers have also directed
assistance at the development of training facilities. New training facilities have been
built for the governments of Turkmenistan (in March 2007 and March 2009),
Kyrgyzstan (April and October 2007), Tajikistan (June 2007) and Uzbekistan (May
2008).27
The reconstructed Officer Training Centre in Dushanbe (worth 1 million
USD) is the biggest single EU border management investment in Central Asia.28
In technical assistance and capacity building key milestones have been reached
towards the goals of the EU Strategy (EU 2007: 25). The creation of joint border
posts that might facilitate cross-border control and movement of people and goods is
emblematic the EU‟s agenda. The first pilot joint border post was planned in 2004 on
the Kyrgyz-Tajik border on the road Isfara-Batken29
. In September 2006 the EU
embarked on the creation of mobile posts along the Tajik-Kyrgyz border, but
provided support mainly in the form of training local staff30
. In 2006 BOMCA was
successful in convincing Uzbek and Kyrgyz governments to open a new border
crossing at Karasuu. It subsequently financed its construction before handing it over
to Kyrgyzstan in April 2008. The same year a renovated Border Crossing Point (BCP)
on the Kyrgyz-Kazakh border at Ak-Jol was handed over by the EU. Ak-Jol BCP is
piloting joint customs and border control31
. Other BCPs have been supported at
Merke on the Kazakh-Kyrgyz border32
and at Fotekhabad and Patar on the Tajik-
Afghan border33
. EU–Central Asia cooperation covers also issues of data exchange.
One of the aims of BOMCA is „to create a data base border management and security
in Central Asia” (BOMCA 2007: 19). Finalized in March 2009, an EU funded project
worth 3 million euros is aimed at connecting Central Asian border sites with Interpol
databases34
. However, despite these significant milestones of technical assistance, the
broader impact of EU assistance is more difficult to ascertain. This is because
questions of security and border management cannot be reduced to technical goals but
must be considered in their wider political contexts.
ASSESSING EU SECURITY ASSISTANCE
EU security assistance has provided a series of border management inputs to Central
Asia – most importantly through training and technical assistance. In this final section
of the chapter we provide a preliminary assessment of the effectiveness of these
inputs. We begin with a discussion of the exceptional case of assistance to the Tajik-
Afghan border before examining to what extent the difficulties found here can be said
to beset all EU border management programmes across the region. Finally we provide
some thoughts with regard to the future prospects for EU security assistance.
Border management assistance to Tajikistan Tajikistan‟s border management is both military and post-Soviet in character. Until
recently, Tajikistan was mostly dependent on Russian border security assistance. The
Russian border service (Pogranichnaya sluzhba FSB) had protected Tajikistan‟s
borders since 1993 on the basis of a bilateral agreement. In 2005 Russia handed over
border protection to the Tajik Border Forces35
. The office responsible for border
protection was the Border Protection Committee (Komitet Okhrany
Gossudarstvennikh Granits, KOGG) subordinated directly to the government.
Apparently in response to ongoing accusations of corruption, it was merged – in
December 2006 – with the Security Ministry and transformed into the State National
Security Committee (Gosudarstvennyy Komitet Natsionalnoi Bezopasnosti)
9
responsible directly to the President. Tajik Border Forces (Pogranichnyye Voyska) are
supervised by the Committee36
.
The handover from Russian to Tajik control perhaps brought with it more threats than
opportunities for EU border management. Prior to 2005, whilst most of the Russian
contracted soldiers (kontraktniki) were Tajik citizens their uniform was that of the
Russian federation. The international agreement was annulled following Rahmon and
Putin‟s 2004 meeting in Sochi in which a number of agreements were reached with
regard to Tajikistan‟s external debt, the space station at Nurek, the position of
Russian troops on Tajik soil and Russian investment in Tajikistan‟s hydro-power
infrastructure. As a consequence over a transition period from 2004 to 2006 formal
sovereignty was handed over and Russia‟s kontraktniki were replaced by Tajikistani
soldiers, largely conscripts, on much lower wages. Fears of corruption and thus
porosity were widespread in the international community. As a consequence extra
assistance, including EU funds, was provided in order to increase both development
and security.
The Tajik-Afghan case is exceptional not simply because it involves the transfer of
sovereignty over the border but that EU involvement is tightly intertwined with that
of the United States. This perhaps leads to a differentiated approach which seems, in
practice, to place less emphasis on developmental and more on security objectives. In
June 2004, EU and US delegations organized a joint assessment of the Tajik-Afghan
border. The assessment was carried out on the request of the Tajik government after it
finalized its agreement on the Russian border troops withdrawal37
. Subsequent to this,
the international community provided US$4 million of new funding specifically for
projects at the Tajik-Afghan border.38
European donors publicly represented
assistance in terms of „multilateral cooperation‟ and „integrated border management‟
in order to introduce „legal and institutional reforms‟.39
Such reforms aimed not just
at building the government‟s capacity but socializing it into better practices.
However, they were conducted alongside US initiatives whose primary aim was to
support counter-terrorism, stabilization and state-building in Afghanistan. The
international security objective of countering terrorism became predominant over
broader EU concerns.
The border handover from the Russian Federation to Tajikistan did not clear up
ambiguity over who has de facto sovereignty over the border. The Tajik-Afghan
border is an object which is violated by state actors (both elite, senior officers and
subordinate foot soldiers) as it is represented as the boundary of the state –
simultaneously the frontier of national, regional and international communities (see
Heathershaw 2009: 126-135). Whilst foreign as well as domestic government
officials claim the border as a “frontline” some of these same officials have unofficial
interests in the “porosity” of the border, thus implying that power over it may lie
beyond state institutions. Both Tajik and Afghan state representatives are deeply
bound up in the drugs trade. Indeed much of the violence in the latter stages of the
civil war and the post-war period can be linked to drugs trafficking40
. Organized
crime groupings are very powerful in Tajikistan, include high-level government
officials and therefore retain significant political influence (Marat 2006: 107-108;
Akiner 2001: 72-76). High-level officials carry „virtual immunity‟ from prosecution
and thus there are few public examples of their complicity. One exception concerns
the Tajik Ambassador to Kazakhstan, twice caught for trafficking (ICG 2001: 15-16).
Occasionally „turf wars‟ between official actors simmer to the surface with
10
recriminations and accusations of trafficking between elites.41
There are even
occasional prosecutions of businessmen-statesmen who have lost their cover after
falling out with colleagues in the regime.
This state-crime nexus provides particularly infertile institutional ground for EU and
international assistance despite the rhetoric to the contrary. Thus, we might say that
the partnership between the EU and Central Asian states in security assistance is
discursively constituted rather than practically institutionalized. The Rahmon regime
pays lip-service to the EU‟s objectives but emphasizes retrenchment (security,
narrowly defined) over reform (development and liberalisation). This is reflected in
the maxim that, according to a national Drugs Control Agency (DCA) official,
„Tajikistan is the main barrier to prevent [Afghan] drugs reaching markets‟ and „that
only joint efforts can be effective.‟42
Through the reiteration and acceptance of such
security statements (speech acts) Tajikistan becomes an increasingly important
member of the international community for the first time in its history as an
independent state. This is not merely a matter of abstract discourse but includes
performances of sovereign authority which feign adherence to international policy
objectives and standards of conduct. KOGG makes monthly and annual reports on
drug seizures and comments on the nature of the trafficking threat which are widely
reported in the national press.43
Such reports constitute a public discourse of state
border protection which denies collusion with drugs traffickers.
However, this common security discourse does not entirely conceal the conceptual
and practical differences which remain between Tajikistan and its Western partners,
including the EU. There is dissonance between international and national approaches
to border security which occasionally surfaces in public. For example, in a press
conference in February 2005, General Zuhurov, the head of KOGG at that time,
departed from the international consensus in defending Tajikistan‟s right to fixed
border outposts (zastavi), in the face of donor calls for mobile units which would be
better equipped to interdict highly mobile smuggling gangs. „I know better the status
on the border than regional representatives of the UN,‟ he noted, adding that effective
border posts in Tajikistan „must be physical‟ (quoted in EC 2005). This dispute gets
to the heart of the different conceptions of Tajikistan‟s security. While Zuhurov is
widely respected in the international community for being a „honest guy‟, it is also
acknowledged that zastavi are integral for institutionalised corruption as fixed
outposts provide points for the collection of bribes from legal as well as illegal
travelers and traders.44
Thus, whilst a comprehensive academic assessment is yet to be conducted there are
strong reasons to doubt the effectiveness of EU security assistance to the Tajik-
Afghan border in terms of its own objectives. However, this is not to say that the
EU‟s engagement does not inadvertently affect security in Tajikistan. As argued by
Matveeva, with the financing, infrastructure and training for border security and anti-
drugs operations being „outsourced to external powers‟, the ruling elite is able „to
concentrate on the challenges it considers important‟ (2005: 134). These include
resisting reform and suppressing internal dissent. Yet there is little alternative for the
international community but to work through the local system. „People who are
corrupt are experienced in dealing with border management,‟ one international
representative working on BOMCA noted in an interview with one of the authors. „If
we remove them there will be none left.‟45
Publicly, the solution (reformed border
managers) is found in the problem (corrupt border managers). Thus, it seems a matter
11
of judgment as to whether „the state‟ should be seen as part of the problem or part of
the solution for „porous‟ borders in Tajikistan. For many Tajiks living along the
border the state can often seem a hindrance to livelihood strategies of survival and
sustenance.46
This worrying situation illustrates the limited power and utility of
BOMCA as a political instrument which implies that the absence of alternatives and
an EU institutional interest in being seen to be doing something might be as much a
cause of its continuation as any substantial evidence that it is actually meeting its
broader objectives of better border management.
A preliminary assessment of EU security assistance
The gloomy analysis above puts into doubt the possibility of achieving the EU‟s
objectives in terms of security assistance to the region. However, EU policy-makers
are not unaware of many of these difficulties. As early as 2002, the EU acknowledged
that Central Asia states‟ efforts to strengthen its borders can add to the anti-
government sentiment of the population and economic malaise. It noted:
A vicious cycle is developing whereby Central Asian countries are taking
action to limit cross-border movement of people and goods in the name of
security which, in turn, hinders the legitimate movement of people and goods
and the medium-term prospects for economic growth in the region. Mutual
accusations of dissatisfactory border controls aggravate this cycle, with
Uzbekistan‟s decision to mine its borders a particularly worrying
development. (EU 2002: 9).
Nevertheless, the acknowledgement of the existence of this problem has not led to a
solution. Moreover, the EU continues to offer technical assistance to states to
strengthen borders despite a lack of substantial reform by its partners.
The more fundamental difficulty with assistance in the security and development
fields may be less apparent to policy-makers. It is not simply that official actions for
state security are detrimental for the progress of reform. It is also that the merger of
security and development in international assistance fails to overcome the inherent
tension between security (narrowly understood as the countering of threats) and
development (liberal economic and political reform which leads to, amongst other
things, security). It has been claimed that the EU‟s presence in Central Asia should
be more development-focused (Fritz 2007: 3), but present activities, especially in the
realm of border management, suggest the intrinsic interweaving of development with
security (including energy security) concerns47
. Despite „rhetorical commitment to
link development and security‟, there is very little change in terms of policy. The EU
lacks a clear vision how these two policy goals might be balanced (Youngs 2007: 3).
It has pointed to the Tajik-Afghan border as being of the utmost importance with
regard to countering drug trafficking and the ongoing military operation in
Afghanistan. However, the civilian approach which the EU develops with regard to
border security – stressing the law enforcement type of border regimes – is often seen
as inadequate for a war-affected area and omits the interests and initiatives
implemented by other actors, both regional and extra-regional. According to the
European model, border troops should be transformed into modern law enforcement
agencies. Such attempts, if they are to have an effect, require changing the perception
of border zones by top officials in Central Asia, away from understanding the borders
in military security terms. The EU prefers and promotes the police-like
organisational structure of border security (EU 2007: 25), whereas Russia and China,
12
also engaged in border issues, understand border security in a highly militarised way
(and may push their SCO partners into that direction). Divergence in perceptions of
border security (civil vs. military) will undoubtedly undermine EU efforts48
. Yet
another problem lies in the high expectations of the host governments regarding the
advanced security equipment that they expect to obtain through BOMCA. On the one
hand, if expectations are not met, this may undermine BOMCA overall effort. On the
other hand, such an approach distracts attention from the development objectives and
training mission of BOMCA (Gavrilis 2008: 164).
Given failure to accept the enduring nature of traditional thinking about regional
security, rooting in Soviet precepts, the EU fails to address the whole spectrum of
border securitization implications. Securitization does not uniformly affect states and
societies alike. In other words, what may seem to be a secure border (e.g. from the
point of view of international actors) may in fact be a space of insecurity for local
population, a disruption to human security and a stimulus for criminalisation. Every
instance of tightening border controls, especially in the ethnically mixed region of the
Ferghana Valley, may create obstacles for the local population (Megoran 2004;
Posdnyzkova and Chernogayev 2005; Bichsel 2008: 96). It has been observed that
border violence (in the form of occasional shootings) has actually risen together with
allegedly higher level of professionalism (Megoran 2007). Additionally, as recent
ethnographic research in the Ferghana valley shows (Reeves 2006), securitized
borders provoke the creation of informal border regimes, societal citizens for
overcoming border controls and ultimately exacerbate corruption.
EU assistance for border management then raises significant questions regarding its
effectiveness49
. Where the principal partner and responsible agent of international
security assistance is the nation-state, the demand for more and better security
becomes a demand for more and better state. Yet such assistance presumes a state
which is institutionally, materially, and ideationally autonomous from its society and
thus able to assert its authority over societal actors (Migdal 1994). Such basic
autonomy should not be an objective of security assistance but a precondition for its
viability. How can security institutions be reformed when those institutions serve as
vehicles for personal and regime security? How might state resources be renewed
when those resources remain the property of officials who exploit them for personal
and family gain? Thus, while EU officials acknowledge the problem of „corruption‟
they simultaneously fuel it by providing further assistance to regimes who are
inextricably linked to drugs and other illicit trades. Government officials and
parliamentarians are often involved in drug trade or smuggling activities while
officially striving to fight such illegal activities (Cornell & Spector 2002: 197; Marat
2006: 100; Cornell 2006: 40-42, 64; Matveeva 2006: 19-21). Aid strategies for
Central Asia are not well adapted to the conditions on the ground, being broad in
scope and implemented by a small team of capital city-based officials, and thus
neglect the need for curbing corrupt practices (Megoran 2007). An obvious
conclusion emerges that the achievement of EU goals requires nothing less than the
liberalisation and democratic reform of Central Asian states (Ismailov and Jarabik
2009: 3). Almost two decades after their independence reform seems less not more
likely. In the absence of reform we are left with little more than simulated or virtual
democratic state structures (Lewis 2008; Heathershaw 2009)
Future prospects
13
For the foreseeable future EU security assistance for border management in Central
Asia is likely to face four continuing obstacles. Firstly, the strengthening of existing
regimes, materially and symbolically, in terms of both their coercive capacity and
international legitimacy, is likely to be an unintended consequence of EU‟s security
engagement. Border services and troops form a substantial part of state institutions in
Central Asia and remain the basis of the region‟s (semi-)authoritarian regimes. The
EU, in assisting border forces, may therefore be unintentionally strengthening the
existing regimes. Any kind of military or quasi-military aid to state structures can
easily be appropriated for the regime‟s coercive goals (McGlinchey 2005: 566).
Lubin points that providing training and border equipment in a corrupt environment
with no or scarce oversight – which is the EU‟s position – can boost the drug trade at
the same time as it aims to eradicate it (Lubin 2003:52). Some actions, e.g.
information exchange and the building databases, may be harmful as they potentially
strengthen the ability of governments to repress legitimate political opposition
movements. Regional governments are suspected of using counter-narcotic operations
as a cover-up for strengthening their political control (CES 2008).
Secondly, and consequently, it is highly unlikely that these regimes can be socialised
into better practices and shared threat perceptions over the course of EU security
assistance. What might appear to be a happy consensus between the EU and Central
Asian states over security assistance breaks down at a closer look. The Central Asian
regimes consider calls for democracy, reform and good governance a threat to their
grip on power (see Kimmage 2008: 11)50
. Central Asian actors have different threat
perceptions regarding illegal activities (such as trafficking in persons) in comparison
with Western actors (Jackson 2006: 302). Moreover, BOMCA addresses the micro-
level of technical assistance, leaving aside the macro-level of security perceptions and
concepts (Gavrilis 2008: 164-165), whilst assuming these will converge with EU
norms through the process of training. Yet massive differences in perception remain
and limit the effectiveness of EU activities. It is thus dubious to suggest as
Kassenova (2008: 124-125) claims that border security and fighting organised crime
constitutes an „unproblematic area‟ of cooperation compared with areas such as
human rights, democracy or rule of law. For Central Asian governments, projects
tackling organised crime and trafficking in the way formulated by the EU may, if
properly implemented, be no less controversial than initiatives addressing human
rights and democratisation (Boonstra 2009: 4).
Thirdly, despite a great deal in common between the way threats are perceived by the
post-Soviet governments, intra-regional cooperation in border management is likely
to continue to be limited. The distrust between Central Asian states seems to
undermine broader EU efforts of fostering security through regional cooperation. So
far, there is only very limited regional cooperation between Central Asia states
regarding borders. In the case of the relations between the border services of
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan problems at the border posts are handed upwards and
dealt with at the high political levels instead at the level of post commanders (Gavrilis
2008: 141). Here they can become issues of inter-state controversy. A major
problem faced by the EU in its security cooperation with Central Asian states is the
persistence of these border disputes including the fortifying of borders and protracted
border demarcations51
. So far, the EU managed to secure only one case of joint border
control through BOMCA which is between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The
Government of Uzbekistan has been a particular difficult interlocutor which deployed
mines along its border and repeatedly closed crossing. As a result of deterioration of
14
EU-Uzbekistan relations after Andijan events of 2005, the latter was excluded from
the participation in BOMCA 6 programme (BOMCA 2008: 13-14). The now
rescinded EU sanctions against Uzbekistan further hindered the development of a
regional approach. Yet even without such political ruptures the day-to-day politics of
„indirect rule‟ of Central Asian peripheries mitigates against substantive cooperation
(Torjesen 2008). Border posts provide rent-seeking opportunities which the regimes
and their clients at the margins of the state may be unwilling to give up by sharing
border responsibilities with neighbouring countries. To sum up, Central Asian
leaders are ready to cooperate in border management with external actors, but not
with each other (Jackson 2006: 306).
Finally, the EU will continue to be a secondary or junior actor in the security realm in
Central Asia as long as it continues with a regionalist, civilian and reformist
approach. Central Asian states have other partners which do not necessarily share the
EU‟s civilian security approach, including the demilitarisation of borders. In
addition, major actors in Central Asian border security like Russia, China52
and the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation are not included in EU‟s plans for cooperation53
.
Equally, Russia and China are unlikely to be inclined to share responsibilities
regarding border security with other actors, such as the EU. This may be more about
ideational or conceptual differences than a fundamental clash of interests.
Nevertheless, the EU should take into account the role played by the CIS and SCO,
their border management initiatives and regional structures (e.g. CIS Heads of Border
Forces Council and the Coordinating Service) as it reviews the viability of its
programmes. The EU defines its aim as „institutional reform by gradual change
through training and exposure of Central Asian Border and Customs leadership to
European best-practices for border management‟ (BOMCA 2008: 7), neglecting
already existing influence exercised by regional structures and states. The CIS
remains the forum for dealing with border security and customs – the latter through
its uniform customs tariff (Gavrilis 2008:119). The SCO itself was created to deal
with border delimitation and, despite a significant broadening of its scope of
activities, border security cooperation remains its predominant interest (Kassenova
2009: 11-12).
CONCLUSIONS The EU, engaging with Central Asia on multiple levels, has in the 2000s begun
assistance to the security sector. However, despite the broad agenda declared in the
EU Strategy for a New Partnership, practical cooperation has been reduced to border
security issues. As this chapter has shown this approach is fraught with difficulty.
One cannot be sure that higher drug seizure rates on Central Asia‟s borders are the
result of BOMCA as they may as well be just a by-product of higher trafficking rates
(Lubin 2003: 52). With no clear commitments on either side and with no conditions
posed by the main financing actor it may be foolish to expect anything more than
meagre results (Matveeva 2006: 90; see also Ismailov and Jarabik 2009: 3).
Moreover, EU assistance has been based on several mistaken assumptions inherent to
a conceptual approach which is derived from the EU‟s global and internal contexts. In
such a way the EU has neglected the characteristic features of the situation „on the
ground‟, such as the Soviet-type militarized approach to border security, which
differs markedly from the European model, and the limits to cooperation between the
region‟s states. Most governments in the region pursue unilateral policies with regard
to border security which undermine regional cooperation. As a result, EU security
assistance programmes at best remain limited and at worst have unintended outcomes
15
which hinder the achievement of broader EU development and security goals such as
the strengthening of human rights, the emergence of democratic politics and the
development of the rule of law. EU security assistance has the effect of providing
material and symbolic resources to the region‟s authoritarian regimes without
addressing the fundamental political issues which create corruption and confrontation
at Central Asia‟s borders.
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008.pdf> (last accessed 2 December 2009).
20
Youngs, R. (2007) Fusing security and development: just another Euro-platitude?
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1 The European Consensus on Development http://ec.europa.eu/development/policies/consensus_en
.cfm (last accessed 15 December 2009); Council conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU's
External Relations http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/111250.pdf (last accessed 15
December 2009) 2 There have been several instances of high increases in opium production in Afghanistan – especially
in the years 1999-2000. After American-led intervention in 2001 the production returned to 1990s
level, only to increase by 50% after 2004 and double – in comparison to 1999 production levels – in
the years 2007-2008 (UNODC 2008: 49). 3 It should be noted that EU countries are not the most important consumers of Afghan opium.
Significantly greater amount of drugs is directed to Iran and Pakistan, and both countries constitute
important transit routes (Hodes 2007: 38-39). 4 Such a view is not necessarily in contradiction to what has been voiced by Central Asian scholars.
Moldaliev, for instance, argued that the dire economic situation in Kyrgyzstan was the most pressing
issue for national security, which was crucial for the state‟s very survival (2000, p.264). 5 Orbie and Versluys elaborate on EU‟s programming which, by means of so called „policy mix‟,
enmeshes development assistance and other EC activities (2008: 70). 6 For further elaboration on soft security with relation to Europe see: Aldis and Herd 2005.
7 The EU itself avoids labelling its programmes as „security assistance‟, which most commonly tends
to be associated with hard type of military aid. We use this term as it is widely used in the academic
literature to describe assistance in these areas. 8 Heads of Border Forces Council of the CIS (Sovet Komanduyushchikh Pogranichnymi voyskami),
http://www.skpw.ru (last accessed 19 June 2009). 9 BOMCA Newsletter, No. 14, http://bomca.eu-bomca.kg/en/el/nletters (last accessed 10 December
2009). 10
EC External cooperation programmes, EU cooperation in Central Asia,
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/regional-cooperation/asia-wide-programmes/index_en.htm
(last accessed 27 June 2009). 11
The EU Newsletter No. 104, 15 September, 2008
http://delkaz.ec.europa.eu/joomla/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=433&Itemid=43
(last accessed 29 June 2009). 12
The European Union‟s Border Management Programme in Central Asia, http://bomca.eu-
bomca.kg/en/about/history (last accessed 27 June 2009). 13
The European Union will help Central Asia with border control,
http://enews.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=2154, 08 October 2007 (last accessed 27 June 2009). 14
Border management and the EU in Central Asia
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/central_asia/docs/factsheet_border_management_en.pdf (last
accessed 27 June 2009). 15
Ibid. 16
BOMCA Newsletter, No. 1, http://bomca.eu-bomca.kg/en/el/nletters (last accessed 10 December
2009). 17
BOMCA Newsletter, No. 1, , http://bomca.eu-bomca.kg/en/el/nletters (last accessed 10 December
2009). 18
BOMCA Newsletter, No. 2, http://bomca.eu-bomca.kg/en/el/nletters (last accessed 10 December
2009). 19
BOMCA Newsletter, No. 4, http://bomca.eu-bomca.kg/en/el/nletters (last accessed 10 December
2009). 20
BOMCA Newsletter, No. 1, http://bomca.eu-bomca.kg/en/el/nletters (last accessed 10 December
2009). 21
BOMCA Newsletter, No. 2, http://bomca.eu-bomca.kg/en/el/nletters (last accessed 10 December
2009). 22
BOMCA Newsletter, No. 19; BOMCA Newsletter, No. 22, http://bomca.eu-bomca.kg/en/el/nletters
(last accessed 10 December 2009); The European Commission's Delegation to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
21
and Tajikistan, Almaty, 25 June 2009
http://delkaz.ec.europa.eu/joomla/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=619&Itemid=43
(last accessed 10 December 2009). 23
BOMCA Newsletter, No. 20, , http://bomca.eu-bomca.kg/en/el/nletters (last accessed 10 December
2009). 24
BOMCA Newsletter, No. 21, http://bomca.eu-bomca.kg/en/el/nletters (last accessed 10 December
2009). The European Commission's Delegation to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Press
release, 22 may 2009 http://bomca.eu-
bomca.kg/upload/docs/1209_NR_TKM_IBM%20Airport_ENG.pdf (last accessed 27 June 2009). 25
BOMCA Newsletter, No. 7;; BOMCA Newsletter, No. 9, http://bomca.eu-bomca.kg/en/el/nletters
(last accessed 10 December 2009) 26
http://www.skpw.ru/Itogi.htm. 27
BOMCA Newsletter, No. 10, BOMCA Newsletter, No. 13, BOMCA Newsletter, No. 17, BOMCA
Newsletter, No. 22 http://bomca.eu-bomca.kg/en/el/nletters (last accessed 10 December 2009).. 28
BOMCA Newsletter, No. 11 http://bomca.eu-bomca.kg/en/el/nletters (last accessed 10 December
2009). 29
BOMCA Newsletter, No. 3 http://bomca.eu-bomca.kg/en/el/nletters (last accessed 10 December
2009).. 30
BOMCA Newsletter, No. 7 http://bomca.eu-bomca.kg/en/el/nletters (last accessed 10 December
2009). 31
BOMCA Newsletter, No. 7, BOMCA Newsletter, No. 16, http://bomca.eu-bomca.kg/en/el/nletters
(last accessed 10 December 2009). 32
BOMCA Newsletter, No. 15 http://bomca.eu-bomca.kg/en/el/nletters (last accessed 10 December
2009). 33
The European Commission's Delegation to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Dushanbe, June
22, 2009
http://delkaz.ec.europa.eu/joomla/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=615&Itemid=43
(last accessed 27 June 2009). BOMCA Newsletter No. 23, BOMCA Newsletter No. 25,
http://bomca.eu-bomca.kg/en/el/nletters (last accessed 10 December 2009). 34
AKIpress, 18 March 2009. 35
Russian troops – forming the the 201st battalion – have remained in Tajikistan, but are not used for
border protection activities. 36
http://www.skpw.ru/Tadg.htm (last accessed 19 June 2009). 37
BOMCA Newsletter, No. 5 http://bomca.eu-bomca.kg/en/el/nletters (last accessed 10 December
2009).. 38
Richard Hoagland, US Ambassador to Tajikistan, noted that the US was interested in establishing air
surveillance of the border and even salary support to Tajik border guards, although this would require
„anticorruption programmes‟. This included an increase from USD6.87 to 9.5mil in funding from 2004
to 2005, the majority of which was for „strengthening border posts‟. Financed primarily by new US
funding, UNODC added the project AD/TAJ/E24, „Strengthening Control along the Tajik-Afghan
Border‟ to BOMCA in April 2004 (EC 2005). 39
Comments by Pierre Cleostrate (European Commission), Stephen Lysaght (UK), and Harold
Loeschner (Germany) in, EC 2005. See also, Odyssey Migration Control 2005. 40
For example, incursions into Khujond, November 1998 were allegedly linked to a failed drugs deal.
See Akiner (2001: 72-74). 41
For example, in 2005, in Moskovskiy district, Tajik and Russian guards publicly accused each other
of drugs trafficking. John Heathershaw‟s interview with Bojidor Dmitrov, OSCE, Kulob, 2 June 2005. 42
See speech by Faizullo Abdulloev, First Deputy Director, Drug Control Agency of Tajikistan in EC
2005. 43
All copies of the state newspaper Jumhuriyat which Heathershaw reviewed from 2002 to 2003
contained one account of the arrest or killing of border violators. See Jumhuriyat: 21, 18 February
2002; 56, 18 May 2002; 99, 21 August 2002; 20, 18 May 2003; 54, 17 May 2003. 44
John Heathershaw‟s interview with Suhrob Kaharov, UNDP, Dushanbe, 2 August 2005. 45
John Heathershaw‟s interview with international programme officer, Dushanbe, March 2005. 46
This includes not only hindrance to livelihood strategies based on cross-border small trade but may
involve intimidation and „border incidents‟ with very serious consequences for peoples‟ lives (see
Megoran 2007; Yadgarova 2009; Umetov 2009). 47
For more on consequences of securitization of EU development assistance see (Orbie and Versluys
2008: 68, 77, 82). A broader debate regarding security-development nexus in Western foreign policies
has been introduced by Chandler (2007), who, above all, points to the separation between policy
rhetoric and policy planning.
22
48
Additionally, the effectiveness of the EU‟s example-giving approach is questionable despite the
EU‟s assertion that, „the underlying strategy of BOMCA IBM activity is to bring about institutional
reform by gradual change through training and exposure of Central Asian Border and Customs
leadership to European Best Practice for border management‟. Apart from significant doubts related to
the applicability of EU border to Central Asia, it is also worth considering to what extent this approach
may at all be taken seriously by those towards whom it is directed.
(http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/central_asia/docs/factsheet_border_management_en.pdf (last
accessed 27 June 2009). 49
For an example of positive assessment of BOMCA see: George Gavrilis, „Beyond the Border
Management Programme for Central Asia‟, EUCAM No. 11,
http://www.eucentralasia.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF/Policy_Briefs/PB11.pdf, (last accessed 16
December 2009). 50
At the same time the counter-terrorist discourse has been skilfully undertaken by Central Asian
regimes and used to advance the political objectives of the ruling elites (Horsman 2008: 195). 51
For an extensive description of border disputes see ICG (2002: 7-22). Often unilateral demarcations
and land-swaps give rise to various controversies, fatalities and economic hardships (e.g. Aydarov and
Manzarshoeva 2009; see also IWPR 11 June 2009; RFE/RL 2009 b; RFE/RL 2009a). 52
While the first priority of Chinese engagement was the settlement of border disputes with the three
immediate neighbours, it has more recently committed itself to a variety of assistance projects,
including border guards training (Kassenova 2009: 11, 13-14) , which, amongst other things, is driven
by the perception of narcotics threat stemming from Central Asia (Swanstrom 2006). 53
While acknowledging the role of SCO in Central Asia and declaring its preparedness „to enter into
an open and constructive dialogue with regional organisations‟ (EU 2007: 6), the EU has not proposed
any clear mechanisms. The need for EU‟s engagement with other actors in the region has been voiced
(e.g. Antonenko 2007; Fritz 2007).