russia's policy towards kazakhstan during yeltish period

Kazakhstan TodayKairat Umarov

The Geopolitical Realities of Central AsiaAigul Kurganbayeva and Galia Movkebayeva

Russia’s Policy towards Kazakhstan during Yeltsin PeriodK. Warikoo

Kazakhstan-US Relations: Some PerspectivesFatima Kukeyeva

Kazakhstan-China Trade and Economic RelationsAlia Akataeva

Trans-border Nationalities and State Relations:A Case Study of Kazakhs in Altai (Xinjiang)

Xu QinhuaDemocratization and Political Stability in Kazakhstan

Kuralay BaizakovaElections in Kazakhstan

Saifolla SapanovNazarbayev Emerges Stronger After Polls

Indranil BanerjieKazakhstan and the International Organizations

Mara GubaidullinaKazakhstan and the United Nations

Klara MakashevaOSCE Activities in Central Asia

Ailuna Utegenova

KAZAKHSTKAZAKHSTKAZAKHSTKAZAKHSTKAZAKHSTANANANANAN SPECIALSPECIALSPECIALSPECIALSPECIAL

Vol.10 No.4 October - December 2006

HIMALAYANAND

CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES(JOURNAL OF HIMALAYAN RESEARCH AND CULTURAL FOUNDATION)

NGO in Special Consultative Status with ECOSOC, United Nations

ISSN 0971-9318

HIMALAYAN AND CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES

Editor : K. WARIKOOAssociate Guest Editor : KURALAY BAIZAKOVAAssistant Editor : SHARAD K. SONISub-Editor : MAHESH R. DEBATA

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Himalayan and Central Asian Studies is indexed and abstracted inPAIS International, CSA, USA

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This journal has been published with the partial financial assistance of the CentralAsian Studies Programme, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal NehruUniversity, New Delhi. However, the responsibility for the facts stated or opinionsexpressed is entirely of the authors.

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Prof. Harish KapurProfessor EmeritusGraduate Institute ofInternational StudiesGeneva (Switzerland)

Lt. Gen. (Rtd.) Hridaya KaulNew Delhi (India)

Prof. Devendra KaushikGurgaon, Haryana (India)

Dr. Osmund BopearachchiDirector of Research at CNRSand Professor, SorbonneLaboratory of ArchaeologyUniversity of Paris (France)

Prof. M.P. LamaChairpersonCentre for South, Central &Southeast Asian StudiesSchool of International StudiesJawaharlal Nehru UniversityNew Delhi (India)

Dr. Lokesh ChandraDirectorInternational Academy ofIndian CultureNew Delhi (India)

Prof. I.N. MukherjeeSchool of International StudiesJawaharlal Nehru UniversityNew Delhi (India)

Prof. Touraj AtabakiInternational Institute of SocialHistoryUniversity of AmsterdamThe Netherlands

Dr. Sanjyot MehendaleExecutive DirectorCaucasus and Central Asia ProgramUniversity of CaliforniaBerkeley, USA

Prof. Jayanta Kumar RayChairmanMaulana Abul Kalam AzadInstitute of Asian StudiesKolkata (India)

Prof. K. Warikoo is Director, Central Asian Studies Programme, School ofInternational Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Kairat Umarov is Ambassador of Kazakhstan to India.

Dr. Aigul Kurganbayeva is Associate Professor, Department of InternationalRelations, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Dr. Galia Movkebayeva is Associate Professor, Department of InternationalRelations, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Dr. Fatima Kukeyeva is Head, International Relations and Foreign Policy,Department of International Relations, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University,Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Ms. Alia Akataeva teaches at the Department of International Relations,Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Dr. Xu Qinhua teaches at the Institute of Russian, Eastern Europe and CentralAsian Studies, School of International Studies, Renmin University, Beijing,China.

Prof. Kuralay Baizakova is Dean, Department of International Relations,Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Dr. Saifolla Sapanov is Associate Professor, Department of InternationalRelations, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Indranil Banerjie is Executive Director, SAPRA India Foundation,New Delhi.

Dr. Mara Gubaidullina is Associate Professor, Department of InternationalRelations, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Dr. Klara Makasheva teaches at the Al-Farabi Kazakh National University,Almaty, Kazakhstan.

Dr. Ailuna Utegenova teaches at the Department of International Relations,Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan.

CONTRIBUTORS

HIMALAYAN AND CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIESVol. 10 No. 4 October - December 2006

CONTENTS

Editor’s Page 1-2

Kazakhstan Today Kairat Umarov 3-8

The Geopolitical Realities of Aigul Kurganbayeva 9-19Central Asia and Galia Movkebayeva

Russia’s Policy towards Kazakhstan K. Warikoo 20-34during Yeltsin Period

Kazakhstan-US Relations: Fatima Kukeyeva 35-44Some Perspectives

Kazakhstan-China Trade and Alia Akataeva 45-56Economic Relations

Trans-border Nationalities and Xu Qinhua 57-68State Relations: A Case Study ofKazakhs in Altai (Xinjiang)

Democratization and Kuralay Baizakova 69-76Political Stability in Kazakhstan

Elections in Kazakhstan Saifolla Sapanov 77-83

Nazarbayev Emerges Stronger Indranil Banerjie 84-90after Polls

Kazakhstan and the International Mara Gubaidullina 91-106Organizations

Kazakhstan and the United Nations Klara Makasheva 107-115

OSCE Activities in Central Asia Ailuna Utegenova 116-129

HRCF File

Kazakhstan Today (Seminar Report) Mahesh R. Debata 130-134

Himalayan and Central Asian Studies Vol.10 No.4, Oct.-Dec. 2006 1

Editor‘s Page

With its borders touching Russia in the north, Kyrgyzstan,Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in the south and China in the east,Kazakhstan enjoys a central position in Eurasia, which also contributesto its unique strategic importance in the region. Its largest non-Asianand non-Muslim population in Central Asia has accorded it a distinctEurasian character. Kazakhstan is striving to forge a commonKazakhstani identity, which would be shared both by the Kazakhs,Slavs and other minorities.

During the past fifteen years of its independent nationhood,Kazakhstan has evolved as a dynamically developing, market orientedand multi-ethnic state today. Socio-political stability has been madepossible through a number of political reforms. Though Islam ispracticed by 70 per cent of the population, tolerance is an importantingredient of the traditions and culture of the Kazakh society.

Kazakhstan’s remarkable progress in the post-Soviet space ismarked by its political, economic and social stability, which are thethree main pillars forming the edifice of nation-building. The Kazakhgovernment has identified the priority sectors of the country’s economyas building infrastructure, e-governance, banking, energy (oil andnatural gas, hydro-electricity), mining and tourism. On the economicfront, Kazakhstan has become major exporter of oil and is set tobecome one of the top five producers of oil in this decade. Kazakhstanhas also emerged as one of the fast growing economies of the worldhaving a growth rate of ten per cent. Radical economic reforms haveopened up the market and helped integrate into the world trade system.

Considered by many experts as the “Anchor of Stability in CentralAsia”, Kazakhstan occupies a unique place in the whole Eurasianregion. Kazakhstan has devised a pro-active, multi-vector and balancedforeign policy to cope with the challenges of the 21st century.Kazakhstan’s geographic location and its vast territory are thedetermining factors in its foreign policy, which seeks to create stable,

2 Himalayan and Central Asian Studies Vol.10 No.4, Oct.-Dec. 2006

secure and friendly surroundings. Kazakhstan views itself as a bridgebetween Europe and Asia laying stress on establishing multilateraleconomic and political relations with Russia, US, China, Central AsianRepublics, European Union and other Asian countries. Kazakhstan hasevinced keen interest in the establishment of a common economic spacein Eurasia. The central Eurasian landmass which is a geographicalcontinuum with historical commonality, is not divided by any land,mountain or sea barriers. According to President Nazarbayev ofKazakhstan, who broached the idea of Eurasianism, Kazakhstan beingat the centre of Eurasia would be a connecting link between Russia,China and the Muslim world.

Kazakhstan has been making efforts to expand friendly relationswith all countries, especially in close and extended neighbourhoods.India is one of the first countries that President of independentKazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev paid his official visit to in 1992.According to Kazakhstan’s statistics, overall trade between India andKazakhstan in 2004 amounted to $96.6 million. Though it is 22.4 percent higher than in 2003 (78.9 million US dollars), still it is far behindthe potential. Since 2002, Kazakh-India Joint Working Group onCombating International Terrorism has been working on the joint actionagainst terrorism, extremism, drugs trafficking, illegal trade of arms andorganised crime. Kazakhstan-India Inter-governmental Commission onTrade, Economic, Scientific, Technological, Industrial and CulturalCooperation has been playing a sheet-anchor role in cooperationbetween the two republics in the fields such as trade, economy, energy,information technology, science and technology etc.

K. Warikoo


KAZAKHSTAN TODAY*

Kairat Umarov

On 30 August 2005, the people of Kazakhstan celebrated thetenth anniversary of the Constitution, which was adopted on 30 August1995 through a national referendum. It was based on the French modeland proclaimed Kazakhstan a democratic, secular state with aPresidential form of government. The newly adopted Constitution hasfurther ensured effective governance, guaranteed checks and balancesin government and separation of powers. The distinct difference of thisConstitution from the earlier one is that it declares the rule of law andprotection of human rights and freedom as the highest priority.

Over the last ten years, the Constitution has proven itself as anefficient law that lays a legal foundation for overall development ofKazakhstan. Kazakhstan, today, is a dynamically developing, marketoriented, multi-ethnic and secular state. Its remarkable progress in thepost-Soviet space is marked by political, economic and social stability.These are three main pillars on which nation-building achievements reststrongly and due to these, Kazakhstan may be viewed today as asuccess story of nation-building from the scratch.

Political stability has been achieved because of the wide rangingand consistent democratic reforms, which were further spurred by theConstitution. What is important is that under the Constitution, nopolitical discussions have developed into a crisis. All political disputeshave been settled within the constitutional framework. What are themain features ensuring political stability in Kazakhstan? The right ofevery citizen to vote and participate in elections is guaranteed by theConstitution. Democratic representation of various views in decisionmaking is ensured by free activities of eleven political parties and 372public associations of different political affiliations contributing topromotion of a civil society and building a democratic community.

* This is an updated version of the presentation made at the Seminar onKazakhstan Today at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi on29 August 2005.

Kairat E.Umarov


Another important factor is the public accord, which is verysignificant for the society comprising more than 100 nationalities withvarious religious outlooks. According to the 2002 census, Kazakhsconstitute 54 per cent, Russians - 30 per cent, Ukrainians - 3.6 percent, Uzbeks - 2.5 per cent and Germans - 2.3 per cent of thepopulation. The Kazakhstan Nationalities Assembly, consisting ofrepresentatives of all ethnic groups in the country, plays an importantrole in maintaining the inter-ethnic peace by having consultative powerin legislative process and direct appeal to the President. Like a miniUN in Kazakhstan, it tackles issues in a peaceful manner and avoidsethnic conflicts. Due to that, all ethnic groups in Kazakhstan live inpeace and harmony. As a result, there has never been any conflict onreligious or ethnic basis since independence. Guaranteed freedom ofconscience also contributes to the stability in Kazakhstan. Everybodyis free to practice his or her own religion. Nowadays, there are 46 faithsand about 1,313 religious associations preaching peace, tolerance andvalues common to all. Islam is practiced by 70 per cent of thepopulation. There are also followers of Russian Orthodox Church (25per cent), Protestant (1 per cent) and others (4 per cent). To fosterinter-religious dialogue at the international level and prevent the socalled “clash of civilizations”, Kazakhstan has initiated, and nowregularly convenes the Congress of Leaders of World and TraditionalReligions, in which Indian representatives also take an active part.

Freedom of speech is ensured. Censorship is prohibited by theConstitution. Dynamic rise in the number of Kazakh media outlets from600 in 1991 to 2,110 today indicates that the mass media, 77 per centof which is private, is thriving in Kazakhstan. News media in thecountry speaks 13 languages including Kazakh, Russian, Uzbek,Ukrainian, Polish, English, German, Korean, Uyghur, Turkish etc.

Vibrant civil society institutions are the main attribute of today’sKazakhstan. There are over 5,000 non-governmental organisations(NGOs) operating in the country. Under the President, Human Rightsand Women Affairs Commission, National Commission for Democracyand Civil Society Development, Public Council for Media are entrustedto promote human rights, empower women and help conduct

KAZAKHSTAN TODAY


democratic transformations step-by-step. Human Rights Ombudsmanhas been established in Kazakhstan, who acts on the complaints overhuman rights violations. There is a moratorium on death sentences.

Success of the Kazakh model of development was also ensuredby the principle adhered to by the country at the outset of itsindependence: First Economics, Then Politics. It was due to thatapproach that the political and social stability has been preserved andeconomic prosperity achieved. Radical economic reforms have openedup the market and helped actively integrate into the world trade system.As a result, macro economic indicators have grown substantially.Kazakhstan has been enjoying ten per cent average annual growth inGross Domestic Product (GDP) for the last seven years in a row. Iften years ago, the GDP per capita was only $700, today it is $3,300.In 2004, the foreign trade volume reached 33 billion US dollars with atrade surplus of seven billion US dollars. The government is carryingout an Industrial and Innovation Development Strategy aimed at buildingpost-industrial, high-tech, English-speaking economy with capabilitiesin aerospace, biotechnology, Information Technology (IT), peacefulatomic energy etc. Investment climate has been another key to rapideconomic growth. Kazakhstan has been able to attract about $50billion foreign direct investment (FDI) since 1991. The annual FDIinflux is 1.5 billion US dollars. The distinction of Kazakh investmentpolicy is creation in 1998 the Foreign Investors’ Council consisting ofthe Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of foreign companies working inKazakhstan which meets twice a year under the direct chairmanship ofthe President of Kazakhstan. It gives recommendations on improvingbusiness and investment climate in the country. As a result, Kazakhstanis renowned as a reliable partner that guarantees investors’ rights. Thecountry is included into the World Bank list of 20 countries with themost investment friendly environment. The Kazakh financial systemreform has resulted in making it the strongest in the Commonwealth ofIndependent States (CIS) area and beyond. In Kazakhstan, there is afree flow of capital and 100 per cent currency convertibility. Inflationis as low as 5 to 7 per cent.

Kairat E.Umarov


Hydrocarbon reserves in Kazakhstan constitute about 1.5 per centof the world resources. The prospective development of Caspian Seaoil deposits will surely place Kazakhstan in the ranks of five top worldoil producers. Establishment of the National Fund for Stable Social andEconomic Development in 2001, which has already accumulated eightbillion US dollars from oil and gas revenues, is a valuable asset for thefuture economic progress and stability. In terms of social improvements,it can be noted that the vast majority of Kazakh citizens enjoy the fruitsof economic prosperity. Reforms in pension, housing, education andhealthcare sectors of the country have been carried out successfully.

There has been significant increase in pension, hardshipallowances, etc. In July 2005, salary of the public employees wasraised by 32 per cent. Another increase of 30 per cent will take placein January 2007. As the President of Kazakhstan, NursultanNazarbayev put it in his annual address to the nation, Kazakhstan aimsto join the ranks of “effectively developing economies while ensuring ahigh standard of living for its population.”

According to the World Bank, Kazakhstan now belongs to the groupof middle-income countries. Since the end of the last decade, averageincome has grown almost five fold; monthly salaries have increased byabout six times; minimum wage has gone up 25 times; average monthlypension by 4.6 times; personal and average per capita banking depositsby 35 and 37 times respectively. Compared to 2003, state expenditureson free healthcare have risen by 1.7 times. Rapid economic growth hasmade it possible to expand substantially the social targeting of governmentexpenditures. The Constitution guarantees free-of-charge state-financededucation up to high school level. Under the Constitution, every citizenhas a right to get free high education on the basis of competition. Soon,there will be 50 per cent increase in government-sponsored grantsavailable to the students. Today, literacy rate in the country is 98 percent. Every year, under the Bolashak (Future) Programme, 3,000 of ourbest students receive scholarship from the national budget to study at theleading universities of the world. To alleviate housing problem, thegovernment plans to build twelve million square meters of residentialhouses, which is 195,000 apartments in the next three years only.

KAZAKHSTAN TODAY


The three pillars of growth can not be sustainable without thefavourable external environment. That is why Kazakhstan’s foreignpolicy aims at creating stable, secure and friendly surroundings. Wehave pro-active, multi-vector and balanced foreign policy to cope withthe challenges of the 21st century. Kazakhstan’s geographic locationand its vast area predetermine its foreign policy. Actually, in terms ofarea, Kazakhstan is the ninth largest country in the world. Its territoryis equal to 86 per cent of that of India. Kazakhstan has been makingefforts to expand friendly relations with all countries, especially in closeand extended neighbourhoods. India is one of the first countries thatPresident of independent Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev paid hisofficial visit in 1992. Since then, there have been intensified exchangesof official visits between the two countries at various levels. Becauseof the political will of our leaders and sincere friendship between ourpeoples, it has been possible to expand and deepen the relationshipbetween Astana and New Delhi.

India’s participation in the CICA process (Conference onInteraction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia), which is aKazakh foreign policy initiative uniting 17 Asian countries (with SouthKorea intending to join as the 18th full fledged member) designed tobuild security mechanisms in the region, contributes a lot to the stabilityof the continent. Along with other countries, India was given anObserver status at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) atthe Astana Summit in July 2005. This provides an opportunity forregular discussions of global and regional issues within the SCOframework. In our foreign policy, India is defined as a reliable andstrategic partner. To match the bilateral political interaction, oureconomic partnership needs to be encouraged. According toKazakhstan’s statistics, overall trade between India and Kazakhstan in2004 amounted to $96.6 million. Though it is 22.4 per cent higher thanin 2003 (78.9 million US dollars), still it is far behind the potential.

Kazakhstan’s main exports to India today are mineral products,leather and raw materials, and imports from India include vegetableproducts, food stuffs, chemicals, plastic, machinery and equipment.However, there is vast scope for cooperation in various fields including

Kairat E.Umarov


manufacturing sectors, such as textiles, construction materials,leatherwear, plastics, pharmaceuticals, information technology (IT), oiland gas, tourism, etc. It is especially relevant, since the government isestablishing industrial clusters in tourism, oil and gas machinery building,food processing, textiles, transport logistics, metallurgy and constructionmaterials.

There is need to raise the awareness of Indian business communityabout the huge opportunities awaiting them in Kazakhstan. RoundTables such as this one, seminars and business meets can help in thisprocess. To intensify private sector interaction, it is much needed toestablish direct trade routes between the two countries, in particularwithin North South Corridor. We also need to encourage people-to-people contacts. Some steps have been already taken. The Centre forIndian Studies was set up in Almaty in August 2005. We invited Indianmovie producers and Bollywood stars to participate at the secondInternational Eurasian Film Festival at the end of September 2005. Awell known violinist and the Head of the Western KazakhstanSymphonic Orchestra, Marat Bisengaliev is working with the NationalCentre for Performing Arts (NCPA) to launch the first ever professionalIndian National Symphonic Orchestra in Mumbai.

Kazakhstan is one of the most attractive tourist destinations, whichawaits to be discovered by Indian travellers. “Air Astana” flies fromDelhi to Almaty and back twice a week, on Wednesdays and Saturdays,by comfortable Boeing airplanes. Almaty is only three and a half hoursaway from New Delhi by air.

There are a lot of opportunities today opening up for developingcloser and mutually beneficial relations between the two countries. WithKazakhstan’s stable growth and becoming a strong economicpowerhouse in the region and India emerging as a global power, it is inthe interest of both the nations to work together to ensure peace andstability regionally and globally.

Kazakhstan is a dynamically developing country with stablepolitical system, prospering economy and thriving democracy. This isKazakhstan today.


THE GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES OF CENTRAL ASIA

Aigul Kurganbayevaand

Galia Movkebayeva

The creation of newly independent states of Central Asia in 1991has radically changed the political landscape of the Eurasian region.Since then Central Asia has become the focus of diversified politicaland economic interests of various global and regional powers. With thedeclaration of independence, the Central Asian Republics (CARs) facedthe problems of self-identification and defining of foreign policy,economic and civilisational priorities. The favourable geographicalposition, huge stocks of hydrocarbons and other precious minerals inthis region attracted the attention of world powers.

Central Asia borders on the strategically most important regionsof the Eurasian continent. Situated in the east are - China and thecountries of the Asia-Pacific region; in the south - Afghanistan, MiddleEast and a number of other Islamic states; in the west and the north -Caucasus, Turkey, Europe and Russia.

All the Central Asian Republics as well as other former Sovietrepublics have inherited numerous problems from the erstwhile USSRsuch as deep economic inter-dependence rooted in a state planningsystem, paternalism, raw materials based economy. Besides, thesestates were riddled with other problems like - crisis of the system,geopolitical competition, subjective mistakes of the country’s politicalleaders etc.1 An increasing diversification and incompatibility of theeconomic, political, strategic interests; distinctions in levels of economicdevelopment of the states, trade and economic relations, raw materialssupply; geopolitical factors such as historically disputed territories,limitations of communication, struggle between Uzbekistan andKazakhstan for the leadership in the region etc., show the existingcontradictions among the countries of Central Asia. Today when theCentral Asian states are at a transitional stage, it is imperative to point

Aigul Kurganbayeva and Galia Movkebayeva


out some important points here: first, the communist political andeconomic system is dismantled; and second, the initial stage of the statebuilding process has been over and the fundamentals and priorities ofinternal policy have been determined. Though the absence of a civilsociety has predetermined the region’s internal political developmentand set up, the main question about foreign policy priorities and creationof a stable system of the national and regional security is still open.2

It is impossible to comprehend and understand the presentgeopolitical situation in Central Asia without analysing the peculiaritiesof the region. Central Asia comprises Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. One of the major factors ofpolitical and economic stability of the Central Asian republics is theirsignificant natural resources. Despite this advantage, these states findthemselves in the closed transport space with limited access to theworld markets and poorly developed internal and externalcommunications. In addition, problems of uneven availability anddistribution of water resources, existence of numerous zones ofenvironmental disasters, demographic imbalance, migration problemsand limitation of living space in some states of the region, economic,transport and communication dependence on Russia etc. are importantso far as Central Asia is concerned.

The above factors influence the mutual relations in the region andthe choice of foreign policy priorities. In terms of geopolitical strategy,each of the five Central Asian states chose their own way ofdevelopment proceeding from own national interests, and economic andpolitical situation. However, they all had one goal - to become full-fledged member of the world community. The most significant exampleof mutual relations of the post-Soviet Central Asian Republics is theevolution of the Central Asian Union created in January 1994, whichwas renamed as the Organization of Central Asian Cooperation(OCAC) on 28 December 2001. This shows that the Central Asian statesgave priority to mutual economic relations rather than political ones.

Despite all the distinctions of internal political development and thecontradictions in the region, Central Asia today is an object of steadfast



attention of USA, China, Russia, Western Europe, Iran, Pakistan, Indiaand Turkey. All these countries are actively aiming at strengthening theirpositions in Central Asia. The main reasons why these states areattracted to the Central Asian region are the availability of large quantityof natural resources, commodity markets of goods and services andother geopolitical, geoeconomic, civilizational-cultural reasons etc. Forthe above global and regional actors, the Caspian Sea with its uniquehydrocarbon and biological stocks has a special strategic importance.Japan, Saudi Arabia, and also the Newly Industrial States (SouthKorea, Malaysia and Indonesia) and other countries, continental andtrans-continental economic structures (MNCs and TNCs) also havetheir respective interests in the region. The inter-dependence ofantagonistic strategic interests of the external actors leads to theformation of the international tension zone that influences the stabilityof the development of the region and the balance of geopolitical forcesand thus, leading to a new ‘Great Game’ of the big powers and globalinterests. The countries of Central Asia are interested in strengtheningtheir statehood which is the main guarantee against the present chaoticsituation. Two other guarantees are military-political coalitions andinternational organizations. The newly independent states of the region,with unequal political and economic power and insufficient militarypotentials, have the risk of being “pawns on the chess board of Eurasia.”3

Geographically, being situated at the crossroads of Russia,People’s Republic of China and the Muslim states, it was important forthe Central Asian countries not to allow occurrence of a certaingeopolitical vacuum in the region at the initial stage of development.Each state of Central Asia has specific interests, but there are a numberof large geopolitical problems which could be solved by a single blocof the states of the region. For example, the conflicts on the perimeterof external borders of Central Asia (the Afghanistan problem,separatism in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the Indo-Pakistan conflict etc.) have the potential to affect a significant part ofthe Central Asian territory because of porous borders.4

The US foreign policy strategy concerning the new states ofCentral Asia is based mainly on geopolitical reasons, a pragmatic



approach considering its own strategic priorities and interests. AmericanScholar Z. Brzezinski believes that the basic US interest in the regionis to create such conditions in which none of the global and regionalpowers could have control over this region, and the world communitywould have an unobstructed financial and economic access to it.According to him, the geopolitical pluralism will become a steady realityonly when the network of oil pipelines and transport routes connect theregion directly with the big centres of world economic activities throughthe Mediterranean Sea and Arabian Sea as well as through the overlandroutes.5

The other main actor in this region is Russia. The reorientation offoreign economic relations of Russia towards the “far abroad” in thebeginning of 1990s, and also the shortage of economic resources ledto the significant decrease of Russian influence as a dominating partnerin cooperation with the Central Asian countries. However, Russia stillremains the most important neighbour and a partner in all fields ofactivity for the Central Asian countries besides being a guarantor ofregional stability. Russia is also interested in strengthening its positionin Central Asia because:

i) There is interdependence between Russia and the Central AsianRepublics on delivery of raw materials and finished goods.Besides, many of their products are non-competitive in theworld market and can be sold only in the post-Soviet countries.It is believed that Russia can have its place in internationalrelations only if it continues close trade and economiccooperation with the Central Asian states and the CIS.

ii) Russian interests are connected to geopolitical problems suchas control over the major transport especially the transitcommunications in Central Asia. However, Russian actions havebeen limited due to weakness of the Russian economy, anactive advance of the US and other leading states. For example,the American capital investments in the region have surpassedthe investments of Russia and even China.

iii) The share of the Russian population in a number of CentralAsian Republics is significant. The protection of the rights of



ethnic Russians is one of the most important concerns of Russiabecause Russian immigrants have been instrumental in themodernization of the Central Asian Republics since long andoccupied key positions.6

iv) Russian presence in this region has been ironically felt in orderto check the spread of extremist and religious ideas,proliferation of drugs, weapons, arms and ammunition.

v) The five Central Asian states manufacture some kinds ofindustrial and agricultural goods which are of special interest toRussia. The region has one of the world’s richest stock ofprecious minerals. The Caspian Sea holds the second positionin hydrocarbon stocks after the Persian Gulf. Central AsianRepublics expect Russian participation in the mining andtransportation of these resources across their territory. Theshare of the Central Asian countries in the Russian export ismore than 25 per cent.7

The other two actors which are engaged in wielding their influencein the region are Turkey and Iran. With the decrease of Russianpresence in the region, the first half of 1990s witnessed the rivalrybetween Turkey and Iran in Central Asia. Both these countries tooksteps to convince the Central Asian Republics to recognize theirrespective roles in the region. The West, in its turn, has been pushingTurkey to assume the role of promoting the process of modernizationand maintenance of political moderation in the region. The USAcontinues to encourage Turkey by regarding the transportation ofenergy resources from the region. The US sees Turkey as theconductor of its policy, as the realization of other transportationprojects (except for the Afghanistan and Caucasian ones) would meanstrengthening of the positions of one of the three regional actors -Russia, China and Iran. Washington’s efforts also aim at checking Iran,which the USA considers as one of the rogue states and which doesnot agree upon the “game rules” in Central Asia. Iran, on the otherhand, offers the alternative project of transportation of hydrocarbonsthrough its territory, which is much more favourable than the routethrough Pakistan.8



For Iran, it is much easier to carry out trade and economiccooperation because it has the common overland and sea border withthe Central Asian Republics. Pakistan is irritated with the vigorousactivity of Iran on use of the religious - cultural factor, which has animportant role in the social-political life of the states of Central Asia.Heads of the Central Asian states cannot ignore Iran, taking intoaccount its possession of international seaports, its role as a centre ofcommunications, its influence in Afghanistan, and also the oil stocks andtechnologies for their processing. Teheran will continue to aspire forexpanding the sphere of its influence in Central Asia, considering it tobe historically rightful and justified.

People’s Republic of China, another important economic andmilitary power, has been making efforts in spreading its influence in theCentral Asian region. However, the Central Asian states perceive therelations with China quite cautiously, taking into account some momentsfrom the history of mutual relations with China. Nevertheless, theCentral Asian countries bordering on China have taken anunprecedented step by concluding multilateral agreements in 1996 and1997 (between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and China)on demilitarization of the common border with People’s Republic ofChina and strengthening of measures of trust in the military field on theborder areas.9 It is quite probable that these agreements dispelledsome apprehensions of the Central Asian leaders about China’sexpansionist aspirations. It is believed that the basic efforts of Chinawill be directed towards strengthening its position in Southeast Asia inthe near future. In the long term, in the multipolar world and changingbalance of forces in the international arena, the successful economicreforms of China and vigorous growth rate of its economy testifying toits huge economic potential, will lead to increased activism by China toexpand the sphere of its influence in the western and northwestdirection. Besides, the leading position of China in Asia will increaseits role in Central Asia. This geopolitical process is tending to grow andit is an objective consistent pattern in the modern balance of forces andthe present conditions of interstate mutual relations.10 China will useall forms of cooperation, including bilateral and multilateral ones, the



Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for example. According tosome analysts, SCO is an instrument of China and Russia for influencingthe Asian region as well as the relations with India and Pakistan. Russiaand China also use the SCO for coordination of their positions on otherglobal issues. Both countries do not agree with the alignment of forcesin the international system and the US hegemony.11 China aspires touse economic and technical opportunities of the countries of CentralAsia to speed up economic development of its backward northwesternregions. However, separatist activities in China’s Xinjiang UyghurAutonomous Region (XUAR) will remain the most acute andcomplicated problem in the near future not only in China’s relations withthe Central Asian countries but also with Pakistan.

Pakistan has become a key player in the geopolitical situation inthe Central Asian republics. Pakistan’s importance in Central Asia stemsfrom the following facts:

i) Central Asia is a sort of “bridge” between “three” Asias (theterm has been widely used recently by the majority of politicalscientists), as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (IRP) enjoys aunique position being part of both the Organization of theIslamic Conference (OIC) and SAARC (the South AsianAssociation for Regional Cooperation). Islamabad seeks to usethe OIC platform to become an important element of thestrategic communication network covering Central, Western andSouth Asia;

ii) the historical affinity of cultures, traditions and customs basedon religious affinity of people;

iii) the favourable geopolitical situation of the Central Asianrepublics being at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, hugemineral resources and geographical proximity to Pakistan definethe strategic course of Pakistan’s foreign policy.

iv) India, which was having close relations with the former USSRduring the Cold War era, is an important factor defining thenational interests of Pakistan in this region. In case ofnormalization of the Indo-Pakistan relations, India couldconduct more profitable trade and economic relations with thecountries of Central Asia.



v) The Afghanistan conflict has been an essential obstacle instrengthening the position of Pakistan in the Central Asianregion.

vi) The creation of transit routes from the countries of Central Asiato the ports in Indian Ocean with the help of foreignparticipants has been of great interest for Islamabad. Theseroutes are the important lever of influence on the developmentof cooperation with the Central Asian region.

Some international experts believe that the end of bipolar systemin international relations has greatly improved the relations between theUSA and India which was the traditional strategic partner and ally ofthe former USSR in South Asia. Now interests of both India and USAcoincide on a number of issues. For example, both countries areconcerned about the threat of “Islamization” of the Central Asianrepublics and consequently aspire to support existing secular regimes.12

On the other hand, India and Pakistan also compete for expansion oftheir sphere of influence in Central Asia. Central Asia holds an importantplace in the Indian foreign policy strategy in the context of strengtheningregional and global security. Analysis of the geopolitical situation showsthat countries like Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have of latebeen strengthening their positions in the region, using economic,ideological and cultural - civilizational factors. In order to stop Pakistanplaying the anti-India card, New Delhi has been advocating the secularmodel of development in the Central Asian states. The other factorwhich worries India is the attempt by Pakistan to create a radical Islamicbloc from Bosporus up to Punjab and Kashmir.13 India expressesconcern over the Sino-Pakistan cooperation in the development of newCentral Asian markets, which is confirmed by the Quadrilateral Treatyon Transit Trade on the Karakorum Highway, signed by Kazakhstan,China, Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan in March 1995.14

The Central Asian region is situated in the so-called ‘arch ofinstability’, covering southern borders of the Commonwealth ofIndependent States (CIS) and Russia, separating it from the ‘zone ofboth potential and existing local conflicts’ (Afghanistan, Tajikistan,Pakistan and India). Russia’s military-political interaction with the



countries of Central Asia, which form a buffer zone for Russia, wouldprevent actual and potential threats from the distant approaches. In thisrespect, Central Asia is a buffer to check the penetration of militantreligious fundamentalism and extremism. Secular character of the rulingelites in the states of Central Asia, disapproval and/or limiting thepoliticization of Islam in the frame of its moderate forms is the majorfactor of stability not only in the region, but also in Russia itself.Moreover the mutual relations of “the post-Soviet Muslim states” andalso with ‘external’ Muslims are not based on principles of Islamicsolidarity. Except for the Islamic opposition in Tajikistan and growth ofa level of religiousness in Ferghana Valley, Islam does not have anysignificant influence on the political course of these countries.”15 Thus,Central Asia has become an arena for collision of interests between theneighbouring states. Considering its own strategic plans, Pakistan willbe striving to realize its tasks, without damaging mutual relations andusing similar positions of these countries on certain issues.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is actively movingahead towards Central Asia with various projects and programmes.Membership in the NATO provided a foothold for the US strategicforces during the military actions in the Persian Gulf. The NATO closelycooperates with international organizations such as the United Nations,Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) andEuropean Union (EU). In order to strengthen the security system in theregion, the NATO emphasizes preventive diplomacy, supportsuniformity of the systems of military planning and introduction of uniformstandards, thus trying to establish a new world order on the Eurasiancontinent. However, it has been pointed out that “appearance of theNATO on the coast of Caspian Sea in Central Asia means a radicaltransformation of geopolitical contours of this part of Eurasia, cominginto a deep rear of Russia, Afghanistan, Iran, India and China. It alsomeans an appearance of the new centre of pressure and potential threatto stability.”

The Central Asian Republics are mainly interested in thedevelopment of economic cooperation with all nearby and neighbouringstates, including Islamic countries which can be possible only after the



construction of the transport communications running through theterritory of Pakistan to the seaports of Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.In this situation, the effective strategy is the one aiming at coordinatingthe tactics of the Central Asian states in order to do away with thegeopolitical pressure of external powers. Despite the internalcontradictions existing in the Central Asian community today, theCentral Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) plays a significantrole in strengthening mutual relations inside the region. Thus, theimportant decisions on creation of inter-state consortium, adopting thecommon principles of a securities market formation, the order of signingthe UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia(SPECA) in 1998, the activity of “Central Asian battalion”, the creationof uniform economic union, etc. have been made within the UN framework.This shows that the relations between the states of Central Asia havereached a new level of economic and political development.

REFERENCES1. N. A. Nazarbayev, On the Eve of the XXI Century, Almaty, 1996, p.9.2. M. Esenov, “The Neutrality of Turkmenistan and its Influence on the

Regional Security System”, Central Asia and Caucasus (Luleo,Sweden), February 2001.

3. A. Torkunov, “Security Problems on the Korean Peninsula”, TheDiplomatic Year Book, 1996, p.184.

4. V.N. Moscalenko, Pakistan and the States of Central Asia; theWestern Asia, the Central Asia and Transcaucasia; Integration andConflicts, 1995, p.29.

5. Z. Brzezinski, The Great Chess Board, 1999, pp.178-179.6. S.K. Kushkumbayev, “Regional Integration in Central Asia”, Sayasat,

no. 18, 1998, p.72.7. S.S. Razov, “In New Central Asia” International Life, no. 13, 1997,

p.36.8. Arshad Ali, “Pak - Central Asian Communication Links”, Contemporary

Central Asia, 1995, p. 47.9. K.K. Tokayev, Under the Banner of Independence, Almaty, 1997,

p.218.



10. K.S. Sultanov, Reforms in Kazakhstan and China: Peculiarities,Similarities, Distinctions, Successes, Problems, Astana, 2000, p.456.

11. D.A. Kalieva, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Prospects ofDevelopment”, The Analytical Review, no. 3, 2001, p.38.

12. E.M Grushko, Foreign Policy of Modern Pakistan, 1997, p.43.13. T. Shaumian, “Foreign Policy Perspectives of the Central Asian States”,

Post-Soviet Central Asia, 1998, p.71.14. Frederick Starr, “Making Eurasia Stable”, Foreign Affairs, vol.75, no.1,

January/February 1996, p.24.15. S.K. Kushkumbayev, Central Asia on the Ways of Integration:

Geopolitics, Ethnicity, Safety, Almaty, 2002, p.93.


RUSSIA’S POLICY TOWARDS KAZAKHSTAN

DURING YELTSIN PERIOD*

K. Warikoo

Stretching over 1,600 kms. from north to south and over 2,000kms. from the Caspian Sea in the west to China’s frontier in the east,Kazakhstan in terms of area is the largest of the Central Asian Republicsand the ninth largest country in the world. Its strategic importance isnot only due to its central position in Eurasia sharing its borders withRussia in the north (about 7,000 kms.), with Caspian Sea in the west(2,320 kms.), with China (over 1,500 kms.), with Kyrgyzstan (1,000kms.), with Uzbekistan (2,300 kms.) and with Turkmenistan (380kms.), but also due to its abundant oil, gas and mineral resources. TheRepublic is multi-ethnic with Russians (30 per cent) constituting thelargest minority followed by Ukrainians (3.6 per cent), Uzbeks (2.5 percent), Germans (2.3 per cent), Tatars (1.6 per cent), Uighurs (1.4 percent) and others. As such, Kazakhstan has the largest non-Asian andnon-Muslim population which accords it a distinct Eurasian character.Kazakhstan and Russia have been part of a single state system fornearly two centuries. Due to its long common border with Russia, itslarge Russian population (second after the Kazakhs) and rich energyresources, Kazakhstan has been regarded highly important to Russia’sinterests.

THE SOVIET PERIODRussia’s push southwards in the Kazakh steppes began around

1730s with the acceptance of Russian control by Abulkhair, the Khanof the Lesser Horde. It was much before Russia had initiated itsforward policy towards Central Asia following its defeat in the CrimeanWar (1853-56), which led to the transfer of Russian interest from

* This paper is based on the presentation made at the InternationalSymposium on Rising Powers and Values in Eurasia organized by theAtaturk University, Erzurum, Turkiye, March 1-3, 2006.



Balkans to Central Asia. From early 1850s onwards, numerous CentralAsian cities and Khanates were taken over and incorporated. Thusstarted the process of migration of Russian farmers, artisans andworkers for work and settlement in the vast Central Asian region. Largesettlements of Russians came up in northern Kazakhstan. Soon afterthe October Revolution, the Kazakhstan Autonomous Republic, whichincluded some regions of southwestern Siberia, mostly populated byRussians, was created on 26 August 1920 as part of the RussianFederation. On 5 December 1936, this Republic was reorganised intothe Kazakhstan Union Republic. Kazakhstan was always treated in theSoviet terminology as being different from the other four Central AsianRepublics. The region was referred to as Srednyaya Aziya (MiddleAsia) and Kazakhstan. Even in the centralized economic planning,Kazakhstan and Central Asia were treated as separate regions, havingtwo SOVNARKHOZ (Council for Running the Economy), one foreach region.

With the launch of first Five Year Plan and also during the WorldWar II, hundreds of industries were set up or relocated in Kazakhstan.Several hundred thousand Russian skilled workers, engineers,technicians, technocrats, doctors and teachers moved out of thewestern parts of erstwhile Soviet Union to Kazakhstan for work.Another wave of Russians settled in Kazakhstan in early 1950s underthe Virgin Lands Scheme. Between 1959 to 1970, over one millionRussians had moved into Kazakhstan.1 So till early 1970s, the maindirection of migration was from Russia due to the development ofcommunication, irrigation networks, hydel projects, construction works,mining, machine building, chemicals, textile and other heavy industriesin Kazakhstan. Thus ethnic Russians attained the numerical majority inKazakhstan in 1959 and retained this status till 1970s. Later on, theRussians started losing their privileged positions in spheres of trade,education, culture, public health etc. The percentage of Russians in thetotal population of Central Asia began declining since late 1960s. InKazakhstan, the Russian population declined from 42.7 per cent in1959 to 37.8 per cent in 1989 and further to 29.9 per cent in 1999.So much so, Kazakhs became a majority in Kazakhstan for the first

K. Warikoo


time in 1989, since the early years of the Soviet Union, comprising 39.7per cent of the Republic’s total population as against 30 per cent in1959. And the 1999 Census recorded their absolute majority puttingthem at 53.4 per cent.

Table: 1Ethnic Trends in Kazakhstan

Ethnic Group 1926 1959 1970 1989 1994 1999*Kazakhs 3,713,300 2,787,300 4,234,100 6,534,600 7,636,200 7,985,000

(57.1%) (30%) (32.6%) (39.7%) (44.3%) (53.4%)Russians 1,279,900 3,972,000 5,521,900 6,227,500 5,769,700 4,479,600

(19.6%) (42.7%) (42.5%) (37.8%) (35.8%) (30.0%)Ukrainians 860,800 761,400 933,400 896,200 820,800 547,100

(13.2%) (8.2%) (7.2%) (5.5%) (5.1%) (3.7%)

Source: A. Elebaeva (ed.), Razvitiye mezhnatsionol’nykh otnoshenii vnovykh nezavisimykh gosudarstvakh Tsentralnoi Azii, Bishkek, Ilim,1995, pp.316-22, cited in Rafis Abazov, “Central Asia’s ConflictingLegacies and Ethnic Policies”. In Nationalism and Ethnic Politics,Vol.5, No.2, Summer 1999, pp.62-90.

*Census of Kazakhstan, 1999

1970s and 1980s were marked by an increasing tendency amongthe Muslim peoples of Central Asia towards national exclusiveness andethno-centrism.2 Though Gorbachev’s policy of perestroika andglasnost ushered in a new era of press freedom, politicaldemocratisation and decentralisation of decision making process, yetthe removal of Din Muhammad Kunaev as First Secretary of theCentral Committee of the Kazakh Communist Party and hisreplacement by Kolbin, a Russian, sparked off violent demonstrationsin Almaty in December 1986. Slogans like “Kazakhstan for Kazakhs”and “Kolbin go to Russia.” were raised openly. Various factors suchas ethnic seclusion, nationalist and religious resurgence, socio-politicalassertion by indigenous educational, political and bureaucratic elites,growing unemployment, low productivity in farming and industry thatresulted in shortages and decline in standard of living, led to heightenedinter-ethnic tensions in Soviet Central Asia. Notwithstanding the Soviet



efforts to achieve the goal of assimilation of different nationalities, therewas inter-ethnic discord. The indigenous people now openly expresseddissent against the Tsarist and later Soviet Russian policies in the region,and gave vent to their feelings and aspirations which were perceived tohave been suppressed under the Tsarist and Soviet regimes. The bittermemories of Russian colonisation, rebellions against Tsarist and Sovietregimes that were suppressed, collectivisation campaign and the Stalinistrepressions, famine, neglect of local religion, culture and languages, thatare embedded in the psyche of Kazakhs, do influence the course ofKazakh policy and relations towards Russians and the RussianFederation.

POST-SOVIET PERIODOne may recall that the Central Asian Republics neither strived nor

were actually prepared for their independence, which was thrust uponthem. In fact, there was a move to form a confederation of advancedSlavic Republics of the former USSR-Russia, Belarus and Ukraine- tothe exclusion of the Central Asian Republics, which did not materialize.Instead the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) came intobeing after eleven of the former Soviet Republics signed a Declarationin December 1991 at Almaty, the then capital of Kazakhstan. TheCentral Asian Republics, being heavily dependent upon the subsidiesfrom Moscow and with their economies being closely interlinked withRussia, were in favour of preserving in some form their links withRussia. All the road and rail links of Kazakhstan as well as its oil andgas pipelines moved northward towards Russia. But inspite of theexistence of a single currency- the Russian rouble in the CIS, commoneconomic space and other factors, the Russian leadership under BorisYeltsin and its reformers led by Prime Minister Gaidar and ForeignMinister Kozyrev followed a policy of Russian isolationism. Theybelieved that Russia needed to distance itself from Muslim Central Asiain order to join the Western ‘civilised’ world. So in the period followingthe disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russian foreign policy was at thecrossroads, primarily due to teething socio-economic problems withinRussia and also due to the Western influence. During the Yeltsin period,

K. Warikoo


Russia found itself in a deep economic crisis. The year 1993 wasmarked by the closure of a large number of enterprises. The CentralBank of Russia could not make adequate supply of roubles to theCentral Asian Republics, which were thus forced to have their ownnational currencies. The first phase of Yeltsin period (1991-93) markedthe shift of Kazakhstan and other Central Asian Republics away fromMoscow, mainly due to Russia’s indifference towards Central Asia.Quick political and economic initiatives by the West in Kazakhstan ledto decline in Russia’s influence in the region.

In the initial years, the Russian policy was marked by its initial lackof interest in Central Asian affairs. In the immediate aftermath ofdisintegration of Soviet Union, Russian foreign policy was orientedtowards the West. Russia gave priority to build relations with Europeand USA, at the same time retreating from its previous geopolitical rolein Asia. Pre-occupied with its own domestic problems and obsessedwith the Euro-Atlantist approach in its foreign policy, Russia wasindifferent to the developments in its ‘Near Abroad’. Russia hoped tobecome a prosperous liberal democracy based on the Western modelwith generous aid and assistance from the West. There was a generalfeeling of viewing Central Asia as a “burden and an alien civilization.”3

Russia was in no position to lend any assistance to Central Asia, as itwas besieged with its financial problems. Previously Soviet Unionsubsidised the Central Asian Republics to the tune of twenty five billiondollars a year. The pro-West political elite of Russia considered anyassociation with the Central Asian Republics as burdensome whichwould hinder the ‘speedy modernisation’ of Russia. The Atlantistsviewed Central Asia as a “burden for Russia” and “a source ofinstability, conflict and problems”, which was considered to be beyondRussia’s control.4 This perception was also based on the past Sovietexperience in Afghanistan which cost the Soviet Union too high in termsof men, materials and international image. It was in September 1992that the Russian Foreign Ministry in its report on the Russian policy inthe CIS, outlined its priorities as “(1) ensuring human rights includingthe rights of ethnic-national minorities; (2) achievement of stability andsafety; (3) equal rights of all states; (4) obligatory fulfilment of



agreements by all states and (5) strengthening the security of Russia’sborders.”5 However, this report did not define the place and role ofCentral Asia in the CIS.6

However, assumption of power by the Islamist extremist partiesin Tajikistan in September 1992 and the escalation of fighting provokedprompt and strong reaction from Russia and the neighbouring CentralAsian states. Just one day after the removal of Nabiyev on 2 September1992, the presidents of Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan andKyrgyzstan issued a warning to the government and politicalorganisations of Tajikistan describing the unrest as threat to the CIS.They also announced their collective decision to deploy CIS troopsalong the Tajik-Afghan border to stop the large scale smuggling of armsand cross border movement of armed bands.7

It was in these circumstances that the Eurasianists’ arguments infavour of restoring close relations with the Central Asian Republicsgained ground in Russia. Whereas the Russian nationalists drewattention to the problems faced by Russians and the Russian speakingminorities in Central Asia, Russian military pointed to the dangersimplicit in the dismantling of Russian military and strategic space facilitiesin Central Asia.8 Now the need to secure the southern flank of Russiaand to retain control over the external border of CIS was stressed. TheEurasianists wanted “Russia to prevent conflicts in Central Asia,neutralise attempts by third countries to take advantage of regionalinstability and create an effective peacekeeping mechanism built on thebasis of the Russian military potential.”9 Now senior leaders of theRussian government and military openly voiced their concern over thesecurity of Russian minorities and vowed to discharge theirresponsibilities on this account.10 The Russian Foreign Ministry issueda strongly worded statement on 15 October 1992 expressing concernover the “expanding fratricidal civil war in Tajikistan and the danger ofconflict spreading to adjacent countries.”11 It warned that “Russia willdo everything necessary to protect the legitimate rights and interests ofthe Russians.”12 This signalled an end to the drift in Russia’s policytowards Central Asia. Now Moscow took the lead and a summitinvolving the concerned Central Asian states and the Russian Foreign

K. Warikoo


Minister, A. Kozyrev was held at Almaty on 4 November 1992.13 Itwas agreed that Russia’s 201st Motor Rifle Division should remain inTajikistan.14 It was at the Minsk Summit of the heads of CIS stateson 22 January 1993 that a formal decision to reinforce the Russianborder troops by forces from the neighbouring CIS states for effectivelyclosing the Tajik-Afghan border was taken.15

The massacre of more than 25 Russian Border Guards on theTajik border post on 13 July 1993 sent shock waves in Russian officialand public circles, jolting the government out of its indifferent andambiguous policy towards Central Asia. President Boris Yeltsin calleda special session of the Russian Security Council in Moscow on 26 July1993 to take stock of the si tuat ion and take remedialmeasures.16 Yeltsin described the Tajik-Afghan border as “the frontierof Russia.”17 Soon after, Yeltsin organised a summit meeting with thepresidents of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan inMoscow on 7 August 1993. Now the basic parameters of Russianpolicy towards Central Asia were outlined as preserving internal stabilityin Central Asia, protection of Russian speaking minorities, preventingIslamist extremism from destabilising the social and political situation inCentral Asia, and treating the Tajik-Afghan border as the common CISborder. So from 1993 onwards, “Russia began to link its policytowards Central Asia particularly with the treatment of the Russian-speaking population there.”18 Russia’s Foreign Minister, A. Kozyrevvisited Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in November 1993. Hepointed to Russian interest in developing mutually beneficial economiccooperation with the region but “linked it to the treatment of Russianspeakers there.”19 Moscow was now getting concerned over theincreasing influx of Russian refugees from Central Asia, which posedthe problems of their employment, housing and rehabilitation.

The Russian foreign policy and military doctrines of 1993 declaredthe whole of the former Soviet territory as an area of ‘vital interest’ toRussia and also claimed the right to defend the Russian speakingpopulation living outside Russia. In May 1992, Kazakhstan became thefirst Central Asian Republic to sign a bilateral treaty with Russia on‘friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance’, by which they were



obliged to render each other military assistance in the event ofaggression against either party. Both countries agreed that they wouldform a “united military and strategic zone and jointly use the militarybases, test sites and other military infrastructures.”20 In 1994,additional agreements on military cooperation between Russia andKazakhstan were signed. Another agreement was signed with Russialeasing 6,000 kms. enclosing the Baikonour Cosmodrome for 20 yearsfor 120 million US dollars per year.21 Notwithstanding theseagreements, the military cooperation achieved was considered byRussia as inadequate.22 However, Kazakhstan and also the otherCentral Asian Republics demonstrated their keenness to be independentof Russia and they became part of UN, OSCE, NATO, ECO, OICetc. Kazakhstan participated actively in NATO’s Partnership for PeaceProgramme and joint military exercises.

On their part, the Central Asian Republics including Kazakhstanviewed Yeltsin as the best guarantor of their independence. The newregimes in Central Asia, though part of Soviet Communistnomenclatura now renounced Communist ideology and tookconcerted steps to promote nationalism and consolidate the sovereigntyof the newly independent Republics. Finding themselves in the changedpolitical and social situation, the Russians in Kazakhstan felt that theywere suddenly reduced to the status of second class citizens.23 Withthe Kazakhs assuming power and holding key positions in politics,government, civil and other services, they asserted claiming political,social and economic privileges for the indigenous people.Homogenisation and building a mono-ethnic state were viewed by thepolitical elite of Kazakhstan as a means towards nation building.Emphasis was laid on the consolidation of Kazakhs scattered in Asiaand Europe in their homeland. In fact during the three years 1990-92,over 190,000 Kazakhs immigrated into Kazakhstan from Mongolia,Russia and other Central Asian states.24 The declaration of Kazakh asthe official language in Kazakhstan spurred the exodus of Russians fromCentral Asia, since very few Russians know the local language whichputs them into a marked disadvantage in the matter of securing jobs.The issue of protection of rights of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan

K. Warikoo


became an emotive issue in Russia, thereby influencing Russia’s policytowards the region. In September 1996, the Committee on CIS Affairsof the Russian Duma expressed concern at the treatment of Russiansin Kazakhstan. It called upon the Kazakh authorities to “stop thepersecution and harassment of the Russian population and of Cossacksin particular.”25 It urged upon the Russian President and governmentto “use all their powers to prevent the violation of generally acceptedinternational norms in Kazakhstan.”26

Table: 2Migration from Kazakhstan to Russia (1990-1994)

(Year wise)1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

Kazakhstan 131,000 49,000 179,000 203,000 409,000

Source: Z.A. Zainochkovskaya, “Migration in the Post-Soviet Territory”,Geography, no.39, 1996.

Table: 3Migration of Ethnic Russians from Kazakhstan to Russia

(1997)% of Total Emigration to Russia

Kazakhstan 167,475 48.5%

Source : IOM, Migration in the CIS, 1997-98, Geneva, 1999, p.127.

Kazakhstan which is geographically closer to Russia and whereRussians form the second largest community after the indigenousKazakhs, presents a special case. Russians had settled in Kazakhstan,particularly the northern parts, much before than they did in otherCentral Asian Republics. The Soviets never treated Kazakhstan as partof Central Asia. And the Russians “who lived there for severalgenerations regard the steppes of northern Kazakhstan as theirhomeland.”27 Russians particularly in northern Kazakhstan, put upopposition to the Kazakhisation process. The Cossacks organisedthemselves under the banner of Vozrozhdeniye and other societiesdemanding secession of the Cossack dominated territory of Kazakhstan



and its merger with Russia. Influential circles in Russia including theNobel Laureate Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Russian nationalist leaderVladimir Zhirinovsky called for the incorporation of Russian speakingareas in the northern oblasts of Kazakhstan into Russia. A joint meetingof the Cossacks of Siberia and Kazakhstan held in Omsk in early 1994,announced the merger of two Cossack Unions into a Siberian CossackForce. Other Russian organisations - the Congress of RussianCommunities and Lad Movement, which are based mostly in northernKazakhstan, have been campaigning for decentralisation, recognition ofofficial status of the Russian language and dual citizenship for Russianspeaking population. Ust Kamenogorsk became the main centre ofRussian activism. In February 1997, over 150 ethnic Russian and Cossackorganisations joined together to create a bloc in Kazakhstan to defendtheir rights. They urged upon Russia to link its offer of economic andpolitical cooperation with Kazakhstan to Kazakhstan’s observance ofrespect for the rights of Russian minorities.28 But the Kazakhstanauthorities have dealt with the situation both tactfully and firmly.

Kazakhstan’s Citizenship Law of 1991 provides citizenship to allthose who resided in Kazakhstan permanently on the day of enactmentof the law. Though citizenship was extended to ethnic Kazakhs livingoutside Kazakhstan, dual citizenship was prohibited much to thediscomfiture of Russians. In April 1994, Yeltsin and Nazarbayev signeda memorandum in Moscow agreeing that Russian residents inKazakhstan and Kazakhs living in Russia be allowed to migrate freelyto Russia and Kazakhstan respectively. A Russian- Kazakh treaty onthe legal status of Russians living in Kazakhstan and Kazakhs living inRussia was ratified by the Kazakh Parliament in early 1995 and laterby Russia’s State Duma on 24 May 1996. The Russian Upper Houseratified the treaty on 5 June 1996.29 While the treaty sought to allaythe fears of Russians in Kazakhstan, it in no way conferred dualcitizenship upon them.

Whereas President Nazarbayev has been trying to maintainfriendly contacts with Russia “at a healthy distance”, he moved theKazakh capital from Almaty in the southeast to Astana (formerlyAkmola) in the north-central region which is predominantly Russian.

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With the shift of capital, hundreds of thousands of Kazakhs belongingto administration, police, trade and political circles are expected to takeup residence in the new capital over a period of time thus marking theKazakhisation of the northern territory. This move would also help theKazakh authorities to keep a check on any Russian secessionist ornationalist activity there. At the same time, stringent steps have beentaken to deter any anti-Kazakh moves in the region. For instance inUst-Kamenogorsk-the capital of East Kazakhstan Oblast, which has amajority of Russians, the Kazakh authorities arrested 22 persons on thecharge of “planning to overthrow the Oblast’s leadership and proclaimthe region a Russian Altaic Republic.”30 Those arrested included 12Russian citizens, who were not extradited to Russia.31 Thus the Kazakhauthorities have tried to thwart any possible challenge by the Russiansto their strategy of building a homogenous Kazakh nation state. Thistask has been facilitated by the exodus of nearly one million Russians32

from Kazakhstan to Russia and immigration of over 200,000 Kazakhsfrom outside Kazakhstan, which has drastically altered the demographicsituation in Kazakhstan. The balance of power has shifted in favour ofKazakhs.

CONCLUSIONRussia’s concern over the welfare of Russian minorities, national

security, economic and energy cooperation, perceived threat of Islamicextremism and need to combat drugs and arms trafficking have beensome of the key issues that factor in Russia’s policy towards post-Soviet Kazakshtan. Ensuring the Russian presence over the Tajik-Afghan border was seen as a pragmatic way of protecting about 7,000kms. long Russia-Kazakhstan border from the influx of illegal drugs andarms, Islamist extremists and also illegal migrants. The RussianFederation, which claims to look after the interests of Russians living inits ‘Near Abroad’, can assist in reviving the sick enterprises andindustries in Central Asia, which in turn can provide the requisiteemployment to the skilled Russians thereby reducing the cause of theirexodus. Russia can also render assistance to Kazakhstan in starting andrejuvenating Russian educational and cultural institutions, in order to



meet the educational and cultural needs of the Russians living there. Butfor all this, strong and vibrant political and socio-economic partnershipbetween the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan on mutuallyadvantageous basis is a requisite.

Kazakhstan looks itself as a bridge between Europe and Asia withits emphasis on establishing multilateral economic and political relationswith Russia, US, China, Central Asian Republics, European Union andother Asian countries. Kazakhstan has evinced interest in theestablishment of a common economic space in Eurasia. The centralEurasian landmass, which is a geographical continuum with historicalcommonality, is not divided by any land, mountain or sea barriers.Turkey, Kazakhstan and Russia are the three Eurasian countries ingeographical sense. In 1994, President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstanbroached the idea of Eurasianism, during his address at the MoscowState University. According to President Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan beingat the centre of Eurasia would be a connecting link between Russia,China and the Muslim world. The years 2003 and 2004 werecelebrated as the Year of Russia in Kazakhstan and Year of Kazakhstanin Russia respectively. The establishment of Collective SecurityOrganisation, SCO, Single Economic Space, CICA are allmanifestations of the Eurasian approach. The actual realisation ofCustoms Union will be an important step in this direction. ThoughRussia’s trade with Central Asia has been declining since 1991, havingdropped to about one-third of the volume of trade with the formerSoviet Central Asian Republics, yet Russia’s foreign trade with post-Soviet Kazakhstan has been substantive. Russia remains an importanttrading partner although the percentage of exports from Kazakhstan toRussia has fallen to 25 per cent.33 Kazakhstan is one of the five leadingcountries engaged in economic/trade cooperation with Russia. With itsvast resources of oil and gas, Kazakhstan is of special importance toRussia which still dominates the existing infrastructure for refining andtransporting Kazakh oil and gas. A new pipeline from the Tengiz oil fieldto the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk was opened in October2001. That Russia and Kazakhstan have agreed on the delimitation ofthe Caspian Sea Shelf, shows the importance attached by Russia to

K. Warikoo


Kazakhstan being an important energy source. Russia has invested over$700 million in Kazakhstan. In October 2000, Russia, Belarus,Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed the treaty on the creationof Eurasian Economic Community in place of the Customs Union, whichwas created in early 1996.

Table: 4Foreign Trade of Russia with Kazakhstan (US $ million)

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000Exports 2198 2555 2550 2471 1893 1226 2246Imports 1996 2675 3041 2743 1884 1398 2197

Both Russia and Kazakhstan share common perceptions about theneed to have friendship and mutually advantageous economic relations.Russia and Kazakhstan are not only the co-founders of the CIS andthe Customs Union/Eurasian Economic Community, but both countriescooperate within the Collective Security Treaty system (CST) signedon 15 May 1992, the SCO, Central Asian Cooperation Organisation(CACO) and the CICA. Ensuring national security of Russia’s southernfrontiers constituting over 7,000 kms. long border with Kazakhstan, isgoing to be one of the key concerns of Russia’s policy towardsKazakhstan in the coming years. This issue has assumed importanceparticularly after the withdrawal of Russian Border Guards from theTajik-Afghan border, Russia’s southern frontiers have becomevulnerable to drugs and arms trafficking, illegal migration, influx ofIslamist extremists into Kazakhstan from the direction of Afghanistan,Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. While under President Vladimir Putin, Russiais seeking to protect its national interests by consolidating its presencein Kazakhstan both in economic and security spheres, Russia is alsotrying to avoid any confrontation with the US in the region. On its part,Kazakhstan is seeking to balance its relations with the West on the onehand, and with Russia and China on the other. Since the US is striving topromote democracy, human rights and is seeking access to Kazakhstan’srich energy resources, Kazakhstan is building closer ties with Russiaand China to insulate it from any undue pressure from the West.



REFERENCES1. Gengchen Liu, “Ethnic Harmony and Conflicts on Central Asia,” in Yongjin

Zhang and Rouben Azizian (eds), Ethnic Challenges Beyond Borders:Chinese and Russian Perspectives of the Central Asian Conundrum,London, St. Antony’s College, 1998, p.75.

2. K. Warikoo, “Soviet Central Asian in Ferment”, in K. Warikoo and DawaNorbu (eds.) Ethnicity and Politics in Central Asia, New Delhi, 1992,p.62.

3. Andrei Kortunov and Sergei Lounov, “Russia and Russians in CentralAsia”, in Yongjin Zhang and Rouben Azizian (eds), op. cit, p.97.

4. Ibid, p.98.5. Yuri V. Gankovsky, “Russia’s Relations with the Central Asian States

since the Dissolution of the Soviet Union”, in Hafeez Malik (ed.), CentralAsia, London, Macmillan, 1994, p.121.

6. Ibid.7. Ibid, SU/1480, 8 September, 1992.8. Andrei Kortumov and Sergei Lounov, op. cit, p.99.9. Ibid, p.100.10. Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/1502, 3 October 1992.11. Ibid, SU/1514, 17 October 1992.12. Ibid.13. Ibid, SU/1531, 6 November 1992.14. Ibid.15. Ibid, SU/1595, 25 January 1993.16. FBIS – SOV – 93 – 142, 27 July 1993.17. Ibid.18. Anderi Kortunov and Sergei Lounov, op. cit. p.104.19. Ibid.20. Itar Tass, 25 May 1992.21. C.N. Goodman, Kazakhstan: The First Ten Years, London, 2002, p.55.22. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 28 October 1997.23. Gengchen Liu, op. cit, p.79.24. Argumenty-i-Fakty, Moscow, 4 January 1993.

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25. Inside Central Asia, no. 139, 16-22 September 1996, p.4.26. Ibid.27. Algis Prazauskas, “Ethnopolitical Issues and the Emergence of Nation

States in Central Asia”, in Yongjin Zhang and Roubin Azizian (eds), ibid,p.63.

28. Inside Central Asia, no.160, 17-23 February 1997, p.4.29. Kyrgyzstanskaya Provada, 2 March 1995; Itar-Tass, 24 May and 5

June 1996.30. Liz Fuller, “Trial of ‘Separatists’ Highlights Plight of Kyrgyzstan’s

Russians”, Central Asia Monitor, no. 4, 2000, pp. 29-30.31. Ibid.32. Kazakhstan: Forced Migration and Nation Building, New York, Open

Institute, 1998, p.6.33. C.N. Goodman, Kazakhstan: The First Ten Years, London, 2002, p.55.


KAZAKHSTAN-US RELATIONS: SOME PERSPECTIVES

Fatima Kukeyeva

Since the beginning of the ‘New Great Game’, several externalactors have been trying to wield their influence in Central Asia, a regionwith huge hydrocarbon reserves as well as the hub of strategic and geo-political importance. The United States of America can be named asone of the strongest players working in this region. The lonesuperpower has developed very good relationship with Kazakhstan,which is one of the leading Central Asian states so far as the presenceof a huge stock of hydrocarbons and other raw materials, and the levelof democratization and political reforms in the region are concerned.

The US policy in Kazakhstan, which is based on geopoliticalapproaches and the pragmatic interests, includes:

• Establishment and expansion of the US presence in the regionas an element of its general strategy of consolidating globalleadership in long-term prospect;

• Interest in maintenance of guaranteed access to hydrocarbonicstocks in the Caspian Sea region within the framework of thepower policy realization, namely, the reduction of dependenceon deliveries of energy from the Persian Gulf area andmaintenance of the transport routes;

• Continuing influence on the country’s political and economicdevelopment through the principles of democracy and marketeconomy;

• Using Kazakhstan as a strategic base against internationalterrorism and religious extremism; and

• Making a new commodity market in Kazakhstan for the USindustrial goods.

The US policy in Kazakhstan has been divided into four periods:

First Period (1991-1992): In the conditions of objectivenecessity of adaptation to the occurring geopolitical changes after the

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disintegration of USSR in 1991, Washington did not have a consistentand thorough policy towards the five newly created Central AsianRepublics (CARs). Initially, the USA limited its policy to the diplomaticrecognition of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The special attention toKazakhstan was determined by the presence of the nuclear weaponsin its territory. Up to 1995, the nuclear issue remained the main basisof the mutual relations between both the countries. The USA alsocarried out the general political agenda of the development of theprocess of democratization and carrying out of market reforms in allCentral Asian states, including Kazakhstan.

Second Period (1992 to 1995): During this period, the economiccomponent came to the fore in the US policy. Promotion of the USinterests in Kazakhstan was carried out mainly by means of economicmechanisms and strengthening of position in strategic economic spheres,especially oil and natural gas. In the initial years of independence, bigWestern companies entered the local market. During this period, theNATO programme “Partnership for Peace” also began to develop.

Third Period (1996 to 2001): The USA decided to concentrateon the development of America-Kazakhstan and America-Uzbekistanrelations.

Fourth Period (2001 onwards): After events like 11 September2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent anti-terror campaign (the waron terror) led by the USA in Afghanistan, American policy in the regionin general and Kazakhstan in particular has entered a new stage. It ischaracterized by the US aspiration to expand its political and economicactivities in the region. This American strategy in relation withKazakhstan has a well defined geopolitical context and strategicimplications.

After the events of 11 September 2001 and the beginning ofAmerican military presence in Central Asia, a “new Washingtonstrategy in the region” was being discussed in the scientific and socialcircles. The Kazakh scholars emphasize that with this, the USA startedpaying attention to the political problems in Kazakhstan. To quoteK. Syroezhkin, “the Republican administration in US actively uses the

KAZAKHSTAN-US RELATIONS


estimation of the human rights and degrees of democratic character inthe state as the tool of foreign policy influence. Ironically, theadministration has refused to employ such attractive tool for promotionof the US national interests.”1

The main element of the US led war on terrorism is the right ofpre-emptive measures including possible military actions against thecountries accused of aiding and abetting terrorist organizations.Geopolitical location of Kazakhstan, which is vulnerable to Islamicterrorism and extremist activities in Central Asia, is a major cause ofconcern for the USA. Astana has supported the US anti-terroristoperation which became one of the most important factors to influencethe America-Kazakhstan relations after the 9/11 episode. On its part,Kazakhstan was the first Central Asian Republic to allow its air spaceto the US for carrying out anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan. Theconstruction of an oil pipeline named KTK in November 2001strengthened the mutual relations between the two countries.

During Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s official visit toWashington, problems of interaction between both the states werediscussed within the framework of the security policy and stability inCentral Asia in view of the US anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan,rendering of humanitarian help to this country, and also on the issue ofcooperation in the energy sector.

The US Assistant Secretary of State on Affairs of Europe andEurasia, E. Johns, stated during his official visit to Central Asia inJanuary 2002, “when the conflict will come to the end, we shall notleave Central Asia. In all the five countries, we should expand constantsupport to democratic institutions, the local non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs) and independent mass media.” The then USDefence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld offered military and technicalassistance to all the Central Asian states including the Kazakh Republic.However, security issues and development of the Caspian resources stillremain the strategic priorities in the relations between Kazakhstan andthe USA. With the re-definition of Central Asian countries as the “firstline of combating terrorism,” the US State Department provided direct

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support to independent mass media, the development of politicalparties, religious freedom, administrative reforms, education and healthcare. In the field of security, the US military presence in Kazakhstan isstrategically important. Some security analysts feel that long-term USmilitary presence in the region may bring an element of strategicuncertainty. However, like the majority of the Central Asian countries,Kazakhstan too considers the presence of NATO military bases in theregion as support in struggle against terrorism, and also as a guaranteeof stability and a pledge for future prosperity.

Kazakhstan is a part of the transnational transport-power projectslike TRACEKA and INOGATE. Programmes on training in the USeducational institutions and centres, programmes of financing andcarrying out of joint doctrines, formation of a peacemaking Kazakhbattalion etc. are devoted to this goal. The Partnership for Peaceprogramme, in which almost all the Central Asian countries are involved,is one of the major channels of cooperation between Kazakhstan andUSA.

Despite the extremely intensive political and economic dialoguebetween Astana and Washington for strategic cooperation, theAmerican political and academic circles criticize Washington’s Astanapolicy. This is evidenced by the US criticism of human rights recordand democratization in the Central Asian countries made in the annualreports of the US commissions and speeches and comments ofAmerican experts and policy makers. American administration’stoughening of requirements on democratization in Kazakhstan isexplained by the fact that Washington considers this process as one ofthe major points for victory in the global war on terrorism.

In analyzing the US policy in the region before the events of11 September 2001, many experts deduced the conclusion that thedegree of democratization and reform of the political system as well asthe process of forming the civil society did not achieve the degree asexpected by the West. To explain the “insufficient promotion ofdemocratic reforms” in these republics, Kazakh scholars and authorsspecify the following factors: the Americans take a short-term view in



supporting the establishment of real democracy; the absence ofdemocratic institutions of authority, the lack of a liberal social mentalityand the lack of experience with private ownership in the post-Sovietcountries etc., all complicate the creation of a lawful state, marketeconomic relations and civil society, which are the social and economicpreconditions for democracy. While recognizing the United States’ rolein the democratization of Central Asian countries, Kazakh politicalanalysts criticize the US methods to achieve its policy and point to thecontradictions in the American policy. However, the United States’interests in political stability, democratization and economic prosperityin Central Asia are linked with American strategic interests in the region.

Washington continues to assert that it is doing its best to supportthe democratization process in these states. At the same time, theUnited States determines its relations with the states of the regiondepending on their readiness to provide America with military bases andother strategic facilities in their territories. In this context, the questionof further political and social reforms to strengthen democracy in theregion appears to be minor priorities. Therefore, the Central Asianleaders while ignoring the American emphasis for democratic reform,continue their pursuit of policies in whatever direction they findnecessary.

In a more anti-American vein, other researchers connect theiraversion for Western values with the struggle against internationalterrorism advocated by the current Bush administration, which they seeas the rigid imposition of alien social values and political cultures onthe Muslim people. From this point of view, the American approach tothe democratization of society in the Central Asian states shows a lackof desire by the policy makers in Washington to recognize and take intoaccount the unique features of development in the region. As a resultof Washington’s shifting priorities, Kazakh analysts are doubtful aboutthe motives of United States’ foreign policy. One scholar argues thatthe United States asserts “responsibility for security and stability in theregion using democratic rhetoric and economic control levers as themeans of putting pressure on ruling elites with the goal of creating a netof political regimes which are effectively controlled by Washington.”2

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Murat Laumulin, one of the best known political scientists in Kazakhstan,says that Washington formally proclaims democratization and humanrights “as principles of American foreign policy, but in reality … (they are)often used as methods of political influence and tools of pressure.”3

To be precise, the Kazakh analysts criticize Washington’s strategywhich appears to demonstrate that the United States, being interestedin economic cooperation and military bases, prefers to keepauthoritarian regimes in power, but is not keen to push these countriestowards democratization of their social-political systems. These analystsconsider that the slow rates of democratizing internal and externalpolicy significantly encourage the growth of social movements or socalled “Colour Revolutions” that have shaken the political systems ofsome countries, while raising concerns in other countries. Kazakhpolitical scientists characterize the spring 2005 events in Kyrgyzstan asa “revolution”, a “coup d’etat” or the replacement of authority. Theysay that the Central Asian political elites should draw their ownconclusions from the events in Kyrgyzstan.

Kazakh experts give two types of arguments while analysing thereasons of the “Colour Revolutions.” Some consider “revolutions” as aresult of external influence by non-regional players, especially by theUS, and others hold the internal situation responsible for this. Expertswho support the first opinion believe in the impossibility of effectivelyintegrating Central Asia as a significant geopolitical region in the globalinternational system on the Western pattern. They argue that the CentralAsian elites have no other strategy than to promote the authority of theirclan. Therefore, American pressure provides the social base for “ColourRevolutions” through the use of such methods as the criticism ofauthoritarian regimes, allegations of human rights violations andcorruption, and the political use of financial, economic, technical, orhumanitarian assistance; mounting pressure by supporting NGOs andopposition groups, and public relations programmes to promote apositive image of the United States, etc.4 On the other hand, analystswho ascribe the causes of “revolutions” to internal political andeconomic processes, specify the following factors: the crises in existingregimes; serious contradictions within the ruling elite, active opposition



and its populist slogans; lack of authority to use the force; andunresolved problems between the more advanced north and the moreunderdeveloped southern part of the country. These authors identifyexternal interests in regime change as the minor factors.

Thus, Kazakhstan which has set for itself high standards ofeconomic development, now faces the objective necessity to increaseits standards of political development. American assistance can onlyspeed up this process. However, domestic analysts in Kazakhstan opinethat significant successes in economic development of the country andsuperficial political reforms are not enough to fully enter the comity ofadvanced democratic nations.5 There is no common view about thepossibility of “Colour Revolutions” in Kazakhstan. The Asar party, isone of the first parties, which started discussion about the possibilityof such revolution in Kazakhstan. According to D. Nazarbaeva, theleader of the Asar party, such kind of revolution would be based on“the new form of democratic expansion.” Reacting over D. Nazarbaeva’sstatement, the Kazakh Ambassador in Russia, K. Kusherbaev pointedout that in Kazakhstan “Colour Revolutions” would not be successful.Well known political scientist M. Ashimbaev points to the absence ofnecessary base for such revolutions. According to Ashimbaev, “the onlyreally functioning democratic system can give immunity to variousradical variants and revolutions.” The convincing victory of PresidentN. Nazarbayev has shown that the people of Kazakhstan voted foreconomic reforms and political stability.

However, analyzing political situation in Kazakhstan, it is necessaryto take into consideration the following such factors: the independenceof the Central Asian states and their integration into the worldcommunity is occurring under the conditions of globalization, which inturn is related to the process of democratization; the geopoliticalcharacteristics of the region generate problems, such as closed transportspace with limited access to world markets and the ratherunderdeveloped network of communications, especially external ones.The irregular distribution of water and other natural resources and ofthe population, numerous zones of ecological disaster, overpopulationand deficiency of vital spaces (for instance in Uzbekistan), enormous

Fatima Kukeyeva


empty territories, and inhospitable living conditions (as in Kazakhstanand Turkmenistan). These contradictions substantially amplify complexsocial and economic conditions, and aggravate the struggle for powerby various political, ethnic, religious groups and clans and the increasingactivities of the extremist and terrorist organizations, especially Islamicfundamentalists.

Finally, non-regional actors also play a very significant role. Theactive promotion of democratic values should affect the politicalsituation in the states of the region. The success of the Georgian andUkrainian opposition has emboldened Washington to promotedemocratization throughout the post-Soviet space. In March 2005,American President George W. Bush expressed his desire to activelyassist the “Colour Revolutions” and to support the new democracies.However, this declaration has stimulated an ambiguous reaction in theCentral Asian countries. For Central Asia, it means support todemocratic transformation. As experts argue, “the United States mostlikely will not actively support the Central Asian opposition forces.” So,for example, the US expressed its support to Bishkek “revolution” bystressing the need for pluralism in Kyrgyzstan. This statement is true incase of Kazakhstan which is entrusted a role in the struggle againstterrorism. Kazakhstan also accepts the role of the state that activelyadvances democratic principles in the region.

The following conclusions can be drawn with regard to the USpolicy of promoting democratization in Central Asia:

• As a result of globalization and the global reach of Americaninterests, it is difficult to analyze processes occurring in CentralAsia without taking into account the role of the United States.

• The American double standards allow authoritarian regimes toconsider problems of democratization as minor and sometimesthey entirely ignore them. This double standard not onlydamages the proper understanding of democracy, but also leadsto a growth of anti-American attitudes in Central Asia. Althoughin Kazakhstan, there is a more open forum for informationwhere it is possible to hear various points of view on American



policy in the region, anti-American propaganda is very muchthere in the Uzbek Republic.

• Washington probably prefers to maintain the existing forms ofauthoritative government in the region to avoid the establishmentof what might be more democratic, but less predictable formsof authority.

• Some directions in American policy appear to be contradictory.Where the US State Department rigidly criticizes human rightsconditions in the Central Asian republics, military policymakersseem ready to cooperate with any government that agrees tojoin the “war on terrorism.” In fact, the US Secretary of StateCondoleezza Rice’s meetings with the leaders of Central Asiademonstrate that the US strategy in Central Asia has notsignificantly changed despite the events in Uzbekistan(Andizhan) and Kyrgyzstan.

• In Central Asia, the American administration has a potentialforce for expanding the horizons of democracy. Oppositionforces which are ready to promote the US efforts to spreaddemocracy in the countries of the region, include averagepeople (educated persons, representatives of the middle andsmall business, students and local NGOs), who support theWesternization of regional countries. They not only want to livein the US or Europe, but also believe that in case of politicalchanges in their country within ten to fifteen years, this dreamwill be realised.

• The United States faces difficulties on its way to establishdemocracy in the Central Asian republics. It depends, on theone hand, on the need to base policy on a comprehensiveregional vision. On the other hand, the policy in the field ofdemocratization should be in consonance with the uniquecharacteristics of regional states.

• Distinctions in political and economic development makepossible regional strategy only in the field of security, but not inthe spheres of democracy and human rights which develop ona bilateral level.

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• The development of democratic political systems in CentralAsian republics, which are capable to serve as an example forother countries with large Muslim population, will help theUnited States to solve some of the strategic objectives in theregion: conducting war against terrorism; campaign againstradical Islam and drugs trafficking; efforts to strengthen theregional economy and the most significant state institutions; theconsolidation of regional trading communications and anadequate transport infrastructure.

REFERENCES1. K. Syroezhkin, Russia-USA-China and Central Asia: US Political

System and Democratization Problems in Central Asian States,Almaty, 2005.

2. N. Omarov, Kyrgyzstan and the USA: State and Perspectives ofIntergovernmental Cooperation: US Political System andDemocratization Problems in Central Asian States, Almaty, 2005, p.93.

3. M. Laumulin, US Policy on Supporting Democracy in Central AsianStates: US Political System and Democratization Problems in CentralAsian States, Almaty, 2005, pp.31-33.

4. H. Khalil, “US State Policy in Central Asia: US Political System andDemocratization Problems in Central Asian States”, Sayasat (Almaty),no.11, 2003, p.11.

5. “Kazakhstan has all possibilities to prevent Colour Revolution”,Panorama, no.131, 19 August 2005.


KAZAKHSTAN-CHINA TRADE AND

ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Alia Akataeva

Central Asia has been traditionally a sphere of geopolitical interestof China. During the Han rule, China maintained close contacts withthe Western world through the Silk Route, which passes through thesettlements of Turkestan (in the territory of modern Kazakhstan).Through the Silk Route, goods such as the Chinese silk, porcelain etc.were delivered to Europe, in exchange of metallic products and woolenclothes. Many elements of the Western and Asian culture have beendisseminated in the countries through which the Silk Route passed.

The first official political contact between the Kazakh governorsand China’s Qing dynasty rulers began in the summer of 1755 AD. TheCommander of Qing army came into contact with the Sultan of AverageZhuz, Ablay. However, in the autumn of 1755 AD, anti-Qing revoltbroke out in Zhungaria and in the summer of 1756 AD, Qing armyintruded into the Kazakh areas and in early 1757 AD, Ablay’s andAmursana’s groups entered into negotiations with the Qing Court as aresult of which diplomatic and trade relations between the Qings andthe Kazakh governors were re-established. “Tribute System”, a systemof offering traditional gifts to the Chinese Emperor was very muchprevalent during that period. However, the Qing Court designatedKazakh Khans and Sultans as new vassals of the Chinese Emperor. Bythe middle of 1760s, there was a paradoxical situation in Kazakhstanwhen Kazakh Zhuzs in the Russian empire were considered by theChinese as “Citizens of the Chinese Empire”, and their territory wascalled as “the territory of the Celestial Political Instability.”

China’s trade relations with other countries began in the beginningof the reign of the Zhou dynasty (1122-247 BC). During the Handynasty (206 B.C.-220 AD), China conducted trade and business withKorea at frontier fairs, where Chinese bought horses, sables, pearls,weapons etc. The Chinese historical annals record the existence of

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constant ‘Sea Trade’ with southern islands, Japan, Korea, India, thecountries of the Near East and Europe in the direction of Sianfu or tothe north up to Koko Nor through Berude, Urumqi or to the south fromTurpan aside Karashahr, Yarkand and Hotan. By the end of 15th century,China was the leading economic and political power of East Asia. Atthe end of the 18th century, the merchant class played a big role in thesocio-economic life of the country. In the north of China, there was anexclusive association known as “Shanghai Traders”, which was focusingon trade in salt and also strengthening commercial relations with Russia,Mongolia, Turkestan etc. At the end of 17th and in the 18th century,Qing rulers waged successful wars against their western and southwestneighbours and gained supremacy at all levels.

In 1689 AD, China made its first treaty known as “NerchinskTreaty” with Russia. It was also her first treaty with any foreign country.Besides specifying articles concerning delimitation of territories on therivers of Argun and Gorbitse, the treaty also determined the procedureof overland border trade between Russia and China. The tradingroutine stipulated by the “Nerchinsk Treaty” gave equal rights toRussian and Chinese citizens in trade and did not impose anyrestrictions on either of them. In 1851 AD, “Kuldja CommercialTreaty” between Russia and China determined a trading procedure forRussian merchants in Kuldja and Chuguchak. This treaty was based onthe same principles which have been established by the Nerchinsk andKyakhta treaties.

Border trade continued under the supervision of the Chinese andRussian authorities. It laid down rules and regulations for the Russianmerchants for purpose of trade. Item 2 of the “Kuldja Treaty” providedfor the supervision over affairs of Russian citizens by the RussianConsul, and over affairs of the Chinese merchant class by the officialof the Ili Central Administrative Board. Under this treaty, the Russianmerchants living in China received plots specially allocated for them intowns of Ili and Òàrbagatay to build residential houses, warehousesand shops. Russian and Chinese merchants were doing business in cashwithout any credit. Unlike the English-Chinese Treaty, which was signedin 1858-60 providing rights only to the Englishmen, the Russo-Chinese

KAZAKHSTAN-CHINA TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS


Treaty of 1860 AD provided the right of free trade both for the Russianmerchants in China and also for the Chinese merchants in Russia.

Under the “St. Petersburg Treaty of 1881”, Russia fixed the rightof trade in frontier areas and in the territories of Xinjiang and Mongolia.In all major cities of these territories, Russian Consulates and tradinghouses were set up. This treaty gave overland Russian and Chinesetraders the much required advantage. Trade was made duty-free andthe right was distributed far beyond Xinjiang and Mongolia and otherdistricts lying on the northern and southern slopes of the Tian Shanrange up to the Great Wall of China.

The history of the Sino-Kazakh trade and economic relations hasbeen influenced by the Russian empire’s relations with the Qing empire,Republican China and People’s Republic of China (PRC) in whichKazakhstan participated not as the sovereign partner, but as anadministrative-territorial part of Russia. Specific conditions of thisrelationship opened opportunities for trade and economic contracts. On27 May 1920, a protocol was signed in Kuldja determining conditionsof trade relations between Soviet Russia and China on Turkestan andXinjiang border, and other issues including the return of Russianrefugees and Cossacks. As per this document, an Agency of the Sovietauthority in Kuldja and an Agency of Ili authority in Verney (Almaty)were established to decide upon the diplomatic and trading issues. IliProtocol had the political and legal importance for the countries of theEast. It laid down a strong basis for commercial relations of Russia withXinjiang region of China.

At the end of 1970s, social, economic and political reforms wereimplemented in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Now the foreignpolicy and external economic doctrine of China began to change. Fromthe beginning of 1980s, Chinese leadership declared its readiness to renewdialogue on cultural, economic and political questions. Since 1983, frontiertrade was being restored, but within the framework of northeastprovinces of China and the Soviet Far East. In January 1986, the StateCouncil of PRC decided to restore trade relations between the USSRand Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China.

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After the disintegration of USSR and formation of the newindependent states, a new era of cooperation between Kazakhstan andChina began. Due to joint efforts of heads of the states, Sino-Kazakhrelations have been successfully and steadily developed. Friendly,good-neighbourly relations and mutually advantageous cooperationbetween the two countries continued to develop and strong partnershipwas established between the two countries.

First step towards the bilateral Kazakhstan - China cooperationhas been made by Kazakhstan and China in July 1991 during the visitof the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic President, Nursultan Nazarbayevto China. During this visit, an agreement on principles and the basicdirections of the development of cooperation between Kazakh SSR andXinjiang was signed. In the agreement, both sides declared that theyconsider each other as close neighbours and want to build the relationson the basis of mutual trust and cooperation. They also agreed tocreate favourable conditions for trade in goods and services and tostrengthen economic cooperation.1

Diplomatic relations between the independent Republic ofKazakhstan and the People’s Republic of China were established on3 January 1992. The Joint Communiqué on the establishment ofdiplomatic relations stated: “according to interests and expectations ofthe people of two countries, the government of the Republic ofKazakhstan and the government of the PRC have decided to establishdiplomatic relations between two states at Ambassadorial level since3 January 1992. The governments of the two countries have agreed todevelop relations of friendship and cooperation between them on thebasis of principles of mutual respect of the sovereignty and territorialintegrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each others’internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and also peaceful co-existence.” In February 1992, China opened its embassy in Almaty, andthe embassy of the Kazakhstan was opened in Beijing in December 1992.

A Kazakh government delegation led by Kazakh Prime MinisterS. Tereshchenko visited China in February 1992, which became thestarting point of the subsequent top-level contacts between them. Intheir Joint Statement, both countries confirmed their intention to build



further good-neighbourly relations on the basis of mutual respect forthe sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression and non-interference in internal affairs of each other, equality and mutual benefit.They agreed to carry out consultations between their Ministries forForeign Affairs on the questions of mutual relations, other issues ofmutual interest, and also to develop relations and contacts at all levels,including top-level meetings. They declared to use new ways andmethods of economic cooperation, to develop all its forms in theframework determined by the legislation of both the countries. Whilesigning nine documents to this effect, both countries gave a call toconcretize development of relations between them, including theagreement on creation of the Inter-Governmental Commission on trade,economic, and scientific and technical cooperation. Besides, anagreement on mutual visits of the citizens and a visa-free procedure wassigned. This agreement promoted development of trading contacts, andthe frontier trade and “shop tourism.” However, the entry of a largenumber of Chinese citizens into the territory of Kazakhstan has beennegatively perceived by the Kazakh people who feared “Sinicization ofKazakhstan.” To allay this fear, new agreements providing a visa-freeprocedure of mutual trips only for those possessing diplomatic andservice passports were signed in 1993. During the visit of KazakhForeign Affairs Minister, T. Sulejmenova to China in August 1992,agreements on the development of bilateral cooperation in various areaswere signed. One of the important documents signed was theagreement on encouragement and mutual protection of the investments.Both countries agreed upon the conditions, principles and the procedureof mutual investments. According to the agreement on opening of checkpoints through the Kazakh-China frontier, international status wasconferred on the “Horgos” (Kazakhstan) – “Horgos” (PRC),“Friendship” (Kazakhstan) – “Alashankou” (PRC), “Bahty”(Kazakhstan) – “Pokitu” (PRC) check points which were opened forthe movement of people, vehicles and cargo.

Kazakhstan-China relations got a boost during Kazakh PresidentNursultan Nazarbayev’s first official visit to China in October 1993.During the negotiations between President Nazarbayev and his Chinese

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counterpart Jiang Zemin, the main focus was on the issue of coordinationbetween the two neighbours. The Joint Declaration stated that bothcountries would develop relations of good neighbourhood, friendshipand mutually advantageous cooperation according to the Charter of theUnited Nations, on the basis of the principles of mutual respect, sovereigntyand territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in eachother’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, peaceful co-existence, and also other conventional norms of international law. In thedeclaration, Kazakhstan and China attached importance todevelopment of trade and economic relations. It was specified that theeconomy of Kazakhstan and China supplement each other which opensthe prospects for mutually advantageous cooperation. They also agreedto create favourable conditions and to encourage all forms of economiccooperation, mutual contacts between departments, regions and theenterprises. Both countries showed readiness for bilateral economiccooperation particularly in the fields of industry, agriculture,biotechnology, transport and power.1 Trade and economic relationsbetween Kazakhstan and China continued to develop on the basis of thesigned inter-governmental agreements determining the main principles ofcooperation. Kazakhstan and China Inter-governmental Commission ontrade and economic and scientific and technical cooperation has beenplaying the role of a coordinator of bilateral cooperation in this regard.

In 1995, according to the Chinese Customs House, Kazakhstan’sforeign trade with China was 390 million US dollars (an increase of17.7 per cent as against the one in 1994.). In 2002, it became morethan 650 million US dollars. Export in the year 1995 was 324.5 millionUS dollars (a growth of 47.5 per cent), China’s import in 1995 was65.5 million US dollars (showing a decrease of 37.5 per cent). About 90per cent of the export of Kazakhstan to China is in raw goods,including black and non-ferrous metals- 42 per cent (steel, copper,aluminium), sheep wool- 14.3 per cent, cotton- 13.7 per cent, leatherand skins- 8.6 per cent and mineral fertilizers- 10 per cent.2 Importsfrom China to Kazakhstan comprise textile and knitted products(clothes), and yarn- 35.5 per cent, footwear- 9 per cent, electrical goods-7.2 per cent, chemical- 6.6 per cent, and food stuffs- 22.8 per cent.



In 1996, bilateral trade was 497.5 million US dollars, of which exportwas 461.4 million US dollars and imports 36.1 US million dollars.However, since 1993, the quantum of exports and imports declined dueto a reduction in the number of Chinese trading firms and increase inexport duties on the fuel-raw materials. The main causes of reductionin exports from Kazakhstan were the growth of insolvency in theenterprises and liabilities. Despite this, many large enterprises andcompanies of Kazakhstan participated in their cooperation with Chinain 2002 to work on about 300 joint ventures. The volume of China’strade now is about 0.15 per cent of her total foreign trade that amountsto over 1.5 billion US dollars. The volume of Kazakhstan’s export in1997 remained low, i.e., seven per cent of all exports from Kazakhstan.In 1999, the trade turnover between Kazakhstan and China went upto 79.2 per cent, and in 2001, it was 36.7 per cent.3

Trade and economic relations between Kazakhstan and Chinabegan from a zero level. Kazakhstan has inherited already existingeconomic relations between the former Soviet Union and PRC. Nowtrade between Kazakhstan and China’s Xinjiang Uyghur AutonomousRegion makes more than 80 per cent of the total trade turnover ofKazakhstan and China. In 1986, the volume of trade betweenKazakhstan and Xinjiang was three million US dollars, and in 1989, itrose to 45.6 million US dollars. In the trade turnover betweenKazakhstan and China in 2002, the Chinese exports to Kazakhstanwent up to 21.1 per cent (up to 599 million US dollars), and its importsgrew by 48.5 per cent (up to 958 million US dollars). This growth wasachieved mainly due to frontier trade with Xinjiang.

From the beginning of the 1990s, Kazakhstan became the basictrade and economic partner of China in the Central Asian region. Havingthe most extended border with China, and being a source of rawmaterials, Kazakhstan provided opportunities for China to improve thetrade. The volume of trade on border transit points like Horgos,Dostyk-Àlashankou started growing. In 2002, other transit points wereopened in Dulat and Kolzhat, which further enhanced the border trade.The Chinese imports to Kazakhstan constitute textile and knittedproducts, yarn-37.5 per cent, footwear-13 per cent, domestic electrical

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equipments-7.2 per cent, chemicals-6.6 per cent, food stuffs-25.8 percent (including sugar and confectionery products-9.8 per cent, juicesand soft drinks-10 per cent).4

For Kazakhstan, China will apparently remain as one of the mostsignificant trade and economic partner. The future of the Kazakhstan-China economic relations depends on many factors amongst whichgeopolitics is the main factor. In spite of the fact that Kazakhstanperiodically toughens customs, tax quotas etc., these measures do nothave a big influence on the trade turnover between the two countries.It is possible to assume that border trade and similar economiccooperation between Kazakhstan and China will dynamically developand China can effectively use this cooperation to achieve both economicand political ends. For more than ten years of economic interaction,Kazakhstan and China have used all forms of foreign economicrelations - from barter trade to universal methods of state regulation offoreign trade activities. It is obvious that for China, its momentum of“reforms and openness” occurs at the optimum rate due to thecentralized control of the state which maintains the political frameworkof the society at the same time carrying out all-round modernization inthe country. As for the West, it is possible to assume that the successof the Chinese economy is capable to supersede Western competitorsin the Central Asian market.

The positive dynamics in development of bilateral relationsbetween Kazakhstan and China stems from the agreement on goodneighbourliness, friendship and cooperation, Programmes of Kazakhstan-China Cooperation for 2003-2008 etc. President Nazarbayev hasexpressed the hope that the volume of trade between the two countrieswould increase from two to five billion US dollars. He has called uponthe domestic investors to pay attention to western China. Speaking ata press conference in Almaty on the results of 10th Plenary Session ofCouncil on foreign investors on 6 December 2003, President Nazarbayevsaid, “We should encourage, in every possible way, export of ourinvestments abroad. The legislations of the Republic of Kazakhstanshould not limit the process of Kazakhstan investments abroad. A goodsignal is that the Kazakh business operates in Russia and the Kyrgyz



Republic. At the same time, domestic investors should pay attention towestern China. It is very important to formulate and determine a roleand status of Kazakhstan in the global economy, not only as a supplierof power resources and raw materials to the world markets, but alsoas an advanced sub-regional economic power of the Central Asianregion. Being the bridge between Europe and Asia, Kazakhstan canbecome the best platform for development of trade and business.5

Deepening of bilateral economic interaction between Kazakhstanand China is characterized by the rise in the volume of bilateral trade.In 2003, the trade volume was 3.3 billion US dollars (showing growthup to 68 per cent), and in January - February 2004, this trade grew2.2 times. It is high time for both the Republics to diversify the structureof trade and to develop direct economic relations between the regionsand enterprises of both the countries. To achieve this, the Kazakhstan-China Information and Consulting Centre in Beijing is now working forthe establishment of the Permanent Joint Council of Businessmen whichcould give valuable recommendations to governmental bodies of boththe countries in future. Besides, the Committee on cooperation on thefurther improvement of conditions for development of mutual trade andeconomic cooperation has been operating successfully.6

There is dynamic cooperation between the two countries in thefield of infrastructure development. For cooperation in the field ofdevelopment of the railway and automobile sector, it is necessary totake into account the situation in Kazakhstan, China and also in theentire region as a whole. The infrastructure in Central Asia and thewestern region of China is less advanced, which is one of the obstaclesfor regional cooperation. In Kazakhstan, the infrastructure is still as itwas in the Soviet period, and therefore, requires reconstruction.Railways in Xinjiang were built about 20 years ago. Roads connectonly the basic industrial centres. The centres for extraction of mineralsand the mineral processing centres do not have transport or communicationfacilities. The present condition of railways is characterized by the lowlevel of technical equipment, and many sites require reconstruction.In these conditions, revival of the Silk Route has huge advantage forall the Central Asian states participating in the project ORASAEA.

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As compared to the Trans-Siberian Railway, the distance fromLyanjungan to ports of Latvia – is much less (about 1,500 kms), andtransportation by sea route takes 20 to 30 days, and eleven days byrail. Some sites of the Trans-Asiatic highway beginning at the east coastof China and passing through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan,Iran and Turkey, and connecting the ports of the Persian Gulf has beenput in action. Each state covers the expenses on arrangement of a siteof the railway within the limits of its borders. It has both positive andnegative effects. On the one hand, it gives viability to the project asthe state keeps monopoly over the lining of tracks and receiving profitsupon their use. On the other hand, the opportunity of participation offoreign investors does not guarantee non-interference of one state inthe internal affairs of others.

Analyzing the development of bilateral cooperation in this area, itis necessary to note that the key point of the Trans-Asiatic TrunkRailway is the development of the East West Transport Corridor.During the first nine months of 1992, Kazakh delegation visited Chinanine times for carrying out negotiations, including the development ofinfrastructure. Opening of check points along the border, constructionof railways and highways, and also an air communication between thetwo countries were high on the agenda. As a result, in Xinjiang, sevennational highways, 68 provincial and 28 international passenger andcargo routes have been constructed. Significant part of the negotiationswith Kazakhstan concerned the official beginning of the operation ofthe railway which, as it was declared, will connect the east coast ofChina with Rotterdam in Europe. Negotiations for cooperation in thesphere of railway transportation on 1 June 1994 facilitated theunobstructed passage through a railway crossing named “Friendship –Alashankou.” It also facilitated the movement of all cargo fromKazakhstan to all areas of China and back, from all areas of China,and from other countries to Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states.Though the “Friendship - Alashankou” has international status, it servesbilateral and regional trade. In 1999, the turnover of goods through“Friendship- Alashankou” was 3.68 million tonnes, and it rose to 4.7 milliontonnes in 2000. And the number of passengers through the Kazakhstan-Chinese border grew by 12.8 per cent during this year.7



The creation of a transcontinental highway known as “Bridge ofEurope-Asia” has given new stimulus to the expansion of cooperationamong the countries of the central part of the Eurasian continent. Theconcept of “Triangles of Economic Development” offers to createspecial areas with international status on the borders of China andKazakhstan. “Bridge Europe - Asia” will make basic changes to thecharacter of development of Xinjiang, Kazakhstan and the entireCentral Asia region. To continue this process, China and Kazakhstan,have to devise a policy of external economic openness, which will giveopportunities of expansion of contacts to other countries, developmentof market relations, creation of the whole spectrum of new branchesand achievement of general prosperity. The transcontinental “BridgeEurope-Asia” will be equipped with a set of branch lines, stations andbridges. It will begin in the east from the Pacific coast, and will crossall territories of China as well as the countries of Central Asia and EastEurope and will end in the west with the countries of the EuropeanUnion. This will form an important economic corridor, connecting theseterritories to rich natural resources and increasing economicinterdependence. This will also create wide opportunities for scientificand technical cooperation and will serve as a stimulus not only for thoseregions through which the highway will pass through, but also foreconomic integration of all the countries of the Eurasian continent.Finally, it will result in stable economic development of the whole world.Besides, “The Big Triangle”, on the frontiers of China and Kazakhstan,is formed by the cities of Urumchi, Akdochi and Almaty, connected byeach others’ railway and highways. This region, by rail from Xinjiangthrough Lanchow and up to Shanghai, has an exit to the east, in thenorth borders on Russia, in the south with the countries of Central andWest Asia. These are the main gateways to China, the West and theCentral Asian Republics and the East, with a big potential ofdevelopment.

In this age of globalisation, economy holds the key in any bilateral,trilateral and multilateral cooperation. People’s Republic of China is aneconomic powerhouse with high economic growth rate. Therefore, it isvery important for Kazakhstan to deepen and strengthen bilateral

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economic cooperation with China, which will be beneficial for itseconomy in particular and the entire Central Asian region in general.

REFERENCES1. “Joint Declaration between Kazakhstan and China, 18 October 1993;

"Collection of Bilateral Treaties between Kazakhstan and China: 1992-2002”, Xinhua, Beijing, 2002, p. 97.

2. I. Avazovskyi, “Silk Road on the eve of XXI century”, http://www.cac.org/journal/cac-03-1999/st_06_azovski.shtml

3. “Priority Directions of Economic Cooperation between Kazakhstan andChina: Collection of Articles, Documents”, Almaty, Urumqi, May 2004,p.18.

4. www.kazinvest.kz/ main.htm.5. http://almaty.keden.kz/zakonadat.zakon/cgi?doc=9606. Guangcheng Wang, “Chinese Policy of the Good Neighbourhood”,

Internationale Politik, February 2002, no.2, p.69.7. “Priority Directions of Economic Cooperation between Kazakhstan and

China”, op. cit.


TRANS-BORDER NATIONALITIES AND STATE

RELATIONS: A CASE STUDY OF KAZAKHS INALTAI (XINJIANG)

Xu Qinhua

Having a long land frontier and numerous nationalities, China iscomposed of 55 ethnic minorities, 34 of them belonging to the trans-border nationalities. Among these ethnic groups that have acomparatively larger population include the Uyghur, Mongol, Kazakh,Korean, Tibetan and the Hui nationalities, with a total of 66 millionpeople. In China’s larger ethnic family, those which possess a trans-border characteristic, occupy a critical position and play a veryimportant role in developing China’s relations with its neighbouringcountries.

In recent years, study on the trans-border nationalities hasrevealed that they are now no more confined merely to the “borderpolitics” but have expanded to “international politics.” Current study onthe situation outside the boundaries of China is generally insufficient andeven less attention has been paid to the trans-boundary comparison oftrans-border nationalities. Based on an analysis of trans-bordernationalities, this paper makes an attempt to discuss the interactionbetween the “trans-border Kazakh nationalities” in China and in

map

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Kazakhstan (see the map illustrating the Kazakh nationality in Altai areaof Xinjiang). It also highlights the effect of such interaction on Sino-Kazakhstan relations.

TRANS-BORDER NATIONALITIES: CONCEPT,CHARACTERISTICS AND CLASSIFICATION

The three concepts of “trans-border nationality”, “trans-boundarynationality” and “trans-frontier nationality” are always interlinked witheach other. Chinese scholars hold the view that “trans-bordernationality” refers to the ethnic group which lives in two or more thantwo countries (no matter whether they live near frontiers or in placesfar away from the frontiers), basically keeping the original ethnic identityand possessing the same historical background. “Trans-boundarynationality” or “trans-frontier nationality” refers to the same ethnicgroup whose inhabitants live in the border of two or more than twocountries, that is, the traditional dwelling of one nationality is dividedby one or even several state boundary lines; one nationality dwells onthe border area of two or even several countries and is almost in thecontiguous areas. The former is the nationality isolated by states, as itresides in trans-boundary area involuntarily, while the latter is the onethat immigrates to live in trans-boundary areas.1 However, from thepolitical perspectives, these three may be called by a joint name: thenationalities, which share trans-border dwelling because of themismatch of political boundary and their national distribution.

If one compares “trans-border nationality”, “trans-boundarynationality” and “trans-frontier nationality” with “non-trans-border,trans-boundary and trans-frontier” nationalities, the main difference canbe found that the former has one or several state boundary lines todivide the same ethnic group into different parts, while the latter doesn’thave such a line. Broadly speaking, “trans-border nationality” may becalled “trans-boundary nationality” or “trans-frontier nationality.” Thesethree have no fundamental difference, but in a narrow sense, it’s obviousthat the existing sphere of “trans-border nationality” is much broaderthan that of the “trans-boundary nationality” and “trans-frontiernationality”, for it includes not only the same ethnic group in the border

KAZAKHS IN ALTAI (XINJIANG)


area, but also the folk of same nationality who migrate from the secondor third country into another country (i.e., residing in the countrieswhich are not contiguous or are separated by oceans or several othercountries).2 For instance, the total population of the Kazakh nationalityall over the world is 13 million, the majority of which resides inKazakhstan and some live in Turkmenistan, Mongolia, Russia, Turkey,USA, etc. While talking about the trans-boundary or trans-frontierKazakh nationality, one can refer, in particular, to the Kazakhs living inthe border area of Kazakhstan and China, or the Kazakhs residing inthe border area of Kazakhstan and other countries. Other ethnic groupsliving in trans-border areas include Uyghur, Mongol, Korean, Tibetan,Russian, Hui, Kyrgyz Turkmen, Tatar nationalities, etc. who are knownas “China’s trans-border nationalities with the same origin.”3

Trans-border nationalities have political, cultural, social, economicand geographical attributes. Attribute is the nature or characterpossessed by one object. The political attribute reflects the relation ofnationality and state (such as unilateral main body, bilateral main bodyand bilateral non-main body).4 Reflecting the relation betweennationalities (such as consanguinity and ethnic culture identification), thecultural attribute embodies the essential characters that distinguish thetrans-border nationalities from states or other nationalities. They oughtto be the innate attribute of trans-border nationalities.5 The attributesthat embody geographic distribution, economic development and socialstructure belong to the category of non-innate attributes.

This article emphasizes the influence of trans-border nationalitieson state relations and classifies trans-border nationalities according totheir attributes, numbers and geographic distribution. As to the attributeclassification of trans-border nationalities, we must take two factorsinto consideration: firstly the perspective of classification; the otherbeing the commonness and difference of trans-border nationalities.“Perspective” means taking one country’s stand while studying trans-border nationalities. If we look at trans-border nationalities fromdifferent angles, such as from the angle of our country, other countryor the world, we’ll get different results. While studying the trans-bordernationalities in China’s northwestern border areas, one can see some

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ethnic groups that are “main body” nationalities at home but are minoritynationalities abroad, such as the Han nationality. There are also somenationalities that are minority nationalities at home and main bodynationalities abroad, such as the Kazakhs, Russians, Khalkhas, Tajiksand Uzbeks. Some are minority nationalities both at home or abroad,such as the Hui, Uyghur and Tatar nationalities. Besides, some trans-border nationalities in other parts of China possess the character of twocases (as both main body nationalities and minority nationalities abroad),such as the Mongol nationality; some are main body nationalities in bothcountries, such as the Korean nationality. Living in contiguous countries,the same trans-border nationality shares common traits in their culture,mental state and economic life, while as individual difference are causedby the different situations and impact of countries they live in.6 Owingto their historical background, nine cross-border nationalities such asKazakh, Uyghur, Russian, Hui, Khalkhas, Tajik, Uzbek, Tatar and Hannationalities living in the boundary areas of northwestern China arecomparatively different from others.

Trans-border nationalities can be divided into two types: i) thosewho have larger population and have formed synthetic effect on politicsand economy in a large scale; and ii) the trans-border nationalities, whohave less impact on the security of political and economic life becauseof their less numbers. Populationwise, trans-border nationalities inCentral Asian countries constitute: (in sequence) Uzbeks, Kazakhs,Russians, Tajiks, Kyrgyzs, Tartars, Uyghurs, Dongans; and in China,they include the Hui, Uyghur, Kazakh, Khalkha, Tajik, Uzbek, Russianand Tatar nationalities.7 The Kazakhs (around 13 million), Uyghurs(around 9 million), Kyrgyz (around 3.5 million) nationalities possesslarge population and have closer relations, they can exert greaterinfluence on the future development of China and Central Asian countries.

From the angle of geographic distribution, trans-bordernationalities can be divided into two types: i) those inhabiting the areashaving special political and economic status and ii) the nationalitieswhich do not inhabit the areas having special political and economicstatus. Generally speaking, in those special areas, countries are closeto each other, with numerous trans-border nationalities and abundant



resources. Thus, ethnic relations among nationalities are more complex,and ethnic conflict is fierce. Due to imbalanced economic development,plundering of resources by foreign powers and influence of religiousclans in these areas, there is possibility of ethnic crisis. Central Asia andthe nearby northwestern border of China is one of the politicallysensitive areas. As an important strategic barrier, the northwesternborder of China, with numerous nationalities living together and itsunique geopolitics, has a profound influence on the security of China ateach level. The interaction of trans-border nationalities in this area maybecome both a bridge to peaceful coexistence among these countriesand also the cause of social and political upheavals. The Kazakhnationality can serve as an example.

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RELATIONS OFTRANS-BORDER KAZAKH NATIONALITY

The word “Kazakh”, according to various explanations, means“refugee”, “outsider”, “beautiful girl”, “swan and brave freemen ingrassland.” Among them, the explanation of “brave freemen ingrassland” is comparatively suitable for the history of the Kazakhnationality. The Kazakhs are a minority nationality, which possesses richcultural heritage and complex ethnic origin. From the ethnologicalviewpoints, the Kazakh is a sub-nationality. Modern nationalities suchas the Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Kyrgyzs, Tajiks and Turkmens have beengradually formed by the constant integration of nationalities living in thisarea such as the Saizhong, Qiankun, Wusun, Hun, Turki, Sute and thelater Wugusi, Jiegesi, Qidan and Mogol. Located at the crossroads ofAsia and Europe, Central Asia has been an important ligament of thecivilization from all directions since ancient times. It has had closeeconomic and cultural exchanges with China.

In the middle of 15th century, the “white tent” of Roujibie tribeunion split. Some so called “Roujibie-Kazakh” tribes escaped andmoved to the area of Chu River and Talas River. Later, they foundedtheir independent political entity- “Kazakhan” Kingdom. By late 15th

and early 16th century, a stable Kazakh nationality, having a commonname, common language, common area, common economic life and

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common mental state represented by a common culture evolved.In 1560s, “Kazakhan” Kingdom was divided into three Yuzs that weresubmitted to Zhungar tribe. In the middle of the 18th century, the Qinggovernment sent its army to pacify Zhungar and the large, middle andlittle Yuzs pledged allegiance to the Qing Court. In the early part of the19th century, Russia took advantage of China’s crises both at home andabroad and invaded the eastern area near Balkhash Lake andcontrolled the majority of China’s Kazakh tribes.8 Since the mid-19th

century, Russia forced the Qing government to sign a series of unequalboundary treaties that ceded a large part of Chinese territory to Russia.By this means, Russia controlled the majority of Kazakh nationalitiesthat originally belonged to China. These treaties included The Treatyof Peking between Russia and China (1860), The Convention forDividing Northwestern frontiers of Russia and China (1864), Treatyof Yili (1881), Yili Boundary Treaty (1882), Kashgar BoundaryTreaty (1882), Tacheng Boundary Treaty (1883) etc. After theRussian invasion, the Kazakhs became a trans-border nationality. TheKazakhs, who didn’t want to pledge allegiance to Russia, immigratedinto China after that. They inhabited the areas of Yili, Tacheng andAshan in Xinjiang. After the October Revolution of 1917, more than200,000 Kazakhs escaped into Yili and Kashi of Xinjiang. Thus, theKazakhs became a trans-border nationality of Central Asia and China.During the Soviet period, the Kazakh nationality in China was differentfrom those living in the Kazakh Republic and in other countries, butthey still kept a long-term close relation towards each other.9 After theend of the Cold War, social upheavals took place in East Europe. Thedisintegration of Soviet Union and the independence of Central Asianrepublics enabled some nationalities in China to develop links with thosewho were living in other countries. The Kazakh nationality was one of them.

Trans-Border Distribution of the Kazakh NationalityAfter the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Kazakhs have

become the majority nationality in the newly independent KazakhRepublic. In 2004, the overall population in Kazakhstan was 15.0463million. With a population of 8.6817 million, the Kazakh nationalityconstitutes 57.7 per cent of the total population. Besides the Kazakhs



in Kazakh Republic, there are around 4.1 million Kazakhs in othercountries. Among them, more than one million lives in Uzbek and1.2505 million live in China. (See table 1)

Table: 1Distribution of Kazakhs in Trans-Border Areas (in Million)

Kazakhstan 8.681China 1.25Uzbekistan 1Turkmenistan 1.398Russia 0.74Mongolian 0.14Others 0.24Total 13.449

The Kazakhs in China and Kazakhstan belong to the trans-bordernationalities of the same origin sharing common language, religion andculture. Their traits are represented in three ways: Firstly, China has acomparatively wide range of Kazakh distribution, mainly in Xinjiang(Yili Autonomous Prefecture of Kazakh; Mulei and Balikui KazakhAutonomous Counties and Urumqi), Gansu (Akesai KazakhAutonomous County) and Qinghai. Secondly, the Kazakh trans-bordernationality of same origin is comparatively centralized in one area.It lives in a compact community with small decentralization on thewhole. The distribution of the Kazakh nationalities in China andKazakhstan follow such trait. Thirdly, there are many ethnic groups inboth the countries. China has 56 nationalities. Although the mainnationality of Kazakhstan is Kazakh, it is still a multinational countryhaving 131 nationalities.

Migration of Kazakhs to Trans-China and KazakhstanThe main reasons for China’s Kazakhs coming to Kazakhstan are:

settling down, studying abroad, labour and service export, visitingrelatives, travel, etc. In order to settle down the non-resident Kazakhsin Kazakhstan, the Kazakh Republic announced a special policy afterits independence, The Project of the Return of the Kazakhs to

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Historical Motherland. This project which encourages the immigrationof Kazakhs into Kazakhstani has the state migration fund. It also seeksto establish good relations with the Kazakhs outside Kazakhstan. Theprimary objective of this project is to facilitate their organized migrationof the Kazakhs returning to their motherland. In order to absorb thenon-resident Kazakhs, some Kazakh organizations such as the KazakhInternational Association, Kazakh Homeland Association have beenplaying the key role. Another organisation International Congress ofKazakhs is sending invitations to the Kazakhs abroad and publicizingit through radio, TV and newspapers. The Kazakh President has madeappeals several times, encouraging the Kazakhs abroad to return home.To encourage the Kazakhs all over the world to settle down inKazakhstan, the government has enacted the “Civilization Law” andother relevant laws. According to the statistics, from 1991 to the firsthalf of 1997, 36,839 Kazakh families comprising over 160,000 peoplereturned to Kazakhstan. In such circumstances, a sizable group of theKazakhs living abroad and even the Kazakhs in Xinjiang and Gansuprovinces of China have returned to Kazakhstan. According toKazakhstan’s official statistics, 172 Kazakhs migrated from China toKazakhstan in 1998 and 163 in 1999.10 For instance in the JimunaiCounty in Altai area of Xinjiang, which borders Kazakhstan, theKazakh population is 61.8 per cent of the total. According to thestatistics, from 2002 to 2004, 34 persons in this County immigrated toKazakhstan. However, some non-resident Kazakhs, who had migratedto Kazakhstan recently, have now returned to their former countries.Owing to the differences in politics, economy, culture, lifestyle, customsand habits, etc., two families of Tajimu County which had emigrated toKazakhstan have returned to Tajimu. The number of foreigners studyingin Kazakhstan is increasing, for the tuition fee in Kazakhstan is not highand universities offer scholarships and free accommodation. In termsof labour and services, many areas in western China promote theproductive mode with great effort, which ameliorates a large numberof country’s labour force. Under the guidance of the government,labour and services exports to Kazakhstan increase yearly. This is animportant approach for accelerating the economic developmentprocess. Meanwhile, some ethnic college graduates intend to work in



Kazakhstan as part of their future job plan. With the gradualdevelopment of the living standards in Kazakhstan, the number ofChina’s Kazakhs visiting relatives or travelling abroad has alsoincreased.

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LINKS OFTRANS CHINA-KAZAKHSTAN KAZAKH NATIONALITY

In 2003, the rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) inKazakhstan was over nine per cent and this rate has been maintainedduring the last four years. Andre Jack of Finance Times says:“Kazakhstan has become the most attractive economic power inCentral Asia. It makes a sharp contrast with neighbouring countries ineconomic depression.”11 Kazakhstan directly borders upon XinjiangUyghur Autonomous Region of China. Xinjiang is the province havinglargest area and shares longest boundary line with a number ofneighbouring countries on its border and trans-border Kazakhnationalities in China. The Xinjiang Kazakh nationality was 1.3521million in 2003, which is 6.99 per cent of the total population. In 2004,the GDP of Xinjiang increased to 10.8 per cent, which is higher thanthe national level GDP. The economy of China and Kazakhstan hasbeen on the stage of high growth, which provides material content forenlarging further economic cooperation between China and Kazakhstan.Therefore, the political, economic and social links of cross China-Kazakhstan Kazakh nationality have strengthened.

Table: 2Comparison of Economic Development between

Kazakhstan and Xinjiang in 2004State GDP GNP No. of No. of

per Capita Employed Laid-offKazakhstan 42.3 billion $ 2700$ 7.95 million 4.16 millionXinjiang 27.5 billion $ 1048$ 7.39 million 0.112 million

Source: This Table is based on the data taken from the Statistics Bureau ofKazakhstan Republic and the Government of Xinjiang UyghurAutonomous Region. The exchange rate of US Dollar and Chinese RMBhas been conversed by 1: 8.

Xu Qinhua


(a) Political and Economic ExchangesChina and Kazakhstan share more than 1,700 kms. common

border. In recent years, both the countries have been making use oftheir geographic proximity to advance their development strategies andtake specific measures for accelerating development, invigorating andenlarging their border trade as well as tourism. Xinjiang has close tradeexchange with Dongha area of Kazakhstan. Both sides have developeda broad range of economic cooperation and communication, and haveconcluded agreements on technology, trade, tourism etc. For instance,between January to July 2005, the imports and exports of JimunaiCounty amounted to 3.5523 million US Dollars (28.7736 millionRMB), which is about 135 per cent increase over the same period in2004. By the end of July 2005, the whole Jimunai port (small-tradeboundary port designated by Kazakhstan and Xinjiang AutonomousRegion) had import and export turnover of 0.53 billion RMBcomprising 54.1 thousand tons of goods.

(b)Cultural ExchangesWith the constant enhancement of trade cooperation between

Xinjiang and Kazakhstan (in particular Dongha region), the cooperationin the sphere of education and culture has also increased. For instance,from 2004 onwards, three art troupes with nine persons performed inJimunai County and exchanged their experiences with Jimunai Countytroupe. Meanwhile, the Education Commission in this area signed anEducation Exchange Agreement with Kazakhstan. Besides, there hasbeen frequent cooperation in the science and technology sectors. Forinstance, the “east goat” bean in Jimunai County has spread throughthe seeds imported from Kazakhstan.

CONCLUSIONIn general, the positive influences of trans-border nationalities on

China’s boundary areas are through their own linkages. The trans-border nationalities strengthen friendship with neighbouring countries,promoting political, economic and cultural exchanges between bothsides and help in the construction and development of the border areas.



The trans-border nationalities in China’s western border mainly consistof Uyghur, Kazakh and Hui. Apart from their overlapping consanguinityand geography, they are traditional social groups who believe in Islam.The doctrine of Islam holds that those who believe in this religion areall children of Allah and they should call each other “sisters” and“brothers.” The idea of “sisters and brothers” in Islam is easily acceptedamong the ordinary people. So the spread of Islam in Xinjiang makesthe society more consolidated.12 Religious doctrine and consanguinityalso deepen the friendship of trans-border nationalities having the sameroots. In December 1991, China recognised the independence ofKazakhstan. In March 1992, these two countries established diplomaticrelations. The Treaty of Cooperation between China and Kazakhstansigned in 2002 officially declares the desire for everlasting friendshipof these two countries. It also points out the specific direction of thedevelopment of Sino-Kazakh relations in the new century, that is, basedon mutual understanding and mutual belief, promoting the cooperationbetween these two countries deeply and broadly. For many years,Kazakhstan has been the biggest trade partner of Xinjiang and hasaccelerated regional economic development of Xinjiang. In 2004, theexport trade of Xinjiang with Kazakhstan constituted 58 per cent ofthe total of 5.64 billion US Dollars of Xinjiang’s export trade and 73per cent of the total of 4.5 billion US Dollar of China’s export tradewith Kazakhstan.13 Kazakhstan and China have also strengthenedcooperation in the traditional or non-traditional security spheres suchas joint anti-terrorism manoeuvers carried by the Shanghai CooperationOrganization (SCO) member countries in Yili, in 2003.

REFERENCES1. On the definition of “ trans-border nationality”, “ trans-boundary

nationality” and “ trans-frontier nationality”, see Ma Manli (ed.), CentralAsia Study: The Trans-border Nationalities of Same Origin in MiddleAsia and China, Beijing: Nationality Publishing House, 1995, p.33. CaoXing, “On the Difference of Trans-boundary Nationality and Trans-frontier Nationality”, Nationality Studies, no. 6, 1999; Liu Zhi, “TheType, Attribute and developing Tendency of Cross-boundary Nationality”,Yunan Social Science and its Developing Tendency, no. 5, 2004.

Xu Qinhua


2. Ma Manli, Ibid.3. Trans-border nationalities with the same origin refer to those who inhabit

more than two countries while belonging to the same ethnic group.4. Unilateral main body refers to the trans-border nationality, which is the

main nationality or majority nationality in one country while it is not so inanother country; Bilateral main body refers to the trans-border nationalitywhich becomes main body nationality in both countries; bilateral non-main body refers to the trans-border nationality which is not the mainbody nationality in either country.

5. In “On the Difference of trans-boundary Nationality and trans-frontierNationality”, Cao Xing makes distinction of these two ideas of nationality:“political identity” and “cultural identity”. Cultural identity in differentcountries, owing to the different political, economic and culturalbackground, has formed different attributes and thus differentnationalities. He holds the view that while studying trans-border, trans-boundary, trans-frontier nationalities, “nationality” should be understoodas a cultural identity.

6. Liu Zhi, op.cit.7. Ding Jianwei, The Security of Northwestern Border in Geopolitics,

Beijing: Nationality Publishing House, 2004, p.287.8. Ma Manli, Ibid., p.125.9. Ibid., p.128.10. Wu Hongwei, “Population and Population Migration of stan after Its

Independence”, East Europe and Central Asia Studies, no. 3, 2002.11. Yuan Zheng, “Kazakhstan Becoming the Most Attractive Economic

Power in Central Asia”, Central Asia Information, no. 7, (2004).12. Sun Kui, “Overlapped Societies of Consanguinity and Geography :

A Study on the Social Structure of the Uyghur and Kazakh Nationalities”,Dalian Nationalities University Journal, no. 2, 2004.

13. Xie Xia,“Expanding Trade Passage from Xinjiang to Central Asia” , athttp:?www.ucatv.com.cn£¬2005/5/17.


DEMOCRATIZATION AND

POLITICAL STABILITY IN KAZAKHSTAN

Kuralay Baizakova

Destruction of old global order and regional structures ofinternational security inherent in the former scheme of the bipolar world,in many cases, is accompanied by the shaking of the state formations.The world has entered into a stage of extreme instability, uncertaintyand lowered security. In these conditions of relative decrease in the roleof government mechanisms to maintain security, certain forces and non-state actors try to use the factors of instability in order to secure theirgoals. The problem of maintenance of national security in the modernworld differs radically from the problems of twentieth century. A callfor the formulation of an effective policy of safety and security today ispart of the process of globalization, which is understood as a dynamicprocess of forming new accruing associations or societies across theworld. This process is a close interlacing of communications in social,political, economic and cultural spheres leading to mutual influence andadaptation in the changing external conditions. Globalization points outthe danger of erosion of the state territory, state, nation and thegovernment, territorial integrity and sovereignty. The risks caused byglobalization arise when the economic and public processes aspire tobe pulled out from the sovereign control of the state and thus representpotential threats. One of the cardinal problems of the present day worldis the parity between globalization and national interests, which impactsupon the sovereignty of the states.1 As these problems of the modern dayworld have occurred at sub-national and inter-state levels, the opportunitiesfor the nation states have decreased. This compels the nation states totransfer part of the power in favour of sub-national constituents.

Due to various political processes for minimizing the risks andthreats of internal political stability and for the steady development ofthe society, the Kazakh state is faced with so many complex problems.For durable internal security, there is need to bring about democratic

Kuralay Baizakova


changes in the political system.2 Political security in modernKazakhstan is certainly influenced by the political processes in thecountry, which are characterized by a set of both negative and positivefactors. The negative factors are: incompleteness of the process ofpolitical formation, discrepancy in the process of political formation,discrepancy and incompleteness in the development of legal basis,inadequate social policy and a dangerous level of differentiation in thesociety; discrepancy in the political consciousness of the society; thetightened process of economic development. The positive factorsinclude: formation of a modern political system, creation of the legal andsocial state; formation of a pluralistic society; a multi-party system;democratic elections (parliamentary and presidential), democratictransformation in the economic sphere, market relations and support bythe majority of the population for democratic and economic reforms.

The principal cause of the existing political problems is that duringthe reform and nation building process, no attention has been paid tosome important aspects of revamping the political system. The reactionsof the Kazakh political elite to criticism from outside are defined notonly by specificity of internal political and regional development of theRepublic, but also by the duality of policy of the Western countries,particularly the USA. Therefore, reacting to criticism in the field ofhuman rights, it is necessary to reflect on its purposes: whether the basicpurpose of the Western policy is to promote democracy or it is areflection of the “double standards” of the leading global powers.

Kazakhstan is not in a hurry to develop democratic institutions andmulti-party system. Influence of political parties on the government isvery less. Their presence as political entities in the political arena is notaccepted by the people. As a rule, they do not reflect the mood ofsociety and at the same time do not serve as an area for recruitment ofthe ruling elite. They have not been able to influence the decisions ofthe executive. Political activity of the population is frozen. Sociallyactive population is alienated from politics. In this case, it is noteworthyto remember what President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s stated: “The mainthing is that it is impossible to overcome the gap between newinstitutions and old models of behaviour on a mass level quickly in a

DEMOCRATIZATION IN KAZAKHSTAN


short period.”3 Political realities in the Republic noticeably differ fromits Western partners. Some Western scholars criticize the excessiveconcentration of authority in the hands of the President and his loyalists.V. Zhiskar D’Esten wrote, “even if the President does not want it, butfrom the very moment of his election, there is public aspiration to liftup to the level where all their problems can be solved. Therefore, thereis a risk of a command consisting of a narrow circle of persons aroundhim which uses excessive authority. In order to prevent this phenomenon,it is necessary to find corresponding balance in power structures.”4

In Kazakhstan, there is no strong party system and the politicalculture of citizens. Therefore, it is important to upgrade the generallevel of political consicousness of the citizens of Kazakhstan. One ofthe major questions of democratization in Kazakhstan is the reformationof local self-management that is the mutual relations between the centralgovernment and the self-governing institutions at the grassroot level.Here, the role and status of Akims has been given importance. TheKazakh researchers have pointed to the election of Akims of oblasts,who would be selected nationally. The appointment of Akims by thePresident of Republic of Kazakhstan is considered to be a justified step.5

While reforming and reorganizing the state bodies, it is necessaryto avoid unsystematic characters and develop a uniform methodology,having precise functions of state bodies and regulations in view of thefeatures and development of transition economy; change of priorities;rationalization of structural state bodies by functional attributes anddistributing between them the whole system of power and functions.Also at present, parallel structures of executive authority directlysubordinated to the President have been created. When the statebodies, duplicating each other, do not promote economic growth andpolitical stability, it leads to serious consequences.

One of the reasons of delay in the reconstruction process ofdemocratic society in Kazakhstan is that the overwhelming majority ofthe population is politically passive. Significant tendencies ofauthoritarianism of power were outlined in the conditions of a transitionperiod from totalitarianism to democracy in the Republic. It is popularlybelieved that authoritarianism is the main feature of political culture in

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Kazakhstan. Often similar conclusions are drawn while ascertaining theoutlook of the Kazakhs, who have had reverence for the supremeauthority and its direct carriers during the Soviet period. The processof democratization, which has been breaking traditional mechanisms ofsocial and political attitudes, is considered to be imposing and alien tothe people of Kazakhstan.

Taking into consideration the national and cultural features of thedevelopment of the Kazakh traditional society, which is a direct objectof authoritative influence and a resource for ethnocratic decisions, andalso high level of consciousness of national political traditions and socialnorms, it is necessary to specify that authoritarianism has been ofparamount value during a crisis condition of the state. In such asituation, centralization and monopoly of authority by NursultanNazarbayev played an important role. The concentration of all authorityin Nazarbayev’s hands and consolidation of the former partynomenclature has resulted in socio-political stability, peace, redistributionof powers, fixing and legalising new political systems and mobilizationof resources for carrying out large scale economic and politicaltransformation. It is necessary to note that the attitude of the populationto the government, the management efficiency and concentration ofefforts of President Nazarbayev in this direction has evoked widepublic support.

As a whole, Authoritative Board in many respects owes to thepersonality factor, i.e., political experience and personal charisma ofPresident Nazarbayev. As a seasoned politician, he was considered bythe Kazakhs as being the key factor for maintenance of internal stabilityand implementation of foreign policy initiatives. “The special way”development of democracy is specific to each country, and can not betreated as a universal denominator.

Many believe that democracy and transition to the system ofparty-political representation is risky. There is need to take into accountthe ethnic attitudes in a society and consequences of any imbalancebetween Kazakhs and Russians in the power structures as a result ofdemocratization of selective procedures. The image of PresidentNazarbayev in this situation again represents itself as being the



stabilising force and the guarantor of political stability in the state. As amatter of fact, it means that the system will continue to be stable infuture only if Nazarbayev remains the President of the country.

Actually, authoritarianism in present set up in Kazakhstan isadequate for the processes occurring in the post-Soviet space and theneighbourhood of Kazakhstan. The dynamics of political process in theRepublic is guided by the general laws of the post-totalitarian societiesin the former Soviet republics. At the same time, recognizing that thegovernment bodies function effectively from the point of view ofinterests of the state, it is possible to judge low efficiency of authorityfrom the point of view of interests of a society, whose social andeconomic, political, cultural and other needs are not fully satisfied.

Majority of the population have expressed serious concern andanxiety over the low level of monetary income, growing propertystratification and corruption among officials. So, substituting the struggleagainst corruption by initiating repressive measures among the lowestparts of machinery of state, the authority in the opinion of the populationloses the moral right in its anti-corruption rhetoric. In case ofKazakhstan, where legitimacy of authoritarian power leans on traditionsand customs owing to President Nazarbayev’s charismatic type ofpolitical domination, ignoring the specified central questions of growing“rationalization” of activity of the government and state machinerydeprives the authority of the right to authoritarianism. So, it indicatesthe absence of negative reaction of the population on the issues ofcriticism by international organizations and other powers on theproblem of democratization.

In the context of democratization process, it would be desirableto specify three most probable scenarios. The first one assumes tocontinue a former course with the developed style of management,counting on self-organizing of political system. However, this scenariolacks a strong base. Following a way of cardinal economic reforms,Kazakhstan simultaneously initiated the process of politicaltransformation. It is necessary to consider that the economic reforms,which are carried out in the Republic, are directly connected withpolitics. Economic freedom assumes other type of relations in a society

Kuralay Baizakova


that follows from the nature of development of market relations. It is aquestion of system change - about adaptation of authority in varyingpolitical conditions to forms of interaction between state bodies, asociety and large business, i.e., the enterpreneur.

All participants of the given “triangle” are interested in theefficiency of political reforms. For a society, it is guaranteed by thelegislation and political practice, protection of the civil rights, politicalfreedoms, responsibility of the authority before a society, refusal ofauthority to unconstitutional command and intervention in political andeconomic processes. For businessmen, it means a stable politicalclimate. Freedom of business and legal regulation of financial andeconomic relations corresponds to market democracy. For an authorityto guarantee its recognition by the society and businessmen, operatinginstitutes should be legal, steady and conventional to provide legitimacyto ruling elite. For political elite, it is recognition by society of its politicaldomination. Thus, system of state governing requires reforms foroptimization of the structure. For administrative reform, i.e., transformationof essence of the government, its qualitative structure is required.

The political system of the Republic now is stable due tocontinuous updating and reform alongwith modernization and the highrate of development which causes the political disorganization of thepopulation and shift of potentially politically active population toeconomic sphere. Any checks in this process and change would causestagnation.

The external factors such as the process of democratization inRussia and in the post-Soviet space and active promotion of democraticvalues by the Western countries play an important role. The externalinfluence on the political system of Kazakhstan can be seen at twolevels: (i) the objective political processes caused by the activities ofmasses thus causing shockwaves in political circles. Transition of thestate from presidential to the parliamentary-presidential form inKyrgyzstan and in Ukraine is a sharp expression of the question ofredistribution of powers, carried out at the institutional level within theconstitutional framework. The situation in Central Asia is much seriousbecause of some factors. It can not be ruled out that the absence of



real progress in the development of democratic values will make thisregion a hostage of ideology of struggle with dictatorship regime; andii) strengthening of foreign policy pressure upon the ruling circles,initiated with the purpose to accelerate democratic and othertransformation. The “Kyrgyz” and “Ukrainian” experiences demonstrated,the inability of authority to resist foreign policy pressures and to adaptto a new reality. Kazakhstan, conceding to the Western pressure,moved on the path of democratization of a political mode. Kazakhstancarries out political reforms, which will give an impetus to politicaltransformation of the entire Central Asian region. Leaning on its highgrowth rate, the Republic accepts the role model of democracy andfreedom in Central Asia, thus advancing the region’s democratic principles.

The basic condition for realization of this strategic line is, first ofall, liberalization of political system in the Republic that has both theinternal and external risks. Internal political risks for the ruling elite are:unpredictable as regards the consequences of socio-political activitiesof the population, strengthening of ethnic and religious factors in thepolitical life of the country, infringement of inter-ethnic balance, and, atlarge, start of a new phase of opposition between the government andopposition. Under the influence of these problems, the political systemof a country can be disorganized. Considering features of functioningof political organizations in the Republic, it can lead to politicalinstability and change of the country leaders. Besides, the acceptanceand “blind copying” without serious adaptation of liberal economicvalues and reforms will lead to washing out of historical roots andtraditional societies, which is not at all acceptable. There are alsoserious foreign policy risks. Without political changes in Russia andTranscaucasus, the liberalization process in Kazakhstan is not only lessprospective, but even counterproductive.

The third variant is the “operated democracy”. Keeping in viewpolitical developments in Kazakhstan last year, it is represented to bethe most real and assuming continuation of the policy of deduction ofauthority by management of the country through a combination ofmodernization and introduction of party-political system. Kazakhstanpursues liberal economic policy, but does not carry out the necessary

Kuralay Baizakova


political reforms. However, from the first variant, it is distinguished fromthe course of progress and modernization. Finally, it will allow the rulingelite to supervise transition of a society to democratic political system.

In the historical plane, functions of present elite consist ofmodernization of the Kazakh society, maintenance of stability,transformation from socialist to a new social order, adaptation to a newform of statehood and foreign policy environment. It is a model ofdevelopment of the country and adapted to its foreign policy interests.Advantage of the given variant is also because the propaganda of theuniversal values of democracy and freedom in the Central Asian Republicshas been ineffective. And “Political Westernisation” will cause tearing awayof the extremely conservative modes of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Andto build intra-regional interaction, it is more favourable due to ideological,social and economic factors, representing itself as the moderate supporterof liberal reforms, modernization and an advance of southern neighbourson course of economic growth.

Last but not the least, the fourth variant “Creeping Islamisation”assumes greater significance. This pertains to strengthening of the role ofIslam in the political life of the country. However, considering ethno-religiousstructure of the Kazakh society, the Islamic factor, even a secular variantof Islam as in Turkey, has little prospects. It can now be concluded that inKazakhstan, there is an authoritative system, which corresponds to thespecificity of development of the Republic during the transition period.

REFERENCES1. E. Idrisov, In Conditions of Globalization: Kazakhstan and the World

Community, Almaty, 2000, p.4.2. B. Jusipov, “Politics of Development: Democracy as the Factor of Safety

of Republic”, Siasat, April-May 2000, p.44.3. “President N. Nazarbayev at the Session of Constant Advice of OSCE,

24 February 2000”, Diplomatic Courier, no. 1, 2000, p.74.4. Jeskar D’esten, “President: The Arbitrator and the Guarantor”, News,

8 March 1990.5. J.U. Ibrashev, “The Political Mode Necessary to us”, New Generation,

no. 1.


ELECTIONS IN KAZAKHSTAN

Saifolla Sapanov

Immediately after the Presidential Elections in Kazakhstan in 2005,the mass media and scientific journals all over the world put thefollowing questions: “Whether a Colour Revolution is possible inKazakhstan?”, and “Who is the main competitor to present PresidentNursultan Nazarbayev for the Presidential chair?” Though nobody hadany doubt of President Nazarbayev’s victory, there were certain fearsconcerning the re-election of President Nazarbayev, the person whohas been the President of the country since the beginning ofKazakhstan’s statehood and during whose previous reign, twoconstitutions and 18 amendments were incorporated. It is necessary tonote that the Western scholars saw infringement of the Constitutionallaw in case of President Nazarbayev’s submission as a Presidentialcontender. According to the Constitution, the President of Kazakhstanhas the right to be elected only for two terms, each term being a periodof seven years. The Western scholars believe that two terms ofNazarbayev have already expired and according to this, Nazarbayev’sparticipation in the presidential elections was illegal. However, thedomestic experts have a different view. They contend that accordingto the Constitution of 1993 or 1995, Nazarbayev has been thePresident for one term in office. His first term appeared rather long forthe reason that the President, due to internal political crises, could notstay in office for the whole term till the end. When there was conflictbetween the Parliament and the President, the latter had to hold pre-term elections. The President’s first term ended only in 2005. Thus, indomestic circles, the question of legitimacy of Nazarbayev’s re-electiondid not exist.

Nazarbayev’s absolute victory in the elections has puzzled theworld community very much. For them, over 90 per cent victory marginis too impressive a figure to believe in the transparency in thePresidential elections. Even in Kazakhstan nobody believed thatNazarbayev would receive such a huge number of votes. Even most of

Saifolla Sapanov


the psephologists predicted 80 per cent, but not over 90 per cent.However, nobody tried, except for the opposition which lost theelections, to challenge the election results declared by the CentralElectoral Commission. All this shows that the Presidential election wassmoothly conducted in Kazakhstan within the ambit of standard norms.The independent international observers from several foreign countriesand many international organizations did not notice any malpracticeduring the elections. To them, the elections in Kazakhstan were conductedpeacefully and there was not even a shred of evidence of violence.

The factors behind such an outstanding outcome of the electionsare: the charismatic personality of President Nazarbayev, a favourablydeveloped external environment, stable economic growth, absence ofsharp social contradictions and disappointments in the society, andabsence of a strong opposition.

NAZARBAYEV’S CHARISMATIC PERSONALITYKazakh people still remember all those complex phenomena which

they faced through out the 1990s. Defaults in payment of wages,pensions, periodic disruption of electric power, decline in production,hyperinflation, unemployment and impoverishment of the populationwere the main challenges at that time. Nursultan Nazarbayev, whorescued the country from a crisis condition, is perceived by everyonein Kazakhstan as the guarantor of stability and sustainable development.Nowadays, people think stable growth of Kazakhstan’s economy andconstant improvement of citizens’ well being in the country is the directresult of the far-sighted policy and the charismatic personality ofPresident Nazarbayev. Besides all this, President Nazarbayev has takensome rational steps such as increase of pensions and wages to teachers,physicians and other state employees and increase of the grants tostudents on the eve of the Presidential elections to attract the Kazakhsto his party. A year earlier in 2004, he had launched a successfulagriculture programme supported by the state by declaring “Three Yearsof Village”. The annual economic growth in Kazakhstan is on theaverage estimated at ten per cent. The constant price rise of fuel duringthe last few years has affected the budgetary proficiency that prompted



the government to increase spending on social programmes andpayment of the extraordinary debts to the international financial institutions.

The credit to build the Kazakh society goes to PresidentNazarbayev. Kazakhstan is a multinational and multi-ethnic state, wheremore than 120 representatives of various ethnic groups live. Thoughmany called Kazakhstan “the Asian Balkans” at the beginning of thecountry’s independence, this did not come true. Due to PresidentNazarbayev’s political ingenuity and able administration, it was possibleto adjust inter-cultural dialogue with the inter-ethnic consent to realizethe concept “unity in diversity.” This became an important step in theformation and consolidation of a united Kazakhstan nation. Some ethnicgroups, who do not belong to the Kazakh nationality, are even afraidof any other person replacing President Nazarbayev. They think thenew President may become a nationalist one and oppress the rights ofthe national minorities. They preferred the stability associated withPresident Nazarbayev. Therefore, it is no wonder that representativesof national minorities, who constitute 42 per cent of the total Kazakhpopulation as per the statistics of 2005, have voted largely in favour ofPresident Nazarbayev.

FAVOURABLE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAfter the elections in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan which

witnessed “Colour Revolutions”, elections in Kazakhstan wereapproaching. The period between 2005 and the beginning of 2006witnessed elections in Iran, Moldova, Russia, Azerbaijan, Iraq,Palestine and in Latin America with an anti-American orientation. Allthis reduced the threat of influence of the West on the outcome of theKazakh elections. It may be noted here that the US blackmail of theCentral Asian states to carry out the liberalization of their economy anddemocratization of their political systems has not succeeded. Leadersof the Central Asian states, Russia and China in their meeting in thesummer in the Kazakh capital Astana within the framework of theShanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) issued a declaration whichfocussed on two important points - mutual support of the leaders ofthe SCO and an anti-American unity. After such developments, the

Saifolla Sapanov


USA changed its tone and the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Ricemade an attempt to pacify the Central Asian leaders. It is necessary totake into account that in the oil-extracting branch of Kazakh economy,there are a lot of American oil corporations for the successfulfunctioning of which internal stability in the Republic of Kazakhstan isextremely important and the US administration mustn’t lose sight of it.Thus, USA agreed to cooperate with Kazakhstan and in turn, Kazakhstannow carries out pro-American policy to secure its national interests.

For the fifteen years of its independent existence, Kazakhstan hascreated all conditions for functioning of market economic relations andhas strongly been assimilated into the world community. Havingrecommended itself as a peaceful state, Kazakhstan refused the nuclearlegacy on a voluntary basis as was inherited from the former USSR,and managed to liquidate separatist tendencies and sought to constructa united Kazakh nation. Having constructed the best banking systemon the post-Soviet space, Kazakhstan, as marked by the internationalelection observers, has initiated steps in the field of the human rightsand freedom. A bright example can be the announcement of themoratorium on death penalty. Annual meets of “International EurasianMedia Forums” promote freedom of speech, which is one of the basicfreedoms of a human being. The regular exchange of experiencebetween domestic and foreign journalists promotes unbiasedinterpretation of the events taking place inside the state and abroad.

ABSENCE OF STRONG OPPOSITIONAnalyzing the past Presidential elections in the Republic of

Kazakhstan, it is imperative to take into account the role of oppositionin the country. The role of opposition is an important parameter ofdemocracy in a society. Kazakhstan welcomes the ideas of democracyand since its independence, it has been taking positive steps to builddemocracy. As regards the Kazakhstan opposition, its influence is veryweak. Elections to the country’s Parliament were held in September2004, where the opposition could not achieve the overall objective -mandates to Mazhilis (the Lower Chamber of the Parliament). Itcouldn’t do anything spectacular in the Presidential elections of 2005.



For a year, the opposition could not mobilize its forces and resourcesdespite the international financial and other support. Though theopposition consists mainly of business elites, which have big financialopportunities, it could not match the charisma and popularity ofPresident Nazarbayev.

In Kazakhstan, there are two types of opposition: the oppositionsupporting wider liberalization of Kazakhstan or the so called “pro-Westerners” and the Communists. The latter are popular only amongthe people of the older generation and are represented by theCommunist Party of Kazakhstan headed by Serikbolsyn Abdildin,and the Communist Peoples Party of Kazakhstan led by VladislavKosarev. The “pro-Westerners” are represented by the DemocraticParty of Kazakhstan “Akzhol” under the leadership of AlikhanBaimenov and the Party of the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstanled by Zharmakhan Tuyakbay. At times, the leaders of oppositionworked for the country and devoted themselves for the service of thecountry. For example, up to the middle of 2004, Zharmakhan Tuyakbaywas the Speaker in Mazhilis being appointed by the President as perthe constitutional norms. During the election campaign, the oppositionhad nothing to offer to the Kazakh people. President Nazarbayev haspractically carried out all those ideas which were being propagated bythe opposition in the elections of 2004 liberalization of political authoritywas started by the introduction of Akims in Oblasts and cities; 3,000grants have been allocated under state programme Bolashak forstudents wishing to get education abroad; increase in pensions, wagesand welfare payments. All these measures weakened the position of theopposition before the elections of 2005.

At the present stage, there is a discussion concerning position ofthe Parliament in the Republic. Today the President enjoys enormouspowers. He appoints the government, speakers of Parliament, membersof the Constitutional Court, Akims of oblasts and cities, issues decreeshaving equal force to law, etc. He is the arbitrator between threebranches of political authority: Executive, Legislature and Judiciary.Though there was a fear in the country about a social and even politicalcrisis, in his pre-election campaign President Nazarbayev put emphasis

Saifolla Sapanov


on increasing the powers of the Parliament. It can be noted here thatKazakhstan is at a stage of transition from the Presidential form toparliamentary form of government. President Nazarbayev now believes thatthe country’s Parliament can pass effective and people friendly laws. Henow favours a mature party system. For the 2005 elections in the country,there were eleven registered parties, which bears testimony of a multi-partysystem in the Republic. Many observers argue whether there is a formationof two-party system in the Republic of Kazakhstan based on two blocs.In our opinion, it is improbable as each party has its specificity and strategyfor its development. For example, the Agrarian Party, which supports thereform measures of President Nazarbayev, aims at the improvement of theposition of villages, and asserts the interests of rural people in Parliament,but never of urban people. Today there is only one presidential party. It isOtan (Motherland).

It can be summed up that democracy is a constantly evolvingprocess. Perhaps, it is impossible to fix any final stage of democracy.For Kazakhstan, it is still experiencing a transitional stage. This countryhas not got accustomed to democracy in classical understanding. Itrequires the advanced civil society, which is in its formative stage. It isnecessary to speak about the oriental type of democracy and itsnecessity, which is explained by different realities of Western andEastern societies. As regards the first one, it is characterized byindividualism and the second by collectivism. Kazakhstan is considered,perhaps, more as an Eastern civilization than a Western one, though itis located at the interface of Europe and Asia. Whether it is good orbad for the Kazakh society, the Kazakhs still have tribal manifestation,and a division on zhuzes (historically formed economic regions), furtheron clans. In 1990s, when Kazakhstan was engaged in copying theWestern democracy, it learnt that all borrowings from the West can notbe applied to the government set up in the East. Growth of corruptionand economic crisis have necessitated the centralization of authority.Therefore, there is still an element of authoritarianism in Kazakhstanwhich is being criticized by the Western scholars. Today, when theeconomy and consciousness of Kazakhstani people have becomestronger, it is possible to speak about some decentralization. However,



it is necessary to be extremely cautious as there is a probability of splitin the society. For example, the population living in the western regionsof Republic, rich with oil, are disappointed that all income is transferredinto the state budget which is necessary for the equal development ofKazakhstan as a whole. Now we shall hypothetically assume that acandidate for “oblast akim” appears and promises to the local peopleaccumulation of half, and even larger share of the incomes taken fromoil into the local budget. It is not difficult to guess, that local populationwill choose him unanimously. And it, in turn, will cross out all thoseworks directed in previous years on rallying and construction of a unitednation. Therefore, Kazakhstan today is in search of its own formula ofdemocracy reflecting the specificity of the Kazakh society to make theRepublic a progressive and peaceful country.


NAZARBAYEV EMERGES STRONGER AFTER POLLS

Indranil Banerjie

Nursultan Nazarbayev was re-elected as the President ofKazakhstan for another seven-year term through general elections heldon 4 December 2005. Over six million Kazakhs trudged to pollingstations all across their country to vote in the Presidential polls on4 December 2005, even as cold Siberian winds brought snow and frostthroughout the country. It was later estimated that more than 77 percent or about 6.85 million of 8.87 million eligible Kazakh voters hadcast their ballots in the poll. The President incumbent, NursultanNazarbayev, secured a whopping 91.01 per cent of the votes, whilehis nearest rival, Zarmakhan Tuyakbai, received just 6.64 per cent ofvotes. The other three candidates barely made an impression: AlikhanBaimenov of the Ak Zhol Democratic Party got a minuscule 1.65 percent, Yerassyl Abylkassymov got 0.38 per cent and Mels Yeleusizov ofthe Tabigat (Nature) environmental movement got just 0.32 per centof the votes. Thus, President Nazarbayev secured another seven yearstint in power.

To some Western observers, the very fact that PresidentNazarbayev secured 91 per cent of the vote suggested something waswrong. The previous Presidential elections had taken place on 10January 1999, where Nazarbayev had received 79.8 per cent of thevotes cast. These kinds of victory margins are unheard of in Westerndemocracies. So the big question was: were the elections fraudulent?According to the government, more than a thousand foreign electionobservers, 16,458 observers from Kazakh political parties, 5,652observers from public institutions and 500 Kazakh mediapersonsoversaw the elections. Most foreign observers and leaders judged thepolls to be free and fair. The big voice of dissent was that of theinfluential Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE), which expressed complete displeasure over the electionprocess.



The Almaty office of the OSCE issued a statement on the pollingday, slamming the election process: “Despite some improvements in theadministration of this election in the pre-election period, the Presidentialelection did not meet a number of OSCE commitments and otherinternational standards for democratic elections. Candidate registrationwas mostly inclusive and a field of five candidates provided voters withan opportunity for choice. However, numerous and persistent examplesof intimidation by the authorities, including undue restrictions oncampaigning and harassment of campaign staff, limited the possibilityfor a meaningful competition whereby all candidates had equalopportunities to convey their views to the electorate.” The statement,however, admitted that “The Central Election Commission (CEC)administered the election in a generally transparent manner during thepre-election period, taking into account some previous OSCE/ODIHRrecommendations regarding election administration. While internationalelections observers assessed that voting was conducted in a calm andpeaceful atmosphere, the quality of the process deteriorated during thevote count and was assessed negatively in 27 per cent of observations.”The OSCE also accepted that the state media largely met their legalobligations to provide free airtime to candidates; voter’s lists weregenerally available to the public well before the polling day; and severalother electoral improvements were effected. The OSCE also observedthat “Voting was conducted in a generally calm atmosphere... the votingprocess positively in 92 per cent of polling stations visited, andnegatively in eight per cent. However, the international observers foundsome instances of interference of unauthorized persons, multiple andproxy voting, ballot box stuffing, and pressure on students to vote.”International observers assessed the vote count as bad or very bad in27 per cent of counts observed and noted serious violations in 21 percent of counts observed, including tampering with results protocols.

It must be pointed out that while there could have been instancesof poll malpractices, this does not imply that President Nazarbayevintended to or did rig the elections. Also, as one observer pointed out,the OSCE poll stipulations were so strict that even the United Statesgovernment would have found them difficult to meet. Moreover,

Indranil Banerjie


Nazarbayev did not have to rig the polls: every indication suggests thathe would have won in any case. Lastly, a close reading of the OSCE’sconclusions does not throw up anything that could justify junking theelections. Even the head of the EU parliamentary delegation for theelections, Struan Stevenson, did not completely dismiss the poll results.He said: “we witnessed some improvements in the electoral processand were encouraged by these signs. Nevertheless we are of the viewthat much work remains to be done if Kazakhstan’s embryonicdemocracy is to grow and mature.” Remarks like this and the OSCE’sconclusions are clearly patronising of Kazakh democracy, which isperceived as being fraudulent because they are not up to Europeanstandards. This argument is specious and clearly uncharitable.

If President Nazarbayev secured an overwhelming majority ofvotes, it was because for the average Kazakh the poll was areferendum for Nazarbayev. The other five candidates were notnationally well known personalities and, in any case, it was not a tossup among the five. The vote was for or against Nazarbayev. This is themanner in which elections are viewed in a host of Asian democracies,including India. The nuances of issues are often unimportant. Theaverage Kazakh expressed confidence in the leadership of Nazarbayev.

THREAT OF “COLOURED REVOLUTIONS”One reason why the internal security apparatus in Kazakhstan must

have been extra-zealous during the polls was the incipient threat of anexternally sponsored revolution. Most Central Asian elite feel that theWestern powers have engineered a series of “revolutions” in theCommonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, including inUkraine (Orange Revolution), Kyrgyzstan (Tulip Revolution) and Georgia(Rose Revolution). To prevent the “export” of a “Colour Revolution” frompost-revolutionary Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, Kazakh authorities expelledmany foreigners from Kazakhstan and sealed the border with Kyrgyzstan.The authorities were also hard on the student community in the country’smajor cities because it was felt that any coup attempt would utilise thestudent community. In hindsight, President Nazarbayev need not haveworried. For, internally, he was more stable than most CIS rulers;



his country’s economy was doing well; and, most importantly, big powerstakes in his country were too high to allow for sudden coups.

Reforms Pay OffThe singular fact about President Nazarbayev’s success is that

market reforms initiated by him in 1993 have paid off. A UNDP Reportreleased in early December 2005 titled Bringing Down Barriers:Regional Cooperation for Human Development and HumanSecurity pointed out that while most of Central Asia continues tostruggle to undo economic, political and social shortcomings nearly 15years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan has shown the mostpromise to overcome these challenges. Since 1998, the region hasrebounded because of rapid economic growth in Russia and China, highenergy prices and economic reforms. With its huge energy resources,Kazakhstan has been able to attract relatively large amounts of foreigninvestment. “Kazakhstan has made significant progress in reforming anddeveloping its financial sector and is at a much more advanced stagethan the other four countries,” according to the study.

With more growth, there has been an increase in public spendingand welfare measures. The cities and towns of Kazakhstan havebenefited immensely in the last five to seven years. Prosperity in thestreets is palpable. Investment in public infrastructure is higher than inmany developing and CIS countries. Today, Kazakhstan ranks topamong the five Central Asian Republics in terms of the HumanDevelopment Index, though it continues to lag behind Russia andCentral European countries. The population generally tends to associatethis new found prosperity with Nazarbayev’s policies, especially sincethings are significantly worse in the neighbouring countries, which wereall part of large Soviet Central Asia not too long ago. The per capitaincome in Kazakhstan is about US $ 2,250, which is about five timeshigher than in neighbouring Uzbekistan. Per capita Gross DomesticProduct (GDP) calculated in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)was US $ 6,671 in 2003 as compared to US $ 7,939 for Central andEastern Europe and the CIS countries as a whole. It is estimated that percapita GDP has gone up five fold since Kazakhstan became independent.

Indranil Banerjie


GEOPOLITICSIndependent assessments by a number of countries, including the

United States and India, had predicted a win for President Nazarbayev– and that too not through fraudulent elections. A few days before thepolls, a senior State Department official had said President Nursultanis likely to be reelected for another term by a broad margin. DeputyAssistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs,Matthew Bryza said independent polling suggests that Nazarbayev hasa genuinely wide lead over his rivals, and could garner well in excessof 60 percent of the vote. The “code of conduct are commitments thathave, by and large, been implemented on behalf of the government toprovide access to the media, to television in particular, by oppositioncandidates to facilitate debates on television among the oppositioncandidates. That’s happened. The government is committed to publishaccurate voter lists all over the country so that each voter can go andcheck whether he or she is on the lists, and correct the lists. That’shappened. They published the lists in fact on November 18th (2005).That has never happened before,” he said.

There were two reasons why the US State Department, which hasbeen highly critical of President Nazarbayev in the past, chose tosupport him this time. First was the fact that Nazarbayev clearly haddomestic support and second, the US today needs the support ofKazakhstan in the region, which has turned somewhat cool to the USin recent times. Even the three countries where regime changes havebeen effected through “Coloured Revolutions” are not doing too well.In early December 2005, US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice,visited Ukraine to urge the leadership to start shaping up. But that isgoing to be difficult because Russia has started tightening the screwsby asking Ukraine to pay market prices for gas and oil imports. InGeorgia and Kyrgyzstan things are not better.

Kazakhstan, along with a host of other CIS countries, has inrecent times begun cosying up with Russia and China. The Russianleadership has declared that the new relations with the CIS countrieswill not be based on dominance and exploitation but on joint



cooperation and equal partnerships. The Chinese, having successfullyworked out border deals with Russia and most Central AsianRepublics, is looking at regional consolidation and the creation of analliance through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to keepthe West at an arm’s length. The year 2005 has been one ofrealignments in regional geopolitics. Should the US fail to maintain goodrelations with Kazakhstan, then its position in the region could suffereven further. The United States has been forced to close down itsairbase in Uzbekistan and has one last remaining airbase in Kyrgyzstan.Neither China nor Russia like this fact and there would be pressure onKyrgyzstan to close down this airbase as well. Kazakhstan hasconsiderable influence over the neighbouring Kyrgyz Republic andcould influence a decision on the US airbase.

FUTURE DIRECTIONSPresident Nazarbayev has got a mandate for another seven years

and it is unlikely that he will waste it. If there is anything that couldserve as a guiding principle for his future actions, it would be his policyof balance of interests. He has been extremely successful in recent timesby steering clear of restrictive relations with one or more power. Hehas maintained good relations with the West while growing closer toChina and reinventing ties with Russia. He has championed the SCOwithout openly opposing the NATO. He has sought to build bridgeswith a new set of countries beyond Kazakhstan’s core interest countries(the Central Asian Republics, China and Russia) like India, Iran andTurkey. He also believes in the coexistence of different religions andraces and has sponsored a number of events to demonstrate this point.It is this belief in balancing interests that has paid off and this is onepolicy President Nazarbayev is likely to stick to.

Even in the economic sphere, he has succeeded in breaking outof the Russian oil-gas pipeline stranglehold by collaborating with thePeople’s Republic of China to participate in an eastern pipeline (whichbecomes operational in January 2006), agreeing to participate in theUS-sponsored westward looking Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline;opening a trade corridor via China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous

Indranil Banerjie


Region and the Karakoram highway to the Indian Ocean port ofKarachi (Pakistan); and looking at ways to open another gas-oil routevia Afghanistan or Iran.

Finally, it is certain that he is going to try to give ordinary Kazakhsa better economic deal. While economic growth as a whole has beenhigh, the World Bank and other agencies estimate the percentage ofpopulation living below subsistence levels to be as high as 30 and 38per cent in Kazakhstan. The distribution of income is highly skewed andgenerally in favour of the urban population. After the polls, PresidentNazarbayev said in an interview: “During the next seven years we willdouble salaries of the people of Kazakhstan, and double pensions andscholarships for students. The country’s economy will grow 2.5 times”.Should the President’s promise materialise in the years to come, thenthe country’s voters would justifiably feel vindicated.


KAZAKHSTAN AND THE INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATIONS

Mara Gubaidullina

With the end of the bipolar system, international relations entereda new phase of development, especially in the security sector. The veryconcept of security is becoming more complicated and gaining newgrounds. During the 1990s, the international community highlighted theglobal security needs and its importance not only on a global scale, butalso at the regional level besides underlining the importance of regionaldefence structures.

Regional instability created new forms of crises. The past decadedemonstrates the inability of international forces to adequately resolvecrises that arose in the Balkans, the Near East, Southeast Asia and theformer Soviet Union. In the 1990s, Central Asian Republics emergedas independent states. Kazakhstan, the largest territorial state in CentralAsia, attracted the attention of world powers and the regional powersas well. The end of bipolarity and the emergence of independent nationstates had an immediate impact upon the geopolitical and geostrategicposition of China, the United States as well as Russia. By the mid-1990s, European states and even smaller nations around the globe alsorealised the emerging significance of Central Asia.

Central Asia occupies a crossroads or fault line of strategicinterests between international actors at the end of Cold War.Emphasizing the importance of Central Asia for the United States,Zbigniew Brzezinski argues that “geopolitics has moved from regionalthinking to global, thus the superiority over all Eurasian continent formsthe central basis for global domination. Now the United States ofAmerica, the non-European power, predominates internationally, andits authority is directly distributed on three peripheral regions of theEurasian continent from which position, it carries out the powerfulinfluence on the states.”1

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Western powers ostensibly support large-scale political reformswithin Kazakh Republic, while stressing the need for integrating thecountry into global economic and political structures. However,geography and geopolitical interests guide the Western priorities.Kazakhstan’s policy in response to current issues at the global leveldepends on the arrangement of forces in the world and the sequenceof global events. Traditionally seen as an important tool of foreignpolicy, geopolitics proceeds from a principle of geographicaldeterminism to define policy options. Many threats to the security ofKazakhstan directly depend on its geopolitical position, which includesthe main elements of geopolitics such as territory and the absence ofthe exit routes to the sea, natural resources and economic potential,population and its ethnic composition, the Islamic neighbourhood etc.

Geopolitical factor is considered to be the key part of the conceptof foreign policy in Kazakhstan and its adherence to the principle of“multi-vector foreign policy.” The President of Kazakhstan and theHead of the State, Nursultan Nazarbayev has pointed out time andagain that countries not only need cooperation at the regional level, butalso global cooperation and partnership. According to PresidentNazarbayev, “to construct mutual relations between Kazakhstan andother countries on such a basis requires a commanding principle of globalpartnership.”2 This means the expansion of strategic interaction withleading world powers to maintain and consolidate global and regionalsecurity.

Located at the heart of continental Eurasia, without its own outletto the world’s oceans, and sandwiched between the People’s Republicof China to the south and Russia to the north, Kazakhstan requires“global partnership” as much as possible. The partnership should notonly be in bilateral and multilateral relations, but also on equal terms.Early in the 1990s, Kazakhstan’s foreign policy solved the mainproblems of defining the status and role of the Republic in internationalaffairs by virtue of its geographical position. The young Republic soughtthrough diplomacy to take into account economic opportunities as wellas the political, military and humanitarian potentials of the country.Kazakhstan sought reliable partners to find a worthy place in the new

KAZAKHSTAN AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS


system of international security, and to establish connections withinternational organizations, institutes and trans-national companies(TNCs). In view of these objectives, Kazakhstan chose a “multi-vectored foreign policy” as reflected in the concept of foreign policy ofthe Republic accepted in 1995 (it was later amended in 2001), and in“The Strategy of Kazakhstan Becoming and Developing as a SovereignState”, “Kazakhstan-2030: Prosperity, Security and Improvement ofthe Wealth of all Kazakhs.”3 This “multi-vectored foreign policy”stresses the necessity to establish equal rights, mutually advantageousrelations with the external world, with all countries borderingKazakhstan. It is imperative now to take such policy decisions whichwould provide security of the country.

REFUSAL OF NUCLEAR STATUSThe anti-nuclear policy of Kazakhstan facilitated the establishment

of mutually confidential relations with the USA and other Westerncountries. Kazakhstan has received guarantees of safety and non-intervention from the outside forces in order to independently carry outinternal political reforms and strengthening of its statehood. The anti-nuclear policy of Kazakhstan has called for maintenance of regional andglobal security, and construction of the international security system anddisarmament process.

The question of nuclear disarmament led to special initiatives byWashington to remove nuclear weapons from new states that inheritednuclear stockpiles from the former Soviet Union. Indeed, Kazakhstanoriginally possessed a large arsenal of nuclear weapons, including 104CC-18 rockets with 1,216 nuclear warheads at fixed locations, and 40THAT–95 IN strategic bombers with 240 cruise missiles. Kazakhstanaccepted the recommendations made by the United States andabandoned its status as a nuclear state and refused the possession,storage and production of the nuclear weapons.

The 1992 Lisbon Protocol first acknowledged Kazakhstan’sresponsibility in abandoning its nuclear weapons. Under the LisbonProtocol, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Ukraine, Russia and the United Statesagreed to eliminate strategic nuclear systems in their territories to comply

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with the terms of the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START I),which had been negotiated between the US and the former Soviet Union.

In an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) in 1993, Kazakhstan acknowledged the possession of nuclearweapons on its territory, and in September 1994 Kazakhstan signedthe Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile System. Kazakhstan’s ratification ofthe Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993, and the officialguarantees of security from Russia, the United States and Great Britainled to the signing of a Memorandum on 5 December 1994 guaranteeingthe security of Kazakhstan by Russian President Boris Yeltsin,American President Bill Clinton, and British Prime Minister John Majorduring the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE) Summit in Budapest. Under this Memorandum, Russia, theUnited States and Great Britain confirmed the OSCE principles ofindependence, sovereignty and respect for territorial integrity of theRepublic of Kazakhstan. All the three powers agreed to abstain fromthe threat of force, or the use of force to seize sovereign territories, tothreaten political independence of Kazakhstan. They also agreed notto impose economic sanctions for political purposes.4 The abovesignatories negotiated the extension and prolongation of the NPT at aconference in New York in April-May 1995. In the “OperationSapphire”, Kazakhstan sold to the United States about 600 kgs. ofhighly enriched uranium previously stored in the warehouses at theUlbinsk metal works, as after signing the NPT, it had becomeunprofitable for Kazakhstan to bear the cost of the maintenance andprotection of its nuclear stockpiles. Declaring the “Operation Sapphire”a success, US President Bill Clinton said, “the world is relieved of onemore threat of nuclear terrorism and distribution of the nuclear weapons.”5

After the last nuclear test, which was conducted in Adit in theSemipalatinsk range on 30 May 1995, Kazakhstan removed the last1,216 units of nuclear ammunition from its territory. Political circles andpolitical scientists in Kazakhstan had expressed fears and were criticalof the decision to abolish these nuclear stockpiles. However, thisdecision resulted in greater mutual understanding between the Kazakhgovernment, the United States of America and the European powers.



The next step confirming Kazakhstan’s involvement in theinternational security system began with the Agreement on the UniversalProhibition of Nuclear Tests in 1996. After joining the framework toliquidate its nuclear arsenals, Kazakhstan began the rather difficultprocedure of injecting the norms of international law in theseagreements. With the international organizations OSCE, InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and European Union (EU), it wasalready possible to build mutual relations on an allied basis. Kazakhstanalso became a participant of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation(NATO) programme on cooperation, the “Partnership for Peace, Treatyon Conventional Forces in Europe”.

The anti-nuclear policy of Kazakhstan also promoted its bilateralrelations with the United States. Kazakhstan fully enjoys a ‘credit oftrust’ from the world powers. The anti-nuclear policy of Kazakhstanpromotes conditions for the maintenance of regional and global security,and involves Kazakhstan in the process of constructing a meaningfulsystem of international security and disarmament.

EU-KAZAKHSTAN PARTNERSHIPKazakhstan represents a link between Europe and the Asia-Pacific

region. At the same time, many regional actors - Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan - surround Kazakhstan. Assuch policy makers need to deal with the regional problems whileparticipating in the global order. While acting regionally, Kazakhstanalso aspires to establish and strengthen its relations with the leadingcountries of the world by participating in international political andmilitary organizations, and to promote economic development throughparticipation in economic organizations. In this connection, theexperience of regional and inter-regional cooperation by countries ofthe European Union is crucial for the countries of Central Asia,especially Kazakhstan.

Partnership with Europe is one of the most important directions inthe foreign policy of Kazakhstan. In order to integrate with the worldcommunity, Kazakhstan seeks constructive cooperation with the leadingcountries of Europe. In seeking secured borders, the European Union

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allocates to Kazakhstan a significant share of responsibility formaintaining stability in the world and in Central Asia as well. Forexample, on behalf of the EU, French President Jacques Chirac onceconfidently stated that “Kazakhstan possesses the potential of astabilizer in the region and is the catalyst of regional cooperation.”6

Efforts by the Kazakh Republic to carry out democratic andmarket reforms must appear in this context to strengthen its politicalindependence through diplomacy. So, having started originally to buildtrade and economic relations with the countries of Europe, Kazakhstanaspired for a closer partnership, which now includes the military-political sphere as a necessary component of these mutual relations.

However, difficulties arise in relations between Russia and thesouthern countries. Oil exporting states of the Caspian region areengaged in an increasing competition with other energy producers whichexport energy products to the European market. The Caspian oil boomcan strengthen the economy of the southern countries ofCommonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which in turn would leadto easing of economic and military dependence on Russia. As a result,Western powers gain influence, thus pushing Russia from the regionfurther.

On its part, the European Union, in the opinion of the famousGerman expert Alexander Rar, “could bring an important contributionto the successful formation of a Eurasian economic community – astrategic alliance, giving more attention to the Caspian region with allavailable means under its command to spread responsibility for theprevention of conflicts.”7

The energy sector of Kazakhstan is developing under theconditions of a market economy, a basis for involving the Republic inglobal markets. As an economic partner of Europe and Asia,Kazakhstan can maintain its security through various internationalstructures, institutes, and organizations. Thus, in the 21st century,Kazakhstan can contribute to the economic, social and political stabilityand security of the region.



EUROPEAN SECURITY AND KAZAKHSTANThe Western and European countries appear as potential military-

political partners of Kazakhstan, which could support Kazakhstan’sinitiatives to strengthen mutual trust and security in Asia. Partnership, isunderstood as a level of interstate dialogue and cooperation thatexcludes the application of block standards, and is based onrelationship of equality, transparency and trust. Certainly, thatexperience acquired by the leading European countries in creatingEuropean integration and security provides a universal model,theoretically. And practically it is useful in Central Asia over the longterm. Central Asia requires a common security structure similar to theEuropean model as a basis for replacing potential conflict with trueregional integration.

As Europe’s own defence structures obviously depend oncooperation between organizations, it is necessary to pay attention todevelopment of cooperation with the given organizations. The Europeanexperience appears rather useful from the following point of view:Kazakhstan actively pursues a policy of regional economic integration,which is inconceivable without the system of collective security. Todaythe European model provides a useful reference point in this regard.Many elements of European defence may be adopted. For example,Central Asia can develop a mechanism for coordinating the efforts ofnational armed forces in the event of a common regional threat. Regionalforces can also standardize arms and military equipment and coordinatethe operation of their war-industrial complexes.

European countries possess enormous experience in respondingto such problems as terrorism, extremism, separatism and drugtrafficking. Facing similar problems, Kazakhstan and Central Asia canlearn from Europe. In April 2001, the EU Council of Ministers set thecooperation with the Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan as a priority incombating drug addiction.8 In December 2001 at Bucharest, theEuropean Union and OSCE accepted the “Joint Political DeclarationConcerning Terrorism” and the “Plan of Action against Terrorism” at

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the regional level, including Central Asia. The European Commissionassigned EU Foreign Policy Commissioner, Chris Patten to expandstabilization efforts in Central Asia.9

There is cooperation in the field of military security, and in the longterm, it will be through the framework of the EUROPOL. Today, thesale of the weapons remains one source of revenue in world trade.In this connection, it would be expedient for Kazakhstan to study andadopt the most effective elements of European export strategies in thefield of arms sales and military technology. Kazakhstan should alsoconsider the European experience in conversion technologies and theestablishment of a long term bilateral cooperation between defenceenterprises specializing in dual purpose output. The weapons’ trade isthe most profitable trade in the modern world. It is better forKazakhstan to examine in detail the European experience of formingexport strategy in the trade of weapons and military equipment. It isvery useful for Kazakhstan to analyze conversional ability of EUmembers in two ways: how to acquire European conversionaltechnologies; and to establish bilateral cooperation with defenceenterprises that are producing goods of double appliance. As theMinister for Foreign Affairs of Republic of Kazakhstan, KasimzhomartTokayev states, “an active position of the European Union indevelopment of regional cooperation, settlement of military conflicts,carrying out of peacemaking operations on the European continentmarks, and also process of expansion of EU due to the countries ofEast Block determine the necessity of updating of a policy ofKazakhstan concerning the European community with the purpose of adeepening of interaction and its conclusion to a level of strategicpartnership.10

KAZAKHSTAN AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTSBilateral relations within the framework of international agreements

represent another dimension of military cooperation betweenKazakhstan and the European countries. Such international documentsinclude the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (TCF) andthe 1999 Vienna Document about negotiations to strengthen trust and



security. For Kazakhstan, the TCF has special significance. Thisdocument, which applies to the territory “from the Atlantic to the Urals”,establishes basic levels of arms necessary for rapid response and largescale offensive operations. TCF was signed on 19 November 1990with the Warsaw Treaty Organization states within the framework ofNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The final document of theExtraordinary Conference of States – participants in the Treaty onConventional Forces in Europe (the Final Oslo Communique) - allowsthe deployment of conventional forces in Europe in a new internationalsituation. The document takes into account the Tashkent Agreement of15 May 1992 among the successor states of the erstwhile USSR withterritory in the operative range of the Treaty on Conventional Forcesin Europe, distributing between them obligations and rights of theformer USSR, and also makes them participants of the Agreement.

In October 1992, Kazakhstan joined this TCF. The participationof Kazakhstan in this Treaty, the Forum on Cooperation in the field ofsecurity and the Joint Consultative Group under the Treaty onConventional Forces in Europe, promotes its national military andpolitical interests. The responsibility for implementing the Treaty onConventional Forces in Europe and the Vienna Document of 1999 isassigned to the Kazakhstan Ministry of Defence on behalf of itsstructural division – the Centre responsible for reduction of armamentsand maintenance of inspection activities. According to the ViennaDocument, the European experts repeatedly carried out inspectionsaccording to the given basic systems of Kazakhstan’s arms andtechnical equipment. Besides the documentary certificates concerningthe combat material converted to peaceful purposes, the privatizedenterprises and wholly private firms in Kazakhstan have been submittedto experts on the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe.

For Kazakhstan, the formation of the independent system of safetyof the European Union has direct value for the Central Asian countries.Firstly, it is paradoxical, but “miniaturization” objectively promotesdemilitarization as the military measurement of the EU’s internationalrelations will play an auxiliary role within the framework of its complexpolicy of safety. Secondly, the corresponding amplification of a military

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role and the responsibility of the EU, to a certain degree, pre-determines the opportunities for interaction between the West and theEast in the sphere of security. In fact, the concept of the “indivisibilityof European security” has more relevance for the EU than for theAmericans because of the proximity of Europe to the CIS states.Thirdly, the new quality of relations between the EU and the CIScountries with regard to security issues opens up further opportunitiesfor developing cooperation with the European countries, and promotesmany-sided cooperation at the sub-regional level of security.

OSCE AND CENTRAL ASIAN SECURITYAt the beginning of the 1990s, the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) became part of the “architecture” ofregional security in Central Asia. Kazakhstan as well as other states ofpost-Soviet Central Asia gained membership in this organization not dueto geography, but as the successors to former USSR. OSCE is the onlypan-European security organization entrusted with the responsibility toensure peace and stability in its area. In accepting the OSCEDeclaration on the model of general and universal security for Europein the 21st century through the 1996 Lisbon Protocol, the OSCEunderscored the importance of participation by the Central AsianRepublics. According to the decisions in Lisbon, Kazakhstan beganannual exchanges of military information, notifying its OSCE partnersabout plans and certain kinds of military activity.

The final documents of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summitdemonstrate the importance of Central Asia for OSCE. Signatures ofthe states of Central Asia and Kazakhstan under the Charter ofEuropean Security impose on them the obligation to maintain all rounddevelopment of all OSCE territories and their adjoining regionsincluding Central Asia. Amid intractable challenges like internationalterrorist networks, aggressive extremism, organized crime, and illegaldrugs and arms trafficking, which are common throughout the OSCEcountries, the Istanbul Summit Documents says, “we agree that forstruggle against these threats, including what proceeds from the areasadjoining states - participants of the OSCE, require national, regional



and joint actions by the international community.”11 The Charter ofEuropean Security, which directly mentions safety and prosperity of thestates of OSCE, admits that instability in Central Asia generatesthreats.12

Time has come now for the countries of the region to expand thesphere of security and promote creation of a “Euro-Central Asiansystem of security” together with the OSCE. Recognizing the presenceof destabilizing factors in the region and the long process of establishingmilitary-political stability in Afghanistan, the OSCE and Kazakhstancould promote Stability Pact for Central Asia much similar to the Pactof Stability for Southeast Europe. This will, as the Istanbul Charterelaborates, contribute to the “enormous development and diversificationactivity of the OSCE.” Creation of the Pact could be carried out withinthe framework of the Centre for Prevention of Conflicts.

The following arguments clarify the benefits of a Euro-CentralAsian system of security.

1. Central Asian states should participate in security organizationsoutside the former Soviet Union to the effectiveness of theOSCE in case the need arises to carry out or supervisepeacemaking operations;

2. Disputes on the possible expansion of the NATO will stop, aswill friction in relations between Russia and the NATO, Russiaand the USA, Russia and the West as a whole, as negotiationswould clarify the situation of Russia in East Europe and in thepost-Soviet space. The distinction between “near” and “far”abroad shall dissolve in favour of uniform Euro-Central Asianspaces of security;

3. The creation of a Euro-Central Asian security spherecompliments efforts by Kazakhstan to create organizationalbases through the Conference on Interaction and ConfidenceBuilding Measures in Asia (CICA). Indeed, the example ofEuropean security initiatives inspired Kazakhstan’s initiative onthe establishment of interaction and measures of trust in Asia,which has a lot in common with the experience of the OSCE.

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4. A Euro-Central Asian security system will provide arecognizable security structure in the context of rapidlyincreasing exchanges between Western countries and CentralAsia, besides providing opportunities to interface withpotentially expanded NATO activity in the region.

Kazakhstan strives to develop a security system compatible withthe Atlantic powers to develop all available opportunities for increasingstability amidst the current situation of instability and uncertainty. By thismeans, Kazakhstan seeks to defend against the threats to internationalpeace. Kazakhstan will get opportunities for new ideas and initiativesto be realized during the period of its Presidency of the OSCE in 2009.

KAZAKHSTAN AND THE NATOThe military-political aspect of communications between

Kazakhstan, the European Union and OSCE logically leads towardsbetter relations with the NATO. Relations between Kazakhstan andNATO began well with the visit of NATO’s Secretary General,Manfred Werner to Almaty in November 1992. The official visit ofKazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev to NATO headquarters inBrussels in February 1993 confirmed the beginning of substantiverelations that remain positive today.

In 1992, Kazakhstan joined the Council of North Atlantic TreatyOrganization – NACC/EAPC (North Atlantic Council/Euro-AtlanticPartnership Council). Kazakhstan and NATO implemented cooperationon the basis of the “Plan on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation”,which includes periodic consultations, seminars and symposia on avariety of economic, defence, ecological and other questions. Since1992, the Republic of Kazakhstan regularly participates in the workingsessions of NATO at the Foreign Ministers level. In relation to CentralAsia, NATO seeks the following:

- To prevent creation of a new military bloc opposing the NATOwithin the framework of the CIS;

- To prevent alliances between the Central Asian Republics andthe Islamic world, especially with countries where the ideologyof an orthodox Islam dominates;



- To cooperate with the Newly Independent States on maintainingregional and global security. In May 1994, Kazakhstan becamethe 19th state to join “The Framework Agreement Partnershipfor Peace.13

On 31 July 1996, Kazakhstan and NATO signed two agreementsat NATO headquarters in Brussels, (i) “The Treaty on Security” and(ii) “The Treaty on the Status of Armed Forces.” The first treaty seeksto protec classified information exchanged within the framework ofcooperation under the Partnership for Peace Programme. The secondagreement stipulates the status of military divisions in the operations onparticipant’s territories under the Partnership for Peace Programme.

Military-political cooperation between the Republic of Kazakhstanand NATO under the Partnership Programme focuses on:

i) discussions regarding questions of stabilization in the region;ii) exchange of opinions regarding arms control and disarmament;ii) participation in NATO activities;iv) Informing countries - members of NATO and other NATO

partners under the Partnership Programme about the positionof Kazakhstan on various foreign policy questions, problems ofregional safety, including realization of own political initiativeson Eurasian union and within the framework of Conference onInteraction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia(CICA).14

Several high level military and political officials including NATO’sSecretary General, Javier Solana, Chairman of Military Committee,General K. Neumann and General George Mackenzie visitedKazakhstan between 1997 to 1998. These visits testify to thestrengthening of cooperation with the NATO, concretely through the“Individual Programme of Partnership (IPP).” Besides its militarycooperation with the NATO, Kazakhstan supports the NATO presencein Central Asia, in view of the situation in Afghanistan.

Within the framework of preparing peacekeeping forces,Kazakhstan has extended cooperation to the NATO for some years.For the first time in August 1996, the battalion of peacemaking forces

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created by Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, joined the UnitedStates within the framework of the PFP programme. The USA sponsorsthe training of the Kazakh officers at military schools and colleges ofthe NATO.

In declaring the need for joint efforts to create a universalEuropean-Atlantic Security System, Javier Solana stressed the principleof cooperation as the basis for a new approach to the common defence.The NATO actively connects the countries of the region to anti-crisisactions. During his official visit to Kazakhstan in July 2000, NATOSecretary General, George Robertson noted that the NATO attachessignificance to relations with Kazakhstan as both Kazakhstan and theNATO share common interests in combating terrorism, smuggling andthe drugs mafia.

After the Taliban were ousted in December 2001, and thesubsequent creation of an Interim Government in Afghanistan, theAmerican presence in Central Asia strengthened the belief that NATO,the USA and their allies would control the security of the region. On 7June 2002, Kazakhstan became the first Central Asian country to jointhe NATO’s “Process of Planning and Analysis (PARP).” Thisinternational programme was developed to evaluate the activities of thearmed forces, to provide multinational combat training, and to carry outsearch and rescue and humanitarian operations with NATO forces. ThePARP procedure is designed for six years. The expansion ofcooperation between Kazakhstan and NATO, the use of huge militaryand economic potential that this organization and its members possess,substantially promotes the strengthening of national security and themaintenance of stability in Kazakhstan.

The analysis and response to current challenges and threats,including international terrorism, organized crime, uncontrolledmigration, drugs trafficking and the distribution of weapons of massdestruction (WMDs), will be the main agendas of the basic dialogue ofKazakhstan with NATO and OSCE in the present and in the future.The NATO members may maintain a long term military presence inCentral Asia, which demonstrates that the Western powers regard



Central Asia as a crucial buffer against the threats and crises of the 21stCentury…15 Kazakhstan’s participation in the “Partnership for thePeace” programme is an opportunity to integrate in the global securitysystem, implement international military and political cooperation.Armed with the experience of the European security structures OSCE,EU and the Republic of Kazakhstan can create effective securitysystem suitable to all concerned.

REFERENCES1. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and

Its Geostrategic Imperatives, New York: Basic Books, 1997.2. Speeches of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan

Nazarbayev at the UN Millennium Summit, New York, 6 September2000, Diplomatic Courier, no.3, 2000, p.88.

3. “The Strategy of Kazakhstan Becoming and Developing as a SovereignState”, Kazakhstan-2030: Prosperity, Security and Improvement ofthe Wealth of all Kazakhstanis, Almaty, 1998.

4. “Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty Memorandum on SecurityGuarantees as a result of Joining of the Republic of Kazakhstan theNuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty”, International LawDocuments Collection, Almaty, 1998, pp.249-255 and 265-266.

5. “Materials on the Official Visit of President Nursultan Nazarbayev tothe USA”, Diplomatic Courier, no.4, 1994, pp.3-6.

6. The Visit of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan NursultanNazarbayev to France, Diplomatic Courier, no.3, 2000, p.14.

7. Rar Aleksandre, “If there is a New Choice in Putin’s Policy”,Internationale Politik, no.10, 2001, pp.51-52.

8. General Report on the Activities of the European Union 2001,Brussels, 2002, pp.174, 320; Bulletin 4-2001, point 1.4.7.; Bulletin 12-2001, point 1.6.86.

9. Chris Patten in Central Asia, General Report, 2003; Bulletin 12-2003,point 1.6.22, p.270.

10. Kasymzhomart Tokayev, The Diplomacy of the Republic ofKazakhstan in Globalisation Circumstances, Almaty, 2000, pp.272,315.

11. “Declaration of Istanbul Summit”, 18 November 1999.

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12. “Charter for European Security”, Istanbul, 18 November 1999.13. “Partnership for Peace: Frame Document”, International Law

Documents Collection, Almaty, 1998, pp.300-302.14. Ibid.15. Birgit Bawer, “The Struggle for the Influence in the Central Asia Region:

China’s Influence is still Limited”, Internationale Politik, no.2, 2002,p.19.


KAZAKHSTAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Klara Makasheva

In the beginning of the new millennium, the world underwent aspectacular change. With this, each nation state now aspires to keepabreast of the changing dynamics of international relations across theworld as well as to find a place among the members of the worldcommunity. The world community is at a critical stage of developmentand formation of a new type of human civilization. In the era ofglobalization and integration, which becomes the dominating tendencyof global development, interdependence of interests of the statesgrows.1 As each state comprehends its role in the world, finding aworthy place in the world community is important for Kazakhstantoday. It is obvious for Kazakhstan that active participation in worldand regional affairs is an indispensable condition for survival andstrengthening of its sovereignty.2

Since globalisation overcomes unilateral character of dependence,it is mutual coexistence rather than inter-dependence of states which isrequired to tackle one of the problems the present world has beenfacing, i.e., parity between globalisation and national interests that isnational sovereignty. Kazakhstan, on its part, considers respect forsovereignty of each state as the cardinal principle of internationalrelations. No global system will prove to be viable, if there is nointeraction between the states. And that is where national interest, whichis the synthesis of internal and external factors, plays an important role.The global responsibility of respecting sovereignty of each state is,therefore, driven by national interests of states. As a whole, globalizationand national interests of the states, though not mutually exclusive, havecomplementary structural elements and are guarantors of steadydevelopment of international relations.

The beginning of the new century coincides with the beginning ofa new stage in the foreign policy of Kazakhstan - a stage of the political

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pragmatism directed towards strengthening and developing of bases ofindependence and sovereignty of Kazakhstan. Political pragmatismmeans extraction of maximum advantages and benefits for a countrythrough its vibrant foreign policy. Recently in the West and on the post-Soviet space, objective opinion affirms that in the age of globalization,the role of the state in the economic and social sector should grow.According to American analyst J. K. Galbraith, for the last half-century,successful and long periods of general development always occurredin the countries having stable and strong governments, mixed economyand poorly advanced markets. Here it is pertinent to recollect thewords of Charles de Gaulle that “the state dies from lack of authorityor even from insufficient comprehension by authority of theresponsibility.” The state should develop and put into practice long-term strategies of development of the country. It can be assumed thatthe foreign policy of Kazakhstan should be inextricably related to theeconomic needs of the country, and Foreign Policy Department needsto take more pragmatic position to uphold the country’s strategicinterests. First of all, it emphasises the functional priorities of our foreignpolicy - definition of the legal status of the Caspian Sea, routes oftransportation of the Kazakhstan oil, delimitation of the frontiers ofKazakhstan, attracting investments etc.

With the end of Cold War new states including the Republic ofKazakhstan joined the world community. The sovereign Republic ofKazakhstan became the full member of the United Nations on 2 March1992, taking up the obligations stated in the Charter of the UnitedNations.3 Within its fifteen years of independence, relations betweenKazakhstan and the United Nations developed remarkably and haveremained stable and mutually advantageous. The basic directions ofactivity in Kazakhstan by the international organizations under theUnited Nations are to offer grants for steady development of humanpotential and to render technical help, advisory services and preparationof the national staff.

From the date of signing the agreement between the Republic ofKazakhstan and the United Nations with regard to the opening of theUN activities in Kazakhstan, active teamwork for developing and



realizing the programmes in the spheres of political transformation,democratization, economic reforms, steady social development andpreservation of the environment began. With the collaboration amongforeign scientific research institutes, private sector and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs), various seminars and conferenceswere held, constant meetings convened, joint councils created,declarations made besides making recommendations for socialdevelopment, education, culture, science and communications, statusand position of women and children, struggle against narco trade,trafficking and crime, health protection and environment, improvementof working conditions agricultural growth etc.

Ever since its independence, Kazakhstan became the activeparticipant in the international programmes, projects, conventions andthe agreements developed under the aegis of the United NationsOrganizations. For the last few years, the international community hasbeen observing development of democracy and steady marketeconomy in Kazakhstan. The specialized structures of the UnitedNations have provided Kazakhstan their help for its political, economicand socio-cultural development.

The United Nations Organization plays the vital role of a forum,capable to stimulate general concern and practical actions formaintenance of regional and international safety, development andmaintenance of the global norms, conditions of economic development,human rights and preservation of the environment. Fundamental activityof the United Nations is the maintenance of balance of interests of thestates.4 The United Nations Organization which includes 191 states ofthe world, has been formed to maintain international peace and safety,strengthen cooperation between the nations, provide assistance for socialprogress, increase the standard of living and protection of human rights.

Kazakhstan supports the maintenance of a more fair representationof the members states of the United Nations in Security Council, a morebalanced character, its greater authority and productivity. Kazakhstanalso supports expansion of the structure of the members of the SecurityCouncil.5

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The United Nations is now more concerned about the maintenanceof regional and global safety. Presently one of the most dangerousthreats to mankind is the proliferation of the nuclear weapons and theWeapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). Kazakhstan has supported theidea of creation of nuclear free zones as emphasized by the global body,particularly in Central Asia.6 During the 52nd and 53rd sessions of theUN General Assembly, three Central Asian Republics includingKazakhstan became the co-author of two resolutions in this regard.

In the sphere of non-proliferation of the nuclear weapons,Kazakhstan has found the reflection in the work of sixth surveyconference of 2000 in Kazakhstan. In the final document of thisconference, a call was made to end all tactical and strategic nuclearweapons from the Central Asian region. Kazakhstan persistently andconsistently supports the creation of effective structures of safety in theAsian region. At the 47th session of the UN General Assembly, KazakhPresident Nursultan Nazarbayev put emphasis on the need forinteraction and measures of trust in Asia.7 In September 1999 for thefirst time, the legal basis of the system of Asian security wasincorporated in the Declaration of the principles regulating the relationsbetween the states signed at the Foreign Ministers level. Kazakhstanfirmly supports the peacemaking efforts of the United Nations. Itsupported the UN strategy of preventive diplomacy to resolve crises inKosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo etc.

Geo-economic realities of the modern globalized world dictate thenecessity of creating uniform transport space. Therefore, thedevelopment of a transport infrastructure of Kazakhstan as the countrywhich is not having an exit to sea, is considered as one of the long-term priorities in the strategy of development suggested by PresidentNazarbayev in “Kazakhstan – 2030.” The 55th session of the UnitedNations General Assembly submitted a resolution on the system oftransit in the states in Central Asia which are not having an exit to thesea. The document would draw attention of the world community tothe necessity of forming transit-transport system in Central Asia forcreating real preconditions for exit of goods and services of the CentralAsian states to the international markets. Kazakhstan together with the



United Nations and its regional structures pays attention to regionaleconomic cooperation. In the first Eurasian Economic Summit held inApril 2000, the world community argued to cooperate within theframework of investment projects in the spheres of transport, water andpower resources. This Summit paved the way for an internationaleconomic conference in Tajikistan.

One of the negative consequences of the process of globalizationis environmental problem in various regions of the world. Kazakhstanis interested in mobilization of the world community to sort out theproblems in ecological disaster zones particularly in the region of formerSemipalatinsk range. The members of the United Nations at 52nd and53rd sessions at UN General Assembly expressing their concern onthese problems, supported the resolution “international cooperation andcoordination of activity with a view to rehabilitation of the populationand ecology and economic development of Semipalatinsk region inKazakhstan.”

The framework of national strategy of development and prioritiesof the United Nations is going to help Kazakhstan to continue its reformsprogramme particularly in the social sphere. Several bodies of the UNare cooperating with the Kazakhstan government, and have developedprojects and programmes to help the poor and homeless, providingmicro-credit systerm for the poor sections of the population, theprogramme on assistance of employment and development of small andaverage business and encouragement of business among women. TheUnited Nations assists in reforming the public health services andeducation. In particular, the public health departments have taken stepsto increase the availability and quality of medical services for thepopulation, to strengthen the system of medico-sanitary help. Besides,the UN bodies are focussing on decentralization of education.

The United Nations aspires to adjust practical cooperation withnational parliaments. Kazakhstan is party to ten multilateral internationaltreaties. Kazakhstan has supported the Declaration of the UNMillennium Summit in New York in 2000 and has vowed to extend allhelp for cooperation and development in the world. At this Summit,

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Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev noted that “the process ofglobalization puts new tasks before the world community. In theseconditions, he added, an extremely important role is to be played bythe community of the nations to deal with new calls and threats. Hefurther said that the main task of the United Nations is to maintain ofpositive character of the process of globalization which opens ampleopportunities for less developed countries and the states with transitiveeconomy.” Working along with the United Nations, Kazakhstanconsistently supports strengthening the sovereignty and internationalauthority. In 1992, President Nazarbayev put forward the initiativeabout convening the meeting on interaction and measures of trust in Asiawhich reflects the spirit of the United Nations and its practical actionsdirected on strengthening of regional safety.

Kazakh diplomacy puts emphasis on the issue of disarmament andliquidation of the weapons of mass destruction. Thus Kazakhstanconfirms its obligations to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).Kazakhstan also supports the idea of preparation of an internationalcode of conduct regarding non-distribution of ballistic missiles.Accumulation of arms and ammunitions threaten safety and stability ina number of regions of the world, including Central Asia. As thesituation in Afghanistan is alarming, United Nations has paying specialattention to this problem.

Kazakhstan raised in the UN the issue of maintenance of socialand economic development of Central Asia. The United NationsSpecial Programme for Economy of Central Asia (SPECA) gave boostto economic development of the states of the region, in addition tomutual cooperation and their integration into economy of the countriesof Europe and Asia.

The world community has recognized the importance of creationof a regional system of transit in Central Asia as these countriesexperience difficulties with regard to access to the high seas and theworld markets. In 2003, Kazakhstan organized an InternationalConference of Ministers of Transport of the Group of least developedcountries, which are not having access to the sea. Representatives of



several international organizations and donor countries participated inthis Conference.

Kazakhstan is also going to extend active cooperation to theWorld Trade Organization (WTO). There were serious concerns overnuclear tests on Semipalatinsk range. Under the initiative of the Kazakhdelegations to UN in 1997, 1998 and 2000 respectively, the resolution“International Cooperation and Coordination of activity with a view ofrehabilitation of the population and ecology and economic developmentof Semipalatinsk range in Kazakhstan” was accepted by the GeneralAssembly of the United Nations. On its basis, the programme ofactions consisting of diversified projects in the field of public healthservices, ecology, economy, humanitarian help and information has beendeveloped. In 1999 the International Conference passed a resolutionon these problems in Tokyo under the aegis of the United Nations.

New geopolitical realities and radical changes all over the world,accentuated a new role of the United Nations in the new conditions.The 9/11 tragedy further sharpened the internal contradictions of amodern world order and the danger of international terrorism confirmedthe necessity of fuller use of potential of the United Nations. Kazakhstanis devoted to cooperation with the USA and other members of theinternational anti-terrorist coalition. Within a short span in the UnitedNations, Kazakhstan has successfully been integrated into theinternational community of the states.

The United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan launched theFrame Programme of the United Nations on rendering assistance witha view of development for 2000-2004. In Kazakhstan, the Programmeof the United Nations is directed towards the maintenance of theprojects for nation building process of the country that includesinteraction between the United Nations and local organizationalstructures which are strengthening the system of social security,development of a transport infrastructure, irrigation and potable watersupply to the people.

In the changing world scenario after 9/11 terrorist attacks, severalquestions cropped up regarding maintenance of the international and

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regional stability in the future. As President Nazarbayev declared that“in the world of 21st century, the approach to world affairs in theconditions of globalization requires an understanding of problems facingthe community. Adherence of Kazakhstan to the idea of multipolarity isnot directed against any states or the unions and does not pursue thepurpose to belittle their role in global affairs. On the contrary, movementin this direction will serve democratization and all the systems of theinternational relations.”

The future world order should be the world without wars andconflicts, dictatorship and the violence, the closed borders with “IronCurtain” and dividing lines. It should be based on a wide and mutuallyadvantageous cooperation of all the countries of the world. Thecountries together can be able to face the global challenges - distributionof the Weapons of Mass Destruction, international terrorism, narco-terrorism, extremism, ecological degradation etc.8 As a responsiblemember of the United Nations, it is the duty and responsibility of theRepublic of Kazakhstan to promote world peace and progress besidesits own development – social, economic and political.

Last but not the least, as the largest state (area wise) in the CentralAsian region, Kazakhstan should step forward to bring all other CentralAsian Republics under one umbrella to sort out the outstandingproblems in the region. Kazakhstan should be at the vanguard to tapthe natural resources in the region along with her Central Asianneighbours and reap the benefits for one and all.

REFERENCES1. Speeches of President Nazarbayev on “Priorities of Kazakhstani

Diplomacy at the Turn of the Century”, 2000, pp.8-9.2. Anatomy of European Integration, Almaty, 2003, p.22.3. “Post-Soviet Central Asia: Losses and Gains,” Oriental Literature, 1998,

p.55.4. A.H. Arystanbekova, United Nations and Kazakhstan, Almaty, Dike

Press, 2002, p.203.5. A. H. Arystanbekova, “To be Problem of Reforming the Organisation

of United Nations,” Diplomatic Courier, Astana, 1998, no. 3, p.80.



6. E. A. Idrisov, “The Foreign Policy of Kazakhstan in GlobalisationConditions”, Priorities of Kazakhstani Diplomacy at the Turn of Centuries,2000, p.38.

7. K. K. Tokaev, “International Policy of Kazakhstan: Cooperation,Integration, Well-Neighbourhood,” Diplomatic Courier, Astana, 1998,no. 4, p.124.

8. “Kazakhstan Aspires to the Future”, Evening Astana, 30 December2000; Diplomatic Courier, Astana, 2000, no. 4, p.127.


OSCE ACTIVITIES IN CENTRAL ASIA

Ailuna Utegenova

INTRODUCTIONMore than ten years have passed since the incorporation of

Central Asian Republics (CARs) into the Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe (OSCE). After their independence, the CARshave faced a variety of security threats and challenges. The internationalsecurity organizations and the OSCE as well as other institutions havebeen increasingly active in the region, and have established centres inall the five Central Asian states in late 1990s.

During 1990s, the region was included in the political agenda ofthe OSCE. In the second half of 1990s and early 2000s, Central Asiawas elevated to one of the top priority regions in the zone of the OSCEactivity. During their visits to the region, the high profile OSCE officialsconfirmed that Central Asia was considered as an integral part of theOSCE community.

The Central Asian Republics, in their turn, consider OSCE as animportant mechanism for their inclusion in the wider architecture ofsecurity. They view the OSCE as the forum, in which they can carrytheir regional problems of military, economic and ecological importance.The OSCE is not an economic organization, but it confirms its readinessto contribute to attracting international financial institutions to solve theeconomic problems of Central Asia. Former Secretary General ofOSCE, Wilhelm Höynck pointed out, “the relationship of the OSCEwith five of its member states from Central Asia, in OSCE language‘Participating States’, has seen ups and downs, successes and failures,performance and non-performance.”1

However, a Turkish scholar Ömer Burhan Tüzel stresses that thereis growing disinterest among a number of Central Asian states towardsthe OSCE. This comes surprisingly at a time, when the internationalcommunity in general and the OSCE in particular have been paying



increasing attention to Central Asia in the wake of 9/11 attacks in theUnited States and ensuing developments in neighbouring Afghanistan.In his opinion, the OSCE has not been successful in addressing theconcerns and needs of the Central Asian Republics, notably in theeconomic and security spheres.2

In the beginning of 1990s, the ground was laid for the institutional,functional and geographical expansion of the OSCE. To providepractical support to the newly independent states in consolidatingdemocratic institutions and human rights, strengthening civil society andthe rule of law became one of the main priorities of the OSCE. Duringthat time, the OSCE put too much emphasis on the human dimensionin Central Asia and other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)countries. The problem of the OSCE in the region was that there wasnot enough emphasis on other dimensions of the OSCE – politico-military, economic and environmental. The OSCE’s broad andcomprehensive concept of security and a balanced approach towardsall these dimensions was not maintained during 1990s.

COOPERATION BETWEEN CARs AND THE OSCEThe 1990s were marked by the complete change of conditions

that determined European security architecture. The former SovietRepublics actually proved to be out of any security mechanisms anddid not have the intention to join the integration processes in the world.

On 28 January 1992, the CSCE supported the idea of inclusionof all the Republics of the former Soviet Union excepting Georgia inthe European integration process. There were serious objections in thediplomatic circles against the decision to accept the Republics of theformer USSR in the CSCE. As some experts thought, Asianization ofthe European process put a question mark on the need for consensusduring major decision makings. Theoretically, each Republic wouldhave the right to veto the European problems. However, in the opinionof some diplomats, it was not worthwhile to overestimate this threat.There was a fixed mechanism of economic and political pressure thatacted effectively in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) andEuropean Union. There were more positive gains from the participation

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of Central Asian Republics in the CSCE. The main advantage of theirentry was a possibility for the Western powers and Russia to effectivelycontrol the defence policy of the CSCE’s new members and to monitorthe human rights situation. The Eastern European countries and Austria,which were sceptical of the idea about the membership of the CentralAsian Republics in the CSCE, later dropped their objections.

In the beginning of 1992, Central Asian countries became fullfledged members of the CSCE. They signed the Helsinki Final Act andthe Charter of Paris and took upon all political obligations of the CSCE.One of the main goals of their entry into CSCE-turned-OSCE was toget international recognition. Membership of the OSCE was a goodopportunity for the newly independent countries to establish relationsin a multilateral format. International organizations in Central Asiaplayed an important role to bring the five Central Asian Republics intothe international community.

At CSCE’s Helsinki Summit in 1992, it was proclaimed that “thetransition to and development of democracy and market economy bythe new democracies is being carried forward with determination amidstdifficulties and varying conditions. We offer our support and solidarityto the ‘Participating States’ undergoing transformation to democracyand market economy. We welcome their efforts to become fullyintegrated into the wider community of states. Making this transitionirreversible will ensure the security and prosperity of all.”3

The “Participating States” also decided to establish a programmeof coordinated support for those “Participating States”, which havebeen members of the CSCE since 1991. It was pointed out that theprogramme would be coordinated by the Office for DemocraticInstitutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) under the overall guidance ofthe Committee of Senior Officials (CSO). The ODIHR would act as acentre of information for relevant activities of the CSCE and the“Participating States” as well as international organizations. Efforts foreffective integration of the new “Participating States” were highlightedby the visit of the CSCE Chairman-in-Office to Central Asia during thatperiod.



At the Budapest Summit, the CSCE ceased to be a process andbecame an Organization. A Memorandum on Security Guarantees forKazakhstan was signed by the major nuclear powers during the CSCESummit meeting. The Memorandum guarantees independence andterritorial integrity of Kazakhstan, and non-aggression, bothconventional and nuclear, against it. Under the Memorandum, ifaggression is committed against Kazakhstan, the UN Security Councilmust respond immediately. Kazakh President, Nursultan Nazarbayevsaid that the Memorandum is vital for Kazakhstan’s security and for itsparticipation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state.

Lisbon Summit of the OSCE in 1996 emphasised the role of theCentral Asian countries in the OSCE. Heads of the OSCE“Participating States” expressed their desire to make sincere effortstowards the development of democratic structures, strengthening therule of law, maintenance of stability and preventing conflicts in theregion.4 On 16 March 1995, the OSCE Permanent Council decidedto establish OSCE Liaison Office for Central Asia in Tashkent(Uzbekistan). The objective of opening such an office in Central Asiawas the establishment of closer relations between five Central Asian“Participating States” and the OSCE within the framework of 1992strategy of integrating the recent “Participating States.” The LiaisonOffice started its activities in June 1995.

The activities of the OSCE Central Asian Liaison Office weredifferent from other missions, because its mandate provided the activityin accordance with all OSCE obligations such as the development ofdemocratic institutions and civil society as well as maintaining andimproving economic and ecological security. The Liaison Office inCentral Asia itself was the part of the Secretariat, but not the Centrefor Conflict Prevention. It was also directly accountable to the OSCESecretary General, but not to the Director of the Centre.

Central Asian Liaison Office participated in the OSCE seminarsand conferences dedicated to regional security and strengthening theconfidence against illegal drug trafficking and crime control, stable and

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transparent legislation on economic issues, and regional ecologicalproblems. However, this Liaison Office was unable to carry out all itsregional obligations. After the establishment of the OSCE Centres inthe Central Asian Republics, the functions of Central Asian LiaisonOffice were reformulated. On 14 December 2000, Permanent Councildecided to change the name of Central Asian Liaison Office in Tashkentas the OSCE Centre. This decision was made in connection with thechange in the Central Asian Liaison Office’s activities and expansion ofthe OSCE in Central Asia. Central Asian Liaison Office played animportant role in strengthening the relations between “ParticipatingStates” of Central Asia and the OSCE.

In April 1998, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, who wasthe OSCE Chairman-in-Office (CIO), visited Central Asia. Hedescribed Central Asia as a priority region in the zone of OSCEactivities. The visit was followed by the decision to establish the OSCECentres in Almaty (Kazakhstan), Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) and Ashkhabad(Turkmenistan). The centres, opened in early 1999, were designed toimplement the OSCE principles and commitments as well as tostrengthen cooperation among Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan andKyrgyzstan within the ambit of the OSCE. Special emphasis was givento the regional context in all OSCE dimensions, including the economic,environmental, human and military-political aspects of security. Thecentres now maintain close relations with the local authorities,universities, research institutions and non-governmental organizations(NGOs).

The establishment of the post of the Personal Representative ofthe CIO for Central Asia at the end of 1990s can be considered as anevidence of the OSCE’s growing desire in strengthening cooperationwith the Central Asian region. In April 1999, Ambassador WilhelmHöynck, who was the OSCE Secretary General in 1993-1996, wasappointed as Personal Representative of the CIO for Central Asia. ThePersonal Representative was responsible for developing the conceptualplan for further integration of the Central Asian Republics and expansionof OSCE activity in this region. The establishment of the post ofPersonal Representative of the CIO for Central Asia was OSCE’s



intention to strengthen political dialogue with the countries of the region.It is necessary to note that the activity of the Personal Representativesof the CIO is a very delicate matter in political sense. Emphasis wasgiven to the principle of “non-intervention in internal affairs”, which isone of the ten principles of the Helsinki Act of 1975 with regard to therelations between “Participating States.”

However, the OSCE regional initiatives towards Central Asia didnot always find support in these Republics, which did not welcome“special attention to Central Asia” within the framework of theOrganization. For example, some states of the region objected to theassignment of the Personal Representative of the CIO for Central Asia.

In June 1999, Ambassador Wilhelm Höynck visited all theRepublics of Central Asia, and had the opportunity to discuss furtherprospects for OSCE activity in the region. In his report of 15 July 1999to the Permanent Council, prepared on the basis of his meetings in theregion, Ambassador Höynck emphasised that the discussion must dealwith the regional dimension taking into account the individual needs ofthe individual countries and differences between them. On the basis ofthe report, the intensive discussion about developing closer relationsbetween the OSCE and Central Asian Republics began.

The Istanbul Charter for European Security of 1999 and theDeclaration of Istanbul Summit had the special role in determiningCentral Asia as the priority zone of the OSCE activity. The ParticipatingStates proclaimed that in 1999 they had witnessed significant increasein their cooperation with the five “Participating States” in Central Asia.Paras 13-14 of the Istanbul Declaration were devoted to Central Asia:“We share the concerns expressed by the Participating States in CentralAsia regarding international terrorism, violent extremism, organizedcrime, drugs and arms trafficking. We agree that national, regional andjoint action by the international community is necessary to cope withthese threats, including those stemming from areas neighbouring theOSCE Participating States. We further recognise the importance ofaddressing economic and environmental risks in the region, particularlythe issues related to water resources, energy and erosion. We are

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convinced that strengthening regional cooperation will promote stabilityand security in Central Asia, and we welcome the active approachtaken by the Chairman-in-Office to this effect.”5

It was proclaimed in the Istanbul Charter that “security in areasnearby, particularly in the Mediterranean area as well as areas in directproximity to Participating States of the Central Asian region, is ofincreasing importance to the OSCE. We recognize that instability inthese areas poses challenges, which directly affect the security andprosperity of the OSCE states.”6 Until recently, almost all OSCEactivities in the economic and environment spheres of CARs werereduced to limited small projects. Although such activities were flexible,they could be more effective in the more long term plan. Therefore, theOSCE started to combine small projects into more structured, middleand long term programmes.

The countries of Central Asia have a great interest in the economicand ecological dimension of the OSCE that can be explained by socio-economic problems in the countries of the region. The OSCE Centresplay an important role in promoting concrete projects in Central Asiain the fields of economy and ecology. However, the OSCE humandimension remains to be the most significant and most developed, bothin quantitative and qualitative senses. One of the reasons is that theOSCE occupies better position than other international organizations inthis dimension. Though in the economic and ecological dimension, theOSCE remains to be an insignificant player. Nevertheless, it is oftensaid that precisely the economic-ecological dimension will be thepossible sphere of expanding the OSCE activity in Central Asia. Bydeveloping its activity in economic-ecological dimension in the region,the OSCE will contribute to strengthen regional cooperation.

OSCE ROLE IN TAJIK PEACE PROCESSIn comparison with many of the internal conflicts of the late

20th century, the inter-Tajik conflict is notable both for its rapidescalation into a war in 1992 and also for its relatively quick settlementthrough a negotiated settlement in June 1997. The Tajik peace processbrought together a range of international partners, who were able to



coordinate their interventions effectively to support the efforts of Tajiks toend the war.

In the first half of 1990s, the CSCE became involved in thesettlement process of Tajikistan’s conflict through its Representative.The tasks of the CSCE Representative in Tajikistan were to coordinateand cooperate with the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary Generaland the team of the UN officials in Tajikistan to resolve the conflictsituation. The Representative kept the CSCE informed about thedevelopments in Tajikistan.

The UN Officer V. Goryayev stressed the important contributionof the OSCE to the Tajik peace process. It was agreed that the UNwould have its leading role in the peace process, while the OSCE wouldplay the primary role in promoting development of democraticinstitutions, which included organizing elections, developing a newconstitution, and monitoring human rights in Tajikistan.7 On 19 February1994, the CSCE Mission to Tajikistan started its work in Dushanbe.In implementing its mandate, the Mission established contacts with the“regionalist and political forces” in the country, facilitating dialogue andbuilding confidence. Another important activity of the Mission was toassist in the development of legal and democratic political institutionsand processes. In close cooperation with the ODIHR, the Missionoffered, in particular, advice to the Tajik authorities on drafting the newconstitution. The Mission also tried to promote respect for human rightsand followed the inter-Tajik talks under the Chairmanship of UN.8

In June 1997, the General Agreement on the Establishment ofPeace and National Accord in Tajikistan was signed in Moscow. TheOSCE Mission to Tajikistan had been an observer of all the inter-Tajiknegotiations and it became a signatory to the Protocol on theGuarantees of Implementation of the General Agreement on theEstablishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan signed inTehran in May 1997. As a condition of this Protocol, the OSCE,through its Mission in Dushanbe (Tajikistan), was entrusted with thetask of facilitating the implementation of the General Agreement in theareas related to human rights and the establishment of political and legal

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institutions and processes along democratic lines. In order to monitorthe implementation of the General Agreement and to provide the partieswith expert consultants and other good offices, the guarantor states andorganizations agreed to establish a Contact Group to be stationed inDushanbe. The Mission regularly participated in its deliberations.

Since the Commission for National Reconciliation (CNR) startedits work in September 1997, the Mission provided assistance andadvice to the CNR in its review of the amendments to the constitutionand changes to laws dealing with political parties, elections and massmedia. With the aim of encouraging the development of politicalprocesses, the Mission organized various conferences and seminars ontopics such as “Peace and Reconciliation Process in Tajikistan”; “Issuesof Consolidation of the Tajik Nation”; and “Role of Youth in the FutureTajikistan.” Cooperating closely with the Government in implementingits mandate, the Mission has succeeded in establishing contacts withregional and political forces in the country, thereby facilitating dialogueand building confidence.

KAZAKHSTAN AND OSCEIn February 2003, during the session of the Permanent Council,

Kazakhstan proposed its candidature for the post of the OSCEChairman-in-Office in 2009. It is necessary to note that until this time,none of the former Republics of the Soviet Union had occupied thiscoveted post. The Chairman-in-Office is vested with overallresponsibility for the executive action and coordination of currentOSCE activities. This includes coordination of the work of OSCEinstitutions, representing the Organization and supervising activitiesrelated to conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflictrehabilitation. The CIO may form adhoc and steering groups andappoint personal representatives to deal with specific crisis or conflictsituations.

The ambitions of Kazakhstan for the OSCE Chairmanshipattracted reactions from the international community. The leadingposition of Kazakhstan in many aspects in the CIS is obvious. Thesuccessful economic and political reforms, political stability as well as



inter-ethnic harmony demonstrate the significant potential of modernday Kazakhstan. At present, a wide discussion of the Kazakh proposal isgoing on in the OSCE and final decision in this regard would be made soon.

Kazakhstan wants the OSCE to increase its preventive workagainst security threats and challenges to expand its role in the fightagainst international terrorism and extremism, mainly in Central Asia;to develop a system that prevents illegal trafficking of drugs in theregion; and to establish a special structure under the OSCE to deal withthe threat to regional security.

The OSCE can also play an important role in providing securityin the Caspian region. In this aspect, Kazakhstan proposed to sign the“Caspian Region Stability Pact.” The key point of the Pact would beto abolish the use of military forces in the Caspian Sea region. Besides,preventing technogenic emergencies and catastrophes, formation ofshielding barriers in the way of the spread of epidemics are seen as thepromising directions of the OSCE activities in Central Asia. In this way,Central Asia could become one of the outposts of the OSCE’s standagainst global threats and challenges.

Kazakhstan gives much importance to cooperation with the OSCEin the process of forming the architecture of Asian security. TheConference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asiainitiated by Kazakhstan could serve as the basis for it. The idea of theConference was taken from the experience of the European processof security and cooperation and has similar aspects with the CSCEprocess. It should be pointed out that President of Kazakhstan, NursultanNazarbayev suggested the idea of a Conference on Interaction andConfidence Building Measures in Asia at the CSCE’s Helsinki Summitin July 1992. At that time, the President declared Kazakhstan’sreadiness to carry out all political activities to convene an AsianSecurity Conference.

The OSCE Centre in Almaty, established in 1998, monitorspolitical, legal and economic developments with a view to maintainstability in the country and the region as well. It also promotes OSCEstandards and commitments within Kazakhstan. Much of the Centre’s

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efforts focus on the security field, which includes issues such asinternational terrorism, border security, control of small arms and lightweapons and police activities. To increase effectiveness at the regionallevel, the Centre works in coordination with other OSCE Centres inCentral Asia. Joint activities comprise events such as meetings on theissues of fight against terrorism and respect for human rights as well asthe exchange of experiences among the law enforcement officials of theCentral Asian Republics.

A Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic ofKazakhstan and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions andHuman Rights (ODIHR) was signed at the end of 1998. It includedregular consultations on human dimension issues and jointimplementation of corresponding projects with non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs). In accordance with the MoU, ODIHR togetherwith the OSCE Centre in Almaty implemented projects on theestablishment of Ombudsman Institute in Kazakhstan; improvinglegislation related to elections; and conducting legal reforms.

REFORM IN OSCE AND POSITION OF CARsThe OSCE has to adapt a new security environment in order to

be able to address new threats and challenges. The reform in the OSCEis a necessary process aimed at strengthening OSCE’s effectivenessand to respond current criticism of its field operations concentrated onlyin post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav countries.

According to the OSCE, a comprehensive security concept, theprotection and promotion of human rights, along with economic andenvironmental cooperation should be considered as important elementsfor the maintenance of peace and stability in Central Asia. However,the OSCE’s regional activities in a number of countries contradictedthe initial concept of its missions as the means of aid to participatingcountries. Central Asian countries are now in the group of CIScountries speaking in favour of reforms in the OSCE’s field activities.

Nine Presidents of the CIS countries including Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan pointed out serious shortcomings



of the OSCE in their “Joint Statement on the State of Affairs in theOSCE” during an informal meeting in Moscow on 3 July 2004 andmade elaborate constructive suggestions to strengthen the OSCE. Thesuggestions were included in the Joint Appeal of the CIS member statesto the OSCE partners signed by Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Ukraine,Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan during the meetingof their Foreign Ministers in Astana on 15 September 2004.Turkmenistan did not sign the documents, although it seems to supportother CIS member states’ campaign to reform the OSCE. The JointAppeal comprised following considerations and suggestions: toreinforce the OSCE activities in combating international terrorism anderadicating its underlying causes; to develop a full-fledged OSCEeconomic and environmental wing; to ensure the development ofuniform objective criteria for the evaluation by the ODIHR and theOSCE missions of electoral process throughout the Organization’sspace etc. The CIS member states called for moving away from thepractice of limiting OSCE field activities to the monitoring of thepolitical situation, with a priority emphasis in the course of its reformon specific project activities which should be carried out transparently,taking into account the needs and requirements of the receiving states.9

Western scholars consider Russia to be the main initiator of theCIS campaign to adopt the Moscow Declaration and Astana Appeal.Arie Bloed stresses that “Russia managed to get Belarus, Armenia,Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on board,but the colleagues from Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova refused tosign the Astana letter… Whether Kazakhstan’s support for this initiativewill contribute to a consensus in the organization concerning itscandidature for the OSCE Chairmanship in 2009 is doubtful.”10

It is obvious that the main issues of the OSCE activities in the CISwere reflected in the Moscow Declaration and Astana Appeal. Therewas growing discontent among the Central Asian countries with regardto the OSCE policy in the human dimension in the region. There is aclear imbalance between the OSCE’s security dimensions – politico-military, economic, environmental and human. In 1990s, the OSCEshifted its priorities towards human dimension issues which reduced the

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Organization’s ability to oppose new challenges and threats. Therefore,the CIS member states including four Central Asian countries intendedto organize their further joint policy within the OSCE towards itsspecialized institutes and field presence and monitoring of the electoralprocess.

During the Sofia Ministerial Council in 2004, the need for thebroad discussion on strengthening the OSCE role was emphasised. Asa result of the Council’s decisions in 2005, the seven-member Panel ofEminent Persons was appointed to review the work of the OSCE. Therepresentative of Kazakhstan, Kuanysh Sultanov was appointed as oneof the seven eminent persons to find out ways to strengthen theeffectiveness of the OSCE. Kazakhstan considers its participation in theGroup as an important achievement that makes possible for it tocontribute the implementation of the OSCE’s reforming process.

CONCLUSIONAfter the end of the Cold War, the OSCE was expected to

become a unique security structure in its zone of activity. However, in1990s, the OSCE faced many difficulties in the fulfilment of its purposesand tasks. It faced a whole number of fundamental problems such asinability to solve new risks, the small budget and a vast bureaucracy.The OSCE did not achieve any tangible result in the region. However,Wilhelm Höynck notes that for the OSCE, as compared with itsobjectives, its records in Central Asia is “mixed at best.” But he thoughtthat the OSCE was in principle moving in the right direction.11 TheOSCE is now in the reforming process aimed at determination of theeffective methods of adequate response to new challenges and threats.The OSCE in Central Asia has played a significant role in the humandimension, promoting the principles of democracy, building democraticinstitutions.

Kazakhstan considers co-operation in the field of providingregional security as the integral part of efforts to strengthen globalstability. In this sense, the OSCE is a unique European organization andits comprehensive concept of security with its focus on soft securityissues, has great importance. In 1990s and even in early 2000s, the



OSCE became a useful tool of strengthening regional cooperation. TheOSCE also proposed to use its abilities as catalyst to the developmentof contacts and cooperation among the Central Asian participatingstates which could strengthen regional security sooner or later.

REFERENCES1. Wilhelm Höynck, “The OSCE in Central Asia – On the Right Track?”

Helsinki Monitor (Special Issue), p.300.2. Ömer Burhan Tüzel, Perceptions. Journal of International Affairs,

volume 8, no. 1, March-May 2003, p.33. CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, “The Challenges of Chance”,

http:www.osce.org/documents/mcs /1992/07/4046_rn.pdf4. OSCE Lisbon Document 1996, http:www.osce.org/documents/htm/

pdftohtml/4049_en.pdf.htm5. OSCE Istanbul Summit Declaration, 19 November 1999,

http:www.osce.org/documents/mcs/ 1999/11/4050en_pdf6. OSCE Istanbul Charter for European Security, 19 November 1999,

http:www.osce.org/documents/ mcs/1999/11/4050en_pdf7. V. Goryayev, “Architecture of International Involvement in the Tajik

Peace Process Accord ‘The Tajik Peace Process’”, www.c-r.org/accord/tajik/accord10/architecture.htm

8. Annual Report 1994 on OSCE Activities.9. “Appeal of the CIS Member States to the OSCE Partners”, Astana,

15 September 2004, http://www. belarusembassy.org/news/digests/pr092004.htm

10. Arie Bloed, “CIS Countries Continue to Push for a Reform of the OSCE”,Helsinki Monitor, 2004, no. 4, p.299.

11. Wilhelm Höynck, op.cit., p.311.

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KAZAKHSTAN TODAY

(Seminar Report)

Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation in collaboration withthe Central Asian Studies Programme, Jawaharlal Nehru University,New Delhi organized a one-day Seminar on Kazakhstan Today onMonday, 29 August 2005 at the School of International Studies,Jawaharlal Nehru University Campus. The Seminar was well attendedby over 80 participants representing the diplomatic community,academia, research scholars, strategic analysts and media. Notableparticipants/speakers included Mr. Kairat Umarov, Ambassador ofKazakhstan, Mr. Nurgali and Ms. Aneliya, both from the Embassy ofKazakhstan, Prof. Syedaminov, Charge D’Affaires, Embassy ofUzbekistan, Mr. Suhrob Rajabov, Charge D’Affairs, Embassy ofTajikistan, Prof. Qui Yonghui, Director, Department of ContemporaryReligions, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Beijing), Mr. VidyaSagar Varma, formerly India’s Ambassador to Kazakhstan (2002-05),Prof. K. Warikoo, Prof. Devendra Kaushik, Prof. I.N. Mukherji,Dr. K. Santhanam, Mr. Indernil Banerjie, and others.

Prof. K. Warikoo, Director, Central Asian Studies Programme,Jawaharlal Nehru University and Secretary General, HimalayanResearch and Cultural Foundation, who presided over the Seminarproceedings, in his introductory remarks, described Kazakhstan as thelargest Republic in Central Asia and the ninth largest country in world.He drew attention to its central position in Eurasia, with its borderstouching Russia in the north, Caspian Sea in the west, China in the east,Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which contributed to theunique strategic importance of Kazakhstan. Its largest non-Asian andnon-Muslim population in Central Asia accorded Kazakhstan a distinctEurasian character. The Republic is truly multiethnic, with Kazakhsaccounting for over 53.4 per cent followed by Russians with 30 percent and others. Kazakhstan is striving to forge a common Kazakhstaniidentity which would be shared both by the Kazakhs, Slavs and otherminorities.

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Prof. Warikoo highlighted the age old historico-cultural contactsbetween India and Kazakhstan, which flourished due to Silk Routeconnection and due to transmission of Buddhism from India toKazakhstan. Discovery of Buddhist monasteries/ruins in Sairam,Antonovka, Chu valley, Kyzil Kent by the Soviet/Central Asianarcheologists Bernshtam, Goryacheva, Baipakov and Kazhemiakovtestifies to these contacts. In contemporary times, the Ispat Karagandasteel plant is a great success story of Indo-Kazakh economicpartnership. Prof. Warikoo stressed the need for Kazakhstan’s politicalleadership to facilitate the setting up and operationalisation of Indo-Kazakh joint ventures in oil, gas, industry, trade and information andtechnology (IT) sectors.

Kairat Umarov , Ambassador of Kazakhstan to Indiacongratulated the organizers for holding the seminar to coincide withthe 10th anniversary of adoption of the 1995 Constitution of Kazakhstan.He stressed that this constitution proclaimed Kazakhstan a democratic,secular state with a presidential form of government. He stated thatKazakhstan today is a dynamically developing, market oriented,multiethnic and secular state. Political, economic and social stability arethe three main pillars of nation-building. There are 11 political partiesand 372 public associations. There has been no ethnic or religiousconflict in Kazakhstan. The Kazakhstan Nationalities Assembly,comprising representatives of all ethnic groups in Kazakhstan plays animportant role in maintaining the inter-ethnic peace in the country.

As regards its economic development, it has been possible byfollowing the principle - “First Economics, Then Politics.” There hasbeen ten per cent annual growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) forfive years. In 2004, foreign trade volume reaches 33 billion US dollars,with a trade surplus of seven billion US dollars. Since 1991, there hasbeen direct investment worth 30 billion US dollars in Kazakhstan. Theannual Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) influx is 1.5 billion US dollars.

Kazakhstan’s Foreign policy is aimed at creating stable, secureand friendly surroundings. “We have pro-active, multi-vector andbalanced foreign policy.” Kazakhstan is making efforts to expandfriendly relations with all countries. President Nazarbayev visited India

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in 1992. India participated in Conference of Interaction and ConfidenceBuilding in Asia (CICA) process, which is a Kazakh foreign policyinitiative. And in July 2005, India was given Observer status at theShanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

“In Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, India is defined as a reliable andstrategic partner. To match the bilateral political interaction, oureconomic cooperation needs to be encouraged. Overall trade betweenIndia and Kazakhstan in 2004 was only 96.6 million dollars, which is22.4 per cent higher than 78.9 million dollars in 2003. But it is still farbehind the potential. There is need to establish direct trade routesbetween our countries, in particular within North-South Corridor.

There is vast scope for cooperation in various fields includingmanufacturing sectors, such as textiles, construction materials,leatherware, plastics, pharmaceuticals, IT, oil and gas machinerybuilding, food processing, textiles, transport logistics, metallurgy andconstruction materials”.

Vidya Sagar Varma, formerly India’s Ambassador to Kazakhstan(2002-05), highlighted the strength of political relations between Indiaand Kazakhstan. He stated that both India and Kazakhstan are multi-religious and multi-ethnic societies. There is keen interest for Indianstudies in Kazakhstan. The Rigveda, Gita, Mahabharata andRamayana have been translated into Kazakh/Russian languages byProf. Nilibaev of Kazakhstan and published there. Indian Embassy atAlmaty runs yoga, dance and Hindi classes in Kazakhstan, with the helpof Kazakh teachers. According to Varma, one of the important stepstowards confidence building measures (CBMs) between India andKazakhstan has been Kazakhstan’s support to India’s bid for apermanent seat in the UN Security Council. Kazakhstan and India arealso going to sign an accord on counter-terrorism. There is scope forbilateral cooperation in oil, gas, tourism, industries and IT sectors.

Prof. Devendra Kaushik viewed commonness in the multi-vectorapproach in the foreign policy of Kazakhstan and the concept ofEurasianism which was advocated as an idea of multi-culturalism byVernadsky, Alexiev, Trobotsky and others. The central Eurasian

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landmass which is a geographical continuum with historical commonalityis not divided by any land, mountain or sea barriers. Turkey,Kazakhstan and Russia are the three Eurasian countries in geographicalsense, and this concept can be extended to India and China as wellfrom historical and cultural point of view. Kaushik recalled thatAcademician Andrei Sakharov had in 1989 at the Congress of SupremeSoviet suggested the idea of retaining the Union of Soviet SovereignRepublics (USSR) replacing the word “Socialist” with “Sovereign.” Theword Soviet was retained by him, as it was a pre-October revolutionidea having grassroots connotation. In 1994, President Nazarbayev ofKazakhstan broached the idea of Eurasianism, during his address at theMoscow State University. The years 2003 and 2004 were celebratedas the “Year of Russia in Kazakhstan” and “Year of Kazakhstan” inRussia respectively. The establishment of Collective SecurityOrganisation, SCO, Single Economic Space, CICA are allmanifestations of the Eurasian approach, which is very close to theNehruvian approach of moving towards security through non-militarymeans. Eurasian cooperation is the Kazakh-Russian way of gettingintegrated into the globalisation process, in favourable circumstances.The actual realisation of Customs Union will be an important step inthis direction. Kazakhstan is one of the five leading countries engagedin economic/trade cooperation with Russia. Russia and Kazakhstanhave agreed on the delimitation of the Caspian Sea Shelf. Russia hasinvested over 700 million US dollars in Kazakhstan. Eurasianism willbe a stabilizing influence in the emerging global order, due to its multi-culturalism. It can be a bridge between the West and Islam.

Sandeep Chakravarty, Deputy Secretary, Eurasia Division,Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India described the Indo-Kazakh relations as multi-dimensional. Besides engaging each other inbilateral relations, both the countries interacted in regional forums likeCICA, SCO etc. However, lack of direct transportation access ishampering the full realization of bilateral trade, potential, as it takes 60days to reach Kazakhstan through China. And going through longdistance via Iran is also cumbersome. But, India is party to theinternational North South Corridor agreement, which when worked out

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will help in resolving the problem.

Kairat Umarov, Ambassador of Kazakhstan answers severalpointed questions. In response to one by Prof. Warikoo, Umarov statedthat Kazakhstan supports full membership of India in SCO. He alsohoped that ONGC would select an oil field out of the two fields atMahmet and Satpaev near the Caspian Sea by December 2005, asthese have been offered to India. He stated that the Kazakhstangovernment is dividing the Caspian Sea Shelf into sectors, which wouldbe put to tender soon for international companies. Umarov stressed theneed for direct dialogue between Indian and Kazakh companies, as theKazakh companies, as the Kazakh government cannot influence thetender process. Umarov admitted that though there is perfect politicalunderstanding between India and Kazakhstan, there is lack of activismin Indo-Kazakh relations. There is enough scope for joint ventures inIT, tourism, textiles, construction, transportation and small scaleindustries, as Kazakh government is setting exclusive Parks for thesesectors where all processes from beginning to finished products wouldbe done at one place.

Prof. Warikoo stressed the need for proper institutionalization ofthe cultural/scholarly exchanges between India and Kazakhstan, so thatthese exchanges take place in a proper, organized and not in an ad hocmanner.

Dr. Mahesh R. Debata

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Section of the Audience at the Seminar on Kazakhstan Todayat the JNU Campus, New Delhi on 29 August 2005

From left Dr. K. Santhanam, Ambassador Kairat Umarov,Prof. K. Warikoo, and Prof. Syedaminov

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From the left Prof. Syedaminov, Charge d’Affaires of Uzbekistan,Prof. D. Kaushik, Mr. Sohrab Jabarov, Charge d’Affaires of Tajikistan,

Mr. Sandeep Chakravarty, Prof. Nirmala Joshi and Prof. I.N. Mukherjee

Mr. Kairat Umarov, Ambassador of Kazakhstan making his presentation.To his right is Dr. K. Santhanam, and on his right Prof. K. Warikoo

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Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies (KazISS)(under the President of Kazakhstan)

Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under thePresident of the RK (KazISS) was established by the President’sOrder of June 16, 1993.

Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies is a nationalscientific research institution providing scientific research andanalyses for the President of Kazakhstan.

Ever since its establishment, KazIIS has a team ofprofessionals and specialists in political and strategic studies,historians, economists and sociologists. The Institute isrecognized as the leading scientific and analytical center inKazakhstan.

Many high-rank employees of the Kazakhstan President’sadministration, ministries and agencies, diplomats ofKazakhstan and faculty of higher educational institutions begantheir career in the KazISS.

Students of Almaty higher educational institutions have aprobation and under-graduate probation on the basis of theKazISS, and some of them are later employed by the Instituteor some other institutes.

Now the Institute has all necessary infrastructure andfacilitates for the professional and scientific advancement of itsstaff and also for award of Ph.D. degree.

The Institute carries out basic researches on strategic issues,foreign and domestic policies, problems of the social-economicdevelopment of Kazakhstan, besides making prognosis andanalyses for the country’s leadership.

The Institute organizes Seminars, Conferences, RoundTables, International Forums particularly on the main issuescovered by the KazISS.

The KazISS cooperates with foreign scientific andanalytical institutions, and implements international researchprojects on different problems of the development ofKazakhstan and Central Asia.

MAIN DIRECTIONS OF THE KAZISS STUDIES1. Strategic Aspects of Foreign Policy:

• monitoring of domestic political, social and economicdevelopment of the neighboring countries;

• analysis of bilateral relations of Kazakhstan with Russia,China, USA, India, Turkey, countries of EU, CIS states;

• study of integration problem on the post-Soviet space;• study of security issues.

2. Political and Social Processes in Modern Kazakhstan:• monitoring of social-political situation in the Republic

of Kazakhstan;• study of the processes of democratization and political

institutions in the country;• analysis of current political situation in Kazakhstan.

3. Economic Strategy of Kazakhstan:• study of the economic security problems of the Republic

of Kazakhstan ;• study of the development tendencies of world

economies and their impact on the Kazakhstaneconomy;

• study of the problems of globalization and theirinfluence on Kazakhstan;

• monitoring of social-economic situation in the Republicof Kazakhstan.

4. Editorial-publishing activity:• editing information and publication of analytical journal

Analytic• editing scientific journal Kazakhstan-Spectrum• editing scientific and analytical journal Kogam jane

Dauir (in Kazakh)• editing analytical journal Central Asia’s Affairs (in

English).

For cooperation and partnership you may communicate with theKazISS on the following contact details:

Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies87-B, Dostik Avenue, 050010 Almaty, KazakhstanTel.: + (7-327) 264 34 04; Fax: + (7-327) 264 49 95

email: [email protected]: www.kisi.kz

FORM B

1. Title of the Newspaper : Himalayan and Central Asian Studies

2. Language : English

3. Periodicity of Publication : Quarterly

4. Publisher’s Name : Prof. K. Warikoo

5. Nationality : Indian

6. Address : 20, DakshinapuramJawaharlal Nehru UniversityNew Delhi - 110 067

7. Printer’s Name : Prof. K. Warikoo



10. Name of the Printing Press : Print India,A-38 / 2, Mayapuri - I,New Delhi - 64

11. Editor’s Name : Prof. K. Warikoo



14. Owner's Name : Himalayan Research and CulturalFoundation

I, Prof. K. Warikoo, solemnly declare that above items are correctto the best of my knowledge.

Sd/-Prof. K. Warikoo

HIMALAYAN AND CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES is a quarterlyJournal published by the Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation, whichis a non-governmental, non-profit research, cultural and development facilitativeorganisation. The Journal is devoted to the study of various issues pertainingto the Himalayan and trans-Himalayan region in South and Central Asia orparts thereof, connected with its environment, resources, history, art and culture,language and literature, demography, social structures, communication, tourism,regional development, governance, human rights, geopolitics etc.

While the principal concern of the Journal will be on its focal area, i.e.,from Afghanistan to Mayanmar including the Central Asian states of Uzbekistan,Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, China, Mongolia, Nepal,Bhutan and the Indian Himalayan States of Jammu and Kashmir, HimachalPradesh, Sikkim, Uttaranchal and North East states; papers with a broadsweep addressing environmental, social, cultural, economic, geopolitical andhuman rights issues are also welcomed.

The objective is to make a scientific appraisal of the issues confrontingthe Himalayan and adjoining region in South and Central Asia or parts thereof,and to make specific policy oriented studies and need based recommendationsas the means to promote the human, educational and economic advancementof the peoples of the region besides preserving and enriching their ethno-cultural, literary and historical heritage. Promotion of human rights, social justice,peace, harmony and national integration are the other key areas in which theHimalayan Research and Cultural Foundation has been active.

CONTRIBUTIONS FOR PUBLICATION AND ANY ENQUIRIESSHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO :

Prof. K. WARIKOOEditor and Secretary GeneralHimalayan Research and Cultural FoundationB-6/86, Safdarjung EnclaveNew Delhi - 110029 (India)

Tel. : 0091-11-26162763, 0091-11-41651969Fax : 0091-11-26106643E-mail: [email protected] for review should be sent to the same address.

Registered with the Registrar of Newspapers R.No. 67256/97

AFGHANISTAN FACTOR IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIAN POLITICSEdited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 1994. 73pp.)

SOCIETY AND CULTURE IN THE HIMALAYASEdited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 1995. 316pp.)

CENTRAL ASIA : EMERGING NEW ORDEREdited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 1995. 352pp.)

JAMMU, KASHMIR AND LADAKH : LINGUISTIC PREDICAMENTEdited by P. N. Pushp and K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 1996. 224pp.)

ARTISAN OF THE PARADISE : A STUDY OFART AND ARTISANS OF KASHMIR

By D.N. Dhar (New Delhi, 1999. 230pp.)

GUJJARS OF JAMMU AND KASHMIREdited by K. Warikoo (Bhopal, 2001. 317pp.)

BAMIYAN: CHALLENGE TO WORLD HERITAGEEdited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 2002. xviii, 313pp. 61plates)

THE AFGHANISTAN CRISIS : ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVESEdited by K. Warikoo (New Delhi, 2002. xxvi, 523pp.)

MONGOLIA-INDIA RELATIONSBy O. Nyamdavaa (New Delhi, 2003. 228pp.)

CHILD LABOUR REHABILITATION IN INDIAEdited by B. Zutshi and M. Dutta (New Delhi, 2003. 257pp.)

MONGOLIA-CHINA RELATIONSBy Sharad K. Soni (New Delhi, 2006. xix, 328pp.)

HIMALAYAN RESEARCH AND CULTURAL FOUNDATIONPost Box-10541, Jawaharlal Nehru University Post Office, New Delhi-110067 (India)

Central Office : B-6/86, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi-110029 (India)Tele : 0091-11-26162763, 0091-11-41651969, Fax : 0091-11-26106643

E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.himalayanresearch.org

HRCF PUBLICATIONS