russia's non-covenantal federalism: past and present

Russia’s Noncovenantal Federalism:Past and Present

Elena Chebankova

The evolution of Russia’s center-regional relations represents aunique political puzzle. At first glance, the country’s territorial, cul-tural, and ethnic diversity may well lead to the emergence of a federalsociety. This should make federalism the most distinct and naturalstructural answer to the problem of territorial governance.1 Yet,Russia’s path towards federalism has proven to be difficult andtumultuous. It often seems that federalism is being almost subcon-sciously rejected by Russia at the cultural and socio-historic levels.

This essay will examine Russia’s socio-cultural, historical, andtheo-philosophical relations to the original idea of federalism devel-oped in the West, and will realize and understand the cultural andsocietal constraints that inhibit the successful entrenchment ofWestern-type federal structures in Russia. This article departsfrom the examination of the original federal thought developedduring the Reformation era by focusing on its central idea of cove-nant. The discussion then proceeds to analyze the extent to whichRussian Orthodox theology and the subsequent political thoughtaddressed the same issues that led to the emergence of federalideology and practice in the West. The essay argues that Russiadeveloped some unique answers to the most fundamental ques-tions posed by Western federal thought and theology. First, itdenied the principles of covenant on moral ideological grounds.Second, it viewed liberty and authority in extreme, unlimited

ELENA CHEBANKOVA (MPhil, University of Oxford; PhD, University of Cam-bridge) is research fellow, University of Cambridge. She is author of Russia’sFederal Relations: Putin’s Reforms and Management of the Regions (2009). Herarticles have appeared in Europe-Asia Studies, Journal of Communist Studiesand Transition Politics, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, and Demo-cratisation. Special interests include federalism and political culture.

Journal of Church and State vol. 51 no. 2, pages 312–340; doi:10.1093/jcs/csp066Advance Access publication November 10, 2009# The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the J. M. DawsonInstitute of Church-State Studies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail:[email protected]

1. W. Livingston, Federalism and Constitutional Change (Oxford: Oxford Univer-sity Press, 1956), 9; M. Burgess, Comparative Federalism. Theory and Practice(London: Routledge, 2005), 28–32.

312

at University of L

incoln on October 9, 2012

http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/D

ownloaded from

http://jcs.oxfordjournals.org/

terms. These answers have transcended religion and become trans-formed into deep-seated socio-political perceptions, which play animportant cultural role in the evolution of center-regional andfederal relations in Russia.

This essay contains four parts. The first two sections deal with theorigins and nature of Western and Russian federal thought respect-ively. The subsequent two sections examine the impact of theRussian socio-cultural standpoint and its attempts to create abalanced structure of center-regional relations. The discussionincludes some references to Russia’s historic experiences andfocuses on the particularities of the post-Soviet federal modelestablished during the presidency of Vladimir Putin.

Theoretical and Ideological Considerations

Western Sources of Federalism

Federalism has a long history that is ultimately based on religiousfoundations. The initially theological notion of covenant hasbecome the foremost historical and philosophical principlebehind the idea and practice of modern federalism.2 Covenant sus-tains the two most important conceptual pillars that are central toour contemporary understanding of federal systems. First, it gener-ates legalistic, contractual, and ultimately constitutional inter-actions among the composite units of a federal state. Second, itsupports individual integrities of contracting parties, thus skilfullycombining the principles of unity and diversity, freedom and auth-ority, the creation of a wide social entity, and the preservation of theuniqueness of its constituent parts.

Daniel Elazar traces the origins of covenantal thought backthrough the Hebrew Bible.3 The essence of the original federalidea was that humans could become God’s free and equal partnersand be dually committed to a relationship of mutual responsibility.God was brought into this relationship as a partner, which impliedthat Man entered into a compact with Him in order to achieveeternal love and blessing and promises in return to keep faithfuland uphold God’s law on earth. Covenant re-emerged as a centralcategory of political theology during the Reformation era in thewritings of the most prominent exponents of the Protestant tra-dition such as Calvin, Bullinger, Luther, Beza, and Zwingli. And

2. The word federal derives from the Latin foedus, which means compact, cove-nant, or bargain.3. D. J. Elazar, “The Political Theory of Covenant: Biblical Origins and ModernDevelopment,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 10, no. 4 (1980): 7–9, andExploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1987), 117.

Russia’s Noncovenantal Federalism

313

at University of L



ownloaded from


the seeds of theological covenantalism had enormous politicalimplications, in that they raised the questions of the limitations ofpower in both church and state and of governmental checks and bal-ances.4 Johannes Althusius made the first comprehensive attemptsto secularize the extant covenantal idea5 and to “interpret all politi-cal life in terms of pactum, the bond of contractual union, or cove-nant.”6 The most important part of Althusius’s thought, however,was a tentative introduction of the territorial principles of such acovenant—an idea that became a forerunner of contemporary feder-alism.7 Therefore, speaking of modern federal systems, Friedrich8

observes that “a federal order typically preserves the institutionaland behavioral features of a foedus, a compact between equals toact jointly on specific issues of general policy.”

A theological covenant also gives rise to political constitutional-ism and legalism in a secular world.9 For “the logic of both covenantand constitution demands a democratic evolution satisfying legiti-mate human needs, extending human rights . . . extending popularparticipation.”10 A covenant, however, precedes a constitution by

4. Q. Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political thought. Volume Two: TheAge of Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 237–38,325–26; C. McCoy and W. Baker, Fountainhead of Federalism: Heinrich Bullingerand the Covenantal Tradition (Westminster: John Knox Press, 1991); DanielJ. Elazar and John Kincaid, eds., The Covenant Connection: From Federal Theo-logy to Modern Federalism (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2000).5. Even though Althusius lived at the age when state and church were far fromseparated in practice, he claimed that “it was for him, the political scientist, andnot for the church, theologian, lawyer, or moralist, to interpret and determinethe exact nature of politics.” See M. Burgess, Comparative Federalism. Theoryand Practice (London: Routledge, 2005), 7–8; Th. Hueglin, Early Modern Con-cepts for a Late Modern World (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press,1999), 23–24. At the same time, full secularization of the covenantal ideaemerged half a century later with political philosophy of Hobbes, Locke, andSpinoza. See Elazar, “The Political Theory of Covenant,” 9, 20; Hueglin, EarlyModern Concepts for a Late Modern World, 23–24; E. Reibstein, Johannes Althu-sius als Fortselzer der Schule von Salamanca (Karlsruhe: C.F. Muller, 1955); andBurgess, Comparative Federalism, 181.6. C. McCoy and W. Baker, Fountainhead of Federalism: Heinrich Bullinger andthe Covenantal Tradition (Westminster: John Knox Press, 1991), 55.7. Hueglin, Early Modern Concepts for a Late Modern World, 3–4, 85–109;C. J. Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice (London: Pall MallPress, 1968), 12; R. Nisbert, The Social Philosophers (New York: WashingtonSquare Press, 1982), 186–87; Burgess, Comparative Federalism.8. Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice, 6.9. Elazar and Kincaid, eds., The Covenant Connection: From Federal Theology toModern Federalism; Burgess, Comparative Federalism.10. N. Riemer, “Covenant and Federal Constitution,” Publius: the Journal of Fed-eralism 10, no. 4 (1980): 141–42; R. Rothman, “Impact of Covenant and ContractTheories on Conception of the US Constitution,” Publius: the Journal of Federal-ism, 10, no. 4 (1980): 151–55.

Journal of Church and State

314

at University of L



ownloaded from


creating the civil society and the moral code embedded in humanbehavior and social interactions. Hannah Arendt11 observes theimportance of covenant’s mutuality in guarding against tyrannyand points to the instrumental significance of the U.S. consti-tutional process. Indeed, American constitutionalism has becomea product of a distinct merger between the theological covenantalconcept and a more secularized idea of compact.12 Constitutional-ism, on the other hand, is of paramount importance to federalism,in that the supreme and binding constitution is a cornerstone of allfederal structures.13 Thus, theological covenantalism, secular con-stitutionalism, and political federalism form a closely intercon-nected conceptual-philosophical triangle.

As a result, the question of liberty and preservation of individualintegrities within the given covenantal unity is another fundamentalaspect of covenantalism, in that “the right to contract implies thefreedom of all contracting parties.”14 In theological terms, therelations between God and humans could not be one of equals.This problem was, however, resolved through the assumption thatGod has “graciously limited” Himself and, by restricting His other-wise omnipotent powers, He has granted a significant degree offreedom and integrity to humans.15 Thus, a covenantal theologicalpresupposition is individual legitimacy. For in the Bible, humanbeings are created as unique individuals and are given controlover the world.16 Rufus Davis17 writes that “the idea of covenantbetokens not merely a solemn pledge between two or more peopleto keep faith with each other, to honor an agreement; it involvesthe idea of co-operation, reciprocity, mutuality, and it implies therecognition of entities—whether it is persons, a people, or adivine being.” Thus, covenantalism becomes inextricably linkedwith federalism through its ability to unite freedom and

11. Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: The Viking Press, 1965), 165–70.12. Elazar, “The Political Theory of Covenant,” 10; D. Lutz, “From Covenant toConstitution in American Political Thought,” Publius: the Journal of Federalism,10, no. 4 (1980): 101–33; B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revo-lution (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1967), 175–81.13. K. C. Wheare, Federal Government (London: Oxford University Press, 1963),54; W. H. Riker, Federalism: Origins, Operation, Significance (Boston: LittleBrown, 1964), 11; P. King, Federalism and Federation (London and Canberra:Croom Helm, 1982), 77; Robert Dahl, Democracy, Liberty and Equality (Oslo:Norwegian University Press, 1986), 114; Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patternsof Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (NewHaven: Yale University Press, 1984), 170.14. Elazar, “The Political Theory of Covenant,” 25.15. Ibid., 15; Elazar, Exploring Federalism, 117, 115.16. Freeman, “The Process of Covenant,” 73.17. Rufus Davies, The Federal Principle A Journey Through Time in Quest ofMeaning (Berkley: University of California Press, 1978), 3.


315

at University of L



ownloaded from


authority. For at the heart of federalism lies a drive towards settlingan eternal conflict between “unity and diversity,” which is com-bined, in Duchacek’s18 view, “with a keen awareness of mutualdependence.”

This discussion suggests that the theological idea of covenant hashad an important historical influence on the mode of socio-politicaland federal integration. Elazar19 and Kincaid20 distinguish betweenpolities that come about in the covenantal and noncovenantal, pri-marily organic, traditions. While organic orders are sustained byan hierarchical system of values based on perpetuating tradition,21

the nature of covenantal polities is invariably federal, regardless oftheir supporting institutional structures. In all such systems,humans are coming together as equals to “establish body politicsthat reaffirm their fundamental equality and retain their basicrights.”22 This also makes such polities republican in characterand links them strongly with democracy.23 It comes as no surprisethat the first political practice of federalism took shape in thosecountries of Europe where the Reformed communities were particu-larly prominent, including the United Provinces of Netherlands andSwitzerland, and having made its way to England and Scotland,finally settled in North America.24

Subsequent parts of this article will examine to what extentRussia’s theological and philosophical tradition has addressed thesame questions that laid the foundations for a distinct federal prac-tice in the West and what impact this worldview has had on thefederal integration in Russia. The next section deals with theRussian view on the theological aspects of covenantalism and itsinfluence on Russia’s federal thought. Remaining parts willdiscuss practical implications of these influences.

18. I. Duchacek, Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics(Boulder: Westview Press, 1970), 192.19. Elazar, “The Political Theory of Covenant.”20. Elazar and Kincaid, The Covenant Connection.21. N. Biryukov and V. Sergeyev, Russian Politics in Transition (Aldershot:Ashgate, 1997), 12–13; E. Colson, Tradition and Contract: the Problem ofOrder (Chicago: Aldine, 1974).22. Elazar, “The Political Theory of Covenant,” 13.23. C. Ross, Federalism and Democratisation in Russia (Manchester: ManchesterUniversity Press, 2002), 11–12; R. Watts, Comparing Federal Systems, 2nd ed.(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), 68.24. Elazar, “The Political Theory of Covenant,” 4, 21–22; Hueglin, Early ModernConcepts for a Late Modern World, 15–16; McCoy and Baker, Fountainhead ofFederalism, 21; M. Burgess, Federalism and European Union: the Building ofEurope, 1950–2000 (London: Routledge, 2000), 6–7; Rothman, “Impact of Cove-nant and Contract Theories on Conception of the US Constitution,” 151–52.


316

at University of L



ownloaded from


Theological and Political Debates in Russia

Russian Orthodoxy pondered the two most important theologicalquestions crucial to the development of federal structures. First, itaddressed the problems of reconciling the individual and the collec-tive, and second, it analyzed covenantalism, enforcement, and con-tractual obligations. Prominent among Orthodox concerns is tryingto reconcile unity and diversity, as well as individualism and socialobligations. On the one hand, Orthodoxy has an ultimately social,“coming together” character, in which collective religious con-sciousness plays the most prominent role.25 Leading Slavophilthinker Alexei Khomyakov26 wrote that faith in its religious sense“belongs not to the individual as such but to the human being asa member of an organic community united by love.” Fr JohnMeyendorff,27 a distinguished Orthodox theologian of the twentiethcentury, continues that “Orthodoxy will always maintain that thestarting point, the source, and the starting point for solving socialissues is found in the uninterrupted, mysterious, and in a sensetranscendent communion of the euchartistic gathering.” On theother hand, it is important that the “coming together” processwas indelibly marked by the efforts to preserve the uniqueness ofindividuals composing the potential religious collective orcommune. Firmly behind these attempts stood a distinctly Ortho-dox theological concept of sobornost initially introduced byKhomyakov. This notion is derived from a proposition that Man isindeed free but cannot develop his potential except through themembership of society.28 Lossky29 defines sobornost as “the combi-nation of unity and freedom of many persons on the basis ofcommon love of God.”

In many respects, the incessant search for the combinationbetween unity and diversity, recognition of entities and communalexistence, between freedom and societal obligation makes RussianOrthodoxy, and its sobornost concept in particular, fit to provide abasis for further federalist understanding. However, the chief impe-diment to the evolution of federal perceptions and processes lies in

25. A. M. Allchin, “Eastern Orthodox Contribution to the ‘Debate about God,’” inA. M. Allchin, ed., Orthodoxy and the Death of God (Fellowship of St. Alban andSt. Sergius, 1971), 12–22, esp. 15–17.26. Alexei Khomyakov, Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii (Moskva, 1911), 340.27. J. Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes(New York: Fordham University Press, 1974).28. N. Riasanovsky, Russian Identities. A Historical Survey (Oxford: OUP, 2005),152; J. H. Pain, Sobornost: A Study in Modern Russian Orthodox Theology(Oxford: Bodleian Library: Unpublished DPhil Thesis, 1967).29. N. Lossky, History of Russian Philosophy (New York: International Univer-sities Press, 1951), 407.


317

at University of L



ownloaded from


the absence of the covenantal component. The theological notion ofa human covenanting with God is absent, as are the subsequentnotions of humans contracting with each other to regulate theircivil and political relations, and as a consequence, territorial inter-actions between composite units and the national center.

More importantly, the absence of the covenantal component is notan accidental omission. Rather, it is a conscious negation of suchobligatory constraints. It is an undisputable recognition of theall-encompassing power of God, a recognition that would renderany such contract superfluous. Crow30 describes this approach asfollows: “God is beyond anything that we can imagine, and beyondany way we try to limit Him . . . . Orthodoxy demands a greater,bigger, further, wider view of God in the world. And it can only bea view that is filled with amazement.” There follows a differentdynamic of the Man-God relationship. In contrast to the Protestantidea of partnership, in which God descends to level Himself withhumans, Orthodoxy assumes an incessant upward movement ofman towards God and the eventual achievement of total unitywith Him through Christ. Karl Rahner,31 supported by a largenumber of contemporary Orthodox theologians,32 claims: “ahuman being is a reality absolutely open upwards; a reality whichreaches its highest perfection, the realization of the highest possi-bility of man’s being, when in it the Logos himself becomes existentin the world.” Thus, it is not a contract but a permanent upwardmovement towards Creator that constitutes our relationship withHim. This movement is called to “unite theology and life, individualand community, as well as tradition and creativity in the marriage ofhuman freedom to grace.”33

This expressly noncovenantal logic generated some importantphilosophical outcomes. First, it gave Russian theology an ulti-mately messianic, idealistic, and eschatological character. The theo-logical goals of Russian Orthodoxy were manifest through theattainment of a perfect world, in which society would find itself ina full conformity with God. As Meyendorff notes, “the Orthodox

30. Gillian Crow, Orthodoxy for Today (London: SPCK Press, 2008), 7–15.31. K. Rahner, Theological Investigations, Vol. 1 (Baltimore: Helicon Press,1965), 183.32. J. Pelikan, The Christian Tradition. A History of the Development of Doctrine.The Spirit of Eastern Christendom (600-1700) (Chicago and London: ChicagoUniversity Press, 1974), 10–11; J. Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern ChristianThought (New York: Crestwood, 1975), 21; A. Schmemann, Ultimate Questions(London and Oxford: Mowbrays, 1979), 58–64.33. L. Shaw, “John Meyendorff and the Heritage of the Russian Theological Tra-dition,” in New Perspectives on Historical Theology. Essays in Memory of JohnMeyendorff, ed. Bradley Nassif (Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans PublishingCompany, 1996), 33.


318

at University of L



ownloaded from


religion is driven by eschatological expectation of the ideal universeand by the ultimate knowledge that this universe will arrive. Itdenounces the eschatology of inaction, characteristic of theWestern trend, and calls for a permanent perfection and transform-ation of a human community on the basis of the law of God.”34

Second, the lack of contractual thinking resulted in a uniqueapproach to the relationship between state and church, as well aschurch and society. The “Dostoevsky project,” primarily expressedthrough the thought of Ivan Karamazov, seems particularly inter-esting in this context. In this project, the world and its socialrelations had to be recast in accordance with the New Testament.This process inextricably linked to the deification of Man was toresult in the church occupying all terrains of human life and even-tually supplanting the State.35 This vision leaves little space for con-tractual relations between man and state and church and state, as itprovides the ultimate unification of these estates on distinctly reli-gious, righteous principles that a priori exclude crime, tyranny, andhuman suffering. Despite that such thinking somewhat differs fromthe initial Byzantine, and subsequently Russian, idea of symphonicrelationship between state and church,36 in which both entities areinstitutionally independent and equal, it is completely in line withthe eschatological goals of Orthodox theology.

Finally, the noncovenantal vision led to the ultimate denial ofauthority in its secular, legalistic sense. Fr Alexander Schmemann37

claims that the Western dichotomy between freedom and authorityneed not exist. The very principle of authority, as Orthodoxy under-stands it, is something external to man, representing the result ofthe fall and alienation from true life. Thus, the church is not anauthority or a combination between freedom and authority, in itsexternal legalistic and limited sense. The church itself is freedom,and there is no true freedom outside the Church. JaroslavPelikan38 insists that such unlimited freedom stems from the Chris-tological idea of deification, which endows man with a possibility ofbecoming divine and represents the centerpiece of Orthodox

34. J. Meyendorff, Living Tradition. Orthodox Witness in the ContemporaryWorld (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press), 200–02.35. O. Kahrkhordin, Main Concept of Russian Politics (New York: UniversityPress of America, 2005), 48–51.36. J. Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes(New York: Fordham University Press, 1974), 283; Nikolai Petro, The Rebirth ofRussian Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 61–70;Timothy Ware, The Orthodox Church (New York: Penguine, 1993); Schmemann,Ultimate Questions, 41; N. Zernov, The Russians and Their Church (London:William Clowes & Sons Limited, 1945).37. Schmemann, Ultimate Questions, 179–91.38. Ibid., 10–13.


319

at University of L



ownloaded from


theology. Orthodoxy holds that the central tragedy of WesternChristianity is that it has accepted authority as its formative prin-ciple and measured freedom against it.39

Following this tradition, many Slavophil theologians viewed thenecessity of legal and contractual obligations as “symptoms ofsocieties lacking spiritual and moral integrity.”40 Khomyakov41

blamed the West for being governed by compulsion and law andthus being unable to understand the real faith with its truemeaning of freedom and grace. George Samarin explicitly rejectedthe use of faith in enforcing any particular contract: “faith by itsvery nature is not accommodating, and one cannot enter intodeals with it . . . faith is not a stick with which one defends himselfand scares others . . . faith serves only him who sincerely believes.”42

Leontyev supported this stance by rejecting the idea of courts andjudicial systems and calling to freeze Russia in its Orthodox non-contractual mentality so as to keep it from rotting.43

Orthodox treatment of religious and social interactions was sig-nificant for the development of Russia’s approach to socio-politicalrelations in a broad sense and to federal-territorial integration inparticular. Russian federal thought, which had surfaced by the nine-teenth century, bore distinctly Orthodox traditional traits. It deniedcovenantal legalistic principles and had ultimately eschatological,messianic, and nationalistic overtones, thus undermining theideas of partnership and reciprocity. Russia’s liberal thinkers per-ceived the world in a structured dichotomous fashion, inadvertentlystereotyping political situations and creating various moraldogmas. Berlin et al.,44 while admitting certain moral dilemmas ofthe Russian thinkers of that period, nevertheless observe their ten-dency to take “the ideas and concepts to their most extreme, evenabsurd, conclusions” and to “discover some monolithic truthwhich would once and for all resolve the problems of moralconduct.”

Furthermore, Russia’s federal thinkers expressly rejected legaland contractual obligations and proposed to build federations on

39. Ibid., 182–85.40. A. Kelly, Views from the Other Shore. Essays on Herzen, Chekhov, andBakhtin (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999), 6.41. Aleksei S. Khomyakov, “On the Western Confessions of Faith,” in UltimateQuestions: A Anthology of Modern Russian Religious Thought (New York: Holt,Rinehart and Winston, 1965), 31–65.42. Cited in P. Christoff, An Introduction to Nineteenth Century Russian Slavo-philism. Iu. F. Samarin (Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), 224.43. G. L. Kline, Religious and Anti-Religious Thought in Russia (Chicago andLondon: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 194.44. I. Berlin, A. Kelly, and H. Hardy, Russian Thinkers (London: Penguine Non-Classics, 1978), xvii–xviii.


320

at University of L



ownloaded from


the basis of a moral force. King summarizes the perceptions ofRussia’s most prominent exponents of federalism, anarchistsMikhail Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin: “full human accord is poss-ible and can be achieved by giving full reign either to our instinctsor to reason (or to both), thereby excluding the play of forcetogether with all arbitrary means of achieving human accord.”45

Both Bakunin46 and Kropotkin47 advocated a free federation of indi-viduals, associations, and nations within the conditions of anabsent state.48 And they specifically stress moral, rather than judi-cial forms of law.49 Alexander Herzen, another leading nineteenth-century thinker, also advocated a free “coming together” of villagecommunes and artels of the artisans as an alternative to theWestern legal institutional practice.50 Leo Tolstoy, Russia’seminent novelist and philosopher, also vehemently rejected allforms of human violence and regarded every rule of law as a ruleof violence. He therefore preached the absolute negation of thestate and its replacement by a universal “law of love.”51

At the same time, the rejection of legal violence and institutionsthat places an ultimate emphasis on the triumph of human spiritexpressly denied individual integrities and left no room fordissent and pluralism of opinions. Such “tyranny of ethics,” inFrank’s words, “forced men into community of brotherly love, repla-cing the unsubtle coercion of political and legal systems with thesubtle coercion of the ‘law of love’ understood as a coercivegeneral norm.”52 The covenantal school of thought53 further

45. P. King, Federalism and Federation (London and Canberra: Croom Helm,1982), 45.46. M. Bakunin, in G. P. Maximoff, The Political Philosophy of Bakunin: ScientificAnarchism (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953).47. C. Berberi, Peter Kropotkin. His Federalist Ideas (London: Freedom Press,1942).48. F. Copleston, Philosophy in Russia. From Herzen to Lenin and Berdyaev(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), 89; George Crowder, Clas-sical Anarchism. Political Thought of Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 124.49. Bakunin, in Maximoff, The Political Philosophy of Bakunin, 125.50. A. Herzen, My Past and Thoughts. The Memoirs of Alexander Herzen, vol. 4(London: Chatto and Windus, 1965), 1661–64, 1649–55.51. Kline, Religious and Anti-Religious Thought in Russia, 25.52. Cited in ibid., 33; N. Biryukov and V. Sergeyev, Russian Politics in Transition(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), 11; Gillian Crow, Orthodoxy for Today (London:SPCK Press, 2009), 6.53. A. J. Talmon, Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London: Secker andWarburg, 1952), 1–2, 252–54; N. Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium(London: Secker and Warburg, 1957), 307; A. J. Talmon, Political Messianism(London: Secker and Warburg, 1960), 516; Riemer, “Covenant and Federal Con-stitution,” 145.


321

at University of L



ownloaded from


warns that the attainment of such a “perfect” violence-free andvalue driven world is not possible without the primary use offorce, aggrandizement of those who are committed to this idealisticorder, and vilification (and in the extreme case annihilation) ofthose who hold a different viewpoint.

This moves us to the final point, in which federal integration wasviewed as an eschatological process, a messianic gathering of theOrthodox lands invariably led by Russia. This approach indeliblyundermined the ideas of partnership, reciprocity, and equality offederating parties. At the outset, Russia’s federal political thoughthad an ultimately decentralizing, “holding together” characterthat stemmed from the romantic socialist ideal of relieving thepopulation from the chains of despotic oppression and creationon its basis of a new, free union of independent territorial andsocial entities.54 Pan-Slavism was an important branch of suchthinking. Advocates of the pan-Slav movement—Ivan and Konstan-tin Aksakov, Nikolay Danilevsky, Fedor Tiutchev, Yurii Samarin,Alexei Khomyakov, and Vladimir Solovyov—hoped to liberate Slavpopulations from the rule of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires,establish independent Slav principalities, and launch a voluntarymovement of Slav peoples towards instituting a pan-Slav federa-tion.55 However, the achievement of these federal objectives was asomewhat different story.

Orthodox, as well as Russian, messianism was an importantdriving force behind the proposed unification process.56 Orthodoxyprovided a theoretical underpinning to such a messianic federaliza-tion. Despite claiming its universal catholic nature, Orthodoxy ren-dered nations with certain responsibilities. Thus, Russia, with its“humble faith” and “true commitment to the inner life of theSpirit,” was “called to be a light among nations, signalling the wayto universal peace and justice.”57 Following this theologicalcalling, Russia was considered as a natural leader of the prospectiveSlav federation at the political level. Various suggestions cameinto existence from Bakunin figuratively inviting the Tsar to headthe new federal union58 to Danilevsky’s outspoken insistence on

54. P. King, Federalism and Federation (London and Canberra: Croom Helm,1982), 44; A. Kelly, Views from the Other Shore. Essays on Herzen, Chekhov,and Bakhtin (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999).55. P. Christoff, An Introduction to Nineteenth Century Russian Slavophilism.Iu. F. Samarin (Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), 402–12.56. Ibid., 406–18; P. Duncan, Russian Messianism. Third Rome, Revolution, Com-munism and After (New York and London: Routledge, 2000), 30–47.57. A. Khomyakov, Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii (Moskva, 1900–1914), 223; Pain,Sobornost, 118–19.58. Kelly, Views from the Other Shore, 154–55.


322

at University of L



ownloaded from


Russia’s leadership in a new federation, and Dostoevsky’s ponder-ing the virtues of making Constantinople the center of the Slav/Orthodox union under the patronage of Russia.59

Interestingly, Lenin’s vision of federalism bore similar ideologicaltraits. He also hoped to liberate the nations of the Russian Empire,albeit to build on this basis a centralized unitary state. He regardedfederation as a transitory arrangement lying on the path towardscomplete centralization.60 At the same time, his view on the fusion(sliianie) and the rapprochement (sblizhenie) of nations under theaegis of socialism was not far from just another manifestation ofRussian messianism. For these notions explicitly rejected federalcontractual relations, casting them aside as concessions to bour-geois thinking, and assumed, in both the Russian and Sovietcontexts, a mere assimilation of nationalities under the banner ofGreat Russian chauvinism.61

Drawing on our original observations on Western covenantalism,we draw two provisional conclusions. First, covenantalism, and asa consequence legalism and constitutionalism, are culturally aliento Russia. Second, Russia would feel more at ease with organic pol-itical structures, in which recognition of individual integrities iscircumscribed. This makes Western federalism foreign to Russiain religious, historic, and socio-philosophical terms. It stands toreason that this political worldview could largely impede the evol-ution of a Western-type federal practice in Russia. The followingsections will develop these conclusions further and expand onthem with specific historic and contemporary developments.

59. In his later writings, Dostoevsky took a global turn to Europe, albeit in thetraditional messianic style. In The Diary of a Writer, he argued that Russia’strue destiny was to reconcile Europe’s sinful separation on East and West thatultimately stems from the religious divide. He believed that Russia, beingsomehow better than Europe, should shine an Eastern, or fundamentallyRussian, light in Europe. See V. Weidle, “Russia and the West,” in Ultimate Ques-tions. An Anthology of Modern Russian Religious Thought, ed. A. Schmemann(London and Oxford: Mowbrays, 1965), 11–27, esp. 27; Christoff, An Introduc-tion to Nineteenth Century Russian Slavophilism, 406–18.60. L. Boltenkova, Rossiiskaia Gosudarstvennost: Sostoianie i Perspektivy Razvi-tiia (Moscow: Slovo, 1995), 14–16; A. Meshcheriakov, “Rossiiskii Federalizm:teoreticheskie I noramtivo-pravovye istoki,” Pravo i Politika no. 12 (2004): 31–35.61. R. Sakwa, Soviet Politics in Perspective (New York and London: Routledge,1998), 242; G. Gleason, Federalism and Nationalism. The Struggle for RepublicanRights in the USSR (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990); R. Pearson, “The HistoricalBackground to Soviet Federalism,” in A. McAuley, Soviet Federalism Nationalismand Economic Decentralisation (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991), 31;Elazar, “The Political Theory of Covenant,” 22.


323

at University of L



ownloaded from


Repercussions on Center-Regional PoliticalDevelopments

Constitutionalism

It is a logical step to discuss with the issues of constitutionalismand legalism. As we have shown at the beginning of this essay,these represent the foremost ideological and structural pillars ofcovenantal and federal orders. Richard Sakwa62 observes that “aconstitutional system is a much broader concept than the consti-tution itself and reflects the ethical basis of society.” He proceedsto claim that “constitutionalism, together with legalism, is foreignto the Russian political tradition.”63 Indeed, Russia’s ethical andcultural tradition of noncovenantal Orthodoxy has had an adverseimpact on the evolution of its constitutional process. The distinctlack of a contractual mentality has inhibited the emergence of areal constitutional practice for centuries. Therefore, Russia’s aca-demic constitutional thought has often reflected the traditionaldilemmas of Orthodox political theology. Finally, these problemshave led to the fact that Russia’s existing constitutional provisionsserve as a structural facade that does not reflect the real dynamicof center-regional, and in a broader scale socio-political, inte-gration. At the federal level, such issues result in Russia’s failureto develop an appropriate constitutional model of federalism.

The history and tradition of Russian constitutionalism has an ulti-mately fragmented, limited character. It largely coincides with thehistory of the new Russian state.64 Previous attempts to create aconstitutional order have always been unsuccessful largely due tothe lack of ethically accepted and indigenously established legalisticconstraints imposed on the relationship between state and society.The state embarked on a never-ending array of broken promises andunfulfilled agreements, which has almost always found socialacceptance, understanding, and nonresistance. The high authorityin Russia represented a political force independent of society andunwilling to embark on the covenantal mode of governance.Attempts at conditional governance and constitutionalism failedunder Empresses Anna (1730–1740), Catherine II (1762–1796),

62. R. Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (New York: Routledge, 2008), 82.63. Sakwa, Soviet Politics in Perspective, 107.64. N. Dobrynin, Novyi Federalizm. Kontseptualnaia model gosudarstvennogoustroistva RF. (Tiumen, Doctoral Dissertation, 2004); M. Gligich-Zolotareva,Sovershenstvovanie Federativnoi Sostavliaiushchei Konstitutsii: pro et contra(Moscow: Izdatelstvo MGU, 2004); V. Cherepanov, “Federal’naya reforma vRossii: Sovremennoe sostoyanie i perspektivy razvitiya,” in Politiko-PravovyeResursy Federalizma v Rossii, ed. R. Khakimov (Kazan: Kazanskii Institut Feder-alizma, 2006), 65–75.


324

at University of L



ownloaded from


Alexander I (1801–1825), and Nicholas I (1825–1855).65 Russia’sfirst constitution of 1906 did not reflect federal parliamentaryideas of the zemstvo66 leaders,67 while all four Soviet constitutions(1918, 1924, 1936, 1977) did not implement most of their declaredprinciples in practice.68

The lack of a practical tradition of constitutionalism has beenfurther reinforced by the limited history of Russia’s constitutionalthought, which began to develop as a separate philosophical disci-pline only by the beginning of the twentieth century. Political scien-tists of that period (Kokoshin 1912, Lazarevskii 1912, Kotliarevskii1907, Novgorodtsev 1909, Gessen 1917, Alekseev 1910, Yash-chenko 1912) worked to adapt the principles of French andAmerican constitutionalism within Russia. While discussing theprinciples of freedom, liberty, sovereignty, separation of powers,and federalism, these scholars faced numerous dilemmas gener-ated by Russia’s distinct theo-philosophical tradition. Forexample, personal freedom in Russia’s legal and judicial thoughthad an ultimately Orthodox theological and cultural meaning. Itwas related to a spiritual liberation that could not be limited byeconomic and political constraints imposed externally by thestate.69 Kovalevsky claimed that “personal rights originate indepen-dently of the state and cannot be created or annulled by any legal actemanating from the state.”70 This largely echoed the humanistic,Christological nature of the Orthodox vision in which freedomwas given a universal unlimited character.

Freedom was also regarded as a collective supra-human category.Russian constitutional thought departed from a proposition thatMan is indeed free but cannot develop his potential except throughthe membership of society. This supra-human nature of personalfreedom was called to be a link between Man and a legal system.

65. A. Medushevsky, Demokratiia i Avtoritarizm: Rossiiskii Konstitutsionalizm vSravnitelnoi Perspektive (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1998); Arinin, Rossiiskii Federalizm.66. Zemstvos (introduced in 1864) were elected bodies of local self-governancecomposed of the representatives of three estates: gentry, peasants, andtownspeople.67. Solomon Schwarz, The Russian Revolution of 1905 (Chicago and London:The University of Chicago Press, 1967), 32–34.68. Kahn, Federalism, Constitutionalism, and the Rule of Law in Russia, 67–82;Sakwa, Soviet Politics in Perspective, 241–42; G. Gleason, Federalism and Nation-alism: The Struggle for Republican Rights in the USSR (Boulder: Westview Press,1992), 131.69. V. Sinuikov, Rossiiskaia Pravovaia Sistema: Vvedenie v Obshchuiu Teoriiu(Saratov: Poligraphist, 1994), 238–39.70. M. Kovalevskii, Obshchee Konstitutsionnoe Pravo. Lektsii (St. Petersburg:Pravda, 1908), 102–05; see also V. Gessen, Osnovy Konstitutsionnogo Prava(Petrograd: Pavo, 1917), 66.


325

at University of L



ownloaded from


Chicherin,71 who saw a difference between political and personalhuman rights, particularly underscored the social character of indi-vidual freedom. He did not view personal freedoms in instrumentalindividualistic terms, restricting them to economic and privatematters. Rather he granted them exclusively social, integral characterand claimed that the right to form associations, the right of petitions,the right of free press and free speech, the right of teaching and edu-cation fall in the category of personal, and not political rights.However, given that these rights are strongly associated with collec-tive political freedoms, the boundary between social and individualrights have become blurred, ultimately reflecting the collectivist,Orthodox, soborny character of the Russian cultural tradition. Fol-lowing a similar logic of traditional humanism, Russia’s consti-tutional thought also called for the achievement of an integral,catholic condition of a legal-political system. S. Kotliarevsky,72 forexample, rejected coercion and violence as a means of achieving pol-itical stability and social justice. Instead, he advocated a completeunion between people and power and the creation of a coherent “pol-itical whole.” Constitutional order and universal suffrage were calledto sustain the integrity of such a “complete political union.” Kotliar-evsky viewed this fusion between power and people as a safeguardagainst corruption, elitism, unreasonable enrichment, and other ulti-mately individualistic expressions of human behavior.

Unsurprisingly, Russia’s constitutional thought found theprimary federalist idea of combining liberty and authority themost difficult. This issue represented an almost irresolvabledilemma. While praising the idea of people’s sovereignty mani-fested through the right to control the government, Russian consti-tutionalists73 refused the American and French constitutionalprinciples that endorsed an indivisible nature of people’s sover-eignty and the republican form of government. Rather, they recog-nized the dual nature of people and monarchical sovereignty andinsisted that the two could co-exist. The treatment of the supremestate power by Russian constitutionalists reflected the Orthodoxlack of a contractual, partnership-like relationship with the higher

71. B. Chicherin, Kurs Gosudarstvennoi Nauki (Moscow: Tipographiia Tovarish-chestva Kushnerov, 1894).72. S. Kotliarevskii, Konstitutsionnoe Pravo. Opyt Politiko-ideologocheskogoObzora (St. Petersburg: Tipographiia Altshulera, 1907), 9–11.73. P. I. Novgorodtsev, Krizis Sovremennogo Pravosoznaniia (Moscow: Slovo,1909), 21–22; F. Kokoshin, Lektsii po Obshchemu GosudarstvennomuPravu (Moscow: Tipographiia Russkogo Tovarishchestva, 1912), 201–02;N. Lazarevskii, Russkoe Gosudarstvennoe Pravo, vol. 1. (St. Petersburg: Slovo,1912), 107–10; S. Kotliarevskii, Konstitutsionnoe Pravo. Opyt Politiko-ideologocheskogo Obzora (St. Petersburg: Tipographiia Altshulera, 1907),19–22.


326

at University of L



ownloaded from


authority. It was reminiscent of the attitude towards the power ofGod, which due to its omnipotence, could not be subjected to theconstraints of partnership. For these thinkers, the supreme powerhad an unlimited, indivisible character that was not tied to peopleby any particular contract but co-existed with them in one indivisi-ble union. We can clearly trace the eschatological overtones ofRussia’s political theology that strove for the achievement of a com-plete union between God and His people within the conditions ofabsent covenant. Chicherin74 wrote that “state is a union ofpeople tied into one single legal entity and ruled by supremepower for the achievement of common good.” Having an initiallyfederalist, almost Althusian approach to the structure of the stateas a union of unions, he still claimed that the difference betweenthe state and the intra-state unions lies in the fact that the latterare subordinate to the former. Yashchenko75 further argued that,from the judicial point of view, no other form of power couldrestrict the supreme power. Because it can override its own rulesand if there were a supreme judge, then he would have supremepower and authority. Shershenevich76 supported this view by claim-ing that the supremacy of power implies its unlimited character,and its indivisible nature guarantees its independence.

This vision was transferred to the federal level. In contrast to theAmerican federal theorists who claimed that sovereignty can be dis-cretely distributed within the state on several, interconnected levelsof governmental authority,77 Russian federal constitutional thoughtaffirmed one indivisible sovereignty. Yashchenko,78 in a widelyrecognized classic of Russia’s federal thought,79 claimed that divid-ing sovereignty would open doors to disintegration and anarchy.Standing on the principles of an institutional division of functionsand responsibilities, he claimed, at the same time, that “sovereignty,as supremacy and complete authority, cannot be divided by defi-nition . . . . Sovereignty is an expression of the unity of power. Todivide sovereignty is to divide unity.” Korkunov80 concurred with

74. Chicherin, Kurs Gosudarstvennoi Nauki.75. A. Yashchenko, Teoriia Federalizma. Opyt Sinteticheskoi Teorii (Riga: Naukai Zhizn, 1912), 29–30.76. G. Shershenevich, Obshchaia Teoriia Prava (Moscow, 1908).77. Khan, Federalism, Constitutionalism, and the Rule of Law in Russia, 26–33;Elazar, Exploring Federalism, 109.78. Yashchenko, Teoriia Federalizma. Opyt Sinteticheskoi Teorii, 197, 276–77.79. L. Boltenkova, Rossiiskaia Gosudarstvennost: Sostoianie i Perspektivy Razvi-tiia (Moscow: Slovo, 1995); O. Kudinov, “Konstitutsionnye Teorii v Rossii vNachale XX veka,” Pravo i Politika 7 (2004): 25–32; M. Zolotareva, Federalizm vRossii: Problemy i Perspektivy (Moscow: Problel, 1999).80. N. Korkunov, Lektsii po Obshchei Teorii Prava (St. Petersburg: TipographiiaStasiulevicha, 1909), 78.


327

at University of L



ownloaded from


these views, arguing that, within the conditions of a divided sover-eignty, one or another order of government would have to enforcecompliance with such a division and reinterpret its parameters.And the order that will assume such supervisory functions willinvariably prevail over the other levels of government.

Subsequent Soviet constitutional thought has been largely stag-nant,81 and new ideas began to emerge only with the onset of peres-troika. Much attention was given to the federal idea, perhaps againstthe backdrop of the imminent dissolution of the union state.However, the federal thought of that era followed mainly autopian Orthodox trend of noncovenantal messianism. Academi-cian Sakharov drafted a sample of the new Soviet Constitution in1991. His approach to federal relations, though covenantal, wasstill utopian, and in many ways, extreme, and viewed the federalorder in terms of confederalism. Sakharov insisted on the creationof a global world government, based on the ultimate convergencebetween socialist and capitalist systems. In terms of the immediateSoviet problems, he suggested a loosely confederal order for thefuture Soviet state, granting the union’s constituent territories theright to create military units, conduct foreign affairs, and manageindependent financial systems. These ideas were countered by theSolzhenitsyn proposals, who, also utopian, suggested the pursuitof Russian messianism and the creation of a highly centralizedSlavic state composed of the Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Russiannations.82 The Yeltsin-Gorbachev idea of the Union Treaty (theattempted adoption of which set in motion the process of theUSSR dissolution) was also largely utopian, even though itemerged as an effort to save the crumbling Union state. LikeSakharov’s proposals, the draft treaty granted the union republicsunjustifiably excessive rights, such as control over the naturalresources, including mineral deposits,83 the elevation of the auton-omous republics to republican status,84 and the supremacy of therepublican legislation over the union law.85

These socio-cultural particularities resulted in Russia’s currentdifficulties with constitutionalism, and thereby with federalism.Russia’s current Constitution, at least a large number of its pro-visions, serves as a structural facade and does not match socio-political and territorial realities. This translates into Russia’s

81. V. Sinuikov, Rossiiskaia Pravovaia Sistema: Vvedenie v Obshchuiu Teoriiu(Saratov: Poligraphist, 1994), 4–6.82. Medushevsky, Demokratiia i Avtoritarizm, 357–58.83. A. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: OUP, 1997), 288.84. Kahn, Federalism, Constitutionalism, and the Rule of Law in Russia, 95.85. A. Sheehy, “The Draft Union Treaty: a Preliminary Assessment,” Report onthe USSR 51 (December 21, 1990): 1–6.


328

at University of L



ownloaded from


failure to determine an appropriate constitutional model of federal-ism that could accurately reflect the dynamics of its real center-regional integration. Three important themes can be identified inthis context: first, those who determine Russia’s constitutionalprocess manipulate the existing constitution to serve the purposeof a political marketplace; second, the Russian Constitution con-tains a number of clauses that are unclear and contradictory, thusallowing manipulation and noncompliance; and finally, Russia’sregional legislative process has a leading character, which is notreflected in the country’s legal code.

First, the binary nature of Russia’s constitutionalism, seen in theformula “Constitution plus the Federal Constitutional Law”accompanied by the Constitutional Court’s power of legal interpret-ation,86 enabled Russia to indulge its cultural aversion to legalism,because many legal acts have been reinterpreted in a manner expe-dient for the current political heavyweights. Thus, instead of enfor-cing the ethical compact of Russia’s socio-political relations, thisdynamic set in motion a “creeping” constitutional reform thatlargely ignored the principles of genuine federalism. A fewexamples are in order. The January 18, 1996 Constitutional Courtdecision No. 2 “On Constitutionality of the Altai Krai Statutes”ruled in favor of a strict separation of the legal and executivebranches in the regions. The Court claimed that the regional parlia-ments do not have the right to elect the heads of regional execu-tives, eject them from power, or influence the appointments ofexecutive staff (provisions that were initially embedded in Articles81.3, 82, 83, and 84 of the regional statutes). The Court also ruledthat no governmental structure at either the federal or regionallevel has the right to dissolve a popularly elected regional assembly(Article 77 of the Altai regional statutes).87 However, when Putinbecame president, the resulting change in the country’s politicalclimate forced the Court to pass a new, contradictory decision No.13 on December 21, 2005. This decision resulted in the approvalof a new method to select the regional governors, whereby regionalassemblies vote for the executive candidates under the threat of dis-solution.88 In this document, the Court also confirmed the right of

86. Dobrynin, Novyi Federalizm; Gligich-Zolotareva, Sovershenstvovanie Federa-tivnoi Sostavliaiushchei Konstitutsii: pro et contra.87. “Postanovlenie KS RF ot 18 Ianvaria 1996 No. 2 ‘Po delu o proverke riadapolozhenii ustava (Osnovnogo Zakona) Altaiskogo Kraia,’” Sobranie Zakonoda-telstva RF, no. 4, January 22, 1996, 409–11.88. Federal’nyi Zakon No. 159-FZ ot December 11, 2004 “O Vnesenii Izmenenii vFederal’nyi Zakon ‘Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh Organizatsii’ i v Federal’nyi Zakon‘Ob osnovnykh garantiyakh izbiratel’nykh prav,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, December15, 2004; Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii No. 1603 ot December 27, 2004


329

at University of L



ownloaded from


the federation president to dissolve regional assemblies.89 Thisabrupt change shows an alarming absence of constitutionalvalues, largely attributed to a well-entrenched cultural tradition ofdisregard for the compulsory nature of legal constraints.

A well-publicized Constitutional Court decision on January 9,1998 is another case in point.90 In this ruling, the Court placedthe center-regional division of powers under the jurisdictionof the federal constitutional law—a decision, which virtuallygranted the federal center the right to “delegate” certain responsi-bilities to the regions. This decision contradicts article 76.2 of theRF constitution, which states that the federal law can only regulatethe principles of joint jurisdiction and not the division of powers.The latter, in accordance with article 11.3 of Russia’s constitution,falls under the jurisdiction of the RF Constitution or bilateral trea-ties.91 Law 119-FZ from June 24, 1999 corrected the balance byincluding the regional order of government into the process ofdrafting federal legislation pertaining to the center-regional div-ision of powers.92 The document instituted compulsory reading ofall proposed legal acts by the regional parliaments and providedfor the creation of a reconciliatory commission should one-thirdof the regions find the draft law unsatisfactory. However, it didnot outline the principles of this commission’s functioning andthe methods of its formation, leaving such issues to the discretionof the State Duma. Moreover, Article 4.13 of the Law grants regionalrepresentatives just a consultative voice within the State Duma leg-islative committees which draft such laws. Similarly, from a strictlyconstitutional point of view, the drive towards cancellation of

“O Poryadke rassmotreniya kandidatur na dolzhnost’ vysshego dolzhnostnogolitsa sub ekta Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, December 29, 2004.89. “Postanovlenie KS RF ot 21 Dekabria 2005 No. 13 P ‘Po voprosu o konstitut-sionnosti novogoporiadka nadeleniia grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii polnomo-chiiami vysshikh dolzhnostnykh lits subektov RF,’” Rossiiskaia Gazeta,December 29, 2005.90. “Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda RF ot 9 Ianvaria 1998 goda No. 1-P‘po delu o proverke konstitutsionnosti Lesnogo Kodeksa RF,’” Sobranie Zakono-datelstva RF, No. 3, January 19, 1998, 429–31.91. A. Bezrukov, “Sovmestnaia kompetentsiia i sovershenstvovanie vzaimo-deistviia Rossiiskoi Federatsii i ee subektov,” Pravovedenie 4 (2003): 16–23;N. V. Varlamova, “Konstitutsionnaia model rossiiskogo federalizma,” Konstitut-sionnoe Pravo: Vostochnoe Obozrenie 4, no. 29 (1999): 60–61; Dobrynin, NovyiFederalizm; E. V. Riabov, “Dogovornoe Regulirovanie Federativnykh Otnosheniiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Vestnik SamGU 5, no. 2 (2006): 91–100.92. Federalnyi zakon RF ot 24 iiulia 1999 goda No. 119-FZ, “o poriadke razgra-nicheniia predmetov vedeniia ia polnomochii mezhdu organami gosudarstven-noi vlasti Rossiiskoi Federatsii i organami gosudarstvennoi vlasti subektov RF,”Parlamentskaia Gazeta, June 28, 1999; SZ RF, no. 26, 1999.


330

at University of L



ownloaded from


bilateral treaties, initiated by the federal center upon the accessionof Vladimir Putin to power, violated Russia’s constitutional struc-ture. Federal Law No. 95-FZ adopted on July 4, 2003 stipulatesthat the treaties can only be decided within certain regions andgrants these documents a federal law status.93 This contradictsArticle 72 of the Russian Constitution, which assumes that the trea-ties are open to all regions regardless of their cultural or nationalcharacteristics. Moreover, the document “demoted” the treaties tofederal law status, thus depriving them of their rightful consti-tutional rank.94

Apart from the federal authorities, regional leaders also manipu-lated constitutional statutes, which was particularly true during theYeltsin presidency. The regional leaders had their unique, noncove-nantal view of federal principles, loosely interpreting the bounds ofthe federal constitution and legislation and adopting highly selec-tive criteria for following federal fiscal and economic regimes. Thegeneral philosophy behind this view was that some regions andrepublics were entitled to special rights and privileges due totheir specific ethnic, economic, and territorial characteristics. Thislogic served to elevate many of these regions legally and politicallyabove the center and ultimately led to numerous violations of the1993 federal Constitution.95 In his May 2000 address to theFederal Assembly, Putin claimed that by the end of the 1990s,more than 3,500 regional laws contradicted the country’s basiclaw,96 and in May 2000 alone he issued eighteen decrees overridingthe regional legislation that contradicted the federal law. Theregions, nevertheless, continued to violate the federal law duringthe first term of Putin’s presidency with hundreds of newly

93. Federalnyi zakon RF ot 04.07.2003 N 95-FZ, “O vnesenii izmeneniy i dopol-neniy v federalnyi zakon ‘Ob obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii zakonodatel-nykh (predstavitelnykh) i ispolnitelnykh organov gosudarstvennoy vlastisubyektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, July 8, 2003.94. V. Cherepanov, “Federal’naya reforma v Rossii: Sovremennoe sostoyanie iperspektivy razvitiya,” in Politiko-Pravovye Resursy Federalizma v Rossii,ed. R. Khakimov (Kazan’: Kazanskii Institut Federalizma, 2006), 65–75, esp. 72.95. R. Sakwa, “Federalism, sovereignty and democracy,” in Regional Politics inRussia, ed. Cameron Ross (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 1–22; A. Stepan, “Russian Federalism in Comparative Perspective,” Post-SovietAffairs 16, no. 2 (2000): 133–76; Kahn, Federalism, Constitutionalism, and theRule of Law in Russia; V. Lysenko, “Dogovornye otnosheniya kak faktor obostre-niya protivorechii kraev i oblastei s respublikami,” in Asymmetrichnaya federat-siya: Vzglyad is tsentra, respublik i oblastei, ed. L. Drobizheva (Moscow: Instituteof Ethnology and Anthropology RAN), 12–15; Arinin, Rossiiskii Federalizm,165–76.96. Putin’s Address to the Federal Assembly, July 8, 2000, Ofitsialnoe InternetPredstavitelstvo Prezidenta Rossii, available online at http://president.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2000/07/28782.shtml.


331

at University of L



ownloaded from


enacted and existing regional legal acts contradicting the federalconstitution.97

Second, the federal Constitution also contained a large number ofserious contradictions that engendered regional and national non-compliance and allowed legal manipulations.98 The constitutionhas not resolved the problem of equality of federating parties—atradition that stemmed from the messianic ideology of Soviet feder-alism which constructed a confederal institutional facade.99 Bygranting a different name or status to each group of administrativeunits and by permitting change in a subject’s status through a con-stitutional amendment “and mutual consent of the Russian Federa-tion and the subject of the Russian Federation,”100 Article 5.2 of theRussian Constitution implies asymmetry between the federation’ssubjects.101 The document does not outline the principles inorder to include regional legislation in the unified federal legalsystem and mechanisms of federal interference in regional legis-lation when that legislation violates the federal constitution. Thenumber of constitutional clauses pertaining to the sphere of jointjurisdiction seems excessive, opening the way to manipulationand abuse. Article 72 of the Russian Constitution contains somefourteen joint jurisdiction clauses, while Canada allows onlythree.102 Furthermore, the Russian constitution does not outline

97. E. Chebankova, “Putin’s Struggle for Federalism: Structures, Operations, andthe Commitment Problem,” Europe-Asia Studies 59, no. 2 (2007): 279–302;G. Hahn, “The Impact of Putin’s Federative Reforms on Democratisation inRussia,” Post-Soviet Affairs 19, no. 2 (2003): 147–49.98. V. Lysenko, “Dogovornye otnosheniya kak faktor obostreniya protivorechiikraev i oblastei s respublikami,” in Asymmetrichnaya federatsiya: Vzglyad istsentra, respublik i oblastei, ed. L. Drobizheva (Moscow: Institute of Ethnologyand Anthropology RAN), 34–35.99. I. A. Umnova, Konstitutsionnye Osnovy Sovremennogo Rossiiskogo Federa-lizma, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Delo, 2000), 60; B. Ebzeev and L. Karapetian, “RossiiskiiFederalizm: ravnopravie i asimmetriia konstitutsionnogo statusa subekta,”Gosudarstvo i Pravo 3 (1995): 3; A. Meshcheriakov, “Rossiiskii Federalizm: teor-eticheskie I noramtivo-pravovye istoki,” Pravo i Politika 12 (2004): 31–35.100. The Constitution of the Russian Federation, Chapter 1, “The Fundamentalsof the Constitutional System,” Article 66.1 and 66.5; and Chapter 3, “TheRussian Federation.”101. A number of authors including Stepan, Huges, Cashaback, Sharlet,Shakhrai, Boltenkova, and Arinin, argued that asymmetry is an appropriate sol-ution for many multi-ethnic federal states. However, a large number of Russianexperts including Ebzeev and Karapetian, Umnova, Gligich-Zolotareva, andDobrynin, argued that asymmetry could be harmful within the conditions of leg-islative uncertainty and the lack of legal political culture.102. Lysenko, “Razvitie Federatsii i Konstitutsiia Rossii,” 17; V. Chirkin, Konsti-tutsionnoe Pravo: Rossiia i Zarubezhnyi Opyt (Moscow: Zertsalo, 1998), 320–30;A. Bezrukov, “Sovmestnaia kompetentsiia i sovershenstvovanie vzaimodeistviiaRossiiskoi Federatsii i ee subektov,” Pravovedenie 4 (2003): 16–23.


332

at University of L



ownloaded from


electoral methods for the formation of executive branches ofregional governments. Neither does it spell out the rights of citizensto be elected to the post of a regional executive and to take part inelectoral campaigns for regional executive offices. The federalcenter, supported by the Constitutional Court, used these loopholesto grant the Russian Federation president the right to appoint theregional leaders de-facto. Moreover, given that the constitutiondoes not outline the mode used to form the Federation Counciland the State Duma, the national center was able to introduce theproportional representation system at the expense of the pluralitymandates.103 The single mandates system, however, traditionallyenabled the regions to defend their interests in the lower house ofthe national legislature.104 Similarly, the May 2000 reform of theFederation Council105 resulted in the regional interests becomingunderrepresented at the national level.106 In addition, followingthe reconstitution of the gubernatorial elections, Russia’s popu-lation has become virtually excluded from selecting the federalchamber deputies. The de-facto president appoints the regionalgovernors who then proceed to appoint their representatives inthe upper chamber.

Finally, the inability of Russia’s constitution to adequately reflectthe country’s political realities results in a situation whereby theregional legislative process has a leading role, while the nationallegislation is reactive. Ideally, however, regional legislation shouldplay a secondary role, thereby reflecting a general compliancewith the legal norms of the national law. In Russia, many laws andinstitutions have been adopted prior to their induction in thefederal legal code.107 The treaty conclusion process perfectly

103. Federalnyi Zakon, “O vyborakh deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal-nogo Sobraniya Rosiiskoi Federatsii Ot 18 May 2005,” Rossiiskaya Gazeta, May25, 2005.104. R. Turovsky, “The Mechanism of Representation of Regional Interests atthe Federal Level in Russia: Problems and Solutions,” Perspectives on EuropeanPolitics and Society 8, no. 1 (2007b): 80–82.105. Zakon “O poryadke formirovaniya Soveta Federatsii Federalnogo SobraniyaRossiiskoi Federatsii,” Sobranie Zakonodatelstva Rossiiskoi Federatsii 20, May 15,2000, 4319–24.106. T. Remington, “Majorities without Mandates: The Russian Federal Councilsince 2000,” Europe-Asia Studies 55, no. 5 (2003): 667–91; M. Hyde, “Putin’sFederal Reforms and their Implications for Presidential Power in Russia,”Europe-Asia Studies 53, no. 5 (2001): 719–43; Chebankova, “Putin’s Strugglefor Federalism.”107. This problem began with the USSR. During the period of the Soviet stateformation, Union republics adopted their laws and constitutions prior to theenactment of the USSR’s first constitution in 1924. This necessitated theprocess of legal harmonization. The RSFSR had to enact a new version of its con-stitution in 1925, in which a range of rights within the military, foreign relations,


333

at University of L



ownloaded from


illustrates this fact. Launched with the signing of the first Russo-Tatar Treaty on February 15, 1994, the process involved some forty-six subjects of the federation, with Moscow federal city being thelast to sign a treaty on June 16, 1998.108 The process, however,remained beyond the competence of the Russian parliament109

until June 24, 1999, when the State Duma enacted law No 119-FZon the division of responsibilities between national and regionalgovernments.110 Interestingly, following the enactment of this law,the regions and the center have not signed any new treaty,111 withthe single exception of the second Russo-Tatar treaty, which wassigned into law in July 2007.112 Although the Russian constitutiondoes not provide for the existence of the regional judicial systems(articles 71.3, 118, 124, 128), regional constitutional courts, smallclaim courts, and other courts existed independently of such consti-tutional provisions on the judicial level. Russia’s Federal Consti-tutional law No 1-FKZ on December 31, 1996 responded to thissituation by allowing the establishment of regional constitutionaland small claims courts.113 Nevertheless, certain discrepancieswithin the financial regulations created a number of constitutionalcontradictions.114

Having said this, the emergence of leading regional legislation isalmost inevitable in a country such as Russia, with its extremelydiverse ethnic population, large territories, and varying cultural-territorial requirements. Therefore, the federal law has a duty tocreate appropriate mechanisms for accommodating these socio-political realities in order to safeguard popular rights and free-doms. The lack of a covenantal approach was particularly evidentat this point. The country’s legislation did not make any effort to

transportation, and telecommunication spheres had been transferred under theUnion jurisdiction. See Meshcheriakov, “Rossiiskii Federalizm: teoreticheskie.”108. Boltenkova, Rossiiskaia Gosudarstvennost: Sostoianie i Perspektivy Razvi-tiia; Riabov, “Dogovornoe Regulirovanie Federativnykh Otnoshenii v RossiiskoiFederatsii”; Khan, Federalism, Constitutionalism, and the Rule of Law in Russia.109. Stepan, “Russian Federalism in Comparative Perspective”; Khan, Federal-ism, Constitutionalism, and the Rule of Law in Russia; Lysenko, “Dogovornyeotnosheniya kak faktor obostreniya protivorechii kraev i oblastei srespublikami.”110. Federalnyi zakon RF ot 24 iiulia 1999 goda No. 119-FZ “o poriadke razgra-nicheniia predmetov vedeniia ia polnomochii mezhdu organami gosudarstven-noi vlasti Rossiiskoi Federatsii i organami gosudarstvennoi vlasti subektov RF,”Parlamentskaia Gazeta, June 28, 1999; SZ RF, No. 26, 1999.111. Boltenkova, Rossiiskaia Gosudarstvennost.112. Chebankova, “Putin’s Struggle for Federalism,” 1001–2.113. Federalnyi Konstitutsionnyi Zakon No. 1-FKZ ot 31 dekabria 1996, “osudebnoi sisteme Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” SZ RF, no. 1 (1997): 1–3.114. N. V. Varlamova, “Konstitutsionnaia model rossiiskogo federalizma,”Konstitutsionnoe Pravo: Vostochnoe Obozrenie 4, no. 29 (1999): 112–21.


334

at University of L



ownloaded from


reflect the realities of the regional legislative process. Law 119-FZ,for example, has not provided the regions with an opportunity tojoin the leading legislation process in selected circumstances.115

Neither has it described the mechanisms for determining such cir-cumstances and the mechanisms of harmonizing leading regionallegislation with the federal standard.

Organic Conduct of Politics, Informal Relations, andLack of Recognition

Another important aspect of this discussion pertains to Russia’ssocio-cultural difficulties in recognizing the individual integrity offederating parties and endorsing a pluralism of opinions. This isclosely related to Russia’s lenience towards the organic, instead ofcovenantal, political order. Organic polities are strongly linked to“political messianism,”116 and aim to find a sole and exclusivetruth in human, religious, and political interactions. They strive toestablish a state of total harmony, in which the use of legal forceand violence will be avoided. In these polities, an informal meansof political dialogue prevail, and individual integrities are respectedonly inasmuch as they can contribute to the achievement of acommon goal.

Russia’s traditional search for an absolute truth, seen in theeschatological character of the theo-philosophical Orthodox tra-dition, has manifested itself through the evolution of its politicalprocess. During the Putin period, the goal was to achieve a morestable, more manageable, and more secure state. It is importantthat this was viewed in the traditional Orthodox style of reachingan ideal and perfect solution. A course of action was implementedto completely overtake the management of the political system,and those who did not agree with such an objective were excludedfrom the decision-making process. Legal violence has been largelyavoided and a greater emphasis has been placed on the establish-ment of societal and moral forms of control. Of particular impor-tance was the creation of the youth movement Nashi for thepurpose of vilifying those who opposed the current policies. TheYukos affair represented a single selected strike to enforce compli-ance within the business community by moral psychological meanswithout substantially changing respective economic laws regarding

115. Federalnyi zakon RF ot 24 iiulia 1999 goda No. 119-FZ.116. Talmon, Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, 1–2, and 252–54; Cohn, ThePursuit of the Millennium; Talmon, Political Messianism, 516; Riemer, “Covenantand Federal Constitution,” 145; Biryukov and Sergeyev, Russian Politics inTransition, 2–3.


335

at University of L



ownloaded from


transfer pricing and taxation.117 Finally, as Dakhin notes,118 thestate has embarked on the creation of a new nomenklatura classthat will be responsible for the completion of goals identified bythe government. Shevtsova supports this view by claiming thatRussia has begun to develop a new class of bureaucratic oligarchythat occupies key positions within economic and political struc-tures and influences a wide spectrum of political processes takingplace within the country.119

At the federal level, this dynamic was translated to the establish-ment of informal, shadow methods of the center-regional dialoguethat relied on moral rather than legal rules. The first term of Putin’spresidency (2000–2004) exhibited a clear political favoritismtowards a large number of territories. This particularly concernedthe Kremlin’s dialogue with the national republics. The center’srelationship with these territories has been highly selective anddependent on a range of subjective factors such as the personalityof a regional leader, the political and economic situation within therepublic, its natural resources, and other politico-economic con-siderations.120 In a number of cases, where regional leaders wereunacceptable to the Kremlin, the center embarked upon aggressivecampaigns for their dismissals. During the first term of Putin’s pre-sidency, this could only be achieved through active federal interfer-ence in regional electoral processes. This was done in Ingushetiya(2001) and Adygeya (2002), where the center managed to pushthrough its favored candidates Murat Zyazikov and KhazretSovmen.121 In those regions, where compromises were possible,the center chose pressure and intimidation followed by a sub-sequent inclusion of “tamed” leaders into the existing power struc-ture. This took place in Yakutiya (2001), Kalmykiya (2002), andBashkortostan (2003).122 Finally, the center openly supportedsome of the most amenable leaders during their electoral cam-paigns and incumbencies in exchange for clearly demonstrable

117. Chebankova, “Putin’s Struggle for Federalism,” 2009.118. A. Dakhin, “Vlast kak Bolshoe Mysliashchee,” Kazanskii Federalist 1–2,nos. 17–18 (2006): 36–37.119. L. Shevtsova, Russia—Lost in Transition: the Yeltsin and Putin Legacies(New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007).120. S. Mikheev, “Tsentr-Natsional’nye Respubliki: Otnosheniya na NovomEtape,” Moscow Centre for Political Technology, October 30, 2002, availableonline at http://www.politcom.ru/2002/p_region31.php, last accessed March20, 2008.121. “Ziazikov Stal taki Prezidentom Ingushetii,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, April30, 2002; “Tolko ia i Gosudarstvo,” Vedomosti, January 24, 2002.122. “Vybory v Iakutii: Tretia Popytka Nikolaeva,” Parlamentskaia Gazeta,September 28, 2001; “Respublika Kalmykiia,” Kommersant Vlast, October 14,2002; “Respublika Bashkortostan,” Kommersant Vlast, December 1, 2003.


336

at University of L



ownloaded from


political loyalty. Tatarstan, North Osetiya, and Kabardino-Balkariyacould serve as the most illuminating examples.123

During the second term of Putin’s tenure (2004–2008), thecenter continued to exploit its noncontractual relationship withthe regions within the financial, budgetary, and investmentlevels. Various donor-regions, such as Khanty-Mansi AutonomousOkrug, St Petersburg, and Moscow Federal Cities, retained a sub-stantial amount of their income within their own territories,depending on their political importance and personal connectionswithin the Kremlin.124 By 2007, 61 percent of all the existingfederal transfers to recipient regions were distributed on thebasis of shadow negotiations, in which political factors, such asthe amount of votes cast for the pro-Kremlin United Russiaparty, became defined.125 Regarding investments, the level ofdirect regional inflows was largely dependent on the local admin-istrations’ relationships with important officials at the federalcenter, where the Kremlin was able to direct investors into politi-cally loyal territories.126

Difficulties in recognizing the integrity of federating parties arerevealed by the cyclical fluctuations of Russia’s center-regionalpolicy. As a unitary state since the fifteenth century, Russia wascomposed of large divisions of provincial or local administrations,which were decentralized in practice and even demonstratedoccasional separatist tendencies. The center had to react tovarious autonomous pressures from these units and conduct differ-ent regional reforms in order to improve governance and displayleniency towards greater liberalism. Such concessions, however,were short-lived, as the promises for devolution were conductedon a noncontractual basis. The center quickly betrayed its initial lib-eralizing intentions and reset regional dialogue back to the unitaryrails. More importantly, such cycles of promise-and-reneg were notminor fluctuations incapable of reversing the general vector of pol-itical development, similar to what we see in the center-regionalrelationships in the West. Rather, these were important policy mile-stones that seriously affected the evolution of independent regionalinitiatives.

123. “Kreml Podderzhit Dzasokhova na Vyborakh Glavy Severnoi Osetii,” Neza-visimaia Gazeta, July 25, 2001.124. Emiliya Kazumova, “Bednye Rodstvenniki,” Novye Izvestiia, March 15,2007.125. N. Zubarevich, “Sshit Prostranstvo,” Ekspert, December 27, 2007.126. R. Turovsky, “Regionalnye Ekonomiki i Regionalnyi Separatizm,” MoscowCentre for Political Technology, October 23, 2007, available online at http://www.politcom.ru/article.php?id=5246, last accessed February 5, 2008.


337

at University of L



ownloaded from


The 1550 launch of the regional self-governing estate (soslovie)system by Ivan IV,127 the introduction of the ten gubernias byPeter the Great,128 the first attempts towards instituting local self-governance by Catherine II, and the failure of the zemstvo insti-tutions during the counter-reform of the late 1880s and early1890s129 are examples. The Soviet government in particularpursued the policy of the cyclical centralization-devolution devel-opment. The state immobilized for the implementation of majoreconomic tasks, such as industrialization and collectivisation,and devolved power during brief periods of liberalization—examples being the New Economic Policy, sovnarkhozy, and peres-troika. Arinin and Marchenko130 have observed that the Sovietphases of centralization and devolution followed each otherwithin a thirty-five-year period (1922, 1957, and 1992), asthough indicating the capacity of central government to sustaindevolution within certain unitary limits. The establishment ofthe Russian Federation in the early 1990s represented, withcertain reservations, yet another phase of decentralization, whichwas in line with the larger cycle of the post-Soviet centrifugaltrend. This process was gradual and took place over a period offive to six years.131 However, due to the inability of both partiesto follow the decentralization compact, Russia began to exhibit aclear lenience towards reaffirmation of central control by theend of the Yeltsin era.

Statistical evidence exhibits a consensus among the regional leaderson the necessity to reform their relationship with the federal center toa more transparent, legal, and equal partnership. Opinion polls con-ducted at the Center of Sociology of Ethnic and Regional Relations(RAN) in 1999 claimed that a majority of regional elites (50–60percent) negatively evaluated the weakness of the federal center’s

127. A. Pavlov and M. Perrie, Ivan the Terrible. Profiles in Power (London:Longman Press, 2003), 73–75.128. R. Robbins, Jr., The Tsar’s Viceroys. Russian Provincial Governors in theLast Years of the Empire (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987),6–7.129. Ibid., 18; M. S. Conroy, Emerging Democracy in Late Imperial Russia. CaseStudies on Local Self-government (The Zemstvos), State Duma Elections, theTsarist Government, and the State Council before and During World War I(Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 1998), 66–69.130. A. Arinin and G. Marchenko, Uroki i Problemy Stanovleniia Rossiiskogo Fed-eralizma (Moscow: Inteltekh, 1999), 77.131. Lysenko, “Dogovornye otnosheniya kak faktor obostreniya protivorechiikraev i oblastei s respublikami,” 16–17; R. Khakimov, “Ob Osnovakh Asymme-trichnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” in Asymmetrichnaya federatsiya: Vzglyad istsentra, respublik i oblastei, ed. Drobizheva (Moscow: Institute of Ethnologyand Anthropology RAN, 1998), 37–48.


338

at University of L



ownloaded from


policy towards their respective territories.132 Many governors (Orel,Samara, Orenburg, Sverdlovsk regions, Moscow Federal City,Krasnoiarsk Krai) emphasized the need to review the existing mech-anisms of center-regional relationships. They wanted transparentequal dialogue with the Kremlin and equal treatment in all territoriesunder the law.133 More importantly, they wanted to preserve theirexisting political autonomy and pursue the relationship of an equalpartnership with the Kremlin. The governors of Sverdlovsk andIaroslav regions, as well as Krasnoiarsk Krai and Tatarstan, were par-ticular exponents of such views.134

However, the Kremlin was under no obligation, ethical or other-wise, towards the regions and thereby had no incentive to accountfor regional political preferences. Its vision of reforming the exist-ing pattern of center-regional dialogue assumed the traditionalpath towards centralization. Yeltsin’s centralizing efforts135 wereinhibited by the center’s weakness and the absence of regionalcadres capable of counterbalancing the influence of the governors.The May 2000 arrival of Vladimir Putin changed this situation. TheKremlin openly embarked on the creation of a tightly vertical inte-grated structure. The new policies somewhat redefined the existingfederal contract and placed the center above the regions, both insti-tutionally and politically. Yet again, the newly erected rigid systembegan to create many difficulties for effective regional governanceand went, perhaps, too far in its centralizing hierarchical com-ponent.136 This brought about some tectonic political movestowards devolution. Dmitry Kozak, minister of regional develop-ment, insisted in October 2007 that the regions should be givenmore responsibilities in the socio-economic spheres.137 In late2007, Putin also underscored that it was the Kremlin’s current pri-ority to provide the regions with higher levels of responsibilities.Russian president Dmitry Medvedev has made a number of devolu-tionary gestures removing unpopular governors (Ingushetiia),appointing opposition members to gubernatorial positions (Kirovregion, Altai Krai), and expressing his general willingness to

132. V. Ivanov and O. Iarovoi, Rossiiskii Federalism: Stanovlenie i Razvitie(Moscow: Institute of Socio-Political Research [RAN], 2000), 43–54.133. “Rossiiskie Regiony: Put v Novoe Tysyacheletie,” Rossiiskaya FederatsiyaSegodnya, no. 13 (1998).134. “Rossiiu Neobkhodimo Razdelit’ na Respubliki,” Eduard Rossel interview,Izvestiia, June 19, 2001. Alexandr Lebed interview, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 2,1998; Farid Saphiullin interview, Radio Liberty Russia, June 1, 2000.135. Lysenko, “Razvitie Federalnykh Okrugov i Budushchee FederativnogoUstroistva Rossii,” 40.136. Kommersant Vlast, 2008.137. “Polpredov perevodyat v Moskvu,” Vedomosti, October 4, 2007.


339

at University of L



ownloaded from


embark on a more intimate dialogue with representatives of civilsociety.138

Conclusion

This article examined some important traits of Russia’s cultural,theological, and socio-historic relationship with federal ideologiesand infrastructures, concluding that federalism is alien to theRussian cultural and socio-political experience. Russian Orthodoxtheology, which impacts Russia’s political thought, interpreted themain principles of Western federal thought in a profoundly differ-ent way. It purposefully rejected covenantal societal constraintsand established largely hierarchical ideals of social interactions.

In conclusion, it is not the focus of this essay to attribute all thecurrent problems of Russia’s center-regional relations solely tosocio-psychological and cultural constraints, as the role of econom-ies and institutions vary in the evolution of political relationshipsand should not be overlooked. However, cultural aspects, of whichreligion remains one important component, remain significant asto the way and style that political actors understand and operateparticular institutional settings.

Thus, Russia’s noncovenantal cultural mentality has seriouslyinfluenced the evolution of the country’s center-regional relationsand contributed to the inability of the national center to maintainits continuing promises of devolution and recognition. Thisresulted in the prevalence of informal methods of center-regionalpolitical interaction, and impeded the development of genuine con-stitutionalism. More importantly, these dynamics can be found inone way or another in all historical stages of Russia’s evolution toa single independent state.

These theoretical and practical findings suggest that Russia’s pathtoward a Western-type federalism will be difficult and tumultuous.At the same time, given the multiplicity of the country’s compositenationalities, its size, and the generally decentralized nature ofcenter-regional politics, Russia’s only choice is to persevere withits quest to build an effective and functional federal democraticstate. Fulfilling the terms of a federal contract on the basis ofmutual recognition of federal entities must become one importantgoal. To what extent Russia will be able to fulfill these aspirationsand break the traditional mode of noncovenantal socio-politicalinteraction remains to be seen.

138. “Krizis Uskorit Rotatsiiu,” Vedomosti, March 12, 2009; “Belykh PomogutBankiry,” Vedomosti, January 19, 2009; “Gubernatory na Vylet,” Vedomosti,October 29, 2008.


340

at University of L



ownloaded from


russia's non-covenantal federalism: past and present

Documents