romania and the rapprochement between italy and yugoslavia

P.I.E. Peter LangBruxelles · Bern · Berlin · Frankfurt am Main · New York · Oxford · Wien

Italy and Tito’s Yugoslavia in the Age

of International Détente

International IssuesVol. 38

Massimo Bucarelli, Luca Micheletta, Luciano Monzali and Luca riccardi (eds.)

Italy and Tito’s Yugoslavia in the Age

of International Détente

This publication has been peer-reviewed.

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Romania and the Rapprochement between Italy and Yugoslavia

Alberto BaSciani

The 1960s and 1970s were a time of great change for South-East Europe, following the tensions which arose during the most critical phase of the Cold War. During these years commercial business increased, cultural activities resumed, tourism began to expand, but most of all, a season of intense diplomatic contacts and political opening towards the West was inaugurated.

Despite differences between the three countries, regarding for example forces in power and the ultimate goals pursued, Italy, Yugoslavia and romania were undoubtedly the central players in a new phase marked by an easing of tension in international relations. This essay intends to shed some light on one of the least known aspects of European politics by analyzing the normalization of relations between Italy and Yugoslavia determined by the definition of Italy’s eastern border, from the perspective of a South-Eastern European country, romania. Bucharest had in fact gained a certain autonomy from Soviet power during these years. With the aim of expanding margins for maneuver and emancipating the country from Soviet power, the romanian leading class was driving the country to become a mediator between the capitalist and communist worlds, by focusing foreign policies on issues of non-interference, respect of national sovereignty of all countries and, last but not least, the strengthening of commercial and technological ties with the Western world.

Similarly to other popular democracies under the direct control of Moscow, romania severely condemned Yugoslavia, following the expulsion of the country from the Cominform, the advisory organ of the communist parties set up in September 1947 in Szklarska Poręba, in Poland. Curiously, the resolution condemning Yugoslavia was adopted on 28 June 1948 (a historically significant date for the Southern Slavs and for Serbs in particular) during a meeting of the communist parties in Bucharest itself, which had become the organization’s headquarters.1

1 The Cominform headquarters was established in Belgrade. With the transfer to Bucharest Soviet predominance on this organization increased. The entire structure of the Cominform was dominated by Soviet elements, while only a part of the personnel

Italy and Tito’s Yugoslavia in the Age of International Détente

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In the following weeks and months the romanian leading class was among those to violently attack Yugoslavia, to the extent that in the 24 August 1948 edition of the Scînteia, the official press organ of the romanian Working Class Party (Partidul Muncitoresc Român was the name adopted by the romanian communists in 1948 after the merger, or rather the annexation of the Socialist Party) Tito and his close collaborators were described as ‘a gang of assassins’. The attacks were not limited only to this sort of insult. In fact during the course of 1948 the romanian authorities proceeded in a series of actions aimed at harming Yugoslav interests, symbols and institutions present on romanian soil. Tension increased the following year causing various incidents along the romanian-Yugoslav border, to the extent that the romanian military chief of staff implemented the strengthening of the military divisions deployed throughout the Banat region, with the aid of numerous Soviet troops.2

Such a radical stance is not surprising. During the period in question Romania was under firm Soviet control, and Romanian foreign policy outside of the communist countries was more or less inexistent. The hostile attitude adopted towards Tito was yet another element confirming the total submission of romania to the dominant Soviet power.3 On the other hand the red Army was heavily deployed in the Danube country, acting more as an occupation army than an allied force. Furthermore, beginning in the last years of the 1940s, a number of mixed Soviet and romanian entities (the infamous ‘Sov-rom’) controlled the vital centers of romanian economy, beginning with the raw material sector, running them in favor of Moscow. Behind an apparently compact and ferocious facade of true or presumed ‘class enemy’ repression, the romanian communist party itself was ridden with profound disagreements and by personal hostilities, jeopardizing its solidarity and cohesion. Such internal rivalry simplified the work for the Kremlin, and its skillful use of the divide et impera method to maintain firm control and a strict influence over the ruling class in power in Bucharest.4 1948 was a crucial year in

and of the security services were romanian. See: Leonid gibianskii, “Soviet-Yugoslav relations, the Cominform and Balkan Communist Parties: Documentary Sources and some Aspects of research,” in The Balkans in the Cold War. Balkan Federations, Cominform, Yugoslav-Soviet Conflict, ed. Vojislav G. Pavlović (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, 2011), 295. More generally on the Cominform see: The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences, 1947/1948/1949, ed. giuliano Procacci et al. (Milano: Fondazione giangiacomo Feltrinelli, 1994).

2 gheorghe Ciobanu, Relaţiile internaţionale ale României între anii 1948 şi 1964 (Iaşi: Junimea, 2006), 70-3.

3 Ibid., 26.4 On the sovietization process in romania refer to Dennis Deletant, România sub

regimul comunist (Bucureşti: Fundaţia Academia Civică, 2006) 83-126 [original ed., Romania under Communist Rule, Bucharest, 1998]. On the internal struggles within

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the history of the romanian communist dictatorship. It was the year in which the process of ‘sovietization’ brought the state, the economy and cultural life, and finally the whole of society, under the strict supervision of Soviet councilors.5

In the setting of the bilateral relations with Belgrade, the situation certainly did not improve during the years which immediately followed. Also due to the geographical proximity of Yugoslavia, romania became a privileged base for propaganda against Tito as well as for the implementation of acts of sabotage. A specific ‘Yugoslav section’ was created within the PMr’s (the romanian Working Class Party) central Committee formed by leading figures who over the past years had steadily gained experience in covert operations.6 The political and ideological conflict with Tito was also used by the Romanian authorities as a pretext for the planning, towards 1950, of the deportation to one of the most inhospitable areas in Romania (Câmpia Bărăganul) but also to Russia, of over forty thousand people. Twenty-eight thousand of these people were Serbs whom the Soviet regime considered unworthy of trust as they belonged to non-romanian ethnic groups. The population subjected to this treatment lived in a portion of land stretching between 25 and 40 kilometers from the border with Yugoslavia, between Banat and south-east Oltenia. Meanwhile, along the extent of the border with Yugoslavia a military zone was created, inaccessible to ordinary citizens, characterized by the construction of a complex military apparatus of barracks, barbed wire fences and so on.7 Similarly to what happened in other popular democracies, the Yugoslav schism resulted in a witch-hunt that involved party leaders as well as common citizens who were generally accused of espionage for the imperialist powers, and of course of betrayal of the ‘Tito gang’. It is worth remembering that in September 1951 a trial was held in Bucharest against people accused of plotting in favor of the Vatican

the romanian Working Class Party at the time of Tito’s excommunication refer to Florin Constantiniu, Adrian Pop, Schisma roşie. România şi declanşarea conflictului sovieto-iugoslav (1948-1950) (Bucureşti: Compania, 2007), 42-8. For further specific information on the direct consequences of Tito’s schism on relations between Romania and Yugoslavia refer to the volume by Mircea Chiriţoiu, Între David şi Goliath. România şi Iugoslavia în balanţa războiului rece (Iaşi: Casa Editorială Demiurg, 2005), 35-69. For the Italian reader a useful general overview of Nineteenth century romanian history can be found in the book by Francesco guida, Romania (Storia d’Europa) (Milano: Unicopli, 2002).

5 Mioara Anton, Ieşirea din cerc. Politica externă a regimului Gheorghiu-Dej (Bucureşti: Institutul Naţional pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, 2007), 8-9.

6 Ibid., 51-2.7 Johan Steiner, Doina Magheţi, Mormintele tac. Relatări de la cea mai sângeroasă

graniţă a Europei (Iaşi: Polirom – Institutul de Investigare a Crimelor Comunismului în românia, 2009), 18-19.


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and of being part of the so-called Italian espionage center. This period also corresponds to the worst phase in Italian-romanian relations, which were marked by tensions, accusations and opposing claims, and by the complete absence of any commercial and cultural relations.8

regarding romanian foreign policy, the situation began to change slowly only after Stalin’s death and especially after 1956, when the romanian communist regime gradually developed an internal strength, coinciding with the beginning of a gradual and uneasy transition towards relative autonomy from Moscow.9 This was the context in which a cautious approach towards Yugoslavia became possible. In June 1954 diplomatic relations were restored between Bucharest and Belgrade, following in the path set by Chruščëv. On that occasion the unrivaled dominus of the romanian party and state, gheorghe gheorghiu-Dej, was easily able to point at the false information received from Moscow as the reason for the previous quarrels with Yugoslavia. Naturally, it was impossible to altogether dismiss the consequences of the political and ideological conflict that for some time still continued to linger in the background of relations between Yugoslavia and romania. However, the ice had been broken, and despite many difficulties and differences still remaining, as a matter of fact as early as the end of 1954, bilateral relations between the two countries improved substantially, when a series of commercial, cultural and scientific agreements were entered into, including the agreement for the construction of the hydroelectric dam just outside the Iron gates.10 The improvement

8 giuliano Caroli, La Romania nella politica estera italiana 1919-1965. Luci e ombre di un’amicizia storica (Milano: Edizioni Nagard, 2009), 376-428.

9 On the strengthening of the romanian Communist Party refer to Stefano Bottoni, Transilvania rossa. Il comunismo e la questione nazionale (1944-1965) (roma: Carocci, 2007), especially chapters 6 and 7. According to Paul Niculescu Mizil, a romanian Working Class Party leader, already in 1957 gheorghiu-Dej renounced taking part in the demonstration in Moscow for the fortieth anniversary of the October revolution in solidarity to Tito, who at the last moment decided to stay in Belgrade because of disagreements with the Soviets regarding the final statement that all the communist parties gathered in the Soviet capital were to undersign. Cf. Paul Niculescu Mizil, De la Comintern la comunismul naţional (Bucureşti: Editura Evenimentul românesc, 2001), 55. In any case, the leader’s choice would prove successful because upon arrival at Vnukovo airport in Moscow the romanian delegation was involved in a serious plane crash in which the minister for foreign affairs grigore Preoteasa lost his life. It is worth noting that historiography does not consider the accident as an attack.

10 Ciobanu, Relaţiile internaţionale, 74-5. On the normalization of relations between romania and Yugoslavia see Dan Cătănuş, “Reluarea relaţiilor româno-iugoslave. Vizita lui Tito la Bucureşti, 23-26 iunie 1956,” Arhiva Totalitarismului, 3-4 (2002), 72-86. It was only during an official visit by Gheorghiu Dej to Belgrade in November 1963 that a number of difficulties were overcome (due also to Bulgaria’s desire to become part of the project) and the signing of a bilateral agreement was possible, regulating the construction of the hydroelectric station at the Iron gates. See: Cezar Stanciu, Frăţia socialistă. Politica RPR faţă de ţările lagărului socialist 1948-1964

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of relations with Yugoslavia, a state struggling to gain autonomy from Moscow, a regime that had successfully sustained the trial of Stalinist ‘excommunication’, breaking the imposed isolation within the communist area and preparing to become one of the key players on the international political scene, was undoubtedly very important for romania, and increased its room for maneuver in relation to the Soviet Union.11

During the second half of the 1950s romanian diplomacy observed the direction taken by Yugoslavia in foreign policy, a direction aimed at maintaining the balance between the two blocks. Specifically, a report sent by the romanian embassy in Belgrade to Bucharest spotlighted how

in consequence of the pressures exerted on Yugoslavia by the Western Powers and especially by the U.S., it can be expected that in order to prove that Yugoslavia has no intention to get closer to the socialist countries the Yugoslav government will seek to restore the “balance of power” through a variety of approaches in favor of the Western countries order, strongly reaffirming its intention to remain “outside the camp” [as in the text], and play a prominent role among the neutral countries.12

For romania this implied maintaining a special relationship with Yugoslavia also during the difficult period marking the end of the 1950s, when relations between Tito and the Soviet leadership suddenly worsened again.13 During the next few years the romanian leadership continued to develop the process of emancipation from Soviet protection, implementing economic policies with a certain ability. In fact for the Soviets the COMECON, founded in 1949, represented much more than a simple instrument for consultation: the Council was to actually coordinate and direct the economic development of the various satellite countries and on this basis the so-called Valev plan was devised in 1963, consigning romania to the role of supplier of raw materials and agricultural products, a humiliating position for any socialist country.14 The opposition to the Soviet plan shown by the romanian Communist leaders led to the adoption by the Plenum of the Central Committee of romanian Worker’s Party of the

(Târgovişte: Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2009), 224. 11 Ciobanu, Relaţiile internaţionale, 75. On the evolution of romanian foreign policy

after the death of Stalin refer to: Constantin Moraru, Politica externă a României 1958-1964 (Bucureşti: Editura Enciclopedică, 2008).

12 ANIC, Fond CC al PCR – Secţia Relaţii Externe (1958-1965), Dosar 68/1958, Report not dated (however the year is certainly 1958) on the guidelines of foreign policies adopted by the Yugoslav Communist League on the occasion of the 7th YCL Congress.

13 Chiriţoiu, Între David şi Goliath, 77-125.14 The creation of the economic region between Bulgaria, romania and Moldavia

worried the romanian leadership even more. refer to Brândusa Costache, “România şi Consiliul de Ajutor Economic reciproc, 1949-1960,” Arhivele Totalitarismului, 28-29 (2000), 83-8.


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so called ‘declaration of independence’ dated April 1964, which marked a crucial moment in relations between Bucharest and Moscow, inaugurating a new phase of increased romanian autonomy.15 In this setting, during the last phase of gheorghiu-Dej’s power, relations between romania and Yugoslavia underwent continuous and substantial improvement. It appeared almost as if with the anti-Soviet turn aimed at building a national communism capable of standing on its own, gheorghiu-Dej was looking for Tito’s concrete political support, and even more.16 From this moment on, each time the romanian communist leaders faced a political matter of primary importance they resorted to the support or mediation of Tito.

On the other hand, the close ties to the Yugoslav leadership were proof of the autonomy won by the romanian regime. Furthermore, Yugoslavia could become a useful connection to improve economic relations with the West, relations which were greatly needed by Bucharest for enforcing its economic structure and gaining emancipation from an economy based on raw materials, from the Soviet market as well as from the eastern European market in general. There was no question of Yugoslavia ever re-entering the communist block; on the contrary, Tito’s regime was intending to continue along the path of neutrality, also for further improving privileged commercial relations with the western nations as well as with the neutral ones and with the third world. Such was the intention of Mario Stendardi, a high level figure of the Italian Communist Party, responsible for foreign issues within the party, as stated to the romanian ambassador in rome.17

The political position initiated by gheorghiu-Dej (who died in March 1965 after a brief illness) was continued with even greater determination by his successor, Nicolae Ceauşescu. His intention to do so was clearly stated on 27 May 1965 during the course of a meeting held between

15 On the process of the gradual emancipation of romania from the Soviet Union and on the origin of the so called romanian “heresy” refer to the study of Anton, Ieşirea din cerc, especially 148-78.

16 Liviu Ţăranu, România în Consiliul de Ajutor Economic Reciproc 1949-1965 (Bucureşti: Editura Enciclopedică), 2007, 80-1.

17 ANIC, Fond CC al PCR – Secţia Relaţii Externe (1958-1965), Dosar 67/1964. report on the talks of 6 April 1964. During this conversation Stendardi referred to his romanian interlocutor that the meetings with the delegations and leaders of the various communist parties of the East had left him with the impression that with a few exceptions (one of them being romania) the economic situation in the socialist countries was overall complex. In March 1970 Stendardi was expelled from PCI for allegedly giving confidential information to the Soviets. Maurizio Caprara, Lavoro riservato. I cassetti segreti del PCI (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1997), 182-83. During the 1960s and 1970s relations between the PCI and the PCr became very intense, see Stefano Santoro, “Partito comunista italiano e ‘socialismo reale’. I casi romeno e polacco,” Storicamente, 9 (2013), available at: www.storicamente.org/07_dossier/est/santoro.pdf (last access on 18 February 2013).

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Ceauşescu and the Yugoslav ambassador in Bucharest, creating the premises for the first summit between the new Romanian leader and Tito.18 A clear demonstration of this was the non-participation of romania in the armed intervention of the Warsaw Pact during the summer of 1968 to suppress the reformist experiment carried out in Czechoslovakia by Dubček, as well as the firm condemnation of this episode and the support of each nation’s right to choose its own path towards the attainment of socialism.19

A secret classified report dated February 1970, sent from the Romanian foreign bureau to Ceauşescu, highlighted the growing importance that relations with Yugoslavia had gained in romanian international policies. A major role in this improvement was played by the summits held between the leaders of the two communist parties in power.20 During this same period political relations between Italy and romania entered a new more dynamic phase after a long period of difficulties and standstill, as described above. This new phase would become particularly dynamic as testified by the official visit to Italy in 1968 by the Romanian prime minister Ion gheorghe Maurer and the minister for foreign affairs Corneliu Mănescu.21 relations between rome and Bucharest improved to the extent that in January 1971 it was the turn of an official visit to romania by Aldo Moro, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. During talks on the state of bilateral relations, Ceauşescu remarked that Romania wished to

develop the commercial relationship and to support the distension of European political affairs, as a result of its effort to improve relations between romania and Yugoslavia, and between Italy and Yugoslavia. Today our relations with Yugoslavia are good. This represents a good basis for

18 ANIC, Fond CC al PCR – Secţia Relaţii Externe (1958-1965), Dosar 22/1965, Shorthand report of the meeting between Nicolae Ceauşescu and the Yugoslav ambassador in Bucharest Arso Milatović.

19 Lavinia Betea, Cristina Diac, Florin-Răzvan Mihai, Ilarion Ţiu, 21 august 1968. Apoteoza lui Ceauşescu (Iaşi, Polirom, 2009).

20 ANIC, Fond CC al PCR – Secţia Relaţii Externe (1958-1965), Dosar 86/1970, secret report sent by the romanian MAE to Nicolae Ceauşescu as secretary of the Romanian Working Class Party. Visits to Yugoslavia were classified as “Stately and friendship visits,” whereas the rest of the official visits to other socialist countries were classified as “State visits”. According to the official version of a high official of the Securitate, general Ion Mihai Pacepa, at the beginning of the 1970s Ceauşescu, not yet the unrivaled dominus of the party and the state, idolized Tito as a model to follow. refer to Ion Mihai Pacepa, Orizunturi roşii. Crimele şi moştenirea Ceauşeştilor (Bucureşti: Humanitas, 2010), 401.

21 refer to my work: “Tra aperture e neostalinismo. Italia e romania negli anni Sessanta e Settanta,” in Aldo Moro, l’Italia repubblicana e i Balcani, ed. Italo garzia, Luciano Monzali, Massimo Bucarelli (Nardò: Besa – Salento Books, 2012), 188-91.


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direct and appropriate contact with Italy, and for this reason we give great importance to the establishment of good relations in this part of the world, and between these two countries.22

In his reply, Moro did not avoid confronting the issue of relations between Italy and Yugoslavia, and despite the use of the usual diplomatic formulas, did not deny that some difficulties threatening positive relations with Belgrade had arisen:

I wish to assure you that despite recent misunderstandings [with Yugoslavia, ed.] the substance of our relationship and our respect and collaboration towards Yugoslavia have not been damaged. In any case, I believe these misunderstandings will soon be cleared up, with benefit to all three countries, with a satisfactory development of their relations, as has been the case for our relations during this past year. On Italy’s part nothing has changed and I believe this is so also on the part of Yugoslavia.23

As a matter of fact, in that period relations between Italy and Yugoslavia, after a phase of constant improvement, had suffered a sudden freeze. Negotiations for the defining of the border were progressing slowly amidst many difficulties with repercussions on political affairs and in general on Italian public opinion. The situation was so delicate that an unconfirmed press report caused the Italian right wing to react. According to the report Italy would give up Zone B of the Free Territory of Trieste following an agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia, which defined the borders between the two states. This agreement was reported to be due to be signed on the occasion of Tito’s visit on 10 December 1970. Questioned in parliament on the issue, Moro himself stated in response to criticism that despite efforts to settle relations with the eastern territories, Italy would never fail to defend its legitimate national interests. This was all it took to increase tensions with Yugoslavia, leading Tito to cancel his scheduled visit to Italy, precipitating the worsening of the relations between the two countries.24

This impasse in relations between the neighboring Adriatic countries could have represented a good opportunity for romania to give its foreign policies new vitality. As member of the soviet bloc, romania had a certain degree of autonomy from the Soviet Union. This particular political position gave the country the opportunity to play an active role on the international scene. This quality (exalted in many publications and pamphlets in various languages praising romania’s foreign policy)

22 ANIC, Fond CC of PCR – Secţia Relaţii Externe, Dosar 2/1971, Shorthand report of the meeting between Aldo Moro and Nicolae Ceauşescu, 14 January 1971.

23 Ibid.24 Cf. Massimo Bucarelli, La “questione jugoslava” nella politica estera dell’Italia

repubblicana (1945-1999) (roma: Aracne, 2008), 45-58.

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enhanced Ceauşescu’s personal prestige and represented the means of increasing commercial exchanges with the Western Countries. This was a resource greatly needed by romania to fuel dissidence towards the Soviet Union, in relation to international power balances and to the romanian Communist Party’s need for new political and ideological ways of consolidating internal legitimation. The romanian ruling class needed to mark its autonomy from Moscow to consolidate its power for once. In this perspective, close ties to Yugoslavia could be the key for implementing a certain degree of autonomy and security for romania in an international context, just as the previous Sino-Soviet conflict had been used by gheorghiu-Dej to win an increasing degree of self-determination from the suffocating relationship with Moscow.

Obviously Yugoslavia also had an interest in involving romania in its most problematic issues with neighboring countries. These were dealt with in the meeting between Ceauşescu and Tito in July 1974. On this occasion the foreign office of the PCR’s Central Committee prepared an accurate report dealing with the unsettled controversy concerning the border question between Italy and Yugoslavia. In examining the matter, the document pointed out that despite excellent diplomatic relations between the two countries, there were however some points of disagreement. Specifically, it referred to Yugoslavia’s strong opposition towards involving Italy in the talks concerning the disarmament of the Balkan peninsula, and most of all, the disappointment demonstrated by Yugoslavia for the ‘lack of support shown by the romanian press for Yugoslavia in its territorial dispute with Italy’.25 Documents prepared for the summit also contained statements by Tito on the occasion of the 10th Congress of the Yugoslav Communist League (that had been held not long before, in May 1974), during which the Yugoslav president had strongly rejected the latest developments in Italian foreign policy towards Belgrade, setting out territorial claims considered by himself and the Yugoslav leadership as a direct attack on Yugoslav sovereignty and national integrity:

The issue concerning Zone B cannot be taken into consideration any more. We are ready to promote relations with Italy on the basis of the principles that have allowed positive developments until now. However no-one should have any doubt that all our different nations and nationalities will defend the borders, the freedom and the independence of Yugoslavia as one.26

25 ANIC, Fond CC of PCR – Secţia Relaţii Externe, Dosar 139/1974. Shorthand report of the meeting between Tito and Ceauşescu and attached files.

26 Ibid.


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romania did not have the necessary political or diplomatic means to intervene directly in the dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia; however the experience gained during those years as a mediating country in the Balkan area could be used with some advantage. In fact an interesting meeting took place in Bucharest in May 1975 between Ceauşescu and Aleksandar Grličikov, the secretary of the Executive Committee of the Presidium of the Central Committee (UCJ). The Yugoslav political leader remarked on the bad state of relations between his country and Bulgaria, and on how, according to Yugoslavia, not only had Bulgaria not given up claims over Macedonia, but the heads of the Bulgarian nomenklatura were spreading information among the leaders and the members of their party concerning the right to such territorial demand, also stating that with the fall of Yugoslavia the region would return under Bulgarian control. According to Grličikov the Bulgarian authorities were not only taking advantage of every occasion to gather troops along the Yugoslav border, but they had also gotten to the point of committing ‘outright acts of terror towards the population in Pirin’.27 In his reply, Ceauşescu made an attempt to minimize these accusations, and mentioning his meetings with the Bulgarian communist leader Todor Živkov, suggested direct contact between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. He then stated that only a continuous strengthening of Yugoslavia and of the national communion of its people, along with a greater impulse in international politics, would have guaranteed the maintaining of the current borders and the end of every threat to territorial integrity.28 The romanian leader probably guessed that behind the aggressive Bulgarian attitude, Soviet influence was hiding.29

27 This was the only part of Macedonia within the borders of the Bulgarian state after World War II. For an overview of the Macedonian issue from a Bulgarian perspective during the socialist years refer to Armando Pitassio, Storia della Bulgaria contemporanea (Passignano sul Trasimeno: Aguaplano, 2012), 103 et sqq. The Macedonian question, therefore, is not even dozed off during the years of communism. The tensions that shook the communist bloc and even the war in Indochina became elements able to procure new rivalries and disagreements between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria practically until the early 1980s. See Dimităr Petkov, “The Macedonian Question in Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations (July 1948 – October 1956),” Bulgarian Historical Review, 1-2 (2011), 140-68; Spyridon Sfetas, “The Bulgarian-Yugoslav Dispute over the Macedonian Question as a Reflection of the Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy (1968-1980),” Balcanica, XLIII (2012), 241-71.

28 ANIC, Fond CC of PCR – Secţia Relaţii Externe, Dosar 72/1975. Shorthand report of the meeting between Nicolae Ceauşescu and Aleksandar Grličkov of 22 May 1975.

29 Sfetas, “The Bulgarian-Yugoslav Dispute,” 259-66. In January 1979, Brežnev visited Bulgaria. In his meeting with the soviet leader, Živkov expressed his concerns over the unholy alliance of Yugoslavia, romania, China, the USA and NATO against Bulgaria. According to him was a maneuver aimed to isolate Bulgaria in the Balkans. Živkov thought: “Measures should be taken by both countries, and by the brotherly socialist countries, to reinforce our positions in the Balkans,” ibid., 261.

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Of course the situation along the Italian eastern border was very different to the one along the Macedonian border, and, as we know, the worst case scenario was avoided. During 1974 most of the pending issues were settled through long and difficult negotiations, and finally at the end of the same year negotiations between the two countries succeeded in finding an agreement, perfected during the following months, that finally led to the signing of the Osimo agreement on 10 November 1975. This agreement brought a definitive solution to the old and delicate issue concerning the defining of the border between Italy and Yugoslavia, as well as to matters concerning the treatment of the respective national minorities.30

romania had become a reliable element within the sphere of relations between European states: the opening towards Western Countries, the special relationship built with Yugoslavia and a certain degree of acquired autonomy, at least apparently, within the Soviet bloc, gave credit to the Danubian state as a trusted political player with which one could do business and at the same time as a trait d’union with the rest of the socialist world, especially in the Balkan region.

The normalization of relations between Italy and Yugoslavia was the object of an interesting conversation that took place in Bucharest on 25 May 1977 between Ceauşescu and an important Italian delegation headed by the prime minister giulio Andreotti and his minister for foreign affairs Arnaldo Forlani. During the course of the conversation matters concerning foreign policy were dealt with, beginning with the international situation in the Balkan region and in the Mediterranean area. Ceauşescu urged a widening of the distension process in international affairs on the part of European countries, along with the reduction of armaments in respect of full national sovereignty by all states, according to the Helsinki agreement (which had in the meantime become a stronghold of romanian foreign policy). In answer to these requests, Andreotti stated that in such matters Italian politics were going in the right direction:

we have just concluded an important agreement with Yugoslavia to find a definite solution to the problems along the border. I believe this to be an act of great importance, it has caused some emotion in the local population, but the treaty was ratified in Parliament with a vast majority.

Forlani’s words on the subject were even clearer:

President Andreotti has just stated that we have done everything possible in this direction, at the cost of bearing sacrifices and difficulties. Indeed we consider relations with Yugoslavia essential and in this perspective we must

30 Bucarelli, La “questione jugoslava” nella politica estera, 68-73.


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interpret the solution to problems concerning the border. We have established a zone of free economic cooperation in the hope that this may also be achieved with other countries besides Yugoslavia. President Andreotti has also spoken of the great interest shown in this matter by president Karamanlis in Athens, towards romania and the other countries in the Balkan region: Yugoslavia, Turkey […] it is undoubtedly true what you say about the great difficulties and indeed we cannot expect spectacular results, however an interesting prospect is to maintain the European Community area open, offering a chance for cooperation.31

The Balkan issues were also an opportunity to deal with a regional problem often raised (as we have already seen) during the frequent meetings between Ceauşescu and Tito: the difficulties in the relationship between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria caused by the Macedonian issue. The Romanian communist leader recognized a certain difficulty on that front but believed that this would never lead to open confrontation between the two countries. This reassurance could not have been very convincing, despite Andreotti’s quick and cryptic answer: ‘the only real problem will present itself after Tito’.32

During those years relations between Italy and Yugoslavia were dealt with by romania and Yugoslavia also on occasions other than the ritual bilateral meetings. In his memoir Mihai Pacepa, a high official of the Securitate (the romanian secret police) who had escaped to the West in 1978, recounts that on one day early in 1978 he had a secret meeting with Silvo gorenc, Tito’s envoy, who arrived in the romanian capital on a secret flight. Gorec carried a message from Tito in reply to a previous message by Ceauşescu asking the Yugoslav president to mediate in order to obtain the release of Aldo Moro, held captive by the red Brigades. Tito’s answer was negative, because the Yugoslavs – who, according to Pacepa, boasted about being the organizers of the first terrorist formations in Italy and especially of the red Brigades, with the aim of destabilizing their capitalist neighbor – believed that the decision to assassinate the leader of the DC had already been taken and was irrevocable. Tito suggested to Ceauşescu that he wrote a telegram of condolence to the headquarters of the Italian Communist Party, and that he sent a personal telegram to Enrico Berlinguer.33

This is obviously a testimony to be taken with a measure of skepticism. While it is true that because of his high position within the intelligence Pacepa had knowledge of classified political information and of details

31 ANIC, Fond CC of PCR – Secţia Relaţii Externe, Dosar 77/1977, shorthand report of the meeting between Ceauşescu, Andreotti and Forlani in Bucarest.

32 Ibid.33 Pacepa, Orizunturi roşii, 409-11.

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regarding romanian society, many of his statements (including this one) can not be proven and in many cases seem purposefully designed. Indeed, as researchers studying romanian communism well know, in these cases orders and directives given by Ceauşescu were exclusively verbal and direct, to avoid any possible trace.

Certainly the old issues between Italy and Yugoslavia appeared to be completely solved quite rapidly, as the Secretary of the Italian Socialist Party, Bettino Craxi, confirmed in October 1978, during a visit to Bucharest. In fact according to Craxi relations between his party and the Yugoslav Communist League were ‘naturally good because of Italy’s excellent relations with Yugoslavia’.34

Yugoslavia however continued to occupy an important role in the frequent and important bilateral meeting between Italy and Romania. On 15 March 1980, only two months before Tito’s death, giulio Andreotti visited Bucharest as President of the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, and had a long meeting with Nicolae Ceauşescu, by then the undisputed leader of the Communist Party and of the romanian State, having imposed a dictatorship. As had happened during other recent meetings with Italian political delegations, much of the conversation was dedicated to the Afghanistan issue. romania, applauded by the West, had immediately adopted a critical position on Soviet armed intervention in the Asian country. Following close examination of the development of this delicate situation, Andreotti addressed a new issue concerning the Adriatic region close to Italy:

We are evidently interested in Yugoslavia. We have maintained an extremely reasonable political position towards this country and our relations have been very good for some years. However we are concerned about internal contradictions, and about the different nationalities.35

Andreotti stated that he had also expressed his concerns directly to marshal Tito himself who had reassured him, indicating that he was certain of the integrity of the Yugoslav Federation. However, according to the Italian politician:

there are worries caused by groups of refugees who have left Yugoslavia? who could create a degree of destabilization in Yugoslavia. Others are also concerned about the possibility of Soviet intervention. But such a thing does not seem possible to me.36

34 ANIC, Fond CC of PCR – Secţia Relaţii Externe, Dosar 186/1978. Shorthand report of the meeting between Bettino Craxi and Nicolae Ceauşescu on 20 October 1978.

35 ANIC, Fond CC of PCR – Secţia Relaţii Externe, Dosar 35/1980, Shorthand report of the meeting between Nicolae Ceauşescu and giulio Andreotti on 15 March, 1980.

36 Ibid.


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There was no wait for Ceauşescu’s response. He confirmed the excellent state of relations between the two states as well as the economic difficulties in the predicament Yugoslavia was experiencing. He anyway displayed greater optimism than Andreotti who, as we remember, had shown his worries about a post-Tito era in a previous encounter, but the romanian satrap assured [his interlocutor] that

political life in Yugoslavia will continue to develop in a future framework of stability and development. There are certainly circles abroad – I refer to groups of Yugoslav refugees – who are attempting to put certain acts in motion. It is possible that these could present a problem, considering that many of them work in the West, and I believe it will be necessary to put the brakes on their activities. But I do not think there is a problem of Soviet intervention. There is no such danger and the situation in Yugoslavia is not such as to raise Soviet worries.37

We know that at the beginning of the 1990s the situation in the Federal republic of Yugoslavia took a very different turn from the one expected by the romanian dictator who not only fell from power in 1989 but lost his life following his capture and a show trial after his brief flight from a Bucharest in revolt. Perhaps the certainty displayed by Ceauşescu in 1980 for his Italian guest was aimed at reassuring him of the fact that in spite of the predictable consequences of the departure of Tito, the status quo established between the Balkans and the Danube would not undergo substantial change and romania, sharing a border with Yugoslavia, would continue to play a mediatory role between the Socialist lineup and the West. On closer inspection, the death of his friend Tito could have strengthened even further the role and prestige of the romanian leader. Yet something in Ceauşescu’s perception of the international situation must have changed. This appeared evident in a meeting of senior Romanian and Yugoslav officials held a short time after Tito’s death, on 19 May, 1980, set to sanction the continuance of excellent bilateral relations. Between 22 and 24 October, Ceauşescu conducted an official visit to Yugoslavia where he had a series of meetings with the new political leaders in the Socialist Federation. For the romanian leadership it was important to pursue relations with Yugoslavia along the precisely same track that had been laid down over many years of cooperation with Tito. Relations between the two States did figure in the talks and, more in general, the international situation did not come up for analysis. Cvijetin Miatović, as president of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia presidium, appeared to maintain a low profile; he simply indicated that his country would continue to follow the line drawn by Tito promising such good results as excellent relations with neighbors and especially

37 Ibid.

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with Italy, underscoring the goodness of economic relations, which were clearly demonstrated. On the contrary, Ceauşescu was almost aggressive. Dropping the tone used only a few months earlier in his talk with Andreotti, the romanian dictator spoke of the danger of the return of fascist forces on the European continent, probably referring to the Croatian terroristic Movement (ustaša), which, exploiting difficult economic conditions, could destabilize European politics with unimaginable consequences for European stability and the balance between the two blocs.38 These words signaled the thinking, though only at the intuitive level, that the loss of Tito after years of close cooperation, and especially with the increasing difficulties within the Socialist bloc, could lead the Romanian leader to see difficult times ahead. This could have compromised the tried and tested system for running international relations which, up to that point, had served well to strengthen his personal power and put under the world’s spotlights the brilliant foreign policy of his romania which, on the other hand, was not improving domestic conditions in his country which was coming close to experiencing the worst civil and economic period in its history.

38 ANIC, Fond CC al PCR – Secţia Relaţii Externe, Dosar 179/1980. Shorthand report of the meetings between Tvietin Miatović and Nicolae Ceauşescu on 22 and 24 October 1980. During these talks the romanian president remarked on preoccupations regarding the situation developing in the socialist bloc, especially concerning events in Poland (which would soon become an obsession for the romanian dictator) where according to him the solution to the crisis, aside from the collaboration between the working class and the Worker’s Party, required strong policies capable of eliminating all maneuver space for counter-revolutionary forces, acting, according to him under the mask of the free union Solidarność.