revisiting politicization: political advisers and public servants in westminster systems

Revisiting Politicization Political Advisers andPublic Servants in Westminster Systems

CHRIS EICHBAUM and RICHARD SHAW

In recent times much has been made of the threat some argue is posed bypolitical advisers to the impartiality of the Westminster civil serviceDrawing on survey of senior New Zealand civil servants this articleexamines the degree to which political advisers are perceived as a threat tocivil service neutrality and describes the form taken by that threat asvariously perceived On the evidence reported it is suggested that tradi-tional understandings of ldquopoliticizationrdquo need to be reconceptualized ifthey are to fully account for the nature of the relationship between politicaland civil service advisers To existing conceptions of politicization there-fore the article proposes adding another ldquoadministrative politicizationrdquoallowing for different gradations of politicization to be identified andenabling a nuanced assessment of the nature and extent of a risk to civilservice neutrality that the data suggest is not as great as is sometimesalleged

Introduction

A good deal has been saidmdashmuch of it fearfulmdashabout the threat posed bypolitical advisers to the impartiality of Westminster-style civil services Inthe case of New Zealand the issue was placed firmly on the agenda whenin his 2002 Annual Report to Parliament the then State Services Commis-sioner suggested that recent increases in the number of ministerial advis-ers in ministersrsquo offices had ldquoraised fears in some quarters about thepotential for the politicization of the Public Servicerdquo (Wintringham 200210)1

Elsewhere in the family of Westminster nations too senior officialsacademics and media commentators are shining a spotlight on what isnow routinely referred to in the United Kingdom as the ldquothird elementrdquo ofthe executive branch (Wicks 2002 3) On occasion what is illuminated isregarded favorably Sir Richard Wilson a former head of the British Civil

Victoria UniversityMassey University

Governance An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions Vol 21 No 3July 2008 (pp 337ndash363)copy 2008 The AuthorsJournal compilation copy 2008 Wiley Periodicals Inc 350 Main St Malden MA 02148 USAand 9600 Garsington Road Oxford OX4 2DQ UK ISSN 0952-1895

Service maintains that advisers are ldquonow established as a proper andlegitimate feature of the constitutional framework within which Cabinetministers workrdquo whose value lies in being able to ldquohelp the departmentunderstand the mind of the Minister work alongside officials on theMinisterrsquos behalf and handle party political aspects of governmentbusinessrdquo (Wilson 2002 387)

Equally political advisers are sometimes viewed with suspicion orworse In both Ireland and the United Kingdom concern is expressed thatthe growing influence of special advisers maymdashif it has not already donesomdashpoliticize the policy process by diminishing the role of civil servants(Connaughton 2005 2006 Mountfield 2002 Neill 2000 73) There has beendisquiet too that the privileged access political advisers have to ministersleaves open the potential for the inappropriate usurpation of executiveauthority (United Kingdom Parliament 2001 Wicks 2002) Meanwhile inAustralia political advisers have been described in one commentary as theldquojunk-yard attack dogs of the political systemrdquo (Weller 2002 72) andaccused of complicity in events such as the ldquoChildren overboardrdquo affair(see Senate of Australia 2002 Tiernan 2007)2

Much of the scholarship on political advisers conveys a sense of fore-boding a concern that officialsrsquo place in the Westminster scheme of thingsis under threat from the (political adviser) barbarians at the gate But agood deal of it tends to accept that threat as givenmdashtypically on the basisof advisersrsquo role in controversial and mostly media-related events InAustralia the Children overboard affair is the exemplar in the UnitedKingdom that role is perhaps best played by the ldquounfortunate eventsrdquo thattook place in the former Department of Transport Local Government andthe Regions and in Canada the sponsorship scandal that contributed sosignificantly to the defeat of the Liberal (Martin) Government has resultedin a focus on the respective roles and duties of political and public serviceactors

Yet empirical tests of the assumption that political advisers pose athreat to the conventions that underpin the permanent civil service inWhitehall Canberra Ottawa Dublin Wellington and elsewhere and itsrelationship with its political masters and mistresses are few and farbetween Given the explicitly normative dimension of much of thepopular and a significant part of the academic commentary on advisersand more specifically how best to inoculate Westminster systems from thepartisan distemper associated with them the absence of an evidence baseis problematic Moreover there is a sense in which conceptual and theo-retical frameworks have lagged behind significant institutional changessuch as the advent of the third element in executive government Ourprincipal objective in this article concerns the lattermdashand specifically thefailure of orthodox conceptualizations of politicization to speak to a newset of institutional arrangements and behavioral dynamics

While the focus here is on the particular circumstances within onemember of the Westminster family of nations and the implications for

338 CHRIS EICHBAUM AND RICHARD SHAW

that family generallymdashthe issues raised by the introduction of a thirdactor into what was hitherto a bilateral relationship between minister andpublic or civil servantmdashare not confined to Westminster systems aloneSuch systems are both constitutionally and institutionally qualitativelydifferent from those in which there is a clearer separation between legis-lative and executive branches (with the civil service in Westminstersystems sometimes viewed as providing a check against ldquounbridledrdquoexecutive power) and in which there is greater recourse to partisanappointments within the administrative arm of executive governmentBut the imperative for the provision of advice to political actors inWestminster systems by politically neutral and expert public serviceadvisersmdashWestminsterrsquos ldquofree frank comprehensive and fearlessrdquoadvicemdashis shared by others notably in federal and state systems of gov-ernance and public administration in the United States And so there is acommonality between Westminster imperatives and the normative testsadvanced from Wilson (1887) to Wildavsky (1987) whether in theformerrsquos admonition that while ldquopolitics sets the task for administrationit should not be suffered to manipulate its officesrdquo or the latterrsquos oft-citedmaxim that public policy (administration) should ldquospeak truth to powerrdquoThere are also the seminal contributions within the US literatureaddressing these issues (eg Durant 1995 Heclo 1977) More recently therisks associated with a move to ldquoat-willrdquo employment on the part of anumber of US statesmdashrisks including the provision of advice that ismore responsive than responsiblemdashhave been noted in case studies thatspeak both to issues within federal and state administrations in theUnited States and to those that we identify in this article within theWestminster family (see eg Bowman and West 2006 Coggburn 2006Condrey and Battaglio 2007 Kellough and Nigro 2006)

The purposes of this article then are threefold First we reviewtraditional understandings of ldquopoliticizationrdquo particularly in Westminstercontexts where one of the defining elements in the family of ideas thatconstitute Westminster is that of a constitutional expert and nonpartisancivil service (Rhodes and Weller 2005)

Second we advance a new theoretical conception of politicization thatspeaks specifically to the relationship between political advisers and per-manent civil servants Orthodox understandings are of limited use in bothdescribing and assessing the threat to civil service neutrality which somesee in the advent and conduct of political advisers Here we propose aframework derived from the material experiences of the relevant stake-holders It is as a consequence better suited to the particulars of thetrilateral relationship which increasingly applies within the executivebranch in many Westminster jurisdictions

Third we apply that theoretical framework to the analysis of datadrawn from a large-scale survey of senior officials in the New ZealandPublic Service On that basis it is suggested that while it is possible (andindeed increasingly common) to mount an a priori case that the third

POLITICIZATION IN WESTMINISTER SYSTEMS 339

element represents a threat to public servants the evidencemdashat leastfrom New Zealandmdashis that on balance the risk is more theoretical thanactual

Politicization Traditional Views and Limitations

The extent to which in the New Zealand context the advent of ministerialadvisers has resulted in a retreat from Westminster principles and prac-tices has been examined elsewhere (Eichbaum and Shaw 2007) Thepurpose of this article is different but Westminstermdashas a particular doc-trine of political and administrative arrangementsmdashprovides the point ofdeparture Broadly speaking politicization as we use the concept hereinvolves some degree of diminution in one of the defining components ofthe Westminster model That component as foreshadowed above is ldquo[a]constitutional bureaucracy with a non-partisan and expert civil servicerdquo(Rhodes and Weller 2005 7)

The notion of a constitutional bureaucracy suggests both formal andconventional institutional arrangements One of these typically is theconvention that the civil or public service meets its constitutional obli-gations to the government of the day through the provision of advicethat is of a neutral or nonpartisan kind As Weller has recently observedthis ldquomeans telling ministers what they need to know even when thenews is bad and even when ministers may not want to hear itrdquo (Weller2002 64)

The optimal set of circumstancesmdasha ldquoWestminster equilibriumrdquoperhapsmdashis one in which there is an appropriate measure of responsive-ness to the policy priorities of the government of the day but within thecontext of Westminster institutional arrangements (whether formal orconventional) that ensure that responsiveness is mediated by a publicinterest test Politicization can therefore be viewed as the outcome offormal or conventional institutional arrangements that compromise theintegrity of the policy process

As noted during a recent UK House of Commons Select CommitteeInquiry orthodox definitions of politicization ldquohark back to Northcoteand Trevelyan whose seminal recommendations were intended to ensurethat the civil service attracted able and energetic peoplerdquo (UnitedKingdom Parliament 2005 1) In that context it made sense to ensure thatmeritocratic criteria rather than partisan considerations functioned at thepoint of entry into the civil service The influence of Northcote and Treve-lyan is no better demonstrated than in the fact that orthodox definitions ofpoliticization have tended to focus on the systems and criteria underwhich officialsmdashand particularly senior officialsmdashhave been appointedPoliticization has been viewed as a significant departure from the appli-cation of merit criteria in appointment processes And so Peters andPierre for example define politicization as ldquothe substitution of political


criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection retention promotionrewards and disciplining of members of the public servicerdquo (Peters andPierre 2004 2)

In other words standard conceptions have tended to view appointmentprocesses as the primary locus of politicization (see Campbell and Wilson1995 Hughes 2003 Mulgan 1998 1999 Peters 2001 Weller 1989 Wellerand Young 2001) As Mulgan has observed the assumption is that

[p]oliticized appointment processes will encourage politicized actions onthe part of the public servants In particular politicized appointments willundermine the traditional political neutrality of career public servants and theircapacity to give ministers advice that is free and frank (or ldquofrank and fearlessrdquoin the Australian version) (Mulgan 2006 4)

For those interested in establishing whether political advisers are a riskto civil service neutrality this presents several challenges For one thingdefinitions typically focus on the most senior tier of officialdom the per-manent secretary chief executive or country equivalent Consequentlywith the arguable exceptions of Peters and Pierre and Mulgan few ofthose who discuss politicization examine what happens beneath the levelof the head of department3 Yet in policymaking contexts it is typicallyamong the second and third tiers of the public service that contactbetween ministerial advisers and officials generally takes place (see Maley2002a 454) A focus on the very top of the department therefore does notreadily permit an exploration of the degree to which interactions two orthree rungs down the ladder threaten the neutrality of public servants

Second more often than not attention is paid to the process and criteriaby which individuals of a particular ideological disposition are matchedwithmdashor dismissed frommdashthe most senior bureaucratic positions Theinference is that a partisan appointee will produce partisan advice (andadditionally that this is less desirable than advice delivered freely andfrankly) but seldom is the relationship between appointment and thetenor of the advice subsequently tendered expressly asserted much lessanalyzed

Clearly a case can be made for a causal relationshipmdashof indeterminatestrengthmdashbetween a partisan appointment and policy substanceHowever it is not clear that this assumption universally holds (or for thatmatter that political advisers themselves are unable to speak truth topower) Neither is it necessarily the case that the appointment and dis-missal of heads of departments is the onlymdashor necessarily even the mostsignificantmdashdeterminant of politicization

Accordingly it is useful to distinguish between the politicization ofappointments and the politicization of policy A focus on the latter suggestsa remedial ldquotargetrdquo other than the civil service and a structural manifes-tation or determinant of politicization other than the appointmentprocesses for senior officials (see Peters and Pierre 2004 5) Other thingsbeing equal the politicization of senior civil service appointments may


well lead to the politicization of policy Mulgan suggests however thatthe connection

is at most a contingent one A career public servant appointed on merit is quitecapable of distorting the public record to suit the government of the day just asa politicized appointee may behave as a principled professional resisting pres-sure to slant information to suit the governmentrsquos line (Mulgan 2006 26)

Thus politicization of policy may occur in the absence of politicizationof public service appointments indeed that is more or less what isinferred by those who see in political advisers a threat to the politicalneutrality of permanent officials

In sum the bulk of the scholarship on politicization describes an arcaround ministerial advisers Virtually all of it attends to bilateral relationsbetween ministers and their officials Some of it particularly Mulgan (19992006) and Peters and Pierre (2004) emphasizesmdashor at least entertains thepossibility ofmdashsimilarly bilateral relations between senior officials andtheir subordinates within departments But much of the literature has littleto say on the trilateral relationship between ministers ministerial advisersand public servants

Consequently the third element is frequently the elephant in the roomWhat Weller and Young (2001 172) characterize as ldquonarrowrdquo definitions ofpoliticizationmdashthose that concentrate on the appointment andor dis-missal of departmental headsmdashare insufficient Such definitions do notspeak to the nature location and exercise of the institutional levers throughwhich political advisers may be able to exert pressure on civil servants

Toward a New Approach Administrative Politicization

In the research described below initial attempts at analyzing participantsrsquoviews on the risks posed by ministerial advisers were guided by catego-ries suggested by the literature surveyed above It quickly becameclear however that what respondents were saying could not satisfactorilybe explained by reference to that scholarship What was lacking was ameans of conceptualizingmdashin some meaningful waymdashthose behaviors ofministerial advisers which are described (by officials in this case) aspoliticizing

Two issues stood out The first was that the experiences reported byparticipants which in their view had consequences for their impartialitywere not all of the same order For example cases in which ministerialadvisers demand changes to the content of officialsrsquo papers pose a quali-tatively different threat to civil service neutrality than do those in whichministerial advisers disagree with the substance of that advice In theresearch reported here both were described by respondents as actionsthat compromised public service neutrality yet it is important to discrimi-nate between different actions on the basis of their probable impact on thatimpartiality


Second some of what was described by respondents as politicizationseemed in fact to represent some other phenomenon at work It may bemore accurate for instance to treat a disagreement between advisers andofficials over policy options as an example of contestability rather than asan attempt by the former to ldquopoliticizerdquo the latter

In short it was apparent that what was required was a more nuancedconceptualization which did not treat politicization as a single nondiffer-entiated phenomenon and additionally which would help establishwhere something other than politicization might be taking place

To some extent the business of constructing such a framework wasinformed by the growing scholarship on the advent and influence ofpolitical advisers in Westminster nations4 Even here though relativelylittle attention is paid to the complexion of politicization or to the ways inwhich ministerial advisers ldquocauserdquo it It tends simply to be asserted andconsidered a risk For the most part therefore an inductive approach wasadopted drawing on what participants had to say in response to a series ofquestions probing the issue of politicization in order to develop a profileof the phenomenon in the institutional and behavioral context of ministe-rial adviser or official relations

To existing conceptions of politicization then we propose addinganother For the purposes of analyzing the effects of ministerial advisersrsquoactivities on the civil service it is helpful to conceive of ldquoadministrativepoliticizationrdquo as an intervention that offends against the principles andconventions associated with a professional and impartial civil service

This conceptualization has both procedural and substantive dimen-sions An action offends in a procedural sense if it is intended to or has theeffect of constraining the capacity of public servants to furnish ministerswith advice in a free frank and fearless manner Procedural politicizationcan be manifested in two ways The first occurs when an adviser inter-venes in the relationship between a minister and his or her officials Thedistinguishing feature here is the conscious attempt on the part of theadviser to place him or herself between ministers and officials constrain-ing the ability of the latter to tender free frank and fearless advice Thesecond describes conduct by ministerial advisers which is intended to orwhich has the effect of constraining the capacity of officials to tender freefrank and fearless advice by intervening in the internal workings of adepartment

The signal characteristic of interventions of a procedural nature is thatthey interfere with public servantsrsquo responsibilities to and relationshipswith their ministers As such they may well diminish or otherwise limitofficialsrsquo contribution to policy formation But whether or not they neces-sarily politicize the public service or the content of officialsrsquo advice is aseparate consideration

However there are other interventions that may very well have thoseeffects for which reason attention is drawn to the substantive dimension ofadministrative politicization which describes an action intended to or


having the effect of coloring the substance of officialsrsquo advice with partisanconsiderations

The Research

It has been noted that while ldquothere is a sense among practitioners as wellas academic analysts that some politicization [of the civil service] has beenoccurring the evidence supporting that belief is often subjective anec-dotal and rather diffuserdquo (Peters and Pierre 2004 1) The research reportedhere is a response to that relative dearth of empirical evidence (at least inWestminster contexts)5 Specifically it is intended to establish whether ornot senior officials in the New Zealand public service think that ministe-rial advisers pose a threat to public service neutrality and if so whatmaterial form the threat is thought to take

The institutional context in which the officialsrsquo survey was conductedhas been noted elsewhere (Eichbaum and Shaw 2007) The instrumentwhich comprised 68 items and a mix of forced-choice and open-endedquestions was administered in early 2005 Officials from 20 (of the 36)government departments and the New Zealand Police agreed to partici-pate in the project and the questionnaire was distributed to 546 seniorpublic servants Completed questionnaires were received from 188respondentsmdasha response rate of 344

The intent was to elicit the views of those officials who had contact withministerial advisers at any point since 1990 and whose engagement hadbeen in relation to substantive policy matters rather than administrativeconcerns Although it is impossible to specify precisely the number in thatpopulation (and the absence of a sampling frame constrains the use ofinferential statistical analyses) the size of the sample and the response ratepermit a robust analysis of the data6

Respondents

In the event respondentsmdashof whom there were more men (537) thanwomen (463)mdashwere drawn from the span of government departmentsFifteen percent were with one of the three central departments (the Trea-sury the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the StateServices Commission) Most (473) worked in departments in whichpolicy and operations are combined although a good many were indepartments that are predominately policy (266) or delivery oriented(138) A much smaller group (22) were situated in funding orpurchase agencies

The vast majority of participants were employed in the top three tiers ofthe public service Just over 30 were either chief executives or second-tier officials who report directly to their Chief Executive The largestcohort comprised third-tier staff (575) who report to their employer


through a second-tier manager Some 124 of responses were fromfourth-tier or other staff who were predominantly managers of district orlocal offices

Participants drew on a considerable stock of experience 129 hadworked in the New Zealand public service for five or fewer years 183for between 6 and 10 years and the balance for more than 11 yearsForty-six percent had been with their current department for fewer thansix years nearly a fifth (178) for 16 years or more

Data

A series of questions concerning participantsrsquo views on and experiencesof the threat posed by ministerial advisers was asked7 At the most generallevel respondents were split on whether the actions of advisers threatenthe neutrality of the public service (see Table 1) Just over a third felt thatthey did slightly more did not believe this to be the case and a quarterwas unsure one way or the other

There were varying degrees of association between this issue andsundry independent variables The relationship between officialsrsquo viewsand rank for instance was moderate with senior officials less likely thantheir junior colleagues to perceive a risk8 So too were respondentsemployed in one or other of the three central agencies (the Treasury theDepartment of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the State ServicesCommission) and longer serving officials9

When asked to describe in concrete terms the nature of the threatthe third of respondents who expressed concern provided a range ofexamples Table 2 orders those responses according to the dimensions ofadministrative politicization described above

Procedural Politicization

Of the dimensions noted above procedural politicization was cited mostfrequently and particularly that variant describing intervention by politi-cal advisers in the relationship between a minister and his or her officialsIn effect this constitutes empirical support for anecdotal evidence

TABLE 1Do Ministerial Advisers Threaten the Impartiality of the Public Service

Frequency Valid

Yes 66 363No 71 39Undecided 45 247Total 182 100

Note Missing = 6


reported elsewhere that political advisers ldquostand between ministers andtheir departmentsrdquo (Keating 2003 93)

The majority of participants were inclined to think that ministerialadvisers do have some bearing on ministersrsquo receptiveness to advice fromofficials (Table 3)

As to the nature of that effect officials provided a range of assessmentsFor instance there was some support for the proposition that advisersactively prevent officialsrsquo advice from reaching ministersrsquo desks Althoughrelatively few respondents (154) unequivocally agreed this occurs(while 489 disagreed more or less strongly) a further 358 gave amixed response to this item which may suggest that a narrow majority ofrespondents feel such conduct occurs at least some of the time Concernsabout such conduct were most likely to be found among junior officialsand those working for agencies whose primary function was not theprovision of policy advice (ie those in delivery departments andorpurchase or funding agencies)10

Moreover only just over a third of respondents (386) disagreed orstrongly disagreed that ministerial advisers actively hinder officialsrsquo accessto ministers On this matter respondents who had been seconded fromtheir department to a ministerrsquos office were only marginally more inclinedto think advisers do in fact act in this manner than those who had not11 Onthe other hand officials employed in policy ministries and departments inwhich policy and operations are institutionally combined were marginallyless likely to see a problem here than were other officials12

TABLE 2The Nature of the Threat (1)

Count Responses Cases

Procedural 37 355 474Substantive 18 173 231Other 49 47 62N 104 100 1333

TABLE 3Does the Presence of a Ministerial Adviser in a Ministerial Office Have anImpact on the Ministerrsquos Receptiveness to Advice from Officials

Frequency Valid


Note Missing = 7


As to specifics there were reports of ministerial advisers who haveldquoconvinced a minister that a free and frank briefing paper should beturned back at the adviserrsquos door so the Minister could say he had notreceived advice on the subjectrdquo (173)13 of a case in which an adviser didldquonot pass on information she thought the Minister didnrsquot needrdquo (064) andof instances in which ldquoa ministerial adviser with strong personal policyviews and a poor historical relationship with this department periodicallyundermined the Ministerrsquos confidence in officialsrsquo advicerdquo (151) Somerespondents also felt that some ministers were inclined to ask their advis-ersrsquo views on the competence of officials and on that basis either to takethose officialsrsquo advice or not

A number of officials also recounted examples of ministerial advisersintervening directly in their work andor their departmentrsquos Somereported what amounts to intimidation one second-tier official recallsreceiving ldquophone call suggestions directions and hints on what todo [and] views on what might happen if something is not done (iepossible negative consequences)rdquo (040)

Others said that ministerial advisers sometimes ldquogive policy directionsto staff rather than that coming from the Minister to the Chief Executiverdquo(105) ldquocut across accountability lines and intervened in industrial rela-tions negotiations and contract negotiationsrdquo (113) and ldquorefused to let usrelease information under the Official Information Act when we had alegal obligation to do sordquo (162)

But the consequences of advisersrsquo interventions are not universally heldto be nefarious As one respondent noted regardless of the deployment ofadvisers some ministers are ldquoalways open to free and frank advice fromour departmentrdquo (022) And in some respondentsrsquo opinions the net effectcan be positive

The presence of a ministerial advisers in ministersrsquo offices can provide acompeting source of policy advice to departmentsrsquo advice Ministerial adviserscan also provide political and practical technical advice around implementationissues that cannot be or which it is inappropriate to provide as part of depart-mentsrsquo advice to ministers This means ministers consider departmental advicealongside the advice of advisers (041 original emphasis)

Substantive Politicization

Relatively few responses corresponded with the category substantiveadministrative politicizationmdashthat is attempts by ministerial advisers todirectly influence or determine the content of officialsrsquo advice to ministersTo be sure some senior public servants have had experiences ldquowhereadvisers have asked to review policy papers and seek changes beforebeing submitted to ministersrdquo (006) Others report cases in which advisershave ldquoasked for papers to be rewritten to reflect their [the adviserrsquos] needsnot departmental advicerdquo (060) or attempted to ldquoedit out fullcompleteadvice and block out sensitive material that may damage political inter-


estsrdquo (167) But there were fewer such reports than might perhaps havebeen expected given the tenor of much of the commentary regarding theadverse effects of political advisers

Conversely there was some support for the view that even when advis-ers do act inappropriately the ways in which public servants themselvesrespond can go some way to offsetting the attendant risks As one chiefexecutive expressed it while ldquo[t]here is a risk that a hands-on advisercould change the advice and behaviour of a department this can bemanaged Officials need to stick to objective analysis and information andmaintain trust and credibility with the Ministerrdquo (015) A second-tierofficial endorsed this assessment In her opinion

There are risksmdashif public servants feel unduly pressured or donrsquot understandhow to work professionally with advisers But this is not the fault of advisersindividually or as a class it is about public service professionalism In otherwords the risk of impartiality depends on what officials do not what advisersdo (011)

The Significant ldquoOtherrdquo

What was not anticipated was the proportion of responses (as reported inTable 2) which while concerning a question that specifically focused onthe incidence and form of politicization seemed to be evidence of otherphenomena Table 4 incorporates the two coding categories that capturedthe majority of those responses Most strikingly 24 of all responses to theinitial question involved actions or circumstances which are arguably bestdescribed as contestability

Clearly there are methodological issues regarding the attribution ofmeaning in play here but when a senior official reports that ldquopoliticaladvisers advocate a particular line of argument that may not in ourjudgment be supported by data or researchrdquo (035) what they are describ-ing ismdashin our viewmdasha contest for the policy upper hand not an attemptby an adviser to direct officials to produce advice of a particular flavor

Certainly a good many senior officials (475) believe that ministerialadvisers do at least try to keep certain items off the policy agenda of thegovernment of the day But fewer (358) think that advisers activelydiscourage the provision of free and frank advice by officials and fewer



Contestability 25 24 321RoleAccountability 7 67 9Other 17 163 218N 49 47 62


still (262) are of the view that advisers do in practice exert too muchcontrol over the policy agenda (although in both cases the high proportionof equivocal responses should also be borne in mind)14

Many also find nothing especially objectionable much less threateningin the fact that ministerial advisers contest the advice put forward bypublic servants As one put it advisers can impede officialsrsquo work ldquo[b]utonly in the sense that their advice was contrary to ours resulting inthe Minister choosing an alternative approachmdashwhich seems entirelylegitimaterdquo (096 original punctuation)

Some respondents were quite forthright in their assessment of the valueadvisers can add to officialsrsquo responsibilities For one ldquothe most significantrole of ministerial advisers in the policy process is their role in relaying andclarifying ministersrsquo expectations and views to senior departmental man-agers Clear and blunt explanations about ministersrsquo opinions and inter-pretation of issues is invaluable for senior staff in particularrdquo (041 neitherwas the normative orientation underpinning this observation whollyanomalous in the wider context When asked 579 of respondents ratedthe advent of ministerial advisers a positive development overall [87 feltnegatively about it and the remainder were undecided] and 727 indi-cated that their personal relations with advisers were generally positive)

Others though are far less sanguine about the adviserrsquos role generallyand the effects of contestability specifically In the view of one whenadvisers are ldquotoo involved (and therefore directional) in the early stages ofpolicy development [this] [h]inders the consideration of all possibleoptionssolutionsrdquo (180 although this may be no different in practice to thepath-dependent effects of decisions taken by any other policy actor early inpolicy-formation) Another noted that the contribution by one adviser ofwhat officials felt was ldquosubjective and nonempirical comment and advicerdquohad ldquodegradedrdquo the departmentrsquos advice in the eyes of ministers (185)

Such views reflect a measure of intolerance for the intrusion of otherstreams of advice To the extent that any such intolerance reflects a depar-ture from traditional norms of public service impartiality it is worthnoting too that only a quarter of respondents (285) actively disputedthe proposition that it is appropriate for advisers to be drawn from thepublic service and to return there on leaving a ministerrsquos office That mightbe read as an indication that conventions of public sector independenceare less strongly entrenched than Westminster traditionalists might prefer(see also Eichbaum and Shaw 2007)

Roles and Accountability Arrangements

Finally a small number (67) of responses went to what are in the firstinstance issues to do with roles and accountabilities In one of the itemscomprising the composite measure 506 of respondents had eitheragreed or strongly agreed that advisers sometimes exceed their delegatedauthority (only 57 disagreed with the statement and not one strongly


disagreed with it) That strength of sentiment did not carry over intoreports of actual experiences but concerns are clearly harbored in somequartersmdashespecially among departmental officials who had spent time onsecondment in ministerial officesmdashthat ministerial advisers overstep themark from time to time15

Most frequently examples were given of advisers who had asserted anauthority in their dealings with officials which exceeded that of thosedelegated by ministers Thus instances were communicated in whichldquoadvisers have over-ridden ministerial decisionsrdquo (006) ldquorequestedreports from the department for themselves and not for ministersrdquo (090)and ldquoissued instructions purporting to reflect the Ministerrsquos views whichhave then proved to be differentrdquo (108) The second-order consequences of these sorts of incidents were sometimes (but not always) consistentwith one or other of the dimensions of administrative politicizationbut the proximate issue was an inappropriate assertion of executiveauthority

The point was made it should be said that these experiences are notnecessarily the result of deliberately mischievous behavior on the part ofministerial advisers It appears that a lack of clarity (which may in factstem from ministers) around the nature and extent of the delegation can beat the root of misunderstandings Thus what some respondents reportedas malicious interference was construed by others as what happens whenldquothere is (a) a lack of clarity on constitutional contributions and (b) where[the] roles and functions of government andor the department are notwell understood by the adviserrdquo (033)

Moreover it was suggested that when well managed the roles ofofficials and ministerial advisers were complementary rather than con-flicting (a matter to which we presently return in greater detail) Echoingthe view of Sir Richard Wilson (noted above) one explained that ldquo[p]rop-erly managed relationships and roles should mean that ministerial advis-ers deal with matters that officials cannot eg the politics of MMP [and]the political aspects of policyrdquo (049) Policy is developed in an intenselypolitical context and the point made by the respondent who noted thatministerial advisers ldquoare important in ensuring departments understandministersrsquo expectations [and] provide a mechanism to reinforce thedistinction between departmental and political advicerdquo underscored thepotential value of political advisers in this regard

That said the pressing need for clarity around roles and responsibilitieswas a recurring theme As one senior official explained

Yesmdashthere is a risk [to the public service] if the adviser is not clear about theirown role and if the public servants do not hold the line on their role Sometimeswith strong personalities there can be blurring Role clarity is essential (024)

So too are protocols that clearly delineate the various actorsrsquo respectiveroles and responsibilities New Zealand lacks much of the formal archi-tecture that wraps around special advisers elsewhere In the United


Kingdom for instance there is a dedicated code of conduct for ministerialadvisers in both Ireland and Australia legislation underpins the role andfunctions of ministerial staff New Zealand has neither Nor has it taken aconsistent approach to the negotiation of protocols governing relationsbetween ministerial advisers and departmental officials (see Table 5) Inmost cases in fact relations between the ministerial office and the depart-ment are not subject to protocols or officials are unsure whether or notsuch understandings even exist

There was however widespread acknowledgment among respondentsof the importance of protocols codes of conduct and so forth Support fora special code of conduct for ministerial advisers was especially strongfully 81 of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that such a codeshould be articulated16 Many felt that not only might it help regulate theactivity of ministerial advisers it could also usefully clarify the relevantroles and responsibilities of ministerial advisers and officials This it waswidely felt is central to ensuring that the relationship between advisersand officials functions transparently and to minimizing the potential forofficialsrsquo relationships with ministers to be compromised

Discussion Are the Barbarians at the Gates

The Case Against Ministerial Advisers

Commenting on the British context Sir Richard Wilson (2002) has notedwryly that the 3700 or so members of the senior civil service are in noimmediate danger of being overrun by a small cadreacute of special advisersMuch the same could be said of the New Zealand case where some 1250senior officials are confronted by perhaps 25 ministerial advisers(Eichbaum and Shaw 2007)

But what lies at the root of concerns that advisers have the potential toor do in fact erode public service neutrality is their institutional proxim-ity to ministers (and in New Zealandrsquos case advisers are physically locatedin ministersrsquo offices which are themselves collectively situated away fromdepartments) To paraphrase Maley (2000a) advisers are therefore able tocultivate relationships (with departments external interests and other

TABLE 5Are There Protocols Governing Contact between Ministerial Advisers andOfficials in Your Department

Frequency Valid

Yes 51 283No 66 367Unsure 63 35Total 180 100

Note Missing = 8


ministersrsquo offices) and gain access to information (about what is on or offthe agenda which policies are about to be announced emerging oppor-tunities etc) both of which are valuable currencies in the policy processAs veto players (Immergut 1998) they are also able to choke off or facili-tate the flow of advice and information into and out of the ministerialoffice andmdashcruciallymdashcontrol access to the minister It is reasonable tosuggest then that advisers may be a menace to public service impartiality

To some extent the data collected in this research confirm this caseClearly there are times when at least some ministerial advisers exertpressure on officials to temper their advice andor direct them to tailorthe particulars of that advice to partisan requirements The evidence doesnot conclusively establish that officialsrsquo advice is in fact materiallychanged as a consequence of such pressure public servants are perfectlycapable of resisting such imprecations But in and of itself such conduct isat odds with the accepted convention that officials shall tender advicefreely frankly and fearlessly It is the intent as much as the outcome that isof concern here it may be uncomfortable to advise freely and franklywhen the ministerrsquos adviser has made it known that that is not what isneeded in the current circumstances

In absolute terms however there were few reports of substantiveadministrative politicization Rather the data indicate that attempts byadvisers to interfere in relations between ministers and their departmentsor within the operations of departments themselves are more prevalentthan are those to tamper with the contents of officialsrsquo advice Over a third(355) of all examples given by public servants of inappropriate behavioron the part of ministerial advisers fell within one or other of thesecategories of administrative politicization

Procedural politicization may be of particular concern If as has beensuggested (Mountfield 2002 3) at some juncture vigorous gate-keepingon the part of advisers compromises senior civil servantsrsquo contribution topolicy formation and their access to ministers it could well lead to a moreovert form of politicization One participant gave that very point a sharpedge in noting that ldquoover time there is a risk that departments will feelobligated only to provide advice acceptable to gate-keeping advisers orthat they will heavily influence the way advice is presentedrdquo (023)

Respectfully however while the conduct described by Sir RobinMountfield would compromise the policy process (by constraining thecontribution of the professional public service) it need not necessarilypoliticize either the service or its advice As inferred by the responsequoted above that outcome would depend on choices made by publicservants themselves in response to the behavior of ministerial advisersand this research uncovered no evidence that officials are abandoning thetenets of Westminster impartiality in droves in order to ensure continuedaccess to the political executive

For similar reasons it is not clear that interference by ministerial advis-ers in departmentsrsquo activities is as serious a threat to public service


neutrality as might at first be thought This is not to suggest that suchconduct is necessarily acceptable For one thing insofar as New ZealandrsquosCabinet Manual (which codifies the procedural bases of cabinet govern-ment) does not fully distinguish between an adviser and his or her min-ister it may constitute ldquoministerialrdquo interference in operational matterswhich are more properly the domain of officials In New Zealand aselsewhere such is not formally countenanced It happens of course thenotion that ministers are disinterested in policy implementation has longbeen recognized as a fiction But as far as the formal arrangements areconcernedmdashunder which appropriations and purchase and employmentarrangements are predicated on a bifurcation of responsibility forpolicy outcomes (ministers) and outputs (departments and their chiefexecutives)mdashpolitical intervention in departmentsrsquo activities is consideredpoor form

Furthermore it is unhelpful and misrepresentative to assume that aminister and his or her adviser(s) constitute an indivisible entity InsteadWellerrsquos contentionmdashthat ldquowe can no longer maintain the myths thatadvisers are no more than extensions of ministers and that telling theadvisers is the same as telling the ministerrdquo (Weller 2002 73)mdashis the morecompelling view A ministerial adviserrsquos authority may derive from theirappointment by a minister and from any delegations subsequently madebut in dealings with public servants that adviser will exercise agencydiscretion and judgment And as many respondents were at pains to pointout the nature and extent of the authority with which ministerial advisersspeak is frequently (and on occasion some suspected purposefully)unclear at least to the public servant There is a strong case the dataindicate for a rigorous rethinking of the arrangements governing theconduct of ministerial advisers and more generally relations betweenadvisers and officials

The case made here is that a procedural malaise is not synonymouswithmdashindeed it may not producemdashpublic service politicization (wherepoliticization involves a repudiation of Westminster canons of politicalneutrality) However systematic interference by ministerial advisers inrelationships between ministers and officials and within departmentsmay have consequences which are no less deleterious for that Specificallyit may well increase the probability of civil servants finding themselves onthe outer if not politicized then certainly marginalized in the policyprocess Put differently the negative effects of the procedural dimensionsof administrative politicization may attach not so much to civil servants asindividuals or as an occupational class or indeed to the professional ethosof the civil or public service as to matters of process In this view mar-ginalization may be a consequence rather than an example of proceduralpoliticization

Much of the existing literature fails to distinguish the threat ministerialadvisers pose to public service neutrality from that posed to the place ofpublic servants in the policy process This is fundamentally an argument


about access about whether officials are being shut out of a policyldquomarketrdquo in which ministers remain the dominant (if not the only) pur-chasers but where there are multiple providers Were this to be the case itwould have grave consequences for the capacity of the public service toprovide the sort of ldquoinstitutional skepticismrdquo (Plowden 1994 104) whichis viewed a crucial corrective to political short-termism expediency andpolicy naivety

But the data at least provide no evidence that this is what is occurringThey do suggest that officials harbor greater concerns about this prospectthan they do that the civil service is in imminent danger of politicizationThey do not however indicate that these nascent concerns are matched byexperience Neither do they support the contention that ministers aresystematically taking decisions without prior recourse to officialsrsquo advice

Responsive Competence Enhanced

There is another way of looking at all this Thus what for some constitutespoliticization and to others smacks of marginalization looks to others stilllike legitimate contestability

A case can be made that ministerial advisers are part of a widerstrategymdashwhich includes the use of time-limited employment contractsfor senior civil servants and the adoption of output- and increa-singly outcome-based appropriations and performance managementsystemsmdashby political executives to ensure a greater measure of responsive-ness from the permanent bureaucracy This may be especially so in juris-dictions in which ministers exercise no formal responsibility over theemployment of officialsAs members of what Peters (2001 246) describes asa ldquocounter-staffrdquo ministerial advisers break the monopoly on advice tra-ditionally enjoyed by the public service In this view partisans become anoffset to bureaucratsrsquo power and policy leverage (see also Rhodes andWeller 2001b 238)

It may well be that a suspicion of the motives of bureaucrats is part ofthe reason for recourse to ministerial advisers But while rational choiceprovides an ex ante explanation of the growth in the number of ministerialadvisers the testable propositions which stem from itmdashthat officialsrsquo poli-cymaking contribution is curtailed that the public service retaliates to itsloss of ldquomarket sharerdquo by moving from neutral competence to partisanalignmentmdashare not supported by this research

No evidence was forthcoming from officials that ministers are dispens-ing with the services of public servants If anything the reverse applied Inpart this might be because ministers identify a clear division of labor asbetween officials and ministerial advisers To some extent this too may beparticular to the New Zealand context and specifically to the advent ofnon-single party majority government Under minority andor multipartyconditions ministers simply must have advisers who can attend to thepartisan dimensions of government formation and management and


policymaking That said the increase in the numerical size and influenceof this new class of adviser in jurisdictions without proportional repre-sentation suggests that there are other imperatives at work

For their part a number of respondents to the officialsrsquo survey volun-teered that an adviser who offers a different view to public servants orwho reaches different conclusions on the basis of available evidence is notthe same as one who instructs officials to change the substantive or pre-sentational aspects of their advice Others noted that ministerial advisersprovide officials with incentives to improve the quality of their ownadvice As one put it when ministerial advisers are around public ser-vantsrsquo ldquoideas and arguments need to be strongly robust and comprehen-sive Every angle and argument needs to be covered and counteredrdquo (092)There is an acknowledgment too that access to an alternative set of viewsgives ministers greater policy choice

But it is not at all clear that most officials consider the entry into themarket of a powerful competitor to be altogether a bad thing Manyrespondents consider their relationship with ministerial advisers to be acomplementary not a competitive one This assessment is often driven byofficialsrsquo assessment of the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP)-specificdimensions of the adviserrsquos role The point was repeatedly made that

ministerial advisers have a particular contribution to make to the successfulpassage of legislation in situations when the government does not control amajority in the House They are able to undertake negotiations and brokeragreements on legislation that would compromise the political neutrality ofofficials If they do this supported by advice from officials that provides aldquonegotiating briefrdquo this can be a very valuable role (086)

So where some see a buffer between ministers and their officialsothers see a legitimate conduitmdashone that permits an explicit distinction tobe drawn between the political and administrative dimensions of a min-isterrsquos role In so doing advisers can actually take the potential politicalheat off officials thereby allowing them to focus on the provision of freeand frank advice One chief executive indicated in no uncertain terms thatfar from politicizing the public service the effect of ministerial adviserswas ldquothe reverse They free us much more than would otherwise be thecase from being drawn into the political processrdquo (096) Responses such asthis suggest that the institution of the public service may in certainrespects be strengthened by the advent of ministerial advisers

In sum the data tend not to bear out the prognoses of those who fear forcivil service neutrality in the face of a growing number of partisan advisersat the heart of the executive Indeed there is a sense that advisers maywell help officials gain ldquoclear airrdquo and shield them from demands thatmight otherwise be made of them which would expose them to the risk ofpoliticization

In this view the deployment of ministerial advisers need not funda-mentally cut across the imperatives of civil service impartiality Assumingthat the government is inherently political and not an extended exercise in


rationality the appointment of partisan advisers seems an altogether moresensible way of meeting ministersrsquo legitimate political needs than does theconscious politicization of the public service In this way ministers cantake care of the political business but also protect and continue to drawupon the various benefitsmdashinstitutional memory continuity of advicefree and frank assessments of policy issuesmdashthat stem from a professionalbureaucracy In this respect it can be argued that ministerial advisers helpbring about what Peters (2001 87) calls ldquoresponsive competencerdquo (theharnessing of a political disposition to administrative talent in order toachieve governmentsrsquo goals) without necessitating recourse to an undulycommitted and partisan civil service In short advisers may in fact bolsterthe capacity of the permanent civil service to provide institutional skepti-cism in circumstances where that is necessary

Conclusion

To what extent is it possible to extrapolate from the New Zealand experi-ence to other Westminster jurisdictions There is a view (see Wanna 2005)that since jettisoning plurality in favor of proportional representation atthe national level New Zealand has become something of a Westminsteroutlier That said it retains most of the features Rhodes and Weller (20057) associate with the Westminster model including Cabinet governmentministerial accountability to the parliament the fusion of the executiveand legislative branches and a non-partisan and expert civil service

Our focus in this article has been firmly on the last of these character-istics And whatever the attributes of New Zealandrsquos current arrange-ments that support the case that it is a Westminster anomaly in terms ofthe formal and conventional organization of its system of public admin-istration New Zealand exhibits all of the defining features of a profes-sional and impartial civil service17

In that context the purposes of this article have been threefold

1 To explore traditional understandings of ldquopoliticizationrdquo particu-larly in Westminster contexts

2 To suggest a new conception of politicization which speaks specifi-cally to the relationship between political advisers and senior civilservants

3 To review evidence from a large-scale survey of senior officials in theNew Zealand Public Service

Inevitably the research reported here has limitations For instance itelicited relatively few responses from less senior public servants There-fore we cannot be sure of the extent of contact between these officials andministerial advisers nor of the views held by the former regarding the riskof politicization posed by the latter


Equally it suggests matters requiring further enquiry including theimpact that administrative politicization may have on events furtheralong the policy chain (such as policy implementation and outcomes) andthe ramifications of the advent of ministerial advisers for accountabilityarrangements within the political executive There is also the potential tomove beyond the confines of the Westminster family and examine howparticular configurations of political and administrative interests andactors impact on the public policy process across a range of parliamentaryand presidential political and administrative systems Recent USresearch provides an excellent basis on which to build a comparativeresearch enterprise

However the article also provides on the basis of New Zealand evi-dence an opportunity to assess the balance of risk and opportunity pre-sented by the advent of a ldquothird elementrdquo in the institutions and processesof executive government in New Zealand

Peters and Pierre have pointed out that ldquo[o]ne of the persistent claimsmade about the public sector over the past several decades has been thatthe public service has become more politicized [However] the exactmeaning of that term is often not specifiedrdquo (Peters and Pierre 2004 1)Through an assessment of the extent to which senior New Zealandofficials believe ministerial advisers threaten public service neutralitythis article has sought to address both issues

The foregoing suggests a need for a more nuanced and empiricallyrelevant concept of politicization as it applies in the context of intra-executive relations As advanced here that concept is based on whatofficials themselves have to say on the subject and when put to empiricaluse has facilitated several things

First it has revealed something of the scope and diversity of theconduct of ministerial advisers which is perceived by senior officials inthe New Zealand Public Service to constitute politicization Very little ofwhat was conveyed is consistent with traditional understandings of theterm Of the 343 qualitative responses to survey questions concerningpoliticization only one directly referred to the bases on which top officialsare either appointed dismissed rewarded or sanctioned18

In addition the data suggest the need for a flexible approach to thenature of politicization The advent of a third element requires a reflexiveconceptualization it demands that researchers look beyond the bilateralrelationship between ministers and senior civil servants (particularlywhether appointment procedures are or are not consistent with the North-cote or Trevelyan principle of meritocratic appointment and progression)and at the interplay between non-partisan and partisan actors of variouskinds and in multiple contexts

In turn this means discriminating between the substantive and proce-dural dimensions of politicization The former presents a clear and presentthreat to civil service impartiality but the latter while it may constrainofficialsrsquo contribution to policy formation does not present the same


challenge A further distinction can usefully be made between contestabil-ity and actions by advisers which may have the effect of contaminatingthe institution of the public service andor the advice that issues from itThe data reported in this article and the manifest weakness of orthodoxconceptualizations of politicization in providing a framework throughwhich to illuminate emerging institutional and behavioral realitiesstrongly suggest that a more fluid conceptualization of politicization isneeded if theory building and empirical analysis are to reflect institutionaland procedural realities in a number of Westminster democracies

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank three anonymous referees for their comprehen-sive and constructive comments on an earlier draft They also acknowl-edge the assistance of the Marsden Fund administered by the RoyalSociety of New Zealand the New Zealand State Services CommissionerDr Mark Prebble Jeanette Schollum of the State Services CommissionBruce Anderson and Helen Coffey of the Leadership DevelopmentCentre and Michelle Brokenshire of Executive Government Support

Notes

1 Various terms are used in Westminster systems to describe advisersemployed to provide a partisan perspective to ministers Australians refer toministerial staff in the United Kingdom and Ireland the preferred term isspecial advisers In this article reference is to ministerial advisers which isthe formal classification most likely to attach to staff employed by the Execu-tive Government Support unit of the Department of Internal Affairs tofurnish advice to ministers including advice of a partisan nature When theterm ldquoadviserrdquo is used the reference is to ministerial advisers The descrip-tors ldquocivil servicerdquo and ldquopublic servicerdquo are used interchangeably

2 The affair concerned the actions of ldquopoliticalrdquo staff in the Office of theMinister of Defence Peter Reith Before the November 2001 federal electionthese staff were instrumental in the release of photographs of asylumseekers that purported to show children being thrown into the sea as aprotest against or in an attempt to frustrate those asylum seekers beingtaken into custody by the Australian Defence Force Much was made of thisby the prime minister and his ministerial colleagues during the electioncampaign Subsequent inquiriesmdashincluding by a Committee of the Austra-lian Senatemdashindicated that the photographs were taken when the vesselcarrying the asylum seekers sank and that the ministerrsquos staff were advisedof this prior to the release of the photographs (see Senate of Australia 2002)

3 While this is certainly the case within Westminster systems recent researchin the United States has focused on the impact of the replacement of ldquomeritrdquowith ldquoat-willrdquo employment practicesmdashparticularly at the state levelmdashand atthe risk of politicization (largely in personnel decisions but with implica-tions for the quality of policy advice) This research has sought to illuminateattitudes and behaviors among a range of ldquoclassifiedrdquo and ldquounclassifiedrdquoemployees and is not confined to relationships between political principalsand departmental or agency heads


4 See Blick (2004) Connaughton (2005 2006) Holland (2002) Keating (2003)King (2003) Maley (2000a 2000b 2002a 2002b) Mountfield (2002) Neill(2000) Phillipps (2002) Senate of Australia (2002) State ServicesCommission (2004) Tiernan (2004 2007) United Kingdom Parliament (20012002) Weller (2002) Wicks (2003) and Wilson (2002)

5 It is part of a multiyear research project which also entails surveys of andinterviews with New Zealand cabinet ministers officials and ministerialadvisers The officialsrsquo survey from which these data (which are both quan-titative and qualitative the latter comprising participantsrsquo responses to open-ended questions) are drawn canvassed a range of issues regarding relationswithin the executive Only those data relevant to the question of politiciza-tion are included here The survey was endorsed by the State ServicesCommissioner on the basis that the identities of participants and theirdepartments would remain anonymous to the researchers and in subse-quent publications To this end the Leadership Development Centre agreedto contact all departmental chief executives on our behalf seeking permis-sion for senior officials to participate in the research and in due coursedistributed a questionnaire which respondents returned directly to us Fora fuller description of results see Eichbaum and Shaw (2007)

6 In New Zealandrsquos fragmented public service it is difficult to establish theprecise numbers of public servants at different levels The Leadership Devel-opment Centre which holds the most recent data have put the number ofthe top three tiers of officialsmdashnot all of whom have contact with ministerialadvisersmdashat 1254 (as of 2003ndash2004)

7 The focus of this article precludes consideration of the other issues traversedin the questionnaire However the tenor of responses is captured in thecomposite measure reported in the Appendix (and see Eichbaum and Shaw2007)

8 N = 182 gamma = -0227 p = 00379 The N scores correlation coefficients and probability values respectively

are N = 182 gamma = -0428 p = 0008 N = 182 gamma = 0193 p = 001810 The N scores correlation coefficients and probability values respectively are

N = 174 gamma = 0221 p = 0048 N = 173 Cramerrsquos V = 0229 p = 000311 N = 179 gamma = 0136 p = 044212 N = 176 Cramerrsquos V = 0178 p = 013513 The numbers in parentheses are respondent identifiers14 These data too are from the composite scale (see the Appendix)15 N = 176 gamma = 0539 p = 000316 Data from the composite scale (see the Appendix)17 For a fuller treatment of the question of New Zealandrsquos place at the West-

minster table see Eichbaum and Shaw (2007)18 This respondent felt that ministerial advisers were a risk to the public service

ldquomainly because they have better ministerial access and will personallyundermine public service staff both to ministers and across parties Thisproblem becomes acute when Chief Executives are recruited for politicalpurposes without protection if they take positions contrary to party policyrdquo(006)

References

Blick Andrew 2004 People Who Live in the Dark London Politicos PublishingBowman James S and Jonathan P West 2006 ldquoCivil Service Reform Today

Symposium Introductionrdquo Review of Public Personnel Administration 26 (2)99ndash101


Campbell Colin and Graham K Wilson 1995 The End of Whitehall Death of aParadigm Oxford Blackwell

Coggburn Jerrell D 2006 ldquoAt-Will Employment in Government Insights from theState of Texasrdquo Review of Public Personnel Administration 26 (2) 158ndash177

Condrey Stephen E and R Paul Battaglio 2007 ldquoA Return to Spoils RevisitingRadical Civil Service Reform in the United Statesrdquo Public Administration Review67 (3) 425ndash436

Connaughton Bernadette 2005 ldquoThe Impact of Coalition Government on Politico-Administrative Relations in Ireland 1981ndash2002rdquo In Coalitions of the UnwillingPoliticians and Civil Servants in Coalition Governments ed B Guy Peters TonyVerheijen and Laszlo Vass Bratislavia Slovakia NISPACEE

mdashmdashmdash 2006 ldquoRelegating Civil Servants to the Periphery The Institutionalisationof Special Advisers as Carriers of Political-Administrative Rolesrdquo Paper pre-sented at the 14th Annual NISPA Conference Public Administration and PublicPolicy in Emerging Europe and Eurasia Professionalism Impartiality andTransparency Ljubljana Slovenia May 11ndash13

Durant Robert F 1995 ldquoPublic Policy Overhead Democracy and the ProfessionalState Revisitedrdquo Administration and Society 27 (2) 165ndash202

Eichbaum Chris and Richard Shaw 2007 ldquoMinisterial Advisers Politicizationand the Retreat from Westminster the Case of New Zealandrdquo Public Adminis-tration 85 (3) 609ndash640

Heclo Hugh 1977 A Government of Strangers Executive Politics in WashingtonWashington DC Brookings Institution

Holland Ian 2002 ldquoAccountability of Ministerial Staffrdquo Research Paper no 19Department of the Parliamentary Library Parliament of Australia

Hughes Owen 2003 Public Management and Administration An Introduction 3rded Basingstoke England Palgrave Macmillan

Immergut Ellen M 1998 ldquoThe Theoretical Core of the New InstitutionalismrdquoPolitics and Society 26 (1) 5ndash34

Keating Michael 2003 ldquoIn the Wake of lsquoA Certain Maritime Incidentrsquo MinisterialAdvisers Departments and Accountabilityrdquo Australian Journal of Public Admin-istration 62 (3) 92ndash97

Kellough Edward J and Lloyd G Nigro 2006 ldquoDramatic Reform in the PublicService At-Will Employment and the Creation of a New Public WorkforcerdquoJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory 16 (3) 447ndash446

King Simon 2003 Regulating the Behaviour of Ministers Special Advisers and CivilServants London The Constitution Unit

Maley Maria 2000a ldquoConceptualising Advisersrsquo Policy Work The DistinctivePolicy Roles of Ministerial Advisers in the Keating Government 1991ndash1996rdquoAustralian Journal of Political Science 35 (3) 449ndash470

mdashmdashmdash 2000b ldquoToo Many or Too Few The Increase in Federal MinisterialAdvisers 1972-1999rdquo Australian Journal of Public Administration 59 (4) 48ndash53

mdashmdashmdash 2002a ldquoAustralian Ministerial Advisers and the Royal Commission onGovernment Administrationrdquo Australian Journal of Public Administration 61 (1)103ndash107

mdashmdashmdash 2002b ldquoPartisans at the Centre of Government The Role of MinisterialAdvisers in the Keating Government 1991ndash1996rdquo Unpublished PhD thesisSchool of Social Sciences Australian National University

Mountfield Sir Robin 2002 ldquoIf the Civil Service is to Survive It Needs theSecurity of Legislationrdquo Independent langhttpwwwindependentcoukopinioncommentatorsrobin-mountfield-if-the-civil-service-is-to-survive-it-needs-the-security-of-legislation-658883htmlrang (June 3 2006)

Mulgan Richard 1998 ldquoPoliticization of Senior Appointments in the AustralianPublic Servicerdquo Australian Journal of Public Administration 57 (3) 3ndash14


mdashmdashmdash 1999 ldquoPoliticising the Australian Public Servicerdquo Research Paper 3Parliamentary Library Parliament of Australia

mdashmdashmdash 2006 ldquoTruth in Government and the Politicisation of Public ServiceAdvicerdquo Discussion Paper 06-02 Asia Pacific School of Economics and Gov-ernment Canberra Australia The Australian National University langhttpwwwcrawfordanueduaudegreespogodiscussion_papersPDP06-02pdfrang(June 3 2006)

Neill Lord Patrick 2000 ldquoReinforcing Standardsrdquo Sixth Report of the Committeeon Standards in Public Life langhttpwwwpublic-standardsgovukpublications6th_reportaspxrang (June 3 2006)

Peters B Guy 2001 The Politics of Bureaucracy 5th ed London RoutledgePeters B Guy and Jon Pierre 2004 Politicization of the Civil Service in Comparative

Perspective The Quest for Control London Routledge Studies in Governance andPublic Policy

Phillipps Richard 2002 ldquoMedia Advisers Shadow Players in Political Commu-nicationrdquo Unpublished PhD thesis Government and International RelationsFaculty of Arts University of Sydney

Plowden William 1994 Ministers and Mandarins London Institute for PublicPolicy Research

Rhodes Rod A W and Patrick Weller ed 2001a The Changing World of TopOfficials Mandarins or Valets Buckingham England Open University Press

mdashmdashmdash 2001b ldquoConclusions Antipodean Exceptionalism European Traditional-ismrdquo In The Changing World of Top Officials Mandarins or Valets ed Rod A WRhodes and Patrick Weller Buckingham England Open University Press

mdashmdashmdash 2005 ldquoWestminster Transplanted and Westminster ImplantedExplanations for Political Changerdquo In Westminster Legacies Democracy andResponsible Government in Asia Australasia and the Pacific ed Haig Patapan JohnWanna and Patrick Weller Sydney Australia University of New South WalesPress

Senate of Australia 2002 ldquoReport of a Senate Select Committee into a CertainMaritime Incidentrdquo Canberra October 23

State Services Commission 2004 ldquoFact Sheet 3 The Relationship between thePublic Service and Ministersrdquo langhttpwwwsscgovtnzrang (March 14 2006)

Tiernan Anne 2004 ldquoMinisterial Staff under the Howard Government ProblemSolution or Black Holerdquo Unpublished PhD thesis Department of Politics andPublic Policy Griffith University

mdashmdashmdash 2007 Power without Responsibility Ministerial Staffers in Australian Govern-ments from Whitlam to Howard Sydney Australia UNSW Press

United Kingdom Parliament 2001 ldquoSpecial Advisers Boon or Banerdquo FourthReport House of Commons Public Administration Committee London March13

mdashmdashmdash 2002 ldquoThese Unfortunate Events Lessons of Recent Events at the FormerDTLRrdquo Eighth Report House of Commons Public Administration CommitteeJuly 19

mdashmdashmdash 2005 ldquoPolitics and Administration Ministers and Civil Servants Issuesand Questions Paper House of Commons Public Administration CommitteerdquolanghttpwwwparliamentukdocumentsuploadI26Q20Politics20and20Administration202D20Ministers20and20Civil20Servants20FINALdocrang (May 18 2006)

Wanna John 2005 ldquoNew Zealandrsquos Westminster Trajectory Archetypal Trans-plant to Maverick Outlierrdquo In Westminster Legacies Democracy and ResponsibleGovernment in Asia Australasia and the Pacific ed Haig Patapan John Wanna andPatrick Weller Sydney Australia University of New South Wales Press

Weller Patrick 1989 ldquoPoliticization and the Australian Public Servicerdquo AustralianJournal of Public Administration 48 369ndash381


mdashmdashmdash 2002 Donrsquot Tell the Prime Minister Melbourne Australia ScribePublications

Weller Patrick and Liz Young 2001 ldquoAustralia lsquoMandarins or Lemonsrsquordquo In TheChanging World of Top Officials Mandarins or Valets ed Rod A W Rhodes andPatrick Weller Buckingham England Open University Press

Wicks Sir Nigel 2002 ldquoTranscript of Press Launch of Issues and Questions Con-sultation Paper on Defining the Boundaries within the Executive Ministers SpecialAdvisers and permanent Civil Servantsrdquo langhttpwwwpublic-standardsgovukpublicationsspeeches_and_summaries2002executive_iq_transcriptaspxrang(June 3 2006)

mdashmdashmdash 2003 ldquoDefining the Boundaries within the Executive Ministers SpecialAdvisers and the permanent Civil Servicerdquo Ninth Report of the Committeeon Standards in Public Life langhttpwwwpublic-standardsgovukpublications9th_reportaspxrang (June 3 2006)

Wildavsky Aaron B 1987 Speaking Truth to Power The Art and Craft of PolicyAnalysis New Brunswick NJ Transaction Books

Wilson Sir Richard 2002 ldquoPortrait of a Profession Revisitedrdquo Political Quarterly 73(4) 381ndash391

Wilson Woodrow 1887 ldquoThe Study of Administrationrdquo Political Science Quarterly2 (2) 481ndash506

Wintringham Michael 2002 Annual Report of the State Services CommissionerWellington New Zealand State Services Commission


Ap

pen

dix

Rel

atio

ns

bet

wee

nO

ffici

als

and

Min

iste

rial

Ad

vise

rs

(Whe

re1

=st

rong

lyag

ree

2=

agre

e3

=ne

ithe

rag

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dis

agre

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=d

isag

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dis

agre

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Stat

emen

t1

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45

1R

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hips

betw

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publ

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631

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89

02

Ad

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71

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179

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dvi

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mor

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flue

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lnow

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they

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tobe

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408

336

70

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ake

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buti

onto

the

polic

ypr

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947

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Ad

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uch

infl

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shap

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the

gove

rnm

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polic

yag

enda

4

421

947

242

76

Ad

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keep

cert

ain

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sof

fth

epo

licy

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da

83

392

315

188

22

7A

dvi

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thr

ough

thei

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sco

nsti

tute

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publ

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ene

utra

lity

61

2433

532

43

98

Ad

vise

rsd

ono

ten

cour

age

free

and

fran

kad

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onth

efu

llra

nge

ofpo

licy

opti

ons

avai

labl

eto

gove

rnm

ent

78

279

251

335

56

9A

dvi

sers

have

littl

eor

nobe

arin

gon

offic

ials

rsquoacc

ess

tom

inis

ters

2

218

720

944

143

10

Ad

vise

rsso

met

imes

exce

edth

eir

del

egat

edau

thor

ity

68

438

438

57

011

A

dvi

sers

hind

erof

fici

alsrsquo

acce

ssto

min

iste

rs

17

207

391

358

28

12

Ad

vise

rspr

even

td

epar

tmen

tala

dvi

cefr

omre

achi

ngm

inis

ters

2

313

135

843

25

713

It

isap

prop

riat

efo

rad

vise

rsto

bed

raw

nfr

omth

epu

blic

serv

ice

and

tore

turn

ther

eon

leav

ing

am

inis

terrsquo

sof

fice

9

338

523

621

47

1

14

Ad

vise

rsfa

cilit

ate

inte

rest

grou

pen

gage

men

tw

ith

the

polic

ypr

oces

s3

938

343

912

21

715

A

dvi

sers

add

valu

eto

the

polic

ypr

oces

sun

der

coal

itio

nan

d

orm

inor

ity

gove

rnm

ent

cond

itio

ns

73

453

402

56

17

16

Ad

vise

rspl

aya

posi

tive

role

infa

cilit

atin

gre

lati

ons

betw

een

coal

itio

npa

rtne

rs

89

385

497

17

11

17

Ad

vise

rspl

aya

posi

tive

role

infa

cilit

atin

gre

lati

ons

betw

een

gove

rnm

ents

and

thei

rpa

rlia

men

tary

supp

ort

part

ies

56

373

537

28

06

18

The

over

alln

umbe

rof

advi

sers

shou

ldbe

limit

ed

78

279

453

179

11

19

Parl

iam

ent

shou

ldco

ntro

lthe

num

ber

ofad

vise

rs

57

176

449

267

51

20

Ther

esh

ould

bea

spec

ialC

ode

ofC

ondu

ctfo

rad

vise

rs

276

536

144

44

021

A

Cod

eof

Con

duct

for

advi

sers

shou

ldbe

prov

ided

for

inst

atut

e6

712

838

333

38

9


Service maintains that advisers are ldquonow established as a proper andlegitimate feature of the constitutional framework within which Cabinetministers workrdquo whose value lies in being able to ldquohelp the departmentunderstand the mind of the Minister work alongside officials on theMinisterrsquos behalf and handle party political aspects of governmentbusinessrdquo (Wilson 2002 387)

Equally political advisers are sometimes viewed with suspicion orworse In both Ireland and the United Kingdom concern is expressed thatthe growing influence of special advisers maymdashif it has not already donesomdashpoliticize the policy process by diminishing the role of civil servants(Connaughton 2005 2006 Mountfield 2002 Neill 2000 73) There has beendisquiet too that the privileged access political advisers have to ministersleaves open the potential for the inappropriate usurpation of executiveauthority (United Kingdom Parliament 2001 Wicks 2002) Meanwhile inAustralia political advisers have been described in one commentary as theldquojunk-yard attack dogs of the political systemrdquo (Weller 2002 72) andaccused of complicity in events such as the ldquoChildren overboardrdquo affair(see Senate of Australia 2002 Tiernan 2007)2

Much of the scholarship on political advisers conveys a sense of fore-boding a concern that officialsrsquo place in the Westminster scheme of thingsis under threat from the (political adviser) barbarians at the gate But agood deal of it tends to accept that threat as givenmdashtypically on the basisof advisersrsquo role in controversial and mostly media-related events InAustralia the Children overboard affair is the exemplar in the UnitedKingdom that role is perhaps best played by the ldquounfortunate eventsrdquo thattook place in the former Department of Transport Local Government andthe Regions and in Canada the sponsorship scandal that contributed sosignificantly to the defeat of the Liberal (Martin) Government has resultedin a focus on the respective roles and duties of political and public serviceactors

Yet empirical tests of the assumption that political advisers pose athreat to the conventions that underpin the permanent civil service inWhitehall Canberra Ottawa Dublin Wellington and elsewhere and itsrelationship with its political masters and mistresses are few and farbetween Given the explicitly normative dimension of much of thepopular and a significant part of the academic commentary on advisersand more specifically how best to inoculate Westminster systems from thepartisan distemper associated with them the absence of an evidence baseis problematic Moreover there is a sense in which conceptual and theo-retical frameworks have lagged behind significant institutional changessuch as the advent of the third element in executive government Ourprincipal objective in this article concerns the lattermdashand specifically thefailure of orthodox conceptualizations of politicization to speak to a newset of institutional arrangements and behavioral dynamics

While the focus here is on the particular circumstances within onemember of the Westminster family of nations and the implications for








































The Research




Respondents






Data







Frequency Valid


Note Missing = 6










Frequency Valid


Note Missing = 7












































Frequency Valid


Note Missing = 8































Conclusion


















Acknowledgments


Notes














References






















































Ap

pen

dix

Rel

atio

ns

bet

wee

nO

ffici

als

and

Min

iste

rial

Ad

vise

rs

(Whe

re1

=st

rong

lyag

ree

2=

agre

e3

=ne

ithe

rag

ree

dis

agre

e4

=d

isag

ree

5=

stro

ngly

dis

agre

e)

Stat

emen

t1

23

45

1R

elat

ions

hips

betw

een

advi

sers

and

publ

icse

rvan

tsar

ege

nera

llypo

siti

ve

34

631

24

6

89

02

Ad

vise

rsar

ea

legi

tim

ate

feat

ure

ofex

ecut

ive

gove

rnm

ent

71

701

179

38

11

3A

dvi

sers

are

mor

ein

flue

ntia

lnow

than

they

used

tobe

19

408

336

70

64

Ad

vise

rsm

ake

apo

siti

veco

ntri

buti

onto

the

polic

ypr

oces

s4

947

337

59

21

15

Ad

vise

rsha

veto

om

uch

infl

uenc

ein

shap

ing

the

gove

rnm

entrsquos

polic

yag

enda

4

421

947

242

76

Ad

vise

rstr

yto

keep

cert

ain

item

sof

fth

epo

licy

agen

da

83

392

315

188

22

7A

dvi

sers

thr

ough

thei

rac

tion

sco

nsti

tute

ari

skto

publ

icse

rvic

ene

utra

lity

61

2433

532

43

98

Ad

vise

rsd

ono

ten

cour

age

free

and

fran

kad

vice

onth

efu

llra

nge

ofpo

licy

opti

ons

avai

labl

eto

gove

rnm

ent

78

279

251

335

56

9A

dvi

sers

have

littl

eor

nobe

arin

gon

offic

ials

rsquoacc

ess

tom

inis

ters

2

218

720

944

143

10

Ad

vise

rsso

met

imes

exce

edth

eir

del

egat

edau

thor

ity

68

438

438

57

011

A

dvi

sers

hind

erof

fici

alsrsquo

acce

ssto

min

iste

rs

17

207

391

358

28

12

Ad

vise

rspr

even

td

epar

tmen

tala

dvi

cefr

omre

achi

ngm

inis

ters

2

313

135

843

25

713

It

isap

prop

riat

efo

rad

vise

rsto

bed

raw

nfr

omth

epu

blic

serv

ice

and

tore

turn

ther

eon

leav

ing

am

inis

terrsquo

sof

fice

9

338

523

621

47

1

14

Ad

vise

rsfa

cilit

ate

inte

rest

grou

pen

gage

men

tw

ith

the

polic

ypr

oces

s3

938

343

912

21

715

A

dvi

sers

add

valu

eto

the

polic

ypr

oces

sun

der

coal

itio

nan

d

orm

inor

ity

gove

rnm

ent

cond

itio

ns

73

453

402

56

17

16

Ad

vise

rspl

aya

posi

tive

role

infa

cilit

atin

gre

lati

ons

betw

een

coal

itio

npa

rtne

rs

89

385

497

17

11

17

Ad

vise

rspl

aya

posi

tive

role

infa

cilit

atin

gre

lati

ons

betw

een

gove

rnm

ents

and

thei

rpa

rlia

men

tary

supp

ort

part

ies

56

373

537

28

06

18

The

over

alln

umbe

rof

advi

sers

shou

ldbe

limit

ed

78

279

453

179

11

19

Parl

iam

ent

shou

ldco

ntro

lthe

num

ber

ofad

vise

rs

57

176

449

267

51

20

Ther

esh

ould

bea

spec

ialC

ode

ofC

ondu

ctfo

rad

vise

rs

276

536

144

44

021

A

Cod

eof

Con

duct

for

advi

sers

shou

ldbe

prov

ided

for

inst

atut

e6

712

838

333

38

9








































The Research




Respondents






Data







Frequency Valid


Note Missing = 6










Frequency Valid


Note Missing = 7












































Frequency Valid


Note Missing = 8































Conclusion


















Acknowledgments


Notes














References






















































Ap

pen

dix

Rel

atio

ns

bet

wee

nO

ffici

als

and

Min

iste

rial

Ad

vise

rs

(Whe

re1

=st

rong

lyag

ree

2=

agre

e3

=ne

ithe

rag

ree

dis

agre

e4

=d

isag

ree

5=

stro

ngly

dis

agre

e)

Stat

emen

t1

23

45

1R

elat

ions

hips

betw

een

advi

sers

and

publ

icse

rvan

tsar

ege

nera

llypo

siti

ve

34

631

24

6

89

02

Ad

vise

rsar

ea

legi

tim

ate

feat

ure

ofex

ecut

ive

gove

rnm

ent

71

701

179

38

11

3A

dvi

sers

are

mor

ein

flue

ntia

lnow

than

they

used

tobe

19

408

336

70

64

Ad

vise

rsm

ake

apo

siti

veco

ntri

buti

onto

the

polic

ypr

oces

s4

947

337

59

21

15

Ad

vise

rsha

veto

om

uch

infl

uenc

ein

shap

ing

the

gove

rnm

entrsquos

polic

yag

enda

4

421

947

242

76

Ad

vise

rstr

yto

keep

cert

ain

item

sof

fth

epo

licy

agen

da

83

392

315

188

22

7A

dvi

sers

thr

ough

thei

rac

tion

sco

nsti

tute

ari

skto

publ

icse

rvic

ene

utra

lity

61

2433

532

43

98

Ad

vise

rsd

ono

ten

cour

age

free

and

fran

kad

vice

onth

efu

llra

nge

ofpo

licy

opti

ons

avai

labl

eto

gove

rnm

ent

78

279

251

335

56

9A

dvi

sers

have

littl

eor

nobe

arin

gon

offic

ials

rsquoacc

ess

tom

inis

ters

2

218

720

944

143

10

Ad

vise

rsso

met

imes

exce

edth

eir

del

egat

edau

thor

ity

68

438

438

57

011

A

dvi

sers

hind

erof

fici

alsrsquo

acce

ssto

min

iste

rs

17

207

391

358

28

12

Ad

vise

rspr

even

td

epar

tmen

tala

dvi

cefr

omre

achi

ngm

inis

ters

2

313

135

843

25

713

It

isap

prop

riat

efo

rad

vise

rsto

bed

raw

nfr

omth

epu

blic

serv

ice

and

tore

turn

ther

eon

leav

ing

am

inis

terrsquo

sof

fice

9

338

523

621

47

1

14

Ad

vise

rsfa

cilit

ate

inte

rest

grou

pen

gage

men

tw

ith

the

polic

ypr

oces

s3

938

343

912

21

715

A

dvi

sers

add

valu

eto

the

polic

ypr

oces

sun

der

coal

itio

nan

d

orm

inor

ity

gove

rnm

ent

cond

itio

ns

73

453

402

56

17

16

Ad

vise

rspl

aya

posi

tive

role

infa

cilit

atin

gre

lati

ons

betw

een

coal

itio

npa

rtne

rs

89

385

497

17

11

17

Ad

vise

rspl

aya

posi

tive

role

infa

cilit

atin

gre

lati

ons

betw

een

gove

rnm

ents

and

thei

rpa

rlia

men

tary

supp

ort

part

ies

56

373

537

28

06

18

The

over

alln

umbe

rof

advi

sers

shou

ldbe

limit

ed

78

279

453

179

11

19

Parl

iam

ent

shou

ldco

ntro

lthe

num

ber

ofad

vise

rs

57

176

449

267

51

20

Ther

esh

ould

bea

spec

ialC

ode

ofC

ondu

ctfo

rad

vise

rs

276

536

144

44

021

A

Cod

eof

Con

duct

for

advi

sers

shou

ldbe

prov

ided

for

inst

atut

e6

712

838

333

38

9




Data







Frequency Valid


Note Missing = 6










Frequency Valid


Note Missing = 7












































Frequency Valid


Note Missing = 8































Conclusion


















Acknowledgments


Notes














References






















































Ap

pen

dix

Rel

atio

ns

bet

wee

nO

ffici

als

and

Min

iste

rial

Ad

vise

rs

(Whe

re1

=st

rong

lyag

ree

2=

agre

e3

=ne

ithe

rag

ree

dis

agre

e4

=d

isag

ree

5=

stro

ngly

dis

agre

e)

Stat

emen

t1

23

45

1R

elat

ions

hips

betw

een

advi

sers

and

publ

icse

rvan

tsar

ege

nera

llypo

siti

ve

34

631

24

6

89

02

Ad

vise

rsar

ea

legi

tim

ate

feat

ure

ofex

ecut

ive

gove

rnm

ent

71

701

179

38

11

3A

dvi

sers

are

mor

ein

flue

ntia

lnow

than

they

used

tobe

19

408

336

70

64

Ad

vise

rsm

ake

apo

siti

veco

ntri

buti

onto

the

polic

ypr

oces

s4

947

337

59

21

15

Ad

vise

rsha

veto

om

uch

infl

uenc

ein

shap

ing

the

gove

rnm

entrsquos

polic

yag

enda

4

421

947

242

76

Ad

vise

rstr

yto

keep

cert

ain

item

sof

fth

epo

licy

agen

da

83

392

315

188

22

7A

dvi

sers

thr

ough

thei

rac

tion

sco

nsti

tute

ari

skto

publ

icse

rvic

ene

utra

lity

61

2433

532

43

98

Ad

vise

rsd

ono

ten

cour

age

free

and

fran

kad

vice

onth

efu

llra

nge

ofpo

licy

opti

ons

avai

labl

eto

gove

rnm

ent

78

279

251

335

56

9A

dvi

sers

have

littl

eor

nobe

arin

gon

offic

ials

rsquoacc

ess

tom

inis

ters

2

218

720

944

143

10

Ad

vise

rsso

met

imes

exce

edth

eir

del

egat

edau

thor

ity

68

438

438

57

011

A

dvi

sers

hind

erof

fici

alsrsquo

acce

ssto

min

iste

rs

17

207

391

358

28

12

Ad

vise

rspr

even

td

epar

tmen

tala

dvi

cefr

omre

achi

ngm

inis

ters

2

313

135

843

25

713

It

isap

prop

riat

efo

rad

vise

rsto

bed

raw

nfr

omth

epu

blic

serv

ice

and

tore

turn

ther

eon

leav

ing

am

inis

terrsquo

sof

fice

9

338

523

621

47

1

14

Ad

vise

rsfa

cilit

ate

inte

rest

grou

pen

gage

men

tw

ith

the

polic

ypr

oces

s3

938

343

912

21

715

A

dvi

sers

add

valu

eto

the

polic

ypr

oces

sun

der

coal

itio

nan

d

orm

inor

ity

gove

rnm

ent

cond

itio

ns

73

453

402

56

17

16

Ad

vise

rspl

aya

posi

tive

role

infa

cilit

atin

gre

lati

ons

betw

een

coal

itio

npa

rtne

rs

89

385

497

17

11

17

Ad

vise

rspl

aya

posi

tive

role

infa

cilit

atin

gre

lati

ons

betw

een

gove

rnm

ents

and

thei

rpa

rlia

men

tary

supp

ort

part

ies

56

373

537

28

06

18

The

over

alln

umbe

rof

advi

sers

shou

ldbe

limit

ed

78

279

453

179

11

19

Parl

iam

ent

shou

ldco

ntro

lthe

num

ber

ofad

vise

rs

57

176

449

267

51

20

Ther

esh

ould

bea

spec

ialC

ode

ofC

ondu

ctfo

rad

vise

rs

276

536

144

44

021

A

Cod

eof

Con

duct

for

advi

sers

shou

ldbe

prov

ided

for

inst

atut

e6

712

838

333

38

9










Frequency Valid


Note Missing = 7












































Frequency Valid


Note Missing = 8































Conclusion


















Acknowledgments


Notes














References






















































Ap

pen

dix

Rel

atio

ns

bet

wee

nO

ffici

als

and

Min

iste

rial

Ad

vise

rs

(Whe

re1

=st

rong

lyag

ree

2=

agre

e3

=ne

ithe

rag

ree

dis

agre

e4

=d

isag

ree

5=

stro

ngly

dis

agre

e)

Stat

emen

t1

23

45

1R

elat

ions

hips

betw

een

advi

sers

and

publ

icse

rvan

tsar

ege

nera

llypo

siti

ve

34

631

24

6

89

02

Ad

vise

rsar

ea

legi

tim

ate

feat

ure

ofex

ecut

ive

gove

rnm

ent

71

701

179

38

11

3A

dvi

sers

are

mor

ein

flue

ntia

lnow

than

they

used

tobe

19

408

336

70

64

Ad

vise

rsm

ake

apo

siti

veco

ntri

buti

onto

the

polic

ypr

oces

s4

947

337

59

21

15

Ad

vise

rsha

veto

om

uch

infl

uenc

ein

shap

ing

the

gove

rnm

entrsquos

polic

yag

enda

4

421

947

242

76

Ad

vise

rstr

yto

keep

cert

ain

item

sof

fth

epo

licy

agen

da

83

392

315

188

22

7A

dvi

sers

thr

ough

thei

rac

tion

sco

nsti

tute

ari

skto

publ

icse

rvic

ene

utra

lity

61

2433

532

43

98

Ad

vise

rsd

ono

ten

cour

age

free

and

fran

kad

vice

onth

efu

llra

nge

ofpo

licy

opti

ons

avai

labl

eto

gove

rnm

ent

78

279

251

335

56

9A

dvi

sers

have

littl

eor

nobe

arin

gon

offic

ials

rsquoacc

ess

tom

inis

ters

2

218

720

944

143

10

Ad

vise

rsso

met

imes

exce

edth

eir

del

egat

edau

thor

ity

68

438

438

57

011

A

dvi

sers

hind

erof

fici

alsrsquo

acce

ssto

min

iste

rs

17

207

391

358

28

12

Ad

vise

rspr

even

td

epar

tmen

tala

dvi

cefr

omre

achi

ngm

inis

ters

2

313

135

843

25

713

It

isap

prop

riat

efo

rad

vise

rsto

bed

raw

nfr

omth

epu

blic

serv

ice

and

tore

turn

ther

eon

leav

ing

am

inis

terrsquo

sof

fice

9

338

523

621

47

1

14

Ad

vise

rsfa

cilit

ate

inte

rest

grou

pen

gage

men

tw

ith

the

polic

ypr

oces

s3

938

343

912

21

715

A

dvi

sers

add

valu

eto

the

polic

ypr

oces

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Frequency Valid


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Conclusion


















Acknowledgments


Notes














References






















































Ap

pen

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Rel

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Min

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Ad

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631

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373

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Conclusion


















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Notes














References






















































Ap

pen

dix

Rel

atio

ns

bet

wee

nO

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and

Min

iste

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Ad

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siti

ve

34

631

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6

89

02

Ad

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38

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Acknowledgments


Notes














References






















































Ap

pen

dix

Rel

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wee

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Min

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Ad

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Ad

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revisiting politicization: political advisers and public servants in westminster systems

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