reflexivity and meta-reflexivity in meta-studies
TRANSCRIPT
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Draft Chapter
Reflexivity and Meta-Reflexivity in Meta-Studies
Wendelin Küpers [email protected]
Introduction
Exercise & Overview
1. Understanding Reflexivity – From Common Sense to Scientific Usages
1.1. Common usage and Importance of Reflection
Personal and Communal Reflection
1.2. Scientific Usage and Significance of Reflexivity
Background/ History (from Pre- & to Modernity to Post-Modernism)
Interpretive turn, reflexive turn etc Postmodernity and reflexivity
Importance in contemporary science / In methodology (Bourdieu, Latour)
Lack of reflexivity in middle-range science – the postmodern critique of science,
2. Forms, Levels and Domains of Reflexivity 2.1. Forms: Varieties & Modes
2.2. Level & Domains 1. Being reflexive about methodology and method
2. Being reflexive about epistemology epistemological commitments
3. Being reflexive about ontology (ontological orientation/commitments)
4. Being reflexive about discipline and disciplinary framing.
5. Being reflexive about broader embedment and socio-cultural context, Zeitgeist
3. Reflexivity in Meta-studies
Reflexivity on Meta-Levels / Meta-level reflexivity in science and research
Meta-theoretical reflexivity as critical theoretical practice
Integrative / Integral Reflexivity
4. Limitations and Dangers of Reflexivity - Radicalisation
Self-indulgence and epistemological solipsism, Paralysis & Dilemma
Being Critically reflexive about reflexivity & Radical Reflexivity
Meta-reflexivity and its contribution to critical self-awareness in science
5. Reflexivity and Wisdom
The nexus of Integral & Embodied Reflexivity and Wisdom
Perspectives: Significance of Reflexivity and Global issues
Appendix
Guiding Questions for Be(com)ing Self-&-Reflexive
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Introduction
The following invites you to take yourself on travelling reflectively and reflexively
through landscapes of thinking, research and meta-studies. As part of this attentive
journeying, your (self-)critical reading and assessment will be required through this
venturing.
For entering this reflexive world we would first invite you to practice as specific
exercise on your own. The exercise is intended to get you into what being reflective
and what a reflexive practice is all about. This simple exercise helps you to enter into
the act of thinking for and about yourself, thereby develop an experiential
understanding of the notion of reflection and reflexivity, which will then elaborated in
more detail.
So let’s get started by the following task:
Think about what it means to have a thought. Where does the thought come from?
What train of thoughts emerge as you dwell on the thought? What does your inner
voice tell you? What do you hear in terms of “self-talk’ or inner dialogue? What does
this thinking about your own act of thinking reveals?
Write down your provisional associations, tentative definitions or ideas of what
reflection and reflexivity mean for you!
Now, we would like to invite you to take a look into a mirror…
What do you see and experience, and think?
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Metaphorically and practically the very word re-flection invites to associate a mirror
image, which affords the opportunity to engage in a perception or inquiring
observation of our ways of being and doing. When we experience reflection we
become perceivers and observers of our own realities and practice. What does the ‘re-
‘ of ‘re-flecting’ re-fers to? To what do you re-turn and how?
Who is looking back at you? What happens if you move your face? Actually ‘re-
flection’ here is a kind mirroring back. Do you notice the inversion of the returning
mirror image?
The reflected duplication of your self or any object in the mirror appears as identical,
but is reversed. As an optical effect it results from reflection off of the surface of the
mirror as medium or also on glass or water, and mirroring plays an important role for
the development of subjectivityi.
Likewise, but more figuratively, reflection as a more cognitive process looks back
when you reflect your own thinking. With what is called hind-sight, you look back on
what and how something happened. This form of "thinking about thinking" is often
referred as a kind of meta-cognition and can be used to help you also for learning how
to learn.
Reflexivity is more and different then Reflection
You might ask yourself, ok now I have experience and learned about some basics of
reflection, but what about reflexivity then?
Reflexivity is a complex term that enfolds a wide and very heterogeneous range of
experiences, approaches and practices of thinking. In addition to re-flecting,
reflexivity suggests a further complexification and layering of experiences and
thinking about experience. This more comprehensive way is an intellectual capacity,
which exposes and enables the questioning of ways of being and doing as well as its
underlying structures. In so doing, reflexivity enables us to engage with core
assumptions and interpretative frames. Through this reflexive and critical re-turning
the generation of alternatives and the emergence of deep change is made possible.
This is because, without laying open our assumptions transformative insight and
different behaviour could not happen.
After a reflexive examination (and if the insights are taken seriously) you might
correct flaws and biases, assess choices differently or re-orientate yourself with regard
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to future actions. In this way, reflexivity implies quite critical and also practical
dimensions and transformative potentials.
In the following, we focus on reflexivity, in particular its role in scientific research
and meta-studies research. First, some usages and the significance for science and
some varieties and forms of reflexivity are presented. As part of meta-studies then
different levels and domains of reflexive research practice are differentiated and
analysed. Furthermore, then we look more closely at the characteristics of a meta-
level reflexivity as a critical theoretical practice. Afterwards, some limitations of
reflexivity and ways of dealing with them are briefly discussed. Finally, perspectives
on the nexus of reflexivity and wisdom as integral reflexivity are outlined.
1. Understanding Reflexivity – From Common to Scientific Usages
The terms ‘reflection’ or ‘reflexivity’ are widely-used terms and provide diverse often
ambigious meanings in different contexts, while being regarded both as genuine and
important human and scientific processes (Holland, 1999; Johnson and Duberley,
2003). Basically, reflexivity plays already a key role in everyday personal and
communal life. However, within a research context, reflexivity refers to a more
systematic, technical and procedure and has a specific meaning.
First, let’s look at the common usage and role of reflexivity and then the philosophical
background and scientific practices.
Personal and communal reflection
Think back (sic!) to the experiment to which you were invited in the introduction!
What happened, while you thought about your thinking and about your Self? How
was it like having this kind of inner talk with that self in you?
Yes, you became conscious of this thinking! Your thinking reflected back on you, like
the image of the mirror. You could see yourself seeing, perceived your perception,
observed yourself as observer; or with regard to action, noticing what you were doing.
In this way, reflection means thinking about the conditions of what one is
experiencing and feeling, comprehending or enacting. Moreover, this reflection
allowed you to look at your thinking and other phenomena and events from different
perspectives (even if unpleasant).
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This capability of being consciously aware about one’s awareness, being mindful (full
of mind) and being able to make oneself an object of your one’s subjective reflection
is a basic human competence.
Perhaps you take a moment now and write down some of your reflections!
One form of a continuous practice of reflection, which is highly recommended is
journaling in a diary or even writing letters (not emails!) to yourself or others.
What has been described as a personal process of reflecting and experiencing
reflection also happens on a more communal or collective level. We are mirroring
each other for example in our relationships with partners, friends, fellow students or
colleagues.
The same transformative qualities and potentials as mentioned in relation to personal
reflection can also be present or activated on a communal and collective level.
The practical advantage of personal and communal reflection lies in that it is required
for problem-solving especially of complicated or ill-structured problems. As we all
know from our own experiences, this kind of a more existential reflection serves
many creative functions.
What is more is that all our expressions, being linguistically and socially mediated,
reflect that is referring back to the life of society implicit in speaking (or writing).
Thus in making even the most innocent utterance or statement to others we are not
only trying to communicate some ‘content' or substantive point, but invariably also
displaying the form or structure of the utterance - inviting the other to enter into the
speech act and, occasionally, form of life that legitimates and warrants this particular
mode of speech and communication.
On an even broader macro-level, folklore wisdom, proverbs or using common-sense
are manifestations of indirect forms of reflections as are forms of self-problematizing
practices in art, literature and aesthetic reflection.
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Reflexivity in History and Research /
Importance of Reflexivity in Contemporary Science
In addition to the personal and communal practices of reflection, and to understand
more about reflexivity in the following we focus on the importance of it in science
and research. Overall, reflexivity is a much-used term, which often tends to be over-
determined while remaining under-defined (Pillow, 2003). Philosophically, and in the
history of science, reflexivity has a long historical tradition with a multivalent lineage
‘dressed’ in many ways of appearances or guises.
Generally, reflexivity is deeply connected to how philosophy began and its specific
socio-political context. According to Sandywell (1996a,b,c), who in her ‘Logological
Investigations’ pursuit an archaeology of reflexive experience, the verbal and
rhetorical innovations of proto-philosophy in early Greek philosophy during the sixth
and fifth centuries BC, shows that it originated in pre-modern culture.
In one sense, the concept goes back to the Oracle at Delphi – ‘Know Thyself’ as well
as the reflexive tradition of Socratian thinking and philosophical skepticism in
antiquity, while it also has an old tradition in Eastern philosophy.
For Merlin Donald (1991) reflexive cognitive capacity emerged in the long-term
evolution of the human mind through the third major cultural transformation. The first
was the acquisition of mimetic capacities adding communicative potential to the
fundamental episodic memory shared with other animals. The second was the shift
towards story-based mythic worldviews, and the third the acquisition of theoretic
cognitive and cultural capacities. For Donald, theoretic capacities of reflexivity are
characteristic for the ‘modern mind’.
The ‘modern’ idea of reflexivity as a critical and self-critical human action (Lynch,
2000: 26) has its roots in post-Enlightenment Western thinking.
Philosophical reasoning is a reflective process of questioning and clarifying the
meaning of existence. The goal is to achieve self-understanding while at the same
time understanding of the world and of other people. For hermeneutic philosophy this
requires this understanding requires taking a detour through the signs, texts and other
repositories of humanity found in cultural works. Reflexive self-knowledge is an
interpretation including those of perspectives.
‘Modern’ reflexivity became increasingly influential as thinking and juxtaposing
perspectives in relation to other perspectives is part of systematic self-reflection and
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self-critique. This perspectivism implies that there are many possible conceptual
schemes, or perspectives in which judgment of truth or value can be made. For are
reflexive stance no way of seeing the world can be taken as definitively "true", but
this does not necessarily entail that all perspectives are equally valid. Reflexivity
destabilise the authority of a singular perspective, and looks it to the structural and
historical relations that produced the illusion of that authority. Reflexively, there are
no epistemological absolutes, but what is required is a constant reassessment of rules,
including scientific methods according to the circumstances of individual
perspectives. Any “truth” is created by reflexively integrating different vantage points
together.
Reflexive Modernisation
Related to this modern orientation, reflexivity was found to be a structural artefact of
late/ high modernity. For example, Giddens proposed that there is an increasing
tendency to self-monitoring, so that 'we are, not what we are, but what we make of
ourselves' (Giddens, 1991, p. 75), thus there are unprecedented levels of institutional
and individual reflexive monitoring. Modern life requires, as Anthony Giddens
observed that "the question, ‘How shall I live?’ has to be answered in day-to-day
decisions about how to behave, what to wear and what to eat" (Giddens 1991, p.
14).In the same vein of analysing socio-historical developments also Beck noted that
'reflexive modernisation dissolves traditional parameters of industrial society: class
culture and consciousness, gender and family roles', and describes this as a process of
detraditionalization that 'happen[s] in a social surge of individualisation' (Beck, 1992,
p. 87), by which biographies become self-reflexive (see also Beck et al. 1994).
Reflexivity as re-turn
Fundamentally, reflexivity involves giving thought to how one thinks about thinking
(Maranhao, 1991) in a systematic way. Thus it is a move that processes through some
sort of re-turning back, particularly between knowledge and the knower (Steedman,
1991), but also other processes of an entity acting and turning back upon itself, which
implies that it is re-cursive (see Hibbert et al. 2010). But what the turning does, how
it turns, and with what implications differs from different understandings and uses or
practices of reflexivity (Lynch, 2000: 34) .
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Essentially, reflexivity involves a conscious awareness and deliberation, while
particularly in science; it involves thinking about the way in which research is carried
out. Moreover, it comprises an understanding of how the process of doing research
shapes or influences its findings or outcomes (Hardy et al, 2001).
Thus, reflexivity in a scientific context re-flects the relation between researcher and
her conducted research, respectively the (methodologically) obtained material,
interpreting it and writing it up as well as discussing validity and other claims. In this
way, reflexivity, as the committed self-inclusion of the observer in the object
observed, has been a persistent source of epistemological inspiration and sociological
and social imagination.
Accordingly, the importance and relevance of reflexive research has always been and
at present is attracting an increasing attention in a variety of academic disciplines. For
example reflexivity has been debated across a variety of disciplines including
sociology, the natural sciences, and psychology (e.g., Clifford, 1986; Latour, 1988;
Tsekeris, 2010). In social theory, reflexivity refers to circular relationships between
cause and effect, both affecting each other, specifically an act of self-reference where
examination or action 'bends back on', refers to, and affects the entity instigating the
action or examination. In this sense, reflexivity deals with ‘ways of seeing which act
back on and reflect existing ways of seeing’ (Clegg & Hardy 1996: 4).
Investigating reflexivity and pursuing reflexive interpretation implies also inquiring in
which theoretical, cultural and political contexts of individual are situated and how
intellectual involvement affects interaction with whatever is being researched, often in
ways that are difficult to become conscious of (Alvesson & Skoeldberg, 2009: 269,
271).
Moreover, being reflexive means much more than being aware about one’s doing in a
certain discipline or field of research. It means also that one must know how the field
is organized (disciplined) and how it is practiced, including explicating basic
assumptions, paradigms, perspectives and limitations that influence the investigations,
results or findings but also the theorising and presentation of the research.
Thus, in the context of research, reflexivity can be broadly defined to mean an
understanding of the knowledge making enterprise.
As such it is “an approach to aiding the production of knowledge from experience by
examining the impact of one’s position and actions” (Lipp, 2007, para. 6). In
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particular, it requires a consideration of the social, institutional, and political
processes whereby research is conducted and knowledge is produced (e.g. Calás &
Smircich, 1999).
According to Davies (2003: 10):
Reflection constitutes the ecology of knowledge. It is the self-
consciousness of intellectual practices. It gets at what is behind them,
at what they actually do and how they work. Thinking is not
automatically reflexive. Thinking that occurs in terms of disciplines,
does not usually reflect on itself or the wider world. A discipline can
easily decline into technical formalism. It has a preconception of how
its objects make sense. What makes sense is something already
decided as being meaningful by the discipline. Reflection explores
the relationship of knowledge to the reality it is meant to explain.”
This also involves recognising the problematic nature and design of research, the
disputed or dubious position of the researcher, the problematic status of
representation, the constructive nature of language as well as an admission of the fact
that there is no “one best way” of conducting either theoretical or empirical work (e.g.
Denzin & Lincoln, 1994).
Accordingly, reflexivity has been recommended as a response to and indeed is often
represented as an answer to the crises of (act or aspiration of) representation (Clifford,
1986) and legitimation in social research often associated with postmodernism and
post-structuralism (Denzin & Lincoln 1994: 10-11),
With this turn, reflexivity became somewhat of an imperative, particularly of post-
positivist research calling for that the researcher situate themselves, 'own' their
investments and constructions in the research process and in the production of both
meaning and 'partial' truths.
Reflexivity is pragmatic as a theoretical practice and ‘instrumental’ as well as critical
in that it helps to get engaged and conduct a more conscious and (self-)critical
appraisal of one’s own research work.To repeat, it serves reflecting on why and how
researchers frame and investigated specific issues, objectives and questions of (their)
research practice, and how chosen methodological or conceptual approaches lead
them to or arrive at particular kinds of findings, conclusions or interpretation and
theories and not others.
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We will come back to the practical qualities of reflexive research later, when we
discuss a meta-theoretical reflexivity as a specific, more comprehensive form of
theoretical practice. Let us first explore now how different reflexivities vary and take
divers forms and then learn to differentiate levels and domains.
2. Forms and Levels/Domains of Reflexivity in Research
2. 1. Forms of Reflexivity
Across the breadth of research much different reflexivities are practiced and various
inventories have been suggested to demonstrate the diversity of its meanings and uses
(Lynch, 2000; Pels, 2000).
For example Lynch (2000: 27-34) differentiates between mechanic and substantive
reflexivities. The latter one comprises on a macro-level a systemic reflexivity as
organizing principle in late modernity (turning recursively upon itself) based on
dominant modes of scientistic and technocratic expertise. He further discusses
reflexive social construction and interpretative reflexivity, including hermeneutic
circle (textual signs and interpretative meaning) and ethnomethodological reflexivity.
Woolgar (1988) offers the distinction between “benign introspection” at one end of a
spectrum, and constitutive reflexivity at the other.
Introspective reflection maintains some kind of “distinction between
representation and object [and is] usually concerned with improving the
adequacy of the connection between analysts’ statements and the object of
those statements.” (p. 22).
o This is strengthen researcher’s commitment to their research, and alert
the researcher to possible mis-interpretations of the text (Hollway &
Jefferson, 2000).
Disengaged reflexivity defers the application of the research to the researcher
until the project is (more or less) complete and “thus leaves the the actual
conduct of research undisturbed.” (p. 23).
Constitutive reflexivity “ammounts to a denial of distinction and a strong
affirmation of similarity; representation and object are not distinct, they are
intimately interconnected.” (p. 22).
Based on the idea of reflexivity as internal conversation, Archer (2007) draws four
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“modes of reflexivity” (p. 93):
Communicative reflexives: Those whose internal conversations require
confirmation by others before resulting in courses of action.
Autonomous reflexives: Those who sustain self-constrained internal
conversations, leading directly to action.
Meta-reflexives: Those who are critically reflexive about their own internal
conversations and critical about effective actions in society.
Fractured reflexives: Those whose internal conversations intensify their
distress and disorientation rather than leading to purposeful courses of action.
Further differentiation can be made between monological and ‘dialogical reflexivity’
(Sandywell, 1996a, see chapter 12)
Reflexivity is frequently deployed in a mono-logical sense to denote the researcher
'reflecting' on and voicing the effect of their presence on the conduct and
interpretation of her own research. In contrast to the simply individualizing
autobiographical acknowledgments, which have its own problems as we will see later
(see chapter 4), a dialogical reflexivity considers a more participative orientation.
In terms of temporality that is when reflexivity happens, we can distinguish between
ex post facto, reflecting back on something that already happened, and reflexivity in
situ that is reflecting what is currently occurring, simultaneously to its occurrence. For
example in his concept of the ‘reflective practitioner’ Donald Schön (1983)
differentiates between a reflection-on-action, which happens deliberately after the
event of performing and a reflection-in-action, which occurs implicitly in the ‘action-
present’. An integral perspective would strive for a blend of reflection-in-and-on-
action. Following the idea of an integral orientation and by paying attention to the
way the self is and how others are sensing, feeling, thinking, and acting within a
particular event and influencing conditions, structures and social contexts, may then
lead to a reflection-within-the-moment and co-responsive reflexive practice.
Another differentiation between various forms of practices of reflexivity is suggested
by Alvesson et al (2008), who distinguish between reflexivity as multi-voicing
practice, positioning practice, destabilizing practice and multi-perspective practices,
and discuss each their limitations, paradoxa and possible complementing
combinations.
Following a dialectical differentiation they conceptualise two main foci of reflexive
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practices. While the first one, which they call D-Reflexivity refers to practices of
deconstruction, defense, declaiming, destabilising and danger-warning. The second
modus is called R-Reflexivity, which stands for reconstruction, reframing, reclaiming,
and re-presentation (ibd. 494). The first one “challenges orthodox understandings by
pointing out the limitations of, and uncertainties behind, the manufactured unity and
coherence of text as well as the way in which conformism, institutional domination
and academic and business fashion may account for the production of particular
knowledge. The other one “is about developing and adding something… bringing in
issues of alternative paradigms, root metaphors, perspectives, vocabularies, lines of
interpretation, political values, and representations, re-balancing and reframing voices
“R-reflexive practices are employed to illuminate what is left out and marginalised:
the almost missed opportunity, premature framing, reproduction of received wisdom,
re-enforcement of power relations and unimaginative labeling… to open up new
avenues, paths, and lines of interpretation to produced ‘better’ii research ethically,
politically, empirically and theoretically.” (ibd. 494-5).
2.2. Levels and Domains of reflexive research practice
Classically, the objectivist or methodological version of reflexivity is one whereby
“the researcher maintains ‘objectivity’ and focuses on issues of validity and reliability
of methods” (Johnson & Duberley, 2003: 1293).
Different to this a radical reflexivityiv becomes more attuned to the nuances and
unsettling basic assumptions, discourses and practices used in describing reality and
questioning representation veiled instrumentalities, and politics in research.v
We differentiate between the following domains:
1. Being reflexive about methodology and method
2. Being reflexive about epistemology/ epistemological commitments
3. Being reflexive about ontology (ontological orientation/commitments)
4. Being reflexive about discipline and disciplinary framing.
5. Being reflexive about broader embedment and socio-cultural context, Zeitgeist
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1. Domain Methodological Reflexivity
The issue of reflexivity has come to be particularly a major methodological
preoccupation for researchers and writers of social and organizational research. This
domain is concerned with practices and procedures for research and intervention and
how these are implicated in the conclusions reached through the research, i.e. how
and why the research was designed, conducted and analysed, and how this led to
particular interpretations and conclusions.
Methodological reflexivity may entail reflecting on these kinds of issues.
What was the purpose of the methods?
How should the research be designed or conducted in order to provide a
convincing account?
What are alternative interpretations and their refutations?
What was the expected role of the researcher?
What actual role do/did researchers play in producing results?
Which (methodological and research strategy) choices were made and for which
reasons or rationals?
How was credibility (rigour) achieved through chosen methods?
What effects do these issues/questions have on how the research is actually
conducted?
What were the limitations of the methods used?
Generally, this is the area of reflexivity in which we as researchers are most practiced
and which is especially encouraged and critiqued in the processes of peer review etc.
Reflexivity on this issue is important because by making the research process
transparent, it is made public and therefore accountable (Finlay, 2002).
Importantly, we might consider these issues through a quantitative or qualitative
perspective.
Limitations to methodological reflexivity concern an understanding of
methodological critique as ‘localized critique and evaluation of the ‘technical’ aspects
of the particular methodology deployed rather than the underlying metatheoretical
assumptions that justify that methodology in the first place.’ (Johnson and Duberley,
2003). In a narrowing way reflexivity can be reductionistically functionalised here “to
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erase methodological lapses” by the researcher, and thereby protect the objectivity,
validity and generalizability of the research (Johnson & Duberley, 2003: 1293).
In this way, methodological reflexivity is more like trying to make better moves
within the rules of the game rather than reflecting on the nature of those rules or the
nature of the game itself. Thus an emphasis on methodological issues may lead to the
uncritical acceptance of given procedures or expert research just because it seems to
be technically sound.
Domain 2. Being reflexive about ontology
The particular conceptualisation of reflexivity is linked to overall epistemological and
ontological priorities, usually expressed as a commitment to a specific research
paradigm (Finlay, 2003).
One fundamental commitment concerns the underlying understanding of what is
‘real’. Philosophically, this understanding concerns the status of the nature of being,
existence or reality as such, as well as basic categories of interpreting this very being
and its relationships.
Guiding questions in this domain are:
How ‘real’ is reality?
How many levels of existence or ontological levels are there? And what
constitutes a 'level'?
Is the real given or constructed? (Realism/Nominalism)
Is the real of a stable (Parmenides Static) or a fluid (Heraclitus Process)
character?
Is reality substantial or relational?
How is a focus of traditional ontology on the 'what-ness' of beings in their
substantial, standing presence related to question of the 'who-ness' of (human)
being itself
What is existence, i.e. what does it mean for a being to be?
What entities exist or can be said to exist, and how can these entities be
grouped?
Which entities, if any, are fundamental? Are all entities objects?
What features of the real or existence are the essential, as opposed to merely
accidental attributes of a given object?
Can one give an account of what it means to say that a physical object or a
non-physical entity exists?
What constitutes the identity of an object?
When does an object go out of existence, as opposed to merely changing?
Do beings exist other than in the modes of objectivity and subjectivity, i.e. is
the subject/object split of modern philosophy inevitable?
What is our understanding of reality in particular in relation between knowing
and the world?
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How do we perceive the relationship between subjects and collective entities
and the world, between interior spheres and exterior realms?
o How to deal with ontological dichotomies like:
o Universals and particulars
o Substance and accident
o Abstract and concrete objects
o Essence and existence
o Determinism and indeterminism
What would an ontological pluralism mean?
What role do the body and embodiment for understanding being?
Problem of "ontological mutism"
Reflexivity is a guard against ‘hypodermic realism’ “that is the assumption that there
is an unproblematic relationship between the social scientific text and its valid and
reliable representation of the ‘real’ world.” (May & Perry 2011: 15)
Domain 3: Being reflexive about epistemological assumptions
This reflexive domain is guided by questions like:What are our aims in conducting the
research in terms of knowing and truth? What epistemological assumptions and
theories of knowledge are implicated in the theoretical (and empirical) endeavour that
drive our research and are produced as a result of research?
What can our approaches and measures actually tell us about the nature of the world
and human action?
What insights were generated or are hoped to be generated?
On what basis do/will these insights contribute to ‘knowledge’ and the
discourse?
What different insights may be/have been made if a different
epistemological perspective had been taken?
What do we think we can achieve by conducting certain kinds of
research?
What (epistemological) assumptions about the nature of knowledge and
how we can understand people are built into theories (not just methods)
e.g. cause and effect theories may imply that people react to situations
rather than interpreting or creating situations?
What does it imply that sense-making theories assume that people are
active in creating their own cause and effect ‘stories’?
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Epistemological assumptions reflect researcher commitments to particular
paradigmatic orientations and underlying philosophical beliefs. But all
epistemological stances have weaknesses and potential problems.
For example a positivist stance is in danger of an excessive control and assumptions
of objectivity, while an interpretivist/neo-positivist are based on the assumptions of
transparency. Or a postmodernist stance is in danger of getting lost in a relativist
downwards spiral.
Consequently, awareness, debate and reflection are paramount particularly in relation
to how certain accounts may be privileged and appreciating that no one approach has
‘the answer’ is can be the best choice.
Limitations to epistemological reflexivity
With regard, to limitations of this reflexivity the question emerge:
Do we have epistemological ‘beliefs’ or are epistemologies themselves social
constructions?
Do we have to be ‘true’ to our beliefs or can we mix-and-match epistemologies?
Weick (1999) suggests that epistemological commitments encourage
‘monologues that overwhelm rather than dialogues that reconcile’ (Weick,
1999), i.e. that reflexivity may encourage a search for epistemological
supremacy causing ‘paradigm wars’. This doesn’t however seem like a
necessary outcome, rather it may encourage dialogue as people reflect on own
positions as subjectively created.
Domain 4: Being reflexive about the discipline
The task of an enlightening reflexivity implies also working on the (collective
scientific) unconscious at work in research and a discipline.
[Reflexivity calls] less for intellectual introspection than for the permanent
sociological analysis and control of sociological practice ... It entails ... the systematic
exploration of the 'unthought categories of thought which delimit the thinkable and
predetermine the thought' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 40).
Importantly this task attends not to the analysis of individuals, but to the 'social and
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intellectual unconscious embedded in analytic tools and operations' (Bourdieu &
Wacquant, 1992, p. 36; italics in original). Moreover, such examination of the
'epistemological unconscious' and the 'social organisation' of the discipline (or field)
is a 'collective enterprise'.
Being reflexive about a researcher's position within 'the microcosm of the academic
field' is connected to an interrogation of the 'scholastic point of view' (Schirato &
Webb, 2003, p. 545). This scholastic point of view refers to an intellectual bias, a set
of dispositions and perspectives that is produced within the disciplined academic
field.
According to Bourdieu, there are two main dangers of this scholastic point of view.
One is its relative indifference to the 'logic of practice' and its tendency to 'to abstract
practices from their contexts, and see them as ideas to be contemplated rather than as
problems to be addressed or solved' (Schirato & Webb, 2003, p. 545; see also
Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 39). The second is a kind of forgetting and erasure,
whereby the scholastic view masquerades as a natural and objective point of view; as
a perspective without history.
The academic field includes accumulating practices and habits of thought of
individual academics, but is not reducible to such individuals. Reflexivity here
involves a continuously rigorous understanding of the conditions and frames of its
own analysis and modes of though in order to overcome ‘scholastic fallacy’ or
'scholasticism’.
However, Schirato and Webb (2003) highlight a double-edged, paradoxical quality to
the effects of a scholastic habit of thinking. Following the logic of Bourdieu, they
argue that reflexivity itself is a general habit of thought with a history, that it too is
formed in particular scholarly fields. It is precisely these scholarly fields that dispose
subjects to the kind of historicizing and reflexivity called for by Bourdieu. They thus
suggest that 'the scholastic point of view is therefore, simultaneously, both a potential
impediment to, and a condition (almost necessary) of the production of reflexive
knowledge' (Schirato & Webb, 2003, p. 551).
Some form of meta-theoretical examination of the presuppositions, which researchers
have internalized as members of particular research communities and will inevitably
deploy in both sense-making and dissemination’ (Johnson and Duberley, 2003).
‘Reflexive research … allows an examination, not just of the researcher, but also of
the community. Recognizing that we operate in complex networks that hold in place
18
certain approaches to representation’ (Hardy, Phillips and Clegg, 2001 PAGE).
In essence, this domain entails reflexivity, which concerns social and political
limitations and ideological functions of (various) disciplines. This also implies that is
exposing the guiding interests behind knowledge.
How a particular version of reality created through particular research practices within
a chosen discipline is and whose interests does this serve? For example, the
participant gives an account to the researcher; the researcher makes knowledge of it:
the participant is initially author of his or her own account, but becomes the subject of
the researcher’s account.
How does the research community maintain certain approaches? Knowledge is
produced through a combination of the author’s (researcher’s) representation of it
(report/write up) against a background of discipline, specific theory and the
participation of the actual organizational members. In addition, researchers act within
certain conventions, rules and practices e.g. peer review, style guides (Hardy et al,
2001).
Possible questions and issues in this domaina are for example:
Why were we interested in these particular research questions?
What disciplinary-based interpretive frameworks inform our accounts?
What aspects of our disciplinary background lead us to dwell on certain aspects
of the research context and not others?
Whose voices were allowed to be heard?
What (or who) prompted the research and why?
How was access achieved?
What disciplinary assumptions were made?
What was the focus of the research and what was not considered or excluded?
Who was involved in the research and who was not?
What were the outcomes for your participants and those not directly involved?
It is important to reflect on how disciplinary assumptions may structure a research
project, and how such assumptions may favour the production of certain types of
knowledges and how participants may be affected by or even constructed by the
process. For example, in psychology, the ‘psychologising’ of the individual
(examination of ‘internal’ cognitions etc.) can have the effect of individualising,
19
putting responsibility on the individual and ignoring the structural/policy aspects
of a situation. Conversely, in business studies, the emphasis on business outcomes
may gloss over individual differences or privilege managerial accounts to the
detriment of employee accounts.
Limitations to disciplinary reflexivity concern the question inhowfar boundaries
of disciplines are purposeful at all? Furthermore, critical appraisal may undermine
the social standing of the discipline (and of mono-disciplinary science).
Problems with disciplinary reflexivity include the question about pointing
disciplinary boundaries but also issues like:
Inhowfar does this reflexivity introduces an element of uncertainty into
the discipline? On the other hand, inhowfar does a more reflexive and
inclusive discipline may be a more credible one?
How are which different meanings promoted, negotiated and refuted by
members of the academic community over time (based on specific
reflective practices?
How does the context of the broader discourses influence research, by
facilitating and constraining certain understandings and practices?
Reflexive Critique of Economics and Leadership Theory as Example
It is a reflexive perspective, which allows a response to evaluate and critically
examine conventional theories, concepts, and methods with its affirmative logic of
reproduction. A critical reflexivity is problematising what is known about for example
with regard to leadership or organisation theory and how it is known and practiced.
Particularly with regard to the current financial and economic crisis with its complex
causes and individual, socio-cultural, legal, political and institutional failures and
irresponsible non-sustainable business practices causing a worldwide contagion and
far-reaching effects, conventional leadership theories have been reflexively critiqued.
For example Stigliz problematises insufficient theories among business circles. He
notes: “Regrettably, flawed economic theories aided and abetted both those in the
public and in the private sector in pursuing policies that, almost inevitably, led to the
current calamity. We need to do a better job of managing our economy, but this will
require better research that is less framed by the flawed models of the past, less driven
by simplistic ideas, and more attuned to the realities of today. There is a rich research
20
agenda ahead“ (Stigliz, 2009: 35).
In his paper “Bad management theories are destroying good management practices”,
Sumantra Ghoshal put forward the following (2005: 76): “Many of the worst excesses
of recent management practices have their roots in a set of ideas that have emerged
from business school academics over the last 30 years”. Accordingly, simplistic or
trivial leadership concepts and ‘research’ has often been informed by the superficial
ideas of management and academic consultants keen to peddle the latest pre-packaged
list of essential qualities deemed necessary for individual leaders and as the
prescribed solution to all leadership problems, dilemmas and paradoxes. In the same
vein Mintzberg (2004) critises how conventional management education leaves a
distorted impression of a calculating, heroic and techno-crative style of management,
instead of seeing it as an integral blend of craft (experience), art (insight), and science
(analysis).
These critical voices confirm the urgent need for truly re-thinking what we mean by
leadership. They confirm that contemporary dominant mental models of leadership
offer only a narrow understanding of how leadership works. Moreover, they keep us
from recognizing the multiple sources and multiple forms that leadership may take
and the multiple places where it can be found (Ospina & Sorenson, 2006: 200).
All the presented forms and level/domains of reflexivity are historically and
institutionally bound. In other words, all the mentioned modes of reflexivity and its
further mapping out must be 'historically specified and critically explicated'
(Sandywell, 2004: 491). Furthermore, they need to be thought together in an integral
way…
3. Reflexivity in Meta-Studies
Introduction into Meta-Studies An integral reflexivity in metastudies in not only be
about the objectifying relation (knower-known; in sensu Bordieu), but as well about
the social relation (knower-knowledge) and the epistemic relation (known-
knowledge) (Maton (2003). Basically, integral meta-studies makes the point that
reflexivity is necessary in respect to all strands of research, creating articulations
between metatheory, meta-methodology, meta-data-analysis/synthesis and meta-
hermeneutics. Indeed, meta-studies are crucial for realizing more systematic forms of
collective reflexivity in research.
21
Meta-theoretical reflexivity as critical theoretical practice
Pursuing philosophical inquiry and raising meta-theoretical questions and issues is
part of journeying towards greater reflexive awareness and (also collective)
consciousness. As outlined before, one of the advantages of this reflexive orientation
is that is allows considering partiality and inevitable incompleteness of knowledge
claims and re-considering underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions
and commitments. This is essential as “to make unexamined meta-theoretical
commitments, and remain unaware of their origins, amounts to an abdication of
intellectual responsibility, which results in poor research practices.’ (Johnson &
Duberley, 2003), while a meta-theoretical reflexivity helps attend to this.All theory
and meta-theory are forms of doing and are produced in and by praxis that is as the
artful, methodic, reflexive production of specific discursive practices its specific
thematizings and critique (including possibility-conditions of this very practice and
grounds of the possibility of other meta-theoretical phenomena) in a given context
and investigative (scientific) community.
Accordingly, reflexivity can be seen as a basic meta-theoretical practice in research
as it serves as a means of problematising what is known and how it is known by
revealing some of the assumptions on which theory and knowledge is based or
approaches it is produced. As such it involves an emphasis on questioning, unsettling
and opening rather than on categorization, complacency and closure (Pollner, 1991;
Cunliffe, 2003).
In the way that this meta-theoretical reflexive practice of questioning refers to
building a way of thinking (Heidegger, 1977: 3), in other words it is a quest. This re-
searching quest - instead of not seeing the forest for the tree - helps to understand the
surrounding wooded area, of the thick forest of a discipline, for example leadership
(Harter, 2006) and working a way through it or finding a clearing where revealing
insights are emerging.
Not being bound by thought styles, paradigmatic constructs and transcending personal
and political concerns, reflexive meta-theorising allows moving across narrow
concepts and paradigms to appreciated different languages and methodologies
(Holland, 1999).
As indicated before, metaphorically, a reflexive (meta-)researcher is like a traveller,
moving from place to another in order to may seeing things differently, journeying
22
through or bridging/crossing paradigms and wandering theoretical and
methodological landscapes.
As a bricoleur, that is a creative builder, s/he is piecing together a richer, more varied
big picture by viewing research from different angles. This allows him or her to show
how other perspectives provide different understandings and by integrating them
greater insights might be achieved. Critically s/he recognises that no single paradigm,
theory or metaphor can account sufficiently what is at stake (see also Alvesson et al,
2008). By being reflexive, (meta-)researchers learn to identify their own and others’
viewpoints, scrutinizing their underpinnings and influence on research (Flood and
Romm, 1997). As meta-theoretical procedures a reflective stance and practice helps to
explore intricate differences in and between researchers, subjects or ‘units’ of
research and audiences (Herts, 1997) as well as methodologies and methods.
4. Limitations to and Dangers of Reflexivity & Critical and Radical Reflexivity
“Not everyone who understands his own mind understands his heart” (La
Rochefoucauld)
The following discussed various critiques, which have been raised with regard to
limitations, dangers and problems of reflexivity.
Some very practical limitation and constraint refer to costs of reflexivity in particular
so called transaction costs like time, energy, brain power and text space, which may
perhaps are taken away from conventional theoretical and/or empirical work. For
integrating reflexivity into research design a proper material and financial planning
and strategising will be important.
Furthermore, and as part of the contested nature of reflexivity (Berry & Clair 2011),
there are many specific pitfalls: A ‘Romance of Reflexivity’ can parade in a show of
confessional virtues and flourishes rhetoric of moral rectitude and epistemological
panache (Pels, 2000). The following presents some important criticism and some
responses to the same.
Self-indulgence and epistemological solipsism
With its focus on individuated introspection (Woolgar 1988: 22) and taking the
individual as the primary source of critical knowledge, reflexivity has been critised as
a kind of asocial activity or even self-indulgent ‘navel-gazing’ or intellectual
23
masturbation, by which a self-referentially sways merely about the reflector’s own
position(ality), like a ‘Pillar Saint’, removed from the world below, pondering the
nature of self.
For example confessional ethnography and its tales can take the character of being
personal, self-absorbed, melodramtic, self-pitying, self-congratualatory. While
reflexivity can certainly result in such self-referential or self-indulgent practice, being
(self-)critically reflexive about one’s own positionality may allow to reflect on how
one is inserted and confined in grids of for example power relations and how that
influences methods, interpretations, and knowledge production.
Reflexivity can reveal personal biases, directing habits or express thoughtfulness,
doubts and difficulties and modest or humble understandings showing that the
reflector is fully aware of personal weaknesses and shortcomings.
Therefore, the reflecting self of the researcher might become more aware of his very
impacting and embeddness as well as potentially ‘liberated’ (passing off navel bound
orientation) towards developing a reflexivity that is a communal and relational
practice.
Furthermore, a self-critical stance is also implicated in how one relates to research
participants and what can/cannot be done vis-à-vis the research within the context of
institutional, social, and political realities. As such, it is integral to conducting ethical
research orientation and realities respectively developing an ethico-epistemological
reflexivity A healthy dose of ethical reflexivity is indeed the best way to avoid the
arrogance of certainty and self-sufficient, self-immunizing knowledge or the
eurocentric “dangers of complacency” (Rachel, 1996).Finlay (2002) suggests that to
avoid self-indulgence, we should be constantly linking our personal experience of the
research to theories and grounding it in the data.
In addition to a meta-theoretical reflection upon the activity of writing texts
(individually), self-reflexivity needs to be employed as a experiential moment of
interacting with others in the field, thus simultaneously inscribe and transcend the self
who produces research in relation to others who co-produce (including reflective
feedback from them).
Concerning the status of self and a self-centred reflexivity the following critical
questions emerge: Who is the self of self-reflexivity? What exactly is a self-reflexive
self reflecting upon? What are the possibilities and limitations of the capability for
self-knowledge and self-articulation? (Gannon, 2006)? For Adkins (2002) there
24
exists a politics of reflexivity, which inscribes a hierarchy of (normalised) speaking
positions in social research. This implies that it “privileges a particular relation
between knower and known even as it ostensibly appears to challenge - indeed undo -
such forms of privileging” (ibd. 333). For him “the issue concerns who can speak ‘for
whom, why, how and when’ in the age of reflexive social science (ibd. 345) that is
historically situating the reflecting and speaking selves. Thus the problem in regard to
reflexivity is not that there should not be reflexivity regarding one's research
practices, but rather that it ‘is the conception of the self (as ontological ego) at work
within this reflexivity that is at fault’ (Probyn, 1993: 80). Therefore, it is vital always
to ask ‘what had to be held in place in order for this self to appear at all’ (Probyn,
1993: 80) and thereby questioning of how it is that this ego-centred self is speaking.
This critical orientation is also sensitive for the uneven distribution of reflexivity in
regard to class, gender and other contemporary axes of difference (see e.g. Adkins,
1999, 2001). Lash (1994), for example has considered how distributions of reflexivity
are central to new axes of class formation (see also Illouz, 1997), and Adkins (2001)
has shown how categories of sexuality and in particular heterosexuality are
increasingly defined in terms of self-reflexivity.
Paralysis – ‘Reflexivism’ as Infinitism and Relativism
That reflexivity is not always a good thing becomes apparent also when it lead not
only to narcissism and self-indulgence, but also to “an inability to stop the regress of
doubting the doubting and the doubts” (Weick, 1999: 802). In this way researchers
may become paralysed due to a “heightened concern about making mistakes” (ibd).
For example excessive reflexivity may imply that we can’t say anything or make any
interventions; may lead to personal doubt; lack of creativity; no longer respect our
own roles as researchers because of our position and purpose in the social institution
of science (Weick, 1999), frozen in thinking and acting like a rabbit in front of snake.
One possibility, which contributes to overcome such paralysis is by giving our
audiences the tools to criticise our accounts.
Related to aforementioned problems, for critics, reflexivity is a ‘monster: the abyss,
the spectre, the infinite regress’ (Ashmore, 1989: 234), as they bemoan the self-
referentiality of the social sciences and the textual character of social reality
(Woolgar, 1988).
25
A mechanistic form of reflexivity is dangerous because ‘it is only by constantly re-
examining and questioning the foundational assumptions of various theories and
practices that the discipline can avoid becoming trapped within a limited range of
conceptual possibilities’ (Brocklesby, 1997: 192).
This problem amplifies in multi-paradigmatic and meta-level research when it is
piling reflexive layers onto each other. According to Fuchs (1992, pp158-159):
“There is a strong antirealist temptation in reflexive discourse to ‘go beyond’ a given
level of discourse to its metalevel, and from there to the next metalevel, and so on.
This is so because reflexivism, in talking about some object, must also talk about how
it talks about, and constructs, the object. It must thematize and problematize
everything at once to escape from the traps of the tu quoque. But … the infinite
regress in reflexivism that results in adding layer upon layer must be interrupted
somewhere, and it is precisely at this point that discourse cannot help but regain some
of its realist ambitions (Fuchs, 1992, pp. 158-159). Therefore with Gough (2003, p.
32) we need to have “some balance between the extremes of unreflexive, ‘flat’
description, which presents a supposedly ‘objective’ picture of the phenomenon, and
convoluted, meta-reflexive textual presentations, which move too far away from the
phenomenon in question, is recommended.”
We will later show how an integral reflexivity in an integrally informed meta-studies
accomplishes a reflexive balance of the three interrelated layers (empirical,
theoretical, and meta-layer).
Critical stance on reflexivity – Being reflexive about reflexivity
If knowledge in the form of theorizing and empirical work is socially – politically,
linguistically and institutionally – constructed, so too is knowledge in the form of
reflexivity. There it is important to understand that and how reflexivity is a
(linguistic) constructionvii
and a specific performantive practice
“If knowledge more generally is a product of linguistic, political, and institutional
influences, so too is reflexivity: it is a construction of communities of researchers
whose work is informed by particular theoretical influences; who are subject to the
demands of particular university systems, journals, and granting agencies; who
operate within discourses of science, education, management, and progress; and who
26
use language to promote particular versions of ‘truth’ or claims to superior insights.
Reflexivity is not a fixed ‘thing’: what we – as members of a research community –
know to be reflexivity is shaped by practices carried out by researchers in producing
texts which are accepted as being reflexive.” (Alvesson et al. 2008: 498).
As the meaning and epistemic virtues ascribe to reflexivity are relative to particular
conceptions of human nature and social reality, (and usages as cynical rhetorical
device), Lynch (2000) suggested to limit the notion of reflexivity. For him, reflexivity
is not an epistemological, moral or political virtue, but a feature of the way actions
(including those by academic researchers) are performed, made sense of and
incorporated into social settings.viii
As such practice of reflexivity is at work within all social actors. Thus, there is no
real divide between being reflexive and unreflexive. Reflexivity is part of mundane,
social action “woven into the fabric of everyday life” (Wacquant, 1992: 37).
Reflexivity is a principle of practice to be deployed based on the historically
contingent nature of knowledge production.
Reflexivity as Subversion
As much as theorising can be seen as a political act (Arrington and Francis, 1989) so
is reflexive meta- theorising.“Reflexivity means thinking through what one is doing to
encourage insights about the nature of social science and, especially, the role that
language, power/ knowledge connections, social interests and ideologies, rhetorical
moves and manoeuvring in the socio-political field play in producing particular
accounts. It may also inspire creativity through opening up for new perspectives and
providing reference points for what one is doing and to avoid or minimize certain
‘harmful’ aspects of research that follow from lack of reflexivity.” (Alvesson et al.
2008: 497).
What a methodological and meta-theoretical reflexivity points to is the ability for
research to recognize itself as a creative practice that can delegitimize the common
sense of reality and render that reality malleable rather than immutable — the goal of
research is to transgress rather than report reality (Schubert, 1995), to ‘testify to the
reality of lived experience while at the same time undermining the self-evident
character of that reality’ (Rhodes, 2009: 656).
27
But importantly a subversive and disruptive reflexivity (Hibbert et al. 2010: 55) as an
undermining political and poetic "turning back" (Siegle, 1986) requires a responsive
turning forward!
Wisdom as integral reflexivity
Reflexivity in its elementary form presupposes that while saying something about the
‘real world’ includes simultaneously disclosing something about the one, who
investigates. Knowledge of things and knowledge of the self, reflexively known and
the reflexive knower are intertwined, forming a ‘proto-integral’ relationship.
Such integral orientation may help mending the epistemological rift between subject
and object that is subject as ‘present in’, ‘part of’ or ‘at stake in’ the object it-self.
The constitutive inseparability of knower and known redefines knowledge as a matter
of ‘inter-definition’ or mutual genesis of what the world is and what the selves are, an
incessant circulation between representer and represented.
Importantly, the fullest conceptualisation of reflexivity includes the transition from an
individual to a collective, social level (Holland, 1999) and by this linked to wisdom.
An integral reflexive knowing is emphasis the mutually constitutive nature of reality
and accounts and supports a more integrative notion of experience (and
experimentation) including (rather than methodically disqualifying) the situated
particularity of the experiencing and experimenting observer.
The program for developing such reflexive knowing requires bending rectilinear flat
single-storey stories (of discourse) into curvilinear or elliptical (while not getting lost
in infinite spiralling of meta-discourses with endless loops of hyper-reflexivity).
Resisting tendencies towards identification or reification - which make spoke-person
disappear into the object (materialism) or the object into the spoke-person (idealism) -
what is needed is entering a sphere between meta- and infra ‘one step up’ (Pels, 2000,
3). “Let’s take only one step up… No more, since we need to halt the rise of reflexive
skyscrapers reaching into the clouds; no less, to prevent sinking into the positivistic
flatland.” (Pels, 2000: 4). This one step up, needs to be one from the middle, which
then allows us to be truly reflexive. For the meta-perspective to be articulated, those
steps can be up but in any direction "up". This plurality allows for pluralism within
the integration of "up-ness". Integral pluralism is the combination of the pluralism of
taking "any step" with the integration of "upness". Upness is not one thing it is the
clearing in which all steps taken from the middle "end up". "The middle" is any step
28
up from the operational, the concrete, the non-reflexive ground of immediacy; it is
that middle level of abstraction which reflects on description. This conceptuatlisation
refers back to the holarchy of sense-making where the middle is the result of reflexive
knowledge about the perceptual (the non-reflected, non-reflective, non-reflexive) and
in a socio-cultural sense the middle is the layer of unreflexive science.
Perspectives - Embodied & Emotional Reflexivity (as part of integral reflexivity)
As we have seen before, (self-)reflexivity is typically assumed to be a discursive act
processed through cognitive and linguistic abilities and functions. In particular,
reflexivity is seen as dependent on the capacity to communicate via symbols and as
“anchored in language, communication, and social interaction” (Gecas and Burke,
1995: 41).
Conventionally, reflexivity is seen as distinct to embodied experiences as for example
sensual feelings are considered as pre-reflective, and (cognitively operating) internal
conversations are required for entering a reasonable reflexive mode. Consequently
embodied dimensions and awareness were not (sufficiently) considered as basic for
reflective reasoning (Pagis, 2009).
Disputing the claim that self-consciousness can never be achieved through direct
experience, Merleau-Ponty writes (1962: 432): “At the root of all our experiences and
all our reflections, we find, then, a being which immediately recognizes itself … not
by observation and as a given fact, nor by inference from any idea of itself, but
through direct contact with that experience.”
Importantly, although embodied self-reflexivity is based on the pre-verbal reflexive
capacity of the body, it is not a pre-social process. All embodied perception,
awareness and responses are based on and mediated by previous (social) interactions,
and the second-order sensations of embodied reflexivity carries meaning, which
anchored in and intermediated through the social and cultural life-worlds (Küpers,
2012).
Practises, which support a heightened awareness of the body, such as sports, manual
labour or dance and meditation convey dimensions of and cultivate a sensitivity for
such an embodied (self-)reflexivity.x
Furthermore, these modes of embodied self-reflexivity can be connected to
“emotional reflexivity” (King, 2006) and methodological emotional reflexivity
(Munkejord, 2009).
29
One danger of typifying reflexivities implies that the tendency towards dualism at the
macro-paradigmatic level gets too easily translated into a similarly binary
conceptualisation at the more concrete level of reflexive practice, thus following a
binary mode of either/or instead of a more integrative reflexivity (Tomkins &
Eatough, 2010: 164). Such integrative understanding and more fluid approach uses
reflexivity ”to refer to the intertwining of personal experience, intersubjective
dynamics and discursive repertoires within a particular research setting,” which
integrates several different types and dimensions of reflexivity “to accommodate this
wider range and greater potential” (Tomkins & Eatough, 2010: 166). For Tomkins
and Eatough (2010) this requires loosening some of the paradigmatic ties between
overall theoretical positioning and practical reflexive application (ibd. 177).
Following a phenomenological orientation, they invite to push beyond theories and
models and a prior definitions and advocate (Halling 2008 and Finlay 2008) a fluid
engagement or openness, including even a willingness to improvise and call for
creativity, imagination and curiosity to complement the systematic applications of
principles and methodological rigor (Tomkins & Eatough, 2010: 177).
What is needed (for further developing an integral reflexivity) is an interrogation of
the contents of reflexive calls, the consequences for understanding and practice of
reflexive social research as well as the dynamics of the context in which it is produced
and the varying expectations involved (May & Perry, 2011).
Wise Integral Reflexivity leads to epistemological humility that is the understanding
that one’s best beliefs and views may be limited– for example, dependent upon a
specific context, tradition and so on, for their meaning, rather than necessarily shared
as universal truths by all peoples. In a way, epistemological humility is the condition
and result of critical especially self-critical reflection. The practice of articulating our
most basic assumptions and views, is realised precisely in order to critically assess
and evaluate them and determine how far they may be true, not just for us, but for the
larger human community.
Conclusion & Perspectives
The field of reflexive experience and ways of integral reflexivity is like a realm of
possibilities to be explored and reclaimed. A commitment to self-reflection and
critical meta-theoretical reflexivity “means that every interpretation, conceptual
vocabulary, framework of thought and critical model must be in principle open to
30
inquiry and subject to dialogical norms of criticism and self-revision. Each act of
reflection - like each tradition of self-reflection - is in principle subject to further trials
of reflexivity. In this way, only reflexive investigations can help loosen the cold hand
of closure and totality in our lives and imaginations (Sandywell, 1996a: 425-6).
Reflexivity provides opportunities for critically examining and perhaps moving
beyond some of the habits of thought of the field of research.
As a kind of projective imagination into the future, we can assume that the Internet
and the new media technologies are possible incitements for critical reflection and
self-recovery as well as more integral ways of reflexivity.
Potentially, the world of hypertext may add to the growing repertoire of reflexive
practices. It might be possible to expect new kinds of dialogue, novel forms of writing
and collaboration, new cycles of self-reflection and forms of reflexivity as part of
cross-boundary and integral research programmes, beyond.
Without falling into an illusionary or deterministic projection, new technologies can
contribute the augmenting and extending of the reflexive imagination. For this to
happen in an integral way, it will be essential to democratize these new media and
incorporate them into the practices of everyday life and research. Importantly, any
further ‘dealienation of our social worlds is not a discrete achievement of any one
individual, discipline, or community, but the task of a whole culture’ (Sandywell,
1996a: 426).
With all this, reflexivity can serve to radically re-think and re-do management,
organisation and society for an re-evolution towards a wiser and more sustainable
present and future to become…
31
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Guiding Questions for Be(com)ing Self-&-Reflexive
The following provides you with some guiding questions by which you can develop
your own critical reflexive practice (see also Cliff, 2004)
Basic Questions:
Existential: Who am I and what kind of person do I want to be?
Relational: How do I relate to myself, others and to the world around me?
Praxis: How can I become self-conscious and realise an ethical action based
on a critical questioning of past actions and of future possibilities?
Question your own ways of being, relating and acting!
How do my or our assumptions, words and responses in living conversation influence
others? (What would it mean to surface also my defensive responses and their
impact?)
Questioning how do I or we make sense of your surroundings and the multiplicity of
meanings and voices you may or may not hear?
How can I or we become more aware of the limits of your knowledge, of how (y)our
own behaviour plays into (organisational) practices?
Why might such practices marginalize groups ore exclude individuals?
What are you strucked by? What struck you about this chapter?
How do you or we may act (more) responsibility and ethically?
What would it mean for you to be(come) a critically reflexive practitioner?
How do you or we create new possibilities for action, new ways of being and relating
concretely by getting engaged in (self-)reflectivity? Give examples!
So what am I or we going to do now? What issues or questions are you going to
explore further as well as why and how? How will this influence who you are and
how you relate to others and we together?
As we have seen, reflexivity can raise more questions than answers and as it is a
continual process, it remains always a pursuit and never a destination.
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