Reassessing the reasons of the Stalin-Tito split in 1948.

Word Count: 4939

Table of Contents

1. Introduction..............................................3

2. Ideological accusations towards Belgrade..................5

3. Geopolitical reasons of the Stalin-Tito Split.............8

3.1 Albania between the CPY and the CPSU..................8

3.2 Yugoslavia, the Greek Civil War and the West.........11

4. Conclusion...............................................14

Bibliography................................................16

1

1. Introduction

On 28 June 1948, news of the expulsion of the Communist Party

of Yugoslavia (CPY) from the Cominform shocked the Eastern

Bloc. The official Cominform resolution stated that Belgrade

was pursuing a political line “incompatible with Marxism-

Leninism”, thus accusing the Central Committee of the CPY of

ideological deviations, in consequence leading to its

placement “outside the family of the fraternal Communist

Parties” (Cominform Communiqué, 1948).

These accusations were even more astonishing as after the

Second World War Yugoslavia and its Communist leadership was

known to be the leading ally of the USSR (Gibianskii, 1992:

119). Against the background of the oncoming Cold War,

Yugoslavia constantly stood at the Soviet side (Gibianskii in

Naimark, 1997: 291). According to Majstrovic, when Soviet

influence in Eastern Europe was threatened by the Marshall

Plan, Tito used this as an opportunity to demonstrate his

loyalty to the Kremlin (2010:145). After Molotov rejected the

Marshall Plan in July 1947, the British and French governments

invited the countries of Eastern Europe to a Paris conference

"that would establish an all-European organisation to

supervise a Marshall Aid assistance and reconstruction2

programme" (Roberts, 1994: 1376-7). While Di Biagio (in Gori,

Pons, 1996: 212) argues that some Eastern European governments

expressed an interest in the Paris Conference, Majstrovic

(2010: 147) points out that Belgrade was the only one to

categorically refuse participating in it. Tito’s senior

official Edvard Kardelj informed the Soviet Ambassador in

Belgrade Anatolii Lavrentev that “Yugoslavia could not

participate in the Plan without the Soviet Union” (Volokitina:

1999:460).

The Kremlin’s response to the Marshall Plan was the creation

of the Cominform, in which the CPY was given a prominent role.

In his speech at the inaugural meeting at Szklarska Poreba in

September 1947, Zhdanov, the secretary of the Central

Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU),

“warmly praised Yugoslavia as the East European country that

had moved furthest toward socialism” urging other Eastern

European governments “to follow Yugoslavia’s example”

(Perovic, 2007: 40-1). Gibianskii notices that Moscow was

consistently expressing positive assessment of the CPY

(Gibianskii, 1997: 291). The official journal of the CPSU

Bolshevik favourably reported on the Yugoslav policy naming Tito

among the most popular Communist leaders in Eastern Europe

(Perovic, 2007: 40, Majstrovic, 2010: 151). At the 30th

Anniversary of the October Revolution on 7 November 1947,

while emphasizing the achievements of Eastern European

governments, Molotov named Yugoslavia first among other

“fraternal countries” (Pravda, 1947: 2). Thus, on the edge of

3

Stalin-Tito clash the ties between Yugoslavia and the Soviet

Union seemed to be so strong, that when the actual conflict

started to unravel, it caught both the Yugoslavs and the

Soviets by surprise (Petkovic, 1998: 152).

Today, more than 50 years after the split, there is still no

unanimous opinion on its origins. Armstrong (1951: 65) as well

as Gibianskii (in Gori, Pons 1996: 225) argue that it was

Tito's complain about the lack of Soviet support for

Yugoslavia’s interests in Trieste which laid the foundation of

the Stalin-Tito split. Petranovic and Dautovic see the

Yugoslavs’ plans for a Balkan Federation to be the cause of

the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict (1999: 20-1). Similarly, Perovic

agrees that Stalin was infuriated with Belgrade's independent

foreign policy in the Balkans especially towards Bulgaria

(2007: 36). Likewise, Banac suggests that what sparked a

break-down in Soviet-Yugoslav relations was “the Soviets’

umbrage not only at Tito’s actions in Greece but especially at

the policies he pursued in Albania” (1988: 38). Swain believes

ideological differences with regards to the understanding of

the nature of the popular front to be another side of the

foreign policy dispute (1992: 641-2).

The author of this essay will argue that, while ideological

differences indeed played a pivotal role in the months

preceding the split, they rather represent the final straw in

a series of elements leading to open confrontation in 1948.

Next, it will be demonstrated that geopolitical disagreements

4

and Tito’s disobedience with Moscow’s directives in several

cases already during the period of 1943 to 1948 constitute a

major reason for the built-up of Soviet-Yugoslav tensions and

the ultimate escalation in bilateral relations. To do so, the

author will first look at primary sources such as Soviet-

Yugoslav correspondence in 1948 as well as the CPSU’s

documents to analyse the discrepancy in the understanding of

communism between the two countries and their leaders. Next,

the cases of Yugoslav-Soviet confrontation in Albania and

Greece will be consulted in order to shed light on

geopolitical developments in 1940s’ Eastern Europe. First,

through the case of Albania, it will be demonstrated that the

Yugoslavs’ ambitions in the Balkans created competition to

Stalin’s influence in the region. Second, the author will show

that Tito’s independent foreign policy initiatives towards

Greece strained Soviet-Yugoslav relations due to Stalin’s

concern of confrontation with the West as a result of Yugoslav

actions in the Balkans.

2. Ideological accusations towards Belgrade

Throughout the time preceding the split, both the Soviets as

well as the Yugoslavs claimed "to be correct exponents of the

Communist faith" accusing each other of violation of Marxism-

Leninism norms (G.F.H., 1948: 531). The Soviets were

consistently attacking Yugoslavia and its leaders for “going

their own way in the building of socialism”, while the

Yugoslav leaders in return insisted that they were in no way

departing from the Marxist-Leninist doctrine (Perovic, 2007:5

35). This section will analyse the CPSU’s foreign policy

commission memorandum on Yugoslavia, the following Soviet-

Yugoslav correspondence and the Cominform resolution in order

to detect the underlying ideological causes of the Stalin-Tito

confrontation. While the memorandum is important as it

provides the necessary background for the letters, the latter

in turn were a prelude to the June Cominform resolution.

On 18 March 1948, the CPSU’s foreign policy department

presented to Suslov, the member of to the Central Committee

Secretariat, the memorandum On the anti-Marxist positions of the leaders of

the Communist Party of the Yugoslavia. Besides “ignoring Marxists-

Leninist theory and failing to use it as a guide to action”,

the document accused the Yugoslav leaders of such serious

ideological mistakes as “permitting opportunism in their

policy towards kulaks”, and “dissolving the Party in the

People’s Front” (Gibiaskii, 1997: 300).

The first accusation was based on the fact that right before

the split, the Yugoslav leadership was planning to take a

different form of collectivization compared to the Soviet

Union. According to Johnson, “the implication was that Soviet-

type collectivization would not be repeated in Yugoslavia”

(1972: 37). By the beginning of 1948, the CPY decided to

follow “a less violent path than in the Soviet Union”

(Perovic, 2007: 37). Indeed, in late 1947, Kardelj suggested

not to force peasants into Soviet-style kolkhozy asserting that

“it would be a sectarian mistake to consider them [kolkhozy]

6

to be the main instrument for the collectivization of

agriculture” (1983: 166). Instead he proposed to create

“general agricultural cooperatives” which would encompass all

peasants (Bokovoy, 1998: 76). He emphasized that those

agricultural cooperatives would be composed of peasants who

farmed individual holdings (Ibid: 77). It was planned that the

peasants would be forced to surrender their lands to the state

when the necessary economic, political, and social conditions

would exist (Ibid). The Soviets regarded this approach of the

Yugoslav leaders as “an incorrect policy […] by ignoring the

class differentiation in the countryside and by regarding the

individual peasantry as a single entity” (Cominform

resolution, 1948). From the CPSU’s point of view, Yugoslav

Communists were ignoring “the well-known Lenin thesis that

small individual farming gives birth to capitalism and the

bourgeoisie continually, daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a

mass scale” (Ibid). The Cominform resolution further

aggravated these accusations by stating that:

[…] the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party […] by affirming that

the peasantry is the most stable foundation of the Yugoslav state are

departing from the Marxist-Leninist path and are taking the path of a

populist Kulak party (Cominform resolution, 1948).

Thus, the CPY’s behaviour was condemned for accepting a

Bukharin type opportunist tenet of “the peaceful growing over

of capitalism into socialism” and departing from one of the

most important dogmas of Marxism-Leninism – the theory of

class struggle and the leading role of the working class in

7

this struggle (Ibid). In the May letter to the CPY, Moscow

openly accused Tito of denying the leading role of the

proletariat in the revolutionary struggle (Letter of the CPSU

to the CPY, 4 May 1948). The CPSU cited Tito’s speech in

Zagreb on 2 November 1946 as an example:

We [the CPY] tell the peasants they are the most solid foundation of

our government not because we want to get their votes but because

they really are (Tito cited in Letter of the CPSU to the CPY, 4 May

1948).

In the March letter, Stalin and Molotov also underlined the

incorrect stance of the CPY in its relations with the People’s

Front. According to the theory of Marxism-Leninism, they

wrote, the party is the leading power in the country, it has

its program and it does not dissolve in non-party masses

(Letter of Stalin and Molotov to Tito and the Leaders of the

CPY, 27 March 1948). However, they continued, this is not the

case of Yugoslavia, where “on the contrary the People’s Front

is considered to be the real leading power and the Party is

dissolved in the People’s Front” (Ibid). They quoted Tito’s

report at the 2nd Congress of the People’s Front of Yugoslavia

on 27 September 1947 where he said:

Does the Communist Party of Yugoslavia have any program different

from the program of the People’s Front? No! The Communist Party of

Yugoslavia doesn’t have any different program. The program of the

People’s Front is its program! (Tito cited in Letter of Stalin and

Molotov to Tito and the Leaders of the CPY, 27 March 1948)

8

In the May letter, the Soviet leadership further compared the

Yugoslav leaders with the Mensheviks who wanted to dissolve

the Marxist Party in a non-party organization of workers and

peasants, and replace the first one with the latter (Letter of

the CPSU to the CPY, 4 May 1948). It was also noted that the

Yugoslav People’s Front embraces different class elements,

“including kulaks, merchants, small fabricants as well as some

bourgeois parties” (Ibid). This, according to Stalin and

Molotov, was undermining the Communist Party of Yugoslavia as

an independent political power and disparaged its role (Ibid).

In accordance with Marxism-Leninism, it was the Party which

was supposed to act on the political scene of the country and

not the People’s Front (Ibid).

In response, Tito emphasized that in Yugoslavia the CPY formed

the nucleus of the People’s Front, thus, there was no danger

that the Party could dissolve in it (Letter of Tito and

Kardelj to Stalin and Molotov, 13 April 1948). The People’s

Front, thus, was only a tool through which the CPY carried out

its program. Tito stressed the leading role of the CPY by

saying that it was the People’s Front which voluntarily

accepted the Party’s program and not vice versa (Ibid). Tito

and Kardelj rejected all accusations of bourgeois nature of

the People’s Front stating that by its qualities the Yugoslav

Front was even better than some other Communist Parties

(Ibid).

9

Thus, the above analysed documents indeed reveal that there

was some ideological divergence between the two Communist

governments. The Soviets believed that the Yugoslav leaders

clearly abandoned Marxism-Leninism norms and embraced

nationalistic road to socialism. The Stalin and Molotov letter

to Tito from 27 March 1948 even compared the Yugoslavs’

position with the one of Trotsky, Bernstein and Bukharin

(Letter of Stalin and Molotov to Tito and the Leaders of the

CPY, 27 March 1948). At the same time, the Yugoslavs

consistently refuted all the charges by stressing that Moscow

was misinformed of Yugoslavia’s domestic development. In a

reply to Stalin and Molotov on 13 April 1948, Tito and Kardelj

underlined that there was no deviation from Marxism but rather

special Yugoslav circumstances which had to be taken into

account (Letter of Tito and Kardelj to Stalin and Molotov, 13

April 1948). According to them, while Yugoslavia “was taking

the Soviet system as an example […] it was building socialism

in different form […] according to the country’s specific

conditions created by the National Liberation War” (Ibid).

3. Geopolitical reasons of the Stalin-Tito Split

3.1 Albania between the CPY and the CPSU

While the documents analysed in the previous section provide a

good understanding of the confronting ideological positions of

Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, they as well indicate

Stalin’s dissatisfaction with Tito’s lack of subordination to

hierarchical discipline within the Soviet bloc. According to

10

Petrovich, the former member of the American military mission

in Yugoslavia, the Kremlin had “two leading assumptions: that

Soviet interests took precedence over Communist international

interests, and that the Russian interests took precedence over

Yugoslav interests” (in Hammond, 1986: 57). Therefore to

Stalin, it was “inconceivable that any Communist could

challenge that dogma” (Woodhouse, 1976: 252). This section,

will, thus, show that Belgrade’s policy in the Balkans

especially in Albania was often committed without consulting

Moscow, which sparked Stalin’s fear that “Yugoslavia was

beginning to see itself as a regional Communist centre”

(Banac, 1988: 29).

According to Perovic, “a key objective of Tito’s policy in the

Balkans was to establish Yugoslavia as a regional hegemon”

(2007: 42). This was evident already in 1943 when Tito’s

emissary to Macedonia Vukmanovic introduced the idea of a

united headquarters for the partisan movements of Yugoslavia,

Bulgaria, Albania, and Greece, to which Albanian and Greek

communists agreed only if the membership would be equal (Ibid:

40). Yet, in autumn 1943, Tito rejected this idea. Many years

later Vukmanovic revealed that Tito could not accept equal

command but insisted that the other partisan movements

recognize the leadership of the Yugoslav partisan headquarters

instead (Ibid). Thus, from the very beginning the idea of

Balkan integration was understood by the Yugoslav leaders as

subordination of other Balkan countries to Yugoslavia

(Gibianskii, 2001: 44).

11

At the meeting with Stalin on 9 January 1945, Andrija Hebrang,

one of the highest-ranking Yugoslav officials, claimed

Yugoslavia’s demands over some territories in Eastern Europe

(Record of Stalin's Conversation with Hebrang, 1945). Stalin

was obviously irritated with Yugoslav’s territorial ambitions

warning them that “they were planning to wage a war with the

whole world” (Ibid).

At the end of the meeting Stalin advised (read order)

Yugoslavs to ask for Soviet opinion before making any

important decision (Record of Stalin's Conversation with

Hebrang, 1945). However, in August 1947, despite Stalin’s

wish, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria signed the Bled Agreement to

strengthen their ties without consulting Moscow. In outrage

Stalin wrote to Tito and Dimitrov:

The opinion of the Soviet government is that both governments

[Yugoslavia and Bulgaria] have made a mistake […] The Soviet

government must be given advance notice, as it cannot take

responsibility for agreements […] that are signed without

consultation with the Soviet government (Banac, 2003: 423).

After this incident Lavrentev sent several reports to Moscow

indicating an increase in Yugoslav nationalistic propaganda

and overestimation of the Yugoslavia’s wartime achievement,

which threatened to undermine the central role of the USSR

(Gibianskii, 1996: 231).

12

Several months later in January 1948, Belgrade and Moscow were

again at loggerheads, this time over Yugoslav-Albanian

relations. Under “maximum secrecy” Tito requested from Hoxha a

military base for Yugoslav troops at Korce in order to protect

Albania from “the Greek Monarcho-Fascists” (Perovic, 2007: 48;

Banac, 1988: 40). According to Perovic, in his letter to Tito

after this incident Molotov for the first time referred to

“serious differences” between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia:

[...] it is apparent that you consider it normal if Yugoslavia

[…] not only believes it can forgo consulting the USSR about the

questions of deploying its army to Albania but does not even

consider it necessary at least to inform the USSR about such

matters […] on behalf of the Soviet government I must inform you

that the USSR cannot agree to being presented with a fait

accompli (2007: 49-50).

Perhaps, what gave Tito confidence to pursue such an

independent policy towards Albania was the fact Moscow never

openly prohibited Tirana doing that. Majstrovic argues, that

“essentially, Belgrade saw Albania as its own satellite”

(2010: 143). And the Soviet envoy to Albania in 1946-1952

Dmitrii Chuvakhin later noted that “Albanian-Yugoslav

relations were dominated by the secret principle that ‘the way

from Tirana to Moscow leads through Belgrade’” (1995: 124).

Giving a possible explanation to Moscow’s position, Majstrovic

notes that the Red Army “never advanced that far south” and,

thus, it would be hard to exert direct Soviet influence there

(2010: 142).

13

Nevertheless, Stalin and his aides often warned the Yugoslavs

not to force the unification process in the Balkans, and in

the latter half of 1947 Moscow’s policy towards Tirana started

to change. In July 1947, the CPSU received its first official

delegation from Albania. In his conversation with Hoxha,

Stalin expressed his disagreement with Yugoslavia’s policy

towards Albania and underlined that Albania should take care

of its foreign policy independently (Perovic, 2007: 45). A few

months later in August-September 1947, the CPSU’s foreign

policy department prepared a memorandum, criticizing

Yugoslavia’s policy in Albania:

The leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party are very jealous that

Albania seeks direct relations with the Soviet Union. According to

the opinion [of the Yugoslavs], Albania should have relations with

the Soviet Union only via the Yugoslav government (Ibid).

Although there is no clear evidence of what exactly triggered

such a change in the Soviet attitude towards Albania, Perovic

argues, that the Soviet efforts to stem Belgrade’s influence

in the Balkans “became increasingly important at a time when

Stalin sought to tighten control over the whole socialist

camp” (2007: 43). However, Tito was “reluctant to forsake” his

aspirations towards Albania and, thus, the Yugoslavs were

called on the Kremlin’s carpet (Ibid).

During the 10 February 1948 meeting, Stalin concluded that

“the Yugoslavs were afraid of the Russians in Albania and so

14

were hurrying to move their army there” (Perovic, 2007: 53).

Futhermore, Molotov continued, “Yugoslavia didn’t even inform

us [the Soviet Union] about this decision” (Volokitina, 2008:

496). Thus, Kardelj was obliged to sign declarations that

Yugoslavia would consult the Soviet Union before making any

foreign policy initiatives (Banac, 1988:42).

As for incorporating Albania into the Yugoslav Federation, for

the first time Stalin forcefully ordered that Yugoslavia

should first unify with Bulgaria, and only later would it be

joined by Albania (Ibid: 55). As Gibianskii argues, due to the

Soviet influence in Bulgaria, a federation with it would

become “a means for Soviet control over Yugoslavia” (1997:

297).

However, on February 19, the CPY Politburo unanimously

rejected the federation with Bulgaria (Ibid). Tito regarded

the unification with Bulgaria as Stalin’s attempt to “force on

him a Trojan horse” (Jukic, 1961: 8) Moreover, on 1 March 1948

at a plenum of the CPY Tito confirmed that Yugoslavia “must

firmly hold onto Albania” as well as declared that Yugoslavia

“should demand the Soviet advisors in Albania to be within our

[Yugoslav] group” (Banac, 1988:42). Not only did Tito disobey to hierarchical subordination and

orders coming from Moscow, but he also openly demanded Soviet

consent to the Yugoslav policy towards Tirana – something none

of the Soviet satellite states were allowed to do. This move

15

clearly indicated Belgrade’s readiness to assert “its

alternative to the USSR in Eastern Europe”, thus aggravating

the relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Banac,

1988:41).

3.2 Yugoslavia, the Greek Civil War and the West

While the Albanian question was largely a bilateral Soviet-

Yugoslav issue, Tito’s support for the Greek partisan movement

collided with the West’s opposition to communist seizure of

power in Greece. This could potentially lead to an escalation

in Soviet-Western relations as the West “tended to blame

Moscow for Tito’s actions” (Banac, 1988: 16). The former

member of the American military mission in Yugoslavia Michael

Petrovich stated that throughout 1944-1946 Soviet and Yugoslav

policies were considered to be “virtually identical” and hence

“if the Yugoslavs did something that offended us [ the USA],

we assumed that the Soviets approved of it, if they had not in

fact investigated it” (in Hammond, 1986: 57). In this regard,

Yugoslavia’s actions in Greece, which was defined as Anglo-

American sphere of influence, often casted a shadow on the

Soviet Union as it was believed that no matter what Tito was

doing, it was either supported or orchestrated in Moscow.

However, according to Barker, throughout the Second World War

as well as afterwards, the Soviet Union had little if no

interests in Greece (1987: 266). Greece was not on the agenda

in 1939 during the Molotov-Ribbentrop negotiations. Next, on

16

13 November 1940, during a meeting with Hitler, Molotov only

expressed that the Soviet Union would be interested to learn

“what the Axis contemplated with regard to Greece” (Meeting

transcript, 1940). Similarly, the Anglo-Soviet correspondence

in 1944 revealed that Stalin had no objection to the British

claim of predominance in Greece, which was later confirmed in

the famous percentages agreement (Barker, 1987: 266). In

October 1944, Stalin agreed with Churchill that Britain would

have 90% of predominance in Greece, while only 10% would be

allocated to the Soviet Union (Reiss, 1978: 368). Banac

argues, that while “the very survival of the Soviet Union

depended on a strong coalition with Great Britain and the

United States”, Stalin tried to stick up to his agreements

with Churchill regarding Greece (1988: 8, 32). Banac’s point

of view is also supported by the Russian historian Roy

Medvedev in his book Let History Judge. While discussing the

developments of the Greek Civil war in 1944, he writes:

In the conflict that followed, the Greek communists received no real

help from the Soviet Union. Stalin recalled the Soviet military

mission from Greece. With excessive punctiliousness he lived up to

the secret oral agreement he had recently made with Churchill, which

put Greece in the British sphere of influence […] few years later […]

once again, the Greek Communists did not receive the moral and

material support they needed from Stalin and the Soviet Union

(Medvedev, 1976: 473).

As it was already noted in the previous section, Moscow

believed that Russian interests preceded Yugoslav interests.

Thus, it is logical to assume that Stalin did expect Belgrade

17

not to undermine the Soviet position, especially considering

the fact that the Yugoslavs were well aware of Stalin’s

unwillingness to generate tension with the West (Banac, 1988:

9). In his letter to Pijade, a prominent Yugoslav communist,

in March 1942 Tito wrote that “at Grandpa's [the Soviet Union]

they have great regard for the alliance with England” (Tito

cited in Banac, 1988: 9). Similarly, they did know about

Stalin-Churchill percentages agreement. According to Kardelj’s

memoires during his visit to Moscow in November 1944, Stalin

admitted that “he and Churchill had come to an agreement

regarding the West’s influence in determining the internal

structure and the international position of the Balkan states”

(1982: 62).

Nevertheless, Tito’s policies in Greece conflicted with

Stalin’s (Banac, 1988: 33). While in August 1944, Stalin

pressured the Greek communists to join a coalition government,

by December Tito made them change their mind and encouraged

the December uprising (Swain, 1992: 651). In the eyes of Tito

and the Yugoslav leadership, the situation in Greece resembled

the situation that the Yugoslav Partisans experienced during

the National Liberation War. As Swain points out, “Tito

believed that his concept of revolution through a people’s

partisan revolution had the potential for export, most

particularly in Greece” (2011: 186). In December 1946, when

another round of the Greek civil war erupted, it was met with

“public and private Yugoslav support” (Barker, 1987: 267).

According to Woodhouse, Tito supplied arms to the Greek

18

partisans in the winter of 1946-1947 without consulting the

Soviet Union and against Stalin’s wishes (1976: 250-4, 262-5,

272-6, and 284-5). In summer 1947, the CPY continued with its

help by sending large shipments of arms (Banac, 1988: 35).

Pappas adds that the aid from the CPY also included “the use

of Yugoslav territory as sanctuary for DAG forces, as well as

radio broadcast of “Radio Free Greece” emanating from

Belgrade” ( in Vucinich, 1982: 222).

Yugoslav support of the Greek communists caused difficulties

for Stalin. On 12 March 1947, President Truman addressed the

Congress for approval of financial and military assistance for

Greece (Truman Doctrine, 1947). He justified his request by

saying that the Greek state was “threatened by the terrorist

activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists”

(Ibid). Zubok and Pleshakov argue, that the Truman

administration was afraid that the Greek Communists would

"align Greece with the Soviet Union" (1996:127). As they

continue, "any suggestion that it was Tito, not Stalin, who

operated behind the scenes, would have been taken at the time

as a bad joke" (Ibid). The situation got worse at the end of

1947 when the Free Greek radio broadcasted the formation of a

free democratic Greek Government in the city of Grammos under

Markos Vafiadis, a prominent Greek Communist. According to

Kola, around the same time Yugoslavia's General Staff

requested a military base in the region of Korçë on the

Albanian-Greece border and opposite Gammos (2003: 87). Banac

argues that Stalin “undoubtedly linked the Yugoslav moves with

19

the proclamation of a Greek provisional government at Grammos”

(1988: 40). However, perhaps, the last straw with regards to

Greece was Dimitrov’s interview published in The New York Times.

Without consulting Moscow, he spoke of a larger Balkan

Federation including Greece (The New York Times, 1948). He

further emphasized the Federation’s plans to largely cooperate

with Russia (Ibid). As a result, Dijlas and Kardelj were

summoned to Moscow in February 1948. When speaking of the

Greek Civil war, Stalin insisted that it had to be “rolled-up”

(Barker, 1987: 272). In his memoires Dijlas wrote that Stalin

lectured Kardelj:

What do you think – that Britain and the US – the US, the most

powerful state in the world – will permit you to break their line of

communication in the Mediterranean Sea! Nonsense. And we have no navy

(1962: 141).

However, instead of following Moscow’s instructions, on 21

February 1948 Tito met with Nicholas Zachariades, general

secretary of the Greek CP, and agreed on the necessity to

continue Yugoslavia’s support of the partisan movement in

Greece (Gibianskii in Naimark, 1997: 298). Shortly after that,

Tito received the first accusatory letter from Stalin.

Thus, it is fair to say that while Moscow was trying to

strongly limit its engagement in Greece, Yugoslav support of

the Communist rebellion in Greece triggered Western suspicions

of a Soviet “treachery and a blatant breach of the agreement”

(Nachmani, 1990: 3). Such actions form ‘one of the closest

20

ally’ considerably contributed to the Stalin-Tito rift and

Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform the same year.

4. Conclusion

This essay undertook the challenge to inquire the underlying

reasons for the Soviet-Yugoslav split in 1948 based on several

primary and secondary sources. The conducted analysis of the

CPSU’s foreign policy commission memorandum on Yugoslavia, the

Soviet-Yugoslav correspondence and the Cominform resolution

indeed confirms the explanatory value of ideological disputes

between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia with regards to the

split. However, ideological elements only surfaced during the

immediate months preceding Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the

Cominform. The fact that the Soviet-Yugoslav correspondence of

1948 was openly published and presented to the other Cominform

members in 1948, gives reason to believe that accusations

regarding the ideological divergence of Yugoslavia by the

Kremlin were first and foremost utilized for public

denouncement of the Yugoslav leadership.

In contrast, the examples of Albania and Greece outlined that,

already at the end of the Second World War, Tito was not

entirely ready for Yugoslavia to play simply a subservient

role to the Soviet Union with regards to the geopolitical

situation in Eastern Europe. In both cases, the Yugoslav

leadership was eager to pursue individual foreign policy

actions even if that meant undermining Soviet leadership in

Eastern Europe or even provoking Stalin’s outrage. 21

In the case of Albania, Yugoslavia frequently disregarded

Soviet warnings and advice to focus on alignment with Bulgaria

rather than pursing the creation of the Balkan Federation with

Albania. Tito’s decision to act without consulting the CPSU

even after the Kremlin condemned such actions cultivated

Stalin’s concern that Yugoslavia began to see itself as a

regional hegemon. This was further aggravated by the fact that

at the same time while the Soviet Union tried to distant

itself from the developments in Greece, Yugoslavian support of

the Greek communists stimulated Western fears of a Soviet

involvement. It was well established that whatever the

countries of the Soviet Bloc were doing, the West believed

that Moscow either knew or orchestrated that. Thus, whereas

Stalin was firm in his decision to stick up to his percentages

agreement and didn’t want to provoke neither Britain nor the

US, the Yugoslavian actions made this task much more

complicated.

Tito’s disobedience to Stalin as well as ignorance of the

interests of the Soviet Union both in the case of Albania and

Greece strongly increased Stalin’s dissatisfaction with the

Yugoslav communist leadership. In contrast to ideological

disputes, these geopolitical skirmishes persisted for several

years and can therefore not be disregarded when attempting to

understand Stalin’s motivation for excluding Yugoslavia from

the Cominform. In fact, as the author has pointed out, Albania

and Greece are not the only examples for geopolitical

22

conflicts between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the

1940s. The Yugoslav objective to create the Balkan Federation

and tendency to disregard Moscow politically was a predominant

trajectory in the 1940s. The events in 1948, even though being

characterized by ideological rhetoric, therefore most probably

reflect long-standing discontent by the Kremlin.

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