Working Paper No. 19 September 2016

PRC’s co-operation with Central and Eastern European countries in the context of the One Belt One Road initiative. The case of 2016 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the PRC and Poland.

Jedrzej Gorski* This paper can be downloaded from the Social Sciences Research Network at Abstract No. 2837546.

* Faculty of Law, The Chinese University of Hong Kong

Centre for Financial Regulation and Economic Development 金融規管與經濟發展研究中心

1

Abstract:

The idea of China’s co-operation with the Central and Eastern European countries in the sixteen-plus-one format (16+1 Group) rather than bilaterally (including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia) first came forth in December 2011 when China and Poland signed a declaration on strategic-partnership relations. This idea was formalised in April 2012 by China’s unilateral declaration on Twelve Measures for Promoting Friendly Cooperation with Central and Eastern European Countries. Despite a few summits hold and a few plurilateral declarations within the framework of the 16+1 Group signed, the project did not materialise until 2016 when China first entered into strategic partnership (along with a set of concrete agreements) with Czechia in March, and in June entered into comprehensive strategic partnership with Poland as the largest country of the 16+1 Group. One should not be mistaken to think, however, that Poland and China move into unknown territory by signing a few agreements potentially opening doors to intensified economic, infrastructural, and transportation-related co-operation (which will be essential for the One Belt One Road Initiative). In retrospect of the last one hundred fifty years, just the opposite is true. Only last thirty years saw some retardation of Sino-Polish relations after Poland had found itself in the Western sphere of influence. Since 1880s, Poles played a key role in the then Russian Empire’s endeavour to bring about the Russian vision of the New Silk from about century ago, resulting in that a large Polish community lived in Harbin between the 1900s and the 1940s. In the interbellum period, independent Poland concluded trade treaty with the Beiyang government in 1928, replaced by the trade treaty with Kuomintang’s government concluded in 1929, and since 1930s Poland also had to deal with Manchukuo’s government because of Polish community still living in Harbin. After WW2, within the block of communist countries, Sino-Polish relations were very intense. Between 1940s and the 1970s Poland’s and China’s economies were complementary and the volume of trade between two countries grew multi-fold in the 1950s. In 1951 two countries established still-existing Shipping Joint Stock Company which was the first joint-venture in the history of post-war China. In 1956, thanks to Chinese leaders’ veto, Soviet Union’s leaders did not dare to military intervene in Poland which, as a result, regained full sovereignty as to its internal socio-economic policies. During the hardship of the 1980s, Chinese government lend Poles harassed by Reagan administration’s economic sanctions a hand by extending a trade credit to Polish government and by supplying food. Finally the backbone of Sino-Polish economic relations was set up yet in late 1980s when two countries concluded agreements on (i) civil aviation, (ii) avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion, and (iii) protection of foreign investment. Now, thanks to its geographical situation, Poland is a key to the realisations of Halford Mackinder’s 1904’s vision of the creation of Eurasia (heartland) which would reverse the results of (i) the Age of Discovery in the global scale, likely leading to the economic marginalisation of North America, and (ii) economic dualism in Europe split by the river of Elbe, likely leading to income-equalisation between Western Europe and Eastern Europe which has not been the case since the 16th century. Poland is predestined to be the new Silk Road’s hub bridging railway routes coming to Europe from the East (via China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus) and from the South (via Balkans, Hungary, Slovakia). However, current Poland’s government’s stance on the new Silk Road project is rather disappointing. Poland’s membership in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as the only country’s from the Central and Eastern Europe region was inherited from the previous cabinet and, apart from that, efforts to facilitate the development of the new Silk Road on the Polish territory have so far been very mediocre. The conclusion of a rather

2

symbolic comprehensive strategic partnership was accompanied with three agreements resolving only minor issues, including (i) mutual recognition of academic degrees and diplomas in higher education, yet the signed agreement was very general and neither set up any mechanism of automatic recognition nor covered professional qualifications, (ii) plans of cultural co-operation until 2019, and (iii) the exemption of international air transportation services from value added tax. Altogether, for the time being, the prospects for the development of the new Silk Road’s hub in Poland look rather dim. Poland’s current government’s allegiance to the idea of Trans-Pacific alliance remains strong, and policy-makers remain to look Westwards only. They seem to be incapable of scenario-thinking and, at least at present, seem to reject the hand reached out by China.

3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS 5

TABLE OF FIGURES 5

1. Introduction 6

1.1. The case for this Paper 6

1.2. 16+1 initiative and OBOR 7

1.3. Poland’s role 9

2. Sino-Polish relations before Polish transformation 13

2.1. Pre-WW2 13

2.2. War and directly thereafter 23

2.3. People’s Republic of Poland 27

3. Sino-Polish relations after Polish transformation 42

3.1. Prior to Poland’s accession to the EU 42

3.2. After Poland’s accession to the EU 50

4. Toward Sino-Polish comprehensive strategic partnership of 2016 51

5. Assessment 55

5.1. SREB and geo-political determinism 55

5.2. Poland and geo-political determinism 59

5.3. Morawiecki’s Plan 63

5.4. SREB and the EU 66

5.5. Conclusion 71

Appendix A. China's Twelve Measures for Promoting Friendly Cooperation with Central and Eastern European Countries 73

Appendix B. The Bucharest Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries 74

Appendix C. The Belgrade Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries 76

4

Appendix D. Implementation of the Measures of the Bucharest Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries 79

Appendix E. The Suzhou Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries 80

Appendix F. Implementation of the Measures of the Belgrade Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries 83

Appendix G. Sino-Polish bilateral treaties 85

Appendix H. CHIPOLBROK’s chronology of events 96

Appendix I. "Setting Sail for Full Speed Progress of China-Poland Friendship" 99

5

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

BIT Bilateral Investment Treaty

CEE Central and Eastern Europe

CEEC Central and Eastern Europe Countries

CHF Swiss Franc (Confoederatio Helvetica Franc)

CNY China Yuan Renminbi

ECU European Currency Unit

EEU Eurasian Economic Union (Евразийский Экономический Союз)

EU European Union

EUR euro

FOB free on board

MSR Maritime Silk Road

OBOR One belt one road

PLN Polish zloty (polski złoty)

PRC Peoples’ Republic of China

PRL Peoples’ Republic of Poland (Polska Reczypospolita Ludowa)

PZRPR Polish United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza)

SREB Silk Road Economic Belt

USD United State Dollar

21MSR Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road

TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Likely Route of the SREB. 10 Figure 2 Bridging the SREB and the 21MSR. 10 Figure 3 Czechia and the SREB. 11 Figure 4 Germany, the SREB and the 21MSR. 11 Figure 5 Existing Trans-Siberian railway connections. 12

6

1. Introduction

1.1. The case for this Paper

The idea of People’s Republic of China’s (the ‘PRC’) co-operation with the Central and Eastern European Countries (the ‘CEECs’) in the sixteen-plus-one format (‘16+1 Group’) rather than bilaterally (including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia) first came forth during Poland’s Bronisław Komorowski’s visit to Beijing in December 2011 and his meeting with PRC’s Hu Jintao, which produced the Joint Declaration of the Republic of Poland and of the People’s Republic of China on the Establishment of the Strategic-Partnership Relations (Wspólne Oświadczenie Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej w Sprawie Ustanowienia Partnerskich Stosunków Strategicznych1– the ‘2011 Declaration,’ see further section 4).2

On 26 April 2012 in Warsaw, that idea was formalised by the PRC government’s unilateral declaration on Twelve Measures for Promoting Friendly Cooperation with Central and Eastern European Countries (the ‘2012 Twelve Measures’), the highlight of which has been the establishment of the CEE-focused secretariat in Beijing (see: Appendix A. China's Twelve Measures for Promoting Friendly Cooperation with Central and Eastern European Countries). Further summits were held in (i) Bucharest in November 2013 (see: Appendix B. The Bucharest Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries – ‘Bucharest Guidelines’), (ii) Belgrade in December 2014 (see Appendix C. The Belgrade Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries – ‘Belgrade Guidelines’), and (iii) Suzhou in November 2015 (see: Appendix E. The Suzhou Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries – ‘Suzhou Guidelines’). Despite a few summits hold and a few plurilateral declarations within the framework of the 16+1 Group signed, the project did not materialise until 2016 when China first entered into strategic partnership (along with a set of concrete agreements) with Czechia in March, 3 and in June entered into comprehensive strategic partnership with Poland.4

1 See: Centrum Studiów Polska-Azja. 'Tekst Strategicznego Partnerstwa Polska-Chiny, podpisanego 20 XII w Pekinie' <http://www.polska-azja.pl/tekst-strategicznego-partnerstwa-polska-chiny-podpisanego-20-xii-w-pekinie/> accessed on 29 August2016. 2 See: Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar, 'Polsko-chińskie „strategiczne partnerstwo” w oczekiwaniu na wymierne rezultaty' (19 November 2015) PISM Bulletin 101 (1338) at 1. 3 See generally: --'China, Czech Republic elevate ties to strategic partnership' BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific (Mar 30, 2016) n/a. 4 Of course that is not to say that the format of co-operation within the framework of 16+1 Group has been completely unproductive. However, one could claim that, among dozens of summits held in smaller circles, workshops, signed declaration, trade fairs, cultural exhibitions etc. only a few events were actually meaningful. For example, as listed by PRC’s government and attached to the Belgrade Guidelines in December 2014: (i) “China signed currency swap agreements with Hungary and Albania,” (ii) “China signed with Romania and the Czech Republic cooperation documents on peaceful use of nuclear energy, and reached common understanding with Hungary on nuclear energy cooperation,” and (iii) “China signed cooperation agreements on quality inspection with Hungary, Latvia, Serbia and Macedonia.” See: Appendix D. Implementation of the Measures of the Bucharest Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries). And, as listed by PRC’s government and attached to the Suzhou in November 2015: (i) “[i]n January 2015, the customs clearance facilitation cooperation mechanism for the China-Europe Land-Sea Express Line among the Chinese, Hungarian, Serbian, Macedonian and Greek Customs was officially established,” (ii) “[i]n May 2015, heads of customs of China, Hungary, Serbia and Macedonia met in Xi'an, China, and signed the Cooperation Action Plan for 2015-2016,” (iii) “[i]n May 2015, China and Hungary signed an MoU on nuclear energy cooperation,” (iv) “ China and Romania will sign a new agreement on avoidance of double taxation as appropriate; China signed cooperation agreements on education with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Romania respectively; China signed cooperation agreements on quality inspection with Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia respectively; China signed documents on cultural exchanges and cooperation with Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia and Poland respectively; China signed with Romania an MoU regarding the relevant nuclear power project.”

7

The purpose of this paper is to look at the relations of the PRC and Poland as the largest (in terms of demographics, territory and economy) country of the 16+1 Group from a wider time-perspective than recent years. This paper starts by offering necessary background-information on (i) the role of the 16+1 Group for the One Belt One Road Initiative (the ‘OBOR,’ in section 1.2), and (ii) Poland’s significance for the OBOR (in section 1.3). This paper then reviews at the Sino-Polish relations before Poland’s transformation to market economy (i.e. roughly before 1988-1989) including: (i) the period preceding the outbreak of WW2 (in section 2.1), (ii) the period of WW2 and directly thereafter (in section 2.2), and (iii) the period of socialist rule in Poland (in section 2.3). Then, this paper moves onto discussing developments in the Sino-Polish relations after Poland found itself in the Western sphere of influence including: (i) the period preceding Poland’s accession to the European Union (the ‘EU,’ in section 3.1), and (ii) the period following Poland’s accession to the EU (in section 3.2). Next, this paper presents the details of the agreement on Sino-Polish comprehensive strategic partnership reached in June 2016 (in section 4) and concludes with an assessment of these developments from the perspective of (i) geopolitics of the OBOR project (in section 5.1), (ii) geopolitical determinism of Poland (in section 5.2), (iii) current Poland’s industrial and developmental policy (in section 5.3), and (iv) EU’s stance on the OBOR project (in section 5.4).

1.2. 16+1 initiative and OBOR

Pretty obviously, the only role of the 16+1 Group is to pave the way for the development of the one of the two components of the OBOR, i.e. its land component now commonly referred to as the Silk Road Economic Belt (the ‘SREB’), the other being the Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road (the ‘21MSR’). 5 Interestingly, the adoption of the 2012 Twelve Measures preceded Xi Jinping’s (i) election to the General Secretary of the Communist Party, (ii) appointment as the President of the PRC in March 2013, and (iii) visits in autumn 2013, first to Kazakhstan in relation to the SREB and to Indonesia in relation to the 21MSR.6 This observation suggests that back in 2013, when the idea of the SREB was announced to the public, the actual works on the SREB must have then been well on track, which contradicts the view that Hu Jintao’s administration had the OBOR/SREB in mind but did not step up to the plate.7

As to details, the highlights of the 2012 Twelve Measures in the field of trade and investment included: (i) establishment of the USD ten billion credit line mostly in order to finance projects related to infrastructure and new and high technologies with concessional loans for which the central banks of the CEECs could apply to listed Chinese Banks (National Development Bank of China, Export and Import Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial

See: Appendix F. Implementation of the Measures of the Belgrade Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries). 5 See: Tim Summers, 'China’s ‘New Silk Roads’: sub-national regions and networks of global political economy' (2016) 37(9) Third World Quarterly 1628 at 1630. See also: Michael M. Du, 'China’s “One Belt, One Road” Initiative: Context, Focus, Institutions, and Implications' (2016) 2(1) Chinese J Glob Governance 30 at 30; Sergei Uyanayev, 'The Chinese One Belt, One Road Project: Concept, Plan, and Cooperation with Russia' (2015) 43(4) Far Eastern Affairs 12 at 12. 6 See note 5, Du at 30. 7 See: Peter Ferdinand, 'Westward ho—the China dream and ‘one belt, one road’: Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping' (2016) 92(4) International Affairs 941 at 948. Nonetheless, despite the observation that “Hu Jintao had earlier evoked the possibility of some kind of new Silk Road initiative, but it had not gone anywhere” (see: bid.), Ferdinand also notices that idea of ‘Chinese Dream’ closely related to the OBOR project and serving as its ideological foundation had already sprouted within communist party during the second half of Hu Jintao’s rule and, subsequently, it was only simply popularised. See ibid. at 942 at 944.

8

Bank of China, Construction Bank of China, Bank of China, or China Citic Bank), 8 (ii) establishment of an investment co-operation fund aiming at raising at least USD five hundred million in the initial phase of operation,9 and (iii) exploration of possibilities as to setting up currency swaps/local currency settlements and establishment of bank branches in each other’s countries10 In addition, in the field of education and research, PRC’s concrete commitments included (i) establishment of research fund with PRC’s contribution of RMB two million annually,11 and (ii) sponsoring five thousand scholarships to CEECs’ citizens and inviting one thousand CEECs’ citizens to study in the PRC as well as sending one thousand Chinese citizens to study in the CEECs within following five years.12 The secretariat for the 16+1 Group opened in Beijing on 6 September 2012.13

Subsequently, while the Bucharest Guidelines - by mostly listing planned summits, symposia and workshops - did not add new tangible elements to the 16+1 Group’s modus operandi, one could see the highlight of the Belgrade Guidelines in the concrete plans for the development of Serbo-Hungarian railway-connections in co-operation with the Chinese companies.14 Four months after the summit in Belgrade, in March 2015, the government of the PRC also eventually released the assumptions of the OBOR initiative in the document titled ‘Vision and Actions on jointly building Silk Road Economic Belt and Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road’ (the ‘2015 Vision’) which were not inconsistent with previous actions taken toward CEECs. The 2015 Vision defined the SREB as the project focusing on (i) “bringing together China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe (the Baltic); linking China with the Persian Gulf,”15 (ii) “jointly building a new Eurasian Land Bridge and developing China-Mongolia-Russia, China-Central Asia-West Asia and China-Indochina Peninsula economic corridors by taking advantage of international transport routes, relying on core cities along the Belt and Road and using key economic industrial parks as cooperation platforms.”16

Specifically, with regard to the SREB, the 2015 Vision accentuated that the project would be all about developing transportation infrastructure, like by stating that:

(i) “countries along the Belt and Road should improve the connectivity of their infrastructure construction plans and technical standard systems, jointly push forward the construction of international trunk passageways, and form an infrastructure network connecting all sub-regions in Asia, and between Asia, Europe and Africa step by step,”

(ii) “[w]ith regard to transport infrastructure construction, we should focus on the key passageways, junctions and projects, and give priority to linking up unconnected road sections, removing transport bottlenecks, advancing road safety facilities and

8 See: 2012 Twelve Measures, point 2. 9 See: 2012 Twelve Measures, point 3. 10 See: 2012 Twelve Measures, point 6. 11 See: 2012 Twelve Measures, point 6. 12 See: 2012 Twelve Measures, point 6. 13 See: Jurica Simurina, 'China’s Approach to the CEE-16' ECRAN (January 2014) Short Term Policy Brief 85 2010/256-524 1 at 6. 14 See: Belgrade Guidelines, points 3.2, 3.6. See also: note 4. 15 See: 2015 Vision, Part III. 16 See: ibid.

9

traffic management facilities and equipment, and improving road network connectivity,” and

(iii) “[w]e should build a unified coordination mechanism for whole-course transportation, increase connectivity of customs clearance, reloading and multimodal transport between countries, and gradually formulate compatible and standard transport rules, so as to realize international transport facilitation.”

And, in line with that, the only significant point of the Suzhou Guidelines referred to further developments in the construction of the Budapest-Belgrade railway.17

1.3. Poland’s role

When one looks at the map, it immediately becomes clear that OBOR’s success is very unlikely without Polish government active participation and co-operation with the PRC. Poland must be a hub bridging (i) various routs of the SREB (firstly railways coming from the East, i.e. from post-Soviet countries and secondly from the South, i.e. from the Balkans – see: Figure 1) with (ii) railway-extension of the 21MSR planned for the Western Europe, particularly Germany and Netherlands (see: Figure 2 ). This is why the PRC’s government reached out to Polish authorities almost two years before worldwide announcement of the OBOR initiative. Some maps might show Germany a potential hub bridging the SREB and the 21MSR (see: Figure 3) but this is inaccurate given mentioned PRC’s focus on the development of Budapest-Belgrade railway, the ultimate goals of which very likely would be to improve railway infrastructure between Pireus port in Greece and Poland.

Czekia might be seen as the second-best choice for being SREB’s hub yet nowhere as reasonable as Poland from logistical perspective (see: Figure 4). Yet, in light of malaise on the Polish side (if not stonewalling), the prior visit of Chinese official to Prague (March 2016) three months ahead of analogical visit to Warsaw in June (June 2016) must be seen as a yellow card shown to Polish officials. Fortunately, even with existing insufficient infrastructure and burdensome regulatory framework in place, entrepreneurs took matters into their own hands without counting on government (see: Figure 5). Transportation companies took an interest in that - thanks to railway transportation - the time of sending cargo from the PRC to Europe could be reduced even by half from about thirty to about fifteen-sixteen days (depending on the starting point in China) and some trains reportedly started operations as early as 2011 along the route staring in Chongqing and heading to Duisburg across Xinjiang.18 In April 2013, a regular cargo-railway-line was opened between Chengdu and Łódź in Poland,19 to been soon followed by the line between Zhengzhou and Hamburg in summer 2013, and between Yiwu and Madrid in December 2014 all passing through Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus and Poland.20

17 See: Suzhou Guidelines, point 5.3. and 5.4. 18 See: note 5, Summers at 1634; note 5 Uyanayev at 22. 19 See: Adriana Skorupska and Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar, 'Współpraca regionalna kluczem do strategicznego partnerstwa Polski i Chin' (November 2014) PISM Strategic File 25 (61) 1 at 3. 20 See: note 5 Uyanayev at 21, 22.

10

Figure 1 Likely Route of the SREB. Source: Trade and Investment Promotion Section of the Polish Embassy in Beijing. 'Transport route between Poland and China under the concept of "One belt one road"' <https://china.trade.gov.pl/en/news/125063,transport-route-between-poland-and-china-under-the-concept-of-one-belt-one-road-.html#> accessed on 29 August 2016.

Figure 2 Bridging the SREB and the 21MSR. Source: European Union Academic Programme Hong Kong. '“One Belt One Road” – Implications for the European Union' <http://euap.hkbu.edu.hk/main/one-belt-one-road-implications-for-the-european-union/> accessed on 29 August 2016.

11

Figure 3 Czechia and the SREB. Source: Marcin. 'The New Silk Road: a versatile instrument in China’s policy' <http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-02-10/new-silk-road-a-versatile-instrument-chinas-policy> accessed on 29 August 2016.

Figure 4 Germany, the SREB and the 21MSR. Source: GoKunming. 'Report: “Mismanagement” stalling building projects across China' <http://www.eastbysoutheast.com/tag/one-belt-one-road/> accessed on 29 August 2019.

12

Figure 5 Existing Trans-Siberian railway connections. Source: --'Silk Road subsidies undermine rail link' South China Morning Post (8 December 2014).

13

2. Sino-Polish relations before Polish transformation

2.1. Pre-WW2

In the modern times, official political relations between Poland and China can only be traced back to the period directly following the end of WW1 seeing that, in the period 1795-1918, Poland did not pursue its independent foreign policy. 21 The pre-WW1 Poland had been totally partitioned in 1795 between the Kingdom of Prussia (the dominant state of the Second Reich since 1871), the Habsburg Monarchy (reshaped as the Austrian Empire since 1804, and as Austria-Hungary since 1867) and the Russian Empire. In the 123-years period of partitions, there existed two forms of Polish statehood, including the Duchy of Warsaw (1807-1815) and the Kingdom of Poland (1815-1867, also known as Congress Poland, Królestwo Kongresowe or Kongresówka). However, the Duchy of Warsaw found itself under the suzerainty of Napoleonic France (the Duchy of Warsaw was in personal union with the Kingdom of Saxony which participated in the Confederation of the Rhine which in turn was a protectorate of the First French Empire). And, the Kingdom of Poland established at the Congress of Vienna found itself under the suzerainty of the Russian Empire (the Kingdom of Poland had been in personal union with the Russian Empire until 1967 when it was integrated with the Russian Empire as its non-autonomous part).

It’s worth mentioning as a curiosity that Polish people played a key role in the development of the Chinese Eastern Railway (Китайско-Восточная железная дорога) because this had some influence on the relations between Poland and China in the interbellum period. The railway was established based on the concession granted for eighty years by the Qing China to the Russian Empire in 1896, in exchange for the undisclosed defence-pact against Japan (so-called Li–Lobanov Treaty). 22 After a few decades of turmoil (including October Revolution, WW1, Russian Civil War, Sino-Soviet conflict of 1929 over the control of the railway, and Japanese control of the Manchukuo puppet-state), the railway was conclusively handed back by the Soviet Union to the PRC in 1952.23

Poles settled down in Manchuria for various reasons including (i) forced migration to Siberia and Russian Far East as a form of reprisals after the January Uprising (1863-1864) held in the Congress Poland, (ii) service in the Russian army during the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905), or (iii) fleeing from the revolutionary Russia in the 1920s.24 However, most of Poles were attracted by the opportunities generated by the works toward the development of the Trans-

21 “Relations between China and Poland before 1949 were never of particular significance in international affairs nor were they important to these two countries. The reason for this was very simple. The two countries were not only several thousand miles apart, but also had no common interests to bind them together. Poland, as an East Central country, traditionally traded with countries in Europe. During the XlXth century Poland, partitioned and under foreign domination, was unable to play any role in China when the colonial powers struggled! for "spheres of interest" there. On the other hand, China traded primarily with the great powers from the time of the Nanking Treaty of 1842 after the Opium War. China had little interest in Poland which seemed so remote to most of the Chinese people. Poland, on her part, was busy with problems of the European continent Neither country considered the other as a potential ally for national defense or as a potentially important market for foreign trade. For these and other reasons, the relations between these two countries remained unimportant, and no special efforts were made to strengthen them.” See: George P. Jan, 'Sino-Polish Relations, 1956–1958' (1961) 6(4) The Polish Review 93 at 93. 22 See: Mara Moustafine, 'Russians from China: Migrations and Identity' (2013) 5(2) Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal 143 at 144. Liang Chia-pin, 'History of the Chinese Eastern Railway: A Chinese Version' (1930) 3(2) Pacific Affairs 188 at 188-189. 23 See: Sören, Urbansky, 'A Very Orderly Friendship: The Sino-Soviet Border under the Alliance Regime, 1950-1960' (summer 2012) (Special Issue on China’s Post-Revolutionary Borders, 1940s-1960s) Eurasia Border Review 35 at 38. 24 See: Republic of Poland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ' Polonia i Polacy w Chinach ' <http://www.pekin.msz.gov.pl/pl/wspolpraca_dwustronna/polacy_w_chinach/> accessed 1 August 2016. See also: note 22, Moustafine at 144, 146.

14

Siberian Railway (Транссиби́рская магистра́ль, built 1891-1916), of which the Chinese Eastern Railway was an extension (across the Chinese territory in order to shorten the distance to Vladivostok and diversify risks stemming from ongoing Russian-Japanese conflict potentially affecting the main railway passing through the Russian land).25

Roughly seven thousand Polish engineers, technicians and blue-collar employees worked on the construction of Trans-Siberian Railway in the period 1897-1903.26 Between 1888-1898, out of sixty five full-time senior engineers of the project, twenty one were Polish, and in 1908 the Polish participation in the entire workforce of the project was estimated at 18-20 percent). 27 In the case of Chinese-Eastern-Railway-section of the entire Trans-Siberian-Railway project, Polish participation in the workforce reached even about 30 per cent, and also a Pole named Stanisław Kerbedź was appointed as the first manager of project’s Chinese section.28

The Chinese Easter Railway did not have a typical status of a foreign concession or colony in China of the 19th century. While the tsarist government had initially intended to have all railway-related rights granted by the Chinese government directly upon the Russian state, the entire project of the Chinese Eastern Railway was eventually designed as a quasi private-law vehicle. 29 Both governments agreed to first establish the Russo-Chinese Bank (or Russo-Asiatic Bank depending on sources) in which (i) a Russian citizen would be a Chairman, (ii) Chinese capital would be limited to five million taels (an equivalent of about four million US dollars), and (iii) profit, loss and management would be shared in proportion to capital contributions.30 Subsequently, the Russo-Chinese Bank entered into an agreement on the establishment of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company (stock company registered under Russian law), under which among others (i) president of the company shall be Chinese, (ii) Chinese government shall be responsible for the security of company’s employees, (iii) land necessary for the development of the railway shall be granted to company for free by the Chinese government, (iv) no taxes/duties shall be imposed on materials necessary for the construction of the railway, (v) Russian troops could be transported via the railway, however, without stopovers, (vi) railway shall be reverted to China after 80 years without payment or after 36 years could be redeemed by Chinese government upon paying the cost of the railway based on agreed formula, and (vii) upon the completion of the railway the company shall pay 5 million taels to the Chinese government.31

The deal between Russia and China also provided for extraterritoriality of the strip of the land along the railway,32 in the sense that this territory was subjected to Russian laws, police and

25 See: note 22, Moustafine at 144; Chin-Chun Wang, 'The Chinese Eastern Railway' (1925) 122 Ann Am Acad Pol Soc Sci 57 at 58, 26 See: Winiarz, Adam, 'Wychowanie fizyczne i sport w Życiu Polonii mandźurskiej' (2011) 20 Prace Naukowe Akademickie im. Jana Długosza w Częstochowie Seria Pedagogika 351 at 351. 27 See: Orłowski, Bolesław, 'Kolej transsyberyjska - wkład Polaków w jej budowę' (2006)(10) Inżynier Budownictwa 46 at 47-48. 28 See: ibid. at 47; note 26 at 351. 29 See: note 25, Wang, at 59. 30 See: note 25, Wang at 59. In contrast to Wang, Chia-pin notices with relation to the management of the bank that China was to have “no voice in its administration.” See: note 22, Chia-pin at 189. 31 See: note 25, Wang at 59, 60. See also: note 22, Chia-pin at 190. 32 According to Moustafine, that was a five-mile zone. See: note 22, Moustafine at 144. However, it is not clear if the zone was 5-mile wide in total or 5-mile in each direction and Chia-pin mentions in somewhat vague context a 10-mile zone. See: note 22, Chia-pin at 193.

15

judiciary.33 Under such legal environment, in 1898, engineer Adam Szydłowski (send by Stanisław Kerbedź for an exploratory mission) chose a fishing village located at Songhua River’s bank for the establishment of Harbin which was largely developed between 1901-1905 with Ludwik Czajkowski as the chief-engineer.34 When the Chinese Easter Railway was completed in 1903, there had been already about seven thousand Poles settled in Manchuria.35 Polish community made a lot of efforts to establish educational, religious and cultural institutions independent from Russian administration. Upon the consent of that administration, the first temporary Catholic church (in fact a small chapel) started operations in 1901 whereas a proper gothic temple was consecrated in August 1909.36 The St. Vincent de Paul Society (Stowarzyszenie św. Wincentego à Paulo) was established in December 1909 to focus on philanthropic and cultural activities and, in 1912, it also soon opened first Polish primary school, as well as an asylum and an orphanage in the following years.37 Another school by was opened in 1908 by the non-sectarian ‘Polish Inn’ Association (Stowarzyszenie Gospoda Polska) which was established in 1907 and existed until the last days of Polish presence in Harbin.38 Following the inflow of more qualified teachers, the final sections of the Catholic school were restructured as the Henryk Sienkiewicz Secondary School (Gimanazjum im. Henryka Sienkiewicza) in 1916.39

Despite some crackdowns by the Russian administration (such as that many officers of railway-engineering military units were fired because they did not want to convert to Orthodoxy 40 ), Polish community simply did pretty well in business, including mining, forestry, sugar refining or tobacco industry.41 While the Russian community sensu largo (citizens of the Russian empire as opposed to Chinese citizens) peaked at about one hundred twenty thousand in Harbin (and further about thirty five thousand elsewhere in Manchuria) in mid-1920s,42 the maximum number of Poles could have ranged anywhere between twenty and thirty thousand. 43 However, accurate estimates are not possible because of ongoing Russification process where many Poles increasingly spoke Russian at home and sent children to Russian schools.44

The outbreak of WW1, October Revolution and following Russian civil war brought a lot of chaos to the management of the Chinese Eastern Railway and, at the same time, in result completely changed status of Poles who opted for citizenship of independent Poland (2nd Polish Republic, or II Rzeczpospolita) constituted in November 1918 and recognized by

33 See: note 25, Wang, at 57. However, Russians soon proved to abuse the provisions on extraterritoriality by carving out more and more land for settlements allegedly related for the development of the railway and also commenced allocating military forces along those settlements. See: ibid. at 63. 34 See: Adamowicz, Marek, 'Utracona Kolonia' Dziennik Bałtycki (13 September 2013) 24 at 24; note 27 at 47-48. 35 See note 26, at 361. See also: Kim, Yong-Deog, 'Życie kulturalne Polaków w Mandżurii w latach 1897-1947' (2010) 6(2) Postscriptum Polonistyczne 117 at 117. 36 See: note 35, Kim at 118, 119. 37 See: note 35, Kim at 119. 120. To see whole image and overview of Polish institutions in Harbin, see generally note 35, Kim; note 26; Jarosław Neja, 'Polacy w Mandżurii' (2002)(3) Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej 34. 38 See: note 35, Kim at 27, 128. 39 See: note 35, Kim at 123. 40 See: note 35, Kim at120. 41 See: note 34 at 24. 42 See: note 22, Moustafine at 143, 146. 43 See: note 34 at 24. 44 See: note 35, Kim at 117, 122.

16

China on 27 March 1920.45 While the horrors of the revolution in Russia caused the last wave of influx of Poles to Harbin, the turn of 1920 and 1921 actually marked the beginning of the gradual repatriation to Poland or emigration to other places, especially Australia and the US.46 The relative order along the railway was, to some extent, secured by Western powers (allied forced) intervening in the Russian Revolution against communists and siding with anti-communist White Movement (Белое движение). The allied forces set up ‘allied technical board’ head-quartered in Harbin to control economic and technical functioning of Siberia, Far East and Chinese Eastern Railway, which included representatives of China, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Russia and Czechoslovakia, and was chaired by the John F. Stevens from the US.47

In 1920, Chinese government (i.e. the Beiyang government48) took the opportunity, stemming from the chaos in Russia tormented by the conflict between communists and the White Movement, and renegotiated the conditions of the 1896 deal with the Whites (Белые) who then still controlled Russian Far East and the railway concession. Under the amending agreement, among others (i) five million previously unpaid taels shall be paid to the Chinese government, (ii) Chinese Eastern Railway Company’s board of trustees shall include five Chinese (among them a director General) and four Russians, (iii) company’s operations shall be confined to commercial activities, and most importantly (iv) the company shall employ an equal number of Chinese and Russians on equal terms.49

After White Russians had been eventually defeated by the communists and allied forces had left Russian Far East in 1922,50 Soviet Union and China regulated the status of the railways in a very similar way to the amending agreement previously reached with the Whites, including provisions on the citizenship of railway’s employees. And this had implications for Poles who - under the article 6 of the Peace of Riga (Traktat Ryski, Рижский договор) between 2nd Polish Republic as one party and ‘Russia and Ukraine’ as the second party – had to choose between Polish citizenship (which allowed repatriation) or Russian/Ukrainian citizenship (subsequently merged as Soviet citizenship which allowed working for the railway). 51

45 See: Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency('PAIiIZ') and Polish Agency for Enterprise Development (''PARP). 'Historia stosunków polsko-chińskich' <http://www.gochina.gov.pl/index/?id=35f4a8d465e6e1edc05f3d8ab658c551> accessed 15 August 2016. 46 See: note 26, at 352. 47 See: note 25, Wang at 64. 48 “The Beiyang government (北洋政府), also sometimes spelled Peiyang government (Chinese: 北洋政府; pinyin: běiyáng zhèngfǔ), refers to the government of the Republic of China, which was in place in the capital city Beijing from 1912 to 1927. It was internationally recognized as the legitimate Chinese government. The name derives from the Beiyang Army, which dominated its politics with the rise of Yuan Shikai, who was a general of the previous imperial Qing government. After his death the army fractured into competing factions. Although the government and the state were nominally under civilian control under a constitution, the Beiyang generals were effectively in charge of it, with various factions vying for power. The government however enjoyed legitimacy abroad along with diplomatic recognition, had access to the tax and customs revenue, and could apply for foreign financial loans. Domestically, its legitimacy however was challenged by Sun Yat-sen's Guangzhou-based Kuomintang (KMT) government movement in 1917. His successor Chiang Kai-shek defeated the Beiyang warlords during the Northern Expedition in 1926-28 and overthrew the government. The Kuomintang installed their Nationalist government in Nanjing and China's political order became a one-party regime, and subsequently received international recognition.” See: ‘Beiyang government’ Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beiyang_government> accessed 12 August 2016. 49 See: note 22, Chia-pin at 195, 196. See also: note 25, Wang at 65. 50 See generally: Ornatskaya, Tatiana, Yuri Tsipkin and Vladimir Shilyalev, 'More About the History of Foreign Intervention in the Russian Far East in 1921-1922' (2006)(4) Far Eastern Affairs 117. 51 According to article 6.2 of the Peace of Riga, Polish citizenship could have been claimed by person who (i) were at least 18-years old and had their registered place of residence on the territory of the past Congress Poland, (ii) were descendants of Poles forcefully resettled in the period 1830-1865, (iii) could prove that they were not more than third-generation descendants of persons who lived on the territory of the 1st Polish Republic (pre-partition). See: Traktat pokoju między Polską a Rosją i Ukrainą podpisany w Rydze dnia 18 marca 1921 roku, Polish Official Journal (1921) no. 49, item 300.

17

Actually, according initial unilateral declaration made by Soviet government's assistant commissar of foreign affairs Lev Karakhan (so-called Karakhan manifesto, issued on 26 August 1919, received by Chinese government by telegraph in French on 26 March 1920), the Soviet Union intended to return the Chinese Eastern Railway to the Chinese Government for free. 52 However, the Soviet Union quickly backtracked on that idea likely because (i) communist forces were defeating the Whites in the Russian Far East more quickly than predicted which opened possibilities to control not only the Russian Far East but also the railway, and (ii) the realists within the communist camp simply prevailed over the idealists who had been ready to return the railway without any compensation.53

Meanwhile, also allied forces, without participation of Soviet communists’ representative, discussed the future of the Chinese Eastern Railway during the League of Nations’ Washington Naval Conference (12 November 1921 to 6 February 1922) whereby participating countries, excluding China, adopted a resolution “[i]nsist[ing] upon the responsibility of China for performance and non-performance of obligations towards the foreign share- holders, bondholders and creditors of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, which obligations the powers deem to result from the contracts under which the railroad was built.” 54 However, the statements made by allied forces were de facto meaningless in the light of parallel secret negotiations by Lev Karakhan representing Soviet Union and Wellington Koo representing China (Beiyang government),55 which resulted in the conclusion of the treaty regulating outstanding issues in the Sino-Soviet relations on 31 May 1924.

With regard to Eastern Chinese Railway, the Article IX of the treaty stated among others that (i) the railway will serve purely commercial purposes and Chinese law will apply to “judicial matters, matters relating to civil administration, military administration, police, municipal government, taxation and land property (with the exception of lands required by the said railway)” (ii) Soviet Union agreed to the future “redemption by the Government of the Republic of China, with Chinese capital, of the Chinese Eastern Railway, as well as all appurtenant properties, and to the transfer to China of all shares and bonds of the said railway,” (iii) financial conditions of the redemption as well procedures for the future transfer were meant to be discussed at a future conference further regulating Sino-Soviet outstanding issues, (iv) Soviet Union accepted the responsibility for “the entire claims of the shareholders, bondholders and creditors of the Chinese Eastern Railway incurred prior to the Revolution of March 9, 1917,” (v) a provisional agreement on the management of the railway were to be agreed following the conclusion of this treaty, and (vi) “[u]ntil the various questions relating to the Chinese Eastern Railway are settled at the Conference, as provided in Article ii of the present Agreement, the rights of the two Governments arising out of the Contract of August 27, I896, for the construction and operation of the Chinese Eastern, which do not conflict with the present Agreement and the Agreement for the provincial management of the said railway and which do not prejudice China's.”56

52 “The Soviet government restores to the Chinese people without exacting any kind of compensation, the Chinese Eastern Railway, as well as all concessions of minerals, forests, gold, and others which were seized from them by the government of Tsars, the government of Kerensky, and the brigands Horvath, Semenov, Kolchak, the former generals, merchants, and capitalists of Russia.” See: Bruce A. Elleman, 'The Soviet Union's Secret Diplomacy Concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway, 1924-1925' (1994) 53(2) Journal of Asian Studies 459 at 460. 53 See: note 52 at 461. 54 See: note 25, Wang at 66. 55 See generally: note 52, Elleman. 56 See: note 25, Wang at 67, 68. See also: note 22, Chia-pin at 197.

18

In turn, the ‘Agreement for the Provisional Management of the Chinese Eastern Railway,’ (as amended by the Soviet-Mukden agreement also known as the Peking-Mukden agreement concluded on 20 September 1924 between Soviet Union and the government of so-called the Three Eastern Provinces57) compared with the amending agreement of 1920: (i) replaced the Russo-Chinese Bank directly with the Soviet Union as the shareholder in the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, (ii) shortened period of the railway’s return free of charge from eighty to sixty years, and (iii) extended the rule on the employment of an equal number of Soviet (previously Russian) citizens and Chinese citizens over company’s directors (five plus five), and (iv) provided that all controversies arising of the operation of the company shall be referred by the board to the governments effectively meaning that a mutual agreement between Soviet and Chinese side should have been reached on all matters.58

Following those developments, not only Poles but also Russians living in Harbin found themselves between rock and the hard place. Out of about one hundred fifty five thousand former citizens of the Tsarist Russian Empire, only about twenty thousand registered as Soviet citizens to keep their railway-related jobs and those who, unlike Poles, could not claim any other citizenship than Soviet, became stateless.59 Exclusion of Poles from jobs at the railway left in Harbin mostly entrepreneurs and people too poor to leave, the number of which was estimated at about two and a half thousand in entire Manchuria after a group of four hundred had left in June 1925.60 However, even such small community continued to run Polish institutions and Polish Ministry of Religion and Public Education (Ministerstwo Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia publicznego) recognised the diplomas issued by the Henryk Sienkiewicz Secondary School as documents allowing entry to Polish universities in 1923, an option exploited by a few persons each year despite general financial hardship.61

On 19 May 1928, in Beijing, 2nd Polish Republic and Republic of China concluded the Treaty on Friendship and Commerce (Traite d'Amitie et de Commerce) which never entered into force (the ‘1928 Commercial Treaty’) and subsequently, in 18 September 1929, in Nanjing, the Treaty on Friendship and Navigation (Traite d'Amitie, de Commerce et de Navigation) which was ratified by 2nd Polish Republic on 7 October 1931 (the ‘1929 Commercial Treaty’).62 The 1929 Commercial Treaty regulated, among others, (i) diplomatic and consular relations, (ii) travels and legal status of citizens of one party residing in the other party, and (iii) conflicts of laws.63

With regard to trade relations, the treaty provided that: (i) parties would grant most-favoured nation treatment to each other in terms of import

and export duties, 64 subject to trade concessions granted by any country to any bordering country, custom-union concluded by any of the parties, and special

57 The agreement of May 1924 on the joint control of the railway by Soviet and Chinese government (Beiyang government) could not be implemented because those three Eastern provinces were not under full control of Beijing and Karahkan had to negotiate on behalf of the Soviet Union also with the local government. See generally: note 52, Elleman at 474-476. 58 See: note 25, Wang at 68. See also: note 22, Chia-pin at 198. 59 See: note 22, Moustafine at 148. 60 See: note 35, Kim at 139; note 26 at 352. 61 See: note 35, Kim at 123; note 37, Neja at 34. 62 See: Traktat przyjaźni, handlowy i nawigacyjny między RP a Rep. Chińską, Polish Official Journal (1931) no. 62, item. 499. 63 See: ibid, respectively: (i) articles 2 and 3, (ii) articles 5-7, (iii) article 8. 64 See: ibid. article 10.

19

arrangement between 2nd Polish Republic and German Part of Upper-Silesia region (Górny Śląsk, or Haute Silesie),65

(ii) most-favoured nation treatment will also apply to quantitative restrictions imposed on imports and exports of row materials (produits bruts) and semi-manufactured goods (manufactures), subject to restrictions justified with national defence or public health reasons, state monopolies or cattle’s infectious diseases,66

(iii) registered trademarks, and industrial designs shall be protected pursuant to laws of the parties,67

(iv) companies established based on the laws of one party shall have the right to operate on other party’s territory in accordance with local laws, and all provisions on the freedoms and rights of natural persons shall mutatis mutandis apply to such persons.68

With regard to navigation, the treaty (i) restricted cabotage and internal ship transport (navigation interieure) for each party’s own commercial fleet,69 (ii) confirmed that sea ports open to free trade can be used other party’s commercial fleet without restrictions, 70 (iii) regulated emergency issues. 71 With regard to Poles living in China, Chinese government made a commitment that (i) Polish passports of such persons will be endorsed (visas will be issued) by local authorities and will replace Chinese documents of identity previously hold by such persons,72 and (ii) Polish churches and school will be protected and could count on Chinese government’s help.73

Interestingly, the 1929 Commercial Treaty was much more conservative in terms of trade liberalisation than the 1928 Commercial Treaty would have been, had it been ratified and entered into force. The 1928 Commercial Treaty, for example, would have secured that (i) all arbitration clauses and awards in civil and commercial cases would have had to be recognised by the other party,74 (ii) no customs of duties would have been imposed on imports or exports of raw materials and semi-manufactured goods,75 (iii) the real estate (residential, storage, or commercial) of the citizens of one party located on the territory of the other part shall not be confiscated subject to case expressly permitted by laws of the other country equally applicable to citizens of the other party.76

Of course, the ‘renegotiation’ of the already signed 1928 Commercial Treaty was linked to (i) the demise of the Beiyang government 77 with witch the 1928 Commercial Treaty was concluded, (ii) takeover of control over China by Kuomintang after so-called Northern

65 See: ibid. note 2 to article 10. 66 See: ibid. article 11. 67 See: ibid. article 12. 68 See: ibid. article 13. However, the additional protocol virtually negated the sense of this provisions by clarifying that the right to operate on other party’s territory is subject to obtaining governmental consent. 69 See: ibid. article 14. 70 See: ibid. article 15. 71 See: ibid. article 16. 72 See: ibid. note 1 to article 4. 73 See: ibid. attachment: Letter form Chengting T. Wang to Jerzy Barthel Weydenthal. 74 See: 2918 Commercial Treaty, article 7. 75 See: ibid. article 9. 76 See: ibid. article 10. 77 See: note 48.

20

expeditions78 against Beiyang government and various ‘warlords’ ruling various parts of then China, 79 and (iii) the establishment of Kuomintang’s Nationalist government in Nanjing (1927-1948 80 ). Meanwhile the festering conflict over the future of the Chinese Eastern Railway was enflamed anew when Kuomintang also took control over three eastern provinces in 192881 and when Wellington Koo (now representing the Nanjing government) together with Wang Zhengting got around to renegotiating so-called unequal treaties with other countries in the same year.82 Whereas some agreements had been reached with the US, the UK and Japan, in November 1929 the Nationalist government released a statement according to which the Soviet government, since 1924, had been consequently ignoring China’s all attempts to renegotiate previous provisional agreement concluded in September 1924.83

In fact, Soviet Union did not formalise its relations with the Nationalist government until 1933 even though diplomatic missions and consulates of both countries were operating.84 Apart from a brief conflict of 1929 when Chinese troops took over control over the railway by force but were soon repelled, the Soviet Union kept administrating the railway itself, plus educational institutions, hospitals etc. until the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September 1931 and establishment of Manchukuo in March 1932.85 In the best interest of Polish citizens still remaining in Manchuria, 2nd Polish Republic, as one of first countries to do so, soon recognised Manchukuo, though this did not prevent expropriation of largest Polish enterprises,

78 “The Northern Expedition (simplified Chinese: 国民革命军北伐; traditional Chinese: 國民革命軍北伐; pinyin: Guómín gémìng jūn běi fá), was a Kuomintang (KMT) military campaign, led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, from 1926–28. Its main objective was to unify China under its own control by ending the rule of the Beiyang government as well as the local warlords. It led to the end of the Warlord Era, the reunification of China in 1928 and the establishment of the Nanjing government.” See: ‘Northern Expedition’ Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Expedition> accessed 12 August 2016. 79 “The Warlord Era (simplified Chinese: 军阀时代; traditional Chinese: 軍閥時代; pinyin: Jūnfá shídài, 1916–1928) was a period in the history of the Republic of China when the control of the country was divided among its military cliques in the mainland regions of Sichuan, Shanxi, Qinghai, Ningxia, Guangdong, Guangxi, Gansu, Yunnan and Xinjiang. The era lasted from the death of Yuan Shikai in 1916 until 1928 (with the conclusion of the Northern Expedition with the Northeast Flag Replacement, the beginning of the "Nanjing decade"). However, when old warlords, such as Wu Peifu and Sun Chuanfang, were deposed, new minor warlords persisted into the 1930s and 1940s, as the central government struggled to keep its allies under rein, a great problem for the Kuomintang (KMT) through World War II and after during the Chinese Civil War. Some of the most notable warlord wars, post-1928, including the Central Plains War, involved nearly a million soldiers. The division of the country continued after the Warlord Era until the fall of the Nationalist government at the end of the civil war.” See: ‘Warlord Era’ Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warlord_Era> accessed 12 August 2016. 80 “The Nationalist government, officially the National Government of the Republic of China (Chinese: 中華民國國民政府; pinyin: Zhōnghuá Mínguó Guómín Zhèngfǔ) refers to the government of the Republic of China between 1927 to 1948, led by the Kuomintang (KMT) party. The name derives from the Kuomintang's translated name "Nationalist Party". The government was in place until the Government of the Republic of China under the newly promulgated Constitution of the Republic of China was established in its place. After the outbreak of the Xinhai Revolution on 10 October 1911, revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen was elected Provisional President and founded the Provisional Government of the Republic of China. To preserve national unity, Sun ceded the presidency to military strongman Yuan Shikai, who established the Beiyang government. After a failed attempt to install himself as Emperor of China, Yuan died in 1916, leaving a power vacuum which resulted in China being divided into several warlord fiefdoms and rival governments. They were nominally reunified in 1928 by the Nanjing-based government led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, which after the Northern Expedition, governed the country as a one-party state under the Kuomintang, and was subsequently given international recognition as the legitimate representative of China.” See: ‘Nationalistic government’ Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nationalist_government> accessed 12 August 2016. 81 See also: note 57. 82 See: note 52 at 481. 83 See: ibid. See also: note 58. 84 See: Russell M. Story, 'China and Soviet Russia' (1937) 193 Ann Am Acad Pol Soc Sci 154 at 158. To be more precise, both countries adopted a resolution on the restoration of diplomatic relations on 5 October 1932 which happened after an exchange of notes on 12 December 1932. See: Luan Jinghe, 'The 1945 Chinese-Soviet Treaty on Friendship and Alliance, and the 1950 Treaty on Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance Between China and the Soviet Union (Comparative analysis)' (2007) 34(2) Far Eastern Affairs 98 at 98. 85 See: note 22, Moustafine, footnote 15 at 148; note 84, Story at 158, 161; 'Memorandum on the Chinese Eastern Railway' (7 December 1934) 3(24) American Council Institute of Pacific Relations 1 at 3.

21

like vast forest holdings in the Greater Khingan mountains.86 In spite of the odds of Japanese occupation and declining population, Polish cultural and educational institutions continued operations in co-operation with the government in Warsaw which, in 1934, even forced a reform of the secondary school, in result of which for example subjects like Latin were replaced by English and Chinese.87

Nonetheless, the life was generally tough in the 1930s for ‘Westerners’ in Harbin because Japanese administration did a lot to uproot Soviet influence over the Chinese Eastern Railway, also by harassing its Russian workers especially after Soviet had sold railway to the Manchukuo’s government.88 The reasons why the Soviet government made a decision to dispose of the railway were mostly commercial. Between 1924 and 1932, two-thirds of the railway’s revenue was generated by freight as opposed to passenger transport, and only one-third of the freight was local, meaning that remaining two-thirds of freight could soon be exposed to completion of a number of Manchukuo-owned new railways being then under development and close to their completion. Thus the Chinese Eastern railway could only remain commercially viable in Manchukuo’s hands and it made a lot of sense for the Soviet Union to sell the railway at that point in time rather than to keep it and subsequently operate at a loss.89 The non-commercial reasons for the sale were related to the remaining Russian population along the railways which was becoming in the 1930s increasing polarised between backers of the Soviet Union (reds) and the remaining Whites having their shelter in Harbin. 90 So, on the one hand, easing the tensions with Manchukuo’s Japanese administration (which even resorted to torturing Russians still working for the railway company) could improve the situation of Soviet citizens. On the other hand, however, further undermining economic position of the Whites (who had not opted for Soviet citizenship and statelessly lived in Manchuria) could prevent a potential outbreak and spread of any counter-revolutionary (anti-communist) diversionary activities from Harbin.91

Specifically, the ‘Agreement for the Cession to Manchoukuo of the Rights of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway)’ concluded on 23 March 1935 in Tokyo (the ‘Cession Agreement’) set up the price of the Railway at one hundred forty million yens,92 which was way down compared with initial Soviet proposal of two hundred fifty million gold rubles (an equivalent of about six hundred twenty five million yens. 93 Under the Cession Agreement, Manchukuo’s government also committed to additionally pay out about thirty millions yens toward

86 See: note 26 at 354. However, Winiarz in his article neither specifies what soon meant nor gives a specific date whereas - according to the information published online by two Polish governmental agencies (the PAIiIz and the PARP) on a website devoted to Sino-Polish relations (see note 45) – Poland recognized Manchukuo on 18 October 1938. The source of discrepancies might lie in that some articles/memoires specifically related to Polish community in Harbin might refer to earlier more or less formal consular arrangements between 2nd Polish Republic and Manchukuo’s government. 87 See: note 35, Kim at 125. 88 See: note 22, Moustafine at 149. 89 See: note 85, Institute of Pacific Relations at 3, 4. 90 See: note 22, Moustafine at 149. 91 See: note 85, Institute of Pacific Relations at 4. 92 See: 'Manchoukuo-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Agreement for the Cession to Manchoukuo of the Rights of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway)' (1936) 30(2) American Journal of International Law 85. article 1. 93 See: note 85, Institute of Pacific Relations at 4.

22

pensioners previously employed by the railway company. 94 The Cession Agreement also provided, among others that:

(i) “[u]pon the coming into force of the present Agreement, the senior mem- bers of the administration of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) who are citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be released from their duties. The said senior members of the ad- ministration of the Railway shall hand over all the archives, records, papers and documents of whatever description in their charge to their respective successors in the new administration of the Railway.”95

(ii) “[w]ith the aim of ensuring the normal functioning of the Railway, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree to place at the disposal of the new administration the following persons from among the senior members of the administration of the Railway who are citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as advisers for one month from the date of the coming into force of the present Agreement: (A) The general manager of the Administration. (B) The manager of General Affairs Office of the Administration. (C) The manager of the Motive Power Department of the Administration. (D) The chief of the Financial Department of the Administration. (E) The manager of the Commercial Department of the Administration,” 96

(iii) “At any time after the coming into force of the present Agreement, the Government of Manchoukuo may dismiss any or all of the following persons: (A) All the chiefs of railway sections, stations and depots. (B) The chiefs of all the following auxiliary enterprises of the Railway: a. Forest concessions and lumbering. b. Coal mines. c. Power stations. d. Printing plant. e. Auxiliary enterprises of the Commercial Department. f. Nursery and green-houses in Harbin. g. Main workshops of the Ways Department. h. Wool-washing works and hydro-loading works. i. Water works in Harbin. j. Soft-drinks factory. k. Saw-mill. 1. Gradations of beans. m. Waste-cleaning works. n. Grand Hotel. o. Health resorts and sanatoria. p. Hospitals and clinics. q. Library. r. Economic Bureau,”97

(iv) “[i]t is agreed that the provisions of Section 4, Article IX of the Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Union of Soviet

94 See: note 85, Institute of Pacific Relations at 4; Cession Agreement (note 92), article 11. 95 See: Cession Agreement (note 92), article 3.1. Article 2 of the Cession Agreement further provided that: “It is understood that the term the "senior members of the administration of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway)" employed in the present Article indicates: (A) All the members of the Board of Directors and of the Audit Com- mittee. (B) The general manager and assistant manager of the Administration. (C) The assistant chief controller. (D) All the managers and sub-managers of the Departments of the Board of Directors, the Audit Committee, the Control and the Administration. All agents for commission, engineers for commission. All the senior agents, advisers and chiefs of the sections and sub-sections.” On top of that, article 3.4 (first para.) of the Cession Agreement further provided that: “The persons referred to in Section 1 of the present Article shall have the right to remain in Manchoukuo and to retain their railway lodgings for one month after the coming into force of the present Agreement.” 96 See: Cession Agreement (note 92), article 3.2. On top of that, article 3.4 (second para.) of the Cession Agreement further provided that: “The persons referred to in Section 2 of the present Article shall have the right to remain in Manchoukuo and to retain their railway lodgings for two months after the coming into force of the present Agreement.” 97 See: Cession Agreement (note 92), article 3.3. On top of that, article 3.4 (third para,) of the Cession Agreement further provided that: “Those persons who have been dismissed by virtue of Section 3 of the present Article shall have the right to receive their regular salary for one month from the date of their dismissal. They shall have the right to remain in Manchoukuo and to retain their railway lodgings for two months from the date of their dismissal.”

23

Socialist Republics and the Republic of China signed at Peking on May 31st, 1924, and those of Section 3, Article I of the Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Autonomous Three Eastern Provinces of the Republic of China signed at Mukden on September 20th, 1924, shall remain in force.”98

The Cession Agreement forced the repatriation of not only railway’s senior Soviet management,99 but of virtually all Russians as it further provided that (i) “[t]hree months' notice shall be given to each of the employees of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway), other than those included in the provisions of Article III of the present Agreement, who are citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and whom the Government of Manchoukuo may desire to dismiss from reasons of convenience on the part of the Government of Manchoukuo after the coming into force of the present Agreement,” 100 and (ii) “[e]mployees of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Rail- way) who are citizens of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and who may be dismissed shall have the right to remain in Manchoukuo for two months after their dismissal in order to dispose of their personal affairs.”101

As a result, by the end of the 1930s, the number of Russians in Harbin decreased to about thirty thousand people because many moved to still existing international settlements in Shanghai and Tianjin or to the Soviet Union, yet in the latter case many of them in the middle of Great Terror (Большо́й терро́р) were labelled as the Whites, foreign enemies or Japanese spies and persecuted. 102 Indeed, throughout the 1930s, under the Japanese occupation, the post-Tsarist community (i.e. those who, or whose ancestors, had previously been citizens of the non-existent Russian empire, potentially also Poles who did not opt for the citizenship of the 2nd Polish Republic) had a peculiar status somewhat perpetuating the pre-Soviet order. The vast majority of the Tsarist-Russia’s ex-citizens preferred to remain stateless (rather than accept Soviet, Manchukuo’s or previously Chinese citizenship), 103 and since 1934 such people were controlled by the Japanese administration via ‘Bureau of Russian Émigré Affairs in Manchukuo’ managed by Russians originating from the Tsarist/White army. 104 This altogether led to a paradox that, by the end of the 1930s, Poles – who though had been ousted from jobs for the railway company a decade earlier than Soviet citizens - outnumbered Soviet citizens in Harbin with about one thousand five hundred persons in 1938 against about one thousand Soviet citizens examining in the city by the 1940s.105

2.2. War and directly thereafter

Soon after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in August 1937, on 21 August 1937 Republic of China and Soviet Union signed a non-aggression treaty and Soviet Union supported Chinese government diplomatically and materially, like by offering loans and 98 See: Cession Agreement (note 92), article 4 (second para.) 99 See: notes 95, 96, 97 in fine. 100 See: Cession Agreement (note 92), article 10.1. 101 See: Cession Agreement (note 92), article 10.2. 102 About forty eight thousand were arrested, out which thirty one thousand executed. See: note 22, Moustafine at 149, 150. 103 See: note 22, Moustafine at 148. Subject to the Cession Agreement which provided for some framework of repatriation to the Soviet Union, registering as the Soviet citizens initially for all the less appealing given that such registration did not grant full Soviet citizen’s right, such as a possibility to simply leave Manchuria and relocate to the Soviet Union. See: ibid. 104 See: note 22, Moustafine at 151. 105 See: note 35, Kim at 117 note 37, Neja at 34; note 22, Moustafine at 151.

24

backing China in the League of Nations at least until the outbreak of the WW2 in Europe in September 1939, and to some extent until the German invasion of the Soviet Union (‘Operation Barbarossa’) in June 1941 which required diverting resources elsewhere. 106 Nonetheless, reluctant to fight a war on two fronts, the Soviet Union did not support Republic of China militarily until 1945, refused to join Western anti-Japanese coalition and even concluded a neutrality pact with Japan in April 1941.107 Under those conditions, small Polish community lived through the war without major perturbation until 1945, subject to that, following the beginning of the was in Pacific in December 1941 (the attack on Pearl Harbour) the Polish government-in-exile (Rząd Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na uchodźstwie, then located in London)108 broke diplomatic relations with Manchukuo and the closed Polish consulate in Harbin had to be restructured as a local institution called the Polish Tutelary Committee (Polski Komitet Opiekuńczy).109

In the last phase of the WW2 and within few years thereafter, the relations between Republic of China and Poland were dictated by the Sino-Soviet relations and Soviet play with Western forces. With regard to Poland, yet in December 1943, Stalin set up the Polish National Council (Polski Komitet Narodowy) and the Central Bureau for the Communist of Poland (Centralne Biuro Komunistow Polski) with an intention to lay a ground for future Soviet-Union-aligned government of Poland.110 However, the former was later scrapped after (i) the leaders of the Polish Workers' Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza),111 had established the Home National Council (Krajowa Rada Narodowa) on the night of 31 December 1943, chaired by Bolesław Bierut (later, the first leader of the post-war communist Poland until his death in March 1956) yet on the initiative of Władysław Gomułka without ‘s Moscow’s prior consent, and (ii) Stalin had received the Home National Council’s representatives on 16 May 1946 in Moscow and recognized this body as the legitimate representation of Polish people.112 As the offensive against Nazi Germany advanced and the front line was gradually moving Westward,

106 See: Harold H. Fisher, 'Soviet Policies in Asia' (1949) 263 Ann Am Acad Pol Soc Sci 188 at 198. See also: note 84, Jinghe at 99. 107 See: note 106, Fisher at 199; note 84, Jinghe at 99; George W. Atkinson, 'The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance' (1947) 23(3) International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 357 at 357. 108 “The Polish government-in-exile, formally known as the Government of the Republic of Poland in exile (Polish: Rząd Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej na uchodźstwie), was the government in exile of Poland formed in the aftermath of the Invasion of Poland of September 1939, and the subsequent occupation of Poland by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, which brought to an end the Second Polish Republic. Despite the occupation of Poland by hostile powers, the government-in-exile exerted considerable influence in Poland during World War II through the structures of the Polish Underground State and its military arm, the Armia Krajowa (Home Army) resistance. Abroad, under the authority of the government-in-exile, Polish military units that had escaped the occupation fought under their own commanders as part of Allied forces in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. After the war, as the Polish territory came under the control of the People's Republic of Poland, a Soviet satellite state, the government-in-exile remained in existence, though largely unrecognized and without effective power. Only after the end of Communist rule in Poland did the government-in-exile formally pass on its responsibilities to the new government of the Third Polish Republic in December 1990. The government-in-exile was based in France during 1939 and 1940, first in Paris and then in Angers. From 1940, following the Fall of France, the government moved to London, and remained in the United Kingdom until its dissolution in 1990.” See: ‘Polish government-in-exile, Wikipedia < https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish_government-in-exile> accessed 12 August 2016. 109 See: note 26 at 359; ; note 37, Neja at 35. 110 See: Anna M. Cienciala, 'The Activities of Polish Communists as a Source for Stalin's Policy Towards Poland in the Second World War' (1985) 7(1) The International History Review 129 at 137. 111 “The Polish Workers' Party (Polish: Polska Partia Robotnicza, PPR) was a communist party in Poland from 1942 to 1948. It was founded as a reconstitution of the Communist Party of Poland, and merged with the Polish Socialist Party in 1948 to form the Polish United Workers' PartyFrom the end of World War II the PPR ruled Poland, while the Soviet overall control and the communist (also characterized as state socialist) system were being established in the country.” See: ‘Polish Workers' Party’ Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish_Workers%27_Party> accessed 12 August 2016. 112 See: note 110 at 140.

25

the Home National Council was used to legitimise the establishment of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego, or PKWN, also known as the Lublin Committee or Komitet Lubelski) 113 in Lublin which operated until its replacement by Stalin’s decision of 31 December 1944 on the establishment of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland (Rząd Tymczasowy Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej or RTRP).114.115

Further political developments in Poland were dictated by what had been agreed upon during the Yalta Conference (4-11 February 1945), and so was the faith of the Chinese Eastern Railway. As to Poland, post-conference documents stated that “[t]he three heads of Government [i.e. Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt] consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. They recognized that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference.” 116 Churchill and Roosevelt, were then simply presented by Stalin with a fait accompli of the presence of Soviet troops liberating Polish land from German occupation, and of already operating governmental structures. Arguably, they had no choice but to (i) agree to recognise Soviet-aligned institutions, and (ii) ‘believe’ in Stalin’s assurances of having plans to establish democratic and Polish state (despite Stalin’s previous poor record in this regard).117 Following the understanding reached in Yalta, the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity (Tymczasowy Rząd Jedności Narodowej or TRJN) was established on 28 June 1945 with Stanisław Mikołajczyk from the peasant movement (ruch ludowy) as its first prime minister, and Western Powers as well as the Republic of China on 5 July 1945 recognised that institution thereby simultaneously withdrawing their recognition of London-based Polish government-in-exile.118

As to war on Pacific, at the Yalta conference, Stalin agreed to join military operation against Japan only on numerous conditions, also related to the Chinese Eastern Railway, including among others that (i) Outer Mongolia shall remain an independent country, (ii) all results of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 shall be reverted, (iii) Kurils and Southern Sakhalin shall be returned to Soviet Union, (iv) Dalian shall be a free port whereas Port Arthur shall be leased to Soviet navy, (iv) China and Soviet Union will jointly operate not only the Chinese Eastern Railway but also South Manchuria Railway (connecting the Chinese Eastern Railway and 113 “The Polish Committee of National Liberation (Polish: Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego, PKWN), also known as the Lublin Committee, was a puppet provisional government of Poland officially proclaimed on 22 July 1944, allegedly in Chełm allegedly under the direction of State National Council (Krajowa Rada Narodowa, or KRN) in opposition to the Polish government in exile. It exercised control over Polish territory retaken from Nazi Germany and was fully sponsored and controlled by the Soviet Union.” See: ‘Polish Committee of National Liberation’ Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish_Committee_of_National_Liberation> accessed 12 August 2016. 114 “The Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland (Polish: Rząd Tymczasowy Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej or RTRP) was created by Krajowa Rada Narodowa on the night of 31 December 1944.” See: ‘Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland’ Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provisional_Government_of_the_Republic_of_Poland> accessed 12 August 2016. 115 See: note 110 at 140. 116 As cited in: L. H. Woolsey, 'Poland at Yalta and Dumbarton Oaks' (1945) 39(2) American Journal of International Law 295 at 297. See: also: J. R. Thackrah, , 'Aspects of American and British Policy Towards Poland from the Yalta to the Potsdam Conferences, 1945' (1976) 21(4) The Polish Review 3 at 9-10. 117 See: note 116, Thackrah at 6. See also generally: Anna M. Cienciala, 'Great Britain and Poland Before and after Yalta (1943-1945): A Reassessment' (1995) 40(3) The Polish Review 281; William Larsh, 'Yalta and the American Approach to Free Elections in Poland' (1995) 40(3) The Polish Review 267. 118 See: note 116, Thackrah at 6, note 110 at 142; note 45.

26

Dalian) 119 The Republic China subsequently accepted the conditions imposed on it in absentia by entering on 14 August 1945 into the Treaty on Friendship and Alliance accompanied with a set of agreements with Soviet Union. The agreement devoted to the Chinese Eastern Railway provided among others that (i) Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway shall be collectively called the ‘Chinese Changchung Railway,’ (ii) both railways shall be jointly operated for thirty years after which China shall take over a full control of them, (iii) board of governors shall be made up of five Chinese and five Soviet citizens, (iv) railways could only be used for the transportation of Soviet troop until the end war against Japan, (v) duty-free transit of merchandise and military equipment (the latter in sealed carriages) to Dalian and Port Arthur will be secured.120

When Soviet troops entered Manchuria and Harbin in August 1945, mentioned Polish Tutelary Committee121 still looked after 1308 Poles, out of which 1017 lived in Harbin 28 in Dalian and remaining 263 in smaller towns/settlements located along the Chinese Eastern Railway.122 Meanwhile, somewhat reminiscent of the events in the late 1930s which had followed the Cession Agreement,123 another thousands of Russians were forced to relocate to Soviet Union, often ending up in penal colonies as a ‘punishment’ for acts such as having been forcefully drafted into Japanese military or having engaged in organisations previously co-operating with Japanese administration.124 And, after Soviet Troops had left Harbin in April 2016, the Soviet control over Russians remaining in the city continued to be exercised via the ‘Society of Soviet Citizens’ modelled after previous Japanese Bureau of Russian Émigré Affairs in Manchukuo.125

The withdrawal of Soviet troops, and enforcement of the Sino-Soviet Treaty on Friendship and Alliance, (like the takeover of control over Dalian and Port Arthur by Soviets) moved slowly and chaotically, 126 and Sino-Soviet problems in Manchuria were not conclusively resolved until the establishment of the PRC in October 1949 when the Soviet Union (i) did not need to manoeuvre between Kuomintang and Chinese communists anymore, and (ii) in contrast to previous neutrality could firmly, along with PRC’s Communist Party, take a course against the US on the global plane.127 Soviet-aligned Poland recognised the PRC on 4 October 1949 and was the second to country after the Soviet Union to open its diplomatic mission to PRC’s government which happened on 27 October 1949 (Jan Jerzy Piankowski in the rank of charge d'affaires).128 During Mao’s visit to Moscow in December 1949, Mao and Stalin still planned to keep the 1945 Treaty on Friendship and Alliance concluded by the Republic of China unchanged (or at best re-sign it without material changes for propaganda purposes) subject only to that the Soviet Union in practice would not exercise its right to station its troops in Port Arthur.129 However, between 22 and 25 January 1950, Stalin and Mao agreed after all to sign a new Treaty on Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual

119 See: note 84, Jinghe at 99. See also: note 106, Fisher at 194, 200. 120 See: note 107, Atkinson at 360. See also: note 106, Fisher at 200. 121 See: note 109. 122 See: note 37, Neja at 36. 123 See: note 102. 124 See: note 22, Moustafine at 152. 125 See: note 104; note 22, Moustafine at 153. 126 See generally: note 107, Atkinson at 361-366. 127 See: note 84, Jinghe at 100-101. 128 See note 45. 129 See: note 84, Jinghe at 106-107.

27

Assistance,130 which only at the first glance reminded the previous treaty. The devil was in detail because the new treaty - with regard to Changchun Railway and ports - provided among others that (i) that the railway shall remain the Sino-Soviet joint-property until the end of 1952, (ii) half of the Dalian’s port will be leased to the Soviet Union for thirty years for free, and (ii) Port Arthur would continue to be joint Sino-Soviet naval base until conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan, yet not later than by the end of 1952.131

Yet before the conclusion of the new Sino-Soviet Treaty, the first representative of the Soviet-aligned post-war Poland, Jerzy Kłossowki arrived in Harbin in March 1949 to co-ordinate the repatriation of the remaining Poles and, out of 1213 person, 972 wanted to take advantage of that opportunity and left Harbin in July.132 After July, there were still about 450 Poles staying in the city, which eventually departed throughout the 1950s, half of which left for Poland and the rest for countries like Australia, US, Canada and Brazil.133 Likewise, Russians remaining in Harbin throughout 1950s were compelled to repatriate to the Soviet Union under Khrushchev’s leadership, and those who did so often ended up working for new agricultural projects in the wilderness of Kazakhstan or Siberia whereas others fled to the same non-Soviet-aligned destinations as did Poles.134

2.3. People’s Republic of Poland

In violation of the deal on Poland’s future reached in Yalta between the Soviet Union, the US and the UK, Soviet-aligned communists in Poland (i) reverted the results of the establishment of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity and seized full power in Poland after rigging legislative elections (Wybory do Sejmu Ustawodawczego) of 1947,135 and (ii) adopted a new Constitution of the People's Republic of Poland (Polska Rzeczypospolita Ludowa, or the ‘PRL’) on 22 July 1952 (Konstytucja Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej uchwalona przez Sejm Ustawodawczy w dniu 22 lipca 1952).136,137 The first Polish ambassador to the PRC Juliusz Burgin presented his letters of credence on 12 June 1950 in Beijing whereas the first PRC’s ambassador to post-war Poland presented his letters of credence on 20 July 1950 in

130 See: note 84, Jinghe at 109-110. 131 See: note 84, Jinghe at 109-111. 132 See: note 37, Neja at 39. 133 See: note 37, Neja at 41. 134 See: note 22, Moustafine at 153 and footnote 27 at 153. 135 See generally: note 117, Larsh. 136 See: Polish Official Journal (1952) no. 33, item 232. 137 “The Constitution of the Polish People's Republic (also known as July Constitution or Constitution of 1952) was passed on 22 July 1952. Created by the Polish communists in the Polish People's Republic, it was based on the 1936 Soviet Constitution (also known as Stalin Constitution), and it superseded the post-war provisional Small Constitution of 1947 which, in its turn, had declared null and void the pre-war April Constitution, defined as fascist. The Russian text of the Constitution was reviewed and corrected by Soviet premier Joseph Stalin and later translated into Polish. It legalized the communist legislature and practices as they had been introduced to Poland with the Polish Committee of National Liberation in the wake of Red Army progress in 1944. The constitution of 1952 broke the tradition of separation of powers, and introduced instead the Soviet concept of "unity of the state's power". While the ultimate power was reserved for the dictatorship of the proletariat, expressed as "the working people of the towns and villages", the Sejm, the legislative branch of the government, had the paramount authority in government as per the 'will of the people', and oversaw both the judicial and executive branches of the government. But as Warsaw law professor Rozmaryn expressed it, there is a big difference between the "law in books" and the "law in action, explaining that from 1952 through at least 1956 the Sejm exercised no real power, while the State Council (the executive committee of the Sejm) exercised it all instead. The constitution was amended twenty-four times, with the most contentious amendment being that of 10 February 1976. Following the revolutions of 1989 it was significantly amended between 1989 and 1992, and after 29 December 1989 it was known simply as the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.[5] It was superseded by the new Polish constitution on 2 April 1997.” See: ‘Constitution of the Polish People's Republic’ Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Polish_People%27s_Republic> accessed 12 August 2016.

28

Warsaw.138 The PRL closed its consulate in Tianjin on 14 June 1954 but opened new ones in Shanghai on 15 October the same year and in Tianjin on 8 May 1955 whereas the PRC opened its consulate in Gdańsk on 1 December 1958.139

Economic and cultural relations between the PRC and the PRL were initiated on 29 January 1951 by the conclusion of the:

(i) the Agreement on the exchange of goods and payments between the Republic of Poland and the People's Republic of China in the year 1951 (Umowa o wymianie towarowej i płatnościach między RP a Chińską Republiką Ludową na 1951 rok, the ‘1951 Economic Exchange Agreement’ – the ‘1951 Economic Exchange Agreement’),

(ii) the Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Central Government of the People's Republic of China on establishment of the Polish- Chinese Shipping Joint Stock Company (Umowa między Rządem PRL a Centralnym Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o utworzeniu Polsko-Chińskiego Towarzystwa Okrętowego Spółka Akcyjna, – the ‘Shipping-Company Agreement’), and

(iii) the Agreement on cultural cooperation between the Republic of Poland and the People's Republic of China (Umowa o współpracy kulturalnej między RP a Chińską Republiką Ludową - the ‘1951 Cultural Agreement’).140

The 1951 Economic Exchange Agreement141 served as the template for analogical agreements which were concluded in following years. That agreement provided for the general framework of trade between two centrally-planned economies, whereby (i) the exchange rate between Polish zloty (złoty polski, the ‘PLN’) and China Yuan Renminbi (‘CNY’) was fixed the central bank of the Soviet Union,142 (ii) clearing of both commercial and non-trade related payments was to be made via parties’ central banks,143 (iii) all sea-freight-related payments was to be denominated in Soviet rubles but settled in ‘free currencies’ (wolne dewizy, свободные деньги),144 and (iv) specific trade products and their quantity/volume was specified in attachments to that agreement. 145

The Shipping-Company Agreement is still in force and the company established thereunder still operates under the name of CHIPOLBROK, 146 which has been used as company’s

138 See: note 45. 139 See: ibid. 140 See: Polish Official Journal (1952 ) no. 14 item 84. 141 According the database of treaties run by the Polish ministry of foreign affairs (see: Appendix G. Sino-Polish bilateral treaties) this agreement did not enter into force but the literature on Sino-Polish economic relations suggest that the trade between PRC and Poland based on the 1951 Economic Exchange treaty took place. See: note 21 at 101. 142 See: 1951 Economic Exchange Agreement, article 5. 143 See: 1951 Economic Exchange Agreement, articles 7 and 8. 144 See: 1951 Economic Exchange Agreement, article 9. 145 See: 1951 Economic Exchange Agreement, list 1 and list 2. 146 “CHIPOLBROK – Chinese-Polish Joint Stock Shipping Company was founded on 15th of June 1951 under the government of China and Poland bilateral agreement – as a first ever Sino-foreign joint-venture deed of association after proclamation of the People’s Republic of China. Its head office is located at Shanghai and European base at Gdynia. This pioneer, equally shared partnership enterprise arose out of 6 ships contributed by each contracting party. Assigned to provide the sea transportation link between Polish and Chinese ports for carriage of investment goods and other commodities necessary for both countries development – over half-century period Chipolbrok has voyaged through different,

29

telegraphic address since September 1951 and became company’s official name in January 1977 replacing its previous English name (Chinese-Polish Shipbrokers Company for Chinese-Polish Joint Stock Shipping Company – see: Appendix H. CHIPOLBROK’s chronology of events). The agreement was originally concluded for twelve years but since then has been automatically extended in 4 years’ intervals. 147 The purpose of the company originally included (i) operation of cargo ships between PRL’s and PRC’s ports with an option to call at ports of third countries, and (ii) chartering ships and booking cargo space on the commission of Polish or Chinese authorities.148 The company was registered in the PRC with headquarter in Shanghai and its branch was registered under Polish law with office in Gdynia.149 Capital contributions by both countries were equal, totalling eighty thousand Soviet rubles (whereby the value of one ruble was fixed at 0,222167 gram of gold.).150

In the first five years of operations, all profits were to be assigned for purchasing further ships.151 Originally, each two years, ships owned by company were to change the country-of-flag and ship-register from Polish to Chinese or the other way round (Polish in the first turn).152 The managing board (zarząd) has been made out of six members, including three Poles and three Chinese. In the first two-year period, the president of the managing board (prezes zarządu) was to be Chinese, the vice-president of the managing board Polish, the chief executive officer (dyrektor generalny) Polish and the deputy chief executive officer (zastępca dyrektora generalnego) Chinese – whereas such persons responsible for company’s management (and respectively their nationality) shall be swapped each two years. 153

sometimes tough political and economical times. However, activities did not remain limited to trade between China and Poland. Meanwhile, the company has been continuously and flexibly adjusting its services and fleet capabilities according to altered international trade exchange challenges. Despite the main task of linking two continents is realised basically through regular liner service, with fortnight frequency, hooked at Hamburg and Antwerp on the one side and at Shanghai, Xingang, Dalian on the another, nowadays the expanded field of activities covers wide geographical range as from Baltic Sea, North Sea,Mediterranean and US Gulf basic ports up to Middle East and India, South East and Far East Asian destinations. Modern and multipurpose fleet of 17 geared, semi-container triple-deckers with total DWT over 395,000 and container capacity over 19,000 teu, suits perfectly for transportation of project cargo, plant materials and all kinds of general cargo. Four of those 17 vessels have been equipped with cranes able to lift pieces weighing up to 640 tonnes. Those heavy duty vessels have supported liner service in 2004 and enabled Chipolbrok to call at outports en-route, on inducement basis, where heavy cranes are unavailable. Additionally, the advantage for safe cargo handling is Chipolbrok rich experience gained over the years in carriage of awkward, overdimensioned packages, heavy lifts, transformers, metro wagons, locomotives, trunk building machines, crane parts, vehicles, steel products besides the different sort of regular commodities but also empty containers repositioned for leasing companies. In years 2009-2011 next 6 innovatively designed ships will be delivered ex Dalian shipyard. This investment will only strenghten company`s significant market position. Besides, Chipolbrok has modernised some of other types of the ships and equipped them with new cranes being able to lift pieces weighing up to 300 tonnes. For customers convenience – a net of professional agencies in all countries within sailing routes has been set up. Moreover, even complex transportation requirements like “door to door” service ex works at South/East Europe up to smaller ports at Chinese seacoast, some river and hinterland destinations might be skipped at our own, daughter forwarding & agency companies established in both China and Poland. Needless to mention, that customers’ transportation needs and requirements are the guide line and always take top priority in Chipolbrok business philosophy. The company, being the major break-bulk carrier on North Continent-Far East route, with well trained and experienced staff guarantees a very high standard of services, which was confirmed by awarded in 1999 Lloyd’s Register certificates of compliance to ISO 9002 Standards and ISM Code. Apart from shipping business, Chipolbrok is also involved in other activities like real estate and financial capital investments, shareholding in other companies.” See: ‘General Information’ CHIPOLBROK <http://www.chipolbrok.com.pl/strona.php?id=5> accessed 15 August 2016. 147 See: Shipping-Company Agreement, article 21. 148 See: Shipping-Company Agreement, article 2. 149 See: Shipping-Company Agreement, article 4. 150 See: Shipping-Company Agreement, article 7. 151 See: Shipping-Company Agreement, article 8. 152 See: Shipping-Company Agreement, article 12. 153 See: Shipping-Company Agreement, article 14.

30

Ordinary general meeting of the managing board (zebranie zwyczajne zarządu) shall be called twice a year, once in Poland and once in China.154

The company’s personnel was to be halfly Polish and halfly Chinese, yet - under the agreement - that is considered each party’s right rather than each party’s obligation.155 Both parties exempted company’s ships from registration fees and also the company itself from income tax subject to that each party could internally tax its portion of the company’s net profit.156 Both parties agreed on granting state aid to the company in various form such as operational help (with purchases of materials, fuel, handling real-estate matters etc.) by state authorities, credit lines (one million four hundred thousand Soviet rubles by each party’s central bank payable in parties’ local currencies), or national treatment (against other local state enterprises) with regard to prices for transportation services.157

The 1951 Cultural Agreement did not contain precise obligations of the parties except for general call to widely support initiatives such as (i) an organisation of cultural or scientific read-outs pertaining to the other party, (ii) awarding grants to students and academicians and organising academic exchanges, (iii) exchanging informational materials relating to education and culture, (iii) teaching Polish and Chinese language, (iv) exchanging scientific papers, (v) translating literary and scientific works and exchanging books, journals, newspapers and other publications, (vi) organising exhibition, theatrical and musical performances, film displays, (vi) facilitating co-operation between film producers and exchanging vinyl discs for radio stations, and (vii) facilitating activities of press agencies and correspondents.158 More precise conditions of the cultural cooperation were to be determined by the mixed Sino-Polish commission 159 whereby (i) the commission shall comprise two sub-commissions in each country, each sub-commission comprising four officials of the host-country and two representatives of the other country’s embassy,160 (ii) mixed commission shall meet each year alternately in Warsaw and Beijing. That agreement remained in force until 29 December 1987.

Since 1953, the PRL and the PRC have been concluding agreements on the economic (merchandise trade and related payments, following the template of the first agreement concluded in 1951161) each year, subject to a few agreements valid for more than 12 months, and such agreements were often concluded midway through a calendar year and entered into force retroactively since 1 January (see: Appendix G. Sino-Polish bilateral treaties). As to other fields of co-operation, on 20 July 1954 the PRL and the PRC concluded the agreement on technical and scientific-technical cooperation (Umowa między Rządem PRL a Centralnym Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o współpracy technicznej i naukowo-technicznej – the ‘1954 Scientific Agreement’) which provided even less details of co-operation than the abovementioned 1951 Cultural Agreement, but - similar to the 1951 Cultural Agreement – also established a mixed commission (comprising seven representatives of each party to the agreement) which should meet at least once a year alternately in Warsaw and Beijing (plus

154 See: Shipping-Company Agreement, article 15. 155 See: Shipping-Company Agreement, article 17. 156 See: Shipping-Company Agreement, article 18. 157 See: Shipping-Company Agreement, article 19. 158 See: 1951 Cultural Agreement, article 2. 159 See: 1951 Cultural Agreement, article 5. 160 See: 1951 Cultural Agreement, article 3. 161 See: note 141..

31

each party shall have a right to one permanent delegate to the capital of the other party with a view to sustain good communications).162 Since 1954, the agreement has been in force.

Sino-Polish economic relations flourished seeing that the PRC was encumbered with the Western trade-embargo and the PRL was then among the most industrialised countries of the socialist block, resulting in that in the 1950s within the framework of mentioned agreements on the economic exchange, (i) PRL’s exports to the PRC mostly included whole sets of industrial-plants-equipment, heavy machinery, transportation equipment and steel, whereas (ii) PRC’s exports to the PRL mostly included agricultural products such as canned fruits, tea and soya beans, plus tea iron ore and silk cloth.163 For the sake of good record, for example in 1958 the PRC was ex aequo with Czechoslovakia the third largest purchaser of Polish goods with a 6.8% share in PRL’s total exports compared with Soviet Union’s share of 25% and East Germany’s of 10%.164

Sino-Polish relations soon proved to have not only economic but also geopolitical dimension. After the semi-official circulation of the Khrushchev’s speech ‘On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences (О культе личности и его последствиях), which criticised Stalinism165 (Stalin died in March 1953), anti-Soviet sentiments amassed in the Soviet Union’s satellite countries (particularly in the PRL and Hungary). And some historian claim that Warsaw in 1956 – unlike Budapest – was not run over by Soviet tanks also because PRC’s diplomatic efforts to support transformation in the PRL166 It so happened that in Moscow, a few days after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held between 14 and 25 February 1956 (and concluded with the Khrushchev’s speech on the 25th), Bolesław Bierut (then the prime minister of the PRL) died (on 12 March 1956) and was replaced by Edward Ochab who, unlike Bierut, was much less of a pro-Soviet hardliner.167 The leadership of the Polish communist party (since 1948 named the Polish United Workers' Party, Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, or the PZPR) decided to print at least fifteen thousand copies (officially three thousand) of the Khrushchev’s speech,168 and the political thaw could be seen for example in that about thirty five thousand prisoners, out of which one thousand political, 162 See: 1954 Scientific Agreement, articles 2 and 3. 163 See: note 21 at 101-102. 164 See: note 21 at 102. 165 “"On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences" (Russian: «О культе личности и его последствиях») was a report by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev made to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 25 February 1956. Khrushchev's speech was sharply critical of the reign of deceased General Secretary and Premier Joseph Stalin, particularly with respect to the purges which had especially marked the last years of the 1930s. Khrushchev charged Stalin with having fostered a leadership personality cult despite ostensibly maintaining support for the ideals of communism. The speech was a milestone in the "Khrushchev Thaw". Superficially, the speech was an attempt to draw the Soviet Communist Party closer to Leninism. Khrushchev's ulterior motivation, however, was to legitimize and help consolidate his control of the Communist party and government, power obtained in a political struggle with Georgy Malenkov or firm Stalin loyalists such as Vyacheslav Molotov, who were involved to varying degrees in the purges. The Khrushchev report was known as the "Secret Speech" because it was delivered at an unpublicized closed session of Communist Party delegates, with guests and members of the press excluded. The text of the Khrushchev report was widely discussed in party cells already in early March, often with participation of non-party members; however the official Russian text was openly published only in 1989 during the glasnost campaign of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.” See: ‘On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences’ Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Cult_of_Personality_and_Its_Consequences> accessed 15 August 2016. 166 “Kremlin leaders could understand Polish workers' demands for bread, but had a harder time understanding Hungarian demands for freedom.” See: Johanna Granville, 'To Invade or Not to Invade? A New Look at Gomułka, Nagy, and Soviet Foreign Policy in 1956' (2001) 43(4) Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes 437 at 437. See also generally: Joanna Granville, 'Poland and Hungary, 1956: A Comparative Essay Based on New Archival Findings' (2002) 48(3) Australian Journal of Politics & History 369; Johanna Granville, '1956 Reconsidered: Why Hungary and Not Poland?' (2002) 80(4) The Slavonic and East European Review 656. 167 See: note 166, Granville, ‘To invade…’ at 440; Johanna Granville, 'Hungarian and Polish Reactions to the Events of 1956: New Archival Evidence' (2001) 53(7) Europe-Asia Studies 1051 at 1052; Johanna Granville, 'Reactions to the Events of 1956: New Findings from the Budapest and Warsaw Archives' (2003) 38(2) Journal of Contemporary History 261 at 263. 168 See: Tony Kemp-Welch, 'Dethroning Stalin: Poland 1956 and Its Legacy' (2006) 58(8) Europe-Asia Studies 1261 at 1264.

32

were released within the framework of the amnesty announced in April 1956.169 However, such policy-relaxation soon proved to be a double-edged sword for the PZPR as the working class, following the distribution of the Khrushchev’s speech, expected much more profound changes that the PZPR wanted to deliver, including freedom of expression, liberalisation and democratisation of trade unions and changes to the management of state enterprises (often with Yugoslavian model of workers’ self-management in mind to follow).170

On 7 April 1956, also the prior release of Gomułka, (who had been gradually removed from power by Bierut throughout 1948 and 1949 and then incarcerated between September 1951 and December 1954 because of Gomułka’s ‘right wing-reactionary deviation’ or ‘odchylenie prawicowo– nacjonalistyczne’ and conception of ‘Polish road to socialism’171) was made public. And especially after the June’s riots initiated with protests of blue-collar-workers in Poznań (poznański czerwiec) 172 more and more people within the PZPR and among the masses called for readmitting Gomulka to the PZRP and for restoring him to power.173 The June’s riots in Poznań, which according to rumours gathered even up to forty thousand industrial workers joined by up to thirty thousand farmers, were dispersed by about ten thousand deployed soldiers (without Soviet troops’ involvement) leaving over seventy dead protestors.174 Rioters were presented to the public as the hooligans.175 There was an internal feeling within the PZRP (even among less hard-line members) that riots had not been

169 See: Krzysztof Persak, 'The Polish: Soviet Confrontation in 1956 and the Attempted Soviet Military Intervention in Poland' (2006) 58(8) Europe-Asia Studies 1285 at at 1286; note 168 at 1255, 1256. 170 See: 168 note at 1266, 1271. 171 “Gradually, Gomulka developed the conception which became known as the "Polish road to socialism," although he himself seldom used the expression […].[…] To simplify Gomulka's stand somewhat, it can be reduced to the following principles: 1. Loyalty to internationalism, meaning close alliance with the Soviet Union as the basis of foreign policy, but a fully sovereign and independent determination of domestic policy. Gomulka had a negative opinion of the Comintern and its intervention in the policies of particular parties. […] Gomulka was an honest and devoted friend of the Soviet Union and would have done nothing to harm Soviet interests since he was convinced that they converged with those of socialist Poland. However, he maintained that in Polish conditions only he and his party were able to correctly articulate and realize these common interests and aims. 2. In political life, Gomulka opted for a coalition government composed of parties supporting socialist ideology (the PPR and PPS) and democratic, though not socialist, parties. […] 3. A triple-sector model of economic relations foresaw large and middle-sized industry, transport and part of the wholesale trade, as well as banks, run by the state; small industry, a considerable part of commerce and services, and part of the retail trade, run by cooperatives; the crafts and a dominant number of peasant farmsteads run privately. On a number of occasions Gomulka himself, as well as his closest colleagues, rejected the collectivization of small farms. The consequence of such a model was that market relations became an essential factor of economic life. 4. An appreciation of the national historical and cultural heritage and mentality as real factors influencing political life. […].” See: Andrzej Werblan 'Wladyslaw Gomulka and the Dilemma of Polish Communism' (1988) 9(2) International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique 143 at 149-151. 172 “The Poznań 1956 protests, also known as the Poznań 1956 uprising or Poznań June (Polish: Poznański Czerwiec), were the first of several massive protests against the government of the People's Republic of Poland. Demonstrations by workers demanding better conditions began on June 28, 1956 at Poznań's Cegielski Factories and were met with violent repression. A crowd of approximately 100,000 gathered in the city center near the local Ministry of Public Security building. About 400 tanks and 10,000 soldiers of the People's Army of Poland and the Internal Security Corps under Polish-Soviet general Stanislav Poplavsky were ordered to suppress the demonstration and during the pacification fired at the protesting civilians. The death toll was placed between 57 and over a hundred people, including a 13-year-old boy, Romek Strzałkowski. Hundreds of people sustained injuries. The Poznań protests were an important milestone on the way to the installation of a less Soviet-controlled government in Poland in October.” See: ‘Poznań 1956 protests’ Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pozna%C5%84_1956_protests> accessed 15 August 2016. 173 See: note 172, Granville, 'Hungarian and Polish Reactions…’ at 1053; note 172, Granville, 'Reactions to the Events…’ at 263. See also: note 166, Granville, ‘To invade…’ at 440-447. 174 See: note 168 at 1268. See also: note 172, Granville, 'Hungarian and Polish Reactions…’ at 1053; note 172, Granville, 'Reactions to the Events…’ at 264-265. 175 See: 168 note at 1269. Prime minister Cyrankiewicz famously stated to the public that: “every provocateur or maniac who dares to raise his hand against People's rule may be sure that, in the interest of the working class, the interest of the working peasantry and intelligentsia, in the interest of the struggle to raise the standard of living of the people, in the interest of the further democratisation of our life and in the interest of our Fatherland, the authorities will chop off his hand.” As cited/translated in: ibid.

33

spontaneous but rather well prepared in advance,176 and Soviet newspaper Pravda from 1 July 1 seized on that the text released in New York Journal-American from 30 July 1956 admitted that the “[US] Senate has framework of aid to foreign states the sum of $25 million for financing the iron curtain like that which led to the riots in Poznan.”177

Even so, soon after the riots, Ochab continued policy-relaxing initiated in March (like by further discharging Stalinist official, and further exposing failures in economic policies of the Stalinist period) whereas various factions of the PZPR where split as to what to do next during upcoming PZPR’s central committee 7th plenum to be held in July, and whereas Moscow was closely looking at the developments in Warsaw, to the extent that Soviet prime minister Nikolai Bulganin even flew to Warsaw to attend that plenum.178 Tensions between Moscow and Warsaw were further mounting after Gomułka had been re-admitted to the PZPR in August 1956 following the calls expressed during the 7th plenum and preceding the 8th plenum during which Gomułka could be (and eventually was) restored to power, 179 especially given what Gomułka said on Polish–Soviet relations during PZPR’s central committee politburo held on 12 October 1956.180 Thus, directly before the 8th plenum held 19-21 October 1956 (during which Gomułka was elected new PZPR’s first secretary on its first day), Soviets - along with Marshal of the Soviet Union and Marshal of Poland Konstantin Rokossovsky (a Soviet officer of Polish origin born as Konstanty Rokossowski) who was then largely in control of the Polish military as the then PRL’s Minister of Defence – put a lot of efforts into threatening Polish leadership like by (i) moving Soviet and Polish yet Soviet-controlled troops closer to Warsaw in response to which Polish but Gomułka-aligned troops started preparations for the defence of Warsaw, and (ii) sending Soviet naval ships toward the Bay of Gdańsk.181 In the early morning of 19 October 1956, the entire Soviet leadership landed in Warsaw to negotiate with Gomułka, including Khrushchev, Lazar Kaganovich, Vyacheslav Molotov, Anastas Mikoyan, plus many Soviet generals including the chief-commander of the Warsaw Pact Marshal Ivan Konev.182

This is where the Chinese footprint can be seen in the story of the Polish-Soviet wrestle because it is hard to believe that only Gomulka’s conciliatory attitude toward Soviet delegation (despite Khrushchev’s boorishness183) in the course of negotiations with Soviets appeased the situation. It is true that while Gonułka wanted to send Soviet advisor along with Rokossovsky back to Moscow,184 he also deeply believed in the sense of the Polish-Soviet 176 See: note 166, Granville, ‘To invade…’ at 443. 177 As cited in: note 168 note at 1270. 178 See: note 172, Granville, 'Hungarian and Polish Reactions…’ at 1054; note 172, Granville, 'Reactions to the Events…’ at 266; note 169, Persak at 1287; note 168 at 1272-1273. 179 See: note 166, Granville, ‘To invade…’ at 445. 180 For example, with regard Soviet advisors in PRL’s military, Gomułka said that day that: “we had the advisers, they are not needed, so it is obvious that any government should itself solve the issues which are of concern. We approach those who gave us these advisers and we tell them that we dismiss them. We don't co-ordinate anything with them. Nobody will respect you if you act like that. You have got to solve big issues, not just the small ones, so what are you debating about? As cited/translated in: note 169, Persak at 1289. 181 See: note 172, Granville, 'Hungarian and Polish Reactions…’ at 1054; note 172, Granville, 'Reactions to the Events…’ at 266; note 169, Persak at 1294-1297; note 168 at 1272-1273. 182 See: note 169, Persak at 1290. See also note 172, Granville, 'Hungarian and Polish Reactions…’ at 1054; note 172, Granville, 'Reactions to the Events…’ at 266; note 168 at 1272, note 166, Granville, ‘To invade…’ at 461. 183 Reportedly, immediately when they met that day Khrushchev’s shouted that that “That number won't pass here. We are ready for active intervention!” to which Gomułka responded that “[You can] talk in an aggressive tone, but if you talk with a revolver on the table you don't have a fair discussion. I can't continue under these conditions. I am ill. We can listen to the complaints of the Soviet comrades, but if decisions are to be made under the threat of physical force, I am not up to it.” See: note 172, Granville, 'Hungarian and Polish Reactions…’ at 1054; note 172, Granville, 'Reactions to the Events…’ at 266. 184 See: note 180.

34

alliance and the presence of the Soviet troops in order to secure PRL’s Western border with Germany,185 but that was not a sort of alliance which the Soviets wanted. And, it is also true that, had the Soviets wanted to intervene militarily, they would have wanted to intervene mostly with Soviet-aligned Polish troops under Rokossovsky’s control rather than with Soviet troops, but they were not sure on which Polish military units they could actually count.186 Nonetheless, while Soviet leaders were buying time by allowing the 8th plenum to elect Gomułka as the new leader (first secretary) of the PZRP, they were actually seeking satellite countries’ endorsement of the intervention and, after securing support from Czechoslovakia and East Germany, they failed to secure the support for the intervention by the PRC’s government. The background of the PRC’s support for the reformist movement in the PRL could, perhaps, be traced to Ochab’s visit to Beijing in late September 1956, during which, according to New York Times, Mao reportedly told to Ochab that “the Poles should go ahead in their efforts to obtain internal independence and develop their own Socialist system as the Yugoslavs have done,”187 and the reason for such PRC’s stance on the developments in the PRL apparently lay in that Beijing already then had been for some time drifting away from Moscow, opposing Soviet Union’s 'great-power chauvinism.’188

Various authors differ as to how the Chinese veto on the potential soviet military solution to the developments in the PRL was passed to Soviet leadership. Kemp-Welch refers to Torańska’s works, according to which Zhou Enlai later reportedly told Gomułka that he personally called Moscow insisting on the non-military solution189 whereas Persak refers to Werblan’s works according to which, about a week after the 8th plenum, Mao communicated to the Polish Ambassador to Beijing Stanisław Kiryluk that “between 19 and 22 October the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party received a series of messages from the Politburo of the CPSU indicating that the Soviet comrades did not approve the programme of the Eighth Plenum of the PUWP and their attitude vis-a-vis changes in Poland was negative. The Politburo of the CCP addressed the Politburo of the CPSU with request to revise their standpoint,” and later on 3 December 1956 that (i) “the Soviet comrades asked the leadership of the CCP for approval of the use of armed forces [in Poland],” and (ii) “the CCP categorically opposed the Soviet plans and immediately sent their delegation headed by Liu Shaoqui to Moscow in order to present the Chinese standpoint in a direct way.”190 Persak also refers to the works of then Renmín Ribao’s and Xinhua’s chief Wu Lengxi who participated in the meeting of the PRC’s politburo and recalled in his memoires that Mao called a special politburo’s meeting relating to the situation in the PRL in the course of which Chinese leaders made an unanimous decision to oppose any Soviet military intervention against Warsaw, and after which Soviet ambassador to Beijing Pavel Yudin was advised by Mao that, should any military intervention happen, PRC’s government “would be vehement in

185 See: note 166, Granville, ‘To invade…’ at 445. During the eight plenum on 19 October 1056, Gomułka said: "Poland needs friendship with the Soviet Union more than the Soviet Union needs friendship with Poland.... Without the Soviet Union we cannot maintain our borders with the West." A cited in: ibid. 186 See: note 172, Granville, 'Hungarian and Polish Reactions…’ at 1055; note 172, Granville, 'Reactions to the Events…’ at 267. See also: note 168 at 1273-1274 187 See: Sydney Gruson, 'Red China Supports Poles Against Moscow Dictation' New York Times (16 October 1956) 1. See also: note 21 at 95; note 168 at 1274. 188 See: note 168 at 1274. See also: note 21 at 96; 189 See: note 168 at 1274. See also: Teresa Torańska, Oni: Stalin's Polish Puppets London (Collins/Harvill, London 1987) at 55-60. 190 See: note 169, Persak at 1297. See also: Andrzej Werblan, 'Chiny a polski Październik 1956' (1996)(10) Dziś at 125, 127.

35

its protest”191 (although it is not entirely clear if that happened on 19 October when the Soviet delegation was still in Warsaw or on 20 October when Soviet leaders were already back to Moscow192).

In any case, to cut the long story short, Soviet leaders left Warsaw on 20 October in the morning,193 on 21 December decided that no military intervention would take place,194 and on 22 October even agreed that Soviet officers and advisors working within the structures of the Polish military could be recalled to Soviet Union, 195 and Rokossovsky was eventually dismissed on 10 November 1954 which truly marked an end on an epoch in the history of post-war Poland. 196 The strong foundations of the Polish-Soviet geo-political ties remained in place whereby Soviet Union was to guarantee PRL’s Western border and Soviet troops were to keep stationing on the Polish territory and maintain their transit rights, but in many other respects Polish sovereignty especially with regard to socio-economic matters was largely restored. 197 A few weeks after the conclusion of the 8th plenum, under new Gomułka’s rule, among other policy-changes, the process of farming-collectivisation was stopped, and subsequently gradually reverted, farmers’ co-operatives ceased to be mandatory, relations between the government and the Catholic Church dramatically improved etc. 198 Meanwhile, with regard to Sino-Polish relations, New York from 18 April 1957, in a non-authored article titled 'Warsaw-Peiping Axis’ observed that (i) “[t]he political romance between Communist Poland and Communist China has been one of the most remarkable, and most important developments of the past year,” and (ii) “[t]had the Soviet leaders are entirely pleased by these developments would seem highly dubious, yet they have had to accept them with only relatively minor public display of displeasure.”199

In April 1957, during prime minister Cyrankiewicz’s visit to Beijing, governments of the PRL and PRC signed a joint declaration confirming the mutual understanding that (i) the relations between socialist counties should be guided by the principles of mutual respect and equality, and (ii) each country of the social block should achieve socialism in accordance with its own conditions.200 Nonetheless, first cracks on those ‘rosy’ relations could be seen already during which Zhou Enlai’s diplomatic tour of socialist capitals in January 1957 when he (ii) first visited Warsaw where he and Gomułka strongly differed on the assessment of Stalin’s rule, about which there had been nothing good in Gomułka’s judgement,201 and (ii) a few days later in Moscow openly quarrelled with Khrushchev, openly accusing Soviet Union of ‘great

191 See: note 169, Persak at 1297-1298. See also: Jian Chen, The New Cold War History: Mao's China and the Cold War (1) (The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, US 2010) 415 at 147. 192 According to Wu Lengxi’s memoirs, the special politburo relating to the situation in Poland was held on 20 October 1956 but Persak argues that it must have been 19 October instead, in the following way: “In Wu Lengxi's memoirs there are, however, some chronological dates of events described seem to be one day 'late'. Also the Yudin was recorded by Wu Lengxi under the date of 20 although the information referred to by Wu, arriving Politburo Standing Committee, indicated that it could have (Alternatively, perhaps the difference of dates results from of time zones between Warsaw and Beijing.) So one cannot that Khrushchev got to know about the Chinese objection as Warsaw and that it influenced his decision to cease the advance columns.” See: note 169, Persak at 1298. 193 See: See: note 168 at 1274. 194 See: note 169, Persak at 1302. 195 See: note 169, Persak at 1303 196 See: note 169, Persak at 1308. See also: note 168 at 1278. 197 See: note 168 at 1278. 198 See: note 168 at 1278, 1282; note 171, Werblan at 143 199 See: --'Warsaw-Peping Axis' New York Times (1957) 28. See also: note 21 at 94. 200 See: note 21 at 99. 201 See: Lorenz M. Lüthi, 'China and East Europe, 1956-1960' (2015) 22(1) Modern China Studies 233 at 243.

36

power chauvinism.’202 It seems that the rightist or reformist factions within Polish communist movement (which took over the power after 8th plenum) had simply been taken in the Mao’s ‘Hundred Flowers Campaign’ which had been announced in 1956 but in 1957 was in fact already over.203 Yet in April 1957, during Cyrankiewicz’s visit to Beijing, Polish delegation discussed with Chinese the assumption of the Hundred Flowers Campaign (fully revealed in secret to Polish officials in February204) as well as the contradictions and divergences within Soviet block.205 Moreover, after Gomułka had been slated by Khrushchev in Moscow in May 1957 for Cyrankiewicz’s April’s visit to the PRC and threatened with economic hardship for further standing up to the Soviet Union, Poles leaked to the New York Times the full version of the Hundred Flowers Campaign in order irritate Moscow but, by doing so, infuriated Beijing instead.206

The November’s communist countries’ summit only further revealed that PRC’s and PRL’s roads to socialism more diverged than harmonised seeing that while Gomułka (in contrast to Yugoslavia’s delegation) signed the declaration on the unity of Soviet block under joint Sino-Soviet pressure, he still insisted on his concept separate roads to socialism and was harshly criticised by Mao for not cracking down on Polish revisionist whereas the PRC, despite having increasing ideological discrepancies with Soviet Union (or just simply increasingly divergent interests) was still reliant on Soviet industrial help and, therefore, was still strongly interested in the solidarity of the socialist block.207

After this political rift, both the PRC and the PRL continued with the business-as-usual by trading based on subsequent economic-exchange agreements but for many years new agreements were not concluded subject to:

(i) the Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on method of non - commercial payments accounting (Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o sposobie rozliczeń płatności niehandlowych) signed in February 1958, and

(ii) the Amending Protocol of the Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Central Government of the People's Republic of China on technical and scientific-technical cooperation (Protokół zmieniający Umowę między Rządem PRL a Centralnym Rządem ChRL o współpracy technicznej i naukowo-technicznej, podpisaną w Warszawie dnia 20 lipca 1954 r) signed in June 1964.

Since 1961, Sino-Polish economic-exchange agreements also mentioned the ‘Protocol between the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the People’s Republic of Poland and Ministry of Foreign Trade of the People’s Republic of China on the general conditions of supplies of goods between trade-organisations of both Parties’ (Protokół między Ministerstwem Handlu Zagranicznego Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej i Ministerstwa Handlu Zagranicznego Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej w sprawie ogólnych warunkóe dostaw towarów między

202 See: note 201 at 243. 203 See: note 21 at 100. 204 See: note 201 at 247, note 21 at 101. 205 See: note 21 at 100. 206 See: note 201 at 246-248. 207 See: note 21 at 101-102.

37

organizacjami handlu obu Stron na 1962 rok) of 10 July 1961 as the more general regulatory framework also applicable mutatis mutandis in subsequent years.208

Such status quo in Sino-Polish economic relations was not changed until the very eve of the Martial Law in the PRL (introduced on 13 December 1981, ten days later followed by the US economic sanctions imposed on the PRL 209 ) when - instead of the ordinary economic exchange agreement - the PRC and the PRL entered into the Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on meat delivery from China to Poland on long-term, non-interest credit conditions (Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL w sprawie dostaw mięsa z Chin do Polski na warunkach długoterminowego, nie oprocentowanego kredytu- the ‘1981 Meat Agreement’), according to which:

(i) the government of the PRC shall supply fifty thousand tons of frozen pork and grant a long-term interest-free loan for the purchase of that meat,210

(ii) the government of the PRL shall pay the loan back in two instalments in fully convertible currency agreed upon by the parties, whereby the payment for the supplies of meat delivered yet in 1981 will done until 30 November 1992 and the repayment for supplies of meat delivered in 1982 will be done until 30 November 1993.211

(iii) the inflation shall be factored-in in the amount of the repayment in the way that the parties shall first determine the interim FOB (‘free on board’) USD-denominated price of the Chinese pork and compare it with the market price on Amsterdam’s commodities exchange (as of September 1981 with delivery in October 1981) and subsequently, respectively in October 1992 and October 1993, parties shall use this ratio to determine the amount of loan’s repayment based on current prices of pork on Amsterdam’s commodities exchange (as of September with delivery in October of respectively 1992 and 1993).212

In 1982 and in the following years, the PRC and the PRL again concluded standard economic exchange agreements but, on top of that, also concluded further agreements on general and meat-specific trade credits. In march 1983, the PRC and the PRL signed:

(i) the Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on granting Poland the commodity credit by China (Porozumienie między Rządem PRL i Rządem ChRL o udzieleniu Polsce przez Chiny kredytu towarowego – the ‘1983 Loan Agreement’) and

(ii) the Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on meat delivery from China to Poland on long-term, non-interest credit conditions (Porozumienie między Rządem

208 See: 1961 Economic Exchange Agrement, article 3. 209 See generally: Andrzej Paczkowski, and Malcolm Byrne, From Solidarity to Martial Law (Central European University Press, New York 2007). 210 See: 1981 Meat Agreement, article 1. 211 See: 1981 Meat Agreement, article 2. 212 See: 1981 Meat Agreement, article 3.

38

PRL a Rządem ChRL w sprawie dostaw mięsa z Chin do Polski na warunkach długoterminowego, nieoprocentowanego kredytu - the ‘1983 Meat Agreement’).

The 1983 Loan Agreement stipulated that (i) the government of the PRC shall grant a trade credit to the government of the PRL amounting to fifty million CHF with an annual interest rate of 5%,213 and (ii) the government of the PRL will repay it in 1988 in kind, including mining machinery and other goods to be later agreed upon by the parties.214 The list of goods credited by the Chinese party included tea, rapeseed oil, cotton fabric, clothing including work-wear, rubber footwear, school/office stationary, and tires.215 In turn the 1983 Meat Agreement covered twenty thousand tons of frozen pork with repayment due in November 1994,216 and the provisions on the calculation of the amount to be repaid were identical with analogical provisions of the 1981 Meat Agreement.217 The meat-related arrangement was again repeated under yet another agreement on meat-related trade credit to be granted by the government of the PRC to the government of the PRL concluded in January 1984 (the ‘1984 Meat Agreement’), under which the PRC promised to deliver ten thousand tons of frozen pork but with shorter repayment period set for November 1989.218

Apart from trade-in goods issues, in July 1984, the PRC and the PRL concluded:

(i) pretty standard consular convention which entered into force in February 1985,219

(ii) the Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on economic and technological cooperation (Umowa między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o współpracy gospodarczej i technicznej - the ‘1984 Economic and Technical Agreement’), along with the Protocol between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the establishment of the Polish - Chinese Committee for economic, commercial, scientific and technical cooperation (Protokół między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL w sprawie utworzenia Polsko-Chińskiego Rządowego Komitetu Współpracy gospodarczej, handlowej i naukowo-technicznej - the ‘1984 Committee Agreement’), and

(iii) the Agreement between the Polish People's Republic and the People's Republic of China on cooperation in the field of health protection and medical science (Porozumienie o współpracy między PRL a ChRL w dziedzinie ochrony zdrowia i nauk medycznych – the ‘1984 Medical Agreement’).

The 1984 Economic and Technical Agreement provided a general regulatory framework relating, among others, to (i) joint research, exchange and transfer of technique and technology, (ii) seconding professionals and technical staff, providing technical services and technical training, (iii) developing industrial/production co-operation and increasing mutual

213 See: 1983 Loan Agreement, article 1. 214 See: 1983 Loan Agreement, article 2. 215 See: 1983 Loan Agreement, appendix to article 1. 216 See: 1983 Meat Agreement, articles 1 and 2. 217 See: 1983 Meat Agreement, article 3. 218 See: 1984 Meat Agreement, articles 1-3. 219 See: Consular Convention between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China(Konwencja konsularna między Rządem PRL a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej) Polish Official Journal (1985) no. 8 item. 24.

39

supplies also with an option of exporting to third countries’ markets, (iv) mutually providing technical consultancies regarding joint projects in third countries.220 The details of the co-operation were to be provided in project-specific agreements concluded by relevant authorities of both parties in accordance with subsequent agreements on economic exchange.221 As to intellectual property right, the agreement provided that parties could not transfer joint-project-related technique/technology and/or machinery as well as research results to third countries. 222 Parties also granted upon each other the most-favoured-nation treatment in terms of technical co-operation (subject to customs unions, trade blocks, bilateral trade agreements, free trade agreements, and agreements on frontier trade).223 The 1984 Medical Agreement was similar to the 1984 Economic and Technical Agreement in terms of scientific co-operation. 224 The 1984 Economic and Technical Agreement expired in 1995 based in the Agreement in the form of an exchange of notes between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on expiry of certain agreement (Porozumienie w formie wymiany not między Rządem RP a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej ws przeglądu umów dwustronnych zawartych przed 31 grudnia 1993 r. – the ‘1995 Review Agreement’) whereas the 1984 Medical Agreement expired in 2007.

In March 1986, the PRC and the PRL concluded the Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China relating to civil air transport (Umowa między Rządem PRL a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o cywilnej komunikacji lotniczej) which entered into force in August 1986 (the ‘1986 Civil Aviation Agreement’). According to the 1986 Civil Aviation Agreement, each party was to choose one ‘designated’ airline, 225 in which “[t]he substantial ownership and effective control of the airline designated by each contracting party shall remain vested in such contracting party or its nationals.” 226 Designated airlines were to provide ‘agreed services’ and fly across ‘agreed routs’ as specified in the schedule to the agreement, and offer charter flight only upon receiving additional authorisations.227 At the airports of the other party to the agreement, the designated airlines were to be “charged for the use of airports, facilities and technical services of other Contracting Party at fair and reasonable rate prescribed by the appropriate authorities of the other Contracting Party” 228 and “[s]uch rates shall not be higher than those paid by airlines of other States engaged in international air services for the use of similar facilities and services.”229

As to taxes, under the 1986 Civil Aviation Agreement:

(i) “[a]ircraft operated on international air services by the designated airline of the Contracting party, as well as their regular equipment, spare parts, supplies of fuels, oils (including hydraulic fuels) lubricants and aircraft stores (including food,

220 See: 1984 Economic and Technical Agreement, article 2. 221 See: 1984 Economic and Technical Agreement, article 3. 222 See: 1984 Economic and Technical Agreement, article 4. 223 See: 1984 Economic and Technical Agreement, article 5. 224 See: 1984 Medical Agreement, article 2. 225 See: 1986 Civil Aviation Agreement, article 3.1. 226 See: 1986 Civil Aviation Agreement, article 3.2. 227 See: 1986 Civil Aviation Agreement, article 2. 228 See: 1986 Civil Aviation Agreement, article 5.2. 229 See: ibid.

40

beverages and tobacco) on board such aircraft shall be exempt from all customs duties, inspection fees or taxes on arriving in the territory of the other Contracting Party, provide such equipment and supplies remain on board the aircraft up to such time as they are reeexported,” 230

(ii) “[s]upplies of fuels, oils (including hydraulic fluids), lubricants, spare parts, regular equipment and aircraft stores introduced into the territory of each Contracting Country by or on behalf of the designated airline of the other Contracting Party or taken on board the aircraft operated by such designated airline and intended solely for use in the operation of international air services shall be exempt from all duties and charges including custom duties and inspection fees imposed in the territory of the first Contracting Party even when those supplies are to be used on the parts of the journey performed over the territory of the contracting Party in which they are taken on board,”231 and

(iii) “[e]ither Contracting Party undertakes to grant the designated airline of the other Contracting Party the right for free transfer, at the official rate of exchange, of the excess of receipt over expenditure achieved in its territory in connection with the carriage of passengers, baggage, cargo and mail by the said designated airline.” 232

As to tariffs, the 1986 Civil Aviation Agreement provided that “[t]he tariffs on any agreed services shall be established at reasonable levels, due regard being paid to all relevant factors including cost of operation, reasonable profit, characteristics of service (such as standards of speed and accommodation) and the tariffs of other airlines for any part of the specified route,” 233 The tariffs were to be in the first place determined by an agreement between designated airlines,234 and – if such agreement could not be reached – tariffs were to be determined by an agreement by ‘aeronautical authorities’ of the parties.235 And - if the agreement by aeronautical authorities could not be reached – the issue of tariffs was to be referred for governmental consultations. 236 The original schedule to the agreement, specifying agreed services and agreed routes, listed one route between Warsaw and Beijing for designated airlines of each country237 and, as such, this agreement is still in force.

In May 1986, the PRC and the PRL concluded the Long Term Trade Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China for the years 1986 – 1990 (Wieloletnia Umowa handlowa między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL na lata 1986-1990 – the ’1986 Trade Agreement’). It was the last trade agreement listing specific exported goods characteristic for centrally planned economies.238 Although that was a long-term agreement, it still provided that the lists of goods specified in the attachments to the agreement might be adjusted and or supplemented in the course of

230 See: 1986 Civil Aviation Agreement, article 6.1. 231 See: 1986 Civil Aviation Agreement, article 6.2. 232 See: 1986 Civil Aviation Agreement, article 8. 233 See: 1986 Civil Aviation Agreement, article 12.1. 234 See: 1986 Civil Aviation Agreement, article 12.2. 235 See: 1986 Civil Aviation Agreement, article 12.3. 236 See: 1986 Civil Aviation Agreement, article 12.4. 237 See: 1986 Civil Aviation Agreement, schedule. 238 See: 1986 Trade Agreement, article 1.

41

consultations and negotiations on year-specific executive protocols on economic exchange and payments.239

In September of the same year, the PRC and the PRL replaced the 1951 Cultural Agreement with the Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on cultural and scientific cooperation (Umowa między Rządem PRL a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o współpracy kulturalnej i naukowej – the ‘1986 Cultural and Scientific Agreement’). 240 The 1986 Cultural and Scientific Agreement, in addition to very general statements on the cultural co-operation and exchange also found in the previous agreement, added similar provisions related to fundamental research, life sciences as well as to biological, technological, medical and social sciences.241 The agreement also specified that the parties shall ‘support’ mutual recognition of certificates, diplomas, academic degrees and titles in accordance with ‘relevant agreement’242 yet no such more detailed agreement was signed back then. The agreement ditched previously existing joint commission,243 providing instead simply that governments will agree on periodical intergovernmental plans of cultural and scientific exchange along with general financial framework of such co-operation. 244

In June 1987, the PRC and the PRL concluded the Agreement between the People's Republic of Poland and the People's Republic of China on legal assistance in civil and criminal cases (Umowa między PRL a Chińską Republiką Ludową o pomocy prawnej w sprawach cywilnych i karnych – the ‘1987 Legal Assistance Agreement’) which still remains in force.245 The 1987 Legal Assistance Agreement regulates not only the mutual provision of legal aid between the PRC and the PRL but also numerous other issues. With regard to providing legal aid sensu stricto, the agreement provides among others that: (i) such aid shall be provided via central authorities designated by each party,246 (ii) documents/motions shall be done in the official language of one party along with the translation into the language of the other party and/or in English.247 In criminal cases, each party could refuse to provide aid if (i) the act/conduct to which the motion for help pertains does not constitute a criminal offence under the laws of the party asked to provide help, or (ii) in the judgment of the party asked to provide help, the offence to which the motion for help pertains is of political or of military nature.248

Next, with regard to court fees, the 1987 Legal Assistance Agreement’ provides that (i) judicial authorities of one party shall not require citizens of the other party who reside in the first party to secure the future cost of litigation, 249 (ii) citizens of one party shall pay the same court fees related to proceedings on the territory of the other party as citizens of the other party, 250 (iii) those provisions shall also apply to legal entities,251 and (iv) citizens of one 239 See: 1986 Trade Agreement, article 2. 240 See: 1986 Cultural and Scientific Agreement, article 14. 241 See: 1986 Cultural and Scientific Agreement, article 4. 242 See: 1986 Cultural and Scientific Agreement, article 5.f. 243 See: note 160. 244 See: 1986 Cultural and Scientific Agreement, article 13. 245 See: Official Journal (1988) no. 9 item. 65. 246 See: 1987 Legal Assistance Agreement, article 6. 247 See: 1987 Legal Assistance Agreement, article 8. 248 See: 1987 Legal Assistance Agreement, article 24. 249 See: 1987 Legal Assistance Agreement, article 2. 250 See: 1987 Legal Assistance Agreement, article 3.

42

party shall have the right to a full or partial exemption from court fees equal with the analogical right of citizens of the other party.252 With regard to legalization of documents, the agreement provides that documents made or certified by courts or other authorities of the parties and marked with official stamps do not need to be apostilled. 253 With regard to giving witness or expert statement on the territory of the other party, the agreement provides that witnesses and experts, regardless of their citizenship who appeared in the court of the other party, cannot be called to account by the other party in any form or arrested in relation to (i) an offence committed before crossing such other party’s state border, and/or (ii) statements or opinions made on the proceedings in question, and/or (iii) offence to which the proceedings in question pertains.254

Moreover, the 1987 Legal Assistance Agreement also regulates the recognition of courts’ decisions and arbitration awards. With regard to court awards, the agreement stipulates that the provisions on recognition shall apply to (i) court decisions in civil cases (defined as ‘also including’ moral and economic rights in the field of commercial, family and labour law255), (ii) court decisions in criminal cases which pertain to motions for civil compensation, and (iii) decisions of public authorities competent to handle inheritance matters.256 The agreements lists a number of pretty standards reasons for which each party can refuse to recognise decisions made by the courts of the other party, including contradiction with the elementary principles of law or public order of the party on which territory the court decision would have been recognised.257 In turn, with regard to arbitration awards, the agreement provides that the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards shall apply.258

Finally, in November 1987, the PRC and the PRL concluded the Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China concerning conclusion of the Agreement on mutual establishment of General Consulates: the Polish People's Republic's in Guangzhou and the People's Republic of China's in the one of PPR's town (Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL dotyczące zawarcia Porozumienia w sprawie wzajemnego ustanowienia Konsulatów Generalnych - PRL w Guangzhou i jeszcze jednego ChRL w jednym z miast PRL).

3. Sino-Polish relations after Polish transformation

3.1. Prior to Poland’s accession to the EU

A true demarcation line for the Polish transition from centrally-planned economy to market-economy was not any major political event but rather the adoption of the 1988 Act on economic activity (Ustawa z dnia 23 grudnia 1988 r. o działalności gospodarczej) which entered into force on 1 January 1989259and is commonly known as the ‘Wilczek Act’ named

251 See: 1987 Legal Assistance Agreement, article 4. 252 See: 1987 Legal Assistance Agreement, article 5. 253 See: 1987 Legal Assistance Agreement, article 27. 254 See: 1987 Legal Assistance Agreement, article 28. 255 See: 1987 Legal Assistance Agreement, article 12. 256 See: 1987 Legal Assistance Agreement, article 16. 257 See: 1987 Legal Assistance Agreement, article 20. 258 See: 1987 Legal Assistance Agreement, article 21. 259 See: Polish Official Journal (1988) no. 41 item 324.

43

after Mieczysław Wilczek the then minister of industry in the cabinet of prime minister Mieczycław Rakowski.260 It is true that (i) legislative elections of June 1989 (first and second round on 4th and 18 June) were the first partly free elections in the history of post-war Poland,261 (ii) the amendment to the PRL’s constitution of April 1989 (Ustawa z dnia 7 kwietnia 1989 r. o zmianie Konstytucji Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej262) brought a lot of initial institutional changes, and (iii) importantly from the symbolic perspective, in December 1989 the name of the country was changed from the PRL back to the Republic of Poland (Rzeczpospolita Polska sometimes also referred to as 3rd Polish Republic or Trzecia Rzeczypospolita).263

However, it was the Wilczek Act what really changed entrepreneurial Poles’ life 264 by generally deregulating economic activities which could be conducted without authorization subject to activities related to mining (prospection, exploration and exploitation), tooling and sales of gemstones and precious metals, production and sales of munitions, production and sales of pharmaceuticals and sanitary equipment, production of spirits or tobacco, sea transport, air transport, running pharmacies, and security services.265 The Wall Street Journal from 19 July 1989 noted on Mr. Wilczek among others that “[a]s a Communist, it soon became clear, Mr. Wilczek has something in common with many of Poland's Roman Catholics: He may belong, but he doesn't believe. "There haven't been Communists in Poland for a long time," he says. "Nobody wants to hear about Marx and Lenin anymore." Mr. Wilczek comes out foursquare for private ownership and dead set against unions. Among 19th-century thinkers he would seem to lean more toward Carnegie and Gould.”266

In Sino-Polish relations, the strong Poland’s tide toward free market economy was reflected in the set of the agreements concluded between Poland and the PRC signed in Beijing in June, including:

(i). the Development Programme on economic, scientific and technical long term cooperation between the Polish People's Republic and the People's Republic of China (Program rozwoju wieloletniej współpracy gospodarczej i naukowo-technicznej między PRL a Chińską Republiką Ludową – the ‘1988 Co-operation Agreement’),

260 “Chosen to head the Industry Ministry was Mieczyslaw Wilczek, a 56-year-old Communist Party member who left a lucrative job in state industry to found a successful animal-feeds company that employs 60 people. He is also part owner of an enterprise that buys rabbit skins for use in apparel.” See: John Tagliabue, 'Poland Names New Officials to Bolster Economy' New York Times (14 October 1988) 7. 261 See generally: Voytek Zubek 'The threshold of Poland's transition: 1989 electoral campaign as the last act of a united solidarity' (1991) 24(4) Studies in Comparative Communism 355; Paul Lewis 'Non-Competitive Elections and Regime Change: Poland 1989' (1990) 43(1) Parliamentary Affairs 90. 262 See: Polish Official Journal (1989) no. 19 item 101. 263 See: Polish Official Journal (1989) no. 75 item. 444. 264 “In Poland, the so-called ‘Wilczek law’ on business activity, named after industry minister Mieczyslaw Wilczek and passed in December 1988, was the backbone of economic freedom in early 1990s. Then, Poland was still a communist country with its first semi-democratic elections scheduled for June 1989, so the economic freedom preceded political freedom. The Wilczek law stated that every citizen was free to launch a business providing that he fulfilled conditions stated in the law. Economic freedom was unbelievable by today’s standards. The law required only that businesses should meet safety requirements and should ensure that employees had proper skills to perform their tasks, if specific regulations require such qualifications. Only a few specific sectors, such as mining and the trading and production of weapons, pharmaceutical products, alcohol, and tobacco, required a licence to start a business at the time. Moreover, according to the law, the government was given a right to shorten this list but did not have the right to extend it to new sectors.” See: Oskar Kowalewski, and Krzysztof Rybiński, 'The hidden transformation: the changing role of the state after the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe' (2011) 27(4) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 634 at 637. 265 See: WIlczek Act, Article 11. 266 See: Barry Newman, 'The Privatizer: Polish Entrepreneur, Now Industry Minister, Takes a Capitalist Line --- Mieczyslaw Wilczek, Known As the 'Polish Iacocca,' Thrives in Era of Reform --- Giving Shares to Apparatchiks' Wall Street Journal (19 Jully 1989) 1.

44

(ii) the Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on mutual abolition of visa requirements for official travels (Umowa między Rządem PRL a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o wzajemnym zniesieniu obowiązku wizowego przy podróżach służbowych – the ‘1988 Visa Agreement’),

(iii) the Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China for the avoidance of the double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income (Umowa między Rządem PRL a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej w sprawie unikania podwójnego opodatkowania i zapobiegania uchylaniu się od opodatkowania w zakresie podatków od dochodu – the ‘1988 Taxation Agreement’), and

(iv) the Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the reciprocal encouragement and protection on investments (Umowa między Rządem PRL a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej w sprawie wzajemnego popierania i ochrony inwestycji – the ‘1988 BIT’).

The 1988 Visa Agreement replaced some previous arrangements on visa-free travels (the agreement mentions exchanges of diplomatic notes from 1956 and 1962 between PRL’s embassy in Beijing and PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs267) and regulated not only visa-free travels by public officials (i.e. holders of diplomatic passports, official/service passports and ordinary passports for official use) but also visa-free border-crossing by the holders of seafarer books and flight crew licences (the latter only in the case of the holders of Polish documents crossing PRC’s border).268 In turn, the 1988 Co-operation agreement was a pretty hollow document of merely declaratory nature, and its conclusion resulted from first secretary of the PZPR general Wojciech Jaruzelski’s visit to the PRC in 1986 and General Secretary of the PRC’s Communist Party Zhao Ziyang’s to visit to PRL in 1987.269 Instead of identifying any priorities of co-operation and offering some solutions, it listed virtually all possible fields of industrial and scientific co-operation 270 (until December 2000! 271) and set up another intergovernmental co-operation committee, the works of which were meant to be co-ordinated by parties’ authorities responsible for economic planning272 which was then already behind the times.

Discussing the 1988 Taxation Agreement in details would go much beyond the scope of this paper yet its main principles (which are of course subjected to many exceptions) can be summarised as follows. As to the income from immovable property, such income of a resident of one party derived from immovable property situated in the other party shall only be taxed in the other party.273 As to ‘business profits,’ an enterprise of one party shall only be taxed by the other party if it carries on business through a permanent establishment in the

267 See: 1988 Visa Agreement, article 9. 268 See: 1988 Visa Agreement, article 2. 269 See: 1988 Co-operation Agreement, preamble. 270 See: 1988 Co-operation Agreement, articles 2 and 3. 271 See: 1988 Co-operation Agreement, article 7. See also: Jeanne L Wilson, '“The Polish lesson:” China and Poland 1980–1990' (1990) 23(3) Studies in Comparative Communism 259 at 268-269. 272 See: 1988 Co-operation Agreement, article 6. 273 See: 1988 Taxation Agreement, article 6.

45

other party. 274 As to ‘shipping and transport,’ the operation of ships or aircraft in international traffic shall only be taxed by the party on the territory of which the effective management of such transport enterprise is carried out.275 As to transfers prices, subjected to the control of such prices are ‘associated enterprises’ where association is defined as (i) direct or indirect participation in management, control, or capital of an enterprise of the other party, or (ii) sameness of persons involved in direct or indirect participation in management, control, or capital of an enterprise of the other party.276 As to dividends, the dividends paid out by an enterprise of one party to residents of the other party can only be taxed up to ten per cent by the first party.277 Likewise, as to interests, the interests arising in one party and paid to residents of the other party can only be taxed up to ten per cent by the first party.278

As to royalties, the maximum amount of the tax imposed by the party (on the territory of which royalties arise) on such royalties paid to residents of the other party depends on the type of intellectual property right. In the case of payment for “the use of, or the right to use any copyright of literary, artistic or scientific work, including cinematograph films, and films or tapes for radio or television broadcasting, or any patent, know-how, trademark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process” that shall be up to ten per cent whereas in the case of the payment for “the use or the right to use, any industrial, commercial or scientific equipment” that shall be up to seven per cent.279

The 1988 BIT is a typical traditional bilateral investment treaty (‘BIT’) offering state-state dispute settlement mechanism. The agreement defines (i) the investment as “every kind of asset made as investment in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Contracting party accepting the investment in its territory, including mainly (i) movable and immovable property and other rights in rem, (ii) shares in companies or other form of interest in such companies, (iii) a claim to money or to any performance having an economic value , (iv) copy right, industrial property right, know-how and technical process,” 280 and the investor as “(i) any natural person who is a citizen of one of the Contracting Parties and has made in investment in the other Contracting Party’s territory; (ii) any juridical person, organization or association with or without legal personality, constituted in accordance with the legislation of one of the Contracting Parties, having its seat in the territory of this Contracting party and having made an investment in the other Contracting Party territory.”281

As under typical BITs, under the 1988 BIT, “[t]he treatment and protection referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be less favourable than accorded to investments and activities associated with investment of investors of any third state” 282 (as always subject to “customs union, free trade zone, economic union, organisation of mutual economic assistance, any international agreement, arrangement or domestic legislation taxation, any regulation to

274 See: 1988 Taxation Agreement, article 7. 275 See: 1988 Taxation Agreement, article 8. 276 See: 1988 Taxation Agreement, article 9. 277 See: 1988 Taxation Agreement, article 10. 278 See: 1988 Taxation Agreement, article 10. 279 See: 1988 Taxation Agreement, article 11. 280 See: 1988 BIT, article 1.a.. 281 See: 1988 BIT, article 9. 282 See: 1988 BIT, article 3.1.

46

facilitate the trade”).283 Investments can be expropriated nationalised or taken with similar measures “for security reason or public purpose” and the compensation “shall be equivalent to the value of expropriated investment assets at the time when expropriation is proclaimed.” 284 Typically for the BITs concluded by the post-communist economies, the 1988 BIT also provides that (i) “[i]f and investor considers the expropriation […] incompatible with the laws of the Contracting Party taking the expropriatory measures, the competent court of the Contracting Party taking expropriatory measures may, upon the request of the investor, review the said expropriation,” 285 and (ii) “[i]nvestors of one Contracting Party who suffer losses in respect of their investment in the territory of the other Contracting Party owing to was, a state of national emergency, insurrection, riot or other similar events, shall be accorder by the Contracting Party, if it takes relevant measures, treatment no less favourable than that accorded to investors of a third State.”286

The disputes concerning the application or the interpretation of the 1988 BIT, which cannot be solved ‘via diplomatic channels’ within six months, can be submitted to ad hoc arbitration, and – if parties have failed to constitute an arbitration panel (three-person body) within four months from the notice of arbitration – the arbitration panel shall be appointed by the president of the International Court of Justice.287 The same rules apply to disputes merely related to the amount of compensation for the expropriated investment, subject to that the arbitration procedure shall be preceded with maximum one-year period for solving the issue by the party receiving investment instead of maximum six-months period for consultation via diplomatic channels.288 Finally, the 1988 BIT Applies to both investments made prior to or after its entry into force and - in the case of its termination – its provisions “shall continue to be effective for a further period of ten years from such date of termination.”289

Pretty obviously, the conclusion of the 1988 did not mean that the entrepreneurs originating in the PRC or the PRL could freely invest in the other country. While the complexity of the PRC’s various restrictions on foreign investment is widely known, also the PRL at its early stage of economic transition toward free-market economy introduced similar measures. The 1988 Act on Economic Activity with the participation of foreigners (Ustawa z dnia 23 grudnia 1988 r. o działalności gospodarczej z udziałem podmiotów zagranicznych – the ‘1988 Foreign Companies Act’290) stipulated that foreigners could hold a share of not less than twenty per cent of capital in Polish companies,291 and had to obtain a permit to do so.292 Permits shall then be granted in the case of foreign investments contributing to (i) implementation of innovative technological/organisational solutions to the national economy, (ii) exports of goods and services, (iii) improvement of the supply of domestic market in modern and high-quality goods and services, and (iv) environmental protection. 293 The agency competent for issuing those permits could make its consent conditional upon specific

283 See: 1988 BIT, article 3.1. 284 See: 1988 BIT, article 3.2. 285 See: 1988 BIT, article 3.3. 286 See: 1988 BIT, article 3.4. 287 See: 1988 BIT, article 9. 288 See: 1988 BIT, article 10. 289 See: 1988 BIT, articles 8 and 11.4. 290 See: Polish Official Journal (1988) no. 41 item. 325. 291 See: 1988 Foreign Investment Act, article 5.1. 292 See: 1988 Foreign Investment Act, article 2. 293 See: 1988 Foreign Investment Act, article 5.2.

47

proportion of share capital hold by foreigner, and also could allow companies with foreign participation to seek equity investment through public offering.294

Throughout the 1990s, the initially strict regulation of foreign participation in Polish companies was gradually liberated. The 1988 Foreign Companies Act was replaced with the 1991 Act on Companies with Foreign Participation (Ustawa z dnia 14 czerwca 1991 r. o spółkach z udziałem zagranicznym – the ‘1991 Foreign Companies Act’) 295 under which (subject to permits required from all persons regardless of citizenship/place of registration) foreigners should only obtain permits for the establishment or purchase (regardless of share in capital) of companies which were involved in (i) management of sea-ports or airports, (ii) real-estate brokerage, (iii) non-licensed military-related industry, (iv) providing legal advice. 296 The 1991 Foreign Companies Act expired on 1 January 2001 and, thereafter, companies with foreign participation could operate on pretty much the same condition as companies without such participation, subject only to some restrictions on the purchases of immovable property, especially agricultural land and forests.

In December 1989, the PRC and Poland eventually concluded a ‘normal’ trade agreement (Umowa handlowa między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL – the ‘1989 Trade Agreement ’) under which (i) parties granted a most-favoured nation treatment to each other subject to standard exceptions,297 (ii) not only state-trading enterprises but also ‘other persons’ will be allowed to trade,298 and (iii) parties will shift to payment settlement through free floating currencies from previous clearing by central banks.299 Nonetheless, the agreement did not specify any tariff reductions. Nor did the subsequent Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Goverment of the People's Republic of China on commercial and economic relations (Umowa między Rządem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a Rządem ChRL o stosunkach handlowych i gospodarczych – the ‘1993 Trade Agreement’) which remained in force until Poland’s accession to the EU on 1 May 2004. Apart from the 1989 Trade Agreement, the 1993 Trade Agreement also nullified the 1984 Economic and Technical Agreement (which was further confirmed in the 1995 Review Agreement) and the 1988 Co-operation Agreement,300 and - in contrast to the 1988 Trade Agreement – it provided for safeguard/countervailing measures, i.e. the provisions that the importing party can apply appropriate measures if the volume of imported goods and/or the conditions of import cause or might cause a serious damage to domestic producers of like products301- which resulted in a few anti-dumping proceedings and decisions on imposing anti-dumping duties on goods imported from the PRC such as lighters and footwear.

Importantly, while the 1988 Trade Agreement and 1993 Trade Agreement did not reserve foreign trade to state-trading enterprises, in Poland, the economic freedom granted to entrepreneurs under the Wilczek Act did not pertain to foreign trade as the Wilczek Act allowed to introduce an obligation to receive permits for foreign trade in virtually all goods,302

294 See: 1988 Foreign Investment Act, article 8. 295 See: Polish Official Journal (1991) no. item 253. 296 See: 1991 Foreign Companies Act, article 4. 297 See: 1989 Trade Agreement, article 2. 298 See: 1989 Trade Agreement, article 3. 299 See: 1989 Trade Agreement, article 5. 300 See: 1993 Trade Agreement, article 8. 301 See: 1993 Trade Agreement, article 5. 302 See: Wilczek Act, article 11.9.

48

and the original executive regulation (rozporządzenie) required receiving permits for trading, among others, explosives various types of meat, grain, corn, grain of leguminous vegetables, rice, cattle, flock, other slaughter animals (sheep, goat, horses, donkeys), coal, briquettes, fuels, energy, steel products, nonferrous-metal-products, lumber, timber prefabricates, stationary, fabrics and clothes (with some exceptions), meat cans, cold cuts, furs, slaughtered and slaughter poultry, frozen fruits, eggs, butter, powdered milk, cheese, spirits, strawberry raspberry jams etc.303 Throughout the 1990s, the list was gradually reduced and the last list from January 2000 included only explosives, detonation fuses, arms (sports, hunting, non-lethal/neutralising along with accessories), cigars, fuels, natural gas and some parts of farming/forestry tractors.304

In September 1994, the PRC and Poland concluded the Phytosanitary Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China (Umowa fitosanitarna między Rządem RP i Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej - the ‘1994 Phytosanitary Agreement’) which entered into force in April 1995. In April 1995, the PRC and Poland concluded the Agreement on cooperation in science and technology between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China (Umowa o współpracy naukowo-technicznej między Rządem RP a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej – the ‘1995 Scientific and Technological Agreement’) which was meant to replace the 1954 Scientific Agreement305 but have never entered into force. Likewise, the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on cooperation in animal quarantine and animal health (Umowa między Rządem RP a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o współpracy w zakresie kwarantanny i ochrony zdrowia zwierząt) concluded in November 1997 was not ratified by the parties. In May 1997, the PRC and Poland agreed that Poland would maintain its consulate in Hong Kong after the transfer of Hong Kong’s sovereignty from the UK to the PRC on 1 July 1997 and that this consulate will also be responsible for Macao, after the transfer of Macao’s sovereignty from Portugal to the PRC on 20 December 1999.306

In October 1996, the PRC and Poland concluded the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on co-operation in maritime transport (Umowa między Rządem RP a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o współpracy w transporcie morskim – the ‘1996 Maritime Agreement’) which entered into force in April 1997 and is currently in force. The 1996 Maritime Agreement applies to both cargo and passenger transport, yet it does not apply to warships, fishing vessels and vessels performing public functions,307 nor to cabotage or inland-water-transport but “[w]hen vessels of one Contracting party sail from one port of the other Contracting Party to another to load cargo for foreign countries or discharge cargo from abroad, it shall not be regarded as cabotage or inland water transport.”308 Under the agreement, each party grants to other party’s vessels the most-favoured treatment “in its ports, territorial sea and

303 See: Polish Official Journal (1988) no 44 item 355. 304 See: Polish Official Journal (2000) no.8 item 109. 305 See: 1995 Scientific and Technological Agreement, article 13. 306 See: Agreement in the form of an exchange of notes on retaining activity of the General Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Hongkong - Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (Porozumienie w formie wymiany not ws. utrzymania po 1.07.97 r. działalności Konsulatu Generalnego RP w Hongkongu - Specjalnym Regionie Administracyjnym Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej). 307 See: 1996 Maritime Agreement, article 1.2. 308 See: 1996 Maritime Agreement, article 3.

49

other waters under its sovereign jurisdiction” which shall also apply to (i) “port access, levying port dues and charges, treatment during staying in and departure from the ports when using port facilities to transport cargo and passengers, as well as access to all services and other port facilities,” 309 and (ii) “establishment of shipping of representative offices by shipping companies of both contracting parties in the territory of the other Contracting Party in accordance with the laws and regulations of that Contracting Party.”310 Importantly, the agreement recognises the use of flag of convenience by parties’ vessels by stipulating that “[t]he vessels flying foreign flags, acceptable to the other Contracting Party, operated by shipping companies of one Contracting Party, shall have the same rights and obligations on the ports, territorial sea and other waters of the other Contracting party, as of they were flying one Contracting Party’s flag.”311

Apart from that, the 1996 Maritime Agreement also overlaps with some previously concluded agreements. For example, as to seafarers’ identity documents and seamen right to entry territory of the other party, the 1996 Maritime Agreement refers to the 1988 Visa Agreement.312 As to taxation, in line with the 1988 Taxation Agreement, the 1996 Maritime Agreement provides that “[b]oth Contracting Parties agree that all revenues (including profits) derived from the operations of vessels in international maritime transport by shipping companies having the place of their effective management in the territory of one Contracting Party shall be exempted from double taxation in the territory of the other Contracting Party.”313 And finally, as to the status of the CHIPOLBROK, the 1996 Maritime Agreement “shall not affect the provisions between Contracting parties concerning the activity of the joint shipping company established by the two Government – Chinese-Polish Joint Stock Shipping Company.”314

In September 2000, the PRC and Poland concluded the Agreement on financial cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China (Umowa między Rządem RP a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o współpracy finansowej – the ‘2000 Financial Agreement’). According to that agreement (i) Polish government extended a USD eighty five million credit to the PRC’s government “for financing of environmental protection investment in China,”315 (ii) “[t]he credit will be used to finance 100% contract value for the deliveries from the Republic of Poland to the People’s Republic of China, of machinery, equipment and materials produced in Poland, as well as services including technologies,”316 (iii) the minimum value of one project should be USD one million,317 (iv) “[t]the input of Polish origin into the supply of machinery, equipment, material and services under the Agreement cannot be less than 80%,”318 (v) “[m]achinery, equipment, material and technologies exported under this Agreement from the Republic of Poland to the People’s Republic of China can only be used for projects which have been

309 See: 1996 Maritime Agreement, article 3. 310 See: 1996 Maritime Agreement, article 10. 311 See: ibid. 312 See: 1996 Maritime Agreement, article 12. 313 See: 1996 Maritime Agreement, article 13. 314 See: 1996 Maritime Agreement, article 14. 315 See: Financial Agreement, article 1.1. 316 See: Financial Agreement, article ibid. 317 See: Financial Agreement, article 1.3. 318 See: Financial Agreement, article 2.2.

50

agreed upon by the Contracting Parties,” 319 (vi) the repayment of each credit-utilization should be done in twenty four equal semi-annual instalment payable along with interests in May and November each year after a two-year grace period,320 (vii) the annual interest rate shall be 1.98%,321 and (viii) “[a]ll repayments of principal and interest instalments under the Agreement shall be made without deduction of any fees or taxes as may be imposed by the authorities of the People’s Republic of China.”322

Under the original version of the 2000 Financial Agreement, all means from the credit extended by the Polish government were meant to be used until December 2003 but the agreement was further extended and amended many times. Immediately after its conclusion (yet in September 2000) the number of repayment-instalments was increased from 24 to 28. In May 2003, the parties agreed to (i) extend the application of the agreement to cover not only environment-protection-related projects but also to projects related to “health care, education, infrastructure, transportation, mining, power industry, agriculture, food processing industry, building materials and other sectors agreed by both sides (…),” (ii) extend the agreement time-wise until January 2005, and (iii) reduce the interest rate from 1.98% to 0.52%. In January 2005, the parties agreed to (i) extend the agreement until January 2007, and (ii) reduce the Polish-input-requirement from eighty to sixty per cent. In December 2006, the parties agreed to (i) extend the agreement until January 2009, and (ii) increase the interest rate from 0.52% up to 0.96%. In April 2007, the parties agreed to increase the credit-line extended by the Polish government from USD eighty five million to USD two hundred eighty five million. In July 2009, the parties agreed to (i) extend the agreement until January 2011, (ii) increase the number of repayment-instalments from twenty eight to thirty six, and (iii) reduce the interest rate from 0.96% to 0.8%. Finally, in January 2011, parties agreed that all remaining means will be used until December 2013.

3.2. After Poland’s accession to the EU

After Poland’s accession to the EU on 1 May 2004, Poland lost huge part of its sovereignty related to trade-policies but continued to directly (rather than via European Commission) co-operate and conclude agreements with the PRC in the fields other than trade concessions.

On 8 June 2004 in Warsaw, the PRC and Poland concluded (i) the Protocol on cultural co-operation between the Minister of Culture of the Republic of Poland and the Ministry of Culture of the People's Republic of China in the years 2004 – 2006 (Protokół o współpracy kulturalnej między Ministrem Kultury RP a Ministerstwem Kultury Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej na lata 2004-2006 – the ‘2004 Cultural Agreement’), (ii) Agreement between the Minister of National Education and Sport of the Republic of Poland and the Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China on Cooperation in the field of education in the years 2004-2006 (Porozumienie między Ministrem Edukacji Narodowej i Sportu RP a Ministerstwem Edukacji Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o współpracy w dziedzinie edukacji na lata 2004-2006 – the ‘2004 Educational Agreement’), and (iii) Agreement on economic cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China (Umowa między Rządem RP a Rządem ChRL o współpracy

319 See: Financial Agreement, article 2.3. 320 See: Financial Agreement, articles 5 and 6. 321 See: Financial Agreement, article 6. 322 See: Financial Agreement, article 8.3.

51

gospodarczej – the ‘2004 Economic Agreement’). The 2004 Economic agreement established yet another intergovernmental commission ‘for economic co-operation,’ 323 whereas the 2004 Cultural Agreement and the 2004 Educational Agreement were both concluded based on the general framework of the 1986 Cultural and Scientific Agreement and listed specific projects to be carried out 2004-2006. Another similar culture related executive agreements based on the 1986 Cultural and Scientific Agreement were concluded in May 2007 for the period 2007-2011 and in April 2012 for the period 2012-2015, plus one more agreement related to higher education in December 2011 (for unlimited period of time unless terminated after four years).

Following years brought more framework agreements on scientific and technical co-operation in other fields including:

(i) the Agreement between the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development of the Republic of Poland and the Ministry of Agriculture of the People's Republic of China on cooperation within the framework of the Polish-Chinese Center for Science and Agricultural Technology (Porozumienie między Ministrem Rolnictwa i Rozwoju Wsi RP a Ministerstwem Rolnictwa ChRL o współpracy w ramach Polsko-Chińskiego Centrum Nauki i Technologii Rolnej) signed in 2007, replaced/renewed by the new agreement signed in September 2015,

(ii) the Memorandum of Understanding between the Minister of Health of the Republic of Poland and the Ministry of Health of the People's Republic of China on co-operation in the Field of Head Care and Medical Sciences (Memorandum o Porozumieniu między Ministrem Zdrowia RP a Ministerstwem Zdrowia ChRL o współpracy w dziedzinie ochrony zdrowia i nauk medycznych) signed in 2007 which replaced the 1984 Medical Agreement,

(iii) the Agreement between the Minister of National Defence of the Republic of Poland and the Ministry of the National Defence of the People's Republic of China concerning co-operation in the field of defence (Umowa między Ministrem Obrony Narodowej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a Ministerstwem Obrony Narodowej Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o współpracy w dziedzinie obronności) signed in 2009, and

(iv) Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on cooperation in the area of sustainable infrastructure (Umowa między Rządem RP a Rządem ChRL o współpracy w zakresie zrównoważonej infrastruktury) signed in April 2007.

4. Toward Sino-Polish comprehensive strategic partnership of 2016

Meanwhile, apart from the business-as-usual coming down to signing pretty hollow agreements, Poland’s president Bronisław Komorowski paid a visit to Beijing at PRC’s president Hu Jintao’s invitation. Some seedbeds for the SREB initiative could then be seen for example in that the 2011 Declaration signed during that visit provided that “Chinese side wants to increase imports of Polish goods and support Chinese entrepreneurs’ participation

323 See: 2004 Economic Agreement, article 5.

52

in infrastructural projects as well as privatisation transformation in Poland.”324 However, after the release of the 2012 Twelve Measures in April 2012 (see: sections 1.1 and 1.2), Polish government’s action did not speak louder than words of subsequent Bucharest, Belgrade and Suzhou Guidelines. Specifically, apart from mentioned private initiative to launch cargo-railway-line bridging Chengdu with Łódż (see: section 1.3) the actual accomplishments or concrete plans in the field of Sino-Polish co-operation among others included (i) organisation of China-CEEC-cooperation-dedicated special event during PolEko fairs held in Poznań in October 2014,325 (ii) hosting the second ‘Meeting for the Investment Promotion Agencies Contact Mechanism of China and CEECs’ in November 2014 in Warsaw, 326 (iii) establishment of the executive body of the China-CEEC Business Council in Warsaw and hosting the first meeting of the China-CEEC Business Council in Katowice in April 2015,327 and (iv) hosting the third China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue and the second working consultation of the China-CEEC Higher Education Institutes Consortium in Warsaw in September 2015.328

What, however, positively differentiates Poland from other CEECs was Poland’s decision to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (‘AIIB’) done despite the fact that the US administration (since the 1990s having strong influence over decisions made by governments of CEECs) had put a lot of efforts to blacken the idea of the PRC-led development bank. Namely, serious concerns had been expressed about transparency, governance and sustainability of projects to be financed by the AIIB, whereby Western critics had been pointing out environmental and/or social shortcomings of previous projects financed with China’s bilateral aid329 and had been foretelling that the AIIB would finance undertakings rejected by other MDBs in a kind of race to the bottom.330 Pretty obviously though, the criticism had been a part of US’ larger geopolitical game in which a potential success of the AIIB could undermine existing system of development-aid dominated by World Bank and the IMF.331 Simply put, the US-led G7 nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) had for decades refused to accept emerging economies’ criticism about these ‘Bretton Woods’ institutions including, among others staffing policies and voting rights not reflecting emerging economies’ increasing share in global economy.332 Thus, after BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) had eventually decided to circumvent the status quo by opening the New Development Bank (also known as the BRICS

324 „Strona chińska pragnie zwiększyć import polskich towarów oraz zachęcać i wspierać udział chińskich przedsiębiorstw w projektach infrastrukturalnych oraz w przekształceniach prywatyzacyjnych w Polsce.” See: note 1, 2011 Declaration, point 4. 325 See: Bucharest Guidelines, point III.iii; Belgrade Guidelines, Annex, point 23. 326 See: Belgrade Guidelines, Annex, point 24. 327 See: Belgrade Guidelines, point 4.2; Suzhou Guidelines, Annex, point 6. 328 See: Suzhou Guidelines, Annex, point 27. 329 See: Cecilia Torta Jada and Asit K Biswas, ‘New Bank a Challenge for Bretton Woods’ China Daily (New York, NY, 24 October 2014) 16. See also: Jędrzej Górski, 'Recent developments in procurement of projects financed by the Multilateral Development Banks. What can EU’s public procurers expect from the China-led financial institutions?' (Hong Kong January 2016) CUHK CFRED WP no. 15 1 at 8-9. 330 See: Martin Khor, ‘Many in West Back Winds of Change in World’ China Daily (New York, NY, 23 April 2015) 12; note 15, Jada and Biswas, ibid. See also: note 329, Górski, ibid. 331 See: Dan Steinbock, ‘Beginning of AIIB Epoch Benefits All’ China Daily (New York, NY, 1 July 2015) 12; note 330, Khor. See also: note 329, Górski, ibid. See also: note 329, Górski, ibid. 332 See: note 331 Steinbock; note 330, Khor; note 329, Jada and Biswas. See also: note 329, Górski, ibid. See also: note 329, Górski, ibid.

53

Bank) and the AIIB,333 the US failed to prevent its allies from joining the AIIB, 334 like by raising concerns about AIIB’s procurement standards.335

As to the timeline of Poland’s accession to the AIIB, Council of Ministers (Rada Ministrów) upon the requests of the Finance Ministry (Ministerstwo Finansów) greenlighted signing the AIIB agreement and Poland’s ambassador to Beijing signed the AIIB agreement on 9 November 2015 (opened for signature in Beijing from 29 June 2015).336 The lower chamber of the Polish parliament (Sejm) ratified the AIIB agreement on 11 March 2016 which was further approved by parliament’s higher chamber (Senat) on 7 April 2016, and the ratifying statute was eventually signed by president on 19 April 2016.337 Poland agreed to (i) subscribe USD 831.8 million constituting 0.8475 per cent of AIIB’s authorised capital, out if which it shall initially pay USD 166.4 million in cash in five annual installments starting from 2016,338 (ii) have initial voting power set up at 0.98 per cent.339 This is generally comparable with Poland’s capital share in other multilateral development banks including (i) 0.65 per cent share in the capital of the World Bank, (ii) 2.06 per cent share in the capital of the European Investment Bank, and (iii) 1.28 per cent share in the capital of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.340

All of above, plus president Andrzej Duda’s visit to Beijing and Suzhou in November 2015 within the framework of the 16+1 Group (during which Poland, Serbia, Czech, Bulgaria and Slovakia signed yet another bilateral memoranda of understanding on the co-operation with regard to SREB’s development341) has led to president Xi Jinping’s visit to Warsaw in June 2016 bringing about the comprehensive strategic partnership between two countries. In his op-ed written Polish Newspaper Rzeczpospolita from 16 June 2016, Xi Ping literally confirmed that Poland’s central role for the SREB project by stating that (i) “Poland is at the heartland of Europe,” (ii) “[i]t is also where the Amber Road and the Silk Road meet”, (iii) “[s]everal China Railway Express trains to Europe pass through Poland or are bound for Poland,” (iv) “[b]ased on the MOU signed between the two governments on joint building of the Belt and Road, the two sides should speed up the formulation of cooperation plans, identify and prepare for major projects and work for early harvest” (see: Appendix I. "Setting Sail for Full Speed Progress of China-Poland Friendship").

The core document signed by Xi in Warsaw, i.e. the Joint Declaration on the Establishment of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Republic of Poland and People’s Republic

333 See: Daniel Epstein, ‘New Development?’ (2014) 36 Harvard International Review 12. at 13; note 330, Khor; note 329, Jada and Biswas. The very basic premise of the AIIB is that voting powers must reflect AIIB member’s current GDP. See: Chunyan Zhang, ‘Laying Foundations for a Successful AIIB’ China Daily (New York, NY, 15 April 2015) 15. See also: note 329, Górski, ibid. See also: note 329, Górski, ibid. 334 See: note 329, Jada and Biswas. See also: note 329, Górski, ibid. 335 See: note 331 Steinbock. See also: note 329, Górski, ibid. 336 See: Projekt ustawy - o ratyfikacji Umowy o utworzeniu Azjatyckiego Banku Inwestycji Infrastrukturalnych, sporządzonej w Pekinie dnia 29 czerwca 2015 r.2016 Polish Parliamentary Printed Matter no. 246 (submitted 8 February). 337 See: Ustawa z dnia 11 marca 2016 r. o ratyfikacji Umowy o utworzeniu Azjatyckiego Banku Inwestycji Infrastrukturalnych, sporządzonej w Pekinie dnia 29 czerwca 2015 r., Polish Official Journal (2016) item 559., point 1 at 1. 338 See: note 336, point 2 at 6. See also: AIIB Article of Agreement, article 6. 339 See: note 336, point 2 at 6, 7. 340 See: note 336, point 2 at 6. 341 Hungary signed such memorandum of understanding yet in June 2016. The text of Polish memorandum has not been made public and therefore cannot be discussed here in detail. See: Xinhua. 'China, five CEE countries signed memo to promote Belt and Road Initiative' <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-11/26/content_22521790.htm> accessed on 29 August 2016; Xinhua. 'China, CEE countries to promote 'Belt and Road' initiative' <http://www.china.org.cn/world/2015-11/27/content_37174479.htm> accessed on 29 August 2016.

54

of China (Wspólne oświadczenie w sprawie ustanowienia wszechstronnego strategicznego partnerstwa między Rzecząpospolitą Polską a Chińską Republiką Ludową – the ‘2016 Declaration’) also includes references to the OBOR and the SREB. Specifically, the document states that “[b]oth Parties will make joint efforts toward promoting bilateral co-operation within the framework of the Action plan for responsible development of Poland [the ‘Morawiecki’s Plan,’ see further: section 5] presented by Poland and the Silk Road Economic Belt as well as the twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road initiative (Belt and Road Initiative) presented by China. Based on the Memorandum on the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the joint support for the Belt and Road initiative, both Parties will enhance ties between Belt and Road and the Action plan for responsible development of Poland, formulate assumptions of the plan for the Sino-Polish co-operation(…).”342

To this end, on 20 June 2012, the PRC and Poland concluded:

(i) Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's republic of China on mutual recognition of academic degrees and diplomas in higher education (Umowa między Rządem RP a Rządem ChRL o wzajemnym uznawaniu dyplomów ukończenia studiów i tytułów zawodowych w szkolnictwie wyższym – the ‘2016 Academic Recognition Agreement’),

(ii) Protocol on cultural cooperation between the Minister of Culture and national Heritage of the Republic of Poland and the Ministry of Culture of the People's Republic of China in the years 2016-2019 (Protokół o współpracy kulturalnej między Ministrem Kultury i Dziedzictwa Narodowego RP a Ministerstwem Kultury Chińskiej Rep. Ludowej na lata 2016 – 2019 – the ‘2016 Cultural Agreement’), and

(iii) Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the reciprocal exemption in international air transportation services from Value Added Tax or any tax of a similar nature (Umowa między Rządem RP a Rządem Chińskiej Rep. Ludowej w sprawie wzajemnego zwolnienia usług międzynarodowego transportu lotniczego z opodatkowania podatkiem od wartości dodanej lub podatkiem o podobnym charakterze, poprzez wymianę listów – the ‘2016 Aviation Taxation Agreement’).

The 2016 Cultural agreement is yet another executive agreement based on the 1986 Cultural and Scientific Agreement. Nonetheless it includes a few interesting more specific points such as that (i) “[t]he Parties shall support a direct cooperation between the state archives, based on provisions of Agreement on Archival Cooperation between General Director of State Archives of the Republic of Poland and the State Archives Administration of the People's Republic of China, signed in Beijing on April 13, 2015,”343 (ii) “[t]he Parties shall support further cooperation between the National Museum in Warsaw and the National Museum of China, regarding the exchange of curators and restorers as well as 342 Originally in Polish: “Obie strony będą wspólnie dokładały starań na rzecz promocji współpracy dwustronnej w ramach Planu na rzecz Odpowiedzialnego Rozwoju przedstawionego przez Polskę oraz Inicjatywy „Ekonomicznego Pasa Jedwabnego Szlaku” i ”Morskiergo Jedwabnego Szlaku XXI Wieku” (Inicjatywa Pasa i Szlaku) przedstawionej przez Chiny. W oparciu o Memorandum o Porozumieniu dotyczące wspólnego wspierania inicjatywy „Pas i Szlak”, obie strony będą wzmacniały powiązania dotyczącego wspólnego wspierania inicjatywy „Pas I Szlak”, obie strony będą wzmacniały powiązania pomiędzy inicjatywą Pasa i Szlaku oraz Planem na rzecz Odpowiedzialnego Rozwoju, wspólnie sformułują założenia planu współpracy polsko-chińskiej.” See: 2016 Declaration, point V. 343 See: 2016 Cultural Agreement, article 10.

55

cooperation on projects of exhibitions,”344 (iii) “[t]the Parties shall support the in-depth cooperation between the Royal Lazienki Museum in Warsaw and Prince Gong's Mansion Museum, focusing on the Festival of Light,” 345 and (iv) listing specific exhibitions to be held in both countries. 346 In turn, the 2016 Aviation Taxation Agreement was the briefest of the three (concluded in the form of exchange of letters) and its content was virtually confined to the statement that “[i]nternational air transportation services provided by an air transport enterprise established in one of the States shall be exempt from Value Added Tax or any tax of a similar nature in the other State.”347 Finally, the 2016 Academic Recognition Agreement does not provide for automatic recognition of diplomas/certificates etc. as in the first place it stipulates that the “[r]ecognition of certificates, diplomas and degrees for professional purposes shall be made in accordance with the laws of each Party.”348 This agreement merely specifies which degrees/certificates issued in both countries allow to apply to higher-degree academic programs in the other country349 but does not set up any general framework for the recognition of diplomas/certificates for professional purposes or simply for the recognition of professional qualifications.

5. Assessment

5.1. SREB and geo-political determinism

Recent dynamics (or the lack thereof) in Sino-Polish relations must been seen entirely through the prism of the OBOR, the SBER and through geopolitical consequences of those initiatives’ success, namely the reversal of the results of the Age of Discoveries which to quote Mackinder, were to (i) “connect the western and eastern coastal navigations of Euro- Asia, even though by a circuitous route, and thus in some measure to neutralize the strategical advantage of the central position of the steppe- nomads by pressing upon them in rear,”350 and (ii) “reverse the relations of Europe and Asia, for whereas in the Middle Ages Europe was caged between an impassable desert to south, an unknown ocean to west, and icy or forested wastes to north and north-east, and in the east and south- east was constantly threatened by the superior mobility of the horsemen and camelmen, she now emerged upon the world, multiplying more than thirty-fold the sea surface and coastal lands to which she had access, and wrapping her influence round the Euro-Asiatic land-power which had hitherto threatened her very existence.”351

Now, some Chinese scholars, while speculating about the outcomes of the OBOR’s and SBER’s success, speak more openly even about the ‘restoration’ or ‘revival’ of European civilization, should Europe explore all possibilities potentially stemming from increased land- 344 See: 2016 Cultural Agreement, article 11.3. 345 See: 2016 Cultural Agreement, article 11.4. 346 “1) in the Republic of Poland: a) National Museum in Warsaw shall host in 2016 an exhibition from the collection of the National Museum of China, b) Museum Sztuki in L6dz will present in 2017 exhibition "Art in Contemporary China" prepared by the National Art Museum of China in Beijing, c) "Beijing/Warsaw-New Landscape of Chinese Contemporary Art", which is produced by Xin Dong Cheng Space for Contemporary Art; 2) in the People's Republic of China: a) exhibition of Aleksander Kobzdej's, Tadeusz Kulisiewicz's and Andrzej Strumiło's works dedicated to China from the collection of the Asia-Pacific Museum in Warsaw.” See: 2016 Cultural Agreement, article 12.1. 347 See: 2016 Taxation Agreement, Letter from Minister of Finance, Paweł Szałamacha to Mr Wang Jun, the Commissioner of State Administration of Taxation of the PRC dated 20 June 2016. 348 See: 2016 Academic Recognition Agreement, article 2. 349 See: 2016 Academic Recognition Agreement, articles 3-6. 350 See: Halford Mackinder, 'The Geographical Pivot of History' (1904) 23(4) The Geographical Journal 421 at 430 at 432. 351 See: ibid. at 433.

56

trade with China across Russia. 352 And they also like to draw upon Anglo-Saxon understanding of geopolitics (shaped by Mackinder’s notions of Eurasia/heartland’ 353 and rimland,354) like Wang Yiwen repeating after Mackinder and Brzeziński that the integration of Eurasia would isolate the US, and by adding that in current conditions it would “allow Eurasia to return to the center of human civilization, thereby reshaping global geopolitics and landscape.”355 Such statements are not exaggerated given that, for example Burrows and Manning in their contribution to The National Interest from August 2015 titled ‘America's Worst Nightmare: Russia and China Are Getting Closer’ noticed that Russia and China indeed “seek to realize MacKinder’s vision of a Eurasian heartland(…).“356

The parallels between current situation and the Russian Empire’s attempt to revive the Silk Road and build Eurasia with the Trans-Siberian Railway and the East Chinese Railway from a century ago (see: section 2.1) are obvious. In 1904, Mackinder observed with regard to the Russian Empire that:

(i) “A generation ago steam and the Suez canal appeared to have increased the mobility of sea-power relatively to land-power. Railways acted chiefly as feeders to ocean-going commerce. But trans-continental railways are now transmuting the conditions of land-power, and nowhere can they have such effect as in the closed heartland of Euro-Asia, in vast areas of which neither timber nor accessible stone was available for road-making. Railways work the greater': wonders in the steppe, because they directly replace horse and camel mobility, the road stage of development having here been omitted.”357

(ii) “In the matter of commerce it must not be forgotten that ocean-going traffic, however relatively cheap, usually involves the fourfold handling of goods-at the factory of origin, at the export wharf, at the import wharf, and at the inland warehouse for retail distribution; whereas the continental railway truck may run direct from the exporting factory into the importing warehouse. Thus marginal ocean-fed commerce tends, other things being equal, to form a zone of penetration round the continents, whose inner limit is roughly marked by the line along which the cost of four

352 See: note 7, Ferdinand at 955. See also: Werner Fasslabend, 'The Silk Road: a political marketing concept for world dominance' (2015) 14(2) European View 293 at 300. 353 The concept of heartland can be explained by Mackinder’s observation that: “The conception of Euro-Asia to which we thus attain is that of a continuous land, ice-girt in the north, water-girt elsewhere, measuring 21 million square miles, or more than three times the area of North America, whose centre and north, measuring some 9 million square miles, or more than twice the area of Europe, have no available water-ways to the ocean, but, on the other hand, except in the subarctic forest, are very generally favourable to the mobility of horsemen and camelmen. To east, south, and west of this heartland are marginal regions, ranged in a vast crescent, cent, accessible to shipmen.” See: note 350 at 430. 354The concept of rimland can be explained by Mackinder’s observation that: “Once. New Europes were created in the vacant lands discovered in the midst of the waters, and what Britain and Scandinavia were to Europe in the earlier time, that have America and Australia, and in some measure even Trans-Saharan Africa, now become to Euro-Asia. Britain, Canada, the United States, South Africa, Australia, and Japan are now a ring of outer and insular bases for sea-power and commerce, inaccessible to the land-power of Euro-Asia.” See: note 350 at 433. 355 See: Wang, Yiwei, 'China’s “New Silk Road”: A Case Study in EU-China Relations' in Amighini, Alessia and Axel Berkofsky (eds), Xi’s Policy Gambles: The Bumpy Road Ahead (Edizioni Epoké, Novi Ligure 2015) at 103/104. See also: note 352 Fasslabend at 300. 356 Burrows, Mathew and Manning Robert A., 'America's Worst Nightmare: Russia and China Are Getting Closer' The National Interest (24 August 2015). See also: Clarke, Michael, 'Beijing's March West: Opportunities and Challenges for China's Eurasian Pivot' (2016) 60(2) ORBIS 296.at 296. 357 See: note 350 at 434.

57

handlings, the oceanic freight, and the railway freight from the neighbouring coast, is equivalent to the cost of two handlings and the continental railway freight.”358

(iii) “The Russian army in Manchuria is as significant evidence of mobile land-power as the British army in South Africa was of sea-power. True, that the Trans- Siberian railway is still a single and precarious line of communication, but the century will not be old before all Asia is covered with railways. The spaces within the Russian Empire and Mongolia are so vast, and their potentialities in population, wheat, cotton, fuel, and metals so incalculably great, that it is inevitable that a vast economic world, more or less apart, will there develop inaccessible to oceanic commerce.” 359

Nonetheless, Mackinder gravely erred in predicting that “[s]he [Russian Empire] can strike on all sides and be struck from sides, save the north. The full development of her modern railway mobility is merely a matter of time. Nor is it likely that any possible social revolution will alter her essential relations to the great geo-graphical limits of her existence.” 360 Contrary to that prediction, in the light of that reality, the West could not remain idle, the Bolshevik Revolution broke out a year after the Trans-Siberian Railway bridging Europe with Vladivostok entirely across Russian Empire’s territory had been completed (see: section 2.1), and one could perceive the Bolshevik Revolution as nothing but a kind of contemporary colour revolution, except for that the Bolshevik Revolution had global rather than regional ramifications. Analogically, without a doubt, we can now see many tensions generated by countries of rimland which now seem to be losing their grip in line with modified version of Mackinder virtually prophetic scenario that “[w]ere the Chinese, for instance, organized by the Japanese, to overthrow the Russian Empire and conquer its territory, they might constitute the yellow peril to the world's freedom just because they would add an oceanic frontage to the resources of the great continent, an advantage as yet denied to the Russian tenant of the pivot region.” 361 Despite some conciliatory voices coming from the US about the case for tolerating PRC’s advances in heartland,362 the prevailing view is that letting the PRC go would blight the US’ post-war geopolitical ‘grand strategy,’ the sense of which has been, though, to quell all and any attempt to dominate heartland by any other rising power.363

Not only would the consequences of the reversal of the Age of Discovery entail a rebalancing of powers, but they would also come along with significant economic consequences, particularly for the CEECs including Poland. Such consequences are pretty obvious and can be partly found between the lines of the 2015 Vision stating that “[w]e should improve the division of labor and distribution of industrial chains by encouraging the entire industrial chain and related industries to develop in concert; establish R&D, production and marketing 358 See: ibid. 359 See: ibid. 360 See: note 350 at 436. 361 See: note 350 at 437. 362 For example Payne, it the article for The National Interest titled ‘China Goes West And America Shouldn't Be Worried’ suggested US’ disengagement from Eurasia by stating that (i) “[i]f China can contribute to global stability, then why oppose them? China’s rise towards becoming a major power has largely already occurred and opposing all Chinese initiatives will only contribute to greater bilateral hostility,” (ii) “[t]he United States is naturally oriented to serve as an offshore balancer that can operate globally to enhance security, protect commerce and enforce global institutions,” (iii) “China should move ahead with its Belt and Road Initiative as it provides an effective alternative to further adventures in the Asia-Pacific. Not only will it be able to serve its own core national interests, but it may also help enhance global security.” See: Payne, Jeffrey, 'China Goes West (And America Shouldn't Be Worried)' The National Interest (http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-goes-west-america-shouldnt-be-worried-13723 28 August 2015). 363 See: note 356, Clarke at 297.

58

systems; and improve industrial supporting capacity and the overall competitiveness of regional industries.” 364 In the same vein, the justification of the bill on ratification of Poland’s accession to the AIIB stated that “directly, through supporting development of infrastructure and growth in Asia, the membership in the Bank [AIIB] will have impact in Polish economy which increasingly participates in global chain of value and supplies.”365 Clearly, Poland and other CEECs are to European Union/Western Europe what Western provinces are to the rest of the PRC. However, while it is well discerned in the literature concerning the economic impact of the SREB on the PRC, there is no academic or comprehensive discourse (in the form comprehensive peer-reviewed studies) in Poland on those matters.

In the case of the PRC, the accessorial function the of the 21MSR against the potentially historic role of the SREB is obvious. The underdevelopment of PRC’s Western provinces not benefitting from the sea-trade is glaring366 and, to this end, the 2015 Vision states that the PRC shall:

(i) “make use of the advantages of inland regions, including a vast landmass, rich human resources and a strong industrial foundation, focus on such key regions as the city clusters along the middle reaches of the Yangtze River, around Chengdu and Chongqing, in central Henan Province, around Hohhot, Baotou, Erdos and Yulin, and around Harbin and Changchun to propel regional interaction and cooperation and industrial concentration,”367

(ii) “build Chongqing into an important pivot for developing and opening up the western region, and make Chengdu, Zhengzhou, Wuhan, Changsha, Nanchang and Hefei leading areas of opening-up in the inland regions,” 368

(iii) “accelerate cooperation between regions on the upper and middle reaches of the Yangtze River and their counterparts along Russia's Volga River.”369

(iv) “set up coordination mechanisms in terms of railway transport and port customs clearance for the China-Europe corridor, cultivate the brand of "China-Europe freight trains," and construct a cross-border transport corridor connecting the eastern, central and western regions (…).”370

The shift from the sea-trade to land trade will also facilitate the internationalization of RMB,371 and will also help to quell ethnic and religious tensions between Xinjiang and/or

364 See: 2015 Vision, Part IV. 365 See: note 336, point 3 at 7. 366 “In 2013 per capita income in western provinces such as Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai and Xinjiang was only between a third and a half of that in eastern provinces such as Guangdong, Fujian and Zhejiang, and only a quarter of that in Shanghai and Beijing.54 In 2000 Beijing announced a plan for opening up the western part of the country, but by 2015 it was estimated that it was still going to need 30–50 years to catch up with the rest of China.55 The OBOR initiative is partly aimed at speeding up that process.” See: note 7, Ferdinand at 951. 367 See: 2015 Vision, point 6. 368 See: ibid. 369 See: ibid. 370 See: ibid. 371 See: note 7, Ferdinand at 952; note 352, Fasslabend at 297.

59

Tibet and rich coastal provinces of the PRC via economic means. 372 In the same vein, Russian economic planners’ relatively easy task is to “create conditions where Chinese cargoes do not go to south Central Asia and the Near East, and thus bypass Russia, but bring in transit revenue by continuing to join up with Russian railroads, both along the western section of the Trans-Siberian Railroad (either the Barnaul-Novosibirsk-Yekaterinburg line or the more western Chelyabinsk-Ufa-Samara and Orenburg-Kazan-Nizhny Novgorod branches), and then travel on into East and West Europe” 373 and their way harder task is to find ways to alleviate Russian Far East’s underdevelopment by integrating as much of the east part of the Trans-Siberian Railway into the SREB project as possible.374

Despite some numerous gloomy predictions about unavoidability of the Sino-Russian conflict over the future of the Russian Far East along with its resources or of the Eurasian Economic Union (Евразийский Экономический Союз – the ‘EEU’),375 Burrow and Manning in their mentioned contribution to The National Interest noticed that, for the time being, “Moscow and Beijing have avoided strategic competition in Central Asia. There appears to be at least a tacit Sino-Russian division of labor in Central Asia, with Moscow taking the lead on security and Beijing flooding the zone with aid and investment.” 376 In fact, Sino-Russian relations are more complex than that as both countries contribute to both security and economic development as communicating vessels, whereby (i) economic development propelled by investments coming from the PRC would quell ethic and economic tensions not only in PRC’s Western provinces but also outside of the PRC like in Southern Caucasus,377 whereas (ii) Russia’s heavy-handed rule over the huge part of the post-Soviet area through the EEU has already eliminated many customs controls along the PRC-Kazakhstan-Russia route (along with the previously existing problem of corruption), thereby reducing the time of cargo delivery through that route by about six days.378

5.2. Poland and geo-political determinism

The situation of Poland as a Western hemisphere’s peripheral region (in the context of hopes pinned on the potential success of the SREB project) is very different (if not, without much exaggeration, literally dramatic) to the situation of, say Xinjiang or Russian Far East. While the success of the SREB and the economic development of Xinjiang and Russian Far East is in the best interest of Beijing and Moscow, various combinations of the success of the SREB

372 See: note 356, Clarke at 297; David Babayan, 'New Silk Roads in the Souther Caucasus: Chinese Geopolitics in a Strategic Region' (2015) 10 Yale J of Intl Affairs 39 at 40. 373 See: note 25, Uyanaev at 22,23. Uyanaev, for example, observed that “Kazakh route is comparatively minor: the Beijing- Urumchi-Astana-Moscow run (8,200 km) is not much shorter than the line through Zabaikalsk over the Trans-Siberian Railroad (8,950 km).50 In addition, the shortest route (7,650 km) is the railroad through Mongolia that joins up with the Trans-Siberian Railroad in Ulan-Ude.51 This means that when updated to allow high-speed traffic, the latter could still hold considerable promise as a transit route.” See: ibid. at 22. 374 See: ibid. at 23. See also: Junxian Gan and Yan Mao, 'China's New Silk Road: Where Does It Lead?' (2016) 40(1) Asian Perspective 105 at 113. 375 See for example: note 7, Ferdinand at 952; note 352, Fasslabend at 297. Also, for examples Gan and Mao observed that “[m]ore dangerously, China’s initiative will be a potential competitor to Russia’s Eurasian Union strategy, which aims to recover and expand Russia’s economic and cultural influence in the former Soviet states and forge stronger security ties among them. Vladimir Putin’s project is thus incompatible with China’s strategy in certain important respects. According to his blueprint, Central Asian states should forge closer relations with Russia, but in reality status give Beijing a regional advantage (Ziegler 2014). Central Asian states not only have already developed close relations with China in many fields such as petroleum and natural gas but also are thirsty for China’s capital and investment to boost their economies.” See: note 374 at 113-114. 376 See: note 356. 377 See: note 372, Babayan at 40. 378 See: --'Hardly an oasis; The New Silk Road' The Economist (15 November 2014 2014) 413 41. See also: note 25, Uyanaev at 22, at 22.

60

and Poland’s economic integration with Eurasia along with Poland’s moving up the chain of value would never be consistent with the interests of various Western hemisphere’s centres of power, that be Washington (previously London), Brussels or Berlin. Moreover, what makes the matters worse, only until recently, the understanding of the geopolitical conditionings of the SREB project along with its economic implications in and for Poland has been virtually non-existent and, only thanks to massive popularising work done by Jacek Bartosiak, Mackinder has been recently discovered in Poland. 379 However, the solutions which many try to offer in current Polish policy-discourse seem to be utterly flawed.380

Specifically, it is true that Polish policy-makers cannot do anything about Poland’s extremely difficult geographical situation on the Middle European Plain (Nizina Środkowo Europejska) being almost like at a boundary of two tectonic plates whereby the country, in various periods, was tormented by invasions from all directions,381 subject to that “[f]ortunately, life on the Polish plain not only involved hostile relations but also friendly con- tacts with many peoples (Czechs, Hungarians, Eastern Slavs and Baltic peoples)” 382 which “also led to political union with Lithuanians, Ruthenians and (Old) Prussians, and, above all, the influx of great masses of German colonists.”383 At the same time, however, Polish decision-making centres - ever since the peak of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth’s (Rzeczypospolita Obojga Narodów) through its gradual demise, Cossack uprisings against the commonwealth (1591-1704),384

379 Jacek Bartosiak is a Polish barrister (adwokat) who recently (June 2016) defended a thesis titled ‘Geostrategic Situation of the United States and China on Western Pacific and Eurasia and American Concept of Air-Sea Battle (Sytuacja geostrategiczna Stanów Zjednoczonych i Chin na Zachodnim Pacyfiku i w Eurazji a amerykańska koncepcja wojny powietrzno-morskiej - the early assumptions of which can be seen in: Jacek Bartosiak, 'Nowy Porządek: Uwarunkowania Geopolityczne Amerykańsko-Chińskiej Rywalizacji o Hegemonię Rola Rosji i Europy. Analiza Długoterminowa' (October 2012) Centrum Analiz Fundacji Republikańskiej 1) at the Polish Academy of Sciences (Polska Akademia Nauk) whereas the just released book authored by Bartosiak titled ‘Pacific and Eurasia. About War’ (Pacyfik i Eurazja. O wojnie) will likely largely correspond with the content of his thesis. In recent years, Bartosiak has gained enormous publicity and popularity thanks to a number of crisp lectures, presentations and interviews subsequently uploaded to YouTube, in which he often passes the in-between-the-lines the message that Poland now finds itself in the wrong economic trading block and shall look East-ward – the diagnosis with which I do agree. However, Bartosiak, as a scholar deeply steeped into Americano-Centric/ Euro-Atlantic point of view and affiliated to an American think-tank established by the people from the military industrial complex [“The Potomac Foundation is an independent nonprofit research organization dedicated to improving the quality of public discourse and national policy formulation. It was endowed in 1988 by the three founders of the BDM Corporation — Drs. Bernie Dunn, Dan McDonald and Joseph Braddock — to continue the tradition of public service.” - see: The Potomac Foundation. 'About The Potomac Foundation' <http://www.thepotomacfoundation.org/about-the-potomac-foundation/> accessed on 3 September 2016.; see also: The Potomac Foundation. 'Dr. Jacek Bartosiak' <http://www.thepotomacfoundation.org/experts/jacek-bartosiak/> accessed on 3 September 2016.] would like to see (in line with Brzezińki’s visions) Poland’s economic expansion Eastwards only on the rubble of Russia – a solution/prognosis with which I fundamentally disagree (to some extent, I discuss it further in this paper). Nonetheless, I am very thankful to Jacek Bartosiak for his popularising works which drew also my attention do Mackinder works. 380 See: ibid. 381 Including Kievan Rus' (Древнерусское государство) and Grand Duchy of Moscow (Великое Княжество Московское) from the East, Kindgom of Sweden from the North, Ottoman Empire from the South, and particularly Germanic Holy Roman Empire (Sacrum Romanum Imperium) from the West. 382 See: Joseph S. Roucek, 'Geopolitics of Poland' (1948) 7(4) The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 421 at 423. 383 See: ibid. Moreover, “[a]t one time, Poland became an asylum for almost all the Jews of Western Europe.” See: ibid. 384 “The Cossack uprisings (also rebellions, revolts) were a series of military conflicts between the cossacks and the states claiming dominion over the territories the Cossacks lived in, namely the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russian Empire during the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries. Both states tried to exert control over the independent-minded Cossacks. While the early uprisings were against the Commonwealth, as the Russian Empire gained increasing and then total control over the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) lands where the Cossacks lived, the target of Cossacks uprisings changed as well. The origins of the first Cossacks are disputed. Traditional historiography dates the emergence of Cossacks to the 14th to 15th centuries.[5] Towards the end of the 15th century, the Ukrainian Cossacks formed the Zaporozhian Sich centered on the fortified Dnipro islands. Initially a vassal of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the increasing social and religious pressure from the Commonwealth caused a series of uprisings, and the proclamation of an independent Cossack Hetmanate, culminating in a rebellion under Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the mid-17th century. While the Cossacks were useful to the Polish-Lithuanian states in the war periods, they proved to be more problematic in the peacetime, due to their raids on the Commonwealth neighbours (primarily, the Ottoman Empire and its allies). Further, the Polish nobility tried to assert control over the Cossack territories, turn them into feudal latifundia, limit the growth of the militant Cossacks, and even reverse it, by turning the Cossacks into serfs. Afterward the Khmelnytsky Uprising, the Treaty of Pereyaslav brought most of the Cossack Hetmanate under Russian control. The Zaporozhian Cossacks were not the only notable group of Cossacks; others included the Don Cossack Host, Dlobodsk Cossacks, Terek Cossacks and Yaik Cossacks. As the Tsardom of Muscovy took over the disputed Cossacks lands from the

61

partitions (1773-1918),385 the period on Napoleonic Wars and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw (1799-1815), 386 November Uprising (Powstanie Listopadowe, 1830-1831), 387 January Uprising (Powstanie Styczniowe, 1863-1864)388 and breached defence pacts with France (of 1925389) and the UK (of 1939390) - have seemed to miss that: (i) Anglo-Saxon circles (may it be called Anglo-American empire ever since the US

took over the reins from the UK) have always made efforts to generate conflict between CEECs and various forms of Russian statehood to prevent the revival of Silk Road and Mackinder’s vision come true,391 and

(ii) the Kingdom of Prussia made eventually successful efforts to force Russian Empire into splitting Poland in the second half of the 18th century notwithstanding that policy-makers of various forms of the Russian statehood were merely interested in some form of political protectorate over Poland and in guaranteeing Poland’s territorial integrity (which was the case throughout the 18th century until the first partition in 1773 at least since Prussia’s first partition-proposal of 1709,392 of the

Poland-Lithuania, eventually all Cossacks came under the Russian rule, but the Tsarist and later Imperial government had only a limited control over the Cossacks. The Cossacks provided refugee for runaway serfs and bandits, and often mounted unauthorized raids and pirate expeditions against the Ottoman Empire. While the Cossack hosts in the Russian Empire served as buffer zones on its borders, the expansionist ambitions of the empire relied on ensuring control over the Cossacks, which caused tension with their traditional independent lifestyle. As the empire attempted to limit Cossacks autonomy in the 17th and 18th centuries this resulted in rebellions led by Stenka Razin, Kondraty Bulavin and Yemelyan Pugachev. In extreme cases, whole Hosts could be dissolved, as was the fate of the Zaporozhian Sich in 1775. In this last phase of their history, the Cossacks lost most of their autonomy to the Russian state.[1] Cossack uprisings, like the Cossack people themselves, have been portrayed variously in the Polish, Russian and Ukrainian historiographers.” See: Wikipedia. 'Cossack uprisings' <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cossack_uprisings> accessed on 3 September 2016. 385 See: section 2.1 in initio. 386 See: ibid. 387 “The November Uprising (1830–31), Polish–Russian War 1830–31 also known as the Cadet Revolution, was an armed rebellion in the heartland of partitioned Poland against the Russian Empire. The uprising began on 29 November 1830 in Warsaw when the young Polish officers from the local Army of the Congress Poland's military academy revolted, led by lieutenant Piotr Wysocki. They were soon joined by large segments of societies of Lithuania, Belarus, and the right-bank of Ukraine. Despite local successes, the uprising was eventually crushed by a numerically superior Imperial Russian Army under Ivan Paskevich. Czar Nicholas I decreed that henceforth Poland was an integral part of Russia, with Warsaw little more than a military garrison, its university closed.” See: Wikipedia. 'November Uprising' <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/November_Uprising> accessed on 3 September 2016. 388 “The January Uprising (Polish: powstanie styczniowe, Lithuanian: 1863 m. sukilimas, Belarusian: Паўстанне 1863-1864 гадоў) was an uprising in the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (present-day Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, Latvia, parts of Ukraine, and western Russia) against the Russian Empire. It began on 22 January 1863 and lasted until the last insurgents were captured in 1864. The uprising began as a spontaneous protest by young Poles against conscription into the Imperial Russian Army. It was soon joined by high-ranking Polish-Lithuanian officers and various politicians. The insurrectionists, severely outnumbered and lacking serious outside support, were forced to resort to guerrilla warfare tactics. Public executions and deportations to Siberia led many Poles to abandon armed struggle and turn instead to the idea of "organic work": economic and cultural self-improvement.” See: Wikipedia. 'January Uprising' <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/January_Uprising> accessed on 3 September 2016. 389 See: Guarantee Treaty between the Republic of Poland and the French Republic (Traktat Gwarancyjny pomiędzy Polską a Framcją) signed in 1 December 1925 in London, Polish Official Journal (1926) no.114, item 660. 390 See: Agreement of Mutual Assistance between the United Kingdom and Poland (Układ o pomocy wzajemnej między Polską a Wielką Brytanią) signed on 25 August 1939 in London. 391 Some traces of the British involvement in CEE region as early as Cossacks uprising have only recently been discovered and, while emerge in the public debate, still await hefty historical studies. As to existing literature on the cause of the Cossack uprisings, see for example: Frank E. Sysyn, 'Seventeenth-Century Views on the Causes of the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising: An Examination of the "Discourse on the Present Cossack or Peasant War"' (1981) 5(4) Harvard Ukrainian Studies 430. 392 Renowned historian, Jan Engelgard, in a set of video recorded interviews (see: NAI Warszawa, OHP 01. Kulisy rozbiorów Polski - Jan Engelgard (1 July 2016) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3SOWCO8Ye4> accessed 3 September 2016; NAI Warszawa, OHP 02. Rozbiory Polski - sukces czy porażka Rosji? - Jan Engelgard (12 July 2016) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sBHC_pDzxlI> accessed 3 September 2016) proposes a thesis that partitions of Poland were Russian Empire’s defeat rather than success and, as to facts on Russian Empire’s efforts to preserve Poland integrity from Prussian attempts, he refers to works of Władysław Konopczyński, to which I unfortunately did not have access while drafting this paper (see: Władysław Konopczyński, Fryreryk Wielki a Polska (2nd edn Universitas, Kraków 2010).

62

Congress Poland,393 and even that was the case of the Soviet Union guaranteeing the territorial integrity of the PRL 394 ) whereas Prussian/German policy-makers have always been driven by the Drang nach Osten.395

Ever since the Age of Discovery, a form of dual economy has existed in Europe split by the river of Elbe, 396 and it has been in the best interest of Western European Countries, particularly Germany to keep this status quo in place. A summarised by Hobsbawm, in the 17th century: (i) “French Levantine trade halved between I620 and 1635, sank almost to zero by the i65os and did not really recover from depression levels until after the 1670s,” 397 (ii) “[t]he Baltic - the European colony of the western urbanized countries - changed its staple exports from foodstuffs to products like timber, metals and naval stores, while its traditional imports of western woollens diminished,” 398 and (iii) “[a]fter I650, the Mediterranean became like the Baltic an area exchanging locally produced goods, mainly raw materials, for the Atlantic manufactures.” 399 And, the Elbe-delinated economic dualism has meant that, while in Western Europe a modern society accumulating capital was being gradually developed, east of river Elbe local variations of manorialism were embedded, including gospodarka folwarczno-pańszczyżnia (literally folwark-socage economy) in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth (Rzeczypospolita Obojga Narodów) 400 and estates hold by the ‘Juckers’ in Eastern part of Prussia401 which according to Perkins was “was analogous to the contemporary evolution of plantation economies in the Caribbean and the Americas, in which the growth of the progressive capitalist system in western Europe was similarly responsible

393 See: section 2.1 in initio. 394 See: note 185. 395 See: note 382 at 423. 396 While this phenomen (dualizm ekonomiczny na Łabie or dwupodział na Łabie) is in principle mentioned in basic history course-books (and I remember reading about this phenomenon perhaps in middle, if not primary school), I am again thankful to Jacek Bartosiak for unearthing it to a wider audience and making many see obvious links between such economic dualism caused by geographical discoveries and current economic situation of Poland in the EU. In the mainstream literature on world’s economic history, the impact of the Age Discovery on Central and Eastern Europe is often ignored as the focus of the scholarship is rather on the Huntington’s concept of ‘great divergence’ referring to widening income/development gap between Western Europe and Asia resulting from the Age of Discoveries. See for example generally: Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence : China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000); Leonid Grinin, Great Divergence and Great Convergence: A Global Perspective (Springer, 2015). 397 See: Eric J. Hobsbawm, , 'The General Crisis of the European Economy in the 17th Century' (1954)(5) Past and Present Society 33. 398 See: ibid. at 35 399 See: ibid. at 35. 400 “At one extreme were countries like France and western Germany, where at the end of the medieval era, in alliance with monarchs and princes, peasants were successful politically against feudal lords and ended serfdom with full legal recognition of their property rights to plots of land. Though these plots were initially relatively large, towards the end of the sixteenth century rising population and the subdivision of land (the famous French morcellement) left this region with a large class of peasant proprietors working on small plots of land. Thus, by 1550 for instance, 88% of the peasant properties were under 6.2 acres even in the more advanced Paris region. At the other extreme, east of Elbe, where the political domination of the feudal lords gave them the ability to reintroduce the “second serfdom,” that is to redefine peasants as unfree and tied to the expanded estates of their lords. Here a small group of lords ended up with substantial holdings of land upon which peasants, who were legally unable to move elsewhere, were forced to work. In Poland, for example, 80% of the peasant population had by 1650 holdings of no more that 20 acres when a typical family of 7.5 equivalent adults would not have been able to sustain itself on 40 acres.” See: Cem Karayalcin, 'Property rights and the first great divergence: Europe 1500–1800' (2016) 42 Intl Rev Econ Finan 484. 401 Perkins observes that: “The structural moment insists upon a fundamental division and contrast between an East-Elbian agrarian economy of predominantly large holdings, occupied by Junker farmers, and a West-Elbian peasant or small-scale agriculture. Within this context, the Junker farms east of the Elbe-Saale line are held to have especially dependent upon and oriented towards grain production for market, while the peasant farmers of West-Elbia emphasized livestock nongrain crop production.” See: J. A Perkins, 'Dualism in German Agrarian Historiography' (1986) 28(2) Comparative Studies in Society 287 at 287/288. Perkins further notices that “The weak development of urbanization in eastern Germany was further exacerbated by the Junkers' acquisition of the right to trade in the produce of their estates and by their ability, up to the eighteenth century, to enforce a liberal tariff policy in favour of cheap imported manufactures. Such a situation, however, reflected the growing orientation of agriculture in East-Elbia towards exporting grain to deficit areas in western Europe, which provided the economic rationale for the "second serfdom." In other words, the growing demand for grain in western Europe encouraged the Junkers of East-Elbia to expand the area of their demesnes and to extract increased labour services from their subject peasantry.” See: ibid. at 296.

63

for the emergence of a more backward social system based, in that case, upon black slavery.” 402 In the 17th century, the GDP per capita of Poland fell even below levels of Asian countries and – despite catching up with Asia in 18th century – Poland has ever since continued to significantly diverge from Western Europe.403

The economic situation of the CEECs after the collapse of the Soviet block on the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, and particularly after the accession of a number of CEECs from 2004 on, resulting in the re-orientation CEECs’ economies from Eurasia to Western hemisphere resembles the situation the Polish Commonwealth or East Prussia. It suffices to look at above-discussed annual agreements on economic exchange concluded between the PRC and the PRL between the 1950s and 1970s to see where the PRL then stood in the chain of value and production (see: section 2.3; Appendix G. Sino-Polish bilateral treaties), in order to be able to envision how now Poland’s economy could look like, should Poland be economically integrated with Russia-led EEU and served as the hub for the SREB (when none of Poland, the PRC and post-Soviet republics have collectivised centrally-planned economies any more). Meanwhile, the CEECs have again become the ‘granary of Europe’ similar to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 17th century when it “began to feed not only Northern Europe but also the Mediterranean.”404 Exports of food, row materials, intermediate product (anything placed low in the chain of value) from the CEECs to the West have grown massively while CEECs, and particularly Western regions of Poland, have seen numerous investments in assembly plants with no accompanying R&D infrastructure. Pupils in Polish schools, have for long been fed with concept of Poland A and B largely coming down to the infrastructural backwardness (mostly in terms of railway network) in the lands of Russian and Austrian partitions against well developed infrastructure in Prussian/German partition (roughly Pomerania or Pomorze, Greater Poland or Wielkopolska and Sileria or Śląsk) which, admittedly, can still be seen a century after Poland’s reunification. Yet, very few see obvious analogies between current EU’s grave overinvestment, if not malinvestment in CEECs (in overly high-standard road infrastructure, water parks in the middle of nowhere, legendary white-elephant airports that nobody needs etc.) with good infrastructure in the Eastern part of 19th century Prussia/Germany where over half a million of Poles then emigrated from the East to the Ruhr Valley just like, from 2004 on, millions of people left CEECs for Western European countries, mostly for the UK.

5.3. Morawiecki’s Plan

Mentioned Morawiecki’s Plan405 (which under the 2016 Declaration is meant to be, on the Polish side, the core pillar of the Sino-Polish co-operation for the development of the SREB project) does not address these geo-political conditions and does not offer any way out of this trap. In fact, not in a single word does this document mention the PRC, the OBOR or the SREB, and it only perfunctorily mentions the AIIB in one line with other multilateral development banks merely stating that participation in such institutions increases access to 402 See: ibid. at 296. 403 See: Mikołaj Malinowski and Jan Luiten van Zanden, 'National income and its distribution in preindustrial Poland in a global perspective' (May 2015) EHES WP no. 76 1 at 1, 2, 30, 31. See also: Malinowski, Mikolaj, 'Little Divergence revisited: Polish weighted real wages in a European perspective, 1500–1800' (2016)(hew004v1-23) Eur Rev Econ His 1. See also generally: Mikołaj Malinowski, 'Market Conditions in Preindustrial Poland, 1500–1772' (2016) Econ His Dev Regions 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20780389.2016.1175297. 404 See: note 397 at 44. 405 See: Uchwała Rady Ministrów z dnia w sprawie przyjęcia „Planu na rzecz odpowiedzialnego rozwoju” 2016 14/2016 RM-111-18-16 (Action plan for responsible development of Poland, adopted 16 February 2016).

64

financing of investment on preferential terms.406 Generally speaking, Morawiecki’s Plan is underpinned by Keynesian economics, at some points can be found self-contradictory, and some its elements clearly clash with some elements of the SREB project. The document well identifies risks for Polish economy, which include:

(i) middle-income-trap 407 (the plan reinvents the wheel, for example by stating that “middle-income trap can be best illustrated by the fact that, throughout last one hundred years the Poland’s GPD per capita has never surpassed a laf of the USA’s GDP per capita.” 408), as to which the official press release stated that: “The sources of growth thus far (e.g. low labour costs) have run out. If we do not want to get stuck in the group of countries with middle income, we must find new drivers of growth. This goal can be achieved by building global specialisations of the Polish economy. The economic growth must be accompanied by a growth of salaries. Half of the working Polish population earns less than net PLN 2500”409

(ii) the lack-of-balance-trap as to which the official press release stated that: “Healthy economic growth requires an appropriate balance between foreign and domestic capital involved in the economy. Our development model thus far has largely built on foreign capital. Its presence in our economy is important and desirable, since it allowed to increase GDP and contributes to technology transfer. Poland remains open to foreign investors, but domestic capital must be strengthened, since it is the basis for stability of developed economies.” 410

(iii) the average-product-trap, as to which the official press release stated that: “Too many Polish companies build their competitiveness on delivering simple products at the lowest price, and public institutions apply the lowest price criterion in their contract award procedures. We have very few economic champions, not many small and medium-sized enterprises have the opportunity to place innovations on the market. The state not only must support the companies in increasing their competitiveness, but also must itself become a technologically demanding customer through its public procurement system.”411

(iv) the demographic-trap, as to which the official press release stated that: “We are ageing as a society, and this year is critical. Forecasts show that from now on the number of working population will gradually decline. If we do not stop this process, in 2050 it may decrease by even 5 million people. The problem will be exacerbated by labour migration of young people and very low fertility rate.” 412

(v) the trap-of-weak-institutions, as to which the official press release stated that: “This trap exacerbates all others, since it defines the environment we live in. Until now there has been no comprehensive and long-term vision of Poland’s development and coordination of activities of the public administration (“ministerial Poland”). The

406 See: Morawiecki’s Plan, point 7 at 10. 407 See: Morawiecki’s Plan, point 1 at 3. 408 In Polish: “Pułapkę średniego dochodu najlepiej obrazuje fakt, że na przestrzeni ostatnich stu lat poziom PKB per capita Polski nigdy nie przekroczył połowy PKB per capita USA.” See: Morawiecki’s Plan, point 1 at 3. 409 See: Ministry of Economic Development, 'Action plan for responsible development of Poland. Press release' (16 February 2016) <http://www.mr.gov.pl/media/14909/ResponsibleDevelopmentPlan_pressrelease.pdf> accessed 6 September 2016 at 1. 410 See: ibid. 411 See: ibid. 412 See: ibid.

65

increase in the operating costs of administration was not accompanied by an increase in its effectiveness.” 413

As to solutions, Morawiecki’s Plan seems to have nothing to offer, by covering everything from soup to nuts, including (i) reindustrialization, 414 (ii) ‘development of innovative companies,’415 (iii) ‘capital for development,’416 (iv) ‘foreign expansion,’417 and (v) ‘social and regional development.’ 418 The self-contradictions of the Morawiecki’s Plan lie, for example, in that one cannot propose overcoming the average-product-trap by reindustrialisation419 and, at the same time, make a claim that an emphasis shall be placed on those foreign direct investments that ‘would generate transfers of technologies and competencies which are unique or characterised by a high share of expenditures in research and development (‘R&D’)’. 420 It is pretty obvious though that even the most advanced assembly-plants requiring highly-skilled production engineers would contribute virtually nothing to domestic R&D sector.

Likewise, one cannot simultaneously claim that the lack-of-balance-trap can be overcome by the accumulation and reinvestment of domestic private capital421 (like by promoting the idea of employees’ participation in companies’ equity422) and, at the same time, claim that in order to improve access to capital by domestic companies, government shall continue to hold out a

413 See: ibid. 414 “Industry is a natural environment for innovation, the core of expenditure for research and development, also for enterprises from the sector of services. It is here that necessary cooperation chains and high-quality jobs are created. The Polish industry has a huge potential and thanks to specialization may compete on the world markets. The challenge for the next years is to support the existing and develop new competitive advantages and specializations. The establishment of the Ministry of Maritime Economy and Inland Waterways naturally sets out the direction of investment activities in one of the key industrial areas.” See: ibid. at 2. 415 “Polish companies must have good conditions to develop and create innovation (e.g. friendly legal environment, financial incentives). If their environment does not hamper their development, we may see the global champions emerging. Possible actions in this area include facilitating the start for entrepreneurs, promoting research and implementation, deregulation of economic activity, preparing the Business Constitution (a new coherent legal act of general nature) or introduction of the principle of succession of one-person companies.” See: ibid. at 2. 416 “The key task in this area is to increase investments. They should ultimately account for at least 25% of the GDP. From 2008, we have seen a downward trend, which resulted in the investment level amounting to 18% at present. Necessary actions include extension of financial instruments offered by state development institutions and effective investing of the EU funds. It is important to encourage Poles to build capital for the future. The savings should be used to increase the quality of life. Therefore, it is extremely important to increase the share of savings in the GDP, e.g. by means of promoting employee stock ownership plan. This will allow Poles to obtain income not only from labour, but also from capital in the future.” See: ibid. at 2. 417 “Support for foreign expansion of Polish companies is one of the ways to increase the domestic capital. Export is not enough – our enterprises should conquer foreign markets also by means of foreign direct investment, mergers and acquisitions. European markets are still the key markets for Poland, but we should increase activity on prospective markets, i.e. Asian, African and North-American. The state will support our enterprises by means of, inter alia, dedicated financial offer and promotion of Polish products.” See: ibid. at 2, 3. 418 “Small towns and rural areas must be involved in development processes. Each part of Poland has its assets. Smart regional policy should develop them. The Ministry of Economic Development will actively participate in drafting the “Pact for rural areas” which is being developed by the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development. Sustainable social development requires also a qualitative change in vocational education so that school graduates were specialists with skills sought on the labour market.” See: ibid. at 3. 419 „It is the industry which generates comprehensive value chains and co-operation networks, in principle contributing to the growth in productivity, creation of innovation and high-quality jobs ” (in Polish: „To przemysł tworzy złożone łańcuchy wartości i sieci kooperacji, zasadniczo przyczyniając się do wzrostu produktywności, powstawania innowacji i miejsc pracy wysokiej jakości”). See: Morawiecki’s Plan, point ad.1. at 6. 420 “Prowadzenie aktywnej polityki (w ramach pozyskiwania bezpośrednich inwestycji zagranicznych) zabiegania o projekty umożliwiające bezpośredni transfer do Polski unikalnych technologii i kompetencji oraz takich, które charakteryzować będzie wysoki współczynnik wydatków z obszaru Badania i Rozwój, a także duża skłonność do współpracy z polskimi uczelniami w celach badawczo-wdrożeniowych.” See: Morawicki’s Plan, point 8 at 10. 421 “(…)[L]ack if sufficiently strong domestic capital might raise fears about long-term stability in uncertain conditions. Domestic capital is the basis of all developed economies’ stability, and dynamysing its growth shall then be basic priority of the state” (in Polish (…)[B]rak dostatecznie silnego kapitału krajowego może rodzić obawy o długookresową stabilność w niepewnym otoczeniu. Krajowy kapitał jest podstawą stabilności wszystkich gospodarek rozwiniętych i dynamizowanie jego wzrostu powinno być podstawowym priorytetem państwa.”). See: Morawicki’s Plan, point ad.2 at 3, 4. 422 See: Morawicki’s Plan, point ad.3 at 7.

66

begging bowl toward the EU423and establish new etatist/Keynesian institutions like the Polish Development Fund (Polski Fundusz Rozwoju) 424 or ‘Start in Poland’425 whereby a mix capital from the EU and state-owned financial institutions would finance planned reindustrialisation and/or expansion of exports.426 It is a commonsense that domestic persons could rather be encouraged to reinvest/lend their money to domestic business, for example, by (i) securing yields on domestic persons’ capital thanks to reasonably high interest rates, sound monetary system etc.,9 or (ii) improving the flow of venture capital by liberalising securities laws. Finally, one cannot presents to the government of the PRC in the SREB’s context a plan which takes it as premise that future development of the country, in principle, should not be based on foreign investment, 427 seeing that the SREB would largely mean PRC’s firm’s investments in Polish infrastructure which definitely do not fall within the concept of investments ‘generating transfers of technologies and competencies which are unique or characterised by a high share of expenditures in research and development’ encouraged by Morawiecki’s plan.

5.4. SREB and the EU

It is clear then that Poland’s current policymakers are not playmakers but rather pawns in the games played by the others including the US, the EU, Germany and now also the PRC. After the collapse of the Soviet block, CEECs have become crucial for the US from the strategic/security-perspective, and for Germany for economic reasons. Apart from the EU which henpecks all CEECs either as member-states or candidates for EU’s membership, there have also existed institutionalised forms co-operation between CEECs such as (i) Central European Initiative,428 (ii) Central European Free Trade Agreement,429 or most recently (iii)

423 See: Morawicki’s Plan, point ad.3 at 7, point 2 at 9, and point 12 at 12. 424 See: Morawicki’s Plan, point ad.3 at 7. 425 See: Morawicki’s Plan, point ad.3 at 7. 426 See: note 425, 426; Morawicki’s Plan, point ad.4 at 40. 427 “The lack-of-balance-trap is the consequence of the realization of the previous economic model adopted after 1989. The inflow of capital and technology in the form of foreign direct investment has contributed to economic growth of Poland in terms of GPD which, however, is not the only measurement of people’s life quality and of enterprises wealth.” (in Polish „Pułapka braku równowagi to konsekwencja realizacji dotychczasowego modelu rozwoju gospodarczego, przyjętego po 1989 r. Napływ kapitału i technologii w formie bezpośrednich inwestycji zagranicznych przyczynił się do wzrostu gospodarczego Polski pod względem PKB, który jednak nie jest jedyną miarą jakości życia obywateli oraz zasobności firm.”) See: Morawicki’s Plan, point ad.2 at 3. 428 „The Central European Initiative (CEI) is a regional intergovernmental forum committed to supporting European integration through cooperation between and among its Member States and with the European Union (EU), other interested public institutions or private and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as international and regional organisations. In order to offer a solid contribution to European integration, the CEI combines multilateral diplomacy and project management, both as donor and recipient, while also bridging European macro-regions. The CEI strategic objectives are the following:• Support CEI Member States on their path towards European integration; • Promote the alignment of CEI Member States to EU standards; • Implement small and medium-sized projects. In this context, the aim of the political cooperation is to supply the countries and their institutions with a flexible, pragmatic platform for regional cooperation, while focusing on their preparation to a future accession to the European Union (EU). In doing so, special attention is given to capacity building of the non-EU CEI Member States which, thanks to its ideal location, is pursued through know-how transfer and exchange of experience among those countries which are members of the EU and those which are not. The CEI is actively engaged in supporting projects in various areas of cooperation, also through the mobilisation of financial resources providing greater possibilities for studying, financing and executing national and international projects.” See: Central European Initiative. 'Mission & Objectives' <http://www.cei.int/content/mission-objectives> accessed on 6 September 2016. 429 “On December 19, 2006 in Bucharest under the Chairmanship of Romania, the Central European Free Trade Agreement was substantially amended and its membership enlarged to create CEFTA 2006 – a modern and ambitious free trade agreement with six new Parties from South Eastern Europe. Following the necessary ratification processes, this new CEFTA entered into force across the various Parties between July and November 2007. The speed with which they ratified the agreement illustrates the Parties’ belief in the importance of CEFTA for stimulating economic development and the EU accession agenda in the region.

67

the Three Seas Initiative (also known as Trimarium) established on 25 August 2016 in Dubrovnik under US’ auspices. Nonetheless, obviously the EU calls the tune in the region, which the PRC and the CEECs emphasized in the Belgrade Guidelines by stating that “[t]he participants reiterated that China-CEEC cooperation is in line with China-EU relations and reaffirmed their commitment to deepening their partnership for peace, growth, reform and civilization based on the principles of equality, respect and trust, thus contributing as appropriate to the implementation of the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation” (see: Appendix C. The Belgrade Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries).430 Likewise, in the 2016 Declaration, the PRC and Poland stated that (i) “[b]oth parties support full implementation of the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, development of the EU-China partnership for peace, growth, reforms and civilization as well as deepening comprehensive strategic parthership of mutual benefits,” (ii) “[b]oth parties support timely completion of ambitious and complex EU-China investment agreement covering markets access and protection of investment.”431

Meanwhile, the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda,432 likely because of timing (it was adopted in November 2013 that is not long after some sketch of the OBOR’s vision was publicised – see section: 1.2) did not cover potential developments in the land-transportation infrastructure between the PRC and the EU, as - with regard to ‘transport and infrastructure’- it only very generally stated that both parties shall “[s]strengthen cooperation in developing smart, upgraded and fully interconnected infrastructure systems. Expand cooperation in interoperability of seamless supply chain logistics networks between Asia and Europe, maritime markets and routes, rail services, logistics, safety, and energy efficiency.” 433 It comes as no surprise that, most recently, the EU has paid much more attention to the 16+1 Group and SREB’s idea in its unilateral documents devoted to EU-PRC relations which, however, in mid 2016 deteriorated to the extent the PRC and the EU did not issue any joint statement after the 18th EU-PRC Summit held on 12-13 July in Beijing. The ‘Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on Elements for a new EU strategy on China’ released on 22 June 2016 ahead of mentioned 18th summit included EU’s concerns about reciprocal access to PRC’s market formulated in statements such as that:

(i) “Internal change in China has external impact. Economically and financially, in trade and investment flows, strategically, increasingly militarily and in other areas, China is seeking space and a voice. As a consequence, the decisions China makes

The signatories to CEFTA 2006 are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) on behalf of Kosovo in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, As foreseen in the Agreement, Bulgaria and Romania withdrew from CEFTA upon their accession to the EU in 2007 and Croatia withdrew following its accession to the EU in July 2013. Each CEFTA Party has appointed official Contact Points to coordinate communications on behalf of their respective Party with the various stakeholders. They also provide official data and information to the Secretariat.” See: CEFTA. 'CEFTA Parties' <http://www.cefta.int/> accessed on 6 September 2016. 430 For example, Fallon observed that: “China is careful to explain that the ‘‘16+1’’ does not supplant but rather supplements EU–China relations. However, the 11 countries that are also members of the EU can easily form a pro-China lobby and therefore influence policy making in Brussels from within this block.” See: Theresa Fallon, 'China's Pivot to Europe' (2014) 36(3) American Foreign Policy Interests 175 at 179. 431 In Polish: „Obie strony wspierają pełne wdrożenie Strategicznej Agendy Współpracy UE-Chiny 2020, rozwój partnerstwa UE-Chiny dla pokoju, wzrostu, reform i cywilizacji oraz pogłębianie wszechstronnego strategicznego partnerstwa obopólnych korzyści. Obie strony popierają szybkie zakończenie negocjacji ambitnego i kompleksowego porozumienia inwestycyjnego UE-Chiny obejmującego dostęp do rynku i ochronę inwestycji.” See: 2016 Declaration, point 10. 432 See: EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation 2013 (signed in Beijing on 21 November 2013 during 16th EU-China Summit). 433 See: ibid. point 4.2.

68

about its political, economic and social development matter to the EU more than ever,”434

(ii) “The EU wants a China which is economically more open and stable, with significantly improved market access for foreign companies as well as a level playing field and fair competition for business and investment, benchmarked at the level of openness provided for all companies operating in the EU market,” 435

(iii) “There has been a lack of progress in giving the market a more decisive role in the economy in the key areas of concern to the EU. Recent legislative initiatives have introduced new restrictions on foreign operators in China, which go against market opening and the principles of equal treatment and a level playing field. They also deprive China of the best solutions to enhance economic activity,” 436

(iv) “China should also honour its WTO commitment to notify subsidies, starting with those granted to the steel sector. In the medium term, China needs to reform its state-led economy and let market forces naturally address the problem.” 437

As to provisions on the 16+1 Group, OBOR and SBER, one could hardly say whether that statement was more adressed to the policy-makers of the PRC or of CEECs but the clear message from Brussels has been that [t]he EU must project a strong, clear and unified voice in its approach to China. When Member States conduct their bilateral relations with China – whether one-on-one or as groups of countries such as the 16+1 format – they should cooperate with the Commission, the EEAS and other Member States to help ensure that aspects relevant to the EU are in line with EU law, rules and policies, and that the overall outcome is beneficial for the EU as a whole.” 438 In other words, the EU’s message has been that the PRC and the CEECs should not ‘collude’ behind EU’s back. 439 , 440 Very 434 See: European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 'Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Elements for a new EU strategy on China' (Brussels 22 June 2016) JOIN(2016) 30 final, point I.1.2. 435 See: ibid. point III at 5. 436 See: ibid. point I.1.2, fifth tiret. 437 See: ibid. point 3.2. at 7. In fact, the actual rift between the EU and the PRC pertained to PRC’s steel overcapacity, as (i) according to that statement “[t]he EU is seriously concerned about industrial over-capacity in a number of industrial sectors in China, notably steel production. If the problem is not properly remedied, trade defence measures may proliferate, spreading beyond steel to other sectors such as aluminium, ceramics and wood-based products,” (see: ibid.) and (ii) a few days after the summit, instead of signing a joint declaration with PRC’s representative, Donald Tusk and Jean Claude Juncker issued a letter from Ulaanbaatat in which they stated that “[a]t the Summit we decided to set up a bilateral platform on steel and agreed it should have a broad mandate so as to cover all relevant issues. This includes subsidies and other types of support from governments or government-sponsored institutions than can cause market distortions and contribute to global excess capacity. The platform should also be used to monitor and verify commitments taken in this regard” (see: Donald Tusk and Jean-Claude Juncker, 'Letter by President Donald Tusk and President Jean-Claude Juncker to Chinese Premier Li Keqiang on steel-ovrcapacity problem' (Ulaanbaatar 16 July 2016) 438 See: note 434, point II at 4. 439 Such impression about the sense of EU’s message is further confirmed by longish (yet worth citing in full) elaboration on the OBOR initiative which reads as follows: “Improving infrastructure links between the EU and China would boost the economic prospects for all concerned. The EU-China Connectivity Platform should create synergies between EU policies and projects and China's "One Belt One Road" initiative, as well as China will need to fulfil its declared aim of making its "One Belt, One Road" initiative an open platform which adheres to market rules and international norms in order to deliver benefits for all and to encourage responsible economic behaviour in third countries. Co-operation in this field should be based on full respect for relevant policies, and applicable regulations and standards, including with regard to public procurement, and guarantee a level playing field for economic operators from both sides. This should also apply to those countries outside the EU which have pledged to apply EU standards. The aim should be to help build sustainable and inter-operable cross-border infrastructure networks in countries and regions between the EU and China. Joint work on a pipeline of priority investment projects should involve close co-ordination with the countries concerned, not least to ensure compatibility with their fiscal constraints. EU-China co-operation on connectivity should fully benefit Asian partners, including Afghanistan, Pakistan and countries in Central Asia, by contributing to their integration in international trade flows.” See: ibid. point III.4 at 9. 440 In the context of the 16+1 Group, Turcsányi very aptly notices on the nature of relation between Western European Countries and CEECs that “[i]t may be understandable at first that the rest of the EU may look with suspicion at these developments.

69

symptomatically, the statement did not mention a single word about SREB’s specific geographical situation or about necessary co-operation with Russia. 441 Instead, while referring to specific regions, that statement mentioned, for example, that “[f]urther afield, the EU's strategy on Central Asia also provides opportunities to step up co-operation with China in areas such as security, connectivity, development assistance, and the sustainable use of water and energy resources”442- hinting that, despite all odds existing in Central Asia and Caucasus, the EU might be strongly pushing for the SREB’s Southern variant (thus bypassing Poland as the SREB’s hub, in such case likely replaced by Germany) which might anyway not be completed for the next fifty years or more.

Generally speaking, one could also hardly say whether future actions of the EU institutions would be in line with US’ (Anglo-American) or Western European (German) strategic or economic objectives whereby no OBOR’s/SREB’s scenario is good for the US while Western European countries might look favourably at any scenario but Poland’s becoming SREB’s hub bridging railways from Russia (East) and the Balkans (South). Yet in 2003, when the PRC and the EU concluded a number of bilateral agreements (which is commonly considered to be the birth of EU-PRC strategic partnership443), EU-PRC relations promised very well, 444 especially seeing that developments in EU-PRC relations coincided with the US invasion of Iraq which Western European countries very heavily criticised, yet the CEECs firmly supported.445 However, after a few years it appeared that both parties were incapable of solving businesslike matters like the waiver of the EU’s embargo on the sales of arms to the PRC in force since 1989 largely under the US’ pressure446 or recognition of PRC’s market economy status by the EU,447 the latter of which now, in the context of the EU-PRC rift over the steel-overcapacity, seems to be nowhere of the horizon. What makes the matters worse for the EU-PRC relations, are the ideological cracks (such PRC’s harsh reactions Dalai Lama’s visits to Europe which even resulted in the cancellation of the EU-PRC summit in 2008448) whereby (i) to quote Men “[b]enefited from political democracy and capitalism, the EU advocates liberal values and regards itself as a normative power” 449 and “[b]elieving in the superiority of its norms and development model, the EU intends to transform China politically and economically and views such tasks both as a responsibility and as part of its ongoing efforts to extend its soft power globally.” 450and (ii) to quote Holslag, the EU “still assumes that by entangling the Asian power into a web of international institutions and rules, Beijing will adopt the norms that Europe has enshrined in its own

While Brussels officials may have gotten used to the fact that the UK, France or Germany address critical issues of foreign affairs bilaterally, it has not been a custom to see its poorest and newest member countries doing so.” See: Richard Turcsányi, 'Central and Eastern Europe’s courtship with China: Trojan horse within the EU?' EIAS (January 2014) EU-Asia at a Glance 1 441 Yet in 2011, generally with regard to EU-PRC relations, Holslag observed that: “[y]et what is missing, for example, is a common position towards Russia. It can be argued that compared to the United States, Europe and China do not have overlapping spheres of influence. Russia, however, is one of the rare countries that tie both parts of the Eurasian continent geopolitically and geo-economically together (see, for example, Lo, 2008).” See: Jonathan Holslag, 'The Elusive Axis: Assessing the EU-China Strategic Partnership' (2011) 49(2) Journal of Common Market Studies 293 at 298. 442 See: ibid. point 4 at 11. 443See: Jing Men 'Is There a Strategic Partnership between the EU and China?' (2014) 19(3/1) Eur Foreign Affrs Rev 5 at 1. 444 See: ibid. at 6. 445 See: note 430 at 176, 179; note 440 at 5. 446 See: note 430 at 176, ; note 443 at 9. 447 See: note 430 at 176. 448 See: note 430 at 176; note 443 at 10. 449 See: note 443 at 11. 450 See: note 443 at 11.

70

political charters.” 451 At the same time, the PRC’s policy-makers, while increasingly assertive and hypersensitive to any interferences with PRC internal matters,452 are in the first place realist, meaning that they believe in the ‘balance of powers as international relations’ foundation.453 Therefore the EU which is liberal rather than realist,454 according to Holslag – in order to take advantage of opportunities potentially generated by the EU-PRC partnership – must be more realist too because (i) “[t]there are sufficient shared strategic interests to underpin a more realist relationship,” 455 and also (ii) “realism will also make relations less prone to setbacks over symbolical issues, permit Europe to reap larger gains from other powers, and form a worthy alternative for the EU’s defective soft power.” 456

Indeed, EU’s and European policy/makers’, scholars’, thinkers’ etc. approach to the OBOR/SREB initiative seem to be lacking realism and, instead, it is driven by a strong prejudice against coequal EU-PRC relations stemming from the mix of liberal ideology and the allegiance to the US. In the article published in April 2016, British political scientist Peter Ferdinand tells like it is by observing that, by an increased land trade between the PRC, Russia and the EU, the “hopes in this way to make Europe gradually more dependent economically upon China and less dependent upon the United States.” 457 However, for example, Austrian scholar and former Austria’s Minister of Defence Werner Fasslabend, in the article published in December 2015 warns from liberal/axiological positions that (i) the realisation of Mackinder’s visions and the restoration of European civilisation “clearly sounds like a carrot to weaken the transatlantic partnership and to substitute it in part with enhanced China–EU relations,” 458 and (ii) “[i]t is doubtful whether such a development would be favourable for the EU’s political visions and aspirations of a world based on Western values and democratic rule.”459 Nonetheless, the reality is that the PRC, with the OBER/SBER as its primary task, wants to gradually replace the US-led unipolar world with multipolar world where the EU would counter-balance the US,460 and Holslag is definitely right to claim that the EU (i) “has not determined how it should position itself between China and the US, or what the significance of closer co-operation with China can be in relation to Russia and other giants.”461 and (ii) “[i]ts penchant towards Washington seems to be more habitual than the result of strategic thinking, and this is perhaps the main proof that it has not outgrown its diplomatic infancy.” 462

451 See: note 441at 309. 452 To quote Men (i) “as a sovereign state which has a history of being semi-colonized and invaded by colonial powers, China attaches great importance to independence and non-interference from others,” (see: note 443 at 11), and (ii) “China, conscious of its inferior position in the international system, and proud of its achievements through the reforms it has been conducting, desires an equal position in its relationship with the EU” (see: note 443 at 11). 453 See: note 443 at 11. 454 As summarised by Men, liberals: (i) “see institutions as enabling states to reach mutually beneficial, cooperative outcomes. Institutions put forward behavioural principles that are mutually recognized by the members of the system.” (see: note 443 at 11, 12), and “also believe that democracies do not fight each other. If more states are converted into democracies, the world will be more peaceful which will be characterized by cooperation instead of conflicts” (see: note 443 at 12). 455 See: note 441 at 294. 456 See: ibid. 457 See: note 7 at 955. 458 See: note 352, Fasslabend at 300. 459 See: ibid. 460 See: note 443 at 14. 461 See: note 441 at 310. 462 See: ibid.

71

What even more worrying for Poland about this EU’s reluctant stance on the OBOR/SREB, the existing prejudice against extensive Russia’s participation in the SREB project (which, as mentioned many times above in this paper, would entail Poland’s central role in this project as SREB’s hub) seems to be even stronger that mere prejudice against EU’s cooperation with the PRC. Commentators favouring the existing Trans-Atlantic alliance find arguments against SBER’s route via Russia (and Poland) which simply do not add up. For instance, Financial Times’s Shawn Donnan in his piece from October 2014, (i) made a claim that “[t]he operators of the trains and companies that use them say they have yet to see any repercussions from the conflict in Ukraine,” missing, however, that these train pass through Belararus, not Ukraine,463 and also (ii) cited opinion made by Niklas Swanstrm, according to whom “Russia could start using the rail connections much as it has its natural gas pipelines into Europe: as a strategic tool that it can shut on and off” 464 which contradicts the reality where Russia’s absolute priority has been to be a reliable gas supplier to Europe (with emphasis on Germany.)

The Western European stance on the SREB’s route across Russia and its significance for the development of the CEECs, can perhaps be best seen in mentioned Fasslabend’s article, in which this author tries to speak for the CEECs by stating that “[f]rom a Central European perspective, it is not easy to understand why the route of the Silk Road provides a better link between Asia Minor and Russia, rather than between Turkey and the EU.”465 By making a claim that, “this route “looks more like an attempt to reshape the post- Soviet space than an endeavour to improve the connections between the Middle East, the South-Eastern European countries aspiring to EU membership and the EU,” 466 Fasslabend misses that one does not preclude the other as Chinese companies have been working on the North-South corridor across Balkans with Hungary and Serbia already for a few years (see: section 1.2; Appendix D. Implementation of the Measures of the Bucharest Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries; Appendix F. Implementation of the Measures of the Belgrade Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries) and now China only needs to choose between Poland and Czechia as SREB’s hub (see: section 1.1). And, by raising the issue that “it is difficult to see how the Silk Road concept could offer a substantial contribution to the existing and already planned infrastructure between Rotterdam, Antwerp, the Rhine Valley and northern Italy,” Fasslabend proves that in Western-European mindset, there is no place for SREB’s hub neither in Poland nor in Czechia.

5.5. Conclusion

Altogether, for the time being, the prospects for the development of SREB’s hub in Poland look rather dim. While Holslag suggest that the EU, in the lack of capability to carry out a realist policy toward the PRC should allow Member states to deal with the PRC bilaterally,467

463See: Shawn Donnan, 'Geopolitics cast shadow over New Silk Road' Financial Times (17 October 2014 2014) n/a. In this obvious piece of anti-Russian propaganda, Donnan is trying to build a narrative of risks to rail transportation along existing route based on statement made by “Ronald Kleijwegt, the man in charge of European logistics for HP” (see: ibid.) who, according to Donnan (i) “liken[ed] the possibility of an interruption in service to the closure of the Suez Canal due to turmoil in the Middle East.” (see: ibid.), and (ii) said that "[t]here's always a risk nowadays" (see: ibid.) and that "[w]e always have a plan B." (see: ibid.). 464See: ibid. 465 See: note 352 Fasslabend at 300. 466 See: ibid. 467 See: note Error! Bookmark not defined. at 294.

72

it is clear that it will not happen any time soon as, despite greatly increasing trade and economic interdependencies between the PRC and CEECs in the last thirty years, the PRC is not yet powerful enough to divide Western European countries and the CEECs.468 Also, current Poland’s government’s stance on the SREB project is rather disappointing seeing that, apart from the AIIB membership inherited from the previous cabinet, efforts to facilitate the development of the SREB on the Polish territory have so far been very mediocre. Poland’s current government’s allegiance to the idea of Trans-Pacific alliance remains strong, and policy-makers remain to look Westwards only. They seem to be incapable of scenario-thinking and, at least at present, seem to reject the hand reached out to them by the PRC.

468 See: note 440 at 5.

73

Appendix A. China's Twelve Measures for Promoting Friendly Cooperation with Central and Eastern European Countries

See: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 'China's Twelve Measures for Promoting Friendly Cooperation with Central and Eastern European Countries' <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/wjbispg_665714/t928567.shtml> accessed on 27 August 2016.

26 April 2012 “1. Set up a secretariat for cooperation between China and central and eastern European countries. The secretariat will be based in China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and charged with communication and coordination on matters related to cooperation, preparation for leaders' meetings and business forums and implementation of relevant outcomes. The 16 central and eastern European countries will, in the principle of voluntarism, each designate a counterpart department and a coordinator to take part in the work of the secretariat. 2. Establish a US$10 billion special credit line, a certain proportion of which will be concessional loans, with a focus on cooperation projects in such areas as infrastructure, high and new technologies, and green economy. The 16 central and eastern European countries may file project application to the National Development Bank of China, Export and Import Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Construction Bank of China, Bank of China or China Citic Bank. 3. Set up an investment cooperation fund between China and central and eastern European countries with the goal of raising US$500 million in the first stage. 4. China will send trade and investment promotion missions to central and eastern European countries and take concrete steps to move forward bilateral economic cooperation and trade. China would like to work with the 16 central and eastern European countries to increase total two-way trade to US$100 billion by 2015. 5. China will, in the light of actual conditions and needs of central and eastern European countries, encourage Chinese enterprises to cooperate with relevant countries to establish one economic and technological zone in each country in the next five years. China will continue to encourage and support more Chinese enterprises to take part in the development of existing economic and technological zones in the relevant countries. 6. China stands ready to actively explore with the 16 central and eastern European countries financial cooperation such as currency swap, local currency settlement for cross-border trade, and establishment of bank branches in each other's countries, with a view to enhancing support and services for practical cooperation. 7. Establish an expert advisory committee on the construction of transportation network between China and central and eastern European countries. With the Ministry of Commerce of China as the coordinator and the 16 central and eastern European countries participating on a voluntary basis, China and the European countries will explore the building of regional highway or railway demonstration networks through joint venture, joint contracting and other means. 8. Propose to hold a forum on cultural cooperation between China and central and eastern European countries in 2013 in China and, in this context, hold regular high-level and expert meetings on culture, cultural festivals and theme activities. 9. Provide 5,000 scholarships to the 16 central and eastern European countries in the next five years. Support the Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms program in the 16 countries and invite 1,000 students from relevant countries to study the Chinese language in China in the next five years. Enhance inter-university exchanges and joint academic research, and send 1,000 students and scholars to the 16 countries in the next five years. The Ministry of Education of China plans to host an education policy dialogue with central and eastern European countries next year. 10. Propose to establish a tourism promotion alliance between China and central and eastern European countries, which will be coordinated by China Tourism Administration and open to participation by civil aviation authorities, travel agencies and airline companies of the two sides. The purpose is to enhance mutual business promotion and joint tourist destination development, and explore the possibility of opening more direct flights between China and the 16 central and eastern European countries. China Tourism Administration plans to co-organize a tourism products promotion for China and central and eastern European countries during the China International Tourism Mart to be held in Shanghai this autumn. 11. Establish a research fund on relations between China and central and eastern European countries. China is ready to provide RMB2 million yuan every year to support academic exchanges between research institutes and scholars of the two sides. 12. China plans to host the first young political leaders forum of China and central and eastern European countries in 2013 and invite youth representatives from both sides to the forum to enhance mutual understanding and friendship.”

74

Appendix B. The Bucharest Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries

See: Cooperation between of China Central and Eastern European Countries. 'The Bucharest Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries' <http://www.china-ceec.org/151/2014/01/02/41s1569.htm> accessed on 27 August 2016.

26 November 2013 “On 26 November 2013, the Meeting of Heads of Government of China and Central and Eastern European Countries was held in Bucharest, Romania. Premier Li Keqiang of the People's Republic of China, Prime Minister Victor Ponta of Romania, Prime Minister Edi Rama of the Republic of Albania, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Vjekoslav Bevanda of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Prime Minister Plamen Oresharski of the Republic of Bulgaria, Prime Minister Zoran Milanovic of the Republic of Croatia, Prime Minister Jiri Rusnok of the Czech Republic, Prime Minister Andrus Ansip of the Republic of Estonia, Prime Minister Orban Viktor of Hungary, Prime Minister Algirdas Butkevicius of the Republic of Lithuania, Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski of the Republic of Macedonia, Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic of Montenegro, Prime Minister Donald Tusk of the Republic of Poland, Prime Minister Ivica Dacic of the Republic of Serbia, Prime Minister Robert Fico of the Slovak Republic, Prime Minister Alenka Bratusek of the Republic of Slovenia and Minister of Foreign Affairs Edgars Rinkevics, representative of Prime Minister Valdis Dombrovskis of the Republic of Latvia, attended the meeting. They expressed appreciation and gratitude to Romania for the efforts it had made as the host country to ensure the success of the meeting. Parties at the meeting reviewed the achievements made in cooperation between China and central and eastern European countries (CEECs), commended the important contribution of China-CEEC cooperation to solidifying China-CEEC traditional friendship, strengthening political mutual trust, deepening practical cooperation, enhancing people-to-people and cultural exchanges and promoting all-round development of China-Europe relations and agreed that China-CEEC cooperation conforms to the respective features of development and cooperation needs of China and CEECs and meets the common aspirations and interests of their peoples. Parties at the meeting stressed that China-CEEC cooperation is in concord with China-EU comprehensive strategic partnership and expressed their readiness to continue to strengthen and deepen China-CEEC cooperation on the basis of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit and work to make it a growth point in China-Europe cooperation for the benefit of development in all the countries, their peoples as well as world peace and stability, while offering useful experience for countries with different civilizations, systems and levels of development to live in harmony with one another and develop hand in hand. To further advance China-CEEC cooperation, parties at the meeting jointly formulated and issued the Bucharest Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries focusing on the theme of the meeting Win-Win Cooperation for Common Development and affirmed that cooperation will be conducted in accordance with their respective laws and regulations, and in the case of EU member states, relevant EU legislation and regulations will also be observed. I. Hold a China-CEEC meeting of heads of government every year to review cooperation achievements and set the direction for future cooperation. Parties will discuss and set the date and venue of the 2014 meeting as soon as possible. II. Consider formulating a medium-term agenda for cooperation when appropriate in light of how China-CEEC cooperation evolves. III. Promote investment, economic and trade cooperation

i. Firmly oppose protectionism in all its forms and manifestations, work to promote mutual investment and scale up and upgrade economic cooperation and trade while striving to mitigate its current imbalances. ii. Designate and announce 2014 as the China-CEEC Investment and Business Promotion Year, and under its framework:

1. Hold a China-CEEC ministerial meeting on promotion of economic cooperation and trade; 2. Hold an expo of CEEC commodities in China; 3. Hold a China-CEEC symposium on macroeconomic policies in China; 4. Hold a China-CEEC symposium on investment promotion in China; 5. Organize a China-CEEC investment promotion event at the China International Fair for Investment and Trade; 6. Hold a China investment forum in the Czech Republic; 7. Establish a China-CEEC liaison mechanism for investment promotion agencies; 8. Support the establishment of a China-CEEC association of chambers of commerce, joined by chambers of commerce of China and CEECs on a voluntary basis.

iii. Encourage SMEs to play an active role in business cooperation and discuss the possibility of establishing a platform for China-CEEC SME exchanges and cooperation. The Chinese side welcomes CEECs' participation in the China International Small and Medium Enterprises Fair in 2014 and is ready to organize a special event for CEEC SMEs at the Fair. Parties support SMEs in strengthening cooperation in green technologies. Poland will hold a special event during POLEKO Fairs in Poland. iv. Encourage Chinese and CEEC businesses to discuss the possibility and opportunities of using convenient geographic location and favorable investment conditions of China and CEECs to jointly explore third markets. v. Encourage parties to develop agrotrade when supplies are ensured and their respective inspection and quarantine requirements are met. vi. Support the establishment of a China-CEEC association to promote agricultural cooperation. Relevant Chinese and CEEC agencies, businesses and organizations are welcome to join on a voluntary basis.

75

vii. China and one of the CEECs will take turns to hold a China-CEEC agricultural cooperation forum. IV. Expand financial cooperation

i. China and CEECs will step up coordination, encourage their financial institutions to engage in cooperation in flexible and diverse forms and bring into full play the role of the US$10 billion special credit line in promoting China-CEEC economic cooperation and trade. ii. Parties welcome the official launch of the China-CEEC Investment Cooperation Fund (stage one), commend the efforts made by Chinese, Polish and Hungarian financial institutions, support the relevant financial institutions in launching stage two of the fund at an appropriate time and encourage more financial institutions and businesses to contribute to the fund. In the meantime, CEEC governments, financial institutions and businesses are welcome to recommend high-quality and promising projects to the Fund. iii. Support qualified and interested financial institutions of China and CEECs in establishing branches and developing business in each other's countries in line with the relevant regulatory and supervisory legislation. Support the People's Bank of China and the central banks of CEECs in signing agreements of currency swaps as they see necessary and promote local currency settlement as one of the means to promote trade and investment. iv. Support qualified and interested Chinese and CEEC institutions in investing in each other's inter-bank bond market.

V. Enhance cooperation in connectivity i. Actively discuss the possibility of building an international railway transportation corridor connecting China with CEECs and encourage businesses to establish bonded areas and distribution centers along the railway routes to build a new logistics passage between China and Europe. ii. Strengthen cooperation in infrastructure development, such as construction of roads, railways, ports and airports based on the principle of mutual benefit. iii. Support the establishment of a China-CEEC association on infrastructure cooperation and relevant Chinese and CEEC agencies and businesses are welcome to join on a voluntary basis. iv. Welcome a high-level conference on transport, logistics and trade routes connecting Asia with Europe to be held in 2014 in Riga, Latvia.

VI. Expand cooperation in science, technology, innovation, environmental protection and energy i. Hold on a regular basis a China-CEEC symposium to promote innovation, technological cooperation and international technology transfer, with the first symposium to be held in 2014. ii. Strengthen cooperation in the information and communications sector. iii. Strengthen China-CEEC cooperation and exchanges on protection of forest, wetland and wildlife and development of green economy and eco-culture. iv. The Chinese side stands ready to strengthen cooperation and exchanges with CEECs on environment-friendly science and technology, negotiate the signing of relevant MOUs on environmental cooperation, encourage institutes of environmental science and research from China and CEECs to establish partnerships and research networks, support environmental experts and scholars in carrying out exchanges and mutual visits, engage in cooperative research programs on water, air and solid waste management, promote exchanges, cooperation and capacity building in the fields of eco-industries, sustainable consumption and production and environmental labeling certification, and achieve mutual benefit and win-win progress in environmental science, technology and innovation. v. The Chinese side stands ready to step up cooperation with CEECs on nuclear power, wind power, hydro power, solar power and other sources of clean power for mutual benefit and common development. CEECs welcome the Chinese readiness in this regard. vi. Encourage closer cooperation between China and CEECs in the fields of protection and sustainable use of natural resources, geology, mining and spatial planning.

VII. Promote dynamic people-to-people and cultural exchanges and cooperation i. Hold the first China-CEEC high-level symposium of think tanks in China in December 2013. ii. The Secretariat for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries will organize mutual visits by 50 Chinese journalists and 50 CEEC journalists in 2014. iii. Hold the China-CEEC Young Political Leaders' Forum and the China-CEEC Cultural Cooperation Forum once every two years. China and CEECs will discuss and set the venues and dates of the two events to be held in 2015 as soon as possible. iv. Support the establishment of a China-CEEC association of tourism promotion agencies and businesses and welcome Chinese and CEEC tourism promotion agencies and businesses to join on a voluntary basis. Promotion events of Chinese and CEEC tourism products will continue to be held at the China International Travel Mart. v. Hold on a regular basis the China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue. Actively explore the possibility of establishing a China-CEEC association of institutes of higher learning. vi. Take effective measures to facilitate movement of people. The Chinese side welcomes visa and residence permit facilitation measures of Romania and the Czech Republic for Chinese citizens and announces that citizens of all the 16 CEECs will be entitled to 72-hour visa-free transit in Beijing, Shanghai and other ports.

VIII. Cooperation at the sub-national level will be encouraged and supported as one of the important pillars of China-CEEC cooperation. Support the establishment of a China-CEEC association of provincial governors, joined by Chinese and CEEC provinces, states and municipalities on a voluntary basis. The China-CEEC Local Leaders' Meeting will be held once every two years.”

76

Appendix C. The Belgrade Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries

See: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 'The Belgrade Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries' <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1224905.shtml> accessed on 27 August 2016.

16 December 2014 “On 16 December 2014, the 3rd Meeting of Heads of Government of China and Central and Eastern European Countries was held in Belgrade, Serbia. Premier Li Keqiang of the People's Republic of China, Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic of the Republic of Serbia, Prime Minister Edi Rama of the Republic of Albania, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Vjekoslav Bevanda of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka of the Czech Republic, Prime Minister Taavi Roivas of the Republic of Estonia, Prime Minister Orban Viktor of Hungary, Prime Minister Laimdota Straujuma of the Republic of Latvia, Prime Minister Algirdas Butkevicius of the Republic of Lithuania, Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski of the Republic of Macedonia, Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic of Montenegro, Prime Minister Victor Ponta of Romania, Prime Minister Robert Fico of the Slovak Republic, Prime Minister Miro Cerar of the Republic of Slovenia, Deputy Prime Minister Rumiana Bachvarova of the Republic of Bulgaria, First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Vesna Pusic of the Republic of Croatia, and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Tomasz Siemoniak of the Republic of Poland, attended the meeting. They expressed appreciation and gratitude to Serbia for the efforts it had made as the host country to ensure the success of the meeting. EU representatives were present at the meeting. Participants at the meeting (hereinafter referred to as "the participants") commended the progress made in cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries (hereinafter referred to as "CEEC" or "CEECs"), in particular in the implementation of the Bucharest Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (see Annex), and recognized that China-CEEC cooperation has provided new driving force to China-CEEC traditional friendship, built a new platform for mutually beneficial cooperation and served as a new engine for deepening China-Europe relations for mutual benefit and win-win cooperation. The participants reiterated that China-CEEC cooperation is in line with China-EU relations and reaffirmed their commitment to deepening their partnership for peace, growth, reform and civilization based on the principles of equality, respect and trust, thus contributing as appropriate to the implementation of the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation. The participants indicated that as their cooperation shows greater vitality and stronger appeal, China and CEECs are ready to make continuous efforts to bring it to a new level by acting on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and win-win cooperation, with a view to benefiting their countries and peoples, achieving common development and prosperity, and promoting peace and stability. To this end, the participants jointly formulated and issued, on the theme of "New Driving Force, New Platform and New Engine", the Belgrade Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, reaffirming their readiness to expand cooperation in accordance with their respective laws and regulations, as well as in the case of EU member states, the EU legislation, regulations and policies stemming from their membership. 1. Support China in hosting the 4th China-CEEC Meeting of Heads of Government in 2015. 2. Acknowledging the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation as the guiding document for China-EU relations, the participants support the efforts to start formulating a medium-term agenda for cooperation between China and interested Central and Eastern European Countries as appropriate in 2015. 3. Enhance cooperation on connectivity

(1) Taking note of the agreed EU regulations, guidelines, policies and processes in connectivity and the agreed regulations, guidelines, policies and processes of other regions, participants welcome and support exploring possibilities of China-CEEC cooperation in this field. (2) The participants welcome the signing of cooperation agreements on the railway connecting Belgrade and Budapest between China, Hungary and Serbia, and hope that the relevant parties would continue to create a favorable environment for the cooperation on the project through joint efforts. (3) Continue to improve the China-Europe international railway container traffic, making it a priority in deepening mutually-beneficial cooperation between China and Europe and improving connectivity and market-access between Asia and Europe. Encourage relevant countries to facilitate customs clearance, create new logistics routes and hubs and encourage the participation of businesses based on their own advantages. (4) Strengthen cooperation in infrastructure development including road, railway, port and airport under the principle of mutual benefit, and actively discuss the cooperation on building regional transport networks. (5) Invite more CEECs to take part in the China-EU Smart and Secure Trade Lanes (SSTL) Pilot Project. Actively discuss the inclusion of land, air and other means of transportation into SSTL cooperation. (6) Welcome Serbia in leading the efforts to establish a China-CEEC association on transport and infrastructure cooperation, and welcome the participation of relevant Chinese and CEEC institutions, businesses and organizations on a voluntary basis. (7) Support the functioning of existing direct flights between China and CEECs, the opening of new routes at an early date, and the exchanges and cooperation in fields related to civil aviation. (8) Support the Riga High Level Conference on Transport, Logistics and Trade Routes in 2015. (9) Support the establishment of a China-CEEC association on logistics cooperation at an appropriate time.

77

(10) Welcome heads of CEEC customs authorities to China for relevant forums in 2015. 4. Promote economic cooperation, trade and investment

(1) Firmly oppose protectionism in all its forms and manifestations. Work to increase mutual investment, elevate the scale and level of economic cooperation and trade, and create conditions for the sustained and steady growth of trade. (2)Welcome and support the establishment of the executive body of the China-CEEC Business Council in Warsaw, Poland, and invite relevant Chinese and CEEC business associations, organizations and businesses to join on a voluntary basis. (3) Welcome the establishment of the Secretariat of the China-CEEC Investment Promotion Agencies Contact Mechanism in Beijing, China, and Warsaw, Poland, and support its active role in promoting information sharing on investment and increasing mutual investment between China and CEECs. (4) Hold the China-CEEC Ministerial Meeting on Promoting Trade and Economic Cooperation once every two years. Organize a China-CEEC investment and trade fair during the China International Consumer Goods Fair in Ningbo, China, in 2015. (5) The Chinese side welcomes CEEC businesses to continue to participate in the China International Small and Medium Enterprises Fair and other fairs held in Hebei Province and other Chinese localities. The CEECs welcome Chinese businesses to participate in trade fairs and expos in their countries. (6) Encourage Chinese and CEEC businesses to discuss the possibilities and opportunities of using the convenient geographic locations and favorable investment environment of China and CEECs to jointly explore third markets. (7) Encourage the participants to develop agricultural trade when supplies are ensured and in line with inspection and quarantine standards and requirements, and step up cooperation on animal husbandry, including breeding, farming, processing and trade. (8) Welcome and support Bulgaria in leading the efforts to establish a China-CEEC association on promoting agricultural cooperation and invite relevant Chinese and CEEC institutions, businesses and organizations to join on a voluntary basis, noting that the association will be officially launched in Sofia in the first half of 2015. (9) Hold the 10th China-CEEC Agrotrade and Economic Cooperation Forum in Hungary in 2015. (10) Hold CEEC-China Forum during European Economic Congress in Katowice, Poland in 2015.

5. Expand financial cooperation (1) Encourage Chinese and CEEC financial institutions to continue to engage in cooperation in flexible and diverse forms, explore creative models of financial cooperation, and improve financing conditions for businesses. Bring into full play the role of the US$10 billion special credit line and other financing tools in promoting China-CEEC economic cooperation and trade. (2) Commend the positive progress of the China-CEEC Investment Cooperation Fund (stage one) and the contribution by Hungary. Support the launch of stage two of the Fund and encourage more financial institutions and businesses to contribute to the Fund and conduct investment cooperation. (3) Encourage and support qualified and interested Chinese and CEEC financial institutions to establish branches, develop market and expand business in each other's countries in line with the relevant regulatory legislations. (4) Support the People's Bank of China and CEEC central banks in signing currency swap agreements as they see necessary, and facilitate local currency settlement as one of the effective means to increase trade and investment. Welcome the signing of currency swap agreements between China and Hungary and between China and Albania. Encourage Chinese and CEEC businesses to use RMB as settlement currency in cross-border trade and investment. (5) Support qualified and interested Chinese and CEEC institutions in investing in each other's inter-bank bond market. Welcome investment by the relevant institutions of Hungary and Lithuania in the Chinese inter-bank bond market. (6) Encourage Chinese and CEEC banks to develop comprehensive financial cooperation, including information and personnel exchanges and mutual business facilitation and support. (7) The Chinese side will favorably consider organizing the meeting of the Central Bank Governors’ Club of the Central Asia, Black Sea Region and Balkan Countries in China in 2015 and welcomes the participation of countries in the relevant regions.

6. Expand cooperation in science, technology, innovation, environmental protection and energy (1) Hold the China-CEEC Seminar on Innovation, Technology Cooperation and International Technology Transfer in Slovakia in 2015. Encourage Chinese and CEEC research institutes and businesses to enhance industrial, academic and research cooperation and on international technology transfer. (2) Continue to support closer cooperation on information and communications technology. Encourage joint research projects between China and CEECs and promote cooperation among companies of science and technology parks. (3) Step up China-CEEC cooperation and exchanges on protecting forest, wetland and wildlife, and on developing green economy and eco-culture and share experience of forestry development, with a view to increasing mutual understanding and promoting cooperation. (4) Encourage China and CEECs to develop nuclear energy projects under the principle of transparency and responsibility. Recognize the rights of each country to develop nuclear energy and the importance of properly fulfilling international obligations on nuclear security. Welcome the signing of nuclear energy cooperation documents between China and Romania and between China and the Czech Republic, and the common understanding between China and Hungary on nuclear energy cooperation. (5) Encourage closer China-CEEC cooperation on the protection and sustainable use of natural resources, geology, mining, shale gas development and spatial planning. (6) Welcome Romania’s initiative of setting up a Center for Dialogue and Cooperation in energy-related projects and encourages representatives of the academia, legal institutions, businesses and governments in China and CEECs, as well as in other countries, to share and pool their expertise with a view to expanding and further developing their endeavors.

78

7. Deepen people-to-people and cultural exchanges and cooperation at the sub-national level (1) The Chinese side encourages its performing arts organizations to purchase programs from CEECs and supports Chinese and CEEC cultural and arts organizations, groups, businesses and artists in engaging in all-dimensional, wide-ranging practical cooperation such as training, joint creative work, experience sharing and platform building. The Chinese side is ready to use the opportunity of the Festival of Baltic Culture to gradually improve its model of cultural exchanges with CEECs to expand and enhance such exchanges. Support China and Poland in co-organizing an expert forum on the protection of Chinese and CEEC cultural heritage to be held in Poland. Welcome Albania's initiative to hold an expert forum in the field of tangible and intangible cultural heritage management and protection. Invite CEEC artistic directors of international jazz festivals to visit China, hold a China-CEEC summer dance camp in China, and hold Chinese art festival in the three Baltic countries in 2015. (2) Hold the China-CEEC High-Level Symposium of Think Tanks on a regular basis. (3) Support the establishment of a China-CEEC think tanks exchange and cooperation center. (4) The Secretariat for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries will organize mutual visits by 50 Chinese journalists and 50 CEEC journalists in 2015. (5) Hold the 2nd China-CEEC Young Political Leaders' Forum in China in 2015. (6) Hold the 2nd China-CEEC Cultural Cooperation Forum in 2015 and hold a China-CEEC dance evening gala concurrently. (7) Welcome and support the establishment of China-CEEC Association of Tourism Promotion Agencies and Businesses in Hungary. The Association will organize promotion events, open a bilingual (Mandarin and English) website on China-CEEC tourism cooperation and develop more quality travel routes catered to the needs of Chinese and CEEC tourists. (8) Designate 2015 as Year of Promotion of China-CEEC Tourism Cooperation. Organize under this framework the 2nd China-CEEC High Level Conference on Tourism Cooperation in Slovenia, a promotion event of Chinese tourism products, trips to CEECs by 1,000 Chinese travellers, a "China tourism day" event and other events, and build platforms for exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and CEEC tourism sectors. Invite media organizations and tourism businesses from both China and CEECs to look at each other’s tourism products and routes and organize promotion events. The Chinese side will continue to invite heads of CEEC tourism authorities to participate in the China International Travel Mart in Kunming, Yunnan Province, in October 2015. (9) Hold the 3rd China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue in one of the CEECs in 2015. Welcome Sofia University (Bulgaria) in its capacity as the first rotating coordination center on the European side for China-CEEC Higher Education Institutes Consortium and support the Consortium in playing an important role in promoting China-CEEC educational exchanges and cooperation. (10) Support China-CEEC cooperation in translation and publication of each other's literary works. The Chinese side welcomes CEECs to serve as the Country of Honor as a group at the Beijing International Book Fair in 2016. (11) Organize a Romanian film festival in China in 2015; the Chinese side will organize a China-CEEC high-level radio and television seminar; China and the Czech Republic will jointly produce a cartoon entitled Panda and Mole. (12) China and CEECs are ready to make more contribution to facilitating mobility of people. (13) Support Chinese and CEEC localities in taking an active part in exchanges and cooperation in all fields under the China-CEEC cooperation framework, properly run the China-CEEC Association of Governors of Provinces and Regions and make it the most important platform for China-CEEC sub-national cooperation. Welcome the inclusion of sub-national cooperation as an important agenda item of the China Investment Forum. (14) The 3rd China-CEEC Local Leaders' Meeting will be held in Hebei Province, China, in 2016. (15) Strengthen information sharing and exchanges under the China-CEEC cooperation framework.

8. Support the convocation of the 1st China-CEEC health ministers' meeting in the Czech Republic in 2015. The Chinese side will work with interested CEECs to select proper locations to set up TCM centers. The Chinese side commends the efforts of the Czech Republic to cover TCM under its national health insurance system. 9. The Secretariat for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries will organize a trip to China for senior CEEC officials in 2015.”

79

Appendix D. Implementation of the Measures of the Bucharest Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries

See: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 'The Belgrade Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries' <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1224905.shtml> accessed on 27 August 2016.

16 December 2014 “1. Since December 2013, citizens of all the 16 CEECs are entitled to 72-hour visa-free transit in ports including Beijing and Shanghai. 2. In December 2013, the 1st China-CEEC High-Level Symposium of Think Tanks was held in Beijing, China. 3. In April 2014, a delegation of CEEC journalists visited China. 4. In May 2014, the 1st China-CEEC Seminar on Innovation, Technology Cooperation and International Technology Transfer was held in Shanghai, China. 5. In May 2014, the inaugural conference of the China-CEEC Association of Tourism Promotion Agencies and Businesses was held in Budapest, Hungary. 6. In June 2014, the 1st meeting of the China-Hungary-Serbia joint working group on transport infrastructure cooperation was held in Beijing, China. 7. In June 2014, the China-CEEC Ministerial Meeting on Promoting Trade and Economic Cooperation was held in Ningbo, China. 8. In June 2014, the Central and Eastern European Countries' Products Fair (CEEC Fair) was held in Ningbo, China. 9. In June 2014, the High Level Conference on Transport, Logistics and Trade Routes: Connecting Asia with Europe was held in Riga, Latvia. 10. In August 2014, the 2nd China-CEEC Local Leaders' Meeting was held in Prague, the Czech Republic. 11. In August 2014, the China Investment Forum was held in Prague, the Czech Republic. 12. In August 2014, the Memorandum of Understanding on Promotion of the Establishment of the Association of Governors of Provinces of China and Representatives of Regions of Central and Eastern European Countries was signed in Prague, the Czech Republic. 13. In September 2014, the 2nd China-CEEC High-Level Symposium of Think Tanks was held in Bled, Slovenia. 14. In September 2014, the 2nd China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue was held in Tianjin, China. 15. In September 2014, the China-CEEC Higher Education Institutes Consortium was established in Tianjin, China. Sofia University (Bulgaria) was elected as its first rotating coordination center on the European side. 16. In September 2014, a China-CEEC symposium on investment promotion was held in Xiamen, China. 17. In September 2014, the establishment of China-CEEC Investment Promotion Agencies Contact Mechanism was announced in Xiamen, China. 18. In September 2014, a China-CEEC investment promotion event was held in Xiamen, China. 19. In October 2014, a promotion event dedicated to CEECs was held in Guangzhou, China, during the 11th China International Small and Medium Enterprises Fair. 20. In October 2014, the China-CEEC Agrotrade and Economic Cooperation Forum was held in Bucharest, Romania. 21. In October 2014, agreement was reached on Bulgaria leading the efforts to establish a China-CEEC association on promoting agricultural cooperation. 22. In October 2014, artistic directors of international dance festivals from the CEECs visited China. 23.．In October 2014, an event dedicated to China-CEEC cooperation in environmental technologies was held in Poznan, Poland, during the PolEko fairs. 24. In November 2014, the 2nd Meeting for the Investment Promotion Agencies Contact Mechanism of China and CEECs was held in Warsaw, Poland. 25. In November 2014, a promotion event of Chinese and CEEC tourism products was held at the China International Travel Mart in Shanghai, China. 26. From November to December 2014, delegations of Chinese journalists visited CEECs. 27. In December 2014, the 3rd China-CEEC Meeting of Heads of Government was held in Belgrade, Serbia. 28. The China-CEEC Investment Cooperation Fund (stage one) was officially launched and successfully invested in a number of projects. 29. China signed currency swap agreements with Hungary and Albania. 30. Relevant institutions of Hungary and Lithuania invested in the Chinese inter-bank bond market. 31. China signed with Romania and the Czech Republic cooperation documents on peaceful use of nuclear energy, and reached common understanding with Hungary on nuclear energy cooperation. 32. China signed cooperation agreements on quality inspection with Hungary, Latvia, Serbia and Macedonia.”

80

Appendix E. The Suzhou Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries

See: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 'The Suzhou Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries' <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1318039.shtml> accessed on 27 August 2016.

24 November 2015 “On 24 November 2015, the 4th Summit of China and Central and Eastern European Countries (hereinafter referred to as "CEECs") was held in Suzhou, China. Premier Li Keqiang of the People's Republic of China, President Andrzej Duda of the Republic of Poland, Prime Minister Edi Rama of the Republic of Albania, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Denis Zvizdic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Prime Minister Boyko Borisov of the Republic of Bulgaria, Speaker of Parliament Josip Leko of the Republic of Croatia, Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka of the Czech Republic, Prime Minister Taavi Roivas of the Republic of Estonia, Prime Minister Orban Viktor of Hungary, Prime Minister Laimdota Straujuma of the Republic of Latvia, Prime Minister Algirdas Butkevicius of the Republic of Lithuania, Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski of the Republic of Macedonia, Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic of Montenegro, Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic of the Republic of Serbia, Prime Minister Miro Cerar of the Republic of Slovenia, Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Economy, Commerce and Relations with the Business Environment Costin Borc of Romania and Deputy Prime Minister Lubomir Vazny of the Slovak Republic attended the meeting. They expressed appreciation and gratitude to China for the efforts it had made as the host country to ensure the success of the meeting. Representatives of other parties, including the EU, Austria and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, were present as observers. Participants at the meeting (hereinafter referred to as "the Participants") commended the substantial progress that had been made in the past year in the cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (hereinafter referred to as "16+1 cooperation"), in particular in the implementation of the Belgrade Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (see Annex), welcomed and supported the important agreement between the Chinese and EU leaders on establishing the China-EU Connectivity Platform, as well as on developing synergies between the Belt and Road initiative of China and the Investment Plan for Europe, and between 16+1 cooperation and China-EU relations. The Participants expressed their readiness to seize these opportunities and work together to further advance 16+1 cooperation. The Participants jointly formulated and issued, on the theme of "New Beginning, New Domains, New Vision" , the Suzhou Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries. 1. The Participants support Latvia in hosting the 5th China-CEEC Summit in 2016. 2. The Participants welcome the Medium-Term Agenda for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries issued during the 4th China-CEEC Summit, and are ready to implement it in light of their respective realities, needs and priorities. 3. 16+1 National Coordinators' Meetings will be held in China and Latvia respectively in 2016. 4. The Participants support the establishment of a mechanism of quarterly meetings between the Secretariat for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (hereinafter referred to as "the Secretariat"), its member organizations and CEEC embassies in China. The Participants support more efficient use of the Secretariat's website. 5. Cooperation on Connectivity

(1) The Participants note that the cooperation document on the Belt and Road initiative was signed between the governments of China and Hungary and that there is an interest to have similar documents between China and other CEECs, with a view to enhancing cooperation on regional connectivity. (2) The Participants welcome the commencement of the regular express cargo railway transit from China to Poland. The Participants encourage and support similar links between China and other CEECs and appreciate the efforts assuring possibility that the goods could be transported in both directions. The Participants support the further development of the Eurasian Land Bridge and welcome the establishment of logistic centers in CEECs. (3) The Participants appreciate the major progress that has been made in the modernization of the railway line connecting Budapest and Belgrade and welcome the joint efforts of the relevant parties for early completion of the project. (4) The Participants welcome China, Hungary, Serbia and Macedonia in organizing the 2nd working group meeting and a workshop under the Framework Agreement on Cooperation in Facilitating Customs Clearance Among the Chinese, Hungarian, Serbian and Macedonian Customs in Budapest in 2016, streamlining customs clearance procedures for goods in transit and means of transport and increasing cooperation on customs clearance facilitation for the China-Europe Land-Sea Express Line. (5) More CEEC customs are encouraged to take part in the third phase of the China-EU Smart and Secure Trade Lanes Pilot Project. (6) The Participants welcome and support Serbia in leading the efforts to establish a China-CEEC association on transport and infrastructure cooperation and welcome the participation of relevant Chinese and CEEC institutions, businesses and organizations on a voluntary basis. (7) The Participants welcome and support Latvia in leading the efforts to establish a China-CEEC secretariat on logistics cooperation and welcome the participation of relevant Chinese and CEEC institutions, businesses and organizations on a voluntary basis. (8) The Participants welcome the relaunch of direct flights between Beijing and Budapest and the launch of direct flights between Beijing and Prague in addition to existing Beijing-Warsaw connection. The Participants support deepening civil aviation cooperation between China and more CEECs.

81

(9) The 1st China-CEEC Transport Ministers' Meeting will be held in Riga, Latvia, in 2016. 6. Economic and Financial Cooperation

(1) The 2nd China-CEEC Ministerial Meeting on Promoting Trade and Economic Cooperation will be held in Ningbo, China, in June 2016. (2) The China-CEEC Investment and Trade Expo will be held in Ningbo, China, in June 2016 during the China International Consumer Goods Fair. (3) The 3rd Meeting of the China-CEEC Investment Promotion Agencies Contact Mechanism will be held in China in 2016. (4) The Participants welcome and support Romania's initiative of setting up a Center for Dialogue in energy-related projects. The 1st meeting of the Center will be organized in Romania in 2016. (5) The Participants welcome and support the participation of Chinese and CEEC SMEs in the China International Small and Medium Enterprises Fair 2016. (6) China will attend the Brno International Engineering Fair in the Czech Republic in 2016 as a partner country. (7) The China Investment Forum will be held in the Czech Republic in 2016. (8) The Participants welcome and support the organization of an economic forum focused on infrastructure, tourism and industrial capacity cooperation between China and CEECs, to be held in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the first half of 2016. (9) Qualified CEEC financial institutions are welcomed to apply to be indirect participants in the RMB Cross-border Inter-bank Payment System (Phase One). (10) The Participants welcome the ongoing work leading to the signing of a statement of cooperation on crisis management between the China Banking Regulatory Commission and the Czech National Bank and the signing of an MoU on regulatory cooperation between the China Banking Regulatory Commission and the Polish Financial Supervision Authority.

7. Agricultural and Forestry Cooperation (1) The 11th China-CEEC Agrotrade and Economic Cooperation Forum will be held in China in 2016, in conjunction with the 2nd meeting of the China-CEEC Association on Promoting Agricultural Cooperation. (2) An exhibition area will be set aside for top-quality CEEC agro-products at the 14th China International Agricultural Trade Fair to be held in Yunnan Province, China, in the second half of 2016. (3) The Chinese side will create a free-of-charge exhibition space for top-quality CEEC wines and spirits at the National Agriculture Exhibition Center. (4) The Participants welcome the signing or the work leading to the signing of the relevant protocols on quarantine of animal and animal-originated products to be exported to China between China and Serbia, Macedonia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Poland and Estonia respectively. The Participants support China and more CEECs in expanding trade of agro-products and food. (5) The Participants support Slovenia in leading the efforts to establish a China-CEEC coordination mechanism for forestry cooperation. The 1st China-CEEC High-Level Meeting on Cooperation in Forestry will be held in Slovenia in May 2016. (6) The Participants welcome China and CEECs in signing agreements on strengthening cooperation in water resources and agricultural irrigation.

8. Cooperation on Science, Technology and Health (1) The 3rd China-CEEC Seminar on Innovation, Technology Cooperation and International Technology Transfer will be held in China in 2016. (2) The Participants encourage and support the establishment of a virtual China-CEEC technology transfer center, and the role of the secretariat will be assumed by the relevant Chinese and Slovak institutions. (3) The Participants support the environment protection authorities of China and CEECs in enhancing exchanges under the framework of 16+1 cooperation and discussing the possibility of cooperation with a third party. (4) The 2nd China-CEEC Health Ministers' Forum will be held in China in 2016. (5) CEEC health professionals will be invited to visit China in 2016 and to participate in seminars on global health diplomacy, healthcare system reforms and health promotion, with a view to strengthening academic and professional exchanges. (6) CEEC medical and health businesses will be invited to China for exhibitions on health services and medical devices, with a view to promoting cooperation in the medical industry.

9. People-to-People Contacts and Cultural Exchanges (1) The Secretariat will continue to invite senior CEEC officials for a trip to China in 2016. (2) The 4th China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue and the 3rd meeting of China-CEEC Higher Education Institutes Consortium will be held in China in 2016. (3) A China-CEEC forum on cooperation in the field of art and the 2nd China-CEEC Summer Dance Camp will be held in China in 2016. (4) Famous CEEC artists and composers as well as artistic directors of international opera festivals in CEECs will be invited to visit China in 2016. (5) The Participants support China and CEECs in carrying out joint projects on translation and publication of each other's literary works. China welcomes CEECs to be the Country of Honor as a group at the Beijing International Book Fair in 2016. (6) The 1st China-CEEC Cultural and Creative Industries Forum will be held in Belgrade, Serbia, in 2016. (7) The 1st China-CEEC Experts' Forum on Intangible Cultural Heritage will be held in Krakow, Poland, in 2016.

82

(8) The Participants welcome the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in leading the efforts to establish a China-CEEC think tanks network. (9) The 4th China-CEEC High-Level Symposium of Thinks Tanks will be held in 2016. (10) The Participants encourage and support mutual visits by Chinese and CEEC journalists in 2016. (11) A China-CEEC seminar of sinologists will be held in 2016. (12) The Participants welcome the organization of the Travel 2016 expo and the related professional conference in March 2016 in Budapest. China will participate in the expo as the Country of Honor. The Participants support the opening of the regional center of the China National Tourism Administration in Budapest. (13) The 3rd China-CEEC High-Level Conference on Tourism Cooperation will be held in Croatia in 2016. 10. Cooperation at the Local Level (1) The 3rd China-CEEC Local Leaders' Meeting and the China (Hebei) International Economic and Trade Fair 2016 will be held in Hebei Province, China, in 2016. (2) The 2nd working meeting of the China-CEEC Association of Provincial Governors will be held in Hebei Province, China, in 2016. (3) The Participants encourage and support exchanges and cooperation between mayors of Chinese and CEEC capital cities.”

83

Appendix F. Implementation of the Measures of the Belgrade Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries

See: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 'The Suzhou Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries' <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1318039.shtml> accessed on 27 August 2016.

24 November 2015 “1. In January 2015, the customs clearance facilitation cooperation mechanism for the China-Europe Land-Sea Express Line among the Chinese, Hungarian, Serbian, Macedonian and Greek Customs was officially established. 2. From February to October 2015, the Chinese Art Festival was held in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. 3. In March 2015, the launch ceremony of the Year of Promotion of China-CEEC Tourism Cooperation was held in Budapest, Hungary. 4. In March 2015, the 1st working group meeting under the Framework Agreement on Cooperation in Facilitating Customs Clearance Among the Chinese, Hungarian, Serbian and Macedonian Customs was held in Shanghai, China. 5. In April 2015, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs appointed the Special Representative for China-CEEC Cooperation. 6. In April 2015, the 1st meeting of the China-CEEC Business Council was held in Katowice, Poland. 7. In April 2015, the Riga High Level Conference on Transport and Logistics and the 3rd ASEM Transport Ministers' Meeting was held in Riga, Latvia. 8. In May 2015, the 1st Customs Control Techniques Workshop for the China-Europe Land-Sea Express Line among the Chinese, Hungarian, Serbian and Macedonian Customs was held in Shanghai, China. 9. In May 2015, the 33rd Meeting of the Central Bank Governors' Club of the Central Asia, Black Sea Region and Balkan Countries was held in Shanghai, China. 10. In May 2015, the 1st Meeting of China-CEEC Association of Provincial Governors was held in Hebei Province, China. 11. In May 2015, the Beijing-Budapest regular flight was launched. 12. In May 2015, heads of customs of China, Hungary, Serbia and Macedonia met in Xi'an, China, and signed the Cooperation Action Plan for 2015-2016. 13. In May 2015, China and Hungary signed an MoU on nuclear energy cooperation. 14. From May to June 2015, the Chinese Ministry of Culture organized Chinese performing arts organizations to purchase programs from Hungary, Serbia and Romania. 15. In June 2015, a delegation of CEEC journalists visited Zhejiang Province, Henan Province and Beijing, China. 16. In June 2015, the 1st China-CEEC Investment and Trade Expo was held in Ningbo, China. 17. In June 2015, the launch ceremony of the China-CEEC Association on Promoting Agricultural Cooperation and the 1st Meeting of Ministers of Agriculture was held in Sofia, Bulgaria. 18. In June 2015, the 1st China-CEEC Health Ministers' Forum was held in Prague, the Czech Republic. 19. In June 2015, the 1st TCM center in the Czech Republic was established. 20. In June 2015, the cartoon series Panda and the Little Mole co-produced by China and the Czech Republic was premiered in the Czech Republic. 21. In July 2015, the 5th China-CEEC National Coordinators' Meeting was held in Beijing, China. 22. In July 2015, a delegation of senior CEEC officials visited Sichuan Province, Yunnan Province and Beijing, China. 23. From July to August 2015, the 1st China-CEEC Summer Dance Camp was organized in Shaanxi Province, China. 24. In August 2015, Bank of China Prague Branch was opened. 25. From August to September 2015, the 2nd China-CEEC High-Level Conference on Tourism Cooperation was held in Bled, Slovenia. 26. In September 2015, the 10th China-CEEC Agrotrade and Economic Cooperation Forum was held in Budapest, Hungary. 27. In September 2015,the 3rd China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue and the 2nd working consultation of the China-CEEC Higher Education Institutes Consortium were held in Warsaw, Poland. 28. In September 2015, the Beijing-Prague direct flight was launched. 29. In September 2015, the 2nd China-CEEC Seminar on Innovation, Technology Cooperation and International Technology Transfer was held in Bratislava, Slovakia. 30. In October 2015, an exhibition area dedicated to CEECs was created at the 11th China International Small and Medium Enterprises Fair in Guangzhou, China. 31. In October 2015, the Workshop on Customs Clearance Procedures of Transit Goods and Risk Management among the Chinese, Hungarian, Serbian and Macedonian Customs was held in Skopje, Macedonia. 32. In October 2015, a delegation of artistic directors of CEEC jazz festivals visited China.

84

33. In October 2015, the Seminar on Radio and Television Program Production for Central and Eastern European Countries was held in Shanghai and Hunan Province, China. 34. In October 2015, the 6th China-CEEC National Coordinators' Meeting was held in Warsaw, Poland. 35. In October 2015, the 2nd China-CEEC Young Political Leaders' Forum was held in China. 36. In November 2015, the 2nd China-CEEC Cultural Cooperation Forum was held in Sofia, Bulgaria. 37. In November 2015, the China Investment Forum was held in Prague, the Czech Republic. 38. In November 2015, China and Slovenia signed an MoU on the establishment of the China-CEEC coordination mechanism for forestry cooperation. 39. The 3rd China-CEEC High-Level Symposium of Think Tanks will be held in Beijing, China, in December 2015. 40. China and Romania will sign a new agreement on avoidance of double taxation as appropriate; China signed cooperation agreements on education with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Romania respectively; China signed cooperation agreements on quality inspection with Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia respectively; China signed documents on cultural exchanges and cooperation with Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia and Poland respectively; China signed with Romania an MoU regarding the relevant nuclear power project.”

85

Appendix G. Sino-Polish bilateral treaties

short title in English short title in Polish signed in force still in force?

Treaty on friendship and trade between Poland and China Traktat przyjaźni i handlowy między Polską a Chinami 5 May 1929 never n.a.

Treaty on friendship, trade and navigation between Poland and China.

Traktat przyjaźni, handlowy i nawigacyjny między RP a Rep. Chińską.

18 September 1929 7 October 1931 no

Agreement on the exchange of goods and payments between the Republic of Poland and the People's Republic of China in the year 1951

Umowa o wymianie towarowej i płatnościach między RP a Chińską Republiką Ludową na 1951 rok.

29 January 1951 never n.a.

Agreement on cultural cooperation between the Republic of Poland and the People's Republic of China.

Umowa o współpracy kulturalnej między RP a Chińską Republiką Ludową.

29 January 1951 25 January 1952 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Central Government of the People's Republic of China on establishment of the Polish- Chinese Shipping Joint Stock Company

Umowa między Rządem PRL a Centralnym Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o utworzeniu Polsko-Chińskiego Towarzystwa Okrętowego Spółka Akcyjna

29 January 1951 29 January 1951 yes

Agreement on the exchange of goods and payments between the Polish People's Republic and the People's Republic of China in the year 1953.

Umowa o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach między PRL a Chińską Republiką Ludową na 1953 rok.

26 May 1953 1 January 1953 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1954.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na rok 1954.

19 February 1954 1 January 1954 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Central Government of the People's Republic of China on technical and scientific-technical cooperation.

Umowa między Rządem PRL a Centralnym Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o współpracy technicznej i naukowo-technicznej.

20 July 1954 30 October 1954 yes

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1955

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o obrocie towarowym i na 1955r.

21 March 1955 1 January 1955 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1956.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na 1956 rok.

21 December 1956 1 January 1956 no

86

short title in English short title in Polish signed in force still in force?

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on construction of the Chinese Embassy building in Warsaw and the Polish Embassy building in Beijing.

Umowa między Rządem PRL a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej w sprawie budowy gmachu Ambasady Chińskiej w Warszawie i gmachu Ambasady Polskiej w Pekinie.

30 March 1956 30 March 1956 yes

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1957.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na 1957 rok.

1 April 1957 1 January 1957 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1958.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na 1958 rok.

4 July 1958 1 January 1958 no

Agreement between the Government of the Plish People's Reppublic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on method of non - commercial payments accounting.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o sposobie rozliczeń płatności niehandlowych.

22 February 1958 1 March 1958 yes

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods for the years 1959 – 1962.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o wymianie towarowej w latach 1959-1962.

4 July 1958 1 January 1959 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1959.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na rok 1959.

3 June 1959 1 January 1959 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1960.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na rok 1960.

22 February 1960 1 January 1960 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1961.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na rok 1961.

13 July 1961 1 January 1961 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1962.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na rok 1962.

28 March 1962 1 January 1962 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o 30 April 1963 1 January 1963 no

87

short title in English short title in Polish signed in force still in force?

of goods and payments in the year 1963. obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na rok 1963.

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1964.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na 1964 rok.

5 February 1964 1 January 1964 no

Amending Protocol of the Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Central Government of the People's Republic of China on technical and scientific-technical cooperation.

Protokół zmieniający Umowę między Rządem PRL a Centralnym Rządem ChRL o współpracy technicznej i naukowo-technicznej, podpisaną w Warszawie dnia 20 lipca 1954 r.

18 June 1964 25 November 1964 yes

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1965.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na rok 1965.

16 March 1965 1 January 1965 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1966.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na 1966 rok.

22 march 1966 1 January 1966

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1967.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na 1967 rok.

30 June 1967 1 January 1967 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1968

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na rok 1968.

9 April 1968 1 January 1968 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1969.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na rok 1969.

7 August 1969 1 January 1969 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1970.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na 1970 rok.

2 July 1970 1 January 1970 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1971.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na 1971 r.

31 May 1971 31 May 1971 no

88

short title in English short title in Polish signed in force still in force?

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1972.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na 1972 rok.

16 March 1972 1 January 1972 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1973.

Porozumienie miedzy Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na 1973 rok.

23 March 1973 1 January 1973 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1974

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na 1974 rok.

11 March 1974 1 January 1974 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1975.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na 1975 rok.

11 march 1975 1 January 1975 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1976.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na 1976 rok.

19 January 1976 1 January 1976 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1977

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na 1977 rok.

23 May 1977 23 May 1977 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1978.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na 1978 rok.

30 January 1978 1 January 1978 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1979

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na 1979 rok.

22 January 1979 1 January 1979 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1980

Porozumienie miedzy Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na 1980 rok.

25 March 1980 1 January 1980 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on meat delivery from China to Poland on long-term, non-interest credit

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL w sprawie dostaw mięsa z Chin do Polski na warunkach

1 October 1981 1 October 1981 no

89

short title in English short title in Polish signed in force still in force?

conditions. długoterminowego, nie oprocentowanego kredytu

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1982.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na rok 1982.

29 January 1929 1 January 1982 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1983.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na 1983 rok.

8 January 1983 1 January 1983 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on granting Poland the commodity credit by China.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL i Rządem ChRL o udzieleniu Polsce przez Chiny kredytu towarowego.

25 March 1983 25 March 1983 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on meat delivery from China to Poland on long-term, non-interest credit conditions.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL w sprawie dostaw mięsa z Chin do Polski na warunkach długoterminowego, nieoprocentowanego kredytu.

25 March 1983 25 March 1983 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1984

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na 1984 r.

26 January 1984 26 January 1984 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on meat delivery from China to Poland on long-term, non-interest credit conditions.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL w sprawie dostaw mięsa z Chin do Polski na warunkach długoterminowego, nie oprocentowanego kredytu.

26 January 1984 26 January 1984 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on granting Poland the commodity credit by China.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o udzieleniu Polsce przez Chiny kredytu towarowego.

26 January 1984 26 January 1984 no

Agreement between the Polish People's Republic and the People's Republic of China on cooperation in the field of health protection and medical science.

Porozumienie o współpracy między PRL a ChRL w dziedzinie ochrony zdrowia i nauk medycznych

21 June 1984 21 June 1984 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on economic and technological cooperation.

Umowa między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o współpracy gospodarczej i technicznej.

30 June 1984 30 June 1984 no

90

short title in English short title in Polish signed in force still in force?

Protocol between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the establishment of the Polish - Chinese Committee for economic, commercial, scientific and technical cooperation.

Protokół między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL w sprawie utworzenia Polsko-Chińskiego Rządowego Komitetu Współpracy gospodarczej, handlowej i naukowo-technicznej.

30 June 1984 30 June 1984 no

Consular Convention between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China.

Konwencja konsularna między Rządem PRL a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej.

14 July 1984 21 February 1985 yes

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on exchange of goods and payments in the year 1985

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o obrocie towarowym i płatnościach na 1985 r.

30 June 1985 30 June 1985 no

Long Term Trade Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China for the years 1986 - 1990.

Wieloletnia Umowa handlowa między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL na lata 1986-1990.

25 May 1985 1 January 1986 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China relating to civil air transport.

Umowa między Rządem PRL a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o cywilnej komunikacji lotniczej.

20 March 1986 1 August 1986 yes

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on cultural and scientific cooperation.

Umowa między Rządem PRL a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o współpracy kulturalnej i naukowej.

30 September 1986 18 August 1988 yes

Agreement between the People's Republic of Poland and the People's Republic of China on legal assistance in civil and criminal cases.

Umowa między PRL a Chińską Republiką Ludową o pomocy prawnej w sprawach cywilnych i karnych.

5 June 1987 13 February 1988 yes

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China concerning conclusion of the Agreement on mutual establishment of General Consulates: the Polish People's Republic's in Guangzhou and the People's Republic of China's in the one of PPR's town.

Porozumienie między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL dotyczące zawarcia Porozumienia w sprawie wzajemnego ustanowienia Konsulatów Generalnych - PRL w Guangzhou i jeszcze jednego ChRL w jednym z miast PRL.

11 November 1987 11 November 1987 yes

Development Programme on economic, scientific and technical long term cooperation between the Polish People's Republic and the People's Republic of China.

Program rozwoju wieloletniej współpracy gospodarczej i naukowo-technicznej między PRL a Chińską Republiką Ludową.

7 June 1988 7 June 1988 no

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on mutual

Umowa między Rządem PRL a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o wzajemnym zniesieniu

7 June 1988 7 June 1988 yes

91

short title in English short title in Polish signed in force still in force?

abolition of visa requirements for official travels. obowiązku wizowego przy podróżach służbowych.

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China for the avoidance of the double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income

Umowa między Rządem PRL a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej w sprawie unikania podwójnego opodatkowania i zapobiegania uchylaniu się od opodatkowania w zakresie podatków od dochodu.

7 June 1989 7 January 1989 yes

Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the reciprocal encouragement and protection on investments

Umowa między Rządem PRL a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej w sprawie wzajemnego popierania i ochrony inwestycji.

7 June 1989 8 January 1989

Trade Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China.

Umowa handlowa między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL.

19 December 1989 1 January 1990 no

Agreement in the form of an exchange of notes on the amendment to the article 2 point 1 and 2 of the Agreement between the Government of the Polish People's Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China on mutual abolition of visa requirements for official travels, signed on 7 June 1988

Porozumienie w formie wymiany not w sprawie zmiany w art. 2 pkt 1 i 2 Umowy między Rządem PRL a Rządem ChRL o wzajemnym zniesieniu obowiązku wizowego przy podróżach służbowych, podpisanej 07.06.1988 r.

26 June 1992 27 July 1992 yes

Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on commercial and economic relations.

Umowa między Rządem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a Rządem ChRL o stosunkach handlowych i gospodarczych.

13 September 1993 25 December 1993 no

Phytosanitary Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China.

Umowa fitosanitarna między Rządem RP i Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej

22 September 1994 6 April 1995 no

Agreement on cooperation in science and technology between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China

Umowa o współpracy naukowo-technicznej między Rządem RP a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej.

13 April 1995 never n.a.

Agreement in the form of an exchange of notes between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on expiry of certain agreements

Porozumienie w formie wymiany not między Rządem RP a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej ws przeglądu umów dwustronnych zawartych przed 31 grudnia 1993 r.

20 November 1995 20 November 1995 yes

Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on co-operation in maritime transport

Umowa między Rządem RP a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o współpracy w transporcie morskim.

22 October 1996 18 April 1997 yes

92

short title in English short title in Polish signed in force still in force?

Agreement in the form of an exchange of notes on retaining activity of the General Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Hong Kong - Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of Chna.

Porozumienie w formie wymiany not ws. utrzymania po 1.07.97 r. działalności Konsulatu Generalnego RP w Hongkongu - Specjalnym Regionie Administracyjnym Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej.

19 May 1997 1 July 1997 yes

Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on cooperation in animal quarantine and animal health

Umowa między Rządem RP a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o współpracy w zakresie kwarantanny i ochrony zdrowia zwierząt.

17 November 1997 never n.a.

Agreement on financial cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China.

Umowa między Rządem RP a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o współpracy finansowej.

29 September 2000 29 September 2000 yes

Agreement in the form of an exchange of notes between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on amendments to the Agreement on financial cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China, signed at Warsaw on 29 September 2000.

Porozumienie zawarte w formie wymiany not między Rządem RP a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o zmianie Umowy między Rządem RP a Rządem ChRL o współpracy finansowej, podpisanej w Warszawie dnia 29.09.2000 r.

22 October 2001 22 October 2001 yes

Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China of the amendment to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on financial cooperation done on 29 September 2000 in Warsaw

Porozumienie między Rządem RP a Rządem Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o zmianie Umowy między Rządem RP a Rządem ChRL o współpracy finansowej, podpisanej w Warszawie dnia 29 września 2000, zawarte w formie wymiany not.

18 June 2003 31 January 2003 yes

Protocol on cultural co-operation between the Minister of Culture of the Republic of Poland and the Ministry of Culture of the People's Republic of China in the years 2004 - 2006

Protokół o współpracy kulturalnej między Ministrem Kultury RP a Ministerstwem Kultury Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej na lata 2004-2006

8 June 2004 8 June 2004 no

Agreement between the Minister of National Education and Sport of the Republic of Poland and the Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China on Cooperation in the field of education in the years 2004-2006.

Porozumienie między Ministrem Edukacji Narodowej i Sportu RP a Ministerstwem Edukacji Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o współpracy w dziedzinie edukacji na lata 2004-2006

8 June 2004 8 June 2004 no

Agreement on economic cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Republic of China

Umowa między Rządem RP a Rządem ChRL o współpracy gospodarczej.

8 June 2004 27 April 2005 yes

93

short title in English short title in Polish signed in force still in force?

Agreement in the form of an exchange of notes between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on amendments to the Agreement on financial cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China, signed at Warsaw on 29 September 2000

Porozumienie między Rządem RP a Rządem ChRL o zmianie Umowy między Rządem RP a Rządem ChRL o współpracy finansowej, sporządzonej w Warszawie dnia 29.09.2000 r., w formie wymiany not.

31 January 2005 31 January 2005 yes

Protocol between the Minister of Culture and National Heritage of the Republic of Poland and the Ministry of Culture of the People's Republic of China on cultural cooperation in the years 2007-2011.

Protokół między Ministrem Kultury i Dziedzictwa Narodowego RP a Ministerstwem Kultury ChRL o współpracy kulturalnej na lata 2007-2011.

25 May 2005 25 May 2005 no

Agreement between the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development of the Republic of Poland and the Ministry of Agriculture of the People's Republic of China on cooperation within the framework of the Polish-Chinese Centre for Science and Agricultural Technology.

Porozumienie między Ministrem Rolnictwa i Rozwoju Wsi RP a Ministerstwem Rolnictwa ChRL o współpracy w ramach Polsko-Chińskiego Centrum Nauki i Technologii Rolnej.

24 November 2006 24 November 2006 no

Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China of the amendment to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on financial cooperation done on 29 September 2000 in Warsaw.

Porozumienie między Rządem RP a Rządem ChRL o zmianie Umowy między Rządem RP a Rządem ChRL o współpracy finansowej, sporządzonej w Warszawie dnia 29.09.2000 r., w formie wymiany not.

22 December 2006 31 January 2007 yes

Agreement in the form of an exchange of notes between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on amendments to the Agreement on financial cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China, signed at Warsaw on 29 September 2000.

Porozumienie między Rządem RP a Rządem ChRL o zmianie Umowy między Rządem RP a Rządem ChRL o współpracy finansowej, sporządzonej w Warszawie dnia 29.09.2000, w drodze wymiany not.

5 April 2007 11 April 2007 yes

Memorandum of Understanding between the Minister of Health of the Republic of Poland and the Ministry of Health of the People's Republic of China on co-operation in the Field of Head Care and Medical Sciences.

Memorandum o Porozumieniu między Ministrem Zdrowia RP a Ministerstwem Zdrowia ChRL o współpracy w dziedzinie ochrony zdrowia i nauk medycznych.

25 May 2007 25 May 2007 yes

Understanding on the amendment between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the financial cooperation, done on September 29, 2000 in

Porozumienie w sprawie zmiany Umowy między Rządem RP a Rządem ChRL o współpracy finansowej, sporządzonej w Warszawie dnia 29 września 2000 r.

17 July 2009 17 July 2009 yes

94

short title in English short title in Polish signed in force still in force?

Warsaw.

Agreement between the Minister of National Defence of the Republic of Poland and the Ministry of the National Defence of the People's Republic of China concerning co-operation in the field of defence

Umowa między Ministrem Obrony Narodowej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a Ministerstwem Obrony Narodowej Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o współpracy w dziedzinie obronności.

16 December 2009 16 December 2009 yes

Understanding on the amendment to the Agreement on financial cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of Chiba, done on September 29, 2000 in Warsaw.

Porozumienie w sprawie zmiany Umowy między Rządem RP a Rządem ChRL o współpracy finansowej sporządzonej w Warszawie dnia 29 września 2000 r.

12 January 2011 12 January 2011 yes

Agreement between the Minister of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Poland and the Ministry of Education of the people's Republic of China on cooperation in the area of higher education

Porozumienie między Ministrem Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego RP a Ministerstwem Edukacji ChRL o współpracy w dziedzinie szkolnictwa wyższego.

20 December 2011 20 December 2011 yes

Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Peplo's Republic of China on cooperation in the area of sustainable infrastructure.

Umowa między Rządem RP a Rządem ChRL o współpracy w zakresie zrównoważonej infrastruktury.

25 April 2012 25 April 2012 yes

Protocol on cultural cooperation between the Minister of Culture and National Heritage of the Republic of Poland and the Ministry of Culture of the People's Republic of China in the years 2012 - 2015

Protokół o współpracy kulturalnej między Ministrem Kultury i Dziedzictwa Narodowego RP a Ministerstwem Kultury ChRL na lata 2012-2015.

25 April 2012 25 April 2012 yes

Agreement between the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development of the Republic of Poland and the Ministry of Agriculture of the People's Republic of China on cooperation within the framework od the Polish-Chinese Centre for Agricultural Science and Technology.

Porozumienie między Ministrem Rolnictwa i Rozwoju Wsi RP a Ministerstwem Rolnictwa Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej o współpracy w ramach Polsko-Chińskiego Centrum Nauki i Technologii Rolnej.

21 September 2015 21 September 2015 yes

Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic China on mutual recognition of academic degrees and diplomas in higher education

Umowa między Rządem RP a Rządem ChRL o wzajemnym uznawaniu dyplomów ukończenia studiów i tytułów zawodowych w szkolnictwie wyższym

20 June 2016 not yet in force n.a.

Protocol on cultural cooperation between the Minister of Culture and national Heritage of the Republic of Poland and the Ministry of Culture of the People's Republic of China in the years 2016-2019

Protokół o współpracy kulturalnej między Ministrem Kultury i Dziedzictwa Narodowego RP a Ministerstwem Kultury Chińskiej Rep. Ludowej na lata 2016 - 2019.

20 June 2016 20 June 2016 yes

95

short title in English short title in Polish signed in force still in force?

Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the reciprocal exemption in international air transportation services from Value Added Tax or any tax of a similar nature

Umowa między Rządem RP a Rządem Chińskiej Rep. Ludowej w sprawie wzajemnego zwolnienia usług międzynarodowego transportu lotniczego z opodatkowania podatkiem od wartości dodanej lub podatkiem o podobnym charakterze, poprzez wymianę listów

20 June 2016 1 July 2016 yes

96

Appendix H. CHIPOLBROK’s chronology of events

See: ‘Chronology of Events’ CHIPOLBROK <http://www.chipolbrok.com.pl/strona.php?id=25> accessed 15 August 2016)

9 July 1950

“Polish Ocean Lines (PLO) use the vessel WARTA to open a liner service to the ports of the People's Republic of China (PRC).”

2 November 1950

“Negotiations start in Beijing to establish a Chinese-Polish Joint Stock Shipping Company.”

29 January 1951

“Representatives of the governments of the People's Republic of Poland (PRP) and PRC sign a preliminary agreement to establish the Chinese-Polish Joint Stock Shipping Company.”

17 March 1951

“The steamship PUŁASKI marks the beginning of the Company's operations by departing from Gdynia on a voyage to the ports of China.”

15 June 15 1951

“The Chinese-Polish Shipping Company with its Head Office in Tianjin, China, and a Branch Office in Gdynia, Poland is established. Each shareholder holds fifty percent of shares. Because of the tense political situation, a decision is made not to disclose the status of the shipping company which, temporarily, assumes the name Chinese-Polish Shipbrokers Co. Ltd. and charters vessels from PLO.”

26 June 1951

“The Head Office of the Company starts to operate in Tianjin.”

7 September 1951

“A Branch of the Company is established in Gdynia.”

10 September 1951

“The name “CHIPOLBROK”, which later catches on as a popular name, becomes the telegraphic address of the Company.”

31 December 1951

“The fleet operated by Chipolbrok includes 10 ships with an overall deadweight of 100,407 tonnes.”

18 June 1952

“Chipolbrok is the first sino-foreign joint venture partner in PRC, which received a licence to trade as signed by the Deputy Prime Minister, Chen Yun.”

4 October 1953

“Gunboats of the Taiwanese Navy stop the Chipolbrok tanker PRACA carrying petrol to China and manned with a Sino-Polish crew, in the international waters of the South China Sea (position: 21°27’N, 122°45’E), and take it to Taiwan, where it is requisitioned together with its cargo.”

12 October 1957

“M/v Żeromski the first company’s own fleet investment – built in former Democratic Republic of Germany shipyard – launches her maiden voyage.”

12 December 1957

“The Prime Ministers of both Chinese and Polish governments – Mr Zhou Enlai and Mr Józef Cyrankiewicz visiting Chipolbrok Head Office at Tianjin.”

6 September 1958

“M/v Reymont – the first ship built for Chipolbrok at Polish shipyard at Gdańsk – enters the service.”

31 August 1959

“M/v Zamenhof – the first out of the sister vessels’ series designed and constructed at Split shipyard (former Yugoslavia) – enters the service.”

5 November 1959

“M/v Chopin – the second ship out of the sister vessels’ series built at Split shipyard (former Yugoslavia) enters the service.”

29 April 1960

97

“M/v Moniuszko – the next sister vessel delivered ex Split shipyard – enters the services. Other ships of the series built later on: m/v Paderewski, m/v Szymanowski, m/v Nowowiejski, m/v Wieniawski. All these ships are multipurpose general cargo type ships adopted also to refrigerated cargo shipments.”

February 1962

“Chipolbrok Head Office moved from Tianjin to Shanghai

1966 Grand total cargo volume transported on board of Chipolbrok ships as from establishing of the company reached 10 mil. Tons.”

26 June 1971

“Chipolbrok celebrates 20th Anniversary of activity with the presence of Shareholders Mr Yangjie – Minister of Communication and Mr Jerzy Szopa – Minister of Transportation.”

1 January 1977

“Chipolbrok changes its former name Chinese-Polish Shipbrokers Company for Chinese-Polish Joint Stock Shipping Company.”

23 September 1978

“First ship built in Chinese shipyard for Chipolbrok – m/v Shaoxing launches her maiden voyage.”

February 1982

“M/v Parandowski – the second out of the 8 multipurpose ships’ series launches her maiden voyage.”

1984

“Over 1 mil. tons of cargoes transported by company’s ships in the course of one year.”

3 November 1989

“The keel for the first out of 4 multipurpose general cargo ships’ series has been laid down. The new ships: m/v Szymanowski, m/v Wieniawski, m/v Chongming and m/v Jiaxing ordered at 3rd-Maj shipyard at Rijeka.”

1 March 1989

“Signature of the contract for construction of the new office premises for Chipolbrok Branch in Poland and a new domicile house for Chinese staff working in Poland. The real estate properties to be built for Chipolbrok by Austrian company Ilbau Gesselschaft m.b.H.”

1 September 1992

“Chipolbrok and Nepa Shipping Amsterdam concluded a joint-venture agreement for establishing an agency company Sinepol Shipping and Agency B.V. at Rotterdam.”

24 March 1993

“Set up of Chipolbal Shipping Pte Ltd Singapore – a joint-venture of Chipolbrok and local authority.”

27 April 1993

“Delivery of the last vessel out of the series of 4 newbuildings ex 3 rd -Maj shipyard at Rijeka.”

21 July 1994

“Set up of Chipolbrok daughter agency company in China: SGA Shanghai-Gdynia International Transportation and Agency Co. Ltd.”

13 October 1994

“Chipolbrok’s further real estate investment: the contract with Austrian company Ilbau Gesselschaft m.b.H has been signed for construction of the “City Arcade” building in the main office’s centre of Gdynia, fully dedicated for rental.”

24 August 1995

“Chipolbrok’s newly built recreation and sporting centre at Sopot opens its doors for clients.”

25 January 1996

“Daughter forwarding company has been established at Shanghai: CPIF China-Poland International Freight Forwarding Company.”

April 1996

“Next Chipolbrok fleet investment: 3rd-Maj shipyard at Rijeka starts construction of m/v Taixing type ship. The next vessels of the series will be m/v Norwid and m/v Yongxing.”

8 May 1996

“Chipolbrok Management undertakes the decision to implement ISO and ISM code standards in cooperation with Lloyd’s Register Advisory Services.”

21 October 1996

“45th Anniversary of Chipolbrok activity accompanied with opening ceremony of the new office “City Arcade” with presence of Minister of Communication of PRCh Mr Huang Zhendong and Minister of Transportation and Maritime of RP Mr B.Liberadzki.”

20 August 1998

“Delivery of the last ship out of the series of m/v Yongxing type ex 3rd-Maj shipyard.”

98

August/September 1999

“Beginning of Quality and Safety Management System implementation on the ships managed by Head and Branch Office.”

9-11 November 1999

“Certification Audit of the Quality and Safety Management System of Head and Branch Office carried out by Lloyd’s Register.”

17 October 2000

“Chipolbrok takes over the major packet of shares of Baltic Container Lines BCL Gdynia.”

20 July 2001

“Signature of the contract with Shanghai shipyard for construction of 2 new multipurpose heavy geared ships 30.000 DWT each with an option for further two newbuildings.”

3 October 2001

“Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of Chipolbrok held in Gdynia with participation of governments of PRCh and RP delegations and many domestic and foreign guests."

28 April 2002

“An option for further 2 newbuildings has been used - signature of the contract with Shanghai shipyard.”

February 2005

“The launch of a regular liner service from China and other Far East countries to the American ports of the Gulf of Mexico.”

2011

“Chipolbrok completed in 2011 delivery of second series "Orkan" class tonnage - 6 multipurpose heay-lift ships with maximum lifting capacity of 640ts and 30000dwt joined company`s fleet.”

99

Appendix I. "Setting Sail for Full Speed Progress of China-Poland Friendship"

See: Xi, Jinping. 'Full text of Chinese president's signed article on Polish newspaper' <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-06/17/c_135445947.htm> accessed on 29 August 2016.

“WARSAW, June 17 (Xinhua) -- Chinese President Xi Jinping published a signed article on leading Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita under the title of "Setting Sail for Full Speed Progress of China-Poland Friendship" on Friday, ahead of his state visit to the European country. The English translated version of the article is as follows. Setting Sail for Full Speed Progress of China-Poland Friendship By H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China At the invitation by President Duda, I will soon be making a state visit to the Republic of Poland, which will be my first visit to Poland as the Chinese President. I look forward to having in-depth discussions with President Duda and other Polish leaders on enhancing bilateral relations, deepening practical cooperation and strengthening coordination and cooperation between China and Poland on major international and regional issues. I visited Poland in the 1990s, which left me a deep impression. The Polish people are diligent, intelligent and courageous, and the country has a proud history and brilliant culture. Nicolaus Copernicus, exploring the vast universe, pioneered the theory of "the Sun rather than the Earth at the center of the Universe," transforming mankind's understanding of the Universe. Madam Curie, studying the micro world, discovered the two isotopes of Polonium and Radium, which paved the way for the development and application of the theory of radioactivity. Like music lovers all over the world, the Chinese people are fond of F.F. Chopin, a towering musician of Poland. The melodious tunes of Chopin's piano compositions, in particular, have a powerful resonance in our hearts. Though China and Poland are geographically far apart, our friendly interactions date back centuries. In the middle of the 17th century, Polish missionary Michal Boym came to China. He wrote many books based on his extensive study of Chinese society, history, medicine and geography, and became the first European to introduce scientific and cultural achievements of ancient China to the West, winning the reputation of "the Marco Polo of Poland." Both the Chinese and the Poles believe that "true friendship stands out in difficult times." This was borne out during the WWII when our two peoples sympathized with and supported each other, forging a deep friendship. Dr. S. Flato, Wolf Jungerman and many other Polish friends traveled long distances to provide medical support in China during its war of resistance against Japanese aggression. Witold Urbanowicz and Wlodzimierz Szymankiewicz fought in China as members of the allied forces assisting China. With heroic sacrifices, the Polish people made important contribution to the final victory of the Anti-Fascist War and the restoration of world peace. Poland was among the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. The past 67 years of diplomatic ties have witnessed the deepening of traditional friendship between our peoples. In the early years of the People's Republic, Poland gave strong support to China's economic and social development, especially in fields such as mining, sugar making and shipping. The Chinese-Polish Joint Stock Shipping Company, which was set up in 1951 and still runs well today, was the first Sino-foreign joint venture incorporated in the People's Republic. The Mazowsze Polish Folk Song and Dance Ensemble was the first foreign performing group to visit the People's Republic. Its songs and dances, like Mazurkas, Polonaises and Little Cuckoo, are still familiar to many Chinese. In recent years, China-Poland relations have enjoyed fast growth. President Duda and I reached extensive agreement on increasing high-level interactions, deepening strategic mutual trust and expanding practical cooperation across the board during his successful visit to China at the end of last year. And the two sides signed an MOU on jointly building the "Belt and Road." All these have laid a solid foundation for exchanges and cooperation between the two countries in all fields. Poland became one of the first countries in Central and Eastern Europe to establish a strategic partnership with China and was the first CEE country to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In recent years, China and Poland have achieved stable economic growth and remained each other's biggest trading partner in their respective regions for consecutive years. In 2015, two-way trade reached 17.09 billion U.S. dollars. Mutual investment grew steadily. And the two sides continued to expand and enhance cooperation in mining, infrastructure, transportation and logistics, finance, aerospace, science and technology and agriculture. We also maintained dynamic people-to-people exchanges. "Happy Chinese New Year in Poland" has been held for six years, while such events as Polish culture season and Polish cultural festival are gaining popularity in China. Five Confucius Institutes have been established in Poland. More and more Chinese universities have started to offer Polish language programs. The China-Poland Regional Forum has been held successfully for three sessions, providing a platform for sub-national interactions. Our people-to-people exchange has grown more diverse in form and rich in content, injecting fresh vigor into our traditional friendship. Central and Eastern Europe as a sub-region boasts the greatest potential for growth in all of Europe. China and Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) share a profound traditional friendship, sincere desire for cooperation and strong economic complementarity. This is the source of the vitality and great potential for cooperation between China and the CEECs (16+1 cooperation). Over the past four years, guided by the spirit of mutual respect, mutual benefit, openness and inclusiveness, the 16+1 cooperation has maintained strong momentum, expanded and deepened, and has become more mature and ready for harvest. We should promote the 16+1 cooperation with a forward-looking and people-oriented approach, and aim to make greater contribution to the prosperity of Europe and the growth of China-Europe relations. As comprehensive strategic partners, China and the EU have maintained strong relations which hold out great promise for further development. In 2014, during my visit to the EU headquarters, the EU leaders and I agreed to develop China-Europe partnerships for peace, growth, reform and progress of civilizations, identifying the strategic direction for China-Europe cooperation in the new era. Progress has been made concerning the five platforms we agreed to build, i.e. co-investment vehicle, connectivity platform, legal affairs dialogue, digital cooperation and mobility of the people.

100

Both China and Europe are now carrying out structural reforms to boost economic and social development. China is acting on its new vision of innovative, coordinated, green, open and shared development. It is upgrading its growth model and economic structure to maintain medium-high speed of growth and move to medium and upper ends of the industrial chain. The EU is implementing the investment plan for Europe, and has rolled out a combination of policy measures to sustain the growth momentum in Europe. As the world's two major forces, two big markets and two celebrated civilizations, China and Europe have every reason to enhance synergy in their development strategies, deepen shared interests, promote common growth and contribute to world peace and development. The 16+1 cooperation and China-Europe relations cannot go far without the growth of bilateral ties between China and countries of this region. China-Poland relations are now facing great opportunities. Madam Curie once said, one never notices what has been done; one can only see what remains to be done. I hope that this visit will be a good occasion for me to work with Polish leaders to enhance cooperation between our two countries across the board and achieve a higher level of development and broader and deeper growth for the 16+1 cooperation and China-Europe relations. We should treat each other as equals, build up mutual trust, and jointly meet the challenges of our times. Over the past 67 years, China and Poland have made remarkable achievements along their own path of development in keeping with their national conditions. Confucius, the great philosopher in ancient China, once observed that "a gentleman upholds high principles in all his pursuits and fulfills his mission with good faith." In the same spirit, our two countries should view bilateral relations from a strategic and long-term perspective, accord each other understanding and support on issues of core interests and major concern, and ensure steady and sound growth of China-Poland relations in the coming years. We should align development strategies and jointly explore ways of development. Poland is at the heartland of Europe. It is also where the Amber Road and the Silk Road meet. Several China Railway Express trains to Europe pass through Poland or are bound for Poland. Based on the MOU signed between the two governments on joint building of the Belt and Road, the two sides should speed up the formulation of cooperation plans, identify and prepare for major projects and work for early harvest. We should deepen practical cooperation and jointly boost economic development. Poland is pursuing reindustrialization, while China is seeking international cooperation on production capacity. China is ready to join the Polish reindustrialization drive through cooperation on production capacity. China is also keen to cooperate more closely with Poland in such sectors as energy, infrastructure, transportation and logistics, communications and aerospace, with a view to raising the quality and level of bilateral cooperation. We must expand people-to-people ties and consolidate traditional friendship. Both China and Poland have great historical and cultural heritages. We should learn from each other and expand cooperation on culture, education, tourism, sports and at sub-national levels. We should encourage the younger generation to take the baton of friendship and do their part in deepening and renewing our traditional friendship. We must make good use of existing platforms and jointly promote regional cooperation. Poland was the first proponent of 16+1 cooperation and hosted the first Meeting of Heads of Government of China and Central and Eastern European countries. It has actively supported and participated in 16+1 cooperation, and has played an important role in boosting investment and commerce within this framework. We are ready to work with Poland and all other Central and Eastern European countries to make good use of the 16+1 mechanism for regional cooperation and deliver more benefits to the people of our 17 countries. We should enhance China-Europe cooperation and create a better future together. China and Europe need to follow the trend of the times for peace, development and win-win cooperation. We should deepen strategic cooperation, increase communication and coordination on international affairs, and contribute to building a new type of international relations featuring win-win cooperation and a community of shared future for all mankind. Let us work together to set sail for a voyage of win-win cooperation and steer the vessel of China-Poland friendship at full-speed toward a brighter future for China-Poland, China-CEEC and China-Europe relations.”