positive–negative asymmetry in social discrimination

Positive-Negative Asymmetry in Social Discrimination 1

Running Head: POSITIVE-NEGATIVE-ASYMMETRY IN SOCIAL DISCRIMINATION

Positive-Negative-Asymmetry in Social Discrimination

Amélie Mummendey and Sabine Otten

University of Jena, Germany

Index Words: ACCURACY; AGGRAVATION HYPOTHESIS; CATEGORY SALIENCE;

DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE; EXPLICIT DISCRIMINATION; IMPLICIT

DISCRIMINATION; INFORMATION PROCESSING; INGROUP FAVOURITISM;

INTERGROUP ACCENTUATION; INTERGROUP BEHAVIOUR; MINIMAL GROUP

PARADIGM; NORMATIVE APPROPRIATENESS; OUTGROUP DEROGATION;

POSITIVE-NEGATIVE ASYMMETRY; RECATEGORIZATION; SELF

CATEGORIZATION THEORY; SOCIAL DISCRIMINATION; SOCIAL IDENTITY

THEORY


Minimal group experiments showed that mere categorization of individuals into arbitrary

social groups can be sufficient to elicit ingroup favouritism. This effect has been qualified by

demonstrating a positive-negative asymmetry in social discrimination: Categorization into

minimal, laboratory groups was sufficient to elicit ingroup favouritism in allocations of

positive stimuli, but not in allocations of negative ones. Different explanatory perspectives for

this valence-specific asymmetry in intergroup behaviour were tested. An integrative

perspective, linking normative, cognitive and motivational aspects is proposed. This

perspective also implies a critical analysis and re-framing of traditional theorizing on

categorization effects in minimal intergroup situations.


Introduction

Article 3 of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany declares explicitly one

right of man: All human beings are equal before the law. Men and women have equal rights.

Nobody should be disadvantaged or advantaged because of his or her gender, origin, race,

religious or political beliefs. Herewith, the constitution relies on the fundamental principle of

human rights which presupposes the absolute acknowledgement of the individual as holder of

equal liberty. About fifty years ago, on December 10th, 1948, the General Assembly of the

United Nations proclaimed the General Declaration of Human Rights which later (1976)

resulted in two pacts, one concerning civil and political rights, the other concerning

economic, social and cultural rights. By 1989 about 90 states had agreed to these pacts.

Accordingly, many states provide as constitutional law the explicit prohibition of

discrimination in favour of or against individuals because of their race, religion, political

activity or gender.

G.W. Allport (1954) refers to an official memorandum of the United Nations from

1949 when he defines discrimination as "[coming] about only when we deny to individuals or

groups of people equality of treatment which they may wish" (p. 51). He differentiated social

discrimination from differential treatment of persons based on individual qualities by quoting

the memorandum again: "Discrimination includes any conduct based on a distinction made on

grounds of natural or social categories, which have no relation either to individual capacities

or merits, or to the concrete behaviour of the individual person." (p. 52). Up to today,

Allport's definition of social discrimination is taken as the basis for theoretical and empirical

research in social psychology about this phenomenon (e.g. Graumann & Wintermantel, 1989;

Stroebe & Insko, 1989). Looking at the different laws, declarations, conventions and pacts on

national or supernational levels, it seems justified to infer a broad social consensus which


condemns social discrimination and which provides any target or victim access to complaints

at courts of justice.

The stronger and wider this basic rejection is to be heard, the more interesting becomes

the question of why social discrimination nevertheless still occurs. Both occurrence and

rejection of discriminatory treatment look like two fighting inimical brothers. The stronger

the one of them becomes, the more the other feels challenged to fight against him. The more

severe and dreadful discriminatory treatments become, the more effort is put into endeavours

to find explanations for the phenomenon, hoping that explanations might assist the search for

control and reduction of these kinds of social problems. For decades social psychological

theory and research have been a kind of fellow-soldier in this battle against social

discrimination.

It is not the place here to review the different lines of theoretical approaches which have

been developed for this purpose (see Allport, 1954; Brown, 1995; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986;

Stephan, 1985; Stroebe & Insko, 1989). Moreover, we want to focus on those approaches

which conceptualize social discrimination as a category of behaviour between social groups

and which therefore analyse and systematize this kind of behaviour within the context of

relations between social groups.

What leads people to maltreat others, to degrade or to disadvantage them, to prevent

them from access to important resources? In the early fifties, Sherif and co-workers published

their now-classic summer camp experiments which provided the basis for Sherif's functional

theory of realistic intergroup conflict (Sherif, White, Harvey, 1955; Sherif, Harvey, White,

Hood & Sherif, 1961). According to this theory, behaviour directed toward members of own

or other groups is determined by the functional relation between the two groups with respect

to their group interests or goals. Negative interdependence between two groups, or conflict of

interests, leads to negative attitudes, hostilities and aggressive behaviour directed against the


outgroup as well as particularly positive attitudes and evaluations towards the ingroup, in

other words, to intergroup discrimination (Sherif, 1966).

From experiments following Sherif's realistic group conflict-theory increasing evidence

emerged which also demonstrated ingroup favouritism and outgroup discrimination in

situations where intergroup conflict was absent. Rabbie and Horwitz (1969) were the first to

study individuals' behaviour under the condition of mere belongingness to different groups

without further qualifications of the relation between these groups. Horwitz and Rabbie

(1982) conclude from their pioneering findings that the experience of common fate as

members of a group is an important determinant for the instigation of ingroup favouritism

and outgroup discrimination.

Minimal Group Paradigm

Tajfel, Billig, Bundy and Flament (1971) went one step further by presenting the results

of their Minimal Group Paradigm. The idea was to establish a kind of baseline situation and

then to enrich the intergroup situation step by step with additional variables in order to

identify the critical condition or factor which would lead to social discrimination. For an

intergroup situation to be minimal the following criteria have to be met (see Brewer, 1979, p.

309): "(a) no face-to-face interaction among subjects within or between groups; (b)

anonymity of group membership; (c) absence of any instrumental link between the basis for

intergroup categorization and the response measure, and (d) a response measure involving

real and significant choices but of no direct utilitarian value to the subject".

The results obtained in the first studies using this paradigm led to the claim that in the

minimal group situation, mere categorization of people into ingroup and outgroup is a

sufficient condition for ingroup favouritism, i.e. favouring one's own group or category over

an outgroup. When asked to allocate small amounts of money to members of own and other

group, participants in minimal group experiments preferred distributions which gave more to

the own than to the other group. But the more important result in terms of the later developed


Social Identity Theory was that they even preferred to maximize the difference between the

two groups in favour of the own group rather than simply maximizing the absolute gain for

the ingroup. As Turner put it, "Ss seemed to want the ingroup to win rather than gain" (1978,

p. 102).

Meanwhile a large body of empirical evidence supports this claim (for reviews see

Brewer, 1979; Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Messick & Mackie, 1989; Mummendey, 1995;

Tajfel, 1982). Social discrimination as an effect of mere categorization in minimal group

situations has been replicated again and again. It has been observed with variations of the

original experimental setting, with different samples and with different kinds of dependent

measures including evaluations, attributions, choices in prisoners dilemma games, allocations

of resources, and use of different linguistic categories. The robustness and generalizability of

the mere categorization effect, stated for example by Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and

Wetherell (1987, p. 27), has hardly been challenged up to now. Brown (1995) concludes

"[social categorization] seems to provide the sufficient circumstances for people to begin to

favour their own group over others, whether this favouritism be in the form of biased

evaluative judgments or as some kind of concrete behavioural discrimination (p.44).

Social Identity Theory

With Social Identity Theory Tajfel and Turner (1979, 1986) promoted the prevailing

explanation of social discrimination in minimal group situations. By segmenting "an

individual's social environment into his own group and others "(Tajfel, 1978, p. 67), social

categorization provides for an individual its location within a network of interrelations

between different groups. The knowledge of belonging to one group and not belonging to

others, together with the emotional and evaluative meaning attached to this belongingness,

creates an individual's social identity. Individuals strive for a positive evaluation of their own

identity. They obtain evaluative information by comparisons between own and other groups

on evaluative dimensions. A positive identity is achieved by a comparison outcome which


creates positive distinctiveness for one's own group compared to a relevant outgroup. A

negative comparison outcome will create an unsatisfying identity and thus instigate activities

in order to achieve or restore positive distinctiveness. It is obviously the comparative

perspective which links social categorization with social identity.

From the social identity theory perspective, ingroup favouritism and outgroup

discrimination in the situation of the Minimal Group Paradigm is seen as functional, fulfilling

the need for differentiation or distinctiveness between groups. Subsequently, Self

Categorization Theory (Turner et al., 1987) proposed positive distinctiveness as equivalent to

the "relative prototypicality of the ingroup on valued dimensions of intergroup comparison"

(p. 62). Positive self-evaluation is seen as a function of people's relative prototypicality at any

given level of self-other comparison. It is therefore assumed "that there is a general tendency

to seek positive distinctiveness for oneself at any salient level of self categorization" (p. 62).

In both these theories, Social Identity Theory and Self Categorization Theory,

favouritism of own group and discrimination against the outgroup is conceived as the result

of individuals' striving for positive social distinctiveness, which they engage in when they

identify as members of a group in a context where the categorization into ingroup and

outgroup is made salient.

Positive Distinctiveness and Intergroup Discrimination

In the social psychology literature, this theoretical proposition is very often condensed

into the following kind of syllogism: 1st premise: The situation of the Minimal Group

Paradigm provides nothing but mere intergroup categorization. 2nd premise: social

discrimination in the Minimal Group Paradigm is a robust replicable effect. Conclusion:

intergroup categorization is the sufficient condition for social discrimination. This, however,

means a misleading short circuit, against which the founders of Social Identity Theory, even

in their earliest writings, have argued. They stress instead, that the co-occurrence between

categorization and discrimination might be true only under certain conditions: "it would be


premature to conclude theoretically that there is an automatic or inevitable connection

between [intergroup categorization] and intergroup discrimination" (Turner, 1978, p. 105, see

also 1975). What is postulated by Social Identity Theory is not an automatic connection

between categorization and discrimination but, rather, the mediation between the two by the

following three conditions: 1. In order to be identified with, social categorization must be

relevant for an individual's self evaluation; they must contribute to an individual's positive or

negative social identity. 2. Information about whether identity based on these categories is

negative or positive must be provided by the presence or availability of intergroup

comparisons on valued dimensions. 3. The only viable way in the particular situation for the

ingroup to promote positive identity is to create positive distinctiveness on those valued

dimensions. Following these original Social Identity Theory-assumptions, the syllogism has

to be modified: 1st premise: The Minimal Group Paradigm creates an intergroup

categorization which implies these three particular conditions. 2nd premise: Social

discrimination in Minimal Group Paradigm is a robust and replicable effect. Conclusion:

Under minimal group conditions, intergroup categorization is connected with intergroup

discrimination.

According to these assumptions, minimal social discrimination is part and result of

social competition between groups. If a dimension permits individuals to make evaluative

differentiations between ingroup and outgroup, and if both groups value this dimension

similarly, comparison on this dimension can be utilized for social competition aiming at each

group's superiority on the same positively valued pole of this dimension (see Turner 1975,

1978 for detailed discussion of this issue).

Ingroup Favouritism and Outgroup Derogation

The goal of winning is achieved by establishing a positive comparison outcome in

favour of the own group. For such a comparison outcome to be positive, it is irrelevant

whether this is achieved by being better than or less bad than the other group. The positive


distinctiveness can be created independently of the valence quality of resources to be

distributed or the valence connotation of attributes to be assigned. Social Identity Theory

consequently does not take into account the valence of evaluative dimensions or resources in

terms of a categorical differentiation as either positive or negative, nor does it suggest

valence-specific predictions concerning conditions for discrimination.

Looking at the socially and politically problematic evaluation and treatment of others,

at those cases of discrimination, therefore, which originally formed the issue of concern, it is

very often the de-evaluation or derogation, the explicitly more negative treatment of the

outgroup. Accordingly, there is a mismatch between social reality and the empirical studies

on intergroup behaviour, which – as already outlined by Brown (1986) – demonstrate no

evidence for outgroup hostility "but only mild derogation" (p. 557).

Social psychological research concerned with ingroup favouritism and outgroup

discrimination has primarily focused on group members' distribution of positive resources.

There are many real life examples, however, of people's willingness to allocate aversive

stimuli, negative resources like burdens to outgroup members. The question is whether the

conditions sufficient to elicit discrimination in distributions of positive ressources will

function equivalently for intergroup discrimination in the negative area. Yet, empirical

studies not designed explicitly to tackle the problem of valence in social discrimination

already cast some doubts on the adequacy of easy extrapolations from positive to negative

valence. For example Struch and Schwartz (1989) showed convincingly that ingroup

favouritism and outgroup discrimination by positive distinctiveness on positive valence

attributes did not predict at all negative intentions to explicitly disadvantage the outgroup in

an intergroup resource distribution task.

A Taxonomy of Social Discrimination

To approach this question in a more systematic way, Mummendey and Simon (1991)

suggested a taxonomy of social discrimination which will be described below. In a first step


the distinction between positive and negative behaviour quality, i.e. the valence of behaviour

involved in intergroup discrimination, should be clarified. For our purpose at the present

stage, a preliminary operational differentiation is considered as sufficient (see Brendl &

Higgins, 1996, for an elaborated motivational model of the judgment of valence). We define

positive stimuli as those which an individual would like to approach and negative stimuli as

those which an individual would like to avoid. Obviously, the decision whether a stimulus is

perceived as negative or positive, is not to be made a priori but depends on context

information. Nevertheless the decision can be made on the basis of empirical evidence or, in

terms of an experimental procedure, on the basis of manipulation checks. The second step is

to differentiate between two different modes of disadvantaging the outgroup in favour of the

ingroup: The disadvantage might result from differential allocation or from differential

removal of resources or stimuli. This analysis ends up with a two-dimensional taxonomy and

four types of social discrimination presented in figure 1.

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Insert figure 1 about here

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If more positive or less negative stimuli are allocated to the ingroup relative to the

outgroup, we call this direct discrimination in the positive or negative area; if less positive or

more negative resources are taken away from the ingroup relative to the outgroup, we talk of

indirect discrimination in the positive or negative area. The overwhelming empirical evidence

so far refers to the type of discrimination depicted in cell a (the direct discrimination of the

positive type), the ingroup gets more positive evaluations or resource allocations than the

outgroup. There is one example for cell c (the indirect discrimination of the positive type)

provided in a study by Hewstone, Fincham and Jaspars (1981) who, in a minimal group

experiment, established differential removal of money-points, i.e. positive stimuli as the


dependent variable. Results in this study showed scores of ingroup favouritism, which were

somewhat lower than the results of the allocation study done by Tajfel et al. (1971).

Following this taxonomy we started a series of experimental studies which focused on

the comparison of direct discrimination of either the positive or the negative type. The

question to be dealt with was to investigate whether the findings from the classic minimal

group experiments by Tajfel et al. (1971) can simply be replicated: Will members of minimal

groups, when distributing negative outcomes, show the same pattern of ingroup favouritism

as group members in the typical minimal group experiments, who distributed primarily

positive outcomes? Or in other words: Will the mere categorization effect on outgroup

discrimination hold true irrespective of the valence-specific type of social discrimination?

Positive-Negative Asymmetry of Social Discrimination

A first minimal group study (Mummendey, Simon, Dietze, Grünert, Haeger, Kessler,

Lettgen & Schäferhoff, 1992, study I) focused on differential allocation of negative stimuli.

By means of the usual matrices (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel et al., 1971), participants had to

allocate varying duration of an unpleasant sound, supposedly to create the experimental

conditions for an experiment to follow. Participants were told that the next experiment was

about physiological correlates of mood induced by aversive noise. Results indicated that

"fairness" was the dominant strategy used. Regardless of whether the experimental groups

were formed at random or by a similarity criterion, participants did not show ingroup-

favouritism or maximizing difference strategies at all.

In a second experiment (Mummendey et al. 1992, study II) we implemented two factors

in order to vary the participants' need for a positive social identity, namely relative group size

and relative group status, the idea being that minorities and low status groups should

experience a greater need for positive social identity. Now the negative stimulus which had to

be allocated to own and other group was operationalized as the length of a list of meaningless

syllables allegedly to be learned by the participants in an experiment to follow. Tajfel-


matrices were used again, and again groups with no particular need for positive social identity

followed the "fairness" strategy in their allocation decisions. Only participants in a numerical

minority or an inferior status position, i.e., in the state of a threatened or even negative

identity, showed significant ingroup bias.

The findings showed clearly that mere categorization into minimal groups was not

sufficient to elicit ingroup favouritism for negative outcome allocation. However,

discriminatory allocation of negative stimuli will occur as well, provided group members are

particularly motivated to achieve positive social identity. Only under specific and more

compelling circumstances do people tend to discriminate by the allocation of negative stimuli.

We suggested that these first results should be read as "a caveat against the silent

generalisation from the realm of positive to the realm of negative outcome allocations"

(Mummendey et al. 1992, p. 142). We suggested moreover the explicit study of different

types of discriminatory behaviour and formed the hypothesis of a "positive-negative

asymmetry of social discrimination" which claims that ingroup favouritism by negative

stimuli is less probable or less easily expressed than discrimination by positive stimuli.

The study reported above was concerned with negative intergroup allocations only, it

took the comparison reference of positive intergroup allocations from similar minimal group

studies with types of positive stimuli-allocations. In order to investigate explicitly the effect

of stimulus valence on social discrimination in intergroup situations, further studies were

performed to create a systematic comparison of positive and negative outcome allocations in

identical experimental settings. These experiments created a less minimal intergroup

situation, still introducing an arbitrary social categorization, but with overt group assignment

and face-to-face interaction. Blanz, Mummendey and Otten (1995 b) used evaluations of

ingroup and outgroup on either positive or negative attributes; Otten, Mummendey and Blanz

(1996) compared allocation decisions of either money (German D-Mark currency units) or

duration of an unpleasant noise (in minute units). Again, relative group status as well as


relative group size were manipulated, but also the degree of salience of this categorization in

different settings (Blanz, Mummendey, & Otten, 1995 a). In these studies, for the positive

area of intergroup behaviour -- the original version namely -- the primary very consistent and

replicated finding was that in these still relatively minimal conditions the old and well known

ingroup bias, with strategies maximizing ingroup profit or even maximizing intergroup

difference, was significant. In the negative area, however, ingroup favouritism and outgroup

discrimination were absent.

To conclude from these studies: for ingroup favouritism and outgroup discrimination to

occur in the negative area, additional conditions beyond the mere categorization into

laboratory groups. We coined this our "aggravation hypothesis": Social discrimination in the

negative area presupposes not only a salient social categorization, but additional conditions

which "aggravate" the achievement or maintenance of positive distinctiveness are necessary.

In other words, conditions which are known to have an intensifying effect on ingroup bias in

the positive area are necessary in the negative area, in order to elicit ingroup bias. Such

variables are for example the salience of categorization , inferior ingroup status and minority

ingroup position. Conditions of this kind provide information that own and other group differ

on particular dimensions. These differences might then legitimize differntial treatment of own

and other group, potentially ending up with ingroup favouritsm.

In order to obtain more solid evidence concerning our hypothesis referring to the

positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination, we conducted a meta-analysis based

upon all our studies about valence effects on intergroup discrimination. The sample included

mere minimal group situations as well as 'enriched' minimal group situations referring to

artificial social categorizations, but introducing face-to-face interaction between participants

as well as aggravating conditions. Participants were (non psychology) students from the

university or from high schools. Dependent measures included ratings on evaluative

dimensions as well as allocations of resources, each representing either positive or negative


valence-quality. Altogether, 26 experimental conditions in which valence was manipulated as

independent variable were included in the analysis. The mean effect sizes of ingroup

favouritism for positive and for negative valence conditions were significantly different (z =

2.18; p < .05; Rosenthal 1989, p. 84). Participants discriminated less on negative than on

positive valence measures (see Fig. 2). The mean effect sizes weighted by study size were r

negative = .14 and r positive = .30. The reliability of our experimental tests is underlined by the

fact that the mean favouritsm measured in the positive conditions is very close to the results

by Mullen, Brown and Smith (1992, p.109), who report a mean score of r = .26 in their

meta-analysis of ingroup biases (in studies referring to positive comparison dimensions).

According to the conventions by Cohen (1988) the favouritism effect for negative valence

can be considered as small, while it has medium size in the positive domain.

____________________


____________________

In order to test whether discrimination in the negative domain is simply discrimination

to a lower degree than discrimination in the positive domain we correlated the effect sizes

from the positive and negative valence conditions for the 26 independent experimental tests.

However, this Spearman correlation turns out to be negligible ( rs .08 , k=26). Hence, one

can conclude that experimental variations, like the aggravating conditions, differ considerably

in the strength of their impact on intergroup differentiaiton in either the positive or the

negative domain.

To sum up, the empirical evidence so far shows the positive-negative asymmetry of

social discrimination as a fairly well established phenomenon. Apparently, the conditions

established in the minimal group situation are sufficient to elicit ingroup favouritism in the

positive area, but not in the negative area. The mere categorization effect on ingroup


favouritism does not appear when positive distinctiveness of own group has to be established

by comparison on negatively valued dimensions or by differential allocations of negative

resources like costs and burdens. Positive comparisons which result in the ingroup being

"better than" the outgroup seem to be different from those which mean being "less bad".

How can this effect be explained? Neither Social Identity Theory nor Self

Categorization Theory predict any impact of valence on intergroup behaviour. On the face of

it, positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination seems to create difficulties for the

postulate of "a general tendency to seek positive distinctiveness for oneself at any salient level

of self-categorization" (Turner et al. 1987, p. 62). To our opinion, the search for explanations

of the effect of valence on intergroup behaviour can be pursued from three different

perspectives which we define as the normative, the cognitive and the categorical perspective.

In the following paragraphs we will present these perspectives together with recent research.

The Normative Perspective

One line of thinking could be that there are valence-specific differences in the

normative appropriateness of ingroup favouritism (Mummendey et al. 1992). Within the

negative domain, positive comparison outcomes for the ingroup might be perceived as

normatively less appropriate than in the positive area. While ingroup favouritism within the

positive domain means that at least some amount of desirable stimuli is allocated also to the

outgroup, direct discrimination in the negative domain implies an active infliction of aversive

stimuli to outgroup members, and to a larger degree than to the ingroup. Social

discrimination, although generally being socially disapproved of, might be perceived as even

more inappropriate if it implies fewer burdens rather than more benefits for the ingroup at the

expense of the outgroup.

The importance of valence in distributive justice has already been touched on by

Törnblom and co-workers (Törnblom, 1988; Törnblom, Mühlhausen, & Johnson, 1991).The

question here is whether and under what conditions negative and positive allocations, and the


justice evaluation of these allocations, follow the same justice principles. Research which

contrasts the two kinds has only begun to emerge; and up to now, the available evidence is

rather inconsistent (Griffith, 1989; Törnblom, 1992). A number of studies recently conducted

by Mikula and his coworkers focused explicitly on issues of justice in distributions of burdens

and duties (Mikula, Freudenthaler, Brennacher-Kröll, & Brunschko, in press; Mikula,

Freudenthaler, Brennacher-Kröll & Schiller-Brandl, 1997). Their results clearly suggest that

it is inappropriate to simply extrapolate theories and evidence on allocations of positive

resources to the domain of burdens and duties. Concluding from the evidence so far results in

a present status of knowledge about valence effects in distributive justice which is far from

being satisfying.

So we started with a rather global, more plausible than sophisticated assumption: Social

discrimination will be less likely the more difficult it is to explain and to justify differential

treatment of the ingroup and other group. It seems plausible to assume that, in general,

inflicting negative or aversive stimuli is less justifiable or demand more explanation than

allocating positive stimuli.

Inappropriateness of Ingroup Favouritism on Positive and Negative Dimensions

Blanz, Mummendey and Otten (1997) investigated whether valence-asymmetry in

social discrimination has any correspondence to variations in normative evaluations of

positive versus negative outcome allocations in an intergroup setting. We were interested in

the effect of valence on (a) outside observers' expectations about the frequency of

discriminatory behaviour (statistical norm) and (b) their judgments of social discrimination as

more or less normatively appropriate or just (prescriptive norm). Participants from the

perspective of an outside observer read a written description of the experimental procedure

run in the study by Mummendey et al. (1994): Here individuals, categorized into two

different groups, had to allocate either positive or negative stimuli to in- and outgroup

members by using Tajfel matrices in a minimal group setting. After the description of the


experiment, participants had to evaluate the outcome decision of one target person. This

outcome decision was presented as either fair (equal distribution) or in favour of the ingroup

or in favour of the outgroup. Dependent measures in this study were participants' expectations

concerning the statistical frequency of this particular decision and evaluation of the respective

target's allocation as just, appropriate, cooperative and the like.

Not surprisingly, results showed that outside observers considered parity to be the most

appropriate strategy of intergroup allocations in this minimal situation for both positive as

well as negative stimuli. Favouritism or discrimination, be it at cost for the other or for the

own group, is evaluated as inappropriate. Interestingly, however, stimulus valence clearly

moderates this pattern of judgments: For allocations of positive stimuli, participants expected

group members to show predominantly ingroup favouritsm (statistical norm) which

simultaneously was mildly disregarded (prescriptive norm). For allocations of negative

stimuli participants did not expect group members to show ingroup bias, which at the same

time was condemned as the most inappropriate decision in a minimal group situation.

In a second study, Blanz et al. (1995 c) were interested in the motives external

observers inferred to explain a target's respective valence-specific outcome allocations to own

and other group. Again, for a target's ingroup favouritism on positive valence resources,

participants inferred predominantly acceptable motives like "to strengthen the ingroup's

position " or "positive relation with ingroup", whereas for ingroup favouritism on negative

valence resources, less acceptable motives were inferred, like "egoism" or "self interest". This

data pattern supports the assumption of a correspondence between the valence specific

asymmetry of social discrimination and its judgment as normatively appropriate in a minimal

group setting.

Generally speaking, people refer to certain normative orientations when evaluating the

appropriateness of a particular distribution of outcomes between different recipients.

Dependent upon these normative orientations, a distribution might be judged as more or less


appropriate or just. Valence of the resources to be allocated moderates the appropriateness

ratings of an allocation decision: If any justification for a differential treatment is missing,

favouring one's own group against an outgroup is less condemnable if benefits are distributed

than if the decision is about costs and burdens.

In sum, the evidence underlines a valence effect on the differential normative

acceptability of social discrimination. At first sight, this could mean support for the normative

perspective to explain the positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination.

Unfortunately, 'explaining' this effect in terms of different valence-specific norms does not at

all provide a sufficient understanding. Like Billig and Tajfel (1973) put it: "statements of this

nature can be made to explain almost everything, and therefore explain very little if anything

at all." (p. 50). What we have is the parallel or joint relation between valence effects on

discrimination and valence effects on the normative evaluations of this discrimination. Yet,

what we need is to focus on the processes or mechanisms responsible for this joint effect.

The Cognitive Perspective

Research on valence-specific differences in information processing suggests the second

perspective for the search of explanations for positive-negative asymmetry of social

discrimination. Generalizing from studies on negativity effects in impression formation and

person perception (Czapinski, 1986; Peeters & Czapinski 1990, Skowronski & Carlston,

1987) or mood effects on information processing (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994;

Bless & Fiedler, 1995; Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1993) it may be assumed that different

cognitive processes underlie decisions about positive and negative stimuli. Findings from

these studies indicate a more careful, systematic processing of negative information.

Accordingly, evaluative judgments on negative dimensions as well as decisions about

negative stimuli allocations can be expected to be less susceptible to ingroup bias under

conditions which don't provide any information about objective differences to justify any

differentiation between both groups on the comparison dimensions in question.


In several research fields there is evidence for positive-negative asymmetries in the way

knowledge is acquired, weighted, retrieved or organised. Peeters (1993) summarises studies

showing that negative information is weighted more heavily in impression formation than

positive information. Pratto and John (1991) demonstrated in a series of experiments that

negative stimuli per se receive more attention than positive ones. Clore, Schwarz and Conway

(1993) give many examples of a more systematic and correct (although not generally more

efficient) information processing and cognitive retrieval under negative mood as compared

with positive mood. Assuming that systematic information processing is positively correlated

with unbiased behaviour, valence-specific lay-epistemic processes could account for the

positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination. But why should the confrontation with

negative stimuli instigate a more careful and thorough decision-making? Peeters and

Czapinski (1990) argue that disregarding negative information is more risky and dangerous

than disregarding positive information. Accordingly, negative stimuli get more attention and

more weight. In the same vein Fiske (1980) argues: "Attention to negative information is also

literally adaptive in the sense that one survives better by avoiding negative contacts." (p.

904). However, Fiske (1980) adds a further argument, namely a chronic positivity bias in

person perception (as, for example, referred to as the "Pollyanna principle" by Matlin &

Stang, 1978), which in turn leads to the effect that negative information is "rare and hard to

comprehend ...", but -- due to this rarity and novelty -- at the same time "... highly

informative" (p. 304). Fiske showed evidence for this assumption not only in impression

ratings but also in latencies for processing valenced information.

Positive-Negative Asymmetry as an Accuracy Effect

In our own experiment testing a cognitive account for the positive-negative asymmetry

of social discrimination (Otten, Mummendey & Buhl, in press), we chose a very similar

approach. We tried to demonstrate corresponding valence-specific effects for intergroup

evaluations as well as for the response latencies for these judgements, the latter being an


indicator for the elaboration of the decision process underlying intergroup judgements. Also,

it seemed necessary to measure the quality or accuracy of the evaluations themselves. While

faults and deviations might be detected quite easily in memory tasks, it seemed problematic to

define accuracy in intergroup judgements and allocations. Usually, experiments -- especially

in the Minimal Group Paradigm -- deliberately withhold differentiating information;

intergroup differentiation, in spite of the absence of differences, is then interpreted as bias.

Nevertheless, equality of groups in these experiments remains an untested premise.

Additionally, with equal groups as targets of evaluations or allocations, we cannot disentangle

whether they are treated equally because they are really perceived as such, or whether group

members prefer equitable treatment of both groups in spite of perceived differences. In order

to deal with these problems, we did two things. First, data from a baseline experiment with

uncategorised subjects were contrasted with those from the main experiment with participants

being categorised in a classical minimal group setting. Second, ingroup- and outgroup-targets

were presented, whose quality was -- according to a pre-test -- clearly unequal. Targets to be

evaluated were identical in the baseline and the main experiment. Accordingly, biases could

be defined in terms of deviations from the baseline evaluation. If even the baseline

experiment showed evaluative differences between two sets of targets, the crucial question

was whether this difference would be either exaggerated or attenuated, due to the fact that

targets were assigned either to the ingroup or to the outgroup.

The design was based on two factors, stimulus valence (positive, negative) and

instruction for decision making (spontaneous, accurate/thorough, control/no manipulation).

We hypothezised that the instruction to decide thoroughly about ingroup and outgroup

evaluations should have effects analogous to those of the confrontation with negative

evaluative dimensions per se. This analogy should result in a valence × instruction

interaction, on both kinds of dependent measures, response latencies as well as baseline

deviations in ingroup and outgroup treatment. We also included a third factor, target quality


(ingroup targets superior to outgroup targets vs. ingroup targets inferior to outgroup targets).

The experiment tested whether the probability of bias differs depending on whether the

quality of targets assigned to the ingroup is either poor or good. Both a relative exaggeration

of high ingroup target quality as well as a relative attenuation of low ingroup target quality

would manifest in baseline differences in favour of the ingroup.

The experimental procedure of the main experiment was based on the minimal group

paradigm (Tajfel et al., 1971). The task was to evaluate the quality of six short advertisement

texts, three of them supposedly a product of ingroup members, three of them a product of

outgroup members. Before starting the evaluations, participants were encouraged to judge

either spontaneously or thoroughly. In the control condition no special instructions

concerning the decision style were given. The texts as well as the judgmental scales were

displayed on a computer screen and subjects indicated their evaluations by pressing a key.

This way judgements as well as the corresponding response latencies could be measured.

The single experimental sessions were run with a number of five to eight participants.

The only difference between the baseline experiment and main experiment was that in the

former neither subjects themselves nor the advertisement texts were categorised. As the only

purpose of the baseline experiment was to provide the necessary data for constructing an

appropriate indicator for ingroup favouritism in the main experiment, it will not be further

discussed in this paper (for more details see Otten et al., 1997).

Response Latencies: The results for the response latencies were fully in line with the

expectation. Analysis of variance indicated a significant main effect of the valence factor as

well as of the instruction factor. In general, judgements on negative dimensions took more

time than those on positive dimensions. In line with the manipulation, in the 'spontaneous'

condition response latencies were lowest, while in the 'accurate' condition they were highest.

However, these main effects were qualified by a significant interaction effect: The valence-

specific difference in response latencies was significant in the 'spontaneous' and control


condition, but not in the 'accurate' condition, in which positive response latencies were as

high as negative ones. This pattern of data suggests that negative stimuli per se operated like

an instruction to judge accurately and carefully (see figure 3).

____________________

Insert Figure 3 about here

____________________

Intergroup evaluations: Again a valence × instruction interaction was expected: In the

'accurate' condition there should be no ingroup-favouritism while there should be the typical

positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination effect in the control condition and ,

especially, in the 'spontaneous' condition. However, the predicted two-way interaction was

not significant. Instead, there was a highly significant three-way interaction with the

additional factor target quality: Irrespective of valence as well as target-quality, in the

'accurate' condition there were no significant deviations from the baseline data. In the 'no

manipulation' condition there was a positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination,

with significant deviations from the baseline favouring the ingroup on positive comparison

dimensions, but with even a tendency towards outgroup favouritism on negative dimensions.

This effect, however, was substantial only for participants who judged relatively poor ingroup

targets and relatively good outgroup targets. Finally, in the 'spontaneous' condition there were

significant baseline deviations in the positive condition, exclusively. But here, judgements

were not in line with a striving for positive ingroup differentiation, but rather with a general

accentuation of inferiority as well as superiority of own group (see figure 4).

____________________

Insert Figure 4 about here

____________________

Correlational analyses with response latencies, on the one hand, and baseline deviations

in favour of the ingroup, on the other hand, corroborate the results. There is a significant


negative correlation. The longer the response latencies, the less absolute deviation from the

baseline-data. The elaboration of the decision process -- as indicated by response latencies --

predicted intergroup differentiation, but not outgroup discrimination.

In sum, results are encouraging with respect to the assumed valence-specific variation

in information processing underlying intergroup judgements in the negative condition. We

find a highly corresponding data pattern for response latencies and intergroup evaluations. On

the one hand, response latencies are higher than in the positive condition, on the other hand,

there are no significant ingroup-favouring deviations from the baseline evaluations. This

indicates, that -- although ingroup identification was sufficiently high -- the judgments of

categorized targets were not influenced by the raters' corresponding own group

belongingness. In the positive condition, however, the assumption of a linear relationship

between response latency and ingroup bias turned out to be too simple. This relation seems to

be crucially influenced by further contextual variables like -- in this experiment -- the relative

quality of targets assigned to the experimental ingroup. If group members are instructed to

judge spontaneously, we do find a positive-negative asymmetry in intergroup accentuation

rather than the typical positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination effect. Only in

the positive domain, bad quality of targets as much as good quality of targets is exaggerated

compared to the baseline, irrespective of whether the targets are assigned to the ingroup or the

outgroup.

Positive-Negative Asymmetry as Differential Sensitization to Outgroup

Discrimination

In the preceding section, we have dealt with valence effects on aspects of accuracy in

quality judgments of own versus other group's products. It was assumed that unlike the

condition of positive valence, the condition of negative valence would lead individuals to

process information about the target more thoroughly and more deeply. This would make

prevalent the "inherent" or objective quality of single targets and reduce accentuation and bias


as effects of (irrelevant) categorical information. The main focus was on the impact of

valence on the accuracy of the representation of the single target quality. We call this type of

accuracy "descriptive accuracy".

Another perspective of accuracy comes up if the focus is directed on the relational

aspect, i.e. the evaluation of targets as relatively equal or as inferior versus superior to each

other. This leads to the derivation of preference decisions on the basis of these relational or

preferential judgments. Accuracy of a preferential judgement would again mean relying

primarily on information of target qualities and not being influenced by additional

information about category-belongingness, the relation between own and other group or self-

involvement by identification with own group.

If preference decisions between own and other group, the quality of their respective

products, achievement, etc. are at stake, then accuracy receives a moral or justice implication.

Since judgements get distributive qualities and functions, like distributions of higher or lower

positions, higher or lower benefits and so on, they can now be characterized by what we call

"normative accuracy".

A preferential decision in favour of one target at the cost of another, which lacks

justification by the target's "objective" quality differences, is obviously -- if performed

deliberately -- an unjust decision. If category-belongingness outdoes individual quality

information, the decision fits perfectly the criteria of social discrimination. As we have seen

from our studies about perception of normative appropriateness, social discrimination is

principally evaluated as unjust, morally inappropriate and negative. Normative accuracy of a

relational judgment or a preferential decision would be given, if irrespective of category

belongingness, the judgmental basis would be restricted to the individual qualities of each

exemplar to be evaluated or treated.

With respect to our goal of explaining the positive-negative asymmetry of social

discrimination, the notion of "normative accuracy" raises a modified assumption concerning


the effect of valence on intergroup behaviour. Negative stimuli, by instigating more thorough

and careful information processing, might sensitize individuals to social discrimination,

which might be implied by their preference judgements and decision. Negative valence is

assumed to function like a cue indicating inappropriateness of preference and allocation

decisions as biased.

A study by Wenzel and Mummendey (1996) provided first support for this line of

thinking. In an intergroup context, participants had to evaluate ingroup and outgroup products

either separately on 'pure' lists of only positive or only negative attributes, or on 'mixed' lists

of positive as well as negative attributes (see table 1).

____________________

Insert table 1 about here

____________________

With the 'pure' lists, the expected positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination

was confirmed: participants showed ingroup favouritism on evaluations with positive

attributes, but when evaluating ingroup and outgroup on negative attributes, ingroup bias did

not occur. Interestingly the latter was also true for 'mixed' lists: here participants did not

favour their own group irrespective of the valence of attributes; outgroup discrimination

disappeared, now also in the positive valence condition. Being confronted with the task of

thinking in negative terms might have increased the vigilance towards possible injustice or

inappropriateness of ingroup favouritism, which was then transferred to judgments of positive

attributes as well.

Implicit and Explicit Social Discrimination

Otten and Mummendey (in prep.) approached the sensitization-assumption in a more

direct way. Two studies varied stimulus valence (positive, negative) and the visibility of

negative interdependence between groups (implicit, explicit). It was assumed that as long as it

was not made explicit, but rather only implied by the task, that own group's benefits could


only be realised by raising outgroup's costs, the typical asymmetry effect would occur.

However, as soon as this negative interdependence was made salient, ingroup favouritism

should decrease or vanish in both valence conditions.

Method: Valence was manipulated by the quality of resources to be allocated between

two groups. Social categorization referred to realistic groups, namely smokers versus non-

smokers. Allegedly, an issue workshop was planned to take place with members of these two

groups. In the positive condition, participants decided on which group might enjoy certain

leisure activities (e.g., visiting a concert; making a guided tour of a big city nearby). In the

negative condition, participants allocated a number of duties (e.g., washing the dishes;

cleaning the bedrooms) to be done by the workshop attendants. The visibility of negative

interdependence (implicit, explicit) was manipulated as follows: In both conditions,

participants were told that there was a total of eight possible leisure activities/eight necessary

duties and that four of these activities/duties had to be allocated to either group. In the

"implicit" condition the task was to choose which four out of the given eight resources should

be given to the ingroup. However, from a logical point of view participants were well aware

that those stimuli not allocated to the ingroup would be left over for the outgroup. In the

"explicit" condition participants decided for the complete list of eight activities which four

should be done by the ingroup and which four should be done by the outgroup. Ingroup

favouritism in this experiment was indicated by participants' allocating either relatively more

attractive or fewer aversive stimuli to members of their ingroup. The fact that the lists of

positive and negative stimuli varied with respect to their attractiveness/aversiveness was

ascertained in a pre-test. In the main experiment each participant subjectively rated the

activities according to their degree of desirability or aversiveness. Ingroup treatment and

outgroup treatment was defined as the average subjective desirability or aversiveness of those

resources assigned to the respective group (in the "implicit" condition 'assigned to' meant 'left

over for' the outgroup).


Results: The results of this study corroborate our assumption that the visibility of

negative interdependence between groups has an impact on the occurrence of social

discrimination: If there are no legitimising arguments for unequal treatment of groups, then

explicit negative interdependence inhibits ingroup favouring responses in both valence

conditions. However, in the "implicit" condition, disguising that the ingroup profit is realised

at the outgroup's costs, there was significant ingroup favouritism in positive as well as in

negative outcome allocations. Here, the ingroup-outgroup difference scores were somewhat

lower in the negative domain as compared with the positive domain (see table 2), but

statistically there was neither a main effect of valence, nor an interaction of valence ×

visibility, but only the highly significant main effect of visibility.

____________________

Insert table 2 about here)

____________________

These results indicate that negative valence per se is not sufficient to eliminate biases in

intergroup allocations, which are 'minimal' in a broader sense than defined in the original

Minimal Group Paradigm, referring to the fact that the experimental situation provided no

obvious cues and information (e.g., status differences, differences in inputs, competitive

relationships) directly suitable to justify unequal treatment of the two groups. If the outgroup

only implicitly suffered from favouring the ingroup, then there was strong ingroup-

favouritism irrespective of stimulus valence. Probably, participants in the "implicit" condition

took responsibility only for their active decisions for the ingroup and therefore, felt to a lesser

extent normative restrictions against ingroup biases. However, alternatively one might also

argue that participants simply followed a heuristic when choosing four out of eight activities:

They just chose the four activities they themselves liked best but did not bother about who

would profit from their allocation decision. If this interpretation would be right, then an

"implicit"-condition, requesting allocations for the outgroup, only, should result in outgroup


favouritsm of similar size as the ingroup favouritsm measured in the "implicit/ingroup"

condition.

A follow-up study (Otten & Mummendey, in prep.) tested this possibility. This

experiment replicated the preceding one, but additionally included an "implicit/outgroup"-

condition. Results again indicated a highly significant effect of the visibility factor. There was

mild ingroup favouritism in both explicit conditions as well as in the

negative/implicit/ingroup-condition, no favouritism in the implicit/outgroup-condition, and

very high ingroup favouritism in the positive/implicit/ingroup-condition. As hypothesized for

studies V and VI, this pattern of data was reflected in a valence × visibility interaction effect.

The significant difference between the explicit-and the implicit/ingroup conditions

corresponds to the results of the original study. Additionally, we found the typical asymmetry

effect in the implicit/ingroup condition, but not in the explicit condition (see table 3). In line

with the hypothesis that negative valence supports normative, cautious responses in negative

resource allocations, ingroup favouritism in the implicit/ingroup condition was not

significantly higher than in the explicit condition. Furthermore, the implicit/outgroup

condition did not result in symmetrical responses to the implicit/ingroup condition.

Participants did not simply judge on the basis of their own preferences. Obviously, they

realised who would be profiting from their allocation decisions. However, why participants in

the implicit/outgroup condition gave even less to their ingroup than in the explicit condition

needs further clarification.

____________________


____________________

In sum, both studies on implicit and explicit social discrimination offer some

preliminary evidence that negative valence might operate like a cue pointing to the

inappropriateness of intergroup differentiation in minimal or almost minimal intergroup


situations. The two experiments underline that the normative context is highly relevant in

intergroup behaviour. At least in intergroup situations, which are based on a social

categorization that offers no convincing legitimation for unequal treatment of the groups in

question, people refrain from ingroup favouring decisions as soon as the negative

consequences for the respective outgroup become obvious.

The Cognitive-Normative Perspective

So far, our empirical evidence composes the following picture: Minimal (or quasi-

minimal) group situations are sufficient to elicit social discrimination in the positive but not

in the negative area. Although social discrimination is generally judged as inappropriate (see

above), it is even more disapproved of if it implies more duties and more burdens rather than

fewer benefits for the outgroup in favour of the ingroup. Although morally not adequate, it

seems understandable that people favour their own group with a larger share of benefits. To

discharge the own group at the expense of another group, however, is perceived as more

condemnable, such a behaviour can only be explained by mean intentions and selfish motives.

Differences in response latencies clearly show that participants reflect more carefully

when confronted with the task of allocating burdens, compared with the task of allocating

benefits. They might inspect more thoroughly the information concerning criteria for

comparing the two targets to which stimuli have to be allocated; and obviously, in the

minimal intergroup situation, there is no information which gives any hint or justification for

differential treatment of both groups.

The normative and the cognitive perspective can therefore be interrelated to form a

meaningful interpretation: Discrimination means withholding benefits or inflicting burdens in

favour of the ingroup and to the disadvantage of an outgroup. It implies apparently an

ingroup's advantage within a negative interdependence between ingroup and outgroup. If this

negative interdependence is obvious and individuals are aware of its consequences for the

respective groups, they do not favour their own group; because this would mean social


discrimination of the outgroup which, as stated above, would be inappropriate and injust. In

the case of negative valence, individuals think more carefully about the allocation and the

relation between the two targets. So they need less explicit hints to realise the negative

interdependence. Consistently, in the case of a negative valence allocation task, they do not

discriminate.

On the basis of our theoretical considerations and empirical evidence up to now, we

have reached a somehow plausible interpretation of the positive-negative asymmetry of social

discrimination. But with this cognitive-normative explanation we come into collision with the

basic postulate of Social Identity Theory and Self Categorization Theory: Favouritism of own

group and discrimination against the outgroup is explained by the individual's striving for

positive social distinctiveness (Social Identity Theory) or the general tendency to seek

positive distinctiveness at any given level of self-other comparison, at any salient level of self

categorization. Why should this striving be limited to the positive valence type of social

discrimination?

The Categorical Perspective

There are two possibilities for solving the contradiction between Social Identity

Theory/Self Categorization Theory and positive-negative asymmetry of social discrimination:

Either, the positive distinctiveness tendency has to be limited to positive-valence-type of

social discrimination only. This would clearly demand a substantial modification of the basic

assumptions of Social Identity Theory and Self Categorization Theory. Or -- and this

alternative has far less severe consequences for the theory -- the absence of discrimination

and by this of striving for positive distinctiveness under negative valence conditions has to be

seen as a consequence of changed salience of self-categorization. Valence as characteristic of

intergroup behaviour would in this case acquire the status of an additional variable which

moderates the impact of categorization on intergroup behaviour, the basic postulate


concerning the functional relation between categorization and discrimination remaining

untouched.

Being confronted with the task of distributing negative resources or evaluating on

negatively connotated dimensions might have an impact on the level of self categorization

established in advance: it might elicit a feeling of "common fate" for both groups. Facing

negative value dimensions or allocations of burdensome tasks might trigger a joint interest to

cope with or to eradicate the problem. This would likely decrease the salience of the

(experimentally) created categorization. The task of distributing burdens might "switch on"

the representation of a fixed or finite amount of work to be done, which turns any distribution

into a zero-sum-frame. For positive valence, allocation tasks might be handled quite

differently. Benefits like money -- especially against the background of our present

competitive market-society -- are predominantly framed as infinite resource, therefore

negative interdependence between the respective "players" is not necessarily implied.

Accordingly benefits might elicit a striving to maximize own gains, which is socially more

approved because direct disadvantages for competing others are not bought with these gains

simultaneously.

If distributing negative resources changes the salience of the group-level categorization,

then a differential treatment of ingroup and outgroup, namely ingroup favouritism, must

appear particularly inappropriate: Why should they be treated differently if the rationale (the

categorization into us and them) for differentiating has disappeared?

We conducted two experiments which were designed to test the explanation of positive-

negative asymmetry of social discrimination in terms of valence-specific differences in the

salience of the social categorization on which intergroup evaluations are based (see

Mummendey, Otten, & Berger, in prep.). We assumed that placing intergroup comparisons in

the domain of negative stimuli decreases the salience of intergroup categorization. To test

this, we expected to show that an active manipulation of the salience of intergroup


categorization in a typical intergroup experiment shows similar effects on ingroup

favouritism as the valence factor. In a situation with low or medium category salience the

confrontation with negative stimuli should further decrease the importance of an intergroup

distinction and hence the striving for positive ingroup distinctiveness on that level of

categorization.

Accordingly, as in the previous studies on positive-negative asymmetry of social

discrimination, we expect significant ingroup favouritism only in the positive condition.

If, however, category salience is high, then it should be sufficient to instigate ingroup bias

irrespective of valence of comparison dimension. Additionally, the assumed valence specific

decrease in the salience of intergroup distinction should manifest itself not only in measures

of ingroup bias but also on variables indicating category salience. According to our

assumptions we chose the same design for both experiments (see figure 5).

____________________


____________________

In the first study testing the categorical perspective, participants observed a video

presentation of a discussion between members of two different university groups who tried to

generate good reasons for the allocation (positive valence) or against the deduction (negative

valence) of money in favour of their own respective faculty. Salience was manipulated in a

similar procedure to that used by Oakes, Turner and Haslam (1991): High normative fit of

outgroup membership and line of arguing was held constant, while in order to establish the

three levels of salience of categorization, the degree of structural fit was varied. After the

video presentation participants were asked to suggest an allocation (positive) or deduction

(negative valence) of money in reference to the two faculties by using distribution matrices.

The mean scores of decisions on the whole set of matrices represented the overall ingroup-

outgroup difference created by participants. Participants' causal attributions of own


allocations, either situation, person or group-attribution served as dependent measure of

salience of social categorization.

Results supported the main predictions (see table 4). There was a positive-negative

asymmetry in social discrimination only under low salience conditions. Increasing the

salience of social categories eliminated this asymmetrical effect and resulted in ingroup

favouritism irrespective of valence of resources.

____________________


____________________

Increased intergroup-favouritism was related to increased category-based attribution of

own behaviour. Within this data pattern, amount of ingroup identification showed an

interesting picture: Neither valence nor category salience had a significant impact on the

ingroup identification measures, the absolute means each being relatively high. However the

correlation between ingroup identification and intergroup allocation was significantly positive

for all experimental conditions except the negative valence/low salience condition were it was

zero.

Positive-Negative Asymmetry as a Result of Recategorization

Thus, the results of the experiment VII were not only encouraging with respect to the

assumed link between salience effects and variations in the salience of social categorizations,

but also provide additional information qualifying the assumed decrease of category salience

in the negative domain: There is some evidence that in the negative/low salience condition

participants did not change from the initial intergroup categorization to a lower, more

interpersonal level of self-categorization, but to a social categorization at a higher level of

inclusiveness.

It is exactly that condition for which (because of a kind of collapsed ingroup-outgroup-

differentiation) no intergroup discrimination is expected (low salience/negative valence); here


ingroup identification varies independently of intergroup allocations. While identification is

as high as in the high salience condition, intergroup differentiation decreased substantially.

This data pattern does not fit with a process of decategorization but is fully in line with the

"common ingroup identity "model" as suggested by Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman,

and Rust (1993). This model proposes as one pathway to reduce intergroup discrimination, a

change in social categorization towards a higher level of abstraction. This process should be

accompanied by three different effects: a) improved evaluation of the initial outgroup, which

becomes now part of a common ingroup and therefore profits from a general "pro-ingroup

bias"; b) as a result, decreased ingroup bias; c) continuing high ingroup identification.

Therefore while maintaining the assumption that the lack of ingroup favouritism under

negative valence is due to a decrease in category salience, we could specify the process as an

instance of recategorization.

This recategorization-hypothesis concerning positive-negative asymmetry of social

discrimination-effect was tested directly in the following study. If the positive-negative

asymmetry of social discrimination under low salience-conditions can be explained by a re-

categorization process elicited by the negative-valence condition, we should expect the

following data pattern: Compared to the positive realm or high salience, ingroup bias is

supposed to vanish due to a relative increase in the positivity of the treatment of the (former)

outgroup; identification with the ingroup as well as its treatment should remain unaffected by

the valence factor.

Participants were divided into two subgroups and had to put forward their respective

group's arguments for opposing positions in a discussion about how to decide in a resource

allocation dilemma. Salience was manipulated by varying normative and structural fit: In the

high salience condition it was claimed that due to their faculty membership they would be

especially qualified to put forward arguments for a specific alternative. In the salience

condition participants, although invited as members of different faculties, were divided into


two different dimension groups irrespective of this membership. After the exchange of

arguments between the two groups, participants evaluated ingroup and outgroup on either

positive or negative attributes concerning quality of arguments, discussion style or more

general characteristics of the two groups. Additionally measures of ingroup identification and

salience of categorization (operationalized as perceived intergroup similarity and differences)

were assessed.

Results corroborate the findings of the preceding study and are broadly in line with our

main hypothesis (see table 5). The negative valence/low salience condition again was the only

one without significant ingroup favouritism. Data provide considerable evidence for the

assumption that varying the valence of intergroup comparison dimensions actually operated

like a manipulation of category salience: The data pattern for perceived intergroup similarities

corresponds to the data pattern of intergroup discrimination: while in the condition with

highest positive ingroup distinctiveness (positive valence/ high salience) perceived intergroup

similarity is lowest, it received its maximum value in the only condition, where no significant

ingroup favouritism was found (negative valence/low salience).

____________________


____________________

A very consistent picture arises concerning the re-categorization hypothesis: In the

negative valence/low salience condition findings were consistent with all three effects

postulated by Gaertner et al. (1993) for the re-categorization process to elicit:

a) significant decrease of ingroup bias, b) relative increase in the positivity of outgroup

evaluation and c) high ingroup identification. The valence effects on measures of category

salience indicate that valence and salience manipulations not simply result in parallel effects

on discrimination, but that valence actually operates like a manipulation of salience.


In sum, the results from studies VII and VIII are quite encouraging with respect to the

categorical perspective for explaining the positive-negative asymmetry of discrimination. The

evidence so far is in line with the assumption that in intergroup settings which do not provide

objective information about evaluative differences between groups, the task of comparing two

groups on negative dimensions reduces category salience and elicits re-categorization on a

higher level of abstraction. Additional support for this interpretation is provided by Blanz et

al. (in press): A re-analysis of data from two minimal group studies with a total of 280

participants tested whether the impact of stimulus-valence on ingroup favouritism was

attributable to varying degrees of ingroup identification. Here again, results clearly excluded

identification as an explanatory concept for positive-negative asymmetry of social

discrimination. Variation of intergroup discrimination is not due to change of identification

with the ingroup but due to change of the ingroup itself.

Conclusion

In sum, the empirical evidence presented above forms the following picture: Different

from the positive valence conditions typically realized in the Minimal Group Paradigm, under

negative valence conditions mere categorization is not sufficient to elicit ingroup favouritsm

and outgroup derogation. In order to instigate social discrimination in the negative domain,

what we call aggravating conditions are necessary. These conditions provide information

beyond the mere categorization underlining the ingroup-outgroup distinction and, thus,

potentially providing a rationale for discriminative treatment between groups.

As indicated by studies from the cognitive perspective, ingroup- and outgroup

evaluations on negative dimensions elicit a more careful information processing.

Correspondingly, intergroup differentiation appears only, if clear information about category

based differences is provided. Consistently, as shown in the studies from the normative

perspective, ingroup favouritism, which means positive ingroup distinctiveness without

objective differentiating information, is perceived as more inappropriate , in the negative area


than in the positive one. Moreover, the results concerning implicit and explicit social

discrimination show, that as long as the categorization does not provide any rationale for

intergroup differentiation, group members refrain from favouring their own group at the other

group's expenses. As finally illustrated by the studies from the categorical perspective, a

social categorization as introduced in the Minimal Group Paradigm, which is usually

sufficient to elicit ingroup favouritism in social comparisons on positive dimensions, does not

provide a sufficient rationale to treat ingroup and outgroup differently on negative

dimensions. Accordingly, this particular categorization loses its function to organize and

structure the social situation and to guide the respective evaluations and allocations.

If we accept the re-categorization hypothesis to explain the positive-negative

asymmetry of social discrimination, the question is: Why does negative valence instigate re-

categorization? To answer this question we could reach back to the normative as well as to

the cognitive analysis offered above: The negative valence condition could make salient the

inappropriateness of differentiation, especially discrimination on the basis of vague and

insubstantial differences between ingroup and outgroup. Or the more accurate and deeper

information processing might already make obvious, that there are no differences between

ingroup and outgroup relevant for their judgment or treatment. Both lines of thinking will in

the end raise doubts in participants about whether the intergroup level established in minimal

group type situations was actually the appropriate one of self-categorization.

In other words, if confronted with the task of distributing negative aversive stimuli,

which means entering the socially more problematic area of social discrimination, mere social

categorization is no longer a sufficient condition of ingroup favouritism and outgroup

discrimination. This questions on the relevance of positive-negative asymmetry of social

discrimination for Social Identity Theory or Self Categorization Theory and their respective

explanations of social discrimination: If the striving for a positive social identity -- based

upon positive ingroup distinctiveness by a positive comparison outcome -- is the central


motive for ingroup bias, why should individuals pass up the opportunity to establish

superiority on negatively framed evaluative dimensions? This question becomes even more

interesting when considering the expected greater weight and attention assigned to negative as

compared with positive information (Peeters & Czapinski, 1990).

Valence of resources or attributes seems to function as a moderator which is not taken

into consideration in Social Identity Theory/Self Categorization Theory and which cannot

simply be incorporated a posteriori into the theory. The zero-correlation of effect sizes for

positive and negative valence conditions concerning intergroup discrimination, which was

shown in the meta-analysis reported above, points to different processes being at work.

Positive distinctiveness created by relative superiority theoretically includes both the

"better than ...." type and the "less bad..." type as well. Positive and negative valence are

interchangeable ingredients for the same cake. If one of them turns out to produce unexpected

effects, this raises doubts in the original expectations concerning the chemical characteristics

of both. When we now return to the question what the findings altogether mean for the basic

assumptions of Social Identity Theory, then we propose to shift from our initial concern: The

question is no longer why mere categorization is not sufficient to elicit social discrimination

in the negative valence condition. Moreover, we are led back to the question already put 25

years ago, namely: What is it that makes mere categorization a sufficient condition to ingroup

favouritism and outgroup derogation in the positive valence condition? The striving for

positive distinctiveness by creating a positive comparison outcome in order to establish or

preserve a positive social identity no longer seems to be a satisfying answer in itself.

Forgas and Fiedler (1996) showed for participants in a positive mood that a minimal

group situation with almost no relevance of induced categorization for participants' self

concept might lead people to rely on simple categorical information which then ends up in

intergroup discrimination. In order to explain the consistent direction of intergroup

differentiation towards ingroup favouritism, something beyond the mere categorical


information must be taken into account. Ingroup favouritism under (broadly) minimal group

conditions might, moreover, be something like an automatic reflection of positive image of

the individual self by extrapolating it to the evaluation of the own group. Concepts like "pro-

ingroup bias" (Gaertner et al. 1994), an "initial categorization-based ingroup bias" (Maass &

Schaller, 1991) or a "self-anchoring process" for ingroup evaluation (Cadinu & Rothbart,

1996) underline this way of thinking. Continuing this line of thinking would lead to an quite

interesting assumption: under positive valence conditions, individuals do not really

discriminate against the outgroup. What is conceived as ingroup favouritism in the Minimal

Group Paradigm, possibly might be nothing else than a more or less mindless extension of

positive evaluation of self to the own group as a whole. Then, the less positive evaluation of

the outgroup would be a kind of unintended byproduct rather than an explicitly established

differentiation. In other words, in the positive area, mere categorization might create only

‘pseudo-discrimination’. Consequently, this pseudo-discrimination should vanish as soon as

the task of differentiating on negative dimensions or distributing costs or burdens interrupts

this mindless reliance on mere heuristic category information.

Especially the findings concerning the cognitive perspective indicate that negative

valence makes obvious that arbitrary categorizations lack a sufficient rationale for intergroup

differentiation. Consequently, and in line with the results from the studies testing the

categorical as well as the normative perspective, under negative valence conditions the

salience of the initially induced categorization decreases and discrimination is perceived as

more inappropriate.

Discrimination in Allport's sense, namely denial of equality of treatment because of a

person's belonging to a different category is processed differently. The downgrading of an

outgroup needs more than mere categorization. Moreover, it needs motivations like coping

with identity threat or repairing aversive emotional states (Forgas & Fiedler 1996),

aggravating conditions namely (Blanz et al. 1995 b; Mummendey et al. 1992; Otten et al.


1996). Aggravating conditions underline or even enforce salience of categorization. They

provide the legitimizing rationale, which then makes people not hesitate to create positive

ingroup distinctiveness, even at the expense of the outgroup, and by means of aversive

stimuli.


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Author Note

Amélie Mummendey, Lehrstuhl für Sozialpsychologie, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität,

Jena, Germany; Sabine Otten, Lehrstuhl für Sozialpsychologie, Friedrich-Schiller-

Universität, Jena, Germany.

The studies reported here were conducted within a research project supported by the

Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG; MU-551/11-3/4).

We are grateful to Dirk Pisula, Nils Wandersleben, Iris Kohnen, Alexandra Rosol and

Rahel Krückels for their assistance during conceptualization of the experiments and data

collection.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Prof. Amélie

Mummendey, Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Lehrstuhl für Sozialpsychologie,

Humboldtstr. 26, D-07743 Jena, Tel.: 03641 6-36861, Fax: 03641 636862, E-mail:

[email protected].


Table 1

Mean differences of in-group versus out-group evaluations (standard deviations in

parentheses) for experiment 1a (mixed lists) and 1b (pure lists) (from Wenzel &

Mummendey, 1996).

___________________________________________________________________________

Valence

___________________________________

Positive Negative

___________________________________________________________________________

N = 24

Experiment 1a (mixed lists) 3.84 2.96

(24.01) (15.60)

N = 14 N = 15

Experiment 1b (pure lists) 10.08* 2.93

(13.40) (10.31)

___________________________________________________________________________

Note. * p < .05 (cell mean is non-zero, one-tailed t test).


Table 2

Mean ingroup-outgroup difference scores (positive scores indicate ingroup favouritism) and

standard deviations (from Otten & Mummendey, in prep.).

___________________________________________________________________________

Visibility of negative Interdependence

______________________________________________

implicit explicit

Valence (ingroup allocation) (intergroup allocation)

positive 1.36***a .29b

(.92) (1.16)

N = 42 N = 24

negative 1.15***a .15b

(1.05) (.79)

N = 36 N = 29

___________________________________________________________________________

Note. *, **, *** scores are significantly different from zero with p <.05, p < .01, p < .001.

Means with different superscripts differ from each other with p < .05, at least.


Table 3

Mean ingroup-outgroup difference scores (positive scores indicate ingroup favouritism) and

standard deviations (from Otten & Mummendey, in prep.).

___________________________________________________________________________

Visibility of negative Interdependence

___________________________________________________________

implicit explicit implicit

Valence (ingroup allocation) (intergroup allocation) (outgroup allocation)

positive 1.83***a .50*b -.31c

(.94) (.99) (1.41)

N = 21 N = 20 N = 21

negative 0.68**b .53(*) b .06bc

(.92) (1.21) (1.23)

N = 23 N = 20 N = 17

___________________________________________________________________________

Note. *, **, *** scores are significantly different from zero with p <.05, p < .01, p < .001.

Means with different superscripts differ from each other with p < .05, at least.


Table 4

Means and standard deviations for the intergroup allocations, social category attributions and

ingroup identification (study 1 from Mummendey et al., in prep.).

___________________________________________________________________________

Valence positive Valence negative

_____________________________________________

M (sd) n M (sd) n

_____________________________________________

Intergroup allocations

Salience low .54a (.48) 12 .07b (.37) 15

Salience high .51a (.50) 10 .57a (.54) 10

_____________________________________________

Category attributions

Salience low 5.00 (2.89) 12 4.38 (2.62) 8

Salience high 4.56 (3.00) 9 4.75 (2.71) 8

_____________________________________________

Ingroup identification

Salience low 4.53 (1.28) 12 4.60 (.88) 15

Salience high 3.78 (1.30) 9 4.87 (.96) 10

___________________________________________________________________________

Note. Positive ingroup-outgroup-differences indicate ingroup favouritism.

Due to missing data cell counts vary for each dependent variable.

Means with different superscripts differ significantly (p < .05), by simple effects analysis.


Table 5

Means and standard deviations (in hyphenations) for the differences between ingroup and

outgroup allocations, separate ingroup and outgroup allocations, ingroup identification,

intergroup similarities and intergroup differences (study II from Mummendey et al., in prep.).

___________________________________________________________________________

Salience low high

_____________________________________________________

Valence positive negative positive negative

_____________________________________________________

Difference IG–OG .97*a (1.55) .23b (1.40) 1.37*a (1.48) 1.05*a(1.65)

Ingroup evaluations 7.03a (1.20) 8.26b (1.57) 6.44a (1.67) 8.28b (1.35)

Outgroup evaluations 6.06a (1.62) 8.04c (1.50) 5.07b (1.40) 7.22d (1.75)

Ingroup identification 8.13 (1.79) 8.30 (1.18) 8.27 (1.49) 8.38 (1.84)

Intergroup similarities 5.78ab (2.45) 6.37a (2.20) 4.96b (1.73) 5.58ab (2.43)

Intergroup differences 5.55a (2.30) 5.81a (2.32) 6.87b (1.52) 5.29a (2.33)

___________________________________________________________________________

Note. Positive ingroup-outgroup-differences (IG–OG) indicate ingroup favouritism.

Cell counts vary from 23 to 27.

Means with different superscripts differ significantly (p < .05).

Means with * differ significantly from zero (p < .05).

Figure 1

Taxonomy of social discrimination (from Mummendey & Simon, 1991).

Valence

Behaviour

Positive stimuli Negative stimuli

Allocation direct IG > OGdiscriminationpositive type a

direct IG < OGdiscrimination

b negative type

Removal indirect cdiscriminationpositive type IG < OG

d indirectdiscriminationnegative type IG > OG

Figure 2

Intergroup treatment in the domain of positive stimuli and in the domain of negative stimuli:

Meta analysis over 52 hypotheses tests (from Buhl, 1996).

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

-0.9 -0.7 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9

negative valence n = 557 positive valence n = 579

r

Figure 3

The valence × instruction interaction for response latencies (from Otten et al., in press).

INSTRUCTION

accurateno manipulationspontaneous

7.5

7.0

6.5

6.0

5.5

5.0

4.5

4.0

VALENCE

positive

negative

RL [sec]

Figure 4

The valence × instruction interaction for high and low ingroup target quality on ingroup-

outgroup baseline-differences (from Otten et al., in press).

High Ingroup Target Quality

-1.5

-1

-0.5

0

0.5

1

1.5

spontaneous no manipulation accurate

INSTRUCTION

- = O

G-fa

v, +

= IG

-fav

positive

negative

baseline

Low Ingroup Target Quality

-1,5

-1

-0,5

0

0,5

1

1,5

spontaneous no manipulation accurate

INSTRUCTION

- = O

G-f

av, +

= IG

-fav

positive

negative

baseline

Figure 5

Design and hypotheses for intergroup evaluations/allocations (from Mummendey et al., in

prep.).

Valence

Salience

positive negative

low IG > OG IG = OG

high IG > OG IG > OG

positive–negative asymmetry in social discrimination

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