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Positive Psychology and Habit: a Confusion of Terms

Greta Enriquez

Karsten Piep, PhD

HMS 710 01

Union Institute and University

10 November 2014

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Abstract

This paper discusses the dual sense of habit within the larger frame work of positive

psychology. A brief history of positive psychology is outlined, with attention paid to the two

definitions of habit, habit as such and habituation. The main argument of this paper is that

positive psychology tends to conflate these two distinct concepts, a confusion that has

implication to the explanation of virtues and character strengths that are at the core of positive

psychological theory. The confusion that results impacts the clarity and conciseness of the

philosophical foundations of positive psychology, and calls into question the accuracy of its

measurements. A brief discussion on the roots of these definitions follows, with consideration for

future work.

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Positive Psychology and Habit: a Confusion of Terms

Positive psychology, as understood by its founder Martin E.P. Seligman, joins traditional

psychological study and application with several philosophical concepts derived from classical

ethics and metaphysics. Part of the reason for this integration is to advance one of the core

missions of psychology: “making the lives of all people more productive and fulfilling”

(Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi 2000, p. 6). Notions of productivity and fulfillment, traditionally

studied by the fields of economics and philosophy, respectively, are joined together as concepts

that give empirical evidence and purpose to psychological practice that is specifically geared

toward articulating “a vision of the good life.…what actions lead to well-being, to positive

individuals, and to thriving communities” (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi 2000, p. 5). There are

many conceptual overlaps between the kind of psychological study and practice that Seligman

proposes and classical Aristotelian and Epicurean ethics, classical liberal theory in the vein of

Bentham and J.S. Mill, and neo-behaviorism. These overlaps ought not to be taken as

continuation of definitional clarity, as there are also significant differences between Aristotelian,

Epicurean, and utilitarian formulations of habit and the way in which Seligman piecemeals them

together. By drawing from these diverse areas, each of which has its own definitions for concepts

which are often times represented by the same word or phrase in English, a confusion of

meaning is likely to occur. Such a confusion has arisen within positive psychology regarding the

term habit.

The purpose of this paper is three-fold: to give an historical account of the definitions of

habit that are used in philosophy and psychology; to show the ways in which these definitions

have become confused within positive psychology; and to present an integrated understanding of

habit that honors the distinctions represented in philosophy and psychology, while rectifying

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some of the confusion of concepts and terms that are present within the current instantiation of

positive psychology. This paper is divided into three parts to reflect the three-fold purpose. Part

one will present an overview of positive psychology and present the field’s understanding of

habit. Part two will be an historical analysis of the different concepts of habit that contribute to

positive psychology’s understanding of the same. This part will also include some other concepts

of habit, both western and eastern, that not only flavor our understanding of habit, but also call

into question the use and meaning of habit, its confused status, within the field. Part three will

fine-tune positive psychology’s understanding of habit in light of this historical analysis,

allowing for a reconceptualization of the different kinds of habit to clear up the confusion.

Part One- Foundations

The discipline of psychology is relatively new within the larger academic spectrum. As

an independent field of study (separate from philosophy and natural science), psychology only

emerged in the 19th Century (Thorne & Henley 2001). The field is still delineating its identity,

allying itself, on the one hand, with medicine and the natural sciences (for example, in the fields

of psychiatry, cognitive science, and experimental psychology), and on the other, with

philosophy and the social sciences (for example, in the areas of psychotherapy and counseling).

This is a simplistic division, but speaks to the challenge and identity-crisis that positive

psychology attempts to answer. As an integrative approach to the study of human behavior with

the purpose of “exploring what makes life worth living and building the enabling conditions of a

life worth living,” the field of positive psychology continually moves back-and-forth between the

natural and social sciences (Seligman 2011, p.1-2). This alternation enables positive psychology

to draw fruitfully from a wide variety of disciplines, especially in the areas of experimental

psychology, physiology, ethics, metaphysics, economics, and political theory. The following

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sections will provide: a brief history of the development of positive psychology; outline the main

parts and principles of positive psychology; and, discuss the particular area of interest in this

paper (habit).

1.1 Overview of Positive Psychology

The field of positive psychology was first outlined by Martin E.P. Seligman and Mihaly

Csikszentmihalyi in “Positive Psychology: an Introduction,” a special issue of American

Psychologist (2000). Seligman began the work of the special edition, the injunction to bring what

has been learned since World War II about prevention and treatment of major mental illness. The

rudiments of the movement itself pre-date this publication by several decades, specifically in the

writings and research of Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow, prominent in the fields of

humanistic theory and research (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi 2000, p. 7). The intent of the

positive psychology movement is to try “to understand what is and what could be,” and “to adapt

what is best in the scientific method to the unique problems that human behavior presents to

those who wish to understand it in all its complexity” (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi 2000, p.7).

In order to accomplish this task, the articles of the special edition highlight avenues of

investigation, including: evolutionary perspectives (p. 8), positive personal traits (p.9), the

relation between physical and mental health (p. 10), and notions and measurements of excellence

of human abilities (p. 10). The article concludes with possibilities of future inquiry, including:

how to measure the differences between momentary and long-lasting happiness; what factors

contribute to the development of positivity (long-term well-being, the foundations in early

development that are necessary for individual and group flourishing); the influence of

genetics/biology on affective states; the differences and similarities between enjoyment and

pleasure; questions of collective and individual well-being; the role prevention/promotion plays

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in overall happiness (buffering); whether what is learned should be made public policy; and,

whether traits like optimism and the having of positive experience match up with fact (realism)

(p. 11-12).

The avenues of future study, highlighted in the special edition, were taken up by many

individuals, most notably Martin Seligman, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Daniel Kahneman,

Edward Diener, and Daniel Gilbert. Csikszentmihalyi focused his research on creativity,

motivation, and flow. Kahneman focused on cognition, especially memory, and its relation to

happiness. Diener focused on hedonics, the measure of certain kinds of happiness or well-being.

Seligman furthered the overall presentation of positive psychology, making more explicit what is

meant by such terms as “happiness,” “well-being,” “optimism,” and “positive emotions.”

The ten years following the publication of the special edition saw a revamping of the

foundational elements of positive psychology. By 2011, Seligman had added a numerous

vocabulary to the already involved conceptual list expounded in the introductory article. This

compounded the difficulties in definition that already surrounded inquiry into happiness and the

notion of well-being. I will briefly address some of the main components of positive psychology,

before moving onto the concept of habit as it relates to the notion of happiness, well-being, and

life-satisfaction.

1.1.2 Happiness to Well-Being and Flourishing

In “Positive Psychology: an Introduction,” Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi use the term

“happiness” 21 times, the term “happy” 8 times, “well-being” 20 times, and “flourish” 6 times

(2000). The terms are never really defined, but rather they are used in several different ways,

each highlighting a particular aspect of our colloquial and academic understandings of the words.

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However, with each facet, what is being studied is made a bit clearer. For example, happiness is

connected to the concept of “flow,” emphasizing the aspect of happiness that is more closely

aligned with contentment or “being in the moment” (p. 5). Happiness is joined with “marital,”

which calls to mind the feelings of love, connection, and shared experience that comes from

intimate relationships (p. 6).

Happiness is also used in phrases such as “moments of happiness,” to underscore

pleasure, or the good feelings we experience versus attitudinal mindsets like optimism (p. 8). The

term happiness is also connected in conjunctive statements, such as “social relationships and…”

(p. 8); “macrosocial conditions and…” (p. 9); “religious faith and…” (p. 9); “…and long-lasting

well-being” (p. 11); “personal growth and long-term…” (p. 12); and happiness and realism (p.

12). These conjunctive statements focus on the processes that create happiness, or the conditions

necessary for happiness. Just like the differential statements concerning the concept of happiness

in the previous paragraph, these conjunctive statements show us that happiness may be trait-like,

experiential, attitudinal, and/or activity-related, but can somehow be dependent on personality

traits, cognitive patterns, attitudes, and activities.

Interestingly, the term “happiness” is maintained separately from other similar terms,

such as “well-being” (subjective or otherwise) and “flourishing.” In doing so, whatever

happiness means, which remains unclear throughout the introduction, it is separate from, but

connected to, well-being and flourishing. “Well-being,” in the subjective sense, is defined as:

“what people think and how they feel about their lives--to the cognitive and affective conclusions

they reach when they evaluate their existence” (p. 9). It is considered as something reflected

upon about an individual’s past (p. 5). However, Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi term “well-

being” as “a more scientific-sounding term for what people usually mean by happiness” (p. 9). If

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“well-being” and “happiness” are synonymous, why is it explicitly listed, on the same page, as a

separate trait studied in positive psychology? The section Positive Personal Traits states there

are “four different personal traits that contribute to positive psychology: subjective well-being,

optimism, happiness, and self-determination” (p. 9). Maintaining the synonymous definition

creates confusion concerning what is being studied: if subjective well-being contributes to

happiness and is itself happiness, a tautology is created that leads us no closer to defining any

one of the terms than when we started. “Flourishing” is nowhere defined in the article, but used

as if its definition were understood, much like the term “happiness.”

This brief analysis of the article shows two major areas of positive psychology that, at the

time of publication, were still in much need of fine-tuning. The first is that we have an intuitive

sense of what we are trying to study, but articulating this sense into words of a shared common

language is not easy. The second is that this difficulty was not articulated, and as such not only

does the subject under inquiry suffer, but the conceptual confusion that results calls into

question, not the rigor of the scientific results, but the very premises upon which it is founded. In

other words, it suffers from a philosophical invalidity which calls into question the coherence

and universality of the conclusions reached through the research, as the foundations are, at best,

confused.

In 2011, Martin Seligman published Flourish: a Visionary New Understanding of

Happiness and Well-being, in order to update the foundations of positive psychology. He gives a

succinct narrative on what positive psychology is intended to be, and how the theory has

changed. At first, in his words, positive psychology “is about what we choose for its own sake”

(Seligman 2011, p. 11). He initially labels three elements that are chosen in just such a way:

emotion, engagement, and meaning, naming these elements as “better defined and more

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measurable than happiness” (p. 11). In choosing something for its own sake, “emotion” here is

limited to so-called “positive emotions,” emotions that the majority of people experience as

pleasurable or good (p. 11). “Engagement” is defined as “flow,” as “the loss of self-

consciousness during an absorbing activity” (p. 11). “Meaning” is defined as “belonging to and

serving something that you believe is bigger than the self” (p. 12).

During the years between its first proposal and the publication of Flourish, Seligman

states, “I used to think that the topic of positive psychology was happiness, that the gold standard

for measuring happiness was life satisfaction, and that the goal of positive psychology was to

increase life satisfaction” (p. 13). He acknowledges three inadequacies of his original

formulation, the first and foremost being the association of “happiness” to “good cheer” (p. 13).

Life satisfaction proved to be inadequate as the self-reports used to measure it are heavily

influenced by “how good we feel at the moment we are asked the question” and “how well you

judge your life to be going at that moment” (p. 13). In response to the critics that helped him to

figure out these inadequacies, he reformulated positive psychology in the following way: “the

topic of positive psychology is well-being, […] the gold standard for measuring well-being is

flourishing, and […] the goal of positive psychology is to increase flourishing” (p. 13). He

retains the elements of authentic happiness theory- positive emotions, engagement, and meaning-

adding to them positive relationships and accomplishment (p. 12). Moreover, Seligman readily

admits that his understanding of happiness and well-being is “dangerously close” to the ethics of

Aristotle, so the choice of “flourishing” has implications beyond the mere scope of human

behavior, which will be discussed in the next section (p. 16).

The change from “happiness” to “well-being” also marks an interesting development in

the definitional confusion present in “Positive Psychology: an Introduction.” First, it definitively

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separates the concepts of “happiness” and “well-being,” terming happiness as “feeling good”

(with the resulting implication that the pursuit of happiness is about choosing that which

maximizes what makes us feel good), and terming “well-being” as the confluence of all five

elements, “a combination of feeling good as well as actually having meaning, good relationships,

and accomplishment” (p. 25). So, happiness becomes a dimension of well-being, a change in

definition that I will discuss in the next subsection.

Second, flourishing takes on a specific meaning. The core elements described above,

when they are present in an individual, or aggregated into a nation and averaged, becomes the

definition of flourishing (p. 238-9). Therefore, well-being measures flourishing, and when the

pillars of well-being (positive emotion, engagement, meaning, positive relationships, and

accomplishment) are embodied (actually in an individual, or allegorically in an aggregate), then

the individual or aggregate is said to be flourishing to the extent that she performs, participates

in, or is active in these core elements.

Third, the core elements of well-being, as it is described in Flourish are underpinned by

specific strengths and virtues that almost identically match many of the virtues outlined in

Aristotle’s ethical theory (Schwarz & Sharpe 2006; Seligman 2011). By drawing into the

discussion a relatively long history of a particular understanding of morality and life purpose

without making the connections clear, there is further danger of confusion, and indeed, this

confusion is made very clear when we investigate the differences in positive psychology’s

understanding(s) of habit and that of Aristotle. This will be discussed in part two of this paper.

1.1.3 Hedonia, Eudaimonia, and the Hedonic Treadmill

In an attempt to more carefully account for the subjective and objective factors that

contribute to well-being and flourishing, positive psychology draws upon terms and concepts

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from philosophy, specifically ethics and political philosophy. Life satisfaction and associated

pleasurable feelings have long been studied under the heading of subjective well-being (SWB)

within the fields of economics, ethics, and psychology, and as has been shown above, is the

common, if incomplete, understanding of happiness. As a field of inquiry, this is nothing new-

political philosophers have been commenting on increasing social SWB (maximizing happiness)

for centuries (Kahneman & Krueger 2006; Miller 2008; Nussbaum 2008). Since this kind of

study is specifically concerned with pleasure and pain, it is often associated with the term

“hedonism,” meaning the pursuit of pleasure or that pleasure is the highest good in life (with

pain being the worst sin). On the other hand, since Seligman posits the strengths and virtues

often associated with Aristotle’s ethics, the term “eudaimonia” (loosely translated as happiness

of the long-lasting variety, contrasting it with the transitory quality of hedonic happiness) has

made its way into current discussions about well-being, happiness, and life satisfaction (Bok

2010, p. 48; Huta & Ryan 2010; Schwarz & Sharpe 2006). Eudaimonia encompasses personality

traits, aptitudes, learned skills, and other trait-like and state-like aspects that are not affective or

emotional in their origins. In other words, eudaimonia is the sum of all those aspects of

happiness (or well-being) that do not deal with pleasure as such, while hedonia is the sum of

those parts of happiness (or well-being) that deal with pleasure. However, this separation is not

absolute, and within positive psychology this creates a confusion systematically, as those who

study happiness of the hedonic sort (such as Diener and Kahneman) want to describe well-being

in terms of basic physiological, behavioral, and environmental factors (which belies the thrust

Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi had placed in uniting philosophical and psychological factors

together, as described above), while those who ascribe to the more heavily eudaimonic side (such

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as Schwarz & Sharpe, Huta & Ryan, and Waterman) spend much of their time pointing out the

problems of focusing on pleasure.

SWB is the combination of mood and life satisfaction, and is considered subjective in

two senses. In the first sense, it is subjective because the data comes from individuals’ perceived

feeling regarding their experiences. In the second sense, it is subjective because it is not

correlated to facts about their economic, social, religious/spiritual, educational, or other kinds of

statuses, although it is heavily influenced by perceptions of such (Diener 2000). Additionally,

pleasant and unpleasant emotions have an effect on the reported measures of SWB, not as

opposites of each other, but as emotional states that run concurrently (Diener 2000).

Of special concern to our coming discussion of habit is the concept of the “hedonic

treadmill,” a framework designed to understand adaptation and its relation to emotion (Diener,

Lucas & Scollon 2006). Adaptation theory developed to understand why people, despite the

conditions in which they live and experience, adjust to new emotional states quickly (Diener,

Lucas & Scollon 2006). Built on the automatic adaptation theory, the hedonic treadmill posits

that human beings adapt according to automatic processes that “allow constant stimuli to fade

into the background” (Diener, Lucas & Scollon 2006). This allows cognitive processes, like

attention, as well as nervous system responses, such as anxiety (fight or flight mechanisms), to

be available for novel situations in the future (Diener, Lucas & Scollon 2006). The original

hedonic treadmill theory was widely accepted, although it had mixed results in its application,

because it offered an explanation for the apparent stability of individual happiness over time,

despite “changes in fortune” (Diener, Lucas & Scollon 2006). External variables accounted for

less than 20% of differences in happiness, including health, attractiveness, and physical abilities

(Diener, Lucas & Scollon 2006). Moreover, happiness over time adjusts to changing life

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circumstances, and individuals return to baseline levels of happiness following significant

changes in life circumstance (Diener, Lucas & Scollon 2006).

The key points of the original hedonic treadmill theory included: the belief that set-points

for happiness were neutral, and returned to this predetermined set-point following life events

(whether these set points were genetically or socially determined was debated); that the set-

points themselves were stable over time; that the happiness set-point was singular, whether or

not it is dimensional; that happiness is relatively stable over time; and, that adaptation occurs

similarly individual to individual (Diener 2000; Diener, Lucas & Scollon 2006). Diener, Lucas

and Scollon revised the previous instantiation of the hedonic treadmill theory, revisions that

more accurately reflect the changes in baseline happiness and adaptations to changing life

circumstances. These revisions include: happiness set-points are not neutral, but rather are

influenced by environment, motivation, and outcome; set-points of happiness are individually

variable, with genetically, familially, and experientially influenced; that individuals have

multiple set-points to SWB, in-line with the elements of well-being theory; that happiness can

alter an individual’s happiness set-points, understanding that both biology and experience can

alter these set-points; and, that individuals adapt differently, even in similar circumstances

(Diener 2000; Diener, Lucas & Scollon 2006).

Hedonic treadmill theory, at its core, reflects a certain understanding of the basic ways in

which human critters function. First, working off other physiological models of adaptation, it

stands to reason that emotionally we would adapt in similar ways that our bodies do. Second,

matters of attention, cognition, and perception would necessarily impact an individual’s SWB as

these functions in particular regulate, not our adaptive abilities per se, but rather our recognition

of them, our ability to coherently and accurately respond to questions of self-reflection, including

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questions concerning the elements of life satisfaction (Bok 2010; Kahneman & Krueger 2006).

And third, the adaptation that occurs, while not wholly conscious, is not entirely out of our

control to manipulate and change consciously (Bok 2010, p. 145-154). In other words, our

emotions habituate in similar ways to our bodies; the habits that are created through this process

of adaptation, since they draw on both automatic and cognitive aspects, are not out of our ability

to control or change as our happiness set-points, goals, desires, and understanding fluctuate due

to life experiences and mental states.

1.2 The Role of Habit in Positive Psychology

The role of habit in positive psychology is not exactly an easy one to describe, as it is

usually not discussed directly. However, this is not to say that habit is not discussed at all. In

fact, given the proximity of Seligman’s description of positive psychology to Aristotle’s ethics,

the notion of habit is riddled throughout the theory of positive psychology, from the dependence

on strengths and virtues to the hedonic treadmill. While not explicitly done so in the literature, I

am considering the eudaimonic and hedonic aspects of habit in positive psychology’s terms,

positive personal traits and flow, respectively. I do this for two reasons. The first reason is that

Seligman’s presentation, both in “Positive Psychology: an Introduction” and in Flourish, refers

to both positive personal traits and flow, while only making nominal reference to eudaimonia

and hedonia. The second is that, by using these terms I will show how habit is situated within the

larger framework of positive psychology as a conflation of personal traits and flow experience. I

will then connect the positive psychology understanding of habit to the philosophical

understanding of habit as represented in the eudaimonic and hedonic concepts, in order to draw

apart the conflated terms.

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1.2.1 Positive Personal Traits

Positive personal traits are, as Peterson and Seligman describe them, “strengths of

character that a person owns, celebrates, and frequently exercises” (Peterson & Seligman 2004,

p. 18). They establish these traits as coming from a long line of moral philosophy which looks at

“traits of character” or “virtues” that make a good person, good (p. 10). These traits are generally

stable over time, although experience and environment influence the expression of these traits (p.

10). The character of an individual, then, is the confluence of all the personal traits an individual

exercises (p. 12). Positive personal traits are arranged into 3 conceptual levels, virtues, character

strengths, and situational themes (p. 13). Virtues, as Peterson and Seligman describe them, are

“core characteristics” that are universal (uphold cross-culturally), and must be present in an

individual (or community) above a certain threshold in order for that individual (or community)

to be deemed “of good character” (p. 13). Character strengths are psychological processes or

mechanisms by which the virtues are displayed (p. 13). There are multiple character strengths

within each virtue, so it is rare that one individual will display all the character strengths

described under a particular virtue, but rather just 1 or 2. However, like the virtues, at least one

character strength in any given virtue category must be present in order for an individual to have

that virtue (p. 13). In other words, character strengths are how we know that an individual has a

particular virtue. Situational themes are “the specific habits that lead people to manifest given

character strengths in given situations” (p. 14). Situational themes are different from character

strengths in the following ways: they are situation-dependent; seem to be role-responsive and

culturally specific; and are morally neutral (p. 14).

Situational themes are, then, habits of character that are the situational, role-responsive,

and cultural behaviors that reveal character strengths, which are the psychological processes that

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display virtue. These habits are necessary “to live a balanced, well-regulated life” (p. 510). When

discussing self-regulation, Peterson and Seligman state, “it may be necessary to recognize that

the capacity for controlling oneself depends on a limited resource that needs to be managed

effectively and conserved for the most pressing or important demands” (p. 510). It is further

stated that, “much of life must be guided by habit, routine, and other automatic processes, so that

the demands for conscious control over oneself are kept down to the level that the self’s limited

resources can meet” (p. 510).

The above discussion of situational themes is, in many ways, a summary of adaptation

theory already discussed. Habit, as implied here, is an automatic process, based somehow in

character strengths (or weaknesses) that is a foundational conserving process of an individual’s

energy resources. The self-regulation or conservation of an individual’s energy directly relates to

character strengths and positive personal traits motivationally (whether the virtue is worth

cultivating) and practically (constraints of ability, capability, and environment), regardless of its

automaticity, as matters of self-regulation are neuro-biological and neuro-functional in nature,

and create the boundaries in which individuals are able to strengthen positive personal traits (see

Barkley, 2005).

Habit, within this discussion, has taken on two definitions, the first obvious, the second

less so. The obvious definition of habit described here are the automatic behaviors engaged in the

adaptive sense. The less obvious understanding of habit, used concurrently throughout the

description of character strengths, is that character strengths need to be cultivated, used to the

point that facility and skill result. When a skill is sufficiently developed, when facility is reached,

it becomes relegated to the position of habit: it loses its attention-needing aspect, becomes

automatic in its activity. Therefore, character strengths that are based on situational themes,

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become habits the more they are engaged. They do not, however, jump down a conceptual ladder

rung and become situational themes- they remain character strengths despite their habitutation.

1.2.2 Flow

Flow is “intense experiential involvement in moment-to-moment activity” during which

an individual is so completely involved in the activity that time, stamina, and environment are

forgotten (Csikszentmihalyi 2014, p. 230). Although most of our everyday behavior is regulated

by “patterns of habit and necessity,” partly due to the future goals that most activities strive for,

flow occurs when the goal, activity, and feedback are immediate (p. 207). “Entering flow

depends on establishing a balance between perceived action capacities and perceived action

opportunities” with just enough challenge to engage skill but not so much challenge or so little

need for skill that the balance leads to boredom or anxiety (p. 240-1). Flow is also a basically

attentional process, as to enter flow, attention must be focused on a particular stimulus or set of

stimuli, and to stay in flow, attention to these stimuli must not habituate (p. 244). However, the

skills needed in order to focus attention are cognitive habits that fall under the virtue of courage,

with the character strength of persistence or perseverance (Peterson & Seligman 2004, p. 29).

In the concept of flow, the attentional facility needed in order to remain focused during

activity-engagement is a matter of habit. The kinds of activities that lead to flow, which we learn

through doing when attention is worth focusing on such activities (feedback and aptitude), are

themselves, it could be argued, developmentally more complex manifestations of flow states. In

other words, as we develop physically, cognitively, and socially, we learn the kinds of activities

that give us reinforcing feedback to do again (a mostly unconscious process). By engaging them

past the point that skill and challenge balance, we move onto some other activity. Whether the

next activity is outwardly related to the previous activity is less relevant here, as it is the

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physical, cognitive, and social processes that are molded and expanded during development; the

habits that are created that enable flow in the first place are what is important. If this is the case

(and hopefully future studies will be conducted to investigate this), then flow is the outcome of

several habitual processes, and what leads us to seek states of flow is also habitually determined.

Part Two- Concepts of Habit and Critiques

In Part One, I briefly discussed habit in two forms, hedonia and eudaimonia. I also

discussed to two core concepts of positive psychology: the first, character strengths; the second,

flow. Habit, within both these core concepts, makes its appearance subtly in the filed of positive

psychology. Character strengths, as described by Seligman in several of his works, are very

closely related to, if directly in line with, the eudaimonic traditions of moral philosophy.

Subjective well-being and flow, with their connections to good feeling or pleasure, coupled with

adaptation theory and the hedonic treadmill, are very closely related to, if not directly in line

with, the hedonic traditions of moral philosophy. The failure to make this distinction clear in

positive psychology conflates what is being measured, and calls into question the validity of the

studies done, both in the realm of character strengths and in SWB. The moral philosophical

positions are far too complex to fully discuss here and beyond the scope of this paper. However,

I will give brief descriptions of both as they relate to their understanding of habit, specifically, in

order to demonstrate the differences inherent in eudaimonic versus hedonic habit.

2.1 Aristotle

The eudaimonic tradition in moral philosophy, as understood through the western canon,

comes mostly from the Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, and went through some systematic

changes over the ages. Eudaimonia, loosely construed as “the good life,” has implied in its

linguistic origins notions of flourishing, happiness, and well-being (Kristjansson 2010). In order

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to achieve eudaimonia, individuals are encouraged to develop good character, which means,

among other things, developing habits of virtue, actions that embody various aspects of

Goodness. For Aristotle, such actions ought to be habitual, repeated to the point that the behavior

needed to exemplify the virtue is second nature (Aristotle, 1103b). Virtues are dispositions that

foster personal excellence of thought and character (1105b.20-1106a.3). In other words, as

Kristjansson succinctly puts it, “The virtues are at once conducive to and constitutive of

eudaimonia; each true virtue represents a stable character state that is intrinsically related to

flourishing as a human being” (2010).

Although virtues are dispositional, according to Aristotle, or personality trait-like to

Seligman, there is a significant difference between the Aristotelian and positive psychological

formulations of habit. Seligman seems to propose that habit, as situational themes, and character

strengths, as psychological processes that show an individual possesses a certain virtue, are

aspects that are developed within an individual or community, while virtue itself is something

that an individual possesses innately; it is merely behavioral and psychological processes that

need to be developed to activate it. Aristotle, on the other hand, did not make such a distinction:

virtue is not innate to us, it does not come to us by nature; rather, it is the virtue itself that we

cultivate through habits of action and thought (1103a.14-1103b.25).

Habit, in the classical understanding of eudaimonia, is an absolutely necessary

component of excellence of character. Moreover, habit is understood in a dual capacity. There

are habits that are natural to a thing, such as how natural and physiological processes affect an

object (1103a.18-24). These are said to habits in the sense that they are the ways in which a

thing, by its nature, exists in the world, based on the capacities the thing has by virtue of the

thing it is, that is habituation. Excellence of character is made through habit, we do not possess

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the virtues innately, only the capacity to be good, from which flows virtue (1103a.18-26,

commentary, p. 60-1). The correctness of incorrectness of Aristotle’s metaphysics of human

nature is of little consequence. The important feature here is that Aristotle’s understanding of

eudaimonia contains two distinct forms of habit: habit of character and habituation.

Aquinas makes a similar distinction in his treatise on habit. In response to the question

“Is habit a quality?” Aquinas responds, “This word ‘habitus’ is derived from ‘habere.’ Now habit

is taken from this word in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to

‘have’ something; in another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation [se habet] either

in regard to itself, or in regard to something else” (I-II.49.1). Further, in response to the question

“Whether habits are necessary?” Aquinas states, “habit implies a disposition in relation to a

thing's nature, and to its operation or end, by reason of which disposition a thing is well or ill-

disposed thereto” (I-II.49.4). In other words, Aquinas makes the same distinction as Aristotle,

that there are natural habits (habituation) and teleological habits (habits of character), the former

what a thing has naturally, the later what a thing develops in respect to the Good (virtue).

2.2 Epicurus, Bentham and J.S. Mill

The hedonic tradition is usually traced back to Epicurus, a 4th Century BCE Greek

philosopher who posited that “[it] is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and

well and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living pleasantly”

(Epicurus 5). While he did not comment directly on virtue or habit, this statement has

significance in the overall discussion of these concepts, as his followers “believed that if they do

what is necessary for pleasure, they will naturally be just” (Konstan 2008, p. 29). In light of

Epicurus’s words and what is known of his followers and their descendants, justice and the other

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virtues stem from living a pleasant life, or one that is based on pleasurable experience and

lessening of pain (Konstan 2008, p. 27-9).

It is the descendants of Epicurus, the utilitarians of the 19th century that hold a

universalistic hedonism, in which we find relevance to our discussion of habit (Wentworth 1954,

p. 357). Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill are representatives of this form of universalistic

hedonism. Bentham said of habit, “Every habit is a repetition of acts; or, to speak more strictly,

when a man has frequently repeated such and such acts after considerable intervals, he is said to

have persevered in or contracted a habit: but every repetition of acts is not a habit” (Bentham

2000, p. 64). His rules go on to discuss habit in relation to vices, but nowhere in his work was I

able to find where Bentham elaborates further on this point. As it stands here, Bentham merely

repeats what has already been said concerning habit- it is repetitive and happens over time.

John Stuart Mill contributes to this conversation by referring to habit as something of

power, of force, that can be carried out consciously or unconsciously, something that takes the

place of the will, replaces desire, and provides a certainty to action over and above what will or

desire is able to impart (Mill 2009, p. 72-74). While he does not give a full account of habit in

Utilitarianism, his concept of virtue is defined as the “multiplication of happiness” (p. 34). This

multiplication of happiness is contained in “the satisfaction of our primitive desires” (p. 68).

Moreover, he argues that anyone who desires virtue in the more eudaimonic sense do so because

it causes them pleasure or somehow decreases pain (p. 70). Whether this be the case or not, Mill

argues that habit, since it builds upon will and desire, is the avenue that virtue takes as the

reinforcer and proliferator of happiness (p. 73). His discussion of virtue is more nuanced than I

am able to bring forth here, but his discussion of habit is succinct. It reflects, in many ways, the

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sense of habituation already discussed in the section on hedonia- it is the feeling of pleasure that

creates the repetition necessary for habit to form.

Part Three- Reconsiderations of Habit in Positive Psychology

Over the past 14 years, the field of positive psychology has evolved tremendously, in

response to critiques offered by individuals from the fields of philosophy and psychology,

notably Martha Nussbaum (2008), Alan S. Waterman (2007), Alistair Miller (2008), David T.

Lykken (2007), and Woolfolk & Wasserman (2005), and in response to increased technology

and understanding of human physiology. However, despite the advances that have been made to

clarify conceptual issues within positive psychology, one of the foundational elements, habit, has

not been given the same amount of treatment.

As a foundational element of positive psychology, habit, in the two senses described in

this paper need to be treated in different ways, as they represent different processes. Habit, as in

the cultivation of character strengths, is a hermeneutic- a way in which we can talk about the

attributes that are important to us and provide an explanation for the underlying cognitive

processes that are themselves hermeneutics. This kind of habit, whether reducible to hermeneutic

or not, still represents something radically different from the habituation or adaptive

physiological processes of the hedonic form of habit. Habituation is physiologically tied in a

straightforward manner, based on responses of the body to stimuli of various kinds and

intensities. Eudaimonic habit (or habit as such) may use habituation. It stands to reason that it

would, as all behaviors and actions happen in an embodied way. However, the object of habit as

such is not the human person, as it is in habituation, but rather a concept, an ideal, outside the

self.

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Further considerations of this topic not discussed here may be necessary to fully explore

habit and habituation in relation to positive psychology and the pursuit of happiness. Future work

should include a deconstruction of virtue ethics and utilitarian ethics, as the treatment here was

cursory, at best. An analysis of cognitive psychology and neuroscience would also benefit this

discussion, as there is some implication from the work on flow that developmental processes

may fit the joint habit/habituation model flow represents. Also of interest to this topic, and not

handled within this paper, are the distinctions between Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s treatment of

happiness and habit. I treated them as relatively the same, but further investigation is necessary

to determine whether it is a linguistic/generational difference but that they say the same thing, or

if there are deeper differences. All of these are possible avenues of exploration, and perhaps the

burgeoning of my thesis topic.

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