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Construction of Collective and Individual Knowledge in ArgumentativeActivityBaruch B. Schwarz; Yair Neuman; Julia Gil; Merav Ilya

Online publication date: 17 November 2009

To cite this Article Schwarz, Baruch B. , Neuman, Yair , Gil, Julia and Ilya, Merav(2003) 'Construction of Collective andIndividual Knowledge in Argumentative Activity', Journal of the Learning Sciences, 12: 2, 219 — 256To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1207/S15327809JLS1202_3URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/S15327809JLS1202_3

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Construction of Collective and IndividualKnowledge in Argumentative Activity

Baruch B. SchwarzThe School of EducationThe Hebrew University

Yair NeumanThe Ben Gurion University

Julia Gil and Merav IlyaThe Hebrew University

In this article, we elaborate methodologies to study construction of knowledge in ar-gumentative activities. For this purpose, we report on a quasi-empirical study on con-struction of knowledge through successive argumentative activities on a controver-sial issue. A group of 120 fifth grade students participated in successiveargumentative activities; some activities involved individuals and some involved col-lectives. According to a first methodology, construction of knowledge was measuredthrough arguments/outcomes produced. We developed tools for evaluating changesin individual and collective arguments. In the study, we showed the generally benefi-cial effect of argumentative activities on collective and individual arguments/out-comes. The significant discrepancies between collective and individual argumentssuggested that individual students only partly internalized the collectively con-structed arguments. We developed a qualitative methodology to refine this hypothe-sis as well as other hypotheses concerning the interpretation of the quantitative study.The integration of the quantitative and qualitative methodologies for studying argu-mentation helped identify several mechanisms of construction of knowledge in argu-mentative activities. In particular, it brought new light on the mediating role of repre-sentational tools such as Argumentative Maps or Pro–Con tables.

The idea that constructionofknowledgeemerges fromsocial andcultural contexts isofcoursenotnew(Vygotsky,1986).However, adequatemethodologies forevidenc-

THE JOURNAL OF THE LEARNING SCIENCES, 12(2), 219–256Copyright © 2003, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Correspondence and requests for reprints should be sent to Baruch B. Schwarz, The School of Educa-tion, The Hebrew University, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem, Israel 91905. E-mail: [email protected]

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ing construction of knowledge in rich contexts are difficult to elaborate. For exam-ple, although argumentation is recognized as potentially leading to construction ofknowledge, experimental studies focusing on the changes that individuals andgroups undergo during and after argumentative activities are rare. In this article weattempt to contribute to the elaboration of methodologies for studying constructionofknowledge incontext, inargumentativeactivities.Weshowthemethodologieswedeveloped through an experimental study on construction of knowledge throughsuccessive argumentative activities. The quantitative measure of construction ofknowledgereliesonaresearchsetting inwhich individualargument-outcomesalter-nated with collective argument-outcomes. The participants were 120 fifth grade stu-dents who engaged in argumentative activities on a controversial issue (whether topermit or forbid experiments on animals). Students first completed a questionnaireto express their standpoint individually. They then formed triads and engaged in ar-gumentative talk. At this stage, triads had at their disposal short texts presenting in-formation on the issue. At the end of the conversation, individuals completed thequestionnaire again. The triads went on with their argumentative talk and displayedtheir arguments. In a first group (G1, N1 = 60), triads used a computerized tool, theargumentative map, to represent viewpoints and reasons supporting these view-points. In a second group (G2, N2 = 60), triads used a two-column table for inserting“pro and con” reasons. Following their use of the tools, the triads wrote a collectiveessay summarizing their common viewpoint. Finally, individuals completed thequestionnaire for the third time. Knowledge and construction of knowledge weremeasured through argument outcomes produced in the successive activities (thethree questionnaires, the map or the table, and the essay). We developed four mea-sures to characterize the properties of arguments produced in each activity. The typeof the argument establishes whether the argument is one-sided, two-sided, or com-pound. The soundness of the argument measures whether the reason(s) claimed tosupport the argument is (are) relevant to the standpoint and acceptable. The thirdmeasure is thenumberof reasons raised that support alternative standpoints.The lastmeasure concerns the quality of the argument, as reflected in the number of abstractreasons included in the argument. Construction of knowledge by individuals andgroups was studied through the changes in these measures during the successive ac-tivities. All measures of individual arguments increased during the successive argu-mentative activities: Individual arguments became less one-sided and more com-pounded. In addition, reasons invoked were more relevant to the standpoint claimedand more acceptable. More reasons supporting alternative arguments were raised.Finally, the quality of the reasons invoked was higher: Reasons were less vague orpersonal and more abstract.

The analysis of the collective arguments that appeared in the maps, tables, and es-says (considered as produced by one cognitive entity) showed higher measures thanthe individual arguments according to the four measures. The comparison of the es-says in G1 and G2 showed that argumentative maps helped to construct significantly

220 SCHWARZ, NEUMAN, GIL, ILYA


better collective arguments than the tables. However, the measures of individual ar-guments expressed in questionnaires after the construction of the collective argu-ments were significantly lower than these collective arguments (with no significantdifferencebetweenG1andG2).Thisseems to indicate thatalthoughmapsand tableshelped in the representation of arguments agreed upon by members of groups, indi-vidual students only partly internalized the collectively constructed arguments (viathe mediation of the tools) to construct their own arguments.

Scrutiny of the changes that individual and collective argument-products under-went during the successive activities gave partial information on the process ofconstruction of knowledge. Individuals appropriated reasons from peers in the tri-ads and abandoned reasons as a result of argumentative activities. In addition toabandonment and appropriation in the experimental dissemination of consensualknowledge, the changes in the reasons in argument-products showed that someknowledge was also generated in the argumentative activities. The results obtainedindicated that the methodology adopted could evidence key features of construc-tion of knowledge in argumentative activities.

However, this firstmethodologycouldnotexplainchangesargumentsunderwentduring successive activities. We considered again the findings of the quantitativestudy by analyzing several protocols of one triad that exhibited typical changes. ThisanalysiswasbasedonActivityTheory,meaning thatweaccountedfor themotivesofthe participants, their history, and the tools at their disposal. The analysis led to thearticulation of mechanisms of construction of knowledge explaining the significantimprovement of arguments. We identified the mechanism of socialization, in whichpeersadoptaconsensual initial argument (“theypretend toagree”)asaway toelabo-rate new arguments, although this socialization does not reflect the opinion of allmembers of the triad. This socialization enabled further argumentative moves (chal-lenges, counter-challenges, etc.) that led peers to co-construct new arguments. An-other mechanism is the role of written sources as triggers for integrating personal ex-perience toward co-construction of new arguments.

We conclude that the integration of the evaluation of argument-outcomes, themeasure of changes in individual and collective argument-outcomes through suc-cessive activities, and an activity theory-based analysis of protocols in whichprototypical changes occur constitutes a viable methodology for the study of argu-mentation in the school context. This methodology bridges across a skill perspec-tive and an activity perspective in the study of argumentation.

ARGUMENTATION AND THECONSTRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE

Since Plato, argumentation has been considered one of the central means to con-struct knowledge (of course, for Plato, in the Republic’s celebrated fifth book, this

KNOWLEDGE IN ARGUMENTATIVE ACTIVITY 221


is to attain knowledge). This centrality of argumentation in construction of knowl-edge has even led some thinkers to view argumentation as its essence. For exam-ple, for Goldman (1976), this means knowing something is the ability to eliminateother rival possibilities, or believing that the chosen belief is more warranted thanplausible rival beliefs. Constructing knowledge is a never-ending process of mar-shaling evidence that the chosen belief is (a) supported by the available evidenceand (b) more warranted than plausible rival beliefs. The definition of what countsas “plausible” is determined by the discourse within which the validation takesplace. Although some researchers such as Latour and Woolgar (1979) showed thatthe role of argumentation is often overplayed in the history of science, others stillconsider argumentation as central (e.g., in scientific reasoning, see Duschl, 1990;Ohlsson, 1992). Moreover, experimentalists have shown that if situated in therealm of informal reasoning, argumentation is positively correlated to knowledgeconstruction. In the following we review the two lines researchers followed tostudy this question—the skill perspective and the conversational-activity perspec-tive of argumentation. We show that these two lines broadly do not intersect al-though they should gain from interplay.

The Skill Perspective of Argumentation

The first perspective on argumentation focuses on specific skills of the learner.These skills are used during the process of reasoning and the outcome of reasoningis an “argument,” which is a structure consisting of a conclusion and of several rea-sons supporting it (Means & Voss, 1996; Nickerson, 1986; Perkins, Farady, &Bushey, 1991). According to this perspective, construction of knowledge resultsfrom the application of general skills to access knowledge (available from externalor internal sources) and to construct and evaluate arguments (Means & Voss,1996). Some such (argumentive) skills are explicitly listed: the ability to give rea-sons supporting standpoints, to construct a counter-argument, to answer the coun-ter-argument, and so forth (Kuhn, 1991). Such lists open the door to developmentalstudies (Kuhn, 1991; Means & Voss, 1996; Shaw, 1996).

The fact that the skill approach identifies arguments with structures enablesstudying the gains of dyadic interactions in terms of the improvement of argumentsand their evaluation as reflected in individual outcomes such as personal essays(Kuhn, Shaw, & Felton, 1997). This suggests that dyadic interaction fosters argu-mentative reasoning, meaning that the effect of dyadic interactions on argumentsin individual essays leads to the improvement of the quality of the argument-out-comes of the argumentative discourse. However no examination is made concern-ing how argumentative moves such as challenges, responses to challenges, conces-sions, and so forth lead to the beneficial effects detected in the personal essays.Such considerations about the role of argumentative moves in construction ofknowledge are the focus of the activity perspective of argumentation.



The Activity Perspective of Argumentation

In contrast to the skill-oriented perspective, another approach focuses on argumen-tation as an activity. From a Vygostkian point of view, as argumentative activityovertly bridges between interpersonal and intrapersonal processes,1 it is a good can-didate to lead to theconstructionofknowledge.Theaimin theactivityperspectiveofargumentation is to identify mechanisms that govern construction of knowledge asinterplay between interpersonal and intrapersonal discourse processes. For exam-ple, conversations in small and large groups of students engaged in argumentativeactivity inscienceoften take twoformsofdiscourse:constructive/generative thatde-velop insmallgroupsanddialectic/persuasive thatdevelop in largegroups (Meyer&Woodruff, 1997; Woodruff & Meyer, 1997). Alternating the two forms of discourseoften leads students to articulate coherent explanations. In open-inquiry scienceclassrooms, student interactions and collaborative learning evidence negotiationand construction of new knowledge over time for individual students, small groups,and the class at large. This is a mechanism of diffusion of knowledge through a net-work of exchanges between groups that originates in small groups (Roth & Bowen,1995).Computerartifactsand the teachermayplaycentral roles in thisdiffusion. Inarecent study, Schwarz and Hershkowitz (2001) showed how teachers may distributeto a whole class several ambiguous computer windows produced by some of the stu-dents to create conflicts. The desire to reach states of intersubjectivity may then leadstudents to overcome apparent contradictions due to ambiguity and to stress realcontradictions, eventually resulting in the construction of a common meaning. Insum, empirical studies on the emergence of new knowledge of individuals partici-pating in classroom activities point to two kinds of processes—a process of conver-gence/co-construction (see also Roschelle, 1992; Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1994)and a process of dissemination/diffusion. The term argumentation is not alwayspresent in the aforementioned studies; however, they stress the intertwining of richdiscursive practices with the process of knowledge construction.

Fine-grained studies focused on the specific role of argumentation in knowledgeconstruction by adopting an activity-oriented perspective. Pontecorvo and her col-leagues initiated a series of such studies.2 For example, Pontecorvo and Girardet(1993) identified the epistemic actions in historical topics3 and showed how young


1The polysemy of the term argument indicates that Western culture has closely related the discur-sive activity of argumentation and the acquisition of knowledge (see, for example, the fifth book ofPlato’s Republic and numerous Thomist writings in the Middle Ages).

2Most of the research reports by Pontecorvo and colleagues on this topic are written in Italian. Asuccinct description in English is given in a review article (Pontecorvo, 1993). The present descriptionis based on this article unless the reference is mentioned, in which case the report is in English.

3These are of two kinds. The methodological actions deal with the validity and the relevance of theinformation supplied (e.g., is the source authentic, reliable, or truthful). The explanation actions dealwith the interpretation of historical events (e.g., relating actors and actions to the historical context).


children used them in small groups to cope with a historical issue in their conversa-tion. The epistemic actions were embedded in conversation through the use of argu-mentative operations such as claiming, opposing, or counter-opposing. Such meth-odsofanalysiswereadapted to thestudyofargumentation inmathematicalactivities(Schwarz&Hershkowitz,1995) toshowthecontingencyofepistemicandargumen-tative actions. Other studies showed how groups of students learned to hypothesizemathematical properties through argumentative actions and the mediation of agraphic calculator (Hershkowitz & Schwarz, 1999; Hershkowitz, Schwarz, &Dreyfus, 2001).

In some studies, the methodology for studying acquisition of knowledge in ar-gumentative conversation included sequential analysis. For example, Resnick,Salmon, Zeitz, Wathen, and Holowchak (1993) distinguished between social dis-tribution of the argument (elements of discourse of each of the individuals such asobjection, concession, or statement of position) and the elements of the reasoning(premises, conclusions, challenges, and answers to challenges). In this study, rea-soning and conversation were studied as two intertwined ongoing processes. In ad-dition, the researchers computed the density of connections between each of the ar-gument components with previous and later ones (see also Dreyfus et al., 2001).Due to its complexity, sequential analysis is applied to case studies only. Anotherdrawback of very fine-grained sequential methods is that the focus on local movesavoids coping with the issue of convergence and with the issue of the relation of in-dividuals to arguments expressed in interaction within a group.

To capitalize on the insights provided by the activity-conversation approachwithout losing the sight of convergence, we integrated a “skill” with an “activity”approach in mathematics, a domain in which criteria of correctness are relativelyeasier to determine (Schwarz, Neuman, & Biezuner, 2000). Pairs of low-achievinghigh school students with incorrect (buggy) rules (called “wrong” students) com-pared decimal fractions. The pairs of “wrong” students were engaged in an activitydesigned to lead to conflict between them. In this study a new effect was identified,the “two-wrongs-make-a-right” effect; namely, that at least one of the “wrongs”became “right.” There is then clear evidence for construction of knowledge ac-cording to a skill approach. The researchers identified four mechanisms that led toconstruction of knowledge: disagreement, argumentative operations (such as chal-lenge and concession), hypothesis testing (with a calculator), and the internaliza-tion of argumentative operations. To analyze pairs of students interacting to solve atask on which they are in conflict, the structure of the reasoning of the pair consid-ered as one entity was contrasted with the social distribution of the reasoning in theconversation. Moreover, individual knowledge was collected before and after theinteraction in a questionnaire.

In summary, several themes can be outlined from research on the role of argu-mentation in construction of knowledge. First, research generally focuses either onproducts or on processes, depending on whether argumentation is approached



from a skill or a process perspective, although products may also help understand-ing argumentative processes. Secondly, the construction of knowledge during ar-gumentation is extremely sensitive to context (tools available, social interactions,history, and goals of the participants). Therefore, the study of the relation betweenargumentation and construction of knowledge should account for this sensitivity. Itis then important to collect diverse measures of arguments in the course of argu-mentation, when the context changes. In particular, it is necessary to elaboratetools for collecting arguments as artifacts/outcomes produced by “many” individu-als and groups in a defined setting before and after the argumentative activity. Indi-vidual (i.e., collective) arguments can be evaluated when participants act individu-ally (i.e., in collaboration). It is also necessary to collect arguments in the presenceor absence of various tools (textual sources, representational tools, etc.). Finally,research on construction of knowledge and argumentation supports the adoption ofan integrative approach between skill and activity-conversational perspectives.

The general aims of this study are two-fold. First, we studied the effect of suc-cessive argument-activities on collectives and individuals. Specifically, we aimedto (a) to measure the effect of argument-activities on the arguments elaborated byindividual children, (b) identify the origins of these constructs, and (c) compare theeffect of the use of the two tools on the arguments constructed. To address Part (b),we adopted a qualitative approach toward the identification of mechanisms ex-plaining the changes in arguments. The outputs from these analyses informed oursecond general aim, which was to specify improved methodologies for the study ofargumentation in context. To conduct the study, we invited students to engage inactivities around the issue whether to permit or prohibit experiments on animals.

METHOD

Participants

The population consisted of 120 fifth grade children (63 boys, 57 girls) from twosuburban public schools with similar socioeconomical level. In both schools acomputer literacy program was implemented and the children were familiar withbasic applications such as word processors with graphical functions, spreadsheet,and the use of databases. A teacher trained by our research team to initiate argu-mentative activities with the tools we designed worked with the students during the20 hr of the experiment. She introduced the students to normative behaviors con-cerning pluralism and critical thinking.4 In the first school, two classes participated


4The teacher also participated in an educational program, the “Kishurim” project (Schwarz &Glassner, in press), in which pluralism and critical thinking were valued through practices such asbrainstorming, discussions in small groups, presentation, and defense of arguments to “judges-peers.”Although these practices were not explicitly implemented in this study, the teacher encouraged studentsto listen to each other, reflect on own arguments, and criticize peer arguments on a rational basis.


in the study; in the second, there were three. One class in each school and half an-other class in the second school were the first experimental group (G1, N = 60);they used the Argumentative Map. The rest of the children formed the second ex-perimental group (G2, N = 60); they used the Pro–Con table.

Materials

The Questionnaire

The questionnaire was inspired by a questionnaire used by Kuhn (1991) in thestudy in which she checked argumentive skills of children and adults. We reducedthe number of items to avoid excessive use of tests that might lead to lack of en-gagement in the experiment. Students were asked four questions: (a) Do you thinkthat experiments on animals should be forbidden or allowed? (b) What reasons canyou give that support your opinion? (c) If somebody does not agree with you,which reason might she use? and (d) How could you convince her that you areright? We chose the issue of experiments on animals because the solution is notunique and is subject to controversy to a certain degree, and also because most stu-dents have heard about or discussed such an issue. We then hypothesized that thisissue should lead students interacting in small groups to infer new knowledge.

The Mediating Tools forConstructing and Evaluating Arguments

The database. Students were provided with tools we hypothesized mightmediate the construction and evaluation of arguments. The first tool, common toall students, was a database of 10 short texts about experiments on animals. Thesetexts could serve as reasons for supporting arguments. An example of a text is “Notall the experiments really help humans. Not all the experiments have impact on hu-mans. The body of animals is different from that of humans” (T1). Another is “Alot of research based on experiments on animals is used to find medication againstcancer” (T2). It is clear that these two texts may support conflicting arguments.Another example of text is “The development of new technologies for the sake ofhumans means preliminary experiments on animals” (T3). The following com-pletes T3: “Laika is the first dog sent into space, long before the first man” (T4).Although most texts were clearly favorable or unfavorable toward experiments onanimals, some texts were ambiguous such as “To invent new candies, scientistsused rats to check whether they were safe for humans” (T5). Although the textswere useful for constructing arguments, students needed to integrate and completethem to obtain high-quality arguments. The list of the texts appears in the Appen-dix. The rationale for the choice of written sources was to provide information formediating argumentative moves. For example, texts supporting conflicting reasons



may help challenges. Also, a written source completing another one may help thedefense of arguments.

The Argumentative Map. The Argumentative Map is a tool inspired by theBelvedere system, a tool developed by Lesgold and colleagues (Cavalli-Sforza,Lesgold, & Weiner, 1992). The Argumentative Map enables one to represent argu-ments as a conclusion (or a claim) supported by premises (or reasons). It also has adialectical dimension: It is a shared space that enables peers to represent concur-rent arguments, display whether some reasons support or oppose conclusions (byusing different colors), and display degrees of confidence (by choosing color in-tensity). For example, Figure 1 represents an Argumentative Map collaborativelyconstructed by a triad (Na, Ch, and Ad) whose work is analyzed later.

The rationale for the use of the Argumentative Map was that it displays thecomponents of arguments and their structure (standpoint, reasons, and materiallinks that represent support or conflict) and for a shared referent for collective con-struction and evaluation of arguments. In accordance with Collins and Brown(1988), we hypothesized that the display of the structure of arguments could leadstudents to task-relevant externalization, and particularly to the use of abstract con-cepts (see also Schwarz, Kohn, & Resnick, 1993). For example, we hypothesizedthat the Argumentative Map would lead students to use terms such as relevant, op-poses, rebuttal, or assertion that are embodied in the Argumentative Map. Also,


FIGURE 1 An Argumentative Map collaboratively constructed by a triad.


we hypothesized that as students could represent different arguments on the samespace, it could foster discourse among learners (see also Roth & Roychoudhury,1993). Hence we hypothesized that the argument produced could be used as an ar-tifact to write a collective essay instead of inferring intersubjectivity from discur-sive activity only.

The Pro–Con table. The Pro–Con table is a two-column empty table. Thewords “Pro” and “Con” appear at the head of each column. Similar to the Argu-mentative Map, the Pro–Con table displays students’ reasons supporting or chal-lenging the argument. However, unlike the Argumentative Map, the Pro–Con tabledoes not display the conclusion. Also, links (supporting or challenging) are notprovided. Consequently, we hypothesized that the use of the Pro–Con table wouldhave positive effects on the writing of a collective essay, but that these effectswould be weaker than those of the Argumentative Map, as the structure of argu-ments is not displayed.

Procedure

The procedure was organized in several phases to observe arguments in sev-eral contexts. These arguments were individual or collective outcomes thatserved to evaluate individual or collective arguments at the end of each phase. Ina preparatory session, the students of both groups learned basic ideas about argu-mentative debate: what is a dilemma, what are arguments, and that they need tobe justified. They also briefly practiced the search for sources of information tomake up their mind and they elaborated the solution of two dilemmas. Then, inthe first stage, the teacher briefly presented the dilemma of experiments on ani-mals and the students of both groups then completed the questionnaire individu-ally (Q1). In the second stage, students were organized in triads and given thedatabase. The triads were invited to debate the dilemma using the database. Atthe end of the discussion, students again completed the questionnaire individu-ally (Q2). In the third stage, the triads in G1 learned to use the ArgumentativeMap and continued to discuss the dilemma. They were asked to collectively con-struct argumentative maps. In the fourth stage, they were asked to write an essayon the dilemma. The third and fourth stages were identical for group G2 exceptthe use of the argumentative map was replaced by a Pro–Con table. In the lastand fifth stage, individuals were asked to answer the questionnaire for a thirdtime (Q3).

Method

The data consist of three individual outcomes, answers to the same questionnaire(Q1, Q2, and Q3) for both groups, two collective outcomes, an ArgumentativeMap for G1 or a Pro–Con table for G2, and a collective essay for both groups.



Data Analysis

The first research question concerns the effect of the two argumentative activi-ties on the quality of arguments/outcomes. To answer this question, a practicalcharacterization of arguments is needed. Thus, in the following paragraphs we de-fine types of argument, the number of reasons in support of (or in conflict with) theconclusion, the soundness of the arguments, and the quality of reasons. The samecharacterization helped us answer the second research question (the origins ofthese changes) and the third (the comparison of the effectiveness of the Argumen-tative Map and the Pro–Con table).

Characterization of Arguments

It is crucial to note that the coding schemes we developed are strongly based onprevious studies by Means and Voss (1996) and Kuhn (1991). These codingschemes are suitable when students produce texts-arguments in structured inter-views or in essays where they were invited to express their standpoint. In such situ-ations, participants know they are expected to be explicit. The coding schemes arenot suitable for analyzing discourse processes in which the form of arguments isoften idiosyncratic and participants adopt rhetorical moves that reflect a desire toact on the opinions of peers rather than personal arguments.

1. Argument Type

To analyze the arguments given by individual students and also by triads, we usedcriteria inspired by the studies of Means and Voss (1996) and Kuhn et al. (1997).Four types of argument were considered. The first is statements unsupported byany reason. For example, the statement “Experiments on animals should not bedone because it’s not fair” is not really an argument. A second type is one-sided ar-guments, in which a statement is followed by a reason or a series of reasons sup-porting the conclusion reached. An example is “We should permit experiments onanimals because it’s important to develop medication for humans.” The third typeis two-sided arguments, which include reasons that both support and challenge theconclusion. For example, the argument “Although experiments on animals maycause them pain, I agree that they are necessary to help humans.” Two-sided argu-ments do not show clearly whether the individual or group undertook an analysisof the pros and cons to solve the issue. The fourth type includes arguments inwhich such an analysis has been done. Means and Voss (1996) called this analysisdecomposition, meaning that the student generates a conditional statement that re-defines or constrains the stated problem. Such arguments include terms such as “itdepends … if … but if … .” We call them compounded arguments. An example of acompounded argument is the following (written as a collective essay):



We should permit experiments on animals with the condition that the pur-pose of the experiments is to save human lives, and that the experiments aredone under veterinary supervision. It is very important to develop medica-tion for people and for animals to save their lives and animals serve as an al-ternative to experiments on humans, although the experiments can cause ani-mals to suffer, get sick and even die. Although there is a violation of animalrights here, saving lives, including human lives, is important for us. So weshould recommend forbidding experiments on animals in general. If we haveto conduct experiments, it should be for the sole purpose of saving humanlives only and then only under the supervision of a veterinarian who will helpto heal the animal and avoid unnecessary suffering.

This argument is a juxtaposition of two compounded arguments: “We should per-mit experiments on animals with the condition that …” and “We should recom-mend forbidding experiments on animals in general. If we have to conduct experi-ments …” The two arguments are similar but are stated positively and negatively,respectively. Almost every statement expressed in the questionnaire, Argumenta-tive Map, Pro–Con table, or essay was a real argument. In practice, three types ofarguments existed. In the questionnaire, the type of argument was determined byanalyzing the first item only.

2. Soundness of Arguments

The soundness of arguments was judged according to the acceptability of the argu-ment and the relevance of the reasons invoked. The acceptability was evaluated ona scale ranging from 0 to 2 according to the logical structure of the argument and itsdegree of realism. For example, the argument “Experiments will cause animals todisappear and there will be no more animals on earth” is not acceptable (0 on theacceptability scale). In contrast, the argument “I am against experiments on ani-mals because it causes them suffering” is acceptable (2 on the acceptability scale).

The relevance of the reasons invoked in support of the conclusion reached wasalso evaluated on a scale ranging from 0 to 2. For example, the relevance of the rea-son “Experiments will cause the extinction of animals and there will be no moreanimals on earth” was scored as 2 (although it scores 0 on the acceptability scale).The situation for giving scores for relevance can be complex as in the following ar-gument (written by a student in the first part of Q2). All reasons in this argumentare underlined and are followed by a number in parentheses, which represents thescore for relevance.

Experiments must be forbidden, the experiments hurt animals a lot (2). I sawa broadcast on the public channel where experiments were done on mice. Ithurts them a lot. I know that in part of the experiments, animals die or get



sick (2) and I don’t think that people have the right to hurt them (2). But theexperiments help develop medication and it helps save lives and to savemany humans and animals (0). And also, without these experiments, peoplecould not have developed technology and space research (0). They sent firstLaika the dog into space and then people, and humans are very important(0).

This example shows that deciding about relevance is often quite problematic.Scores in relevance are determined in relation to the standpoint stated explicitly. Inthe example, the standpoint is “Experiments must be forbidden.” Consequently,reasons such as “the experiments hurt animals a lot” or “I don’t think people havethe right to hurt them” are relevant. In contrast, the reason “The experiments helpdevelop medication and it helps save lives and to save many humans and animals”is irrelevant and is scored “0.” Of course, in a conversation, the use of the term butbefore claiming that experiments help develop medication expresses a withdrawalfrom the standpoint. However, in a questionnaire, one is expected to be explicit,and standpoints must be expressed together with the reasons that support them.The overall score for relevance was 1.

3. Overall Number of Reasons

The number of reasons includes the reasons raised by the individual or the triad(either supporting or in conflict with the expressed opinion). We extracted thesereasons from the responses to the four items of the questionnaire. In the Argu-mentative Map and the Pro–Con table, the reasons were generally delimited bythe icons and cells of the tool. The same reasons appearing more than once werecounted once only.

4. Number of Reasons Supporting Counter-Arguments

We classified the reasons in the collective table or map according to the conclusionreached in the collective essay. (We assumed that the position adopted in the essaywould be the same as in the table or map whose construction led to the redaction ofthe essay.)

A problem arose in counting reasons supporting counter-arguments in the caseof compounded arguments. Generally, students opted for one opinion only undercertain conditions, so that all the reasons given supported that opinion. We then de-cided to count reasons supporting counter-arguments according to the general ten-dency of the student. If the student stated “We should allow … unless …,” all rea-sons given against experiments were counted as reasons supportingcounter-arguments. The example quoted is more complicated because it includesthe argument “We should permit … on the condition that …” and the argument “So



we should recommend forbidding experiments on animals in general, and if wehave to …” In this case, we counted reasons against experiments on animals for thefirst argument and reasons for experiments for the second argument. In the first ar-gument, the two reasons against experiments are “The experiments can cause ani-mals to suffer” and “There is here a violation of animal rights.” In the second argu-ment, no reason for experiments was expressed. The number of reasons supportingcounter-arguments was then computed as the sum of the number of reasons, whichwas two in this example.

5. Quality of Reasons

The arguments were also analyzed according to the form of the reasons invoked bythe students. Following Means and Voss (1996), this form is called the quality ofreason and was classified into four categories of quality: vague, makes sense, con-sequential, and abstract. Three of these categories (vague, consequential, and ab-stract) are identical to those defined by Means and Voss. We illustrate the catego-ries by examples, with the reasons italicized.

5.1 Vague. These are imprecise statements such as “I am against experi-ments on animals because the animal can be out of control and hurt the scientistand the scientist will be sick and there will be an epidemic.”

5.2 Makes sense. Make sense reasons assemble three kinds of reasons rec-ognized by Means and Voss (1996) in a single category. These are rule-based rea-sons, authority reasons, and personal reasons. Rule-based reasons are generally ac-cepted truisms or beliefs. For example, “Animals have feelings like humans so it’sforbidden to hurt them” or “We like animals so it’s not allowed to hurt them.” Au-thority reasons involve appeal to an authority. For example, “I am for experimentson animals because I heard a scientist on TV who said that it helps fight diseases.”Personal reasons refer to the personal experience of the student. For example, “Iam against experiments on animals because I once dissected a frog and it’s appall-ing.” We decided to combine these three kinds in a single category for several rea-sons. First, as noticed by Means and Voss, “rule-based, authority, and personal rea-sons are presumed to differ little in quality.” Moreover, it was often difficult tounambiguously relate a reason to one of these three categories. For example, “I amfor experiments on animals because I heard a scientist on TV who said that it helpsfight diseases” can be equally related to authority and to personal experience.Finally, each of the three categories relates to something that has been heard or ex-perienced and accepted by the student by capitalizing on a makes sense epistemol-ogy (Perkins et al., 1991).



5.3 Consequential. Consequential reasons are statements in which a directconsequence is stated as an outcome of a particular action. For example, “Althoughthe experiment may cause suffering to animals, one must remember that it helpssave lives,” and “Animals have different properties and for this reason, what we seein experiments is not right.”

5.4 Abstract reasons. Abstract reasons are logical in form. They proceedfrom a general class from which the participant reasons. For example, “Experi-ments help to develop medication” or “Animals have the right to live like humans.”The reason “Humans are very important” proceeds from a general class but is notlogical. It was classified as vague.

Two experts analyzed 20% of the data to validate the characterization. Theinterrater score was high (.9) and enabled one of the experts to conduct the rest ofthe analysis.5

Measure of Collective and Individual Knowledge

One of our aims, as stated in the second research question, was to evaluate theknowledge of the group as well as the knowledge of the individual. According tothe definition of knowledge we adopted, we evaluated the arguments and espe-cially the changes that occurred at each stage of the experiment. We first collectedthe reasons appearing in the three questionnaires, maps, tables, and collective es-says. The reasons were grouped here by content and not by quality or form. Wefound 29 groups, examples of which are (a) “Animals have feelings,” (b) “Experi-ments are not abuse,” (c) “Experiments help develop medication,” and (d) “Experi-ments on animals will help find medication against cancer.” Reasons (a), (b), and(c) belong to different groups. Reasons (c) and (d) belong to the same group buthave different quality: (c) is formulated in an abstract form whereas (d) has a con-sequential form. We defined the knowledge of the individual before the experiment(i.e., after the first argumentative activity) as the arguments raised in Q1 (i.e., inQ2). Regarding the knowledge of the triads, we considered each triad as a cogni-tive entity whose knowledge is the argument agreed upon by the members of thetriad when constructing a table or a map, and when collectively writing an essay.Such a definition implies that the knowledge of the triad depends on the tool at thedisposal of the triad (map or table) and the activity in which the triad is engaged(representing an argument or writing an essay). The knowledge of the triad is thendefined by two measures, although the two activities students were engaged inwere undertaken almost concurrently.


5As mentioned before, most of the measures were already established by Means and Voss (1996)and by Kuhn (1991).


As the triads agreed upon the Argumentative Map (or the Pro–Con table) andthe essay, we compared individual knowledge of the members of the triads in Q1,Q2, and Q3 with their collective knowledge. Thus, we could trace the origins of thechanges in arguments through the phases of the experiment. Specifically, we couldask whether the appearance of new reasons in the individual could be traced to (a)reasons appearing in the questionnaire of other individuals that engaged in argu-mentative activity at the same time, (b) the database they consulted, or (c) the argu-mentative activity itself. Reasons that were not a mere reproduction of any infor-mation appearing in the database but showed some processing of this informationwere coded as stemming from the activity. The same procedure was adopted to ob-serve fluctuations from Q1 and Q2 to the collective products, and from these col-lective products to Q3.

RESULTS

We analyzed the characteristics of arguments to answer the first research ques-tion—the effect of the two argumentative activities on arguments. The research hy-pothesis suggested that social interaction would have a significant influence on thedifferentmeasuresofargumentation.Toavoidmethodologicalproblemsofmultiplemeasures, we limited the measure of the effect of the two argumentative activities onarguments to four variables: TYPE, SOUNDNESS, COUNTER(-REASONS), andABSTRACT.TYPEmeasured theargument typevalue (from0to3),SOUNDNESSmeasured the sum of the acceptability and relevance values (from 0 to 4),COUNTER measured the number of reasons in conflict with the conclusion, andABSTRACT measured the number of abstract reasons. Although the other variables(number of reasons, number of vague, makes sense, and consequential reasons) arecertainly instructive, the four variables we chose to focus on are especially sensitiveto the limitations people have in constructing and evaluating arguments (Kuhn,1991; Means & Voss, 1996). Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations ofstudent performance across the three individual measurements; that is, in experi-mentalphases1,2,and5, inwhich thestudentsproducedarguments individually.

To check our research hypothesis we conducted a 2 × 3 (Group × Time) analysisof variance (ANOVA) test for repeated measures. The ANOVA test was conductedseparately for each of the four dependent variables. The only problem in conduct-ing ANOVA for the four dependent variables concerns multiple comparisons andan artificial increase in the alpha level. To avoid this problem we set the alpha levelto .01 for all the statistical tests we conducted (.05 approximately divided by fourcomparisons). The highly significant results we obtained in this study dismiss thepossibility of an artificial increase in the alpha level. The ANOVA revealed a sig-nificant effect for Time at TYPE, Wilks’s Lambda = .34, F(2, 85) = 77.41, p < .001;SOUNDNESS, Wilks’s Lambda = .61, F(2, 85) = 26, p < .001; COUNTER,



Wilks’s Lambda = .46, F(2, 85) = 47.16, p < .001; and ABSTRACT, Wilks’sLambda = .46, F(2, 85) = 46.48, p < .001.6 The main effect of the experimentalcondition was found nonsignificant for all the dependent variables. From this anal-ysis, we can conclude that the increase in the measures of arguments can be tracedto students’ social interaction.

A further support for this claim can be found in the results for the second re-search question, namely the identification of the sources of the reasons invoked bystudents in the different phases of the experiment. As mentioned earlier, we fo-cused on three possible sources: the texts in the database, the social interaction,and the prior knowledge (as appearing in the initial argument in Q1). Concerningsocial interaction, we differentiated between reasons raised initially in the firstquestionnaire by one member of a triad and appearing in the subsequent question-naire of another member of the triad and new reasons that stemmed from the inter-action itself during the activity. The first category represents diffusion of consen-sual knowledge, whereas the second is evidence of the generation of new


TABLE 1Means and Standard Deviations for the Four

Measures of Individual Argumentsat Phases 1, 2, and 5

Measure Phase M SD

Type 1 2.08 .46Type 2 2.56 .57Type 5 2.83 .53Soundness 1 4.50 1.19Soundness 2 4.91 .96Soundness 5 5.50 .71Counter 1 .87 .68Counter 2 1.50 .59Counter 5 1.57 .54Abstract 1 1.45 .89Abstract 2 2.02 .93Abstract 5 2.30 .87

6The ANOVA test revealed a significant effect for Time x Group for ABSTRACT (Wilks’s Lambda= .70, F(2, 85) = 16.87, p < .001). It can be seen that in general students performances improved withtime while there was not a significant difference between G1 and G2 on phase 1 (M = 1.31[.79] vs. M =1.53[1], respectively), phase 2 (M = 1.89 [.91] vs. M = 1.98 [.98], respectively), and phase 3 (M = 2.68[.79] vs. 1.95 [.81], respectively). However, using t tests it was found that while there was not a statisti-cally significant difference between G1 and G2 on phases 1 and 2, there was a statistically significantdifference on phase 5 (t = 4.2, p < .001). This result explains the source of the interaction: while in gen-eral there was not a significant difference between the groups, on phase 5 students from G1 performedbetter than students from G2.


knowledge. Table 2 presents means and standard deviations for these four possiblesources. PRIME represents the number of reasons initially claimed in Q1 andAPPROPRIATION represents the number of reasons initially raised by one mem-ber of the triad and appropriated in a later phase by another member of the triad.ACTIVITY represents the number of new reasons that arose during the argumenta-tive activities and DATABASE represents the number of reasons appearing in thetexts of the database that re-appear verbatim in the questionnaires after the two ar-gumentative activities (in Phases 2 and 5). Table 2 shows that the most commonsource of reasons is the initial reasons claimed in the first questionnaire. However,the most interesting issue concerns the social source of the individual arguments.Without using any statistical analysis, it appears that the only source that signifi-cantly increased in the successive phases of the experiment is APPROPRIATION.In other words, the social interaction between students encouraged the increasing“diffusion” of reasons through appropriation.

We already mentioned that no significant difference could be detected betweenG1 and G2 concerning individual arguments expressed in Phases 1, 2, and 5 (asmeasured through TYPE, SOUNDNESS, COUNTER, and ABSTRACT). Thisfinding partly answers the third research question. However, we also intended toinvestigate the collective arguments whose construction and evaluation are directlymediated by the Argumentative Map as contrasted to the Pro–Con table. Thesetools make it difficult to analyze the type of arguments because they do not differ-entiate between two-sided and compounded arguments. Thus, we decided to com-pare arguments appearing in the Argumentative Map as opposed to the Pro–Contable using three measures only—SOUNDNESS, COUNTER, and ABSTRACT.Table 3 presents means and standard deviations for these measures across experi-mental conditions and the two collective measurement phases, 3 and 4.

To test the effects of experimental phase and manipulation we conducted a 2 × 2(Group × Time) ANOVA for repeated measures. The ANOVA revealed a signifi-


TABLE 2Sources of Individual

Reasons in Phases 2 and 5

Source M SD

Prime2 2.10 1.00Prime5 2.12 .96Appropriation2 .70 .60Appropriation5 .95 .67Activity2 .99 .58Activity5 1.01 .50Database2 .24 .43Database5 .20 .40


cant effect for Time at COUNTER, Wilks’s Lambda = .47, F(2, 88) = 118.82, p <.001; and SOUNDNESS, Wilks’s Lambda = .68, F(2, 88) = 49.17, p < .001. A sig-nificant effect for Group was found for ABSTRACT, F(1, 86) = 19.85, p < .001.The interaction GROUP ×TIME was found significant for ABSTRACT, Wilks’sLambda = .88, F(2, 88) = 13.55, p < .001. On the ABSTRACT measure studentsfrom G1 scored higher than students from G2. However, when moving from phase3 to phase 4 the average score of students from G1 increased while the averageschore of students from G2 decreased. The interaction GROUP × TIME was foundsignificant for SOUNDNESS, Wilks’s Lambda = .90, F(2, 88) = 10.99, p = .001:On average, scores on the SOUNDNESS measure decreased from phase 3 to phase4. It can be seen that on phase 3 students from G1 performed in the soundness mea-sure better than students from G2. However, this difference between the groupsvanishes as time unfolds to phase 4. It appears then that the Argumentative Mapmediated (according to three measures of arguments) the collective elaboration ofarguments better than the Pro–Con table. However, as mentioned earlier, the analy-sis of the third questionnaire (displayed in Table 1 as Phase 5) shows that the supe-riority of the collective argument for group G1 does not subsist after social interac-tion at the level of the individual.

DISCUSSION

Interpreting the findings of this study is a complex endeavor. The most salient find-ing is that, in general, all measures of individual arguments steadily increasedalong the successive argumentative activities. The first argumentative activity(reading texts together and discussing them) yielded better arguments and the sec-ond argumentative activity (constructing a map or a table to write a collective es-say) yielded an additional improvement in individual arguments. They were betterin the sense that they were gradually less one-sided and more compounded. Also,


TABLE 3Collective Reasons in Phase 3 (With Map

or Table) and Phase 4 (in the Essay)

G1 G2

Phase Measure M SD M SD

3 Soundness 5.69 .57 5.40 .803 Counter 2.36 .61 2.24 .613 Abstract 2.83 .80 2.53 .744 Soundness 5.19 .61 5.15 .844 Counter 1.72 .45 1.54 .694 Abstract 2.95 .60 2.17 .61


the reasons invoked were more relevant to the standpoint claimed and more accept-able. More reasons supporting alternative arguments were raised. Finally, the rea-sons invoked were more abstract. Moreover, no significant difference for any of thefour measures of arguments could be detected between the two groups.

As for collective arguments appearing in maps, tables, and essays, the fact that weconsidered the triad as a cognitive entity trivially caused the cumulative measures tobe higher. The number of reasons supporting alternative arguments and the numberof abstract reasons of the triad is naturally higher than the corresponding number foranyoneof itsmembersand thesameis true for thenumberofcounter-reasonsandab-stract reasons. As for the type and soundness of the arguments, these measures arenot cumulative. On the contrary, a larger number of reasons makes it more difficult toconstruct an argument with relevant and acceptable reasons. Table 3 shows that themeasure of soundness is higher than individual measures in Phases 1 and 2. Thisseemsto indicate thatduring theargumentativeactivities, the triadagreeduponargu-ments that took into consideration individual arguments and integrated them. We re-late the high score triads obtained for soundness to the norms of pluralism and criti-cal thinking that were accepted by all students that participated in the experiment.The collective knowledge of the triad is then not only a theoretical conceptualizationbut is quite realistic. The triads in G1 were significantly more able to take advantageof their maps to write a collective argument than the triads in G2 (with the Pro–Contables). However, the superiority of the argumentative map as a mediator for writinga better essay provides an ad hoc advantage: Not only are the measures of individualarguments expressed in questionnaires after the construction of the collective argu-ments lower than these of the collective arguments, but no significant difference be-tween G1 and G2 could be detected. This seems to indicate that although maps andtables helped represent arguments agreed upon by members of groups, individualstudents only partly internalized the collectively constructed arguments (via the me-diation of the tools) to construct their own arguments.

Table 2 shows that the “migration of knowledge” subsequent to the two argu-mentative activities is intense. At this point Table 4, which shows the source of col-lective knowledge reflected in the maps, tables, and essays. The sources of knowl-edge are computed for each student separately. For example, to compute the valueof PRIME for a specific student in the collective essay, we looked at the number ofreasons originally claimed by the student in this collective product. TheDATABASE and ACTIVITY measures are the same for all students of the sametriad: These are the reasons that appear in the collective products and that can bedirectly traced in the database (for DATABASE) or that cannot be traced in any ofthe three arguments in Q1 (for ACTIVITY).

Table 4 is difficult to interpret. On the one hand, if we hypothesize that the triadconstitutes a cognitive entity, Table 3 displays its “knowledge” and Table 4 displaysthesourcesof thisknowledge.Ontheotherhand,wedonothaveenoughinformationabout the role of each of the members of the triads. It is reasonable to suppose that in



some of the triads, at least one member did not take any responsibility and that insome cases, a dominant child hindered the participation of others. In such cases,identifying the triadasacognitiveentity ismeaningless. Inothercases inwhich thereis symmetry and alignment among participants in argumentative activities, thisidentification is justified.7 The findings in Table 4 are then only illustrative and sug-gestive of a “simmering blend” of arguments that develops along and after the argu-mentative activities. We list some conclusions alluded to in Table 4:

1. The low value of PRIME (M3 = 1.68, M4 = 1.38) in the collective products,as opposed to a higher value in the subsequent individual questionnaire in Phase 5(M5 = 2.12 as shown in Table 2), indicates that the triad abandons many reasonsbut that these reasons reappear later in the individual.

2. The number of appropriated reasons is relatively low (M3 = 1.64, M4 =1.27) if we bear in mind that the appropriated reasons are the reasons that were notcommon to all students at the beginning of the experiment. However, as mentionedbefore, the increase in the appropriation of reasons is noticeable between Phases 2and 5 (see Table 2), indicating that dissemination of consensual knowledge occurs.

3. The high value of ACTIVITY (M3 = 1.51, M4 = 1.23) in the collective prod-ucts shows that the triad constructs new ideas (reasons). These reasons are partlyused by individuals (M2 = 1.01, M5 = .99 in Table 2). This indicates that some ofthe reasons constructed and agreed upon in the elaboration of collective products“disappear” when students are invited to express their arguments on their own.

4. The low value of DATABASE indicates that the triad generates knowledgealong the argumentative activities. Generally, this generation of knowledge does


TABLE 4Sources of Collective Knowledge in Phase 3

(With Map or Table) and Phase 4 (in the Essay)

G1 and G2

Phase Source M SD

3 Prime 1.68 .854 Prime 1.38 .753 Appropriation 1.64 .974 Appropriation 1.27 .843 Activity 1.51 .504 Activity 1.23 .573 Database 0.95 1.974 Database 0.81 .61

7Baker (2000) characterized symmetry and alignment as necessary conditions under which argu-mentative activity leads to construction of knowledge.


not stem from a direct use of texts from the database, but rather develops throughtheir integration with previous knowledge.

This list describes the changes that occurred but does not suggest how thesechanges occurred. Table 1 showed the central findings of the study, namely the im-pressive improvement in the individual arguments. In accordance to the first theo-retical section, we hypothesize that this improvement originates from the argu-mentative moves triads undertook during the activities. However, this hypothesis istoo general and requires support through fine-grained analyses of case studies. Inthe next section, we present some excerpts from one triad that suggest how andwhy arguments generated and developed.

SUPPORT OF THE RESULTS FROMTHE QUANTITATIVE STUDY WITH A SPECIFIC TRIAD

Besides the overall progresses in the children’s arguments, one of the salient re-sults of the experiment is that many reasons initially expressed by individuals areabandoned in collective outcomes but some reappear further in the individual.Moreover, it appears that appropriation is not extremely frequent. What is then thenature of an interaction that causes people to “forget” their ideas, but momentarilyonly? How do children progress if they don’t appropriate others’ ideas? We claimthat in collective argumentative activities children often play a social game (thatwe call “socialization”) in which they pretend to agree, that playing this game isuseful for co-constructing new ideas, and that it helps individuals in further activi-ties. To illustrate this idea, we present some data from one triad of three fifth gradegirls (Ad, Ch, and Na) who belonged to G1.

1. Socializing by Pretending to Agree

To show the game, we first present the opinions of the three girls as expressed inthe first part of Q1:

Ad1: In my opinion, you should forbid experiments on animals because animalsare something that has a soul, and they are living creatures with flesh andbones. The experiments cause damage and discomfort.

Ch1: In my opinion, you should check the laboratories and the ingredients there.If they are not dangerous, it’s possible to do experiments, because it’s pos-sible to learn a lot from them.

Na1: You should forbid experiments on animals because they also have the rightto live.



It appears that the arguments expressed by Ad and Na are one-sided. Their reasonsare vague (animals are something with a soul, they are living creatures with fleshand bones) or makes sense (experiments cause damage and discomfort, they havethe right to live). Ch’s argument is not really compounded (and was coded astwo-sided), as an alternative is not expressed clearly. The reason she invokes (it’spossible to learn a lot from them) was judged as vague. Ad and Na have the samestandpoint, which differs from that of Ch. At the beginning of the second phase(reading and discussion of the written sources), the triad takes an interesting deci-sion, as reflected in the following excerpt:

Ch: We are for it (for performing experiments on animals).Ad: No! We are against!Na: Yeah! We are against!Ch: We are against. Right!

The three first turns matches Q1. The fourth turn shows that although Ch clearlyexpressed her standpoint for experiments on animals under certain conditionsand that she had reasons for this argument, it did not resist social conformity.Hence, here we have a clear example of pretending game, pretending to agree.We contend that the influence of this initial social argument was decisive for theelaboration of further arguments. As first evidence in support of this claim andto describe how arguments developed after the decision to hold a common opin-ion, we present the arguments each of the girls wrote in Q2 at the end of theircommon reading of written sources.

Q2Ad: You can do experiments but you should limit them. Experiments onanimals help people to live, and the animals were meant for that. On theother hand, experiments are damaging and animals suffer from them. Theexperiments can cause extinction of animals.Q2Ch: You can do experiments but you should limit them, because youmustn’t cause animals to become extinct because they also deserve to live.But you can make experiments to save human lives.Q2Na: You can do experiments but you should limit them, because it’s betterto experiment on animals and not on people. But if you experiment on ani-mals, the animals can go crazy and make a lot of damage. If you do experi-ments without limits, the animals will disappear.

The arguments reflect a consensus, as the standpoint “You can do experimentsbut you should limit them” appears verbatim in the three questionnaires. The argu-ments are compatible with the initial argument expressed by Ch, and none areone-sided anymore; they all contain reasons supporting both the for and against ex-periments. In Q2Ad and Q2Ch, these reasons are not well-integrated in the whole



argument but are superimposed (for this reason, they were coded as two-sided). InQ2Na, the sentence “If you do experiments without limits, the animals will disap-pear” indicates that the argument is compounded. Some of the reasons invoked arenot relevant to the standpoint raised. For example, in Q2Ad, “Experiments aredamaging and animals suffer from them” is not clearly relevant to the viewpoint“You can do experiments but you should limit them.” Also, the criterion of accept-ability is not fulfilled in several instances. For example, “The animals were meantfor that” (Q2Ad) and “[animals] make a lot of damage” (Q2Na) were not judged asacceptable reasons. In sum, it appears that the arguments in Q2 are two-sided orcompounded, but the measure of their soundness is not very high. As for the qual-ity of reasons, they were mostly judged as makes sense reasons, as for example,“Animals suffer from them” or “They [animals] also deserve to live.”

In summary, the social agreement expressed in the first excerpt is reflected in Q2.It explains the abandonment of individual reasons unacceptable when pretending toagree. The decision to be aligned perhaps originated from the concern to complywith thenorminstilledby the“Kishurimprogram”(Schwarz&Glassner, inpress) intheclass, toattempt to reachconsensus.But thisconformitymayalsoreflect theneedfor alignment, a condition Baker (2000) identified as facilitating the co-constructionof knowledge. We exemplify further in the next subsection how their further actionsconverged to strengthen “their” initial consensual argument toward the co-construc-tionofnewreasonswhilekeepingonplaying their socialgame(pretending toagree).

2. Relevance of Unacceptable Reasons ThroughSocialization Toward the Co-Construction of New Ideas

In the results section, we showed that new arguments (the variable ACTIVITY)frequently emerge from argumentative activities. Here we propose a possible ex-planation. The explanation is specific: Reasons that would not have been discussedif the children would not have pretended to agree became relevant to the children.More generally, we suggest that socialization enables considering many ideas inargumentative activities, even when the ideas are in conflict with the “consensus.”For this purpose, we observe here how the new reason “Experiments can cause ex-tinction of animals” emerged. This reason is not expressed either in the Q1 ques-tionnaires or in the texts the girls read. It appears in almost identical versions in thethree arguments in Q2. Surprisingly, this reason was expressed once only, when thetriad read the text “Not all the experiments really help humans. Not all the experi-ments have impact on humans. The body of animals is different from that of hu-mans” (T1). The protocol is as follows.

[The three girls read T1.]

T1Ch1: Nowadays you do too many experiments and they can harm animals.But there are some experiments that aren’t harmful. You can put limits



on experiments and also check the laboratories before the experiment tosee if the animals aren’t being tortured.

T1Ad2: Animals and humans have equal rights not to be used for experiments.For instance, if you take a new fruit with seeds or a new medicine andyou give it to animals, then the animals will suffer.

T1Na3: That’s right! Almost all animals are in danger of extinction because ofthose things.

T1Ad&Ch4: No!…No!T1Na5: You can’t go on like this. They also have their lives. It’s like if animals

would kill people if they were the rulers. There’s no reason why animalsshould suffer because they’re not developed like people and don’t havethe same technologies. Animals have four legs and they can’t get thesame things that people can. They don’t have computers or technology,but they also have the right to live.

T1Ad6: When you do experiments, there’s something that can grow in the brainor in the body and then the animals get wild, and you have to put them tosleep because they behave like monsters. Experiments can harm thebrain and the body of animals.

The reason “Experiments can cause extinction of animals” is mentioned in T1Na3.Ch and Ad immediately both reject it without any explanation (in T1Ch&Ad4).Scrutiny of the remainder of the protocol does not show any direct remnant of thisreason. Therefore, although this reason appears in Q2, the circumstances underwhichChandAdare“exposed” to itarenotagreementorconcession,but rejection.

We already saw that at the beginning of the discussion, the triad adopted a com-mon standpoint as a way to socialize. It seems that the idea of “extinction” was alsorejected as a way to socialize, as Na did not even try to defend it after both Ch and Adopposed her. The question is then why, although socialization should have elimi-nated the idea of “extinction,” this idea appeared later on without being raised any-more.Toanswer thisquestion,wereturn to thepresent (second)excerpt.T1suggeststhat experiments should be allowed only when they help humans. In T1Ch1, Ch[wrongly] capitalizes on T1 to claim that experiments should be allowed only whentheycannothurt animals, forexampleby“checking the laboratories.”Suchaclaimisa misinterpretation of T1 that triggers a very rich argumentative activity: In T1Ad2,Ad argues that experiments should be forbidden because animals and humans haveequal rights; in T1Na3, Na implicitly claims that experiments should be forbiddenbecause animals are in danger of extinction. From the point of view of the argumen-tative activity, the sequence T1Ch1 → T1Ad2 → T1Na3 does not have a clear struc-ture, as the three girls seem to juxtapose three different arguments. But the rejectioninT1Ch&Ad4is followedby twoarguments inwhichNaandAdattempt to integratereasons raised by their peers with their previous arguments. In T1Na5, Na develops alist of reasons to prohibit experiments on animals. Na uses the reason raised by Ad in



T1Ad2, “Animals and humans have equal rights” by saying “They also have theirlives” and “They also have the right to live.” The expressions “They don’t have thesame technologies” and “Animals have four legs and they can’t get the same thingsthat people can” seem to ground the reason “They have the right to live,” althoughthis link is not clearly articulated. Therefore, in T1Na5, Na makes two parallel ef-forts: to integrate previously expressed ideas and to be accepted (after the commonrejection in T1Ch&Ad4).

In T1Ad6, Ad also seems to be making an effort to integrate previous reasonsraised by Ch in T1Ch1. She elaborates on the suffering of animals. By using theterms brain and body, which are common to humans and animals, she implicitlycompares between their respective sufferings. The expression “to put them tosleep” she uses originates from the context of experiments in laboratories raised byCh only. Also, the expression “and also check the laboratories before the experi-ment to see if the animals aren’t being tortured” in T1Ch1 finds its natural continu-ation in imaginative descriptions of animals turning to monsters.

To summarize, after three turns in which each girl expressed her argument quiteindependently, and after the rejection of a reason, the two following turns were in-tegrative. We are now in a position to suggest a plausible interpretation for theadoption of the “extinction” reason in Q2, although it was raised only once in thediscussion and immediately rejected. As noted by Trognon (1993) and Schwarz(Schwarz et al., 2000), it often happens that one interlocutor offers the other a pieceof information that is going to take hold in her cognitive environment: The first in-terlocutor discovers the relevance of this information because it is a projection ofan intersubjective process, the debate between the interlocutors. As the reasonsraised by Na in T1Na5 are integrative and accepted, the reason uttered previouslyand rejected takes hold in the cognitive environment of the three girls. In otherwords, the changes arguments undergo are not always directly linked to external(discursive) actions that explain these changes.

3. Written Sources as Triggers for the Integration ofPersonal Experience in New Arguments

In the Results section we showed that generation of knowledge generally does notstem from a direct use of texts from the database in individual questionnaires (Ta-ble 2) and even in collective outcomes (Table 4) when the written sources are atreach. The excerpt we analyzed earlier (T1Ch1) showed that Ch initiated a discus-sion through a misinterpretation of the written source. Here we suggest more gen-erally that written sources are often only triggers that lead children to integrate per-sonal experience in argumentative activities. This is a reasonable explanation forthe low value of DATABASE, which measures the direct use of ideas from the tex-tual sources in subsequent argumentative activities. To strengthen this interpreta-tion already compatible with T1Ch1, we focus on a discussion that developed



when the triad read the text “A lot of research based on experiments on animals isused to find medication against cancer” (T2).

[Ch reads T2.]

T2Ch1: Did anybody in your family have cancer?T2Ad2: No.T2Na3: My grandfather … My grandfather.T2Ch4: My grandmother had cancer. And then they didn’t have medicines

for cancer…T2Ad5: Even now, nothing can cure it…T2Ch6: They [the scientists] are on the right track. Until it happens to you, I

mean until somebody from your family gets it, you don’t know what itis. Every year many people die from it. When my grandmother died,there was nothing yet to cure it. It’s a terrible disease. It’s a disease youhave to cure. And if the solution is that you have to use animals for it,then we’ll do it.

T2Ad7: But it’s like when you do experiments…T2Na8: It’s like when my grandfather … My father also had cancerT2Ad9: Just a minute. You do experiments, you give medicines, and you let him

live. But you kill the other guy. You kill the animals. It’s like you killsomebody so that somebody else will live…

T2Ch10: One cat dies, and 200 persons enjoy life.T2Na11: That’s right! And it’s better!

In this discussion, the triad as a whole began to change its officially one-sidedopinion. This excerpt shows that the reading of the text triggered a rich discussionat the end of which the triad agrees that animals must die to give life (T2Ad9,T2Ch10, T2Na11). This argument was not contained in T2. Rather, T2 mediatedthe discussion within the triad to lead to the final argument. Ch turned to her peersto know whether they have personal experience on the issue (T2Ch1). The per-sonal experience she and Na shared in the suffering of their grandparents led thetriad to feel obligated to find a solution (“It’s a disease you have to cure” inT2Ch6). In her last intervention, Ad, who did not share the emotional experienceof her peers, reformulates the reasons raised by Ch and Na in personal terms in anabstract way: “You let him live. But you kill the other guy. You kill the animals. It’slike you kill somebody so that somebody else will live….”

4. The Role of ArgumentativeMoves in the Change of Arguments

We already suggested an explanation for the high number of new arguments andreasons (the variable ACTIVITY) emerging from argumentative activities. The ex-



planation concerned a social role, argumentation as a social game. This role mayhelp in considering new perspectives but it does not explain their construction. Wesuggest here that besides its role of socialization, argumentation is a powerfulmechanism for construction of knowledge that explains to a large extent the in-crease in individual arguments (Table 1). For this purpose, we trace here the pro-gression in the individual arguments of the triad.

We already saw that in Q1, Ad and Na claimed an unconditional standpointagainst experiments on animals and at the beginning of the reading of the writtensources, they influenced Ch to align herself to this unconditional position, al-though she presented a more compounded position in Q1. In Q2, the members ofthe triad expressed that experiments must be done “with limitations.” Their argu-ments are two-sided or compounded and the reasons raised improve. We have herean opportunity to check our hypothesis about the fundamental role of argumenta-tive moves in the gradual improvement of arguments. It is impossible to distin-guish specific parts of the protocol that focus change of arguments, as all activitieswere designed to lead students to discuss and compare arguments. However, thesegments in which the unconditional position of the triad seems to be underminedare good places to study how changes occurred. We located two such segments.The first one develops through the reading of the text “Animals have the right tolive. Animals are humans’ best friends” (T6). The discussion begins with Ch’s de-scription of a movie she saw on TV in which a chimpanzee killed a man whoworked in the zoo. Policemen then killed the chimpanzee. Ch suggests that theworker certainly did “something mean” to the chimp. The triad goes on to developideas concerning the positive relation between apes and humans.

T6Na1: Because we originate from apes.T6Ch2: That’s not so sure.T6Ad3: Isn’t it?T6Ch4: Each one has his own theory.T6Ad5: Chimpanzees are our ancestors.T6Ch6: God said that He created humans and you don’t believe Him [pause].

They [the animals] are our food. In fact, we live thanks to them. That’swhy God created these animals so that we could live. In fact, animalsenable us to exist. One cow has everything that she can give to man.

T6Ad7: Yeah! Even since the time of the Bible, animals were our food.T6Na8: And also we brought them as sacrifices, and this was a real slaughter!T6Ad9: That was because it was in Biblical times and it was out of belief in God.

What scientists are doing are reasons [pause] … It’s investigating thingsthat only they invented. And we don’t know if it’s dangerous or not.

T6Ch10: We don’t have any alternative for food that comes from animals. But wecan find an alternative to experiments.



To focus on the changes in arguments we present the continuation of the discussionwhile the triad reads the next text, T7, whose content is “Experiments on animalsenabled scientists to develop medication against many diseases. An example ofsuch medication is antibiotics” (T7). Again, while discussing this text, studentsstray from the issue it raises.

T7Ch1: They’re right. Scientists are right for wanting to try the medicine onanimals before giving it to people. Because you can’t check a medi-cine on technological things. You must test it on living creatures andthe computer is not a living creature. So they’re right.

T7Ad2: Maybe they’re right. OK, they’re right. But let’s say that there wereno animals, there were only people, would they test it on people?

T7Ch3: When we want to eat, we have no problem to say, “I want schnitzel.”But when it comes to experimenting on animals to develop a medi-cine that saves us, then we must agree to this. We must do experi-ments on living creatures.

T7Ad4: Let’s say that there were never any animals. Wouldn’t you do experi-ments on people? Because you want to give medicine to people sothat they will be healthy. Right? They do experiments on animals be-cause they don’t want to do experiments on people.

T7Ch5: So why, when you want to eat something, you don’t think, “Oh no, I’meating meat” [pause]. You eat meat and you also cause animals to suf-fer.Youhave todoyourpartandbeavegetarianonly.Canyoudoit?

T7Na6: It’s not so easy to be a vegetarian!T7Ad7: Sometimes, we have to eat meat.T7Na8: When I am older and I’ll be responsible, I’ll be vegetarian.T7Ch9: But you already did the damage! You can’t repair the damage in 20

years when you’re older. You already did the damage for 20 years.T7Na10: The animals I eat are raised up especially for it [for food].T7Ad11: That’s wrong! You don’t explain it right! Because there are also peo-

ple who raise animals especially for experiments. Is that good? I ad-mit that I eat meat, but you have to think about the animals too.

T7Na12: We have to eat meat. It’s like that in nature also!T7Ch13: Imagine that there were no animals for experiments.T7Ad14: If there were no animals? There are plants, too. You can do experi-

ments on plants!

The succession of these two segments shows an interesting argumentative structure.First, to show the closeness between humans and animals (a fact agreed upon thethree girls), two “theories” are brought forward: “we originate from apes” (uttered inT6Na1 and in T6Ad5in a different version) and “God created these animals so we



could live” (T6Ch6). To prove her argument, Ch asserts, “They [animals] are ourfood” and “One cow has everything that she can give to man” (T6Ch6). Ad and Na,who probably feel that this argument threatens their unconditional standpoint re-gardingexperimentsonanimals, answer that this relation toanimalsstemsfromBib-lical times (T6Ad7, T6Na8, and T6Ad9). In T6Na8, Na challenges the “Biblical ar-gument” by reminding that animals were also slaughtered as sacrifices: In otherwords, in Biblical times, people killed animals not for the sake of humans but for sac-rifices. In T6Ad9, Ad seems both to reject Na’s challenge by showing its irrelevanceto the present time (“it was out of belief in God”) and to counterchallenge Ch’s chal-lenge by showing its irrelevance to the present issue (“What scientists are doing arereasons” and “We don’t know if it’s dangerous or not”). In T6Ch10, Ch defends her-self against Ad’s counterchallenge by showing the relevance of her argument to thepresent issue. Her claims “We don’t have any alternative for food that comes fromanimals” and “But we can find an alternative to experiments” reframe her argumenttomodern times.Shemakesexplicit the relevanceof“animalsasour food” toexperi-ments on animals, even if she argues this is not the same.

Later on, this relevance is well-internalized: Just after reading T7 concerningexperiments on animals that led to the invention of antibiotics, she affirms “Scien-tists are right … Because you can’t check a medicine on technological things”(T7Ch1). This is as if she challenges the argument she uttered in T6Ch10! Becauseit was accepted, Ch can now object that in fact, there is no alternative to experi-ments on living creatures. Ad partly concedes to this “challenge” in T7Ad2 (“Maybe they’re right”), but counterchallenges it by suggesting a hypothetical world inwhich there are no animals. In T7Ch3, Ch responds to this counterchallenge byagain bringing up the issue of eating meat to conclude “We must do experiments onliving creatures.” T7Ad4 is a clearer reformulation of T7Ad2. In T7Ch5, Ch reiter-ates the answer she gave in T7Ch3 but also adds that eating animals involves abuse.She brings forward an ad hominem argument and asks Ad whether she can be veg-etarian. In T7Na6, Na reinforces Ch’s argument by admitting that being vegetarianis difficult. The utterances of T7Ad7, T7Na8, and T7Ch9 are a progressive aware-ness that being vegetarian is not a universal solution. In T7Na10, Na tries to defendthe prohibition of experiments on animals, although they are used as food, byclaiming that “The animals I eat are raised up especially for it [for food].” Ad re-jects this defense in T7Ad11 by answering that animals are also brought up for ex-periments. In fact, this rejection is the penultimate nail in the coffin of the prohibi-tion to do experiments on animals. Ad concedes indirectly that experiments mustbe done but adds, “You have to think about the animals too.” In T7Na12, Na incor-porates the idea that animals are our food but to challenge Ch, as she asserts, “Wehave to eat meat. It’s like nature also!” In T7Ch13, Ch is seemingly not satisfiedwith Ad’s indirect concession and with Na’s last challenge and makes the very ob-jection Ad raised in T7Ad2! But this time, Ad (who probably feels that the objec-tion is directed at her) gives the answer that “You can make experiments on



plants!” We have every reason to think that this answer did not satisfy the triad andnot even Ad: Experiments on plants are not alluded to in the rest of the discussion.Rather, the triad reads other texts with the common standpoint that experimentsmust be done but under limitations.

In summary, we saw in these two excerpts that the changes in the positions ofthe members of the triad evolved mainly through argumentative moves such aschallenges and counter-challenges. Explicit concessions were rare, but it appearsthat children often internalized previous challenges to modify their argumentsaccording to these challenges. The need to socialize led Ch to preserve the com-mon argument against experiments while “discussing” T6. However, her inter-ventions made the issue “animals are our food” relevant to further discussions. Itis only then, when the ground is more favorable, that she brings forward her ini-tial argument on experiments with limitations and sustains a rich argumentativeactivity. However, even then, integration is important as Ch uses previous utter-ances used by peers (e.g., T7Ad2 recycled in T7Ch13) to co-construct new argu-ments. In contrast to its social role noted earlier, which facilitates the consider-ation of new ideas, argumentation was shown here as a reasoning mechanismthat describes knowledge construction.

We now present how the arguments raised and discussed while reading textsare capitalized on when the triad engages in the production of collective out-comes, the Argumentative Map, and the collective essay. A short analysis ofthese outcomes and their relations with previous activities will shed more lighton the role of the Argumentative Map and the essay in the fluctuations individ-ual outcomes underwent. However, the role of the Argumentative Map and ofthe collective essay in the common activity of the triad is not analyzed here tokeep the length of this article reasonable.

5. Collective Outcomes and Abstract Reasons

Tables 1 and 3 show that reasons become more abstract in the course of the experi-ment, but that the peak concerning abstractness is reached in the collective Argu-mentative Map and the Pro–Con table. Moreover, although the collective Argu-mentative Map was more abstract than the collective Pro–Con table, thissuperiority did not subsist in Q3. Abstractness is a general feature in collectivework: For example, Schwarz (1995) showed that dyads collaborating to solveproblems create more abstract representations. And indeed, the ArgumentativeMap displayed in Figure 1 shows that five out of the six reasons raised and thestandpoint are abstract. For example, the reason “Experiments endanger species”and the standpoint “Limitations to experiments on animals” express abstract ideasin general terms. The only reason that was not coded as abstract, “The torture wesaw on TV shocked us terribly,” is not really expressed as a make sense reason butin general terms. Although reasons are abstract, the question is whether the Map



represents the abstraction of an argument. We suggest that the triad used the Argu-mentative Map not so much to represent the structure of their collective argument,but more to represent some dialectical aspects. For example, some reasons raisedduring the argumentative activity are not inserted in the Map, like the fact that “oneexperiment can save many lives.” Also, “Some people think that experiments onanimals should be allowed, and some think differently” is not a reason that sup-ports the standpoint “Experiments on animals should be limited.” This is a remarkthat evidences, in a fuzzy way, that the triad is aware that there are different opin-ions. The other “reasons” invoked focus exclusively on attacks on uncontrolled ex-periments on animals, and do not allude to reasons that directly support experi-ments. The triad links the “Limitation on experiments on animals” to theperspective of the extinction of species. According to the triad, the danger of ex-tinction originates from the hypothesis that some people seem to think that humansand animals do not have the same rights. The link from this hypothesis to “Theopinion of these people hurts animals” is similar to the link to “Experiments en-danger species.” Such a triangular link and the fact that only some reasons are dis-played in the Argumentative Map provide evidence that this map does not reflect acomplete “internal” argument. Rather, the triangular (cyclic) link and general rea-sons such as “Some people think that experiments on animals should be allowed,and some think differently” seems to indicate that the triad used the ArgumentativeMap as a mediator for the construction and evaluation of their collective argument.

6. The Collective Outcomes as Mediatorsof High-Level but Evanescent Arguments

A comparison between Tables 2 and 4 shows that despite the steady increase in thequality of individual arguments, these arguments are less elaborated than the col-lective arguments. We already showed that the Argumentative Map does not ex-actly represent an argument but a tool to elaborate an argument. We show here thatit helped in writing a rich collective essay, but we suggest that this outcome is eva-nescent, in the sense that individuals cannot easily reconstitute it. Here we presentthe collective essay. (The standpoint is underlined. Reasons are italicized and num-bered. Grounds for reasons are followed by a number designating the relevant rea-son and an asterisk.)

Experiments on animals must be limited. Experiments on animals are justi-fied, but the number of animals has to be limited because animals have theright to live like humans (1). Animals feel pain like humans (2), and there-fore, we need to understand them (2). There are facts that prove that in exper-iments, animals are abused (3), like painful injections without painkillers(3*). But with all this, we need to continue experiments because animals aremade for this (4) and because without experiments, humankind cannot de-



velop (5) and medicine will not progress (6). On the other hand, animalshave feelings like humans (2) and we need to bear this in mind (2). The ex-periments on animals for the development of medication for humans cansave lives of sick people where no medication has been found yet, such ascancer (6*). But we have to diminish the number of animals experimentedon to avoid their extinction (7).

The essay shows a well-articulated argument supported by seven reasons.One reason is uttered four times (2). Some reasons are grounded (3 and 6).The grounds in 6* can be understood as a reason in itself, but this ambiguitydoes not modify the number of different reasons. We argue that the collectiveargument in the essay is of high quality. First, clearly, it is compounded, asthe triad evokes alternatives and chooses to conciliate between them. Sound-ness is high: All seven reasons are relevant to the standpoint raised. Only thereasons “animals are made for this” (4) and “to avoid their extinction” (7)were judged as unacceptable.

As the general standpoint tends to allow experiments, in order to count the num-ber of reasons supporting counter-arguments, we counted the number of reasonsagainst experiments. There are four such reasons: 1, 2, 3, and 7.

As for the quality of reasons, Reasons 1, 5, 6, and 7 are formulated in an abstractway. Reason 2 was judged as a make sense reason. Reason 3 was judged as a con-sequential reason. Only reason 4 was judged as vague.

The collective argument is of a high level, as reflected by its type, its sound-ness, the number of counter-reasons, and the quality of its reasons. As alreadymentioned, in general, when writing the collective argument, G1 triads capital-ized better on the Argumentative Map they constructed than G2 triads onPro–Con tables. However, at least in the case of the present triad, the relationsbetween the argumentative map and the collective essay are not simple: The Ar-gumentative Map does not include any reason supporting experiments on ani-mals but rather reasons supporting their limitation or their prohibition (1, 3, and7). It seems as if the Argumentative Map represents the defense of an initial ar-gument adopted by the triad (being against experiments) although they changedtheir standpoint. It would make this article unreasonably long if we were to re-port here on the analysis of the mediation of the Argumentative Map on the col-lective essay (through the analysis of the verbal protocol of the triad during thewriting of the collective essay). For the same reason, we do not report here onthe fluctuations of individual knowledge between Q2 and Q3 and on the rela-tions between individual and collective knowledge between Q2, the collectiveessay, and Q3. However, we suggest that the decrease in the level of the argu-ments from the collective stages (3 and 4) to the final individual stage shows thatthe collective outcomes are juxtapositions or partial ideas rather than well-articu-lated collective arguments. These collective outcomes are evanescent. This find-



ing is compatible with other research in which it was shown that mediationalmaps have been shown as not well-internalized in further activities (Roth &Roychoudhury, 1993).

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Scrutiny of the changes that individual and collective arguments-outcomes under-went through the successive activities gave partial information on construction ofknowledge in and after argumentative activities. Individuals appropriated reasonsfrom peers in their triads and abandoned reasons as a result of collective argumen-tative activities. The measures of individual arguments increased after theintragroup argumentative activities. This general trend matches the findings ob-tained by Kuhn and colleagues (Kuhn et al., 1997) according to which students en-gaged in argumentative activities take more alternatives into consideration. But thefact that acceptability and relevance (the variable SOUNDNESS) increased, al-though students incorporated more reasons in their individual arguments, suggeststhat during the argumentative activities there was an effort by the group to integrateand conciliate diverse reasons.

A comparison of the measures of arguments in Phases 2, 4, and 5 (in Tables 2 and4)shows that there isan increase fromPhase2 toPhase4,butadecrease fromPhase4to Phase 5, although all measures in Phase 5 are higher than in Phase 2. This generaltendency is comprehensible. On the one hand, the collective arguments in Phase 4are outcomes of actions undertaken in collaboration. Collaboration lessens cogni-tive load on individuals, leading to collective arguments of a higher quality. On theotherhand,when the triaddissolves, the individual isoftennotable to reconstituteanargument in whose construction only he or she participated.

It seems that theadvantage triadsgained fromtheiruseof theArgumentativeMapover those that used Pro–Con tables is not reflected in the individual, as indicated inthe results from the third questionnaire (at Phase 5). This may suggest that the use ofthe Argumentative Map was not internalized, or simply, that the internalization thatfollowed from its use did not outweigh the gains from the use of Pro–Con tables.

Obviously, our hypotheses on the mental states of students using tools mediat-ing the construction and evaluation of arguments need to be grounded in furtherqualitative research. In our research program, we presently opt for a sequentialanalysis of the interactions among peers within triads, and on the role of the arti-facts at their disposal in the process of construction and evaluation of collective ar-guments. The quantitative analysis stressed in this article uncovers some of themechanisms that explain the impressive improvement of arguments. We identifiedthe mechanism of socialization, in which peers pretend to agree on an initial argu-ment as a way to elaborate new arguments, although this socialization does not re-flect the personal opinion of the members of the triad. This socialization enabled



further argumentative moves (challenging, counter-challenging, conceding, etc.)that led peers to co-construct new arguments. Argumentation the plays two com-pleting roles. The first is social; it allows playing a game. The second concerns rea-soning and helps in changing opinions and arguments. The complementarity ofthese two roles seems crucial to lead to construction of new knowledge. Anothermechanism we identified is the role of written sources as triggers for leading stu-dents to integrate their personal experience in argumentative activities.

The positive findings in the present research results should be compared withother research on correlation between argumentative activities and construction ofknowledge, which indicate detrimental effects. For example, when individuals arepresented with written sources of which some confirm and some contradict theirpersonal standpoint, they may tend to be progressively more one-sided (Lord,Ross, & Lepper, 1979). When two arguers aim to win, the quality of their argu-ments may tend to decrease (Stein & Miller, 1993). Also, participants engaged insuccessive individual argumentative activities tend to elaborate less accurate argu-ments (Wilson & Schooler, 1991). It appears then that argumentation may or maynot lead to construction of knowledge, critically depending on the context in whichthe argumentative activities take place. We contend that some of the most criticalcontextual features that may affect or help construction of knowledge are the mo-tives (in an Activity Theory sense) of the participants and the norms of argumenta-tion. If the motive is to win, or to think harder, the effect may be detrimental. In thepresent experiment, students were invited to negotiate arguments. Their motivewas to reach consensual arguments and it is in the light of this motive that benefi-cial effects should be viewed.

Moreover, we suggest that the beneficial effects of the argumentative activities inthis experiment stem also from another contextual feature of argumentative activi-ties, which concerns the argumentative norms of the participants. We already men-tioned that this study was conducted within a program that valorizes both pluralismand critical reasoning. So, for example, students listen to each other, but at the sametime are critical to the arguments expressed by themselves or by their peers. Such ar-gumentative norms particularly favor the co-construction arguments.

An important additional lesson that must be drawn from this study concernsmethodology for research on argumentation. We integrated quantitative and qualita-tive methodologies that reflect two sides of argumentation—a set of skills and an ac-tivity. This integration allowed us to identify mechanisms that explained effects thatwere found significant. For example, we identified how socialization could lead tothe emergence of new arguments rejected during interaction, because they simplytake hold in the cognitive environment of the children. We could also explain whytexts were rarely appropriated: We observed that they triggered discussions in whichchildren capitalized on personal experience. The findings drawn from the quantita-tive method were necessary, as the mechanisms to be identified cannot be too spe-cific, and can only explain general trends. But in the case of argumentation, there is



more than the quite trivial claim according to which qualitative and quantitativemethodologies lead to deeper interpretations. The quantitative methodology relatedto argumentation as a set of skills (as reflected in the coding scheme) and the qualita-tivemethodologyrelated toargumentationasadiscursiveactivity.The integrationofthe two methodologies is a way to grasp the links between argumentative skills andargumentative activity.

A last important remark concerns the link between the methodology adoptedand the positive results obtained. We already reported the apparent incoherence be-tween research findings concerning the effects of argumentative activities on indi-vidual arguments (Lord et al., 1979; Wilson & Schooler, 1991). This study, as wellas other recent studies, suggests that the incoherence is apparent. To begin with,Davenport and Howe (1999) showed that children obtain partial benefits from peerinteraction, receiving support in problem solving or strategic understanding butnot in both. In contrast, when in dyadic interaction, collaborative problem solvingis followed by a tutoring session in which tutors prompt understanding of the prob-lem solving and hence, gains are more accentuated (Davenport, Howe, & Noble,2000). The same beneficial effect of chaining activities occurs for adults engagedin “wisdom” issues with peers AND “individual appraisal” as compared to socialinteraction only (Staudinger & Joos, 2000). This is because individuals engaged insuccessive discussions do not have enough opportunities to integrate ideas raisedduring discussion (see Schwarz, 2000, for a research review). And indeed, in thestudies showing detrimental effects of social interaction in argumentation, discus-sions did not alternate with individual sessions. In this study, individuals filled thesame questionnaire before, between, and after collective argumentative activities.It is quite reasonable to suggest that the individual activity of filling the question-naires, which served to measure individual knowledge, helped them to integratetheir own arguments. It appears that the methodology adopted unexpectedly shednew light on the very complex issue of the link between argumentative activitiesand the construction of knowledge.

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APPENDIX: THE TEXTS IN THE DATABASE

T1: Not all the experiments really help humans. Not all the experiments haveimpact on humans. The body of animals is different from that of humans.

T2: A lot of research based on experiments on animals is used to find medica-tion against cancer.

T3: The development of new technologies for the sake of humans means pre-liminary experiments on animals.

T4: Laika is the first dog sent into space, long before the first man.T5: To invent new candies, scientists used rats to check whether they were safe

for humans.T6: Animals have the right to live. Animals are humans’ best friends.T7: Experiments on animals enabled scientists to develop medication against

many diseases. An example of such medication is antibiotics.T8: Experiments are often done on animals to develop weapons.T9: Inmedicineschools,studentslearnalotbyundertakingexperimentsonanimals.

T10: Therearecomputerprogramsthathelp in learningsometopics inmedicine.



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