plans and economies: defending the plantation city of londonderry

ORDNANCE

In seventeenth-century inventories (Scott et al. 2008,222ff) there are references to pieces of ‘brass’2 of variouscalibres in Londonderry, none of which survive; all ofthese, in particular the ‘brass’ demi-cannon brought byDocwra in 1600 (Kelly 2003, 43), plus a culverin andfalcon,3 have long since been recycled. Nevertheless,the city boasts one of the most impressive and best-provenanced assemblages of seventeenth-centuryartillery in Britain and Europe, and it is the fact thatguns sent by the City of London between 1620 and1642 were of cast iron that has been a major factor intheir survival.

While bronze ordnance had a high productioncost but could be recycled easily, cast iron was cheap tomake and could be discarded, or put to use as ballast forships or as street furniture. Unlike the ubiquitous oresof iron in Britain and Ireland, those of copper and tinare comparatively rare—hence more expensive—sothat, compared with bronze, cast iron was consideredcheap. In the 1570s iron ordnance was priced between£10 and £12 per ton, while bronze fetched £40 to£60 (e.g. Oppenheim 1988, 159). In 1595, estimates ofequipping one ship with twenty bronze culverinsallowed just over £68 per ton, and 24 cast-iron guns at£10 5s per ton (Teesdale 1991, 108). In 1620, new cast-iron ordnance was still being sold for 12s per cwt, £12per ton (as in the consignment of guns sent forCulmore in 1620: Scott et al. 2008, 105ff). Even in1642, when the various Great Companies boughtordnance for Londonderry following the shock ofOctober 1641, all but one of these cast-iron guns werepriced at 13s 6d per cwt, £13 10s 0d per ton,4 while alittle earlier, in 1640, the Crown paid John Browne justover £160 per ton for bronze guns for the Sovereign ofthe Seas (Edwards 2000, 95), and in 1646 he was paid

£170 per ton for a ‘brass’ mortar (Scott et al. 2008, 202).So, in choosing cast iron over bronze, were the

Londoners cutting corners? Bronze always had itsadvantages over cast iron, particularly in terms ofweight, something valued especially when it came toproviding ordnance for ships. A 10% tin-bronze has adensity of around 8.8gm/cm3, while the seventeenth-century cast-iron guns of Londonderry (taken as goodrepresentatives of contemporary English gunfounding)have a value centring around 7.0gm/cm3, slightly lowerthan modern foundry practice produces normally(Scott et al. 2008, 187–8). So it would seem that a cast-iron piece should weigh less than its bronzecounterpart. As cast iron is brittle, however, and doesnot have the tensile strength of bronze, any givencalibre of bronze gun could be cast in slighterproportions than its iron counterpart. Thus, forexample, in 1642 William Eldred wrote that a ‘brass’saker would weigh roughly in the region of1,500–1,700lb, with its iron counterpart around2,500lb (Eldred 1646, 11). Indeed, when thechangeover from bronze to iron guns was under wayfully in the 1650s, the decks of naval vessels had to bestrengthened to support the extra weight (Brown 2004,124).

In addition, ‘brass’ guns were much less likely to failcatastrophically, the usual form of failure being ‘droop’or a tear fracture,5 usually not the burst—so feared withcast iron—that would spray the immediate area withlethal shrapnel.6 This is not to say that cast-iron gunswere ineffective, for indeed those cast reasonably welldid the job for which they were intended veryefficiently.7 But by and large, until the middle of theseventeenth century, where there was an option, bronzewas the material of choice, at least amongst those onthe front line.

A further factor to be considered is that unlike cast

The Journal of Irish Archaeology Volume XX, 2011 141–154

Plans and economies: defending the Plantation city ofLondonderry1

B. G. Scott

The Livery Companies of London—with a fair degree of unwillingness—bore the costs of construction of the encirclingwalls of the new city of Londonderry, with their bastions designed specifically to take ordnance. And strong walls withmounted ordnance made a statement of power and prestige, especially important when Plantation was imposed onunwelcoming territory. Virtually since the last stone of the walls of the city was put in place, there have been criticismsboth of their form and of the limited expenditure on the accompanying ordnance and its accessories. These can becondensed down (albeit somewhat simplistically) to the suggestion that Londonderry—a frontier city, almost anexperiment—was built dangerously ‘on the cheap’. Nevertheless, although corners were indeed cut, when seen in thecontext of the military threat to English settlers and forces in north-western Ulster at the start of the seventeenthcentury the result was still a viable set of defensive measures that proved entirely fit for purpose for over a century.

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iron, which really only had worth when formed into anartefact, bronze had a high scrap value and thus cannonwere potential targets for those with acquisitivetendencies and good lifting and transport capabilities.Brown (2004) has reminded us that, where possible,during the seventeenth century the Board of Ordnancewas replacing bronze guns in land fortifications withtheir cast-iron counterparts. For similar reasons, theEast India Company changed from bronze to cast-ironguns on their ships as soon as they could. Thus, whilethe supply of cast-iron ordnance rather than bronzemight be indicative of cost-cutting on the part of theCity of London, another motive would have been thelessening of temptation for their light-fingeredemployees—a policy that history shows could havebeen more rigorously enforced, especially in the earlydays of the Ulster Plantation.8

Clearly a batch of ten guns sent in 1620 by theCity of London for the defence of Culmore was abespoke order, filled by the merchant Edmond Turvill,who likely commissioned them from John Browne,gunfounder to the king. We have five pieces bearing theshield of the City of London cast in, and the calibres arein accord with those in a royal warrant of 19 July 1620(NA SP39/12). In contrast, fifteen guns sent in early1642 in response to pleas for assistance following theoutbreak of the Irish rebellion were a job lot boughthurriedly. They came probably from the Tower Wharfmarketplace—through Samuel Ferrers, agent for JohnBrowne, the sale being organised by the merchantWilliam Felgate, Warden of the Skinners Company(Scott et al. 2008, 123, table 7). With the exception ofthe Skinners, each of the eleven contributingcompanies paid the going rate of 13s 6d per cwt, andall had their names and the date 1642 engraved on

them. But between 1620 and 1642 there was constantargument over whether city or Crown should supplynot only ordnance but also carriages and‘appurtenances’.

We can be sure that the figures of £236 plus £40proffered by Sir Thomas Phillips in his ‘Collection’ forexpenditure up to 1629 on ordnance9 and carriagesrespectively (Chart 1928, 129) are a grossunderestimate. His allowance for carriages would noteven have covered the 1620 Culmore consignment, therecords showing that the carpenter John Horton waspaid £59 1s 0d for ten carriages (NA WO49/48, f.137v, dated 1 December 1619). Although Sir TobyCaulfeild noted only ten guns in the city in 1628, the1620 consignment, which cost £145 19s 0d, was still inCulmore. Including then ‘searching’ and proofing, fees,all of the costs of transport and the ‘appurtenances’(shot, powder, gunners’ accessories), the total cost risesto £331 12s 0d. If we project the same spread ofcalibres for the guns in the city (including the ordnancebrought by Docwra), we see that Phillips underplayedexpenditure significantly in his campaign to vilify theLondoners.

Certainly, the city inherited ordnance broughtover originally by Sir Henry Docwra, now representedby a demi-culverin and a saker with rose-and-crownemblems, one cast in 1590 by Thomas Johnson. TheCrown evidently felt that this formed a part of itscontribution towards the defence of the Plantation. Itis likely also that cannon seized by Docwra at BurtCastle, Co. Donegal, were absorbed into the Derryartillery park, while those deployed at Dunalong wouldhave returned once the fort went out of use around1615. Since the original terms agreed between city andCrown were totally vague in terms of how the defence

142 B. G. Scott

Fig. 1—Exaggerated depiction of ‘muzzle droop’ in a brass twelve-pounder by Robert Mallet (1856, pl. iv, facing p. 45).

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of their mutual interests might be organised andfinanced, it is hardly surprising that the city tried ashard as it could to minimise the costs of theirinvolvement in the Plantation, costs that they werehaving increasing difficulty in justifying commercially.And it does seem that the Crown, in the person of theearl of Strafford, regarded the artillery in the city as atits disposal, since the evidence (albeit circumstantial)suggests that most of it was commandeered andremoved, possibly in the earlier part of 1640, for thearmy intended for use against the Scots (Scott et al.2008, 119–20).

THE WALLS

In 1705 the French military engineer Jean Thomas,who at that time held a position in the Irish Office ofOrdnance (Loeber 1981, 41), prepared a report at therequest of the duke of Ormond on the state of theLondonderry defences (Scott, forthcoming). Havingdescribed the dilapidation of the walls, gates and ditch,he submitted a series of proposals to bring them up tothe standard required to resist attack by a well-preparedand experienced army of Continental standard,10

remarking that at the time they had served their basicpurpose to ‘… protect the colony of merchants fromthe assaults of envious papists and the fear of traitors inthe establishment’. But he went on to warn that therewould be ‘… cause to fear battle-hardened enemieswho are very well supplied, [since] it is certain that thefort as it is will not be able to hold for four days under

attack’.11 His analysis of the city as weakly fortified anddominated by higher ground was not new, and is onethat has been repeated on many occasions, perhapsmost famously by Macauley (1861, III, 56),12 whowrote of Londonderry that

‘… the parapets and towers were built after afashion which might well move disciples of Vaubanto laughter; and these feeble defences were onalmost every side commanded by heights’.

Thomas identified as the principal vulnerabilitiesof Londonderry its slight walls, exposure to fire fromhigher ground, the lack of defence for the high groundaround the Windmill and the failure to exploit properlythe extensive marshes, one of the useful defensivefeatures13 of the area originally noted by Docwra (NASP63/207, pt VI, no. 84/1). He is an interestingcharacter in his own right,14 a Huguenot who foundhimself in the French army training as an engineerunder the legendary Sebastien Le Prestre de Vauban,and who served on the French side at the first siege ofNamur in 1692. Later, however, he claimed thatbecause of religious discrimination he had transferredhis loyalties to the Dutch side and the army of Williamof Orange. There he was on the staff of another of thegreat European military engineers of the lateseventeenth century, Menno van Coehoorn, and waspresent when the Allies won back Namur through thesecond siege in 1695.

Following his report on Londonderry, Thomasproduced a study on the construction of canals and

Plans and economies: defending the Plantation city of Londonderry 143

Fig. 2—Le tir à ricochet, the technique devised by Vauban using a low-velocity shot to cause maximum damage to guns and their crews(after Faucherre 1986).


lock gates, including their defensive uses, a subjectwhich evidently he had studied in detail.15 And it issurely no coincidence that both Vauban and Coehoorn,under whom he learnt his trade, were exponents of theuse of water barriers in defensive architecture. Theinfluence of Vauban is clear, too, from the way in whichThomas advocated the exploitation of proposedmeasures against shot fired at different velocities. Hisparapets would be clad so that they ‘… will cause themost violent shot to rebound, and will absorb andengulf those which strike at a slower speed …’, withtraverses added appropriately to block low-velocityshot. It was Vauban who capitalised on the fact that acannon-ball lobbed into defensive works using areduced powder charge—le tir à ricochet—could doterrible damage to both men and guns by prolongedricochet below head height (Fig. 2). He seems to haveemployed the technique first at the siege ofPhillipsburg, Baden-Württemberg, in 1688, and later atthe ‘perfect’ siege of Ath in Belgium in 1697 (Goulon,104; Faucherre 1986, 45). Thus it seems noexaggeration to suggest that Thomas was bringingconsiderable and expert European perspective to thequestions of the deficiencies of the defences of the cityand how they could be improved.

By 1685 the area of bog on the northern flank of

the city had been reduced by drainage and had becomeless impassable, with clear passages across—as can beseen on a watercolour map of Londonderry and itsimmediate surrounds of that year by Thomas Phillips(Pl. 1). Jean Thomas envisaged that serious attack by anarmy well organised and led would come from the areaof the Windmill, the direction of modern Bishop StreetWithout, and towards the ravelin16 that had beenconstructed at Bishop’s Gate (Logue and O’Neill2006). And, of course, it was the area of the Windmillthat saw some of the bitterest fighting during the siegeof 1689.

Such attacks Thomas saw as being supported byartillery from the high ground across the morass to thenorth, a distance of around 300–350m, comfortablywithin the accurate range of the smooth-bore artilleryof the time. To counter this, he proposed a complexcitadel on the Windmill Heights and outworks acrossthe marsh, connected by covered ways, that would holdthe high ground to the north and command themarshy area in between (Pl. 2). A key feature of hisscheme were the dykes and sluices at either end of the‘valley’ of marshy ground and water-meadowbelonging to the bishop of Londonderry, a partlydrained area running from one side of the bend in theFoyle to the other. By means of sluice-gates it could be

144 B. G. Scott

Pl. 1—Map of Derry and its immediate surrounds by Thomas Phillips, dated 1685 (BL K Top 54/31, modified to fit; courtesy of theTrustees of the British Library).


flooded in times of attack, with the dykes retaining thewater at low tide, and then drained again both to avoidthe danger of ‘… stagnant water close to a town[which] exhales malign vapours which corrupt the air’and to allow the land once again to be used for thebenefit of the town. Such schemes were a speciality ofVauban’s. Thomas noted that the idea of a waterobstacle there was not an original concept but oneproposed in original plans that envisaged the diggingof a proper canal some 10m wide and 2m deep alongthe length of the ‘valley’, with the flow of watercontrolled by two major sluice-gates. His attribution ofthe scheme stated (f. 4) that

‘Captain Phillips who was the Director ofFortifications when the Society of the Londoners[i.e. the Honourable the Irish Society] built thistown, had planned from then on to turn it into anisland by means of a canal which he proposed todig in the marsh’.

Again, the idea of taking in the Windmill area was nota new one, as Thomas Phillips in 1625 had proposed adefensive enclosure here (illustrated by Raven) that wasnever built, while the defenders of 1689 had thrown upoutworks around the area (Scott et al. 2008, 80, figs53–4). But in each of these schemes there was nodominance of the ground, leaving its holding to salliesforth by the defenders from within the main city walls

to meet specific threats. Neither addressed the problemof artillery fire from the high ground overlooking thecity.

We have no record of the original design for thecity defences, but Curl (2000, 82) has suggested that afirst version was brought over by George Smithes17 andMathias Springham when they made their‘investigation’ on behalf of the Irish Society in 1613.Indeed, these worthies reported to the CommonCouncil of the City of London (Carter, f. 343) that theyhad

‘... taken great care and paynes concerning thefortification to be made at Derry and have viewedthe ground for the same, and thereupponconferred and advised with Captaine Panton anddivers others of speciall note and good experience,who also saw and trod out the same ground,whose oppinions being 10 in number ... and theyadvised that the fortification should not be gonein hand withall till stone lyme and other materiallswere provided and a great quantitie thereof to belaid in place and made readie for that work and forthe charge thereof readie uppon conference withyou for an estimate of the same’.

Sir Thomas Phillips, however, was at this time anenthusiastic proponent of plantation and had initiateddefences to protect his Coleraine settlement. He was an


Pl. 2—The 1705 proposals of Ing. Jean Thomas for the improvement of the Londonderry defences (NA MPHH 1/282/10, modified tofit; courtesy of the National Archives).


experienced soldier who had spent some twenty yearsin action in France before serving in Ireland fromaround 1598–9 (Moody 1939b, 251). Despite not beingmentioned by Smithes and Springham, his work atColeraine, coupled with the testimony of EngineerThomas, makes it likely that, if not the person whodrew up the first plans, he exerted major influence(infra). It is likely also that three of the ‘divers others’were Sir Edward Doddington (Loeber 1981, 47–8),Thomas Raven and Captain (later Sir) John Vaughan,survivor of the sack of Derry in 1608 and described byCarew as its ‘principal re-edifier’. Sir Henry Docwra,whose original fortifications from 1600 still survived,had been appointed provost of Derry in 1604 (McGurk2006, 231f.), and in early 1611 the Londoners agreedwith him the surrender of his provostship (Cal. SPI1611–1614, 39, Sir Oliver Lambert to the PrivyCouncil, May 1611). Again, it would seem not unlikelythat at the same time his opinion was sought on thedefence of the new city. In short, it can be suggestedthat Captain Panton’s XI comprised military men wellfamiliar with the manner and problems of fighting inIreland and having wider Continental experience.

What is of particular interest in this regard is thatthe defences for the new city ignored the originalsestablished by Docwra. In the wake of the sack ofDerry during the rebellion by Sir Cahir O’Doherty, SirArthur Chichester reported on 12 September 1608 tothe Privy Council (Cal. SPI 1608–1610, 26) that hehad levied fines on the locals

‘... towards the repairing of the forts of the Derry(which already are as strong as they were before)and building of a castle in the lower fort there, forsafeguard of the King’s arms, munition, and stores’.

His opinion that the defences were ‘as strong as theywere before’ is at odds with that of Sir Josias Bodley,who reported on 5 September 1608 (Buckley 1910,63) that

‘... the rampier and bulwarkes of the ffort at ye

Derry are much ruined, the parapitt cleane fallenaway, the most part of it must be newly facedd wth

sodds from the foundation ...’.

When he returned in 1614 to report on the state of thePlantation, he pulled no punches in his criticism of thestate of the project and of the efforts of the GreatCompanies.18 Nonetheless, it is evident that the workby Vaughan had restored the earthworks of Docwra atleast temporarily to a reasonable state of readiness, sincea significant complaint by Bodley in his report to theCrown of September 1614 (Carter, ff 456–7) was thatthe Londoners

‘... found in that towne a greater and lesser fort,with good ramparts and bullwarkes of earth, albeitsomewhat ruyned wch with small charge mighthave bene made defensible, the one they have in amanner whollie demolished, to make waye fortheir buildings, and suffered the other to fall pastreparation, so the the towne wch should serve forsuccour and refuge (if need should require) of theInhabitants of Enishoen and other theirebordering neighbours, hathe no meanes as yet todefend itselfe ...’.

Now while there is no doubt that by this time therewas a growing reluctance on the part of the City ofLondon to get involved in major expenditure on top ofthat which they had incurred already, the fact that thequarrying of stone and stockpiling of lime for the citywalls was ongoing when Bodley arrived shows seriousintent to create permanent and viable fortificationsspecifically to upgrade and replace the earlier ones.Indeed, while the lack of fortifications posed a dangerat the end of 1614, this was clearly viewed as temporaryonly, while preparations for the new ones—at muchgreater cost than reusing the originals—went ahead.

The plan of the circuit of the walls deliberatelyexploited the ridge of high ground on the ‘island of theDerry’, so that on three sides there is a significantincline that can, in places, reach some 30m above OD(Thomas 2006, I, 91). Further, it made use on threesides of the river, and on the fourth, now the Bogside,of the morass that impeded or totally blocked crossing.It is clear also that from the start the walls and bastionswere intended to act as an artillery platform. They areof local schist, with sandstone copings, and the schist isa hard and durable stone that would have splinteredwhen struck by shot, sending flying a shower ofsplinters and injuring those in the vicinity. Thedesigners of defences often showed preference for asofter, slightly yielding material (e.g. Duffy 1975, 36f.)in which shot would embed itself or else punch a neathole. Thomas (2006, I, 58) noted a preference forlimestone in a number of town walls, while at CaherCastle, Co. Tipperary, two cast-iron shot from a sakerfired during the siege of 1599 by the earl of Essex arestill embedded in the walls (Johnson 1976, 114, pl. 1).But we may see the use of the local stone not as aneconomy but as a recognition that the defences werenot going to be subjected to artillery by local hostiles.

The 1611 drawing of the possible configurationfor the city (e.g. Curl 2000, 102, fig. 25) gives no clueas to any intention for such an elaborate extension tothe defences as a waterlogged ditch system. Sir ThomasPhillips, however, was responsible for the initialdevelopment of Coleraine as a fortified settlement (e.g.Curl 2000, 129, fig. 32), and in 1616 Commissioners

146 B. G. Scott


Peter Proby and Mathias Springham found that theditch surrounding the settlement had been furnishedwith dams and sluice-gates to allow it to be flooded toimprove the defences (ibid., 107–8). Engineer Thomasconfirmed that Phillips’s early proposals included theuse of the areas of bog to increase the strength overallof Derry, with the flow of water controlled by damsand sluices. Furthermore, the 1625 proposal for theextension of the city defences refers specifically to the‘cuttinge of the bogg for the better securinge of ye

Cittie’. Drawn up by Raven, who by this time was nolonger working for the Londoners but probably nowfor Phillips, the plan (Scott et al. 2008, 80, pl. 53)appears to show a widening of the northern inlet fromthe Foyle to flood a ditch, annotated as being

‘… intended to be Cutt 20 foot wide 10 footDeepe. The Earth to be Cast inwardes wch willmake a Rampier of good strength being madewith some flankers.’

These substantial dimensions compare with the 10m [c.33ft] by 2m [c. 6ft 6in.] of the Thomas plan. Further, in1629 amongst a list of ‘such things as are most needful’submitted to the king by Phillips was ‘The cutting of

the bog and fortifying of it’ (Chart 1928, 134).Reps (1965, 6ff; cf. Lacy 1990, 89–91, and Curl

2000, 103) suggested a connection between the layoutof Londonderry and that of Vitry-le-François (Fig. 3)on the banks of the Marne, designed in 1545, and ofCharleville-sur-Meuse, laid out in 1608. In addition tothe common grid plan around a market square,19 eachshows the use of a river to augment the defences, notjust along its frontage but also by drawing water fromit into the ditch system that surrounded the walls. So itcould well be that a plan put forward by Phillips for themilitary architecture of Derry, probably incollaboration with Sir Josias Bodley (Cal. SPI1615–1625, 501, Answer of the City of London to thePrivy Council, 2 June 1624), incorporated ideas drawnfrom his French experiences and first tried out atColeraine. This would have been shared with theLondoners while he was still enthused over theirinvolvement, and was executed on the basis of ananalysis of the local topography. His interest in andpromotion of the idea of using water to augment thedefences certainly seems to have survived through tothe end of the 1620s.

But if this were to have been the case, one mightexpect also that his reputation as a designer of


Fig. 3—Vitry-le-François, Marne, France, in 1634 (after Lacy 1990, 89).


fortifications would have suffered as a result of theproblems surrounding those at Coleraine—not justtheir rapid deterioration but also what was seen as theexcessive length of the circuit. Thus, in theirinstructions of 1612 to their agent, John Rowley, thecity stipulated that for the Derry defences he should‘… beware of error committed at Coleraine in makingthe circuit of the town too great’ (Moody and Simms1968, 90). This is why the area of the Windmill was nottaken within the city bounds right at the start of theexercise, since such an extension would have beenexcessive in view of the area to be defended and thusof the difficulties in providing sufficient defenders forthe circuit.

Given that Londonderry earned its reputation asthe ‘Maiden City’ in the period 1641–89, withstandingtwo long sieges (albeit of indifferent organisation andexecution), Thomas’s comment that the walls had todate proved themselves fit for purpose is indicative ofthe minimalist design imposed less by budgetaryexigencies than by military considerations. When planswere being drawn up in the early years of theseventeenth century, Irish use of gunpowder weaponrywas for all practical purposes confined to small arms.The 1600 sketch-map of ‘The Island and forte of thederry’ (NA SP63/207, pt vi, no. 84/1) includesdepictions of exchanges of small-arms fire betweenEnglish and Irish, and it is evident that caliver and pistolshot were considered the most likely incoming hazard(Scott et al. 2008, 69). Without artillery, attempts led byinfantry to get close enough to create a breach in thewalls were made exceedingly difficult by the slopes thatthey had to climb. Thus, military leaders experiencedin fighting in Ireland at the turn of the seventeenthcentury would have understood that while a canalthrough the bog would have been a most effectivemeasure against a Continental foe, it was not justifiedin terms of expenditure to block a threat from thenative Irish.

We can, perhaps, appreciate better the reasoningbehind this when we see that Thomas and his colleagueRudolph Corneille, another Huguenot engineer whorose to second engineer in the Irish establishment(Loeber 1981, 41–2), estimated the total cost of a canallinking the two arms of the bend in the river, plusassociated dams and sluices, at some £20,000 (Scott,forthcoming). Even allowing for inflation over the 90or so years between the two, the cost of £10,755 forthe walls and gates would have been more thandoubled by the plan that he attributed to Phillips.While Continental layouts might have appealed asprestigious, cold commercial sense that realised thelevel of threat to be countered prevailed. When thematter was raised again in 1624 by the Lords, probablyat the instigation of Phillips, it was dismissed in short

order by the Common Council of the City ofLondon.20 And after the 1625 plan and the 1629proposals, the idea seems to have been dropped oneconomic grounds until raised in modified form byThomas.21

Thus, while perhaps admiring the militaryarchitecture and disposition of defended towns such asVitry-le-François and Charleville-sur-Meuse, includingthe enhancement of defence by water barrier, thedecision was made by the Londoners that what wasrequired was the minimum circuit of enclosing wallswith rampart, bastions for ordnance, and nothing more.After all, in the first decades of the seventeenth century,and particularly following Kinsale, the specific threatfrom Spain had receded, and it would have been quiteclear that the city was not going to face the might of aContinental army with a substantial artillery train. TheIrish themselves, while enthusiastically embracingpowder small arms in the course of the Nine Years War,in the main showed a consistent lack of interest inartillery—unsurprising given the form of Irish warfareof the sixteenth and earlier seventeenth centuries. Thus,when embroiled in major conflict from 1642 onwards,there were few like Owen Roe O’Neill on the Irishside who could organise and deploy cannon effectively.So even if English military personnel on the ground in1613 might have hankered after the impressive, theyand the financiers understood that the costs could berestricted to those of providing protection against theworst that Londonderry could face—amounting to notmuch more than what Macauley noted patronisingly ascertain to comprise ‘… a tumultuary attack of theCeltic peasantry’.

SUMMARY

The history of provision for the defence ofLondonderry is one of dispute over the allocation ofresponsibility for its arming, of failure to make thenecessary ongoing provision for a battery of guns, andabove all of neglect. The incomplete ditch circuit soonfilled up with rubbish, as no one took responsibility forclearing it out. Then there were the periods of panic,such as at the end of 1641 with the outbreak of theIrish rebellion, and the realisation that no provision hadbeen made to replace arms removed over a yearpreviously. And, of course, there was the situation in1689, when virtually all of the city ordnance wasunmounted.22 Thus, for example, in 1624 the cityreplied to the Privy Council (Cal. SPI 1615–25, 500,dated 2 June 1624) in respect of ordnance:

‘… as for ordnance, carriages, powder, shot,gunners and other furniture thereto appertaining;

148 B. G. Scott


they conceived that they were not tied to any suchmatter by any agreement and desire that HisMajesty will furnish the same’.

But this should not surprise. As Curl (2000, 44) haspointed out, the initial ‘Articles of Agreement’ betweenCrown and city, signed on 28 January 1610, were vaguein the extreme when it came to provisions for defence.This was the fertile ground in which flourished somany disputes over areas of responsibility, including thecost of providing adequate platforms for the artillery.

Finally, returning to the plans of Engineer Thomas,we may note the absence in the original design of acitadel to which soldiers and ‘loyal citizens’ could repairin time of danger. If we accept that the layout ofLondonderry was influenced by French town planningand military architecture, we might have expected acitadel to have been incorporated into the design, butnot so. Sir Thomas Phillips proposed a fortified market

house for The Diamond, which some have seen as akinto a citadel. The depiction bristles with ordnance (Scottet al. 2008, 15, pl. 21), but the structure was neverbuilt.23 In fact, it was not until around 1653 (Kerrigan1995, 101), apparently, that one was created at thehighest point within the walls, the cathedral precinct(Scott et al. 2008, 77–9, fig. 16 and pl. 52), andapparently incorporating one wall of the cathedral itself(Fig. 4). Demolished in the 1670s, it was in use in the1660s, when one visitor noted that all of the city gunswere inside it, and all unmounted.

The completion of the Londonderry citadel isreferred to in a letter of 23 March 1656 (BLLandsdowne 822, f. 212), and it later features in a surveyof Irish fortifications dated 26 March 1664 (OrmondMSS, n.s. III, 155–6). The remains evidently were stillvisible in 1685, when the other Thomas Phillips madehis well-known illustrations of the city (Pl. 1). AsKerrigan (1995, 100–1 and fig. 51.7–9) pointed out,


Fig. 4—Detail from Thomas Phillips maps dating from 1685 (see Pl. 1) and the modern street plan of the city (bottom left).


citadel-building was a feature of the Commonwealthperiod,24 and thus the Londonderry citadel can beconsidered as having been provided primarily for theprotection of Commonwealth troops rather than forthe citizenry. Again, it is most likely that while a morecomplex structure would have added to the originalimpact of the city defences, it was not felt necessary atthe start of the seventeenth century in terms of threatsto be met. This is an area to which particular attentioncould be paid when and if there is any form ofdevelopment on the perimeter of the cathedralprecinct and the courthouse building.It is not unfair to suggest that the City of London

did its best to minimise the costs of defending its newcity and its inhabitants, making often sensiblejudgements based on the perceived level of threat fromthe surrounding Irish. Clearly, the allegations ofunderspending on defence by Sir Thomas Phillips werein most cases—at the kindest interpretation—exaggeration. The supply of cast-iron cannon asopposed to those made from the significantly moreexpensive bronze was not critical, since any militaryevaluation of threat in the first decades of theseventeenth century would have ruled out the need tolay down sustained artillery fire in defence against asiege in Continental style. Similarly, the city walls weremore than adequate to cope with anything that theIrish on their own could throw against them. Theplanners could not, obviously, have foreseen the eventsof the 1640s, or conceived of an English army makingan assault. Londonderry was spared serious damage in1649 by accident of allegiance, since its defence forParliament by Sir Charles Coote was against a ragtag offorces lacking the heavy ordnance required to pose athreat. It is, of course, most likely that had Londonderrybeen held against Parliament the might of theCromwellian siege train would have made short workof the walls. Again, if in 1689, instead of treating theIrish campaign as a sideshow to his European war,Louis XIV had given the Jacobites a proper artillerytrain and a commander capable of deploying iteffectively in a siege,25 it is unlikely that even the fiercedetermination of the defenders could have delayed theinevitable breach and assault for very long.The Londoners did economise when they could

get away with it, examples being the running battle overgun platforms and the continual poor state—evenlack—of gun carriages. It is also worth bearing in mindthat in the period between c. 1620 and 1642 the variousGreat Companies spent more annually on ‘dinners’ thanon ‘warlicke supplies’ for the colonists in the UlsterPlantation.26 But on balance, although Londonderry wasnever to have defences of the complexity and eleganceof its southern British and Continental contemporaries,they served their purpose well.

ABBREVIATIONS

BL = British LibraryNA = National ArchivesNLI = National Library of Ireland

REFERENCES

Briggs, M.S. 1957. Town planning from the ancientworld to the Renaissance. In C. Singer, E.J.Holmyard, A.R. Hall and T.I. Williams (eds), Ahistory of technology: Volume III. From the Renaissanceto the Industrial Revolution, 269–99. Oxford.

Brown, R.R. 2004. The thundering cannon: guns forthe English Navy in the 17th century. In G.Groenendijk, P. de Gryse, D. Staat and H. Bronder(eds), Farewell to arms: liberorum amicorum for Jan PietPuype, 122–33. Delft.

Buckley, J. 1910. Report of Sir Josias Bodley on someUlster fortresses in 1608. Ulster Journal ofArchaeology (2nd ser.) 16, 61–4.

Bull, S. 2008. The furie of the ordnance: artillery in theEnglish Civil Wars. Woodbridge.

Cal. SPI = Calendar of State Papers Relating to Ireland (24vols, London, 1860–1912).

Carter = Papers relating to the Goldsmiths’ proportioncollected by Henry Carter. Goldsmiths’ CompanyManuscript B.393/1645.

Chart, D.A. 1928. Londonderry and the Londoncompanies, 1609–1629. Belfast.

Curl, J.S. 1986. The Londonderry plantation,1609–1914. Chichester.

Curl, J.S. 2000. The Honourable the Irish Society and theplantation of Ulster, 1608–2000. Chichester.

Danaher, K. and Simms, J.G. (eds) 1962. The Danishforce in Ireland. Dublin.

Duffy, C. 1975. Fire and stone: the science of fortresswarfare. Newtown Abbott.

Edwards, P. 2000. Dealing in death: the arms trade and theBritish civil wars. Stroud.

Eldred, W. 1646. The gunners glasse. London.Faucherre, N. 1986. Places fortes: bastion du pouvoir.Paris.

Goulon = Memoirs of Monsieur Goulon. Being a treatise onthe attack and defence of a place … A journal of the siegeof Ath in the year 1697 … (trans. J. Heath, 1745).London (reprint ECCO Print Editions).

Hogan, J. 1934. Négociations de M. le Comte d’Avaux enIrlande 1689–90. Dublin.

Johnson, D.N. 1976. A contemporary plan of the siegeof Caher Castle 1599, and some additionalremarks. Irish Sword 12, 109–15.

Kelly, W.P. 2003. Dowcra’s Derry: a narration of events innorth-west Ulster, 1600–1604. Belfast.

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Kerrigan, P. 1995. Castles and fortifications in Ireland1485–1945. Cork.

Lacy, B. 1990. Siege city: the story of Derry andLondonderry. Belfast.

Loeber, R. 1981. A biographical dictionary of architects inIreland 1600–1720. London.

Logue, P. and O’Neill, J. 2006. Excavations at Bishop’sStreet Without: 17th century conflict archaeologyin Derry City. Journal of Conflict Archaeology 21,49–75.

Macauley, T.B. 1861. The history of England from theaccession of James the Second. Philadelphia.

McConway, C. 2000. St Mary’s Dominican priory,Hanover Place, Coleraine. In I. Bennett (ed.),Excavations 1999, 36–7. Bray.

McGurk, J. 2006. Sir Henry Docwra, 1564–1631:Derry’s second founder. Dublin.

Mallet, R. 1856. The physical conditions involved in theconstruction of artillery … some hitherto unexplainedcauses of the destruction of cannon in service. London.

Mason, A.S. and Barber, P. 1993. Captain Thomas: theFrench engineer and the teaching of Vauban to theEnglish. Proceedings of the Huguenot Society of GreatBritain and Ireland 25 (1989–93), 279–87.

Milligan, C.D. 1996. The walls of Derry, their building,defending and preserving. Lurgan (reprint of theedition of 1948–50).

Moody, T.W. 1939a. The Londonderry Plantation,1609–41. Belfast.

Moody, T.W. 1939b. Sir Thomas Phillips of Limavady,servitor. Irish Historical Studies 13, 251–72.

Moody, T.W. and Simms, J.G. (eds) 1968. The bishopricof Derry and the Irish Society of London, 1602–1705:Volume I, 1602–1670. Dublin.

Norton, R. 1628. The gunner, shewing the whole practiseof artillerie: with all the appurtenances thereuntobelonging … . London.

O’Flanagan, P. 1988. Bandon. Irish Historic TownsAtlas no. 3. Dublin.

Oppenheim, M. 1988. A history of the administration ofthe Royal Navy and of merchant shipping in relation tothe navy from 1509 to 1660 with an introductiontreating of the preceding period. Aldershot (reprint ofthe 1898 edition).

Ormond MSS = Historical Manuscripts Commission1902–3. The manuscripts of the Marquis of Ormond.London (new series).

Peter, J. 1995. Les artilleurs de la marine sous Louis XIV.Paris.

Reps, J.W. 1965. The making of urban America: a historyof city planning in the United States. Princeton.

Scott, B.G. (forthcoming). Ingenieur Jean Thomas:Memoires touchant la fortification de Londonderry:proposés pour exemple du projet des fortificationsirregulières d’une place dominée et de la manière abrégée

d’en rendre conte au governement.Scott, B.G., Browne, R.R., Leacock, A. and Salter, C.J.

2008. The great guns like thunder: the cannon from theCity of Derry. Londonderry.

Teesdale, E.B. 1991. Gunfounding in the Weald in thesixteenth century. London.

Thomas, A. 2006. The walled towns of Ireland (2 vols).Dublin (reprint of 1995 edition).

True and Impartial Account = A true and impartial accountof the most material passages in Ireland … (London,1689).

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Walton, S.A. 2006. The tower gunners and the artillerycompany in the artillery garden before 1630.Journal of the Ordnance Society 18, 53–66.

NOTES

1. This is the updated text of a paper delivered inDerry in 2009 to the conference ‘The Plantationof Ulster, 1609–2009: A Laboratory for Empire’.

2. References to ‘brass’ cannon may be taken asmeaning that they were cast in bronze (copper–tinalloy), sometimes with the addition of smallquantities of genuine brass (a copper–zinc alloy) orof calamine (zinc oxide). I shall use the term‘bronze’ here as shorthand for copper-alloy.

3. These were removed by Sir Charles Coote in1650, and the City Council was still trying toretrieve them from Sligo in 1682 (Scott et al. 2008,229–30).

4. The exception was the demi-culverin bought bythe Worshipful Company of Skinners, for whichthey paid a ‘second-hand’ price of 12s 6d per cwtto the East India Company.

5. This was the subject of a detailed study by thegreat Irish polymath Robert Mallet (1810–81),who used his experience in the foundry industryto study and explain the ways in which bronzeguns failed in use (Mallet 1856).

6. Nevertheless, William Eldred (1646, 10–11) didcite examples of ‘brass’ guns of the first years of theseventeenth century bursting, with lethalconsequences, and Nicholas Bernard recorded thatin January 1642, in a skirmish during the siege ofDrogheda,

‘The Issue was, some of theirs were slain, but ofours not one, only by the breaching of a littleBrass Piece, a Gunner was hurt, which yet gavethem such a rugged Salute, that very abruptlythey took leave of us’.



7. The metallography of ‘Roaring Meg’ (and otherseventeenth-century cast-iron guns in the city) isnot up to the standard for which a modernfoundryman would wish to claim responsibility.Nevertheless, along with her companions, she sawservice over more than 50 years of action andneglect, and did ‘good execution’ when calledupon.

8. Thus, for example, the activities of the Londonagent John Rowley are described—perhapssomewhat charitably—by Curl (1986, 60) as being‘somewhat zealous in his own interests’ (cf. Moody1939a, esp. 143–4). Indeed, Rowley himself wasinstructed in article 34 of the ‘Instructions’ of 1612to ensure that ‘… the smiths be not trusted withiron and steel above the value of £10 at a time …’(Moody and Simms 1968, 89).

9. The figure given in Scott et al. 2008, 109, of £558for ‘ordnance and munitions’ in fact refers to‘arms’. The correct figure, given underneath on thesame page, is £236.

10. There are two versions of his manuscript andplans. The first, held in the British Library as MSK Top LIV 32c, comprises sixteen pages of papermanuscript in an elegant, flowing hand, with afrontispiece reading ‘Memoires touchant la fortificationde Londonderry: proposés pour exemple du projet desfortifications irregulières d’une place dominée et de lamanière abrégée d’en rendre conte au governement’. Thisis accompanied by a ground-plan and a set ofcross-sections, K Top 54.32a and K Top 54.32b.

The second version, held in the NationalArchives (catalogue NA MPHH 1/282/1–8), is anundated copy in an inferior hand comprising sevendouble pages of paper, the frontispiece muchmutilated, and without the introduction of theBritish Library version. It is accompanied by twomaps (NA MPHH 1/282/9 and 10), very close indetail to each other (one may be a draft from whichthe other was prepared) and to the British Libraryexamples. The manuscript and NA MPHH1/282/10 are undated, but NA MPHH 1/282/9has the handwritten inscription ‘John Todd. January15th 1799’. Both have the lettering key that ismissing from the British Library versions.

An edition and translation of thesemanuscripts, with notes, is currently beingprepared by the author (Scott, forthcoming).

11. Thomas paid tribute to the defenders of 1689,saying (ff 2–3):

‘If this fort [Londonderry] maintained a verylong defence during that siege, one cannotafford the glory to the strength of the ramparts,but to the valour of the besieged [soldiers] and

the townspeople who were nearly as numerousas the besiegers. The besieged had four timesmore cannon than the besiegers …’

One might note also the comments on the siegeof Londonderry by Ferdinand Wilhelm, duke ofWürtemberg-Neustadt, commander of the Danishforces despatched under treaty with William ofOrange by Christian V of Denmark. He wrote tohis king on 12 April 1690 (Danaher and Simms1962, 36), reporting that

‘I saw Londonderry en passant. It is a placesituated on a great height, walled, with ninesmall bastions and terraced. The hill is verysteep. There were over 10,000 men under armsin it, and they had more pieces and militarystores in the town than King James had outside.What was most wonderful was the greatstaunchness with which they held out, as theysuffered great hunger.’

12. Macauley, in his inimitably condescending style,suggested that the city defences were designedwith the most serious level of threat in mind beingfrom ‘… a tumultuary attack of the Celticpeasantry’. Nevertheless, in the seventeenthcentury it was commonly believed that protectionfrom the heaviest ordnance required a thickness ofsome 6–8m of packed earth (e.g. Bull 2008, 87).And there were those, such as Col. William Leggeand Capt. Joseph Bennett, who felt that the wallswere sufficiently strong to withstand seriousbattery. Legge was a veteran royalist who rose tobe lieutenant-general of the ordnance underCharles II (Scott et al. 2008, 228), while Bennettwas one of the defenders during the siege of 1689.In 1689 Captain Bennett wrote (True and ImpartialAccount, 27–8), perhaps optimistically, that

‘… the outward Wall being about 21 or 22 Foothigh, and of a great thickness, and the inwardWall rising as high or near the height of a manof the outward Wall, and between these two,Earth filled up in the middle, whereon eight orten men may walk in Breast, so that no Gun canbatter it to make a Breach to storm: …’

13. In c. 1690–5 another Huguenot engineer in theservice of the Williamite army, Jean Goubet, drewa rough sketch-map of Londonderry, showing hisideas for the siting of defensive outworks across thebog (NLI MS 2742). Unlike Thomas, he evidentlydid not envisage taking in the area of theWindmill.

152 B. G. Scott


14. For a biography of Ingenieur Jean Thomas, seeMason and Barber 1993.

15. BL Additional 60272, comprising twentymanuscript pages on paper with two watercolourillustrations, entitled Nouvelle construction d’Eclusespour le menagement des Eaux, on Maniere d’etablir lanavigation dans les plaines des païs ou les eaux sontrares.

16. Logue and O’Neill (2006, 53) date theconstruction of the Bishop’s Gate ravelin to 1689and attribute it to Lundy acting under orders fromWilliam III. But it is clear from the maps byPhillips (BL K Top 54/30 and 31), as part of hissurvey of forts and fortifications completed in1685, and from a further crayon sketch (BL K Top54/29), that there was a substantial ravelin, or atleast the remains of one, still visible in 1685 (Scottet al. 2008, 79–80; Scott, forthcoming).

17. Following their visit, Smithes was accused fromDublin in 1614 by the magistrate Robert Jacob ofordering that tenements be subdivided ‘... to savehalf the charges ... so that yor Maties intention by ascandalous device will be defrauded, and a notableand famous Worke utterly disgraced’ (BLAdditional 69392, ff 5v–r). The poor state of thehousing was noted also by Bodley, and serves asone example of why so much of what was done bythe Londoners attracted the same blanketcriticism.

18. Bodley opened his report to King James (Carter, ff452 and 456–7) by saying:

‘Haveing taken an exact survey of the workesand plantation performed by the citie ofLondon, I cannot fynde that either in the one orother, they ever intended his Ma:ties satisfaction,or regarded the true end and drift of hisfavourable grant ... And this I must further addconcerning the Derry that whereas at theirefirst undertaking of that busynes they found inthat towne a greater and lesser fort, with goodramparts and bullwarkes of earth, albeitsomewhat ruyned, wch with small charge mighthave bene made defensible, the one they have ina manner whollie demolished, to make waye fortheir buildings, and suffered [f. 457] the otherto fall past reparation, so that that towne wch

should serve for succour and refuge (yf needshould require) of the Inhabitants of Ennishoenand other theire bordering neighbours, hatheno meanes as yet to defend it selfe.’

19. To these could be added possibly Henrichemont,founded in 1609 (Briggs 1957, 290–1). Anothertown that was being planned around the same

time as Londonderry to have a defensive encirclingwall is Bandon, Co. Cork. The original plan of1613 by Christopher Jefford for the layout of thepart of the town to the north of the Bandon Riverenvisaged a grid plan of streets inside walls backedby a substantial rampart and with angle bastions(O’Flanagan 1988, 2 and map 4). This particularscheme would have had the southern end of thetown using the Bandon River as a line of defence.It would seem, however, that there was nointention to use the river to flood the ditch.Further, Richard Boyle, first earl of Cork, whoactually caused the town defences to be built,seems to have looked backwards by severaldecades, since two later maps of 1620 (ibid., maps5 and 6) show the town enclosed on both sides ofthe river by walls without a rampart and havinground bastions. Obviously not realising that he hadcreated perhaps style but certainly not substance,Boyle wrote in 1632 (Thomas 2006, II, 20) that

‘The circuit of my new town of Bandon-bridgeis more in compass than that of Londonderry;my walls are stronger, thicker and higher thantheirs, only they have a strong rampier withinthat Bandon-bridge wanteth…’,

confirming that his strong walls lacked an essentialcomponent that would have made them ‘stronger’!

20. The Lords wrote their ‘demands touchingLondonderry, Coleraine and the Castle ofCulmore’ (Cal. SPI 1615–25, 499–500), withArticle 2 reading:

‘The bog that compassed the fourth part of thecity [Londonderry] should be made navigablefor small boats by cutting a river through it,which would be great strength to the place, andis very needful to be done.’

To which the Londoners replied curtly (ibid., 500):

‘To cut a navigable river through the bog issupposed to be a work of exceeding greatcharge and small use’.

21. Economy was a part of the brief given to Thomasby Ormond, who

‘… ordained that the project is made on twosuppositions. The first is that the Government isonly able to provide few funds, and second thatin this kingdom enemies will not be able tomake the same major efforts as in Flanders,Germany and elsewhere.’



22. It was not just ordnance that was neglected. In1674, for example, Londonderry had 193 musketsdescribed as having ‘ye Stock and Lock Decayed’and 81 musket barrels that were ‘old & Rusty’(Scott et al. 2008, 96, note 32).

23. There are striking resemblances between theLondonderry ‘market hall’ and the towersupposedly added on to the O’Cahan tower-houseat Limavady (e.g. Curl 1986, 483, fig. 371) in theway that each is depicted with ordnance.

24. It is possible that a substantial wall and externalditch uncovered in Coleraine to the south of theDominican priory represented the remains of theColeraine citadel (McConway 2000), althoughanother interpretation might see them as a part ofthe original, pre-Plantation defences.

25. Lieut. General Richard Hamilton, of whoseappointment the Minister for War, the marquis deLouvois, wrote (Hogan 1934, 280, letter dated 13June 1689) to the comte d’Avaux (neither,admittedly, exactly impartial commentators),

‘… It is in truth a great pity that the King ofEngland [James II] entrusts the attack onfortifications to a man like M. Hamilton, whohas no experience of such … he has never seena siege …’,

commanded the forces sent north to reducestrongholds loyal to William III. Louvois’pessimism seems to have been well founded, andHamilton’s ineptitude even led to questions beingraised (ibid., 295, letter from d’Avaux to Louvoisdated 28 July 1689) about his loyalty (‘…l’incapacité de ce general est si grande qu’elle a faitsoupçonner sa fidelité’).

It is also worth remembering that while theother commander, Conrad de Rosen, did have theservices of specialist gunnery officers underComissaire Général de l’Artillerie Jean-Bernard-Louis Desjean, sieur de Pointis, along with otherartilleurs de la marine, he himself had risen toprominence as a commander of cavalry. De Pointiswas an experienced marine gunnery officer whohad been involved in several campaigns involvingthe bombardment of major fortifications, such asTripoli in 1685 and Algiers in 1688 (e.g. Peter1995).

26. Thus, for example, in the aftermath of theoutbreak of the Irish rebellion and appeals forassistance, the Vintners spent a total of £67 13s 4don ordnance and accessories, and donated a further£100 in cash as well for ‘reliefe’, but spent some£220 8s 11d on ‘dinners’ in the year 1641–2(Vintners AC, 1636–58).

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plans and economies: defending the plantation city of londonderry

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