planning, public participation, and money politics in santa ana (ca)

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Planning, Public Participation, and Money Politics inSanta Ana (CA)Victoria A. Bearda & Carolina S. Sarmientob

a Department of City and Regional Planning at Cornell Universityb Department of Interdisciplinary Studies at the University of Wisconsin–MadisonPublished online: 25 Sep 2014.

To cite this article: Victoria A. Beard & Carolina S. Sarmiento (2014): Planning, Public Participation, and Money Politics inSanta Ana (CA), Journal of the American Planning Association, DOI: 10.1080/01944363.2014.953002

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Problem, research strategy, and fi ndings: In this study, we analyze why a low-income community failed to meaning-fully affect plans for the redevelopment of the Station District in Santa Ana (CA) although they used three avenues to do so: public participation, liberal democracy, and deliberative democracy. The city provided opportunities for public participation but controlled the agenda, effectively preventing residents from reframing the discussion. The liberal democratic electoral system failed residents because many were ineligible to vote, while city council members received campaign contributions from external business interests. Residents did develop extensive deliberative democratic processes that produced collaborative plans; however, these plans were not well incorporated into the offi cial plan. In addition, the city refused to sign a community benefi t agree-ment through which residents could hold the city and developer responsible for the redevelopment plan. Takeaway for practice: We suggest that planners have an obligation to improve the participatory process by empowering commu-nity residents to set the agenda and frame the issues at the local level while addressing the role of corporations in local politics and in campaign fi nance, and by seeking to achieve elections that more fairly represent spatially segregated public interests. Less-ambitious changes to the public planning process will fail to achieve a balance of power among low-income communities of color, city offi cials, and those representing private market interests. Keywords: city planning, public participa-tion, deliberative democracy, urban politics, inequality

Planning, Public Participation, and Money Politics in Santa Ana (CA)

Victoria A. Beard and Carolina S. Sarmiento

Low-income communities of color have the right to help shape the places where they live. Yet, for more than four decades, urban planning schol-ars and practitioners have shown that such communities have limited

power to infl uence planning decisions that infl uence their lives (e.g., Clavel, 1989; Davidoff, 1965; Diaz & Torres, 2012; Fainstein, 2010). The economic and political crisis that began in 2008 helped raise public awareness of the disproportionate power that corporations and their lobbyists wield in shaping government, cities, and neighborhoods. This should impel planners to reexam-ine public participation within the context of the respective limitations of liberal and deliberative democracy.1

Planning as it is practiced in city governments across the United States intersects with, and is shaped by, divergent forms of political activity: public participation, electoral politics, and deliberative democracy. In her seminal article on public participation, Arnstein (1969) writes that “In the name of citizen participation, people are placed on rubberstamp advisory committees or advisory boards for the express purpose of ‘educating’ them or engineering their support” (p. 218). Decades later, it is our observation that remarkably little has changed. Planners wield little power over decisions and, in the vast majority of cases, are only advisors. Meanwhile, economic elites—developers, corporations, and wealthy individuals—can have inordinate infl uence on planning outcomes.

We focus on the three different avenues a low-income community of color used in an attempt to infl uence planning outcomes in Santa Ana (CA).

About the authors: Victoria A. Beard ([email protected]) is an associate profes-sor in the Department of City and Regional Planning at Cornell University. Her research and professional practice focus on commu-nity-based planning, collective action, and poverty alleviation. Carolina S. Sarmiento ([email protected]) is an assistant professor in the Department of Interdisciplinary Studies at the University of

Wisconsin–Madison. Her research focuses on race and inequality, the production of creative spaces, and social justice.Color versions of one or more of the fi gures in the article can be found online at www.tandfonline.com/rjpa.

Journal of the American Planning Association,2014DOI 10.1080/01944363.2014.953002© American Planning Association, Chicago, IL.

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City planners there proposed the Renaissance Plan for a 421-acre corridor, including a smaller area known as the Station District. We ask the following questions: Why did the low-income communities of color who actively partici-pated in the planning process have so little infl uence over its outcomes? How can well-informed, engaged, and organized residents infl uence planning outcomes to a signifi cant extent? We conclude there is a need to reexam-ine when residents can participate in the development cycle and who has the power to set the agenda, frame the issues, and who is ultimately held accountable for fi nal decisions. To improve the political process, we highlight the need to place limits on campaign fi nance and rethink how to spatially represent distinct public interests at the municipal level.

Analytical FrameworkWe focus on the three avenues local residents used in

an attempt to infl uence redevelopment of the Station District in Santa Ana: public participation, the liberal democratic political system, and deliberative democracy.2 We contrast the fi rst two approaches, which should com-plement one another, with the third, which is an alterna-tive strategy. Using this analytical framework, we highlight the limitations of public participation and suggest areas where it can be made more responsive to low-income communities of color.

Public ParticipationSince Arnstein’s (1969) article on the typology of

eight levels of citizen power, the literature on public participation focusing on the mechanisms, techniques, material outcomes, and theoretical foundations has pro-liferated (e.g., Bailey & Grossardt, 2010; Burby, 2003; D. Day, 1997; Godschalk, Brody, & Burby, 2003; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; Margerum, 1999; Wagenet & Pfeffer, 2007). In contrast, this study focuses on public participa-tion in the formal planning process by a low-income community of color and describes why the process did not work.

We contend that our system of capital accumulation yields inordinate power to shape public participation. Our case study fi ndings contribute to the work of urban scholars who have critically analyzed how market forces, private property rights, social structure, and—more recently—neoliberalism shape our cities (i.e., Brenner, 2009; Carpio, Irazábal, & Pulido, 2011; Davis, 1990; Harvey, 2008, 2012; Lefebvre, 1996; Logan & Molotch, 1987; Miraftab, 2004; Mitchell, 2003; Molotch, 1976;

Purcell, 1997, 2003). For example, Harvey (2008) articu-lates how neoliberalism creates new systems of governance “that integrate state and corporate interests” (p. 38) and ensures that the economic spoils of urbanization go to corporations and the upper classes.3 Our fi ndings extend this scholarship with a focus on how this relationship affects public participation and ultimately planning outcomes in Latino communities.

The Liberal Democratic System and the Electoral Process

One way that residents exercise power to infl uence their neighborhoods and cities is through the electoral process. In the United States, voters choose among politi-cians who will represent their interests and make decisions on their behalf.4 This political system has been likened to a market (Macpherson, 1977), with the voter as the con-sumer and the politicians as the entrepreneurs. In terms of market theories, politics can be viewed as politicians selling packages of political goods and voters acting as rational consumers whose choices produce the optimal distribution of labor and capital (Macpherson, 1977). The politics-as-market model assumes that political participation is a competitive mechanism that selects leaders and imbues governments with authority.

The Santa Ana case study makes particularly relevant the interface between the liberal democratic system in which we operate and Latino political representation (e.g., de la Garza, 2004; Garcia, 1997; Irazábal, 2012; Irazábal & Dyrness, 2010; Irazábal & Farhat, 2008; Kotin, Dyrness, & Irazábal, 2011; Pantoja, Ramirez, & Segura, 2001; Reckhow, 2009; Rocha & Matsubayashi, 2012; Rosales, 2000; Shah, 2010; Valle & Torres, 2000). Nationwide, approximately 40% of Latinos are not eligible to vote (Shah, 2010), which reduces the extent to which they can infl uence outcomes in their neighborhoods. As a result, voluntary associations, coalitions, and nonprofi t organiza-tions become critical in representing the interests of the Latino community.

Another major infl uence in the liberal democratic political process is the power of the market economy, manifested largely through lobbyists and corporations who support those candidates for political offi ce who serve their goals. This relationship affects planning outcomes because elected city council members vote to accept or reject plan-ning projects. In recent years, the political power of corpo-rations, even at the local level, has been further buttressed by the 2010 Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. the Federal Election Commission, which ruled that the federal government cannot regulate corporate spending on political campaigns (Liptak, 2011).5


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Beard and Sarmiento: Planning, Public Participation, and Money Politics in Santa Ana (CA) 3

Deliberative DemocracyThe third avenue for residents to infl uence planning

outcomes is through engagement in deliberative demo-cratic processes. We defi ne those as the practice of rational argumentation, distinguishable from communication that is rhetorical, bargaining, threatening, or coercive (Besson & Martí, 2006). Deliberate democracy is a process that seeks to transform individual preferences, in contrast to voting, which acknowledges and aggregates individual preferences.

Theorists interested in deliberative democracy build on the work of Jürgen Habermas, who defi nes the “public sphere” as a discursive space distinct from both the market and the state, and the “ideal speech situation” as one in which deliberation among equal individuals is based on the use of reasoned arguments (Chambers, 2003; Dryzek, 2000; Fung & Wright, 2003). Acknowledging the diffi -culty of achieving the ideal speech situation, Habermas (1998) urges legal and constitutional means as the way to create rules for politics that protect the public sphere from undue infl uence by the state. A number of scholars have applied Habermas’s normative ideal of communicative rationality to planning practice and to collaborative plan-ning in particular (Forester, 1989; Healey, 1997; Innes, 1995; Innes & Booher, 2010; Umemoto & Igarashi, 2009).

Critics of deliberative democracy, such as Mouffe (2000), argue that noncoercive consensus is a “conceptual impossibility” (p. 33). For Mouffe, a pluralist democracy requires continued contestation to renegotiate social iden-tity. Another critic of deliberative democracy, Young (2001), argues that deliberative democracy is usually weighted toward the more powerful agents. Similar cri-tiques have been made of the application of Habermas’s normative ideals to planning; Huxley (2000) writes, “Even if planners introduce the most inclusive, gender-sensitive, multi-cultural participatory processes, the individuals and groups presenting themselves in these processes are en-meshed in, and productive of, power and inequality” (p. 375).

Research Strategy, Methods, and DataWe analyze a local planning process in Santa Ana (CA)

using a case study research strategy because it is well suited to the “how” and “why” questions we address, as well as the analytical generalization we seek from our fi ndings (Yin, 1994). Data for the case study are based on Sarmiento’s (the second author’s) experience as a member of El Centro Cultural de Mexico, one organization in a coalition of

organizations seeking to infl uence the planning process. The author participated in building the coalition begin-ning in August of 2007. She took notes on her involve-ment in community outreach and city council meetings, on outreach by the coalition, and on negotiations among members of the coalition. We augmented these primary data by analyzing secondary data sources: planning docu-ments, census data, administrative records, analysis of campaign contributions, reports, newspaper articles, land use maps, and minutes of city council meetings.

The City of Santa AnaThe Station District is in the city of Santa Ana, Or-

ange County, in southern California, which has a popula-tion of 324,528 persons (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010b). According to the U.S. Census, approximately 78.2% of the city’s population identifi es as Hispanic; 71% of Hispanics are of Mexican descent (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010b). Almost half the Santa Ana population is foreign born, compared with 27.2% of the California population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010b). In 2010, Santa Ana had the highest unemployment rate in Orange County: 14.4%, compared with 11% countywide (U.S. Census, 2010a). Almost 1 in 5 Santa Ana residents lived in poverty in 2010, compared with 13% in the larger Orange County area (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010b).

Santa Ana comprises 27.2 square miles (City of Santa Ana, 2012) and is a multicentric city with a historic down-town and an adjacent train station. Three historic neighbor-hoods form part of the surrounding area around the train station: Logan Barrio, Lacy, and French Park. Parts of Lacy and Logan are in the Station District, the area on which we focus. Residents of Lacy and French Park are a mix of long-term and newly arrived Mexican immigrants. Logan Barrio is one of the original Mexican barrios in Santa Ana and has also been the locus of grassroots organizing for increased community participation. French Park has been listed on the National Register of Historic Places since 1999 because it has many historic homes. A group of neighbor-hood residents with an appreciation for old houses started organizing with the goal to enhance the historical features of the remaining original buildings. In the 1990s, a number of artist lofts were constructed in the downtown and on the border of the Lacy neighborhood and the Station District. Over two decades, the city purchased 48 parcels in Lacy and Logan with city redevelopment funds to begin to redevelop the area.6

A number of authors have documented diffi culties ensuring the representation of Mexican immigrant interests


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in planning (Day, Anderson, Powe, McMillan, & Winn, 2007; González & Lejano, 2009; González, Sarmiento, Urzua, & Luévano, 2012; Harwood & Myers, 2002; Medina, 2011). It is worth noting that Santa Ana has an all-Latino city council, with a Mexican-born mayor who was elected in November 1994. Nevertheless, the politics of representation in Santa Ana go beyond the national origins and ethnicity of these politicians to involve class, citizenship, tenure, and the structures of the planning and political processes.

The Renaissance PlanIn 2007, the City of Santa Ana proposed the Renais-

sance Plan, which, as shown in Figure 1, encompassed a 421-acre corridor, including downtown, the 1st Street Corridor, the Civic Center, the Logan and Lacy neighbor-hoods, and the Station District (City of Santa Ana, 2007). The plan proposed major land use changes, such

as mixed-use zoning to combine residential, commercial, and retail uses. At that time, the census count for the area included 58,000 people, of whom 89% were Hispanic (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). Of this population, 72% were renters, and 87% spoke Spanish as their primary language; the median household annual income was $34,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). In 2007, while city staff prepared the environmental impact report (EIR), local activists and organizations became aware of the plan for the fi rst time. Activists objected to the lack of com-munity consultation and involvement in the plan’s development.

As activists began voicing their objections, staff from local nonprofi ts gathered information on both community needs and local residents’ knowledge about the plan. Al-though the city had scheduled community meetings about the Renaissance Plan, only two of the meetings had placed on the agenda the issues about which local residents had concerns: a neighborhood meeting in October 2007 and a question-and-answer session in January 2008.

Figure 1. Renaissance Plan, Station District, and phase plans.Source: 2013 TIGER line shapefi les and the City of Santa Ana. Map prepared by Carolina Martinez and Amanda Micklow.


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It took about one year from the public release of the Renaissance Plan for local activists and nonprofi t groups to come together and form a coalition: the Santa Ana Collab-orative for Responsible Development (SACReD). The coalition consisted of fi ve nonprofi t organizations, a neigh-borhood organization from French Park, community activists, residents from the Logan and Lacy neighbor-hoods, and a Chicano neighborhood-based organization. These organizations represented various interests: afford-able housing, open space, cultural rights, economic justice, and historic preservation. In the context of economic recession, declining property values, and the coalition’s exposure of the city’s failure to engage residents, the city council decided to put the Renaissance Plan on hold.

The Battle Over the Station DistrictIn 2009, the City of Santa Ana began to implement a

much smaller and less ambitious piece of the Renaissance Plan, the Station District redevelopment project. This project included the redevelopment of both the Lacy and Logan neighborhoods and the train station area. The city sent out a request for quotation for this development and hired a developer with experience in affordable housing to develop the 48 parcels of land previously purchased by the city for redevelopment.

In response to community’s backlash against the Re-naissance Plan, the city approached the Station District planning process differently.7 The city and the developer were quick to organize meetings to obtain feedback from local residents. In addition to the required notifi cation of residents who live within 300 feet of a proposed develop-ment, the city and the developer facilitated public input from a larger area. In contrast to the Renaissance Plan, for which public charrettes were conducted during the day when residents were at work, Station District meetings were scheduled in the afternoon at the local elementary school and other accessible locations. When SACReD requested meetings to discuss the plan, city staff hosted semi-monthly brown bag lunches where the developer presented general accounts of the project’s goals and objec-tives. In a later brown bag lunch, the coalition was given the opportunity to present their design of the Station District.

In the city-sponsored meetings, city staff determined who would speak, the agenda items and their order, and how the meeting would be conducted, all without commu-nity input. Most often the agenda included a presentation, either by the city staff, the developer, or a city council member, and then allowed time for questions. The com-

munity gave input by asking questions individually or by participating in an activity organized by city staff (e.g., placing stickers on butcher paper meant to document individual interests).

Residents and coalition members used several strategies to make their voices heard at these meetings. At one meet-ing, for example, a resident stood up from the audience and welcomed the city staff and the developer to “our neighborhood.” Instead of residents presenting their indi-vidual concerns, as is common in charrettes, the coalition presented collective concerns. The coalition brought their own translator to ensure the quality of the interpretation in both Spanish and English; they recorded the meetings to document the oral commitments by the developer on questions posed publically. Despite these strategies, the city’s agenda continued to determine how and when resi-dents and coalition members participated.

In response to the limitations of the public participa-tion process, in 2009 SACReD created a series of parallel opportunities for residents to engage in the plan.8 SACReD began by surveying community needs, investigat-ing local residents’ knowledge about planning, and identi-fying potential local leaders. Four participating organiza-tions agreed to provide one staff member each who would focus on part-time organizing of local residents in the Station District. The community organizers met one-on-one with residents in their homes to share information about the development process and the specifi cs of the Station District plan and to encourage local residents to engage in SACReD’s weekly meetings. These meetings were conducted in Spanish or in both Spanish and English; often food and childcare were provided.

The coalition had a vision for responsible develop-ment: They identifi ed their own potential allies and evalu-ated the decision-making process and the political and economic interests of individual city council members and developers. Meeting in an apartment complex and a nearby church, residents and coalition members conducted several power analyses of the redevelopment process. A power analysis is a tool that community-based organizations and community organizers use to evaluate different actors and their sources of power to create a picture of the political landscape on which to develop long-term agendas and strategies. These weekly meetings became the training ground and strategy sessions for residents directly affected by the redevelopment plan.

The coalition prepared residents for city council meet-ings by helping them formulate talking points, deciding in advance who would speak, and practicing their public speaking. These meetings used acuerdos, or shared agree-ments, that brought them much closer to Habermas’s ideals


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of deliberative democracy. The agreements consisted of fi ve facilitation techniques: 1) rotating meeting facilitation among participants as a means of balancing power; 2) “step up/step back,” which means active participation—but not domination—of the forum; 3) “one mic,” or only one person speaking at a time; 4) “no piggybacking,” or a speaker simply repeating another person’s comments or seconding them (this specifi c acuerdo sought to ensure that the deliberation moved forward); and 5) respecting each other’s comments within the time set for the meeting and the agenda.

Despite these acuerdos, the deliberative process was still contentious, and at times there were serious disagreements between members of the coalition. However, the coalition agreed that for a demand to be brought forward to the city and the developer, all the members of the coalition ulti-mately had to come to consensus about its importance.

As part of this process, residents learned about the many facets of the planning and development process. They learned that the city had purchased land in the Station District and the downtown area in preparation for the Renaissance Plan. They also were informed about both the technical and political potential of EIRs, development agreements (DAs), and community benefi t agreements (CBAs) in supporting responsible development.

DAs (the contract between the city and the developer regarding a development project) depend on the city council to take legal action when a developer does not follow through. Community groups can only seek to legally enforce developer commitments, even those in a DA, by working with their elected representative. In con-trast, a CBA provides the community coalition with the legal recourse to keep the developer and the city account-able.9 A CBA is different from other agreements, including a DA, in that “it is between a developer and a coalition of multiple community groups with plural interests” (Baxa-musa, 2008, p. 263).

Eventually, SACReD reached a consensus on 38 spe-cifi c demands in fi ve substantive areas: housing, cultural and historic preservation, open space, support for small businesses and protection of workers, and public safety. These demands included a CBA, an enforceable legal contract between the city, the coalition, and the developer. As one of the residents noted, “el papelito habla,” or “the little paper speaks,” because having a CBA would ensure that the city and the developer fulfi ll their commitments to the community.

The coalition did not prioritize its demands to avoid placing one organization’s agenda above another’s. Instead, the coalition focused on the specifi c details included in the formulation of each demand believed to be necessary to

ensure the benefi t would reach the intended benefi ciary. For example, the coalition sought interim housing for displaced residents who would be eligible to become rent-ers in the new development. Without the provision of temporary housing, displaced residents would not be able to benefi t from the development because they would have left the city to seek housing.

Table 1 outlines the coalition’s demands that resulted from the deliberative democratic process. The fi rst column shows the initial demands organized by the fi ve areas identifi ed as collective concerns. The second column shows the demands consolidated collectively after negotiations with the city and the developer. The third column indicates the substantive issues actually included in the fi nal devel-opment agreement, and the fourth column describes the actual outcomes.

Moving through the columns in Table 1, it is clear that the number of the coalition’s demands included in the development was reduced at each stage of the process. Moreover, much of the detail in each demand was lost through the negotiation process.

As the process progressed, residents and coalition leaders also organized meetings with individual city council members to discuss the demands and assess their support for a CBA, the negotiated development agreement that would make the city and the developers responsible to the community. For months, it was unclear which city council members were eligible to vote on the project, since those who owned property within the project area or who had received fi nancial contributions from the developer were obligated to recuse themselves. As both city council and coalition members awaited the city attorney’s recommenda-tions regarding voting eligibility, it was diffi cult for the coalition to know where to direct their outreach. Eventu-ally, the city attorney assured the coalition that three of the four city council members were eligible to vote on the proj-ect. The coalition then focused their efforts on ensuring that the city council members eligible to vote were sup-portive of both their substantive demands and of signing a CBA.

A turning point was when the city and the developer agreed to meet and negotiate with the coalition. While the process within the coalition was a deliberate process, the meeting with the city and the developer was a negotiation. Present at the meetings were two city council members, city staff, the city attorney, the developer, and representa-tives from the coalition. After two meetings the coalition agreed to reduce their demands to 16 points, on which there was agreement by all three parties: the coalition, the city council, and the developer. One of the more ambitious demands lost in the negotiation process was an approach


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genc

y to

ens

ure

no te

nant

sele

ctio

n cr

iteria

oth

er

than

inco

me,

cre

dit h

istor

y, a

nd re

ntal

hist

ory

is us

ed to

qua

lify

for t

enan

cy, a

nd th

ese

crite

ria b

e pr

ovid

ed a

s soo

n as

pra

ctic

able

6.

Ass

uran

ce o

f hou

sing

for d

ispla

ced

resid

ents

w

ithin

the

proj

ect i

n ac

cord

ance

with

tena

nt

sele

ctio

n cr

iteria

7

. Se

quen

cing

of d

evel

opm

ent s

o pr

ojec

t co

nstr

uctio

n an

d pr

ovisi

on o

f int

erim

hou

sing

min

imiz

e di

srup

tion

to d

ispla

ced

resid

ents

8.

20-y

ear r

evol

ving

loan

fund

for r

esid

entia

l im

prov

emen

t of $

100,

000

9.

3,00

0 sq

. ft.

of a

fford

able

chi

ldca

re a

t no

char

ge

durin

g da

ytim

e ho

urs t

o a

child

care

und

er a

leas

e,

at n

o ch

arge

to a

qua

lifi e

d ch

ild c

are

oper

ator

id

entifi

ed

by m

utua

l agr

eem

ent o

f city

and

co

aliti

on

A. H

ousin

ga

1.

112

affo

rdab

le re

ntal

uni

tsc

2.

32 n

ew fo

r-sa

le h

ouse

s, of

whi

ch

6 ar

e af

ford

able

2.

Rel

ocat

ion

plan

3

. D

own

paym

ent a

ssist

ance

to 6

af

ford

able

hom

ebuy

ers o

f up

to

$180

,000

4

. R

esid

entia

l loa

n pr

ogra

m o

f up

to $

100,

000

5.

Red

uced

rent

for b

usin

ess

oper

ator

in R

-1 c

omm

erci

al

spac

e 6

. C

hild

care

spac

e in

com

mun

ity

room

7.

55-y

ear c

oven

ant t

o en

sure

af

ford

abili

ty a

t all

of th

e ab

ove

stat

ed le

vels

A. H

ousin

g 1

. SA

CR

eD re

siden

ts w

ere

invi

ted

to g

roun

dbre

akin

g ce

rem

ony

for a

fford

able

hou

sing

2.

Ren

tal u

nits

are

und

er

cons

truc

tion

and

expe

cted

to b

e co

mpl

eted

by

2013

3.

For-

sale

uni

ts a

re g

oing

thro

ugh

the

plan

ning

and

per

mit

proc

ess,

and

are

antic

ipat

ed to

be

und

er c

onst

ruct

ion

late

r thi

s ye

ar 4

. C

ity c

onta

cted

SA

CR

eD to

co

nstr

uct a

list

of r

esid

ents

el

igib

le fo

r affo

rdab

le h

ousin

g

B. C

ultu

ral a

nd h

istor

ic p

rese

rvat

ion

1.

Com

mun

ity c

ente

r of a

t lea

st 1

0,00

0 sq

. ft.

serv

icin

g co

mm

unity

nee

ds a

t low

or n

o co

st to

use

rs 2

. C

omm

unity

cen

ter w

ould

be

regu

larly

acc

essib

le 3

. A

qua

lifi e

d no

npro

fi t o

rgan

izat

ion

to o

vers

ee a

nd

oper

ate

the

cent

er a

nd p

rovi

de p

rogr

amm

ing

4.

Perm

anen

t mai

nten

ance

of t

he c

omm

unity

cen

ter

site

mad

e av

aila

ble

to th

e no

npro

fi t a

t no

cost

5

. Fu

nds f

or h

istor

ical

mar

kers

of u

p to

$60

,000

, de

term

ined

in c

onsu

ltatio

n w

ith S

AC

ReD

6.

Publ

ic a

rt p

roje

cts i

n pu

blic

spac

es v

alue

d at

0.7

5%

of th

e to

tal d

evel

opm

ent c

osts

, art

ists t

o be

iden

tifi e

d by

SA

CR

eD

B. C

ultu

ral a

nd h

istor

ic p

rese

rvat

ion

1.

Com

mun

ity c

ent e

r of a

t lea

st 1

0,00

0 sq

. ft.

2.

Publ

ic a

rt p

roje

ct w

ith a

val

ue o

f no

less

than

0.

5% o

f the

tota

l dev

elop

men

t cos

t of t

he p

roje

ct,

artis

ts to

be

iden

tifi e

d by

SA

CR

eD 3

. Fu

nds f

or h

istor

ical

mar

kers

of u

p to

$60

,000

, de

term

ined

in c

onsu

ltatio

n w

ith S

AC

ReD

B. C

ultu

ral a

nd h

istor

ic p

rese

rvat

ion

1.

Dire

ct st

aff t

o ne

gotia

te a

join

t us

e ag

reem

ent w

ith sc

hool

di

stric

t for

the

deve

lopm

ent a

nd

prog

ram

min

g of

a c

omm

unity

ce

nter

2

. R

eim

burs

emen

t agr

eem

ent w

ith

the

scho

ol d

istric

t for

$25

,000

to

dev

elop

con

cept

ual p

lans

for

com

mun

ity c

ente

r 3

. Fu

nds f

or h

istor

ical

mar

kers

of

up to

$60

,000

, det

erm

ined

in

cons

ulta

tion

with

SA

CR

eD

B. C

ultu

ral a

nd h

istor

ic p

rese

rvat

ion

1.

Fund

ing

for h

istor

ical

mar

kers

is

not a

vaila

ble

as a

resu

lt of

the

diss

olut

ion

of C

alifo

rnia

’s re

deve

lopm

ent a

genc

ies

(Con

tinue

d)


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4

8 Journal of the American Planning Association, 2014Ta

ble

1. (

Con

tinue

d).

Init

ial c

olle

ctiv

e de

man

dsM

ay 2

1, 2

010

Con

soli

date

d co

llec

tive

dem

ands

June

4, 2

010

Dev

elop

men

t agr

eem

ent

June

7, 2

010

Out

com

es to

dat

eJu

ne 1

, 201

2

7.

Publ

ic a

rt p

roje

ct in

the

TZ

C a

rea

valu

ed a

t 0.5

% o

f th

e to

tal d

evel

opm

ent c

ost o

f the

pro

ject

, SA

CR

eD

to b

e co

nsul

ted

8.

Pres

erva

tion

of h

omes

with

hist

oric

val

ue

9.

With

in th

e T

ZC

, hom

es w

ith h

istor

ic v

alue

wou

ld b

e re

habi

litat

ed in

-pla

ce, r

eloc

ated

and

reha

bilit

ated

w

ithin

the

“new

” hi

stor

ic d

istric

t, or

des

troy

ed w

ith

salv

age

10.

Reh

abili

tate

d ho

mes

with

hist

oric

val

ue to

be

sold

or

rent

ed a

t an

affo

rdab

le le

vel

C.

Ope

n sp

ace

1.

Req

uest

for g

ener

al p

lan

upda

te

2.

Com

plet

e st

reet

s and

side

wal

ks w

ith p

edes

tria

n lig

htin

g 3

. B

icyc

le la

nes

4.

LED

refl e

ctiv

e cr

ossw

alks

5

. Sl

ow tr

affi c

initi

ativ

e 6

. C

omm

unity

par

k of

1.5

acr

es in

Sta

tion

Dist

rict

7.

Prev

entio

n of

resid

ent d

ispla

cem

ent b

y pa

rk 8

. Pa

rk sp

ace

and

recr

eatio

n op

port

uniti

es e

qual

to 3

.0

acre

s per

1,0

00 p

opul

atio

n in

the

larg

er T

ZC

are

a

C.

Ope

n sp

ace

1.

Com

mun

ity p

ark

with

in th

e St

atio

n D

istric

t of n

o le

ss th

an 1

.5 c

ontig

uous

acr

es in

size

C.

Ope

n sp

ace

1. C

omm

itmen

t to

purs

ue

deve

lopm

ent o

f 1.5

acr

e pa

rk a

nd

open

spac

e in

the

Stat

ion

Dist

rict

C.

Ope

n sp

ace

D. S

mal

l bus

ines

s and

wor

kers

1.

Supp

ort f

or lo

cally

ow

ned

smal

l bus

ines

s in

the

form

of

disc

ount

ed re

nts,

neig

hbor

hood

-ser

ving

reta

il es

tabl

ishm

ents

, and

prio

rity

give

n to

bus

ines

s op

erat

ed b

y St

atio

n D

istric

t res

iden

ts

2.

Supp

ort t

o sm

all b

usin

esse

s in

TZ

C a

rea

3.

Enfo

rce

a liv

ing

wag

e in

Sta

tion

Dist

rict a

nd T

ZC

ar

ea

4.

Proj

ect l

abor

agr

eem

ent (

guar

ante

eing

labo

r pea

ce

and

timel

y de

liver

y of

the

proj

ect)

with

app

ropr

iate

co

nstr

uctio

n tr

ade

unio

ns in

Sta

tion

Dist

rict t

hat

targ

ets h

iring

loca

l disa

dvan

tage

d re

siden

ts

D. S

mal

l bus

ines

s and

wor

kers

1.

Proj

ect l

abor

agr

eem

ent (

guar

ante

eing

labo

r pea

ce

and

timel

y de

liver

y of

the

proj

ect)

with

ap

prop

riate

con

stru

ctio

n tr

ade

unio

ns in

Sta

tion

Dist

rict

2.

Neg

otia

tions

rega

rdin

g th

e sc

ope,

des

ign,

tim

ing

and

loca

tion

of d

evel

opm

ent a

nd a

ssoc

iate

d co

mm

unity

ben

efi ts

bef

ore

issui

ng d

evel

opm

ent

appr

oval

s in

the

larg

er T

ZC

are

a

D. S

mal

l bus

ines

s and

wor

kers

D. S

mal

l bus

ines

s and

wor

kers


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4


E. P

ublic

safe

ty 1

. T

ZC

are

a ne

ighb

orho

od w

atch

2.

Stric

t enf

orce

men

t of o

ffsite

sale

liqu

or li

cens

es in

St

atio

n D

istric

t and

TZ

C a

rea

3.

TZ

C d

esig

n sa

fety

ele

men

t to

prot

ect l

ocal

resid

ents

an

d sc

hool

chi

ldre

n

E. P

ublic

safe

tyE.

Pub

lic sa

fety

E. P

ublic

safe

ty

F .

CB

A 1

. A

lega

lly b

indi

ng, f

ully

enf

orce

able

agr

eem

ent

betw

een

SAC

ReD

, City

of S

anta

Ana

, the

City

of

Sant

a A

na R

edev

elop

men

t Age

ncy,

and

rela

ted

com

pani

es (t

he “

deve

lope

r”) t

hat a

gree

s to

subs

tant

ive

poin

ts a

bove

F .

CB

A 1

. A

lega

lly b

indi

ng, f

ully

enf

orce

able

agr

eem

ent

betw

een

SAC

ReD

, City

of S

anta

Ana

, the

City

of

Sant

a A

na R

edev

elop

men

t Age

ncy,

and

rela

ted

com

pani

es (t

he “

deve

lope

r”) t

hat a

gree

s to

subs

tant

ive

poin

ts a

bove

F.

CB

AF.

C

BA

Not

es:

a. F

riend

s of L

acy

brou

ght a

law

suit

agai

nst t

he C

ity o

f San

ta A

na to

pre

serv

e th

e ol

der h

ouse

s in

the

Stat

ion

Dist

rict i

n 20

11. A

s a re

sult,

the

affo

rdab

le h

ousin

g in

the

deve

lopm

ent a

gree

men

t w

as c

hang

ed to

99

rent

al u

nits

(of t

hat t

otal

, 97

are

affo

rdab

le a

t ver

y lo

w a

nd e

xtre

mel

y lo

w in

com

e le

vels)

, 14

hous

ing

units

reha

bilit

ated

as a

fford

able

rent

al u

nits

(affo

rdab

le a

t ver

y lo

w a

nd

extr

emel

y lo

w in

com

e le

vels)

, and

24

new

for-

sale

uni

ts, o

f whi

ch a

min

imum

of 3

uni

ts o

r up

to 5

will

be

affo

rdab

le a

t mod

erat

e in

com

e le

vels.

The

resid

entia

l loa

n pr

ogra

m w

as in

crea

sed

to

$200

,000

.b.

Affo

rdab

le u

nits

at 8

0% a

rea

med

ian

inco

me

(AM

I) a

nd b

elow

, with

a m

inim

um o

f 20%

of a

fford

able

uni

ts a

t 30%

AM

I.c.

Affo

rdab

le u

nits

at 3

0% to

50%

AM

I and

bel

ow w

ith a

min

imum

of 2

0% o

f affo

rdab

le u

nits

at e

xtre

mel

y lo

w in

com

e le

vels.

d. A

fford

able

uni

ts a

t 80%

AM

I or b

elow

with

a m

inim

um o

f 25%

of t

he u

nits

at 3

0% A

MI,

and

at le

ast 3

0% o

f ow

ners

hip

units

are

affo

rdab

le to

hou

seho

lds a

t 80%

AM

I and

bel

ow, e

nsur

ed

thro

ugh

rest

rictiv

e co

vena

nts o

f 55

year

s.e.

The

tran

sit z

onin

g co

de (T

ZC

) are

a-w

ide

affo

rdab

le h

ousin

g go

al in

clud

es: 1

) at l

east

50%

of r

enta

l uni

ts w

ill b

e af

ford

able

to h

ouse

hold

s at 8

0% A

MI a

nd b

elow

, 30%

will

be

for h

ouse

hold

s at

30%

of A

MI,

and

2) 3

0% o

f ow

ners

hip

units

will

be

affo

rdab

le to

hou

seho

lds a

t 80%

.


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that would have ensured the provision of affordable hous-ing in a much larger area. Moreover, the city did not com-mit to enter into a CBA as a result of these negotiations.

On June 7, 2010, at the fi nal city council vote, the agenda placed the discussion of the Station District plan at the end of the meeting so city council members who were ineligible to vote could leave early. As a result, hundreds of residents and community organizers stayed with their families and children until 11 p.m. to have their comments entered into the public record. Residents and coalition representatives spoke in support of the need for a CBA that would hold both the city and the developer accountable to the coalition. The city council voted 4–0 to approve the project without the binding CBA. Although the coalition, the city, and the developer had agreed to 16 points, the council approved 11 points that were less ambitious and less specifi c.10

A few months later, the Orange County Register re-ported that two of the city council members who had voted on the project had taken campaign contributions from the developer during the negotiations with the coali-tion (Irving, 2010). If known earlier, that information would have made those council members ineligible to vote. After it was made public, the city council met again and voted to ratify the fi rst vote.11 The city and the developer then signed a DA, giving the coalition no direct way to ensure that the developer complied with the agreement.

Understanding Station District Planning

We view the planning process and outcome in Santa Ana through the three lenses: public participation, liberal democracy, and deliberative democracy. First, residents could participate in planning for the Station District through the forums organized by the city. Since residents had objected to their lack of participation in earlier plan-ning efforts, the city extended its outreach by increasing the number and diversity of opportunities for residents to provide input to planning efforts for the Station District. For example, the city forums were at accessible locations and scheduled at times when residents would be able to attend. In response to the coalition’s demand for additional venues for public input, the city added twice-monthly brown bag lunches.12 Often the city-sponsored and developer-sponsored forums were indistinguishable; the city supported the developer by sending out announce-ments, hosting forums, and promoting the project.

The coalition’s participation yielded one substantial victory but a number of defeats. The coalition demanded,

and the city agreed to provide, 112 affordable rental units, with a minimum of 20% targeted to extremely low-income families.13 However, these provisions were predictable given the federal tax incentives that are available to provide affordable housing. But the coalition’s demand that all displaced residents be provided housing in the new devel-opment, as well as interim housing or relocation benefi ts regardless of immigration status, was not met. In the fi nal agreement, the city provided only the legally required minimum relocation compensation, and did not give priority in obtaining units in the redeveloped housing to those displaced by the project. Moreover, while the coali-tion’s fi rst proposal had included 3,000 square feet of space for affordable childcare, in the fi nal DA, this demand was reduced to a vague reference to “childcare space in commu-nity room.”

There are several explanations for the fact that the input provided by the residents as part of the public par-ticipation process did not have more impact on planning outcomes. First, the city government did not give residents control over the agenda of meetings, even though they expressly solicited their participation in those meetings. It is diffi cult then, if not impossible, for residents to reframe the issues to be discussed in the course of the meeting. Recognizing that, the coalition created a parallel delibera-tive process in which the residents could defi ne the agenda. But there were formal mechanisms to bring the consensus generated through this parallel process to bear on offi cial decision making.

Second, our case study also demonstrates how fallible the model of liberal democracy is in practice, on the ground. First, the Santa Ana city council is elected at large, which raises the question of whether ward-based or at-large elections represent the city’s spatially segregated interests more effectively. This has been debated in the literature (Bridges & Underwood, 2000; Shah, 2010). In Santa Ana, where Latinos are well represented in the city council, their communities still remain spatially segregated by economic status. This strongly supports the view that ward-based elections would better represent Latino interests.14

In addition, campaign contributions were a crucial factor in Santa Ana politics, although the subject has largely been neglected in urban planning research. Because the bulk of campaign fi nancing came from outside the city and from pro-development industries, we question whose interests elected politicians represent. In 2010, Orange County Communities Organized for Responsible Develop-ment (OCCORD) compiled a “follow the money” data-base that tracked municipal campaign contributions in the city of Santa Ana between 2004 and 2010. The study found that approximately 65% of campaign contributions


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made to successful city council and mayoral candidates originated outside the city; approximately 44% originated from other Orange County cities (Ibarra & Nothoff, 2011). OCCORD also analyzed the contributions for links with industries and corporations. Approximately 63% of campaign contributions to successful city council and mayoral candidates came from fi ve industries (Ibarra & Nothoff, 2011); two of these industries—construction and real estate—benefi t directly from development.

The OCCORD report documents other troubling relationships between money politics and planning. From 2005 through 2010, the city council approved 12, or 100%, of proposed new development projects in the face of public opposition (Ibarra & Nothoff, 2011). The report found that most planning offi cials live in the city’s most affl uent neighborhoods and work in industries linked to development (Ibarra & Nothoff, 2011).

For us, the Santa Ana case demonstrates how structural distortions of the liberal democratic political system at different scales prevent residents from shaping planning outcomes. First, in the planning process as now consti-tuted, the community-based organizations representing the interests of residents have disproportionately less power than city planners, elected offi cials, developers, and eco-nomic elites. Second, Santa Ana’s system of electing city council members at large provides no incentives for mem-bers to represent the interests of particular neighborhoods; if elected offi cials come from more affl uent neighborhoods, they may not be responsive to the interests of those who live elsewhere in the city. Finally, the system of local cam-paign fi nancing, much of it from outside the city and from industries that stand to profi t from development, helps to defeat politicians who would represent the interests of residents.

Third, our case study also illustrates the role of delib-erative democracy in addressing citizen concerns. Residents created unoffi cial forums to articulate their interests, developing a parallel process of public engagement (Quick & Feldman, 2011). The demands presented to the city by the residents, including their demand for a CBA that would hold the city and the developer accountable to the community, were formulated through consensus: The coalition required that each individual and organization had to be comfortable with the proposed list of demands. The coalition’s process contrasts sharply with the city’s formal process; within the coalition, participants deliber-ated and adjusted their positions through education and argumentation (Baxamusa, 2008) to build collective inter-ests and demands. Interacting with the city, coalition participants were required to negotiate over positions and demands.

The deliberative democratic process we observed in Santa Ana is time-consuming and painstaking for those involved, and requires a skilled moderator. We fully ac-knowledge the imperfectability of the deliberative demo-cratic process, particularly in terms of suspending power relations (Chaskin, Khare, & Joseph, 2012). However, this process was signifi cantly more functional for the residents than were the participatory forums conducted by the city. We believe the coalition achieved some collective demands that individual residents and standalone organizations would not have had the political power to achieve.

The most signifi cant shortcoming of the kind of deliberative democracy we observed in Santa Ana is simply the lack of a formal mechanism for incorporating the consensus it achieves into the formal planning process (Goodin, 2012). Moreover, there was no mechanism for the community to hold either the city or the developer accountable for any of the benefi ts or programs that the coalition was promised. The coalition attempted to get the city to structure a CBA, but the city council ultimately refused to do so.

Conclusion and RecommendationsWe evaluate the planning process in Santa Ana

through three theoretical avenues: public participation, liberal democracy, and deliberative democracy. The Santa Ana case study illuminates two major problems with public participation in planning: the fi rst is internal to the partici-pation process itself, and the second refers to the broader political processes in which participation is embedded. To begin, participation in planning is limited by who has the power to set the agenda and to frame the issues for discus-sion as well as to establish when in the development cycle public participation occurs. In addition, public participa-tion in the planning process in Santa Ana was further constrained by the at-large election of city council mem-bers, which politically disempowers low-income communi-ties of color.

In evaluating the role of a liberal democracy we also fi nd a disturbing connection between money politics and planning: The prevailing system of campaign fi nance politically and disproportionately empowers economic elites, whose interests can shape the city council’s decisions. In these circumstances, the responsibility of furthering the interests of low-income, immigrant communities fell almost entirely on nonprofi t and neighborhood organiza-tions and the residents of these communities themselves.

The coalition representing residents created alterna-tive spaces in Santa Ana where those interested could


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engage in deliberative democracy. Although not perfect, these meetings generated consensus on a list of collective demands. However, there was no formal mechanism to incorporate these demands into planning for the Station District. While the coalition’s demands were brought to the city’s forums, only a few appeared in the fi nal DA, although this was more than would have been included in the absence of this parallel process. Moreover, the city council refused to accept a CBA, leaving the community with no effective way to hold either the city or the developer accountable. This limits the community’s options unless individuals or groups have “deep pockets” to take legal action against the city or the developer.

The Santa Ana case shows that change is needed, and we offer some preliminary ideas about what change might look like at different scales. At the national level, we need to redress the Citizens United ruling by designing legisla-tion that limits the rights of corporations and their lobby-ists, and specifi cally how they engage in local politics. Doing so necessitates stricter legislation, both about the disclosure of corporate campaign fi nance and to close the loopholes that obscure hidden contributions (e.g., passing funding through organizations instead of directly to candi-dates). We need to redress the continually expanding role of corporations in politics, which undermines democracy at every scale, as well as planning’s efforts to reduce in-equality.

Political reform at the municipal level would place limits on campaign fi nance originating from outside a city and, again, require greater transparency about political contributions. In cities like Santa Ana, where the public’s interests are spatially segregated, instead of electing city council members at large, each district could use ward-based representation. This would ensure that every neighborhood would have a political repre-sentative whom they could hold accountable. These are not simple fi xes; moreover, gerrymandering can easily undermine gains.

As a profession, planners need to confront the prob-lems at the nexus of planning, participation, and politics. We must question whose interests these systems serve and what type of cities and communities will be created by these systems. The relevance of the planning profession rests on our ability to restructure this process to empower those who are disempowered by the current systems, and thus planners need to think critically about how to make these changes and then act boldly.

AcknowledgmentsThe authors are thankful for comments received on early drafts from Pierre Clavel, Randall Crane, and Michael Manville, as well as the

comments received from three anonymous reviewers. The authors wish to express their gratitude to the following people for their willingness to share their insights: Eric Altman, Cesar Covarrubias, Robert Nothoff, Linda Tran, and Ana Siria Urzua.

Notes1. Because the term “citizen participation” is problematic in the context of Santa Ana and other cities with high proportions of undocumented residents, the authors prefer to use the term “public participation.”2. A fourth avenue—radical political action—is not included in our analytical framework because the residents of Santa Ana have not yet used it. It is an important area to consider for future research.3. An exception to Harvey’s (2008) description of the management of urban surplus is the case of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil (Abers, 2000). An important explanatory element in this case, however, was the success of the leftist political party, Partido dos Trabalhadores.4. Notable exceptions are the caucus system and town hall meetings.5. Supreme Court Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, noted both the Court’s break with historical and legal precedents that had differenti-ated between individual and corporate campaign spending and the Court’s error in confl ating corporate entities and human speakers in applying the First Amendment: “In the context of election to public offi ce, the distinction between corporate and human speakers is signifi -cant. Although they make enormous contributions to our society, corpo-rations are not actual members of it. They cannot vote or run for offi ce. Because they may be managed and controlled by nonresidents, their interests may confl ict in fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters. …[O]ur lawmakers have a compelling constitutional basis, if not also a democratic duty, to make measures designed to guard against the potentially deleterious effects of corporate spending in local and national races” (Stevens, 2010).6. In California, city redevelopment agencies were allowed to declare “redevelopment project areas” and then keep most of the new property taxes generated from these areas. The purpose of these projects was to combat blight, develop affordable housing, make infrastructure im-provements, and build public facilities. In February 2012, the California Supreme Court upheld state legislation to abolish redevelopment agencies.7. For a description of the community’s backlash against the Renaissance Plan, see González and Lejano (2009).8. For an in-depth case study on community organizing and action research to obtain a CBA, see González et al. (2012).9. A CBA is a legally binding document that holds both the city and the developer accountable to the community, or in this case, the coalition representing the community. A DA is a legally binding document between the city and the developer.10. As a result of the current economic downturn, California has eliminated all its redevelopment agencies, calling into question the availability of funds to support the following conditions of the DA: 1) the residential loan program, 2) historical markers, and 3) down payment assistance.11. Partly as a result of the struggle for a CBA, SACReD’s subse-quent campaign and victory was a sunshine ordinance approved by the Santa Ana city council on October 15, 2012. The ordinance includes measures to improve transparency and accountability in the planning process.12. These lunches were conducted a few times at the beginning of the planning process.


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13. For the developer to meet the timeline to obtain tax incentives for the affordable housing in the Station District, the city used the transit zoning code EIR created for the Renaissance Plan, thus opening the door for future implementation of the Renaissance Plan.14. In a similar situation, the American Civil Liberties Union is in the process of suing the neighboring city of Anaheim in an effort to elimi-nate the at-large district election because it “violates the California Voting Rights Act by impairing Latinos’ ability to infl uence elections” (“Anaheim’s Feeble Democracy,” 2013).

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planning, public participation, and money politics in santa ana (ca)

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