persona and family relations reviewer

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS August 23,2014

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES

GENERAL RULE & EXEMPTION

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.

Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.

The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter shouldlive abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply ifthe same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.

Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family.The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absencethereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income orfruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties.

Art. 71. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70.

Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union orcommits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief.

Art. 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that:(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to besupported;(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;(3) In the absence of sufficient communityproperty, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for thesupport of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority toadminister or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share. Art. 127. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of conjugal partnership, except that:(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to besupported;(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;(3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon petition in a summary proceeding, be givenjudicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property ofthe other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share.

P r e p a r e d B y : M a r y L a u r e n c e “ R H E Y N E ” D e l M u n d o R o b l e d o


Art. 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply withhis or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose.

The obligations to the family mentioned inthe preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations.A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returningto the conjugal dwelling.

CASES:1. REPUBLIC V. MOLINA

FACTS:Roridel & Reynaldo Molina were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church. They had a son, Andre Molina. A year afterthe marriage, Reynaldo started manifestingsigns of immaturity and irresponsibility: (1) spent more time with his friends (2) depended on his parents for aid & assistance (3) not honest with the finances (4) relieved of his job making Roridel the breadwinner of the family. Roridel went to live with his parents and afterwards, Reynaldo abandoned her and thechild. Roridel filed a case for the declaration of nullity of their marriage by virtue of her husband’s psychological incapacity. Reynaldo claims that Roridel’sstrange behavior, refusal to perform marital duties & failure to run the household & handle finances caused their quarrels. Roridel on the other hand claimsthat her husband is immature, irresponsible, dependent, disrespectful, arrogant, chronic liar & infidel. He now lives with a mistress with whom he has a child.

ISSUEWON Reynaldo is psychologically incapacitated?

HELDNO. Marriage is valid.

RATIO:

1. They seem to have a difficulty or outright refusal or neglect in performing their obligations. They’re not incapable of doing them.

2. Failure of their expectations is not tantamount to psychological incapacity.


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3. Guidelines for Art. 36

a. Burden of proof to show nullity of marriage: plaintiff. Presumption of existence of marriage over its dissolution& nullity.

b. Root cause of incapacity should be: medically/clinically defined, alleged in complaint, proven by experts, clearly explained in decision.

c. Existing at time of celebration of marriage.

d. Medically/clinically permanent or incurable, whether absolute or relative. Incapacity directly related to assumption of marital obligations, doesn’t include incapacity in profession, etc.

e. Grave to render them incapable. Not mere refusal, neglect or difficulty or illwill.

f. Essential obligations outlined in FC Art. 68-71 and 220, 221, 225. State non-compliance in petition with evidence, include in decision.

g. Consider National Appellate MatrimonialTribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines interpretations. Not binding should be given respect since this law originated from Canon law. Harmonize civillaw w/religious faith.

h. Prosecuting attorney/fiscal and Sol. Gen. will appear as counsels for the state. They should submit certification within 15 days from submission of case forresolution.

2. GOITIA VS. CAMPOS-RUEDA

FACTS:Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a month before petitioner returned to her parent’shome. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that


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respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her husbandother than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.

HELD:

The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode becauseof the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.


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3. ARROYO v VASQUEZ (1921)

FACTS:Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo City. They lived together with a few shortintervals of separation. On July 4, 1920, defendant Dolores went away from their common home and decided to live separately from plaintiff. She claimed that she was compelled to leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She in turn prayed for a decree of separation, a liquidation of their conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance.CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was granted alimony amounting to P400,also other feesPlaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal rights, and a permanent mandatoryinjunction requiring the defendant to

return to the conjugal home and live with him as his wife.

ISSUES:1. WON defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home2. WON plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights or absoluteorder or permanentmandatory injunction

HELD:1. The wife had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty done by plaintiff todefendant was greatly exaggerated. The wife was inflicted with adisposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree. No sufficient cause was present.Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife since this recognizes the de facto separation ofthe two parties. Continued cohabitation ofthe pair must be seen as impossible, and separation must be necessary, stemming from the fault of the husband. She is under obligation to return to the domicile.“When people understand that they must live together…they learn to soften by mutualaccommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they become good husbandsand wives…necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes…” (Evans v. Evans)

2. On granting the restitution of conjugalrights. It is not within the province of the courts to compel one of the spouses tocohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. In the case of property rights, such an action may be maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other purpose than to compel the spouses to livetogether. Other countries, such as


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England and Scotland have done this with much criticism.

4.LOURDEZ RAMIREZ-CUADERNO V CUADERNO

As a consequence of a complaint for support filed by Lourdes Ramirez-Cuaderno on August 14, 1957, against her husband Angel Cuaderno, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, after due hearing, rendered judgment ordering the latter to give the plaintiff-wife a monthly support of P150.00, from the date of the filing ofthe complaint, plus attorney's fees, and to pay, the costs. On appeal by the husband to the Court of Appeals, said decision was reversed and set aside "so that (in the language of the court) appellant and appellee may again resume cohabitation which they are hereby admonished to do as their duty as husband and wife." The wife filed the instant petition for review of the aforesaid ruling of the Court of Appeals.

It has been established that the couple were living separately since November 17, 1956 when the husband, after having inflicted bodily injuries on the wife in the course of a quarrel between them, tookher to her mother's house where the latterstayed until the institution of the claim for support. The wife claimed maltreatmentand abandonment by the husband as basis therefor, whereas the husband, in resisting her demand for maintenance, contended that it was she who left the conjugal dwelling and, consequently, is not entitled thereto.


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The trial court, in granting the wife's demand, sustained the theory that she was driven out of the dwelling or, at least prevented from returning thereto by reasonof defendant's maltreatment. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, while adoptingthe findings of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court as to the husband's role in the incident that led to the separation, and notwithstanding the declaration by the husband during the hearing that "all the trouble she (the wife) has givenme is enough for me to turn my back to her," set aside the decision of the lower court, on the ground that it believes that the conditions were such that cohabitation between the spouses is not yet impossible.Thus, they were admonished to live together as husband and wife.

We recognize the wisdom of the exhortation1 that in the interest of society, and perhaps of the parties, courts should move, with caution in providing separate maintenance for the wife, a situation which would be an acknowledgement of the de facto separation of the spouses. However, it would be taking an unrealistic view for us to compel or urge them to live together when,at least for the present, they specially the husband are speaking of impossibility of cohabitation. For while marriage entitles both parties to cohabitation or consortium, the sanction therefor is the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife2 and not any legal mandate or court order. This is due to theinherent characteristic and nature of marriage in this jurisdiction.In the instant case, it is not disputed that the infliction of physical injuries on the wife, by the husband gave rise to their separation. It is likewise shown it

was the husband who took his wife to her parents' home where he left her.

The fact that the wife allegedly accepted money from her husband and desisted from accepting any later, because according to the latter, she was demanding for more, only indicates that even before the filingof the present case, the defendant-husbandwas already providing something for the separate maintenance. Considering that thewife has no income of her own, while the husband has an employment, the sum of P150.00 fixed by the trial court for the wife's monthly support does not seem to beunreasonable. Needless to state that, as the separation has been brought about by the husband and under the circumstances established during the trial, the same shall subsist until a different situation between the parties shall take place.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside and that of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court is hereby revived, without costs.


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5. ILUSORIO V BILDNER

FACTS:

Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year oldof age, possessed extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board andPresident of Baguio Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated frombed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.

In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the latter’s health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potencianodue to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA

petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her demands to see andvisit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.

HELD:A writ of habeas corpus extends to all casesof illegal confinement or detention, or bywhich the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.

Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily render himmentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With hisfull mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived ofhis right to privacy.

The case at bar does not involve the rightof a parent to visit a minor child but theright of a wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to seehis wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus


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carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process.

Ilusorio vs. Bildner

May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus tocompel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss? The answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all casesof illegal confinement or detention, or bywhich the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.

"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his capture and detention, todo, submit to, and receive whatsoever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf."

It is a high prerogative, common-law writ,of ancient origin, the great object of which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause. Itis issued when one is deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented from exercisinglegal custody over another person.

DESIGNATION OF DOMICILE

Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.

The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter shouldlive abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply ifthe same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.

CASES:1. ABELLA V. COMELECFACTS: Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to intervene) filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte.

It was alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the same office.

The COMELEC granted the petition. However,when the Commission granted the decision, Larrazabal was already proclaimed the Governor, hence, when she was disqualified, Abella, who gathered the second highest votes in the said area, sought to take his oath as governor of Kananga, Leyte.

The petitioner, however, avers that the COMELEC decision is erroneous when it


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relied on the provisions of the Family Code to rule that the petitioner lacks therequired residence to qualify her to run for the position of governor of Leyte.

She opines that under "the Election Law, the matter of determination of the RESIDENCE is more on the principle of INTENTION, the animus revertendi rather than anything else."

In this regard she states that ... "her subsequent physical transfer of residence to Ormoc City thereafter, did not necessarily erased (sic) or removed her Kananga residence, for as long as she had the ANIMUS REVERTENDI evidenced by her continuous and regular acts of returning there in the course of the years, althoughshe had physically resided at Ormoc City." ISSUE #1: WON the petitioner is a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte HELD 1: No. Section 12, Article X of the Constitution is explicit in that aside from highly-urbanized cities, component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial electiveofficials are independent of the province.In the same provision, it provides for other component cities within a province whose charters do not provide a similar prohibition. Necessarily, component citieslike Ormoc City whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are treated like highlyurbanized cities which are outside the supervisory power of the province to whichthey are geographically attached. This independence from the province carries with it the prohibition or mandate directed to their registered voters not tovote and be voted for the provincial elective offices. The resolution in G.R.

No. 80716 entitled Peralta v. The Commission on Elections, et al. dated December 10, 1987 applies to this case. While the cited caseinvolves Olongapo City which is classifiedas a highly urbanized city, the same principle is applicable. Moreover, Section 89 of Republic Act 179, independent of the constitutional provision, prohibits registered voters of Ormoc City from voting and being voted forelective offices in the province of Leyte.We agree with the COMELEC en banc that "thephrase 'shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the provincial governor and the members of theprovincial board of the Province of Leyte'connotes two prohibitions one, from running for and the second, from voting for any provincial elective official." ISSUE #2: WON the candidate who got the second highest vote may be proclaimed as governor when the candidate for such position was disqualified HELD 2: No. The Supreme Court held that while it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabalcould be proclaimed, the fact remains thatthe local elections of February 1, 1988 inthe province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that the Abella lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate.


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Sound policy dictates that public electiveoffices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it isa fundamental idea in all republican formsof government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast fora dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid the vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary politics and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief thatthe candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. In sum, the Court does not find any reasonto reverse and set aside the questioned decision and resolution of the COMELEC. The COMELEC has not acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion.

2. DELA VINA V VILLARUELFACTS:

On Sept.17,1917, Narcisa filed a complaintagainst Diego alleging that since 1913 upto the date of the complaint, Diego hadbeen committing acts of adultery with Anaand that he ejected Narcisa from the

conjugal home. Narcisa now prayed for adecree of divorce, partition of theconjugal property and alimony pendentelite in the sume of P400/month. Subsequentto the filing of the complaint, Narcisapresented a motion alleging that since thefiling of her complaint, she had personalknowledge that Diego was trying toalienate/encumber the property belonged tothe conjugal partnership.

Issue: may a married woman ever acquire aresidence/domicile separate from that ofher husband during the existence of themarriage?

Held: where the husband has given causefor divorce, the wife may acquire antherand separate domicile from that of herhusband. And if the wife can acquire aseparate residence when her husbandconsents or acquiesces, there is no reasonwhy the law will not allow her to do sowhen the husband unlawfully ejects herfrom the conjugal home in order that hemay freely indulge in his illicitrelations with another woman.

JOINT MANAGEMENT OF FAMILY LIFE

Art. 71. The management of the householdshall be the right and the duty of bothspouses. The expenses for such managementshall be paid in accordance with theprovisions of Article 70.

Art. 94. (last par) If the communityproperty is insufficient to cover theforegoing liabilities, except thosefalling under paragraph (9), the spousesshall be solidarily liable for the unpaidbalance with their separate properties.

Art. 121. (last par) If the conjugalpartnership is insufficient to cover the


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foregoing liabilities, the spouses shallbe solidarily liable for the unpaidbalance with their separate properties.

Art. 122. The payment of personal debtscontracted by the husband or the wifebefore or during the marriage shall not becharged to the conjugal propertiespartnership except insofar as theyredounded to the benefit of the family.

Neither shall the fines and pecuniaryindemnities imposed upon them be chargedto the partnership.

However, the payment of personal debtscontracted by either spouse before themarriage, that of fines and indemnitiesimposed upon them, as well as the supportof illegitimate children of either spouse,may be enforced against the partnershipassets after the responsibilitiesenumerated in the preceding Article havebeen covered, if the spouse who is boundshould have no exclusive property or if itshould be insufficient; but at the time ofthe liquidation of the partnership, suchspouse shall be charged for what has beenpaid for the purpose above-mentioned.

Art. 146. Both spouses shall bear thefamily expenses in proportion to theirincome, or, in case of insufficiency ordefault thereof, to the current marketvalue of their separate properties.chanrobles virtual law library

The liabilities of the spouses tocreditors for family expenses shall,however, be solidary.

JOINT OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT

Art. 70. The spouses are jointlyresponsible for the support of the family.The expenses for such support and otherconjugal obligations shall be paid fromthe community property and, in the absencethereof, from the income or fruits oftheir separate properties. In case ofinsufficiency or absence of said income orfruits, such obligations shall besatisfied from the separate properties.

Art. 194. Support comprises everythingindispensable for sustenance, dwelling,clothing, medical attendance, educationand transportation, in keeping with thefinancial capacity of the family.

The education of the person entitled to besupported referred to in the precedingparagraph shall include his schooling ortraining for some profession, trade orvocation, even beyond the age of majority.Transportation shall include expenses ingoing to and from school, or to and fromplace of work.

Art. 94. The absolute community ofproperty shall be liable for:(1) The support of the spouses, theircommon children, and legitimate childrenof either spouse; however, the support ofillegitimate children shall be governed bythe provisions of this Code on Support;

Art 94. (last par) If the communityproperty is insufficient to cover theforegoing liabilities, except thosefalling under paragraph (9), the spousesshall be solidarily liable for the unpaidbalance with their separate properties.


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Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shallbe liable for:

(1) The support of the spouse, theircommon children, and the legitimatechildren of either spouse; however, thesupport of illegitimate children shall begoverned by the provisions of this Code onSupport;

(2) All debts and obligations contractedduring the marriage by the designatedadministrator-spouse for the benefit ofthe conjugal partnership of gains, or byboth spouses or by one of them with theconsent of the other;

(3) Debts and obligations contracted byeither spouse without the consent of theother to the extent that the family mayhave benefited;

(4) All taxes, liens, charges, andexpenses, including major or minor repairsupon the conjugal partnership property;

(5) All taxes and expenses for merepreservation made during the marriage uponthe separate property of either spouse;

(6) Expenses to enable either spouse tocommence or complete a professional,vocational, or other activity for self-improvement;

(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouseinsofar as they have redounded to thebenefit of the family;

(8) The value of what is donated orpromised by both spouses in favor of theircommon legitimate children for theexclusive purpose of commencing orcompleting a professional or vocationalcourse or other activity for self-improvement; and

(9) Expenses of litigation between thespouses unless the suit is found togroundless.

If the conjugal partnership isinsufficient to cover the foregoingliabilities, the spouses shall besolidarily liable for the unpaid balancewith their separate properties.

Art. 122. (1) The payment of personaldebts contracted by the husband or thewife before or during the marriage shallnot be charged to the conjugal propertiespartnership except insofar as theyredounded to the benefit of the family.

Art. 146. Both spouses shall bear thefamily expenses in proportion to theirincome, or, in case of insufficiency ordefault thereof, to the current marketvalue of their separate properties.

The liabilities of the spouses tocreditors for family expenses shall,however, be solidary.

CASES:1. SSS V DE LOS SANTOSFACTS:


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Antonio de los Santos and respondentGloria de los Santos, both Filipinos, weremarried on April 29, 1964 in Manila. Lessthan one (1) year after, in February 1965,Gloria left Antonio and contracted anothermarriage with a certain Domingo Talens inNueva Ecija. Sometime in 1969, Gloria wentback to Antonio and lived with him until1983. They had three children: AlainVincent, Arlene, and Armine.

In 1983, Gloria left Antonio and went tothe United States (US). On May 8, 1986,she filed for divorce against Antonio withthe Superior Court of Orange, Sta. Ana,California. On May 21, 1983, she executeda document waiving all her rights to theirconjugal properties and other matters. Thedivorce was granted on November 5, 1986.

On May 23, 1987, Antonio married Cirila delos Santos in Camalig, Albay. Their unionproduced one child, May-Ann N. de losSantos, born on May 15, 1989. On her part,Gloria married Larry Thomas Constant, anAmerican citizen, on July 11, 1987, in theUS.

On May 15, 1989, Antonio amended hisrecords at the Social Security System(SSS). He changed his beneficiaries fromMrs. Margarita de los Santos to Cirila delos Santos; from Gloria de los Santos toMay-Ann de los Santos; and from Erlinda delos Santos to Armine de los Santos.

Antonio retired from his employment onMarch 1, 1996, and from then on beganreceiving monthly pension. He died ofrespiratory failure on May 15, 1999. Uponhis death, Cirila applied for and beganreceiving his SSS pension benefit,beginning December 1999.

On December 21, 1999, Gloria filed a claimfor Antonio’s death benefits with the SSSCubao Branch. Her claim was denied becauseshe was not a qualified beneficiary ofAntonio. SSS DENIED.

Gloria elevated her claim to the SocialSecurity Commission (SSC). On February 12,2001, she filed a petition to claim deathbenefits, with a prayer that she bedeclared the rightful beneficiary of thedeceased Antonio. The SSC deemed thatGloria abandoned Antonio when she obtaineda divorce against him abroad andsubsequently married another man. She thusfailed to satisfy the requirement ofdependency required of primarybeneficiaries under the law. TheCommission likewise rejected her effortsto use the invalidity of the divorce,which she herself obtained, to claimbenefits from the SSS for her personalprofit

HELD: As found by both the SSC and the CA,the divorce obtained by respondent againstthe deceased Antonio was not binding inthis jurisdiction. Under Philippine law,only aliens may obtain divorces abroad,provided they are valid according to theirnational law.15 The divorce was obtainedby respondent Gloria while she was still aFilipino citizen and thus covered by thepolicy against absolute divorces. It didnot sever her marriage ties with Antonio.However, although respondent was the legalspouse of the deceased, We find that sheis stilldisqualified to be his primarybeneficiary under the SS Law. She fails tofulfill the requirement of dependency uponher deceased husband Antonio.

Respondent herself admits that she leftthe conjugal abode on two (2) separateoccasions, to live with two different men.


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http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/aug2008/gr_164790_2008.html#fnt15


The first was in 1965, less than one yearafter their marriage, when she contracteda second marriage to Domingo Talens. Thesecond time she left Antonio was in 1983when she went to the US, obtained adivorce, and later married an Americancitizen.In fine, these uncontroverted facts removeher from qualifying as a primarybeneficiary of her deceased husband.

SUMMARY:AN ESTRANGED wife who was not dependentupon her deceased husband for support isnot qualified to be his beneficiary.

The obvious conclusion then is that a wifewho is already separated de factofrom herhusband cannot be said to be "dependentfor support" upon the husband, absent anyshowing to the contrary. Conversely, if itis proved that the husband and wife werestill living together at the time of hisdeath, it would be safe to presume thatshe was dependent on the husband forsupport, unless it is shown that she iscapable of providing for herself.Gloria appealed the above SSC Resolutionto the CA. She insisted that she, as thelegal wife, was the qualified beneficiaryto Antonio’s death benefits.The CA agreed with the SSC in itsdetermination that the marriage of Gloriaand Antonio subsisted until his death andthe subsequent marriages contracted byboth of them were void for being bigamous.But contrary to findings of the SSC, theCA found that being the legal wife, Gloriawas entitled by law to receive supportfrom her husband. Thus, her statusqualified Gloria to be a dependent and aprimary beneficiary under the law.

2. SSS V. FAVILA

FACTS:A spouse who claims entitlement to deathbenefits as a primary beneficiary under theSocial Security Law must establish twoqualifying factors, to wit: (1) that he/she isthe legitimate spouse; and (2) that he/she isdependent upon the member for support.

She averred therein that after she was marriedto Florante Favila (Florante) on January 17,1970, the latter designated her as the solebeneficiary in the E-1 Form he submittedbefore petitioner Social Security System(SSS), Quezon City Branch on June 30, 1970.When they begot their children Jofel, Floresaand Florante II, her husband likewisedesignated each one of them as beneficiaries.Teresa further averred that when Florante diedon February 1, 1997, his pension benefitsunder the SSS were given to their only minorchild at that time, Florante II, but onlyuntil his emancipation at age 21. Believingthat as the surviving legal wife she islikewise entitled to receive Florante’spension benefits, Teresa subsequently filedher claim for said benefits before the SSS.The SSS, however, denied the claim in a letterdated January 31, 2002, hence, the petition.

SSS averred that on May 6, 1999, the claim forFlorante’s pension benefits was initiallysettled in favor of Teresa as guardian of theminor Florante II. Per its records, Teresa waspaid the monthly pension for a total period of57 months or from February 1997 to October2001 when Florante II reached the age of 21.The claim was, however, re-adjudicated on July11, 2002 and the balance of the five-yearguaranteed pension was again settled in favorof Florante II.8 SSS also alleged that EstelitaRamos, sister of Florante, wrote aletter9stating that her brother had long beenseparated from Teresa. She alleged thereinthat the couple lived together for only tenyears and then decided to go their separateways because Teresa had an affair with amarried man with whom, as Teresa herselfallegedly admitted, she slept with four timesa week. SSS also averred that an interviewconducted in Teresa’s neighborhood in Tondo,


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Manila on September 18, 1998 revealed thatalthough she did not cohabit with another manafter her separation with Florante, there wererumors that she had an affair with a policeofficer.

The SSC ruled that she is disqualified fromclaiming the death benefits because she wasdeemed not dependent for support from Florantedue to marital infidelity. Under Section 8(k)of the SS Law, the dependent spouse until sheremarries is entitled to death benefits as aprimary beneficiary, together with thedeceased member’s legitimate minor children.According to SSC, the word "remarry" undersaid provision has been interpreted as toinclude a spouse who cohabits with a personother than his/her deceased spouse or is in anillicit relationship. This is for the reasonthat no support is due to such a spouse and toallow him/her to enjoy the member’s deathbenefits would be tantamount to circumventionof the law. Even if a spouse did not cohabitwith another, SSC went on to state that forpurposes of the SS Law, it is sufficient thatthe separation in-fact of the spouses wasprecipitated by an adulterous act since theactual absence of support from the member isevident from such separation. Notable in thiscase is that while Teresa denied havingremarried or cohabited with another man, shedid not, however, deny her having anadulterous relationship. SSC thereforeconcluded that Teresa was not dependent uponFlorante for support and consequentlydisqualified her from enjoying her husband’sdeath benefits.

The CA found Teresa’s petition impressed withmerit. It gave weight to the fact that she isa primary beneficiary because she is thelawful surviving spouse of Florante and inaddition, she was designated by Florante assuch beneficiary. There was no legalseparation or annulment of marriage that couldhave disqualified her from claiming the deathbenefits and that her designation asbeneficiary had not been invalidated by anycourt of law. it was also held that it is onlywhen there is no designation of beneficiary or

when the designation is void that the SSSwould have to decide who is entitled to claimthe benefits. It opined that once a spouse isdesignated by an SSS member as his/herbeneficiary, same forecloses any inquiry as towhether the spouse is indeed a dependentderiving support from the member.

IssueIs Teresa a primary beneficiary incontemplation of the Social Security Lawas to be entitled to death benefitsaccruing from the death of Florante?

HELD:Teresa has not presented sufficient evidenceto discharge her burden of proving that shewas dependent upon her husband for support atthe time of his death. She could have donethis by submitting affidavits of reputable anddisinterested persons who have knowledge thatduring her separation with Florante, she doesnot have a known trade, business, professionor lawful occupation from which she derivesincome sufficient for her support and suchother evidence tending to prove her claim ofdependency. While we note from theabovementioned SSS Memorandum that Teresasubmitted affidavits executed by NapoleonFavila and Josefina Favila, same onlypertained to the fact that she never remarriednor cohabited with another man. On thecontrary, what is clear is that she andFlorante had already been separated for about17 years prior to the latter’s death asFlorante was in fact, living with his commonlaw wife when he died. Suffice it to say that"[w]hoever claims entitlement to the benefitsprovided by law should establish his or herright thereto by substantial evidence."31Hence,for Teresa’s failure to show that despitetheir separation she was dependent uponFlorante for support at the time of his death,Teresa cannot qualify as a primarybeneficiary.1âwphi1 Hence, she is not entitledto the death benefits accruing on account ofFlorante’s death.


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3. CALDERON V ROXASFACTS:Petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Calderon andprivate respondent Jose Antonio F. Roxas, weremarried on December 4, 1985 and their unionproduced four children. On January 16, 1998,petitioner filed an Amended Complaint3 for thedeclaration of nullity of their marriage onthe ground of psychological incapacity underArt. 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

On May 19, 1998, the trial court issued anOrder4 granting petitioner’s application forsupport pendente lite.

On motion of petitioner’s counsel, the trialcourt issued an Order dated October 11, 2002directing private respondent to give supportin the amount of P42,292.50 per month startingApril 1, 1999 pursuant to the May 19, 1998Order.7

On February 11, 2003, private respondent fileda Motion to Reduce Support citing, among othergrounds, that the P42,292.50 monthly supportfor the children as fixed by the court waseven higher than his then P20,800.00 monthlysalary as city councilor.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendereddeclaring (sic):1. Declaring null and void the marriagebetween plaintiff Ma.Carmina C. Roxas anddefendant Jose Antonio Roxas solemnized onDecember 4, 1985 at San Agustin Convent, inManila. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila ishereby ordered to cancel the marriage contractof the parties as appearing in the Registry ofMarriage as the same is void;2. Awarding the custody of the parties’ minorchildren Maria Antoinette Roxas, Julian Roxasand Richard Roxas to their mother hereinpetitioner, with the respondent hereby givenhis visitorial and or custodial rights at[sic] the express conformity of petitioner.3. Ordering the respondent Jose Antonio Roxasto provide support to the children in theamount of P30,000.00 a month, which support

shall be given directly to petitioner wheneverthe children are in her custody, otherwise, ifthe children are in the provisional custody ofrespondent, said amount of support shall berecorded properly as the amounts are beingspent. For that purpose the respondent shallthen render a periodic report to petitionerand to the Court to show compliance and formonitoring. In addition, the respondent isordered to support the proper schooling of thechildren providing for the payment of thetuition fees and other school fees and chargesincluding transportation expenses andallowances needed by the children for theirstudies.4. Dissolving the community property orconjugal partnership property of the partiesas the case may be, in accordance with law.

APPEALED TO C.A. AND DENIED THE APPEAL.

HELD:private respondent’s obligation to givemonthly support in the amount fixed by the RTCin the assailed orders may be enforced by thecourt itself, as what transpired in the earlystage of the proceedings when the court citedthe private respondent in contempt of courtand ordered him arrested for hisrefusal/failure to comply with the ordergranting support pendente lite.21 A few yearslater, private respondent filed a motion toreduce support while petitioner filed her ownmotion to increase the same, and in additionsought spousal support and support in arrears.This fact underscores the provisionalcharacter of the order granting supportpendente lite. Petitioner’s theory that theassailed orders have ceased to be provisionaldue to the arrearages incurred by privaterespondent is therefore untenable.

Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 RevisedRules of Civil Procedure, as amended, appealfrom interlocutory orders is not allowed. Saidprovision reads:

SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal maybe taken from a judgment or final order thatcompletely disposes of the case, or of a


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particular matter therein when declared bythese Rules to be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:(a) An order denying a motion for new trial orreconsideration;(b) An order denying a petition for relief orany similar motion seeking relief fromjudgment;(c) An interlocutory order;(d) An order disallowing or dismissing anappeal;(e) An order denying a motion to set aside ajudgment by consent, confession or compromiseon the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, orany other ground vitiating consent;(f) An order of execution;(g) A judgment or final order for or againstone or more of several parties or in separateclaims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case ispending, unless the court allows an appealtherefrom; and(h) An order dismissing an action withoutprejudice;

In all the above instances where the judgmentor final order is not appealable, theaggrieved party may file an appropriatespecial civil action under Rule 65.

THE RIGHT TO EXERCISE A PROFESSIONOR CALLING

Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise anylegitimate profession, occupation,business or activity without the consentof the other. The latter may object onlyon valid, serious, and moral grounds.In case of disagreement, the court shalldecide whether or not:(1) The objection is proper; and(2) Benefit has occurred to the familyprior to the objection or thereafter. Ifthe benefit accrued prior to theobjection, the resulting obligation shallbe enforced against the separate propertyof the spouse who has not obtainedconsent.The foregoing provisions shall notprejudice the rights of creditors whoacted in good faith.

NCC Art. 117. The wife may exercise anyprofession or occupation or engage inbusiness. However, the husband may object,provided:(1) His income is sufficient for thefamily, according to its social standing,and(2) His opposition is founded on seriousand valid grounds.In case of disagreement on this question,the parents and grandparents as well asthe family council, if any, shall beconsulted. If no agreement is stillarrived at, the court will decide whatevermay be proper and in the best interest ofthe family.

Art. 94. The absolute community ofproperty shall be liable for:


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(2) All debts and obligations contractedduring the marriage by the designatedadministrator-spouse for the benefit ofthe community, or by both spouses, or byone spouse with the consent of the other;(3) Debts and obligations contracted byeither spouse without the consent of theother to the extent that the family mayhave been benefited;

Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shallbe liable for:(2) All debts and obligations contractedduring the marriage by the designatedadministrator-spouse for the benefit ofthe conjugal partnership of gains, or byboth spouses or by one of them with theconsent of the other;(3) Debts and obligations contracted byeither spouse without the consent of theother to the extent that the family mayhave benefited;

CONSTI ART 2, Section 14. The Staterecognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamentalequality before the law of women and men.

CONSTI ART 13, Section 14. The State shallprotect working women by providing safeand healthful working conditions, takinginto account their maternal functions, andsuch facilities and opportunities thatwill enhance their welfare and enable themto realize their full potential in theservice of the nation.

NCC Art. 113. The husband must be joinedin all suits by or against the wife,except:

(1) When they are judicially separated;

(2) If they have in fact been separatedfor at least one year;

(3) When there is a separation of propertyagreed upon in the marriage settlements;

(4) If the administration of all theproperty in the marriage has beentransferred to her, in accordance withArticles 196 and 197;

(5) When the litigation is between thehusband and wife;

(6) If the suit concerns her paraphernalproperty;

(7) When the action is upon the civilliability arising from a criminal offense;

(8) If the litigation is incidental to theprofession, occupation or business inwhich she is engaged;

(9) In any civil action referred to inArticles 25 to 35; and

(10) In an action upon a quasi-delict.

In the cases mentioned in Nos. 7 to 10,the husband must be joined as a partydefendant if the third paragraph ofArticle 163 is applicable.

ROC Rule 3 Section 4. Spouses as parties. —Husband and wife shall sue or be suedjointly, except as provided by law.

RELATED RIGHTS / OBLIGATIONS

CASES:


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1. REPUBLIC V MOLINAFACTS:Roridel & Reynaldo Molina were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church. They had a son, Andre Molina. A year afterthe marriage, Reynaldo started manifestingsigns of immaturity and irresponsibility: (1) spent more time with his friends (2) depended on his parents for aid & assistance (3) not honest with the finances (4) relieved of his job making Roridel the breadwinner of the family. Roridel went to live with his parents and afterwards, Reynaldo abandoned her and thechild. Roridel filed a case for the declaration of nullity of their marriage by virtue of her husband’s psychological incapacity. Reynaldo claims that Roridel’sstrange behavior, refusal to perform marital duties & failure to run the household & handle finances caused their quarrels. Roridel on the other hand claimsthat her husband is immature, irresponsible, dependent, disrespectful, arrogant, chronic liar & infidel. He now lives with a mistress with whom he has a child.

ISSUEWON Reynaldo is psychologically incapacitated?

HELDNO. Marriage is valid.

Marital obligations as per court decision:

(6) The essential marital obligations mustbe those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated

in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 6 this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goadedby the indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.

the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume end discharge the basicmarital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.


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2. YASIN V. SHARIA COURT(G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995)

FACTS: On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume the use of maiden name.” The respondent court orderedamendments to the petition as it was not sufficient in form and substance in accordance Rule 103, Rules of Court,

regarding the residence of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which should include all the names by which the petitioner has been known. Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of her former husband to another woman. The respondent court denied the motion since compliance to rule103 is necessary if the petition is to be granted, as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioner’s maiden name and surname.

ISSUE: Whether or not in the case of annulment ofmarriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and the husband is married again to another woman and the former desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition for change of name and comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:NO. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband's name by prefixing theword "Mrs." before her husband's full nameor by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her suchright (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee


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need not seek judicial confirmation of thechange in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her. When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage, as no law requires it. The use of the husband's surname during the marriage, after annulment of the marriage and after the death of the husband is permissive and notobligatory except in case of legal separation.The court finds the petition to resume theuse of maiden name filed by petitioner before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.

ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS OF WOMAN AND CHILDREN

(Check RA9262)

CASES:1. SHARICA MARI GO TAN V. SPOUSES TANFACTS:

On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married. Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petitionwith Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in


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violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,otherwise known as the “Anti-ViolenceAgainst Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO.

On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss and contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they werenot covered by R.A. No. 9262

Appealed and DENIED.

ISSUE:Whether or not respondents-spouses perfecto & juanita, parents-in-law of sharica, may be included in the petition for the issuance of a protective order, in accordance with republic act no. 9262, otherwise known as the “anti-violence against women and their children act of 2004”.

HELD: The Court rules in favor of the petitioner. Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as “any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who ishis wife, former wife, or against a woman withwhom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimateor illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threatsof such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.” While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.

Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of theRPC (ART 10 of RPC). Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily

It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender through another, thus: SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts: x x x (h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

. In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against the woman or her child may includeindividuals other than the offending husband, thus: SEC. 8. Protection Orders. – x x x The protection orders that may be issuedunder this Act shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs: (a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, anyof the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act; (b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise


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communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus: SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children. (Emphasis supplied)

Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents may be considered indispensable ornecessary parties. To do so would be an exercise in superfluity. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated March 7, 2005 and July 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the petitionagainst respondents is concerned.

2. SAN DIEGO V RTCBefore the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Orders dated September 13, 20102 and October5, 20103 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 in Criminal Case No. 09-5210 which denied petitioner’s Motionfor Judicial Determination of Probable Causewith Motion to Quash the Information.

FACTS: on or about the 13th day of July, 2009, in

the City of Angeles, Philippines, and withinthe jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the boyfriend of the complainant, x x x did then

and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use personal violence on the complainant, by pulling her hair, punching complainant’s back, shoulder and left eye, thereby demeaning and degrading the complainant’s intrinsic worth and dignity asa human being, in violation of Section 5(a) of the Republic Act 9262.

After examining the supporting evidence, theRTC found probable cause and consequently, issued a warrant of arrest. The latter posted a cash bond for his provisional liberty. Then filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the Information. Due tot the time of the alleged incident on July 13, 2009, hewas no longer in a dating relationship with private respondent; hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable.

RTC: denied petitioner’s motion. It did notconsider material the fact that the parties’dating relationship had ceased prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since the parties had admitted a prior dating relationship, the infliction of slight physical injuries constituted an act of violence against women and their children asdefined in Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262.

ISSUE: W the act is punishable under RA 9262 even though they are no longer datingat time of incident

HELD: YES

Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical injuries to private respondent is not covered by RA 9262 becauseits proximate cause was not their dating relationship. Instead, he claims that the offense committed was only slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code which falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.

In Ang v. Court of Appeals,5 the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment, to wit:


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1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.

Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary elements of the crime, such as: a dating relationshipbetween the petitioner and the private respondent; the act of violence committed bythe petitioner; and the resulting physical harm to private respondent, the offense is covered by RA 9262 which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance with Sec. 7 of the said law which reads:

SEC. 7. Venue – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant.

Finally, the Court finds the Order9 of the RTC, giving the prosecutor a period of two (2) days to amend the Information to reflectthe cessation of the dating relationship between the petitioner and the offended party, to be in accord with Sec. 4 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.- If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.1âwphi1

Furthermore, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that an information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before

the accused enters his plea. In the present case, the accused petitioner has not yet been arraigned, hence, the RTC was correct in directing the amendment of the Information and in denying the motion to quash the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Orders dated September 13, 2010 and October 5, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court ( RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 in Criminal Case No. 09-5210 are AF.FI RM ED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court is LIFTED and the RTC is directed to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 09-5210.

SO ORDERED.

3. TUA V MANGROBANGFACTS:On May 20, 2005, respondent Rossana Honrado-Tua (respondent) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite a VerifiedPetition2 for herself and in behalf of her minor children, Joshua Raphael, Jesse Ruth Lois, and J ezreel Abigail, for the issuanceof a protection order, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, against her husband, petitioner Ralph Tua. Respondent claimed that she and her childrenhad suffered from petitioner’s abusive conduct; that petitioner had threatened to cause her and the children physical harm forthe purpose of controlling her actions or decisions; that she was actually deprived ofcustody and access to her minor children;


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and, that she was threatened to be deprived of her and her children’s financial support.

Respondent claimed, among others, that: there was a time when petitioner went to herroom and cocked his gun and pointed the barrel of his gun to his head as he wanted to convince her not to proceed with the legal separation case she filed; she hid herfears although she was scared; there was also an instance when petitioner fed her children with the fried chicken that her youngest daughter had chewed and spat out; in order to stop his child from crying, petitioner would threaten him with a belt; when she told petitioner that she felt unsafe and insecure with the latter's presence and asked him to stop coming to thehouse as often as he wanted or she would apply for a protection order, petitioner gotfurious and threatened her of withholding his financial support and even held her by the nape and pushed her to lie flat on the bed; and, on May 4, 2005, while she was at work, petitioner with companions went to hernew home and forcibly took the children and refused to give them back to her.

On May 23, 2005, the RTC issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO). For the purpose of the implementation of the Temporary Protection Order, the respondent (herein petitioner Ralph) is hereby ordered to:1. Enjoin from committing and threatening tocommit personally or through another, physical, verbal and emotional harm or abuseagainst the herein petitioner (respondent) and other family and household members;2. Restrain from harassing, annoying, texting, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner (respondent) whether directly or indirectly or engaged in any psychological form of harassment;

Respondent's Petition with Urgent Motion to Lift TPO. Petitioner contended that the issuance of the TPO on May 23, 2005 is unconstitutional for being violative of the

due process clause of the Constitution. Without awaiting for the resolution of his Comment on the petition and motion to lift TPO, petitioner filed with the CA a petitionfor certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and hold departure order assailing the May 23, 2005 TPO issued by theRTC.

The CA found that the TPO dated May 23, 2005was validly issued by the RTC and found no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance thereof as the same were in complete accord with the provision of RA 9262.

As to petitioner's argument that there was no basis for the issuance of the TPO, considering that the provision authorizing such issuance is unconstitutional, the CA ruled that since the matter raised herein was the RTC’s alleged grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO, such matter could be resolved without having to rule on the constitutionality of RA 9262 and its provisions. And that the requisites that theconstitutionality of the law in question be the very lis mota of the case was absent.

ISSUE:THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN REFUSING TO RULE ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROVISIONS OF RA 9262 HAS DECIDED THE CASE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH ESTABLISHED LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE CONSIDERING THAT CONTRARY TO ITS FINDINGS THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SAID LAW IS THE LISMOTA OF THE CASE

HELD:Section 15 of RA 9262 provides:SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. – Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers tothe protection order issued by the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte determination that such order


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should be issued. A court may grant in a TPOany, some or all of the reliefs mentioned inthis Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a [Permanent Protection Order] PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The courtshall order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of lawenforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.

Clearly, the court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the filing of the application after ex parte determination that there is basis for the issuance thereof. Ex parte means that the respondent need not be notified or be present in the hearing for the issuance of the TPO. Thus, it is within the court’s discretion, based on the petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to determine that the violent acts against women and their children for the issuance of a TPO have been committed.

And Section 5 of the same law provides:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;

(b) Threatening to cause the woman orher child physical harm;

(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;

(d) Placing the woman or her child infear of imminent physical harm;

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the

woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman orher child of custody to her/hisfamily;

(2) Depriving or threatening todeprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support;

(3) Depriving or threatening todeprive the woman or her child of a legal right;

(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity or controlling the victim's own money or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties;

(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions;

(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family;


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(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, butnot be limited to, the following acts:

(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public orprivate places;

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residenceof the woman or her child;

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the propertyof the woman or her child against her/his will;

(4) Destroying the property andpersonal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child;and

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to,repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children.

In this case, the alleged acts of petitioneramong others, i.e., he cocked the gun and pointed the same to his head in order to convince respondent not to proceed with the legal separation case; feeding his other children with the food which another child spat out; and threatening the crying child with a belt to stop him from crying which was repeatedly done; and holding respondent by her nape when he got furious that she wasasking him not to come often to their conjugal home and hold office thereat after their agreed separation and threatening her of withholding half of the financial support

for the kids, while not conclusive, are enough bases for the issuance of a TPO. Petitioner's actions would fall under the enumeration of Section 5, more particularly,paragraphs a, d, e (2), f, h, and i.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 28, 2005 of the Courtof Appeals issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 89939, upholding the Regional Trial Court's issuance of the Temporary Protection Order dated May 23, 2005, is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of

Imus, Cavite is hereby ORDERED to resolve with dispatch respondent's Petition for a Permanent Protection Order.

4. PEOPLE V JUMAWANFACTS:

Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK,5 were married on October 18, 1975. They Ii ved together since then and raised their four (4) children6 as they put up several businesses over the years.

On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit,7 alleging that her husband, the accused-appellant, raped her at3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Phase 2, Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.

On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the RTC respectively docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-6689 and Criminal Case No. 99-669.10 The Information in Criminal Case No. 99-668 charged the accused-appellant as follows:

That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within


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the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter[']s will.

On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed aMotion to Admit Amended Information: That onor about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.

Ruling of the RTC: GUILTY (later affirmed by C.A)

In its Judgment76 dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the version proffered by the prosecution by giving greater weight and credence to the spontaneous and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses. The trial courtalso upheld as sincere and genuine the two daughters' testimonies, as it is notnatural in our culture for daughters to testify against their own father for a crime such as rape if the same was not truly committed.

The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found unbelievable the accused-appellant's accusations of extra-marital affairs and money squandering against KKK. The trial courtshelved the accused-appellant's alibi for being premised on inconsistent testimonies and the contradicting declarations of the other defense witness, Equia, as to the accused-appellant's actual whereabouts on October 16, 1998.

ISSUE: If ruling is correct

HELD: III. Marital Rape in the PhilippinesInterestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached this Court until now. It appears, however, that the old provisions of rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered to Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, albeit in a limited form. According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino,104 a husband may not be guilty of rape under Article 335 of Act No. 3815 but, in case there is legal separation, the husband should be held guilty of rape if he forces his wife to submit to sexual intercourse.

Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed.- Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machinationor grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

A Final Note

Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a woman's value and dignity as a human being. It respects no time, place, age, physical condition or social status. It can happen anywhere and it can happen to anyone.Even, as shown in the present case, to a wife, inside her time-honored fortress, the family home, committed against her by her


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husband who vowed to be her refuge from cruelty. The herein pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our rape laws provide the atonement they seek from their sexually coercive husbands.

Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives. A husband does not own his wife's body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she does not divest herself of thehuman right to an exclusive autonomy over her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or withhold her consent to marital coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife's unremitting refusal to engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious forceor coercion to make her yield. He can seek succor before the Family Courts that can determine whether her refusal constitutes psychological incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage.

Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and biological communion that achieves the marital purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love and self-giving and as such it contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and never sexual coercion or imposition.

The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein pronouncement, menacing personalities may use this as a tool to harass innocent husbands. In this regard, let it be stressed that safeguards in the criminal justice system are in place to spot and scrutinize fabricated or false marital rape complaints and any person who institutes untrue and malicious charges willbe made answerable under the pertinent provisions of the RPC and/or other laws.

The Supreme Court in the case of People vs Jumawan (GR 187495, 21 April 2014) En Banc Reyes J, affirmed the conviction of a husband for marital rape, rejected the notion that a wife is a man’s property, and described the nature of the right of coitionbetween spouses under our laws.

The ruling in People vs Jumawan (GR 187495, 21April 2014) that a husband can be guilty ofrape if he has sexual intercourse with hiswife without her consent is consistent withthe rule that a spouse’s right to havesexual intercourse with his wife cannot beenforced in Court. If the husband cannot usethe courts to compel a wife to have sexualintercourse with him, then surely thehusband cannot use the existence of themarital relationship per se to exculpatehimself from criminal liability for rape.The Supreme Court in People vs Jumawan (GR187495, 21 April 2014) declared that ‘[n]eithercan the Court frame distinct or stricter evidentiary rules formarital rape cases as it would inequitably burden itsvictims and unreasonably and irrationally classify themdifferently from the victims of non-marital rape.’


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PROPERTY RELATIONS OF THE SPOUSES

Requisites for validity of Marriage Settlements

CASE:1. PANA V HEIRS OF JUANITE SR.

This case is about the propriety of levy and execution on conjugal properties where one of the spouses has been found guilty of a crime and ordered to pay civil indemnities to the victims' heirs.

The prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others of murder. On July 9, 1997 the RTC rendered a consolidated decision2 acquitting Efren of the charge for insufficiency of evidence but finding Melecia and another person guilty as charged and sentenced them to the penalty of death.

On appeal to this Court, it affirmed on May 24, 2001 the conviction of both accused but modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua.

Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, on March 12, 2002 the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ,5 resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia. On September 16, 2002 the RTC denied the motion.10 The spouses moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied the same on March 6, 2003.11

Claiming that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the challenged orders, Efren filed a petition forcertiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). On January 29, 2004 theCA dismissed the petition for failure to sufficiently show that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing its assailed orders.12 It also denied Efren’s motion for reconsideration,13 prompting him to file the present petition for review on certiorari.The Issue PresentedThe sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in holding that the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case.


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Ruling of the CourtTo determine whether the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable against the properties of the marriage, the Court has first to identify the spouses’ property relations.Efren claims that his marriage with Melecia falls under the regime of conjugal partnershipof gains, given that they were married prior to the enactment of the Family Code and that they did not execute any prenuptial agreement.14Although the heirs of the deceased victims do not dispute that it was the Civil Code, not the Family Code, which governed the marriage, they insist that it was the system of absolute community of property that appliedto Efren and Melecia.

However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may beenforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned.

Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s findingthat Melecia has no exclusive property of her own,24 the above applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.SP 77198 dated January 29, 2004 and May 14, 2004. The Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 30, shall first ascertain that, in enforcing the writ of execution on the

conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia Pana for the satisfaction of the indemnities imposed by final judgment on the latter accused in Criminal Cases 4232 and 4233, the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.

Donations Propter Nuptias (Definitions)

CASES:1. Solis v. SolisFACTS:The spouses Juan Lambino and Maria A. Barroso begot three children named Alejo, Eugenia and Marciana Lambino. On June 2, 1919 said spousesmade a donation ofpropter nuptias of the lands described in the complaint in favor of their son Alejo Lambino and Fortunata Solis in a


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private document (Exhibit A) in consideration of the marriage which the latter were about toenter into. One of the conditions of this donation is that in case of the death of one of the donees, one-half of these lands thus donated would revert to the donors while the surviving donee would retain the other half. On the 8th of the said month of June 1919, Alejo Lambino and Fortunata Solis were marriedand immediately thereafter the donors delivered the possession of the donated lands to them. On August 3, 1919 donee Alejo Lambinodied. In the same year donor Juan Lambino alsodied. After the latter's death, his wife, Maxima Barroso, recovered possession of the donated lands.

The surviving donee Fortunata Solis filed the action, which is the subject matter of this appeal, against the surviving donor Maxima Barroso and Eugenia and Marcelina Lambino, heirs of the deceased donor Juan Lambino, withtheir respective husbands, demanding of the defendants the execution of the proper deed ofdonation according to law, transferring one-half of the donated property, and moreover, toproceed to the partition of the donated property and its fruits.

The court rendered judgment based upon article1279 of the Civil Code granting plaintiff. We are of the opinion that article 1279 of the Civil Code, relating to contracts, is not applicable to the present case.

ISSUE: Validity?

HELD:We are concerned with a donation propter nuptias, which, according to article 1328 of the Civil Code, must be governed by the rules established in Title II, Book III of this Code, on donations (articles 618 to 656), Article 633 provides that in order that a donation of real property may be valid, it must be made in a public instrument. This is the article applicable to donation propter nuptias in so far as its formal validity is concerned. The only exceptions to this rule are onerous and remuneratory donations, in so

far as they do not exceed the value of the charge imposed, which are then governed by therules on contracts (art. 622), and those whichare to take effect upon the donor's death, which are governed by the rules established for testamentary successions (art. 620).

We have, therefore, a donation propter nuptias which is not valid and did not create any right, since it was not made ina public instrument, and hence, article 1279 of the Civil Code which the lower court applied is not applicable thereto. The last named article provides that, should the law require the execution of aninstrument or any other special form in order to make the obligations of a contract effective, the contracting parties may compel each other to comply with such formality from the moment that consent has been given, and the other requirements for the validity of the contract exist.

The judgment appealed from is reversed andthe defendants are hereby absolved from the complaint, without special pronouncement of costs. So ordered.

We have, therefore, a donation propter nuptias which is not valid and did not create any right, since it wasnot made in a public instrument.


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2. Velasquez v CAFACTS:Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died intestate sometime in 1945 and 1947, respectively and were childless. Leoncia de Guzman was survived by her sisters Anatalia de

Guzman (mother of the plaintiffs) and Tranquilina de Guzman (grandmother of the defendants). During the existence of their marriage, spouses Aquino were able to acquire the following real properties:a) A parcel of land (residential) situated in Guiguilonen, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Bounded on the S. by Simeon Meneses; on the E. by Dionisio Muyargas; on the N. by road to San Jacinto; and on the W. by Juan Magalong; containing an area of 995 sq. m. more or less and assessed for the current year;b) A parcel of land (sugar cane) and coconut land situated in Poblacion, Mangaldan,Pangasinan. Bounded on the N. by Jose Lopez and Cipriano Serafica; on the E. by road to Mapandan; on the S. by Vicente Doyola and Dalmacio Gonzales; and on the W. by Eleuterio Serafica; containing an area of 27,849 sq. m.,more or less;c) A parcel of land situated in Malabago, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Bounded on the N. by Fausto Tandingan; on the E. by Segundo Toralba, Fausto Tandingan and Jacinta Biasaga; on the S. by Roberto Mamapon; and on the W. by heirs of Estanislao Biasaga and Elena delos Reyes; containing an area of 2,077sq. m. more or less;d) A parcel of land (sugarcane), situated in Embarcadero, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Bounded on the N. by Basilio Duya and Bernardo Cano; on the E. by Simeon Manaois; on the S. by a road; and on the W. byLoreto de Guzman; containing an area of 2,857 sq. m., more or less; It is covered by Tax Decl. No. 231;e) A parcel of residential land situatedin Bari, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Bounded on theN. by Andres Aquino; on the E. by Arcadio Barromeo; on the S. by National Road; on the W. by Andres Aquino; containing an area of 595sq. m., more or less and covered by Tax Decl. No. 453;f) A parcel of unirrigated riceland situated in Malabago, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Bounded on the N. by Segundo Tandingan and Jacinto Biasaga; on the E. by Segundo Toralba,Fausto Tandingan and Jacinto Biasaga; on the S. by Roberto Mamapon; and on the W. by heirs


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of Estanislao Biasaga and Elena delos Reyes; containing an area of 2,077 sq. m., more or less, and covered Tax Decl. No. 1156.

Sometime in 1989, the heirs of Anatalia de Guzman represented by Santiago, Andres, Felicidad and Apolonio,[4] all surnamed Menesesfiled a complaint for annulment, partition anddamages against the heirs of Cesario Velasquez(son of Tranquilina de Guzman) for the latters’ refusal to partition the above-mentioned conjugal properties of the Spouses Aquino. The complaint alleged that Leoncia de Guzman, before her death, had a talk with the plaintiffs’ mother, Anatalia de Guzman, with plaintiff Santiago Meneses and Tranquilina de Guzman and his son Cesario Velasquez in attendance; that in the conference Leoncia told Anatalia de Guzman, Tranquilina de Guzmanand Cesario Velaquez that the documents of donation and partition which she and her husband earlier executed were not signed by them as it was not their intention to give away all the properties to Cesario Velasquez because Anatalia de Guzman who is one of her sisters had several children to support; Cesario Velasquez together with his mother allegedly promised to divide the properties equally and to give the plaintiffs one-half (1/2) thereof; that they are entitled to ½ of each of all the properties in question being the children of Anatalia de Guzman, full bloodsister of Leoncia de Guzman. Plaintiffs further claim that after the death of Leoncia,defendants forcibly took possession of all theproperties and despite plaintiffs’ repeated demands for partition, defendants refused. Plaintiffs pray for the nullity of any documents covering the properties in question since they do not bear the genuine signatures of the Aquino spouses, to order the partition of the properties between plaintiffs and defendants in equal shares and to order the defendants to render an accounting of the produce of the land in question from the time defendants forcibly took possession until partition shall have been effected.

Defendants denied that a conference took placebetween Leoncia de Guzman and plaintiff

Santiago Meneses and his mother Anatalia with Tranquilina (defendants’ grandmother) and Cesario Velasquez (defendants’ father), nor did the latter promise to divide the properties equally with the plaintiffs or to execute a deed of partition; that they did notforcibly take possession of the subject properties since their possession thereof has been peaceful, open, continuous and adverse incharacter to the exclusion of all others.

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs:(1) Declaring Anatalia de Guzman and Tranquilina de Guzman as the legal heirs of Spouses Cornelio Aquino and Leoncia de Guzman;and that the former succeeded the latter over the six (6) parcels of land in question in equal shares - ½ belongs to Anatalia de Guzmanor to her heirs; and ½, to Tranquilina de Guzman or to her heirs;(2) Declaring the Donation Intervivos in favor of Jose Velasquez and Anastacia Velasquez over the first parcel of land; the Deed of Sale to Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman over the second parcel; the Deed of Donation to Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman over the 3rd and 6th parcels; the Deed of Sale to third parties over the 4th and 5th parcels as null and void insofar as ½ of the six (6) parcels are concerned which legitimately belong to the plaintiffs;(3) Ordering the defendants to reconvey to theplaintiffs ½ each of the six (6) properties inquestion and if this is not possible, to reconvey the whole of the sugar cane and coconut land situated at Poblacion, Mangaldan,Pangasinan, containing an area of 27,849 square meters, covered by Tax Declaration No. 978 (Exhibit "C") - parcel B, par. 2 of the complaint; and(4) Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay to plaintiffs P50,000.00, as damages, P5,000.00, as attorney’s fees and P3,000.00, as litigation expenses."

Dissatisfied, defendants appealed the decisionto the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the same in a decision dated December29, 1995.


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Petitioners claim that they were able to show by documentary evidence that the Aquino spouses during their lifetime disposed of the four parcels of land subject of the complaint,to wit: (a) Escritura de donation propter nuptias datedFebruary 15, 1919 in favor of then future spouses Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman(petitioners’ parents) conveying to them a portion of the second parcel and the entirety of the third and sixth parcels in the complaint; (b) Deed of donation inter vivos dated April 10, 1939 conveying the first parcel in favor of petitioners Anastacia Velasquez and Jose Velasquez; (c)Escritura de Compraventa dated August 25, 1924 conveying another portion of the second parcel in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman with a P500 consideration; (d) Deed of Conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman conveying to them the remaining portion of the second parcel for a consideration of P600 and confirming in the same Deed the Escritura de donation propter nuptias and Escritura de compraventa abovementioned.

A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title overthe property from the donor to the donee[25] andthe donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee.[26] And once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.[27] The donation of the first parcel made by the Aquino spouses to petitioners Joseand Anastacia Velasquez who were then nineteen(19) and ten (10) years old respectively was accepted through their father Cesario Velasquez, and the acceptance was incorporatedin the body of the same deed of donation and made part of it, and was signed by the donor and the acceptor. Legally speaking there was delivery and acceptance of the deed, and the donation existed perfectly and irrevocably. The donation inter vivosmay be revoked only for thereasons provided in Articles 760, 764 and 765 of the Civil Code.[28] The donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camilade Guzman over the third and sixth parcels including a portion of the second parcel

became the properties of the spouses Velasquezsince 1919. The deed of donation propter nuptias can be revoked by the non-performance ofthe marriage and the other causes mentioned inarticle 86 of the Family Code.[29] The alleged reason for the repudiation of the deed, i.e, that the Aquino spouses did not intend to giveaway all their properties since Anatalia (Leoncia’s sister) had several children to support is not one of the grounds for revocation of donation either inter vivos or propter nuptias, although the donation might be inofficious.

The Escritura compraventa over another portion of the second parcel and the Deed of conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario and Camila Velasquez over the remaining portion ofthe second parcel is also valid. In fact in the deed of sale dated July 14, 1939, the Aquino spouses ratified and confirmed the rights and interests of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman including the previous deeds of conveyance executed by the Aquino spouses over the second parcel in the complaint and such deed of sale became the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 15129 in the names of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman on July25, 1939. The best proof of the ownership of the land is the certificate of title[30] and it requires more than a bare allegation to defeatthe face value of TCT No. 15129 which enjoys alegal presumption of regularity of issuance.[31] Notably, during the lifetime of Cesario Velasquez, he entered into contracts of mortgage and lease over the property as annotated at the back of the certificate of title which clearly established that he exercised full ownership and control over the property. It is quite surprising that it was only after more than fifty years that private respondents asserted co-ownership claim over the subject property.

The Aquino spouses had disposed the four parcels of land during their lifetime and the documents were duly notarized so that these documents enjoy the presumption of validity.[32] Such presumption has not been overcome by private respondent Santiago Meneses with clear


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and convincing evidence. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.[33] Petitioners were able to establishthat these four parcels of land were validly conveyed to them by the Aquino spouses hence they no longer formed part of the conjugal properties of the spouses at the time of theirdeaths. As regards the fourth and fifth parcels, petitioners alleged that these were also conveyed to third persons and they do notclaim any right thereto.

In view of the foregoing, we conclude that this action of partition cannot be maintained.The properties sought to be partitioned by private respondents have already been delivered to petitioners and therefore no longer part of the hereditary estate which could be partitioned. After finding that no co-ownership exists between private respondents and petitioners, we find no reasonto discuss the other arguments raised by the petitioners in support of their petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City are SET ASIDE. The complaint in the trial court against petitioner is ORDERED DISMISSED.

3. Abobon v AbobonFACTS: Respondents filed an action for recovery of possession and damages against petitioner claiming that they were the registered owners of that parcel of unirrigatedriceland which they inherited from their father and covered by transfer certificate of title (TCT). That they had allowed their first cousin, the free use of the land out of benevolence and that they now immediately needed the parcel of land for their own use and had accordinglydemanded that petitioner should vacate andreturn it to them but he had refused. ISSUE: Who is the true owner of the land in question. HELD: A fundamental principle in land registration under the Torrens system is that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. The certificate of tile thus becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land; hence, anyone who deals with property registered under the Torrenssystem may rely on the title and need not go beyond the title. This reliance on the certificate of title rests on the doctrineof indefeasibility of the land title, which has long been well-settled in this jurisdiction. It is only when the acquisition of the title is attended with fraud or bad faith that the doctrine of indefeasibility finds no application. The respondents had the preferential right to the possession of the land in question. Their having preferential right conformed to the age- old rule that whoever held a Torrens title in his name is entitled to the possession of the land covered by the


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title. He may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.

Donations Propter Nuptias (Forms of Donations)

CASES:1. Valencia v. LoquiaoBoth cases involve a parcel of land consistingof 4,876 square meters situated in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. This land was originally owned bythe spouses Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao, as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 18383[8] issued on October 3, 1917 by the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan.

On May 22, 1944, Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao executed a deed of donation propter nuptias which was written in the Ilocanodialect, denominated as Inventario Ti Sagut[9] in favor of their son, respondent Benito Locquiao (hereafter, respondent Benito) and his prospective bride, respondent Tomasa Mara (hereafter, respondent Tomasa). By the terms of the deed, the donees were gifted with four (4) parcels of land, including the land in question, as well as a male cow and one-third


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(1/3) portion of the conjugal house of the donor parents, in consideration of the impending marriage of the donees.The donees took their marriage vows on June 4,1944 and the fact of their marriage was inscribed at the back of O.C.T. No. 18383.[10]

Herminigildo and Raymunda died on December 15,1962 and January 9, 1968, respectively, leaving as heirs their six (6) children, namely: respondent Benito, Marciano, Lucio, Emeteria, Anastacia, and petitioner Romana, all surnamed Locquiao[11]. With the permission of respondents Benito and Tomasa, petitioner Romana Valencia (hereinafter, Romana) took possession and cultivated the subject land.[12] When respondent Romana’s husband got sick sometime in 1977, her daughter petitioner Constancia Valencia (hereafter, petitioner Constancia) took over, and since then, has been in possession of the land.[13]

Meanwhile, respondents Benito and Tomasa registered the Inventario Ti Sagut with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan on May 15, 1970.[14] In due course, the original title was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 84897[15] was issued in the name of the respondents Benito and Tomasa.

On March 18, 1973, the heirs of the Locquiao spouses, including respondent Benito and petitioner Romana, executed a Deed of Partition with Recognition of Rights,[16] wherein they distributed among only three (3) of them, the twelve (12) parcels of land left by their common progenitors, excluding the land in question and other lots disposed of by the Locquiao spouses earlier. Contained in the deed is a statement that respondent Benito and Marciano Locquiao, along with the heirs of Lucio Locquiao, “have already received our shares inthe estates of our parents, by virtue of previous donations and conveyances,” and that for that reason the heirs of Lucio Locquaio were not made parties to the deed. All the living children of the Locquaio spouses at thetime, including petitioner Romana, confirmed the previous dispositions and waived their

rights to whomsoever the properties covered bythe deed of partition were adjudicated.[17]

Later on, disagreements among five (5) heirs or groups of heirs, including petitioner Romana, concerning the distribution of two (2)of the lots covered by the deed of partition which are Lots No. 2467 and 5567 of the Urdaneta Cadastral Survey surfaced. As their differences were settled, the heirs concerned executed a Deed of Compromise Agreement[18] on June 12, 1976, which provided for the re-distribution of the two (2) lots. Although not directly involved in the discord, Benito signed the compromise agreement together with his feuding siblings, nephews and nieces. Significantly, all the signatories tothe compromise agreement, including petitionerRomana, confirmed all the other stipulations and provisions of the deed of partition.[19]

Sometime in 1983, the apparent calm pervading among the heirs was disturbed when petitioner Constancia filed an action for annulment of title against the respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan.[20] The record shows that the case was dismissed by the trial court but it does not indicate the reason for the dismissal.[21]

On December 13, 1983, respondent Benito filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan a Complaint[22] seeking the ejectment of petitioner Constancia from the subject property.

On November 25, 1985, the Municipal Trial Court rendered a Decision,[23] ordering the defendant in the case, petitioner Constancia, to vacate the land in question.

The certification is not sufficient to prove the alleged inexistence or spuriousness of thechallenged document. The appellate court is correct in pointing out that the mere absence of the notarial record does not prove that thenotary public does not have a valid notarial commission and neither does the absence of a file copy of the document with the archives effect evidence of the falsification of the document.[33] This Court ruled that the failure


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of the notary public to furnish a copy of the deed to the appropriate office is a ground fordisciplining him, but certainly not for invalidating the document or for setting asidethe transaction therein involved.[34]

Moreover, the heirs of the Locquaio spouses, including petitioner Romana, made reference inthe deed of partition and the compromise agreement to the previous donations made by the spouses in favor of some of the heirs. Aspointed out by the RTC,[35] respondent Benito was not allotted any share in the deed of partition precisely because he received his share by virtue of previous donations. His name was mentioned in the deed of partition only with respect to the middle portion of LotNo. 2638 which is the eleventh (11th) parcel inthe deed but that is the same one-third (1/3) portion of Lot No. 2638 covered by O.C.T. No. 18259 included in the donation propter nuptias. Similarly, Marciano Locquiao and the heirs of Lucio Locquiao were not allocated anymore share in the deed of partition since theyreceived theirs by virtue of prior donations or conveyances.

Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias or donations by reason of marriage are those “made before its celebration, in consideration of the same and in favor of one or both of the future spouses.”[44] The distinction is crucial because the two classesof donations are not governed by exactly the same rules, especially as regards the formal essential requisites.Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described.[45] However, Article 1330 of the same Code provides that “acceptance is not necessary to the validity of such gifts”. In other words, the celebration of the marriage between the beneficiary couple, in tandem with compliance with the prescribed form, was enough to effectuate the donation propter nuptias under the Old Civil Code.Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127 thereof provides that the form of donations propter nuptias are

regulated by the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2, which contains the Statute of Frauds requires that the contracts mentioned thereunder need be in writing only to be enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129, express acceptance “is not necessary for the validity of these donations.” Thus, implied acceptance is sufficient.

It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended tohave retroactive effect.[46] Consequently, it isthe Old Civil Code which applies in this case since the donation propter nuptias was executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950.[47] The fact that in 1944 the Philippines was still under Japanese occupation is of no consequence. It is a well-known rule of the Law of Nations that municipal laws, as contra-distinguished from laws of political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty.[48] This Court specifically held that during the Japanese occupation period, the Old Civil Code was in force.[49] As a consequence, applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code inthe determination of the validity of the questioned donation, it does not matter whether or not the donees had accepted the donation. The validity of the donation is unaffected in either case.v

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the assailed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED.


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2. Doronio V. HeirsFACTS;Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante, nowboth deceased, were the registered owners of aparcel of land located atBarangay Cabalitaan, Asingan, Pangasinan covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 352

The spouses had children but the records fail to disclose their number. It is clear, however, that Marcelino Doronio and Fortunato Doronio, now both deceased, were among them and that the parties in this case are their heirs. Petitioners are the heirs of Marcelino Doronio, while respondents are the heirs of Fortunato Doronio.

On April 24, 1919, a private deed of donation propter nuptias[5] was executed by spousesSimeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante in favor of Marcelino Doronio and the latter’s wife, Veronica Pico. It appears that the property described in the deed of donation is the one covered by OCT No. 352. However, there is a significant discrepancy with respect to the identity of the owner of adjacent property at the eastern side. Based on OCT No. 352, the adjacent owners are Zacarias Najorda and Alejandro Najorda, whereas based on the deed of donation, the owner of the adjacent property is Fortunato Doronio. Furthermore, said deed of donation remained a private document as it was never notarized.

Both parties have been occupying the subject land for several decades[8] although they have different theories regarding its present ownership. According to petitioners, they arenow the owners of the entire property in view


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of the private deed of donationpropter nuptias in favor of their predecessors, Marcelino Doronioand Veronica Pico. Respondents, on the other hand, claim that only half of the property was actually incorporated in the said deed of donation because it stated that Fortunato Doronio, instead of Zacarias Najorda and Alejandro Najorda, is the owner of the adjacent propertyat the eastern side. Respondents posit that the donors respected and segregated the possession of Fortunato Doronio of the easternhalf of the land. They are the ones who have been possessing said land occupied by their predecessor, Fortunato Doronio. After due proceedings, the RTC ruled in favor of petitioner heirs of Marcelino Doronio (defendants). It concluded that the parties admitted the identity of the land which they all occupy;[17] that a title once registered under the torrens system cannot be defeated byadverse, open and notorious possession or by prescription;[18] that the deed of donation in consideration of the marriage of the parents of petitioners is valid, hence, it led to the eventual issuance of TCT No. 44481 in the names of said parents;[19] and that respondent heirs of Fortunato Doronio (plaintiffs) are not entitled to damages as they are not the rightful owners of the portion of the propertythey are claiming.

In a Decision dated January 26, 2005, the CA reversed the RTC decision. The appellate courtdetermined that “(t)he intention to donate half of the disputed property to appellees’ predecessors can be gleaned from the disparityof technical descriptions appearing in the title (OCT No. 352) of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante and in the deed of donation propter nuptias executed on April 24, 1919 in favor of appellees’ predecessors.”

ISSUES:1. DECLARING ADMISSIBILITY OF THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 352 DESPITE OF LACK OF TRANSLATION THEREOF.

2. (RULING THAT) ONLY HALF OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTY WAS DONATED TO THE PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST OF THE HEREIN APPELLANTS. 3. (ITS) DECLARATION THAT THE DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS IS INNOFICIOUS, IS PREMATURE, AND THUS IT IS ILLEGAL AND UNPROCEDURAL.

HELD:

OCT No. 352 in Spanish Although Not Translated into English or Filipino Is Admissible For Lack of Timely Objection.-

Where such document, not so accompanied with a translation in English or Filipino, is offered in evidence and not objected to, either by the parties or the court, it must be presumed that the language in whichthe document is written is understood by all, and the document is admissiblein evidence.

Issues on Impairment of Legitime Should Be ThreshedOut in a Special Proceeding, Not in Civil Action forReconveyance and Damage.- The net estate ofthe decedent must be ascertained, bydeducting all payable obligations andcharges from the value of the propertyowned by the deceased at the time ofhis death; then, all donations subjectto collation would be added toit. With the partible estate thusdetermined, the legitime of thecompulsory heir or heirs can beestablished; and only then can it beascertained whether or not a donationhad prejudiced the legitimes.

Declaration of Validity of DonationCan Be Challenged by an InterestedParty Not Impleaded in Petition forQuieting of Title or Declaratory Reliefor Where There is No Res Judicata.Moreover, This Court Can Consider


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a Factual Matter or Unassigned Errorin the Interest of Substantial Justice.- Arudimentary doctrine on appealed casesis that this Court is clothed withample authority to review matters,even if they are not assigned aserrors on appeal, if it finds thattheir consideration is necessary atarriving at a just decision of thecase.[68] Also, an unassigned errorclosely related to an error properlyassigned or upon which thedetermination of the question raisedby the error properly assigned isdependent, will be considered by theappellate court notwithstanding thefailure to assign it as an error.

Donation Propter Nuptias of RealProperty Made in a Private InstrumentBefore the New Civil Code Took Effecton August 30, 1950 is Void- Under the OldCivil Code, donations propternuptias must be made in a publicinstrument in which the propertydonated must be specificallydescribed.[71] Article 1328 of the OldCivil Code provides that gifts propternuptias are governed by the rulesestablished in Title 2 of Book 3 ofthe same Code. Article 633 of thattitle provides that the gift of realproperty, in order to be valid, mustappear in a public document.[72] It issettled that a donation of realestate propter nuptias is void unlessmade by public instrument

Titled Property Cannot Be AcquiredBy Another By Adverse Possessionor Extinctive Prescription.- Although We confirmhere the invalidity of the deed ofdonation and of its resulting TCT No.44481, the controversy between the partiesis yet to be fully settled. The issues asto who truly are the present owners of the

property and what is the extent of theirownership remain unresolved. The same maybe properly threshed out in the settlementof the estates of the registered owners ofthe property, namely: spouses SimeonDoronio and Cornelia Gante.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision

is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A new one isentered:

(1) Declaring the private deed ofdonation propter nuptias in favor ofpetitioners’ predecessors NULL AND VOID;and

(2) Ordering the Register of Deedsof Pangasinan to:

(a) CANCEL Transfer

Certificate of Title No. 44481in the names of MarcelinoDoronio and Veronica Pico; and

(b) RESTORE Original

Certificate of Title No. 352in the names of its originalowners, spouses Simeon Doronioand Cornelia Gante.

SO ORDERED.


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Donations Propter Nuptias (What may be Donated)

1. Mateo v Lagua

FACTS: Sometime in 1917, the parents of Alejandro Lagua donated two lots to him in consideration of his marriage to petitioner Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage was celebrated on May 15, 1917 and thereafter the couple took possession of the lots, but the certificates of title remained in the donor’s name.

In 1923, Alejandro died, leaving behind his widow Bonifacia with their infant daughter, who lived with the father-in-law Cipriano Lagua who in turn undertook to farm on the donated lots. Atfirst, Cipriano gave to Bonifacia the share from the lots’ harvests, but in 1926he refused to deliver to petitioner the said share, which reason prompted her to initiate an action and won for her possession of the lots plus damages.

On July 31, 1941, Ciprianoexecuted a deed of sale of the said lots in favor of his younger son, herein respondent Gervacio. Petitioner learned of this only in 1956 when Cipriano stoppedgiving to petitioner her share to the harvest. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued under respondent’s name by the Registry of Deeds (ROD) of Pangasinan.

The CFI of Pangasinan declared the TCT issued to respondent nulland void and ordered cancelled by the ROD,and for respondent to vacate and deliver the lots to petitioner. In 1957, Gervacioand Cipriano filed with the CFI for the annulment of the donation of the two lots. While the case was pending, Cipriano died in 1958. It was dismissed for prescription, having been filed after the lapse of 41 years. When appealed, theCA in 1966 held that the donation to Alejandro of the two lots with the combined area of 11,888 sq. m. exceeded by494.75 sq. m. his legitime and the disposable portion that Cipriano could have freely given by will, and to the sameextent prejudiced the legitime of Cipriano’s other heir, Gervacio. The donation was thus declared inofficious andherein petitioners were ordered to


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reconvey to Gervacio a portion of 494.75 sq. m. from any convenient part of the lots.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly reduced the donation propter nuptias for being inofficious.

HELD: Decision of CA based on unsupported assumptions set aside; trial court’s order of dismissal sustained.

Before the legal share dueto a compulsory heir may be reached, the net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes of the compulsory heirs can be established, and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly, in order that adonation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that thevalue of the donated property exceeds thatof the disposable free portion plus the donee’s share as legitime in the properties of the donor. In the present case, it can hardly be seen that, with theevidence then before the court, it was in any position to rule on the inofficiousness of the donation involved here, and to order its reduction and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the respondents.

Article 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the

testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will.

To the value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the timehe made them.

“A donation proper nuptias property may be reduced for being inofficious. Contrary to the views of appellants (petitioners), donations proper nuptias (by reason of marriage) are without onerous consideration, the marriage being merely the occasion or motive for the donation, not its causa.Being liberalities, they remain subject to reductionfor inofficiousness upon the donor's death, if they should infringe the legitime of a forced heir.”

Void Donations by Spouses (Donations during Marriages)

CASE:1. Ching v Goyanko

Respondents Joseph Goyanko et al. filedwith the Regional Trial Court ofCebu Citya complaint for recovery of property anddamages against Maria Ching, prayingfor the nullification of the deed ofsale and of transfer certificate and theissuance of a new one. Goyanko et al. averthat they are the real owners of theproperty involved. They further contendthat it was after their father‘s deaththat they found out that acontract of


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sale involving the same property has beenexecuted by their father and common-lawwife Ching. However, Ching claimed thatshe is the actual owner of the property asit was she who provided its purchaseprice. The RTC dismissed the complaintagainst Ching, declaring that there is novalid and sufficient ground to declare thesale as null and void, fictitiousand simulated.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversedthe decision of the trial court anddeclared null and void the questioned deedof sale and TCT No. 138405.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the contract of sale andTCT No. 138405, in favor of the MariaChing, was null and void for beingcontrary to morals and public policy

HELD:

The subject property having been acquiredduring the existence of a valid marriagebetween Joseph Sr. and Epifania dela Cruz-Goyanko, is presumed to belong to theconjugal partnership. Moreover, while thispresumption in favor of conjugality isrebuttable with clear and convincing proofto the contrary, the court find noevidence on record to conclude otherwise.The record shows that while Joseph Sr. andhis wife Epifania have been estranged foryears and that he and defendant-appellantMaria Ching, have in fact been livingtogether as common-lawhusband and wife,there has never been a judicial decreedeclaring thedissolution of his marriageto Epifania nor their conjugalpartnership. It is therefore undeniablethat the property located at Cebu Citybelongs to the conjugal partnership.Assuming that the subject property was notconjugal, still the court cannot sustain

the validity of the sale of the propertyby Joseph, Sr. to defendant-appellantMaria Ching, there being overwhelmingevidence on records that they have beenliving together as common-law husband andwife.

The court therefore finds the contract ofsale in favor of the defendant-appellantMaria Ching null and void for beingcontrary to


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Void Donations by Spouses (Donations in common law marriages)

CASES:1. Matabuena v. CervantesFACTS: In 1956, herein appellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felixdied. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962,had the land declared in her name and paidthe estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship.

HELD: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during marriage,

policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.

As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit donationsin favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to applythe same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials.

The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half.

Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.


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2. SSS v. DavacFACTS: Petronilo Davac, a former

employee of Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. became a member of theSocial Security System (SSS) he

designated Candelaria Davac as his beneficiary and indicated his relationship to her as that of "wife"

Lourdes Tuplano his legal wifeand their son Romeo Davac and Candelaria Davac and their minor daughter Elizabeth Davac filed their claims

ISSUE: W/N Candelaria Davac can claim and New Civil Code 739 is not applicable

HELD: YES. she was not guilty of

concubinage, there being no proof that she had knowledge of the previous marriage of her husband Petronilo

The amounts that may thus be received cannot be considered asproperty earned by the member during his lifetime

if there is a named beneficiary and the designation is not invalid (as it is not so in this case), it is not the heirs of the employee who are entitled to receive the benefits(unless they are the designated beneficiaries themselves). It isonly when there is no designatedbeneficiaries or when the designation is void, that the laws of succession are applicable. And we have already held that the Social Security Act is not a law of succession.


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Facts:> Davac was an SSS member, and designated Candelaria Davac, his alleged wife, as his beneficiary.

> When he died, both his first wife, Lourdes and his second wife, Candelaria filed claims for the death benefits.

> Due to the conflicting claims, the SSS filed a petition praying that both of them be required to interplead and litigate the conflicting claims.

> The death benefits were awarded to Candelaria Davac.

Issue:Who is entitled to the SSS benefits?

Held:Candelaria.

Under the SSS Act, the beneficiary as recorded by the employee’s employer is the one entitled to the death benefits, hence they should go to Candelaria. Lourdes contends that the designation made in the person of Candelaria who is party in a bigamous marriage is null and void for being against Art. 739of the CC. SC held that the disqualification mentioned in Art. 739 is NOT applicable to Candelaria, because she was not guilty of concubinage , there bieing NO proof that she had actual knowledge of the previous marriage of her husband.

3. Bienvenido v. CAI. Facts: (Includes petitioner & respondent’s contention)Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3,1942. On February 6, 1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho contracted another marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho (Luisita) with whom he had been livingsince 1953 and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Faustino C. Camacho (Chito) born on May 22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japanwhere Aurelio and Luisita had been livingsince 1958.

There were instances during Luisita and Aurelio’smarriage when,because of their quarrels, one or the other left the dwelling place for long periods of time. In her case Luisita stayed on those occasions at various times in Davao City, Hongkong or Japan.

In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her


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husband, Luis Rivera. He lived with her from June1968 until Aurelio’s death on May 28, 1988, he lived with her, the last time in a duplex apartment in Quezon City. Petitioner’s daughter, Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelio’s son, Chito, who lived with them for about a year in 1976.

On April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the lot on Delgado Street in which they were staying from the owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and Suzette Infante-Moñozca. In the deed of sale and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 288350 of the Registry of Deeds of QuezonCity, issued in his name, Aurelio was described as single.

On November 26, 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of sale of the property in favor of petitioner Nenita in consideration of the sum of P250,000.00, by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 was issued in petitioner’s name on January 11, 1985.

On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, seeking the annulment of the sale ofthe property to petitioner and the payment to them of damages.

Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and that in any event it was executed in fraud of her as the legitimate wife of Aurelio.

In answer petitioner Nenita claimed that she and the late Aurelio had purchased the property in question using their joint funds which they had accumulated after living together for fourteen years, that the sale of the property by the late Aurelio to her was with responden Luisita’s consent; and that she was a purchaser in good faith.

II. Issue/s:Whether the marriage of Aurelio and Luisita is valid.Whether the deed of sale between Aurelio and Nenita is valid.

III. Ruling:• RTC: (What is the RTC’s basis for grant or denial of the appeal?)On August 29, 1989, the trial court rendered a

decision upholding the sale of the property to petitioner and dismissing the complaint of Luisita. It found the deed of sale in favor of petitioner to be genuine and respondents Luisita and Chito to be in estoppel in not claiming the property until 1988 despite knowledge of the saleby thelate Aurelio who had represented himself to be single. Respondents moved for a reconsideration but the trial court denied their motion.• Court of Appeals: (What is the CA’s basis for grant ordenial of the appeal?)On appeal the respondents prevailed. On June 4, 1993, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared respondents to bethe owners of the house and lot in dispute. Although Luisita had admitted that as early as 1985 she knew that Nenita had been staying in thepremises, the appellate court held thatrespondents’ action was not barred by laches because Luisita allegedly did not know that Nenita had obtained title to the property. On themerit, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the absence of proof to the contrary, Aurelio’s firstwife must be presumed to have been absent for seven years without Aurelio having news of her being alive when Aurelio contracted a second marriage. On this premise, it held (1) that the property in dispute belonged to the conjugal partnership of Aurelio and Luisita and (2) that the sale of the property to Nenitawas void for the same reason that donations between persons who are guilty of concubinage or adultery are declared void under Art. 739 of the Civil Code.• Supreme Court: (What is the SC’s basis for grant or denialof the appeal?)The decision appealed from is REVERSED and another one is entered, DISMISSING the complaint against petitioner and DECLARING the deed of saleexecuted in her favor and Transfer Certificate ofTitle No. 326681 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued in her name to be VALID.In the case at bar, the burden of proof was on respondents to show that Luisita and Aurelio’s marriage falls under any of these exceptions in order to be considered valid. They failed to discharge this burden. Instead the contrary appears. It has been held that the first exception refers to the subsequentmarriage of the abandoned spouse and not the


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remarriage of the deserting spouse, after the period of seven years had lapsed. 6 This exception cannot be invoked in this case in orderto sustain the validity of Aurelio’s marriage to Luisita because apparently it was Aurelio who hadleft his first wife. At the time of his second marriage to Luisita, he and Luisita had already been living together as husband and wife for fiveyears. In fact the couple begot a child, in 1961,even before their marriage in 1962.

Consequently, there is no basis for holding that the property inquestion was property of the conjugal partnershipof Luisita and the late Aurelio because there wasno such partnership in the first place. The sale to petitioner must be presumed.Petitioner’s ownership is evidenced by a deed of absolute sale7 executed with all the solemnity of a public document and by Transfer Certificate of Title No.326681issued in due course in her name.Indeed, the property in question was acquired by Aurelio during a long period of cohabitation withpetitioner which lasted for twenty years(1968-1988). While petitioner knew respondent Chito to be Aurelio’s son way back in 1976, there is nothing to show that she knew Aurelio to be married to Luisita. To the contrary, Aurelio represented himself to be single. As far as petitioner was concerned, Chito could have been Aurelio’s child by a woman not his wife. There was, therefore, no basis for the Court of Appeals’ ruling that Nenita was not a buyer in good faith of the property because she ought to have known that Aurelio was married to Luisita.4. Sumbad v. CAFACTS: After the death of his wife, Agata B. Tait, in1936, George K. Tait, Sr. lived in common-law relationship with Maria F. Tait to whom on April 2, 1974 he donated a certain parcel of unregistered land in Sitio Sum-at, Bontoc, more particularly described as follows:One (1) parcel of unregistered agricultural land situated in sitio Sumat, Bontoc, Mt. Province, bounded on the North by Sumat Creek and the rice field of Inginga Limayog, East bythe Hospital Reservation of Bontoc and the lots of Agustin Ututan and Inginga, South by aFoot Trail and West by the Roman Catholic Mission, Pakeopan and the rice fields of

Narding and Pappi, previously declared under Tax Dec. No. 6000 of Bontoc, Mt. Province;[2]

George K. Tait, Sr. himself passed away on December 24, 1977. From 1982 to 1983, Maria F. Tait sold lots included within the Sum-at property in favor of private respondents Eduard Okoren, Gregorio Acoking, Evelyn Saclangan, Mary Atiwag, Jaime T. Fronda, Barbara Tallongen, Julia Piyes, Glen Paquito, and Felicitas Alinao. Private respondents purchased the lots on the strength of a Tax Declaration over the Sum-at property showing the seller, Maria F. Tait, to be the owner of the property in question and thereafter planted different kinds of fruit trees and plants on the lots purchased by them.On July 24, 1989, petitioners Emilie T. Sumbadand Beatrice B. Tait brought an action for quieting of title, nullification of deeds of sale, and recovery of possession with damages against private respondents. They alleged that they are the children and compulsory heirs of the spouses George K. Tait, Sr. and Agata B. Tait of Bondoc, Mountain Province; that said spouses died on December 24, 1977 and April 30, 1936, respectively; that said spouses owned real property in Otucan, Bauko, Mountain Province; and that after the death oftheir mother, their father George K. Tait, Sr.sold the Otucan property and used the proceedsthereof to purchase a residential lot in Sum-at, Bontoc, Mountain Province.

Petitioners further alleged that from 1982 to 1983, Maria F. Tait, without their knowledge and consent, sold lots included within the Sum-at property to private respondents; that prior to the sales transactions, private respondents were warned that the Sum-at property did not belong to Maria F. Tait but to the heirs of George K. Tait, Sr.; that thisnotwithstanding, private respondents proceededto purchase the lots in question from Maria F.Tait; that Maria F. Tait had no right to sell the Sum-at property; that the deeds of sale are null and void and did not transfer title to private respondents; that petitioners discovered the transactions only in 1988 but, as soon as they learned of the same, they lost


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no time in communicating with private respondents; and that private respondents refused petitioners’ request for a meeting, leaving the latter no other alternative but tofile the case in court.

SC HELD THE FF:First. Petitioners fault both the trial and appellate courts for not giving credence to the testimony of Shirley Eillenger with respect to the forgery of the deed of donation.Second. Petitioners argue that the deed of donation is invalid under Art. 749 of the Civil Code, which requires a public instrumentas a requisite for the validity of donations of immovable property. They contend that the person who notarized the deed had no authorityto do so. However, petitioners have not shownthis to be the case. The acknowledgment clause states that the person who notarized itwas the deputy clerk of court, Gonzalo Reyes, who acted “For and in the absence of the Clerkof Court.”

Third. Petitioners argue that the deed of donation contravenes Art. 133 of the Civil Code which provides:Art. 133. Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void. This prohibition does not apply when the donation takes effect after the death of the donor.Neither does this prohibition apply to moderate gifts which the spouses may give eachother on the occasion of any family rejoicing.

Fourth. Petitioners claim that they only learned of the sales to private respondents oflots included in the Sum-at property in 1988 when they visited Maria F. Tait in Bontoc because she was seriously ill. As admitted bypetitioners, their mother, Agata B. Tait, diedon April 30, 1936, while their father, George K. Tait, Sr., died on December 24, 1977.[33] Yet, petitioners waited for twelve (12) years before claiming their inheritance, having brought their present action only on July 24, 1989. Petitioners are thus guilty oflaches which precludes them from assailing thedonation made by their father in favor of

Maria F. Tait. Laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable length of time to do that which, by exerting due diligence, could or should have been done earlier.

The deed of donation in question was executed by their father in 1974. Assuming that the plaintiffs were not aware of the existence of said document, as they now claim, they could not have failed to notice that the land in question had been occupied by Maria F. Tait and later by defendants who bought portions thereof and that said defendants, numbering nine (9), and their families, had built their respective houses and introduced other improvements on the portions they had purchased from Maria F. Tait and had resided therein since 1982 and 1983. As stated by thetrial court, the plaintiffs offered no plausible excuse for their failure to assert their rights sooner. They apparently waited until Maria F. Tait died in 1988 before assailing the validity of the sales made by the latter in favor of the defendants.We believe that the defendants herein bought their respective portions they now possess in good faith. The land is not registered under the Torrens system and they checked with the Assessor’s Office and found that the same was declared in the name of Maria F. Tait. Further, it was the said Maria F. Tait and not the plaintiffs who was in possession thereof. The claim of the plaintiffs that thedefendants were forewarned [prior to the sales transactions] that the property was not owned by Maria F. Tait but by the heirs of George K. Tait, Sr. was not proven in these proceedings.

5. Arcaba v. Tabancura v. De BatocaelFACTS:

Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners ofLot No. 437-A located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956.


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Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of ¼ of the property in favor of Francisco. Since Francisco do not haveany children to take care of him after hisretirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Francisco’s house as well as the store inside.

According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirilawere lovers since they slept in the same room. On the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that Cirila was his mistress. However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper who could enter the master’s bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for her. She denied having sexual intercourse with Francisco. When the nieces got married, Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco who was 75 year old widower. The latter did not pay him any wages as househelper though her family was provided with food and lodging. Francisco’s health deteriorated and became bedridden. Tabancura testifiedthat Francisco’s only source of income wasthe rentals from his lot near the public streets.

In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his house to Cirila who accepted the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name. This was made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner.

Atty Lacaya notarized the deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absoluteowner.

In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value of P57,105 and assessed valueof P28,550. The decedent’s nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donationinter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcaba’s favor was valid.

HELD:

The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation is not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of “CirilaComille” such as application for business permit, sanitary permit and the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is anindication that she was not simply a caregiver –employee.

Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption of menand women holding themselves out to the public as such.Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.


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6. Probate v. De Jesus

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OFPETE ROXAS DE JESUS, a.k.a. PETER ROXAS DE JESUS OR PEDRO DEJESUS, MARIA TERESA LAZATIN DE JESUS v. SALVE BARICAN DE

JESUS, FRANCIS GILBERT DE JESUS, MARIA JOVELYN DE JESUS ANDJENIFER DE JESUS

Third Division

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is aresolution of this Court dated MAR. 27, 2006

G.R. No. 168733 (In the Matter of the Petition for the Probate ofthe Will of Pete Roxas de Jesus, a.k.a. Peter Roxas de Jesus or Pedro DeJesus, Maria Teresa Lazatin de Jesus v. Salve Barican de Jesus, FrancisGilbert de Jesus, Maria Jovelyn De Jesus and Jenifer de Jesus)

This treats of the Second Motion for Reconsiderationfiled by petitioner after this Court had denied bothher Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari andfirst Motion for Reconsideration[1]

cralaw for raisingfactual issues and for a lack of sufficient showingthat the Court of Appeals had committed anyreversible error.

Aside from the fact the instant motion isdismissible for being a prohibited pleading,[2]

cralaw through it, petitioner merely reiteratesarguments she had already set forth in priorpleadings filed with this Court, although she hasnow condensed her issues to one factual and onelegal question. Moreover, even on the merits, themotion must be denied.

This Court does not concern itself with factualissues unless the jurisprudentially establishedexceptions are extant;[3]

cralaw in this case, they arenot. The legal issue, which we now take underconsideration being a significant question of lawhas to be addressed to end this controversy once andfor all. However, such issue is unmeritorious.

The facts are straightforward. Pete Roxas de Jesus(Pete) married respondent Salve Barican on 4September 1960.[4]

cralaw Their union produced threechildren named Francis Gilbert, Maria Jocelyn, andJennifer, all surnamed de Jesus and all co-respondents in this case. Sometime in May 1977, Peteemigrated to the United States of America.[5]

cralaw InDecember of 1977, he obtained a divorce decreeagainst Salve[6]

cralaw and married petitioner, MariaTeresa Lazatin de Jesus, in the state of Nevada.[7]

cralawNotably, however, he only became a citizen of theUnited States in 1988.[8]

cralaw He died in Daly City,California, on 4 December 1994.[9]

cralaw

On 3 March 1995, petitioner instituted with theRegional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, apetition for the probate of the holographic will ofthe decedent, entitled "In the matter of the Petition for theProbate of the Will of Pete Roxas de Jesus, a.k.a. Peter Roxas de Jesusor Pedro de Jesus; Maria Teresa Lazatin de Jesus v. Salve Barican deJesus, Francis Gilbert de Jesus, Maria Jocelyn de Jesus, and Jennifer deJesus." In his will, the decedent institutedpetitioner as his sole heir and disinherited therespondents. After trial, the probate court rendereda Decision dated 26 October 2001 holding that evenas the will is extrinsically valid, i.e., dulyexecuted in accordance with the requisites andsolemnities prescribed by law, it is intrinsicallyvoid for containing illegal dispositions andinstitution of an heir.[10]

cralaw

In its Decision[11]cralaw dated 31 January 2005, the Court

of Appeals held that the decedent was not yet acitizen of the United States at the time he obtainedthe divorce decree against Salve. Being a Filipino,petitioner could not at the time validly obtain adivorce decree. Since the first marriage stillsubsisted at the time the decedent married


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petitioner, the second marriage is bigamous and,therefore, void. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmedthe ruling of the court a quo dismissing the petitionfor probate on account of the illegal dispositionsand heir institution. In a Resolution dated 23 June2005, the appellate court denied petitioner's Motionfor Reconsideration.

On appeal to this Court, both the Petition forReview and Motion for Reconsideration were denied.Despite the unseemly circumstance in which it ispresented, as earlier intimated we deem the solequestion of law in this Second Motion forReconsideration worthy of disquisition nonethelessunworthy of favorable action.

Petitioner's claim to the entire estate of thedecedent having failed, she now argues that sincethe lower courts upheld the intrinsic validity ofthe will, the testamentary provision therein in herfavor should be given effect even if only to theextent that it does not affect the legitime of therespondents. She argues that the pronouncement ofher marriage with the decedent as bigamous does notdetract from the fact that the testator had intendedto leave something for her, entitling her to atleast the free portion of the decedent's estate.

The argument is untenable. Under Article 739[12]cralaw of

the Civil Code, donations made between persons in astate of adultery or concubinage are void. Article1028 of the same code mandates that the sameprohibition be similarly applied to testamentaryprovisions.[13]

cralaw Since the courts below have made thefactual finding that the marriage between petitionerand the decedent was bigamous, necessarily,petitioner and decedent are considered as havingbeen in a state of concubinage in the context ofArticle 739. Significantly, a conviction foradultery or concubinage need not be had before thedisabilities mentioned in paragraph (1) of Article739 may effectuate.[14]

cralaw Thus, in a case for theprobate of a will where the testator bequeathed tohis bigamous wife the free portion of his estate,this Court ruled, inter alia, that the disposition isvoid under Article 739 in relation to Article 1028of the Civil Code.[15]

cralaw

WHEREFORE, the Second Motion for Reconsideration isDENIED with FINALITY. Let Entry of Judgment be madein due course.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) LUCITA ABJELINA-SORIANOClerk of Court

7. Dycaico v SSS

FACTS:

Bonifacio became a member of SSS in 1980 and named Elena and their 8 children as his beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacioand Elena lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. He retired in 1989 and began receiving his SSS pension. He married Elena on January 1997 and he died on June 19997.

Elena filed for survivor’s pension but said application was denied on the ground that they were married after Bonifacio’s retirement. According to the SSC, it has consistently ruled that entitlement to thesurvivor’s pension in one’s capacity as primary beneficiary is premised on the legitimacy of relationship with and dependency for support upon the deceased SSS member during his lifetime.

Section 12-B(d) of RA 8282 provides that the primary beneficiaries who are entitledto survivor’s pension are those who qualify as such as of the date of retirement of the deceased member.

HELD:

The proviso infringes the due process clause. In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, employees havecontractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms of employment. Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected by the due process clause and retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they


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acquire a right to immediate payment underpre-existing law. The mandatory contributions to the SSS under RA 8282 form part of the employees’ compensation. The proviso “as of the date of his retirement” runs afoul of the due process clause as it outrightly deprives the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSS members were contracted after the latter’s retirement of their survivor’s benefits. There is outright confiscation of benefits due suchsurviving spouses without giving them an opportunity to be heard.

By this outright disqualification, the proviso qualifying the term “primary beneficiaries” for the purpose of entitlement to survivor’s pension has created the presumption that marriages contracted after the retirement date of SSS members were entered into for the purpose of securing the benefits under RA 8282. This presumption, moreover, is conclusive because the said surviving spouses are not afforded any opportunity to disprove the presence of the illicit purpose. The proviso, as it creates this conclusive presumption, is unconstitutional because it presumes a fact which is not necessarily or universally true.

Standards of due process require that the petitioner be allowed to present evidence to prove that her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted in good faith and as his bona fide spouse she is entitled to the survivor’s pension accruing upon his death. Hence, the proviso “as of the dateof his retirement” in Section 12-B(d) which deprives the petitioner and those similarly situated dependent spouses of retired SSS members this opportunity to beheard must be struck down.

8. Ching v. Goyanko (same case above)

Revocation of Donations Proper Nuptias

CASE:1. Mateo V. Lagua (same case above)


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