peace and peace orders: augustinian foundations in hobbesian and kantian receptions

Pre-Publication version of: Andrej Zwitter, ‘Peace and Peace Orders: Augustinian Foundations in Hobbesian and Kantian Receptions’, Heinz Gärtner, Jan Willem Honig, Hakan Akbulut in Democratic Peace or a Concert of Powers? Lessons Learned from 1914 and 1815, Rowman and Littlefield: Lexington Books, 2015: 59-80

Peace and Peace Orders: Augustinian Foundations in Hobbesian and Kantian Receptions Andrej Zwitter

When thinking of liberal (or democratic/republican) peace and peace orders, one commonly

thinks of Immanuel Kant and John Rawls, two authors to design normative frameworks that

would provide for the peaceful coexistence of states, i.e. in the international realm. The terms

liberal peace, democratic peace and republican peace are often used synonymously, albeit a

slight difference in what they imply. Democratic peace as a term and as a concept received

more attention in the 80s with Small and Singer’s empirical study on the war proneness of

democratic regimes from 1816 to 1965 (Small and Singer 1976). Republican peace is most

clearly related with Kant’s famous Friedensschrift, Zum Ewigen Frieden (Perpetual Peace)

(Kant 1796).1 Rawls’ conception of liberal peace, as found in The Law of Peoples (Rawls

1993), is indeed a peace of liberal democracies, a peace which also implicitly buys into the

liberal market logic already hinted at in Kant’s work.

When Saint Augustine or Hobbes are mentioned in relation to peace, a most common

association is just war and the state of nature as war of everyone against everybody. Less

frequently we encounter Hobbes and S. Augustine with regards to their thoughts on how to

establish peace and how to maintain it. This one may consider quite an omission, as both

authors do have quite a contribution to make to the conceptualization of peace orders and

certainly did have influence on Kant’s thinking. After all, S. Augustine and Hobbes share the

belief that they consider political order as a condition of the possibility of peace (Patterson

2012, 43–44), very much in line with the peace order that Kant envisions.

The main aim of this chapter is to show that S. Augustine’s peace theory has an

important contribution to make when discussing the other two authors. In this sense, this


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chapter aims to build bridges in the history of thought between three authors that are usually

treated as islands in their own domain. The material, of which the bridges between the three

islands that are S. Augustine, Hobbes and Kant are made, is their thoughts on necessary

social mechanisms involved in functioning peace orders and their thoughts on the conditions

of the possibility of a lasting peace.

For the treatment of this subject, I will keep S. Augustine’s treatment of the concept

of “universal peace” central to the discussion about peace and peace orders and illuminate

similar themes and arguments made by Kant and Hobbes. This chapter is, thus, meant as an

elucidation of Augustinian foundations of liberal peace and peace orders in the works of

Hobbes and Kant, illustrated by the original passages from their work central to our subject:

Civitas Dei (426), Leviathan (1651), and Perpetual Peace (1796).

For one, I aim to show with this history of thought that we find traces in the

conceptions about peace and peace orders already in these philosophically distinct periods,

which already foreshadow what would eventually become liberal peace theory. Of course, by

investigating the precursors of liberal peace one needs to be careful not to anachronistically

impose modern conceptions onto philosophies that were strangers to the modern empirical

and theoretical arguments. This does not mean that a re-reading of these three authors’

theories and conceptions of peace and peace orders cannot shed new light on an aging set of

theories that are the liberal peace theories. But it means that we have to treat their work in

their own right and evaluate their thoughts within the world of ideas that were already shaped

by then; which is why the emphasis will not be on Kant but rather on S. Augustine, and why

we will try to stay as close to the original sources as possible and feasible. Thereby S.

Augustine, Hobbes, and Kant might breathe new life into liberal peace by challenging not

only our modern expectations about the prerequisites for a lasting peace, but also by changing

what peace can mean.


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We will thus proceed to introduce S. Augustine’s conceptualization of the two cities (section

1), which is fundamental to understand the further elaborations on nature and peace in S.

Augustine, Hobbes and Kant (section 2). In section 3, we delve into the complex social and

political construct that is universal peace to S. Augustine. How to ensure such peace through

a peace order and what Hobbes and Kant have to add to that, will be subject of section 4.

Finally, in section 5, we will illustrate that one can already find in S. Augustine and Hobbes

the foundation of a liberal peace conception.

1. Saint Augustine’s Two Cities

S. Augustine of Hippo (354-430 AD) became a philosopher just as he became a theologian –

out of necessity. This is reflected in his writings that, unlike that of S. Thomas of Aquinas,

were also a product of necessity rather than philosophical drive. De Civitate Dei contra

Paganos is not an exception – it is a pamphlet, albeit a long one, of apologetic character. S.

Augustine wrote it after his return to Africa, where the early Christian church had been

almost entirely pushed aside by the Donatists (a Christian sect in vehement fight against the

Roman emperor and the Roman order) and faced the constant threat of schism. He wrote it

after the sacking of Rome by Alaric the Visigoth (410 AD), an event that must have been as

shocking to the medieval world, as the 9/11 attacks were on our contemporary world. Facing

criticism that the Christian God could not prevent such thing happening to Rome, whose

eternity was a supposition of common consciousness, S. Augustine wrote his masterpiece. It

does therefore not surprise that among his core themes are the universality of the Church2 and

the question of peace through the tranquility of order; and both these themes are intimately

connected by one meta-theme, the doctrine of grace in world history.3


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This chapter first elaborates how the two cities as laid out in De Civitate Dei contra

Paganos (City of God against the Pagans, usually referred to as Civitas Dei) can be

understood in a political theoretical reading of S. Augustine. His peace theory can be

considered an ideal theory of strict compliance in Rawls’ sense. However, S. Augustine is not

that naïve to not also develop non-ideal theory for non-compliance. Together they provide for

insights into the war and peace theory that fruitfully enriches contemporary liberal peace

theories.

Central to S. Augustine’s work is the distinction between the two cities, civitas

terrena and civitas dei. The term ‘civitas’ takes in S. Augustine, however, several meanings;

next to ‘city’ it means ‘society’, ‘state’ or even ‘reign’. Both states are connected to specific

historical appearances, which are merely representative of, but not formative nor identical

with the two cities: civitas terrena – Cain, Babylon, and Rome; civitas dei – Abel, Israel and

the Church (Schneider 2013, 398). In abstract terms, the terrestrial city is reigned by

discordia, the separation of hearts through the love for oneself and the lust for power, while

the heavenly city is reigned by concordia, the conjunction of hearts through the love for God.

That concordia takes a political meaning, as in political concord, will be elaborated upon

below in more detail. For now it suffices to explain that these different and incompatible

forms of love are, according to S. Augustine, the formative elements of both cities:

Accordingly, two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by

the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love

of God, even to the contempt of self. [...] In the one, the princes and

the nations it subdues are ruled by the love of ruling. [...] But in the

other city there is no human wisdom, but only godliness, which offers

due worship to the true God, and looks for its reward in the society of


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the saints, of holy angels as well as holy men, "that God may be all in

all". (XIV.28)4

Particularly medieval interpretations of S. Augustine’s cities have advanced a

‘clericalist’ interpretation (Figgis 1921, 64), that is the identification of the City of God with

the institutional church. Such an interpretation can hardly be substantiated by the actual text

and is thought to have mostly served political agendas. In general, three interpretations of the

celestial city seem to be prevalent, namely as: (1) the ‘eternal city’ consisting of the Trinity,

the unfallen angels, saints, and holy men; (2) the collective of individuals who revere God; or

(3) a visible and institutional entity (an institutional catholic church) (Martin 1972).

Interpretation (1) is the one that comes closest to the text and is also most consistent with

Augustine’s binary theory.

With the fratricidal act of Cain against Abel, in analogy with Romulus’ slaying of

Remus, the earthly city is founded. Allegorically, S. Augustine, however, makes an important

distinction between these two cases of fratricide (XV.5): “The quarrel, then, between

Romulus and Remus shows how the earthly city is divided against itself; that which fell out

between Cain and Abel illustrated the hatred that subsists between the two cities, that of God

and that of men.” The former murder is caused by envy and the lust for power (animus

dominandi), the latter “for no other reason than because they are good while themselves are

evil.” The state as an entity that belongs to the ontology of civitas terraena is then an

expression of sinful lust to dominate and it is also the necessary consequence of sin, since it

becomes the indispensable vehicle to govern the cohabitation of sinners and saints, and

justice is its most effective modus operandi, as we will show below (see also Dyson 2006,

48-81).


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There is, however, no Manicheanism in S. Augustine’s conception of the two cities.

One would be mistaken to think that one is evil and the other is good. The terrestrial city

contains sinners and saints equally – as did Noah’s arc carry clean and unclean animals

(XV.26, 27; see also: Figgis 1921, 51–52; Mattox 2011, 199–200). The Church (i.e. the

Kingdom of Christ), being earthly and heavenly at the same time, has the capability and its

specific function vis-à-vis the civitas terraena. Through its guidance the citizen of the civitas

terraena and the earthly city as a whole are progressing over history, are improving and

perfecting themselves; they are, to formulate it in S. Augustine’s terms, on a pilgrimage

towards the civitas dei, which they can never reach in the earthly realm, but will only attain

through and with the final judgment (Zwitter and Hoelzl 2014). The institutional church is

thus part of both. The atomic members as fallible and human can belong to either city and the

institutional church is also subject to both ontologies, the Church as community of believers

in Christ is part of the City of God.

2. Conceptions of Peace in Saint Augustine, Hobbes, and Kant

Three conceptions of peace can be found in S. Augustine’s work: (1) the ultimate peace in the

City of God, (2) the peace within the pilgrim on his way towards the City of God, and (3)

temporal peace common to the two cities (Mattox 2011). This latter peace is not of a lasting

nature, as S. Augustine makes clear in several passages, e.g. (XVII.13): “for in the very great

mutability of human affairs such great security is never given to any people, that it should not

dread invasions hostile to this life.”

S. Augustine explains that the existence of peace is the condition of the possibility of

war, i.e. war cannot exist without peace. This argument follows analogously the classical idea

of evil as the privation of good (privatio boni—book XII, chapter 9: “For evil has in itself no


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substance, rather the loss of what is good had received the name evil”). To S. Augustine, war

is the privation or corruption of peace as sin is the corruption of human nature by will (i.e. the

soul, see XIV.3):

The peace of all things is the tranquility of order. (…) As, then, there

may be life without pain, while there cannot be pain without some kind

of life, so there may be peace without war, but there cannot be war

without some kind of peace, because war supposes the existence of

some natures to wage it, and these natures cannot exist without peace

of one kind or other. (XIX.13)

This illustrates that S. Augustine considers peace as the state of nature, in the sense that the

world is created as good, in a form of tranquility of order and harmony, and war is merely a

lower level negative derivation of this tranquility. In contrast, Hobbes sees the fight of the

one against the other of being the state of nature:

Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common

Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is

called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man.

For WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but

jn a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently

known: and therefore the notion of Time, is to be considered in the

nature of Warre as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of

Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but in an

inclination thereto of many dayes together; So the nature of War,

consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto,


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during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time

is PEACE. (Hobbes 1909, chap. 13, p. 96 (62))5

In addition to this negative definition of peace as the absence of the proclivity to

fighting, Hobbes acknowledges that the fundamental law of nature is to seek peace and to

keep it. This peace can only be established with likeminded people and to the extent they are

willing to agree. Such an agreement has to find the form of a covenant (Springborg, 129). We

will see below how the laws of Nature that Hobbes formulates to describe the circumstances

and conditions of a peace order can be seen as natural development of thought over time

beginning with S. Augustine and how it continues to thrive with Kant’s idea of a covenant to

ensure perpetual peace.

Before this can be done, we have to briefly note how Immanuel Kant himself sees

human nature. Immanuel Kant ascribes wickedness to human nature, which finds its unveiled

expression in the conflicts between states:

Wenn gleich eine gewisse in der menschlichen Natur gewurzelte

Bösartigkeit von Menschen, die in einem Staat zusammen leben, noch

bezweifelt, und, statt ihrer, der Mangel einer noch nicht weit genug

fortgeschrittenen Kultur (die Rohigkeit) zur Ursache der

gesetzwidrigen Erscheinungen ihrer Denkungsart mit einigem Scheine

angeführet werden möchte, so fällt sie doch, im äußeren Verhältnis der

Staaten gegen einander, ganz unverdeckt und unwidersprechlich in die

Augen.6 (Kant 1796, 71–72, nota)

At the same time, Kant describes the beauty of nature of humans bearing an innate

proclivity towards peace and to join in the social compact. This becomes evident in the role

that providence plays in Kant’s description of nature, as a governing force that out of friction


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produces a natural threshold to armed conflict and a tendency towards implementing mutual

controls, like the terminal velocity of a falling object is determined by the juxtaposing forces

of weight, gravity, and friction. This corresponds with the Hobbesian view in which the

source of disunity sits within the human nature.

S. Augustine’s view of peace as the state of nature stems from the fact that he considers all

things created by God as per se created as good and corrupted only through will.

Nevertheless, we should not mistake S. Augustine’s state of nature with what is the common

(i.e. “normal”) state of affairs, in the earthly city – while the earthly city may have its good

sides it remains a product of the will to rule and thus always subject to vice:

But the earthly city, which shall not be everlasting (for it will no longer

be a city when it has been committed to the extreme penalty), has its

good in this world, and rejoices in it with such joy as such things can

afford. But as this is not a good which can discharge its devotees of all

distresses, this city is often divided against itself by litigations, wars,

quarrels, and such victories as are either life-destroying or short-lived.

For each part of it that arms against another part of it seeks to triumph

over the nations through itself in bondage to vice. (XV.4)

In sum, Hobbes and later Kant might differ with S. Augustine in some respect

concerning the explanation on whether the state of nature is peaceful or not. But they share

his opinion about that the normal state of affairs has a proclivity to war, which requires

mechanisms to ensure a stable peace. In all three authors, the root of this tendency can be

found in the wickedness of man. In this respect, S. Augustine, Hobbes and Kant might

disagree in terms of their vision of human nature – as we have mentioned, S. Augustine

considers all creation as good in itself and corrupted by will. To Kant and Hobbes, a


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predisposition in human nature, namely greed and wickedness, makes intrinsic part of human

nature. This difference might possibly be reconciled by S. Augustine’s idea of original sin,

which he pioneered as Christian theologian. But whether we can reconcile these different

conceptions of human nature or not makes little difference to the outcome of evil and selfish

motives being an intrinsic part of and common to human life.

3. Saint Augustine’s Universal Peace

When it comes to the question of peace, it is worthwhile to take a closer look at S.

Augustine's conception of pax universalis. While universal peace is fundamentally

theological (or if one wills spiritual), it is at the same time sociological and political to at least

the same degree. We find elements of rule of law, of covenants among states, and of a right to

some sort of collective self-defense, namely to defend and expand the peace order if

threatened from the outside. This should strike us as a very contemporary political standpoint

and illuminates how much S. Augustine had influence on modern political thought.

S. Augustine gives a structural explanation of different sub-categories of peace, which

all in conjunction form universal peace, and in which the spiritual dimension of S.

Augustine’s treatment of universal peace becomes evident as a sine qua non condition:

The peace of body and soul is the well-ordered and harmonious life

and health of the living creature. Peace between man and God is the

well-ordered obedience of faith to eternal law. Peace between man and

man is well-ordered concord. Domestic peace is the well-ordered

concord between those of the family who rule and those who obey.

Civil peace is a similar concord among the citizens. The peace of the

celestial city is the perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of

God, and of one another in God. (XIX.13)


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Contrary to many contemporary political definitions of peace (e.g. negative peace as

the absence of war), universal peace is not to be understood as a mono-dimensional peace,

but as an interaction between different forms of peace:

(1) individual peace is a peace that requires a harmony of body and soul within man;

(2) spiritual peace is a peace between man and God - S. Augustine defines this latter

peace as man acting in accordance with God’s lex aeterna; that is, in contrast to man’s

law and natural law, the law which is known only to God, but which can be

approximated by the gift of reason, even if it can never be perfectly understood;

(3) social (or sociological) peace: the well-ordered concord between man and man; in

this small but apt formula S. Augustine predates Hobbes’ social contract by including

two forms of social peace:

a) domestic peace: well-ordered concord as a quality that applies to the

relationship within the smallest social and political unit – the family;

b) civil peace as well-ordered concord among citizen within the state.

With pax universalis, S. Augustine introduces a reinterpretation of the Platonic and

Aristotelian eudaimonia (flourishing or wellbeing). We have to understand that Greek virtue

ethics and the later Christian interpretation of it is a body of thought that does not strictly

separate between ethics and politics as two different modes of social action. The Greek

philosophical tradition considered ethics and politics as one contingent of the other: if ethics

was the art of living well as an individual, politics was the art of governing well as a

politician; and a politician could only govern well if he incorporated virtues.

Eudaimonia cannot be achieved without peace, and there is no lasting peace possible

without eudaimonia. To achieve either becomes the task of the individual as much as of the

statesman (Aristotle 2000, Book X, chapter 7, 1177b (p. 195): “Again, happiness seems to


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depend on leisure, because we work to have leisure, and wage war to live in peace. The

activity of the practical virtues occurs in politics or war, and actions in these spheres seem to

involve exertion”).

To S. Augustine peace is rooted in social life. It starts very basically with the virtuous

interaction between individuals among each other. So rather than to provide a set of meta-

conditions, such as economic growth or absence of relative deprivation in different sectors, S.

Augustine is quite pragmatic about peace: it starts with Thou shalt love thy neighbour as

thyself (Matthew 22:39, King James Bible). “It is no set of propositions which he is

defending in a dialectic debate with other philosophers; although he can do this and does it in

detail. But it is a social life which he sets up against another form of social life” (Figgis 1921,

29). This social aspect forms the constitutive part of the nature of S. Augustine’s peace that

makes it different from other peace orders. It is first and foremost a social peace before it is a

political one. However, the political order is not secondary to but merely consecutive to the

social order. While the social peace is based on neighborly concord among equals, justice as

a form of distributive rule requires for its effectuation order and some minimal hierarchy.

That means that the preconditions of justice are set in the political realm. If peace among men

is neighborly concord (i.e. the social order), this concord and the equality of man without

domination of one over the other can only be ensured by the justice that distinguishes the

state from the thiefdom (i.e. the political order, c.f. IV.4; see below). We find here a paradox

in S. Augustine’s doctrine that equally is present in Hobbes’ social contract: for all to be

equal, it requires all to agree to a sovereign, who is allowed to administer justice and thus is

not equal anymore. The political realm requires this sort of hierarchy to preserve order

through the equality of all effectuated by and administered through justice.

For S. Augustine, the spiritual dimension of peace with God and with others in God

completes the concept of universal peace (“harmonious enjoyment of God, and of one


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another in God”), which goes far beyond the traditional conception of eudaimonia. This

harmony through, with, and in God encompasses the tranquility of order (as order in a larger

sense). And conversely, it can only be enjoyed in the tranquility of order. In other words, the

tranquility of order is the result of and the condition for harmony and peace. Vis-à-vis God

this order is based on obedience of faith and vis-à-vis man (read: equals) it is based on

concord. This spiritual dimension becomes clearer when one follows Archdeacon

Cunningham’s interpretation of S. Augustine’s philosophy of history. He argues that S.

Augustine’s contribution was to render history intelligible through Christian faith. In this line

of reasoning, the rise and inevitable fall of empires is part of the continuous evolution of the

divine purpose embedded in human society. Through the change of earthly polities, the

eternal City of God becomes increasingly manifest:

[H]e shows how these two are intermingled, interacting now, but how

different they are in their real nature: one is of the earth, centred only

in earthly things, while the other, because it has its chief regard fixed

on that which is Eternal, gives us the best rule for the things of time.

The earthly city which aimed only at earthly prosperity failed to attain

even that, while the Heavenly City, aiming at an Eternal Peace,

supplies the best conditions for earthly good as well. It is in the hope of

the final triumph of the City of God, that the course of the world

becomes intelligible, for then we may see that the rise and fall of

earthly empires, the glories of ancient civilisation, the sufferings of

men in their ruin, have not been unmeaning or in vain; for they have

served to prepare for the coining of the kingdom of God. (Cunningham

1886, 114)


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Hence, even before Hegel manifestly defined history as following the dictates of

reason and naturally progressing towards the Absolute Spirit, S. Augustine saw in the

progression of events under guidance of Christianity and its humanizing effect the procession

and progression of the civitas terrena towards the civitas dei and ultimately its perfection.

But whereas Hegel beliefs the ultimate aim of history to be in the Absolute Spirit manifested

in the liberal constitutional monarchy (the potentialities of which Hegel sees in Prussia and

Austria, Duquette 2014), S. Augustine sees it in concluding the pilgrimage for the City of

God.

4. Peace Orders in Saint Augustine, Hobbes, and Kant

When looking at how to design peace orders among abstract political entities, it may strike as

surprisingly modern that the well-ordered concord of small kingdoms amongst each other

through a compact constitutes S. Augustine’s sine qua non condition of universal peace:

Let them ask, then, whether it is quite fitting for good men to rejoice in

extended empire. For the iniquity of those with whom just wars are

carried on favors the growth of a kingdom, which would certainly have

been small if the peace and justice of neighbors had not by any wrong

provoked the carrying on of war against them; and human affairs being

thus more happy, all kingdoms would have been small, rejoicing in

neighborly concord; and thus there would have been very many

kingdoms of nations in the world, as there are very many houses of

citizens in a city. (IV.15)

The principle of pacta sunt servanda dominant in Roman Law and extended unto the

international realm as identified by Kelsen as Grundnorm of international law is tacitly


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implied in this formula (Kelsen 1960). Implicitly, Augustinus envisions a defending and

defensible peace order (wehrsame Friedensordnung, see also next section regarding the

defense of persecution in Hobbes and S. Augustine) – one that does not shy away from

defending itself and its internal peace when another state wrongly provokes it by disturbing

the external peace upon which internal peace is dependent. This kingdom, thus, is willing to

wage a just war and to extend its control and thereby its peace by instilling the tranquility of

order in its extended realm.

Furthermore, S. Augustine states a hypothesis alluding to what 15 centuries later

political realism would identify as one form of a balance of power: S. Augustine introduces

the concept of a benign hegemon. This virtuous hegemon grows his kingdom only because he

was wrongly provoked and only to the end of reaching peace, when no peace would be

possible unless the provocateur would be subjected to his rule. S. Augustine hypothesized

that for an alternative and more stable balance of power all kingdoms would have to be small

and co-joined in neighborly concord. In addition to the structural power balance argument, S.

Augustine adds two normative elements for a possible stable peace in the two forms of

equilibrium: (1) many small kingdoms with mutual assurances not to attack or conduct

against the concord; and if that fails (2) a large kingdom that seeks to grow only if wrongly

provoked [this presupposes a virtuous sovereign and the violation of (1)].

However, rather than in the mere physical properties of a material balance of power,

to S. Augustine peace is a matter of the spirit and not of the body – a mindset rather than just

a balance of mutual deterrence capabilities. “He shows that the security and justice and

freedom, which pious Romans believed to be guaranteed by the Roman Empire, were not

guaranteed, that they never could be guaranteed on earth, that they are a treasure not of the

body but of the soul.”(Figgis 1921, 36) In the end, the earthly realm cannot ever guarantee


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peace, it can only aspire it and in the sense of S. Augustine’s philosophy of history try to

progressively achieve it, never to reach perfection but only in the City of God.

As a “de-Hellenizer” who tried to separate all what was Greek in Christianity from

what was Christian, and in his dislike for scholasticism, it does not surprise that Hobbes is

very parsimonious with references to church fathers such as Origen, S. Augustine or Aquinas

in his Leviathan (Springborg, 398). In fact, he explicitly refers to S. Augustine only once

when crediting him with the unpleasantness of the kingdom of darkness, when he writes:

“What were this to Purgatory, if S. Augustine had not applied the Wrath to the fire of Hell,

and the Displeasure to that of Purgatory?” (Hobbes 1909, chap. XLIV, p. 491 (347))

Traditionally Hobbes serves as a father figure to classical realism just as much as

Kant is claimed by the classical liberalist tradition of international relations theory. This does

not mean that a careful reading of his masterpiece Leviathan does not provide for a solid

theory of a peace order beyond balance of power. Yes, it is true that Hobbes claims human

nature to be consumed by greed and the state of nature to be inherently violent, but his

account is not entirely devoid of the historical, intellectual backdrop, to which beyond doubt

S. Augustine belongs (Hanson 1984, 338). A concord between man and man and by

extension between city-state and city-state, which is a pledge to uphold peace in the sense of

pacta sunt servanda and not unlike Augustine’s peace order, is also at the basis of Hobbesian

peace covenants. The need for such a peace covenant is imposed onto people as laws of

nature induced by fear and established by reason: “The Passions that encline men to Peace,

are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope

by their Industry to obtain them. And Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of Peace, upon

which men may be drawn to agreement. These Articles, are they, which otherwise are called

the Lawes of Nature”. (Hobbes 1909, XIV, p. 96 (63))


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A law of nature (lex naturalis) is, according to Hobbes, an obligation imposed by

reason, which is necessary to abide by in order to avoid the destruction of life and to preserve

the same (Hobbes 1909, chap. XIV, p. 99 (64)). The treatise’s first and fundamental law of

nature requires “to seek Peace and follow it” (Hobbes 1909, chap. XIV, p. 100 (64)), which

means to establish a contract, which by the virtue of trust on the “keeping of promise”

between the parties becomes a covenant (Hobbes 1909, chap. XIV, p. 102 (66)). Furthermore,

this requires that one needs to voluntarily lay down all rights to the extent, which is necessary

to preserve peace, according to the principle that one’s rights end were another’s rights begin

(Hobbes 1909, chap. XIV, p. 100 (64–65): “That a man be willing, when others are so too, as

farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this

right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would

allow other men against himselfe.”). Among other laws of nature these belong to the most

important obligations imposed by reason, which can also be extrapolated to the level of

sovereigns. To Hobbes these laws of nature are eternal laws imposed by reason if one sets

peace as ultimate goal to be achieved.

Kants vision of a peace order is one that is of a similar nature. To Kant practical

reason provides the fundament to create the conditions of the possibility to perpetual peace

between states as long as they comply with the terms and conditions of the fictional peace

treaty that he mimics wittily in structure and style. Zum ewigen Frieden7 is a philosophical

essay about the causes of war and the conditions for peace, but it is also at the same time a

template for a multilateral treaty of a peace order between a group of states on their way

towards becoming a community of states.

The structure of perpetual peace is divided into two sections, two additions and an

appendix. The first two sections are divided into preliminary articles and definitive articles:


18

§ first section – preliminary articles (Präliminarartikel):

1) No peace if the peace treaty serves as the basis of a future war;

2) No state should be consumed by inheritance, exchange, purchase or

bestowment;

3) Standing armies (miles perpetuus) should be eliminated;

4) No fiscal dependencies should be made which interfere with

international affairs;

5) There should be no political interference in other states; and

6) No state during wartime should commit acts, which make a mutual

peace treaty in future impossible;

§ Second section – definitive articles:

1) On a constitutional level only a republican state can guarantee peace;

2) On the level of international law a federal union of sovereign states

must be established which protects the particularity and sovereignty of

each member and functions as collective authority;

3) Global civil rights (Weltbürgerrecht) should be limited to the

conditions of general hospitality.

The two additions concern, first, the guarantee of perpetual peace, and second, the

secret article to perpetual peace. Kant explicitly references S. Augustine in the first addition,

“On the guarantee of perpetual peace.” Despite the obvious wickedness of man, the

possibility of peace is innate in its nature and nature in itself through God’s providence. Kant

uses S. Augustine’s distinction in the Confessions between three types of providence: (a)

‘founding providence’ in the beginning of the World and the foundations of Nature


19

(providential conditrix), (b) “ruling providence” as maintaining nature in its course by

universal laws of design (providential gubernatrix), and (c) “guiding providence” directing

nature to ends unforeseen by man (providential directrix) (Kant 1796, 43–45, nota).

Providence becomes visible in the design of nature in that even a race of devils, if it was to

create a state and if it just had reason, would be able to create a constitution and thus live

peacefully together because “although their private intentions conflict, they check each other,

with the result that their public conduct is the same as if they had no such intentions.”

(“obgleich sie in ihren Privatgesinnungen entgegenstreben, diese einander doch so aufhalten,

daß in ihrem öffentlichen Verhalten der Erfolg eben derselbe ist, als ob sie keine solche so

böse Gesinnung hätten.”) (Kant 1796, 55). In nature, thus, Kant sees unfolding providence,

which guides, if the conditions are just opportune enough, to the final end of human race in

the worlds history. Thus in essence we find a philosophy of history in Kant’s peace theory,

which is similar to S. Augustine’s, in that they do not derive human history from the last

principle but see it developing towards it.

Nature, eventually results in three human conditions (Kant 1796, 54–59): (1) that war

spread the people into every corner of the world and keeps them there and if not from within

then from the outside forces them to live in regulatory order; (2) that in the diversity of

language and religion peoples are and remain separated in many independent states, while in

an increasingly globalising culture they progressively draw closer to each other; (3) that trade

among peoples is hampered by war, whereas trade benefits peoples through mutual self-

interest and benefit, which also accords to a human Handelsgeist (trade spirit). Particularly,

the second effect reminds us of S. Augustine’s vision of the ideal condition of a balance of

power as a system of many small kingdoms in neighbourly concord. The concord in Kant’s

versions is a peace treaty; the multitude of people separated in many states is an effect of

nature.


20

To our three authors of a peace order, this covenant – that is the concord between

states – is the fundamental basis of any peace order and the condition of the possibility of

peace. As with Augustinian pax universalis, the civitas terrena is progressing towards

increasingly resembling the civitas dei, so with Kantian pax perpetua, initially separate states

progress from being a group of states conjoined in the common fate of mutual deterrence

towards the community of states resembling a Federation. And also in Hobbes we find this

progression imposed by reason and the need for safety away from the state of nature as a war

of all against all towards a social compact and thus a peace order.

5. Towards Liberal Peace

Liberal peace is said to work because it mitigates forces that make societies and states prone

to conflict. One of these elements is what Morgenthau terms animus dominandi (the lust for

power). This lust for power is also incorporated in the conception of the earthly city when S.

Augustine says that “the earthly city, which, though it be mistress of the nations, is itself

ruled by its lust of rule.” (I.Preface). Liberal peace would encompass several elements to

mitigate the forces that direct the desires of people and the intentions of states against each

other. We find in Kant the principle of republican peace, i.e. the peace within a nation

instilled by state design, in which the selfish forces of people are directed in such a way

against each other that they keep each other in orderly control. Also, Kant emphasizes the

role of international law for federal peace, which can only exists with the multitude of states

besides the laws of global citizenship. The international trade that springs from the human

Handelsgeist and presupposes a level of freedom of trade belongs to the economic element of

liberal peace, which we have already mentioned. Finally, the principle of justice, which is

torn in the tension between morals and politics, as raised as inevitable paradox above, must

not be missing from the constitution of a state, if it wants to flourish over time. However, the

tension between the wickedness of Realpolitik and the high demands of moral philosophy are


21

in practice not easily reconciled. And the lust for power of the practical politician ushers in

three maxims that are (Kant 1796, 69–70):

- Fac et excula (act now and make excuses later);

- Si fecisti, nega (when committing a crime, deny it);

- Divide et impera (divide and rule).

S. Augustine criticizes the practical politician that obeys these principles under the

pretension of morality which ultimately reduces justice to an arbitrary distribution of just acts

on the small scale, for when it is convenient, but to a nullity on the large scale, where it

would require the principled action of a virtuous character:

Justice being taken away, then, what are kingdoms but great robberies?

For what are robberies themselves, but little kingdoms? The band itself

is made up of men; it is ruled by the authority of a prince, it is knit

together by the pact of the confederacy; the booty is divided by the law

agreed on. If, by the admittance of abandoned men, this evil increases

to such a degree that it holds places, fixes abodes, takes possession of

cities, and subdues peoples, it assumes the more plainly the name of a

kingdom, because the reality is now manifestly conferred on it, not by

the removal of covetousness, but by the addition of impunity. Indeed,

that was an apt and true reply which was given to Alexander the Great

by a pirate who had been seized. For when that king had asked the man

what he meant by keeping hostile possession of the sea, he answered

with bold pride, What you mean by seizing the whole earth; but

because I do it with a petty ship, I am called a robber, while you who

does it with a great fleet are styled emperor. (IV.4)


22

The fall of man has led to a state in which chaos and disunity prevail over order and

justice, thus the argument of S. Augustine. The state is the remedy for this disunity, a

mechanism to instill order and an institution to distribute justice (Mattox 2011). Yes, the state

springs from sin as in its roots it serves the lust for power, but in the order it instills it is also a

prerequisite for the possibility of universal peace. This natural necessity of statehood for

order and tranquility is inscribed into the fabric of nature, according to Kant, and thus

logically must necessarily come to its evolutionary expression over time. Likewise, Hobbes

considers justice as the necessary basis of any covenant that wants to form a constitution and

considers it so important, yet even necessitated by reason, that it becomes the third law of

nature in his account (Hobbes 1909, chap. XV, p. 110 (71)).

For the internal governance of a commonwealth, Hobbes establishes in total 19 laws

of nature, which he considers universal and eternal (cf. chapters XIV-XV):

1 – Seek Peace and

follow it;

2 – mutual limitation of

rights required by peace;

3 – pacta sunt servanda;

4 – not to show

ingratitude to bona fide

gifts;

5 – strive to

accommodate with

others;

6 – pardon the offences

past of the repenting;

7 – retribution only with a

view to the future good

not to the past evil;

8 – prohibition of hate

speech;

9 – equality of people;

10 – avoidance of

arrogance;

11 – equity (equality

before the law);

12 – equal use of

common goods;

13 - first possession

determined by lot;

14 – existence of

primogeniture and agreed

system of lot;

15 – save conduct of

mediators of peace;


23

16 – submission to

arbitration;

17 – no man is his own

judge;

18 – judges must not be

partial;

19 – in case of one word

against the other,

witnesses shall be heard.

With law no. 3 we find the fundament that ties all peace orders together, that

internally can logically only be sustained by adhering to the 19 laws of nature. It becomes

evident that internal peace is thus inseparable from external peace, and international peace

orders require domestic peace orders just as vice versa.

The question remains open of whether the Church (and in contemporary reflection

organized religions) can establish or even constitute such internal and/or external peace

orders. Hobbes explicitly refers to the Universal Church with strong critique. In accordance

with this conception of a covenant of all to establish as sovereign, he dismisses the Church of

his time to not fulfill the criterion of the transferal of rights for establishing its sovereign

personality (Hobbes 1909, chap. XXXIII, p. 301 (206)):

But if the Church be not one person, then it hath no authority at all; it

can neither command, nor doe any action at all; nor is capable of

having any power, or right to any thing; nor has any Will, Reason, nor

Voice; for all these qualities are personall. Now if the whole number of

Christians be not contained in one Common-wealth, they are not one

person; nor is there an Universall Church that hath any authority over

them; and therefore the Scriptures are not made Laws, by the

Universall Church: or if it bee one Common-wealth, then all Christian

Monarchs, and States are private persons, and subject to bee judged,


24

deposed, and punished by an Universall Soveraigne of all

Christendome.

In fact one would expect to find such a position to be contrary to S. Augustine’s idea

of the Universal Church. But we must not forget that the civitas dei is not to be equated with

the institutional church that lies in the center of the critique of Hobbes. All that is earthly

belongs to the civitas terrena. Civitas as a term is not directly translatable to ‘state’ (even

though sometimes it takes a similar meaning). S. Augustine is quite clear in that what he

mostly means is ‘society’. The earthly city, to which the institutional church belongs at least

in its atomic constituent reprobated members, is a union largely invisible just as much as the

union of the elect. So S. Augustine’s criticism of the civitas terrena indeed extends to this

institutional church just as much as to the worldly states and empires; he condemns

imperialism and great empires (III.10 and IV.3, 15) and he exalts the commonwealth and the

organized state. In this his theory of the state is in fact political (Figgis 1921, 58–59).

In discussing Cicero’s De Republica, S. Augustine focuses on the concept of justice

(II.21) as being part of the definition of the state, but he continues that in its true sense neither

Rome nor any pagan State would fulfill this definition, because there is no justice where the

true God is not worshipped and no true commonwealth wherein Christ is not King (XIX.20,

21). So S. Augustine continues with a definition of the state from which the word justice is

excluded: “Si autem populus non isto, sed alio definiatur modo, uelut si dicatur; "Populus est

coetus multitudinis rationalis rerum quas diligit concordi communione sociatus", profecto, ut

uideatur qualis quisque populus sit, illa sunt intuenda, quae diligit.”8

This definition also includes Rome, the Greeks, the Egyptians and Babylon. S.

Augustine focuses on what people commonly love (concordi), as this common love requires

rationality and thus distinguishes these assemblages from the assemblages of beasts.


25

Distributive justice and equality are part of such rational concord, and in this logic the

extension to democratic principles, as many modern commentators about S. Augustine argue,

is in the nature of things “because democracy involves the recognition of human personality”

in Augustine’s City of God (Figgis 1921, 61). The concept of the rule of law as supremacy of

the law, in the sense that human justice (not meant in the absolute sense as described above,

but in the sense of distributive justice) has to step back behind legal certainty and legal

authority, becomes particularly evident with S. Augustine’s criticism of Moses’ slaying of the

Egyptian in Contra Faustum Manichaeum. He argues that at this point Moses was only acting

on his own behalf and out of rage, quite differently from when he was instructed by God to

lead the Israelites to kill and to plunder (Castellano 2005). In this sense, divine command and

order as a precondition of tranquility as well as peace supersede short-term justice. This

becomes also clear when S. Augustine advocates the persecution of the Donatists as a group,

which with its apocalyptic view of Christianity threatened to delegitimize Christianity

through instilling chaos and schism. In this theory of persecution S. Augustine is, as in the

concept of the commonwealth implicit in his second definition of the state, a pragmatist (no

peace without order and no justice without order) and in agreement with Hobbes (Castellano

2005; Christenson 1968).

6. Conclusion: Is Universal Peace attainable through a Peace Order?

This paper expands on S. Augustine’s conceptions of universal and political peace orders in

its socio-historical context as a precursor to liberal peace theory. It traces these conceptions in

Hobbes’ and Kant’s work on peace and peace order and demonstrates that some ideas that

would eventually constitute liberal peace were already present before Kant’s famous work on

republican and federal peace. Augustine contributed with a definition of peace in the form of

universal peace to this debate. Universal peace is the harmonic interaction of individuals with


26

each other, with their community, and their sovereign, but it also holds a spiritual element

that informs the political and social: peace is first and foremost a mindset of wanting peace.

All three philosophers depart from nature and the nature of humans. All agree that

nature is intelligent in design (in Augustine and Kant explicitly by Gods providence, in

Hobbes implicitly so). Human nature is corruptible and a general tendency to violence and

greed is attested to it by all three. Human nature, however, also encompasses reason. This

human nature is, thus, according to Kant, intrinsically tamed by the providence in nature’s

design as matter and ratio in conjunction, which leads reasonable entities (be it devils) to

contracts for self-preservation. Hobbes, quite similarly, believes that, while the state of

nature, given human greed, without a sovereign is war, nature leads reason leads to

understand the laws of nature – the two first laws of which amount to the same agreement

that Kant’s devils would reach. Augustine pays particular attention to the kind of agreements

that are necessary for peace: while Hobbes only considers agreements between individuals,

Kant adds the dimension of state agreements, and Augustine envisions multiple layers of

agreements (concords) between man and man, among citizen, within the family, and between

kingdoms.

Also the nature of the agreement is different: Kant believes that because of the drive

for self-preservation, a peace is possible even among devils to limit their capacity for mutual

destruction through installing a system of mutual control. This system of control reminds us

strongly of the cold war with its system of mutual deterrence (mutually assured destruction,

MAD) and its arms control treaties, SALT I & II, START I, NPT etc. It is a cold (or

negative) peace. Augustine uses the word concordi that is agreement based on the

conjunction of hearts in and through God’s love. In other words, Augustine envisions a sort

of positive peace, albeit one that is more complex than many definitions that emerged with


27

the ascend of peace research, for example consider it a form of social justice (See for

example: Galtung 1969, n. 32).

It is only with Kant that the conditions necessary for peace are lifted to an

international level, however. S. Augustine and Hobbes, in contrast to Kant, evidently did not

envision a peace order between states on the basis of international law. To superimpose an

international order on the interpretation of their works would of course be an anachronism to

the extent of deluding readers about the philosophies of Hobbes and S. Augustine.

Nonetheless, both S. Augustine and Hobbes do elaborate on ideas that transcend the

kingdoms and city-states. S. Augustine’s Civitas Dei is paradigmatic for a philosophical

framework, which by virtue of being in S. Augustine’s view universally true, applies the

known world and all states. Part of Hobbes’ conception of the Leviathan is based on the need

of individuals to be protected by the sovereign from the incursions of others. The step

towards an international peace order is, thus, albeit conceptually a major achievement of

Kant, not too foreign to the philosophies of S. Augustine and Hobbes. To claim that they did

not think of peace orders in transcending the kingdom or city-state would certainly be wrong.

Concerning structural conditions, all three agree that a lasting peace order requires the

treaty between states, a concord among individuals and between them and the sovereign.

With regards to qualitative conditions, the rule of law and justice are sine qua non conditions

of peace. Peace requires, however, first and foremost order within the state and among the

states, and so does justice. Then it does not surprise that we find in both Hobbes and

Augustine in what I term a defensible peace order, one that does not hesitate to defend itself

against attacks and that is willing to extend its rule and thus its tranquility of order. Figure 1

illustrates the major themes raised and the differences and similarities between the three

philosophers.


28

Figure 1: Comparison of foundational concepts of peace orders between Augustine, Hobbes, and Kant

In the end, an important lesson for evolving peace orders and liberal peace, which becomes

explicitly clear in Augustine and Kant and implicitly in Hobbes, is that peace orders are in

Peace%Orders%

Peace%

Universal%peace%(A)%

Civil%and%liberal%peace%(H)%

Perpetual%peace%(K)%

Nature%

Originally%good,%subject%of%God’s%grace%(A)%

Intelligently%designed%(H)%

Purposefully%designed,%object%of%God’s%providence%%

(K)%

Nature%of%Man%

Corrupted%by%sin%(A)%

Greed,%state%of%nature,%capable%of%reason%(H)%

Violent,%compelled%by%reason%(K)%

Nature%of%History%

Towards%the%City%of%God%(A)%

Towards%the%social%compact%(H)%

Towards%internaIonal%peace%(K)%


29

eternal progression from less successful towards more effective mechanisms of peace

conservation. Such a progression is conditional on the will and the effort to improve. As

history demonstrated with the development of the League of Nations and its ultimate failure,

and as we can observe with the changing nature and mutable capabilities of the United

Nations, our understanding of what peace means and how it can be achieved might be

refining over time. And our understanding has certainly progressed towards a sophisticated

level, when looking at successful peace orders such as the European Union. The theoretical

and empirical developments of peace studies in the recent decades might suggest that certain

factors such as democracy and human rights are conducive to peace. But it is important not to

take such conditions of the possibility for peace as necessary causal factors. No matter how

good it is built, it remains a fragile peace even today. Because despite our progress, peace

ultimately is a mindset and constant hard labor.

7. Bibliography

Aristotle. 2000. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by Roger Crisp. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Augustine of Hippo. 2012. The City of God. Translated by Marcus Dods. ebook,

iBooks edition. Wyatt North Publishing.

Castellano, Daniel J. 2005. “The First Crusade and the Medieval Concept of Holy

War.” Arcaneknowledge.org. http://www.arcaneknowledge.org/histschol/firstcrusade.htm.

Christenson, Ronald. 1968. “The Political Theory of Persecution: Augustine and

Hobbes.” Midwest Journal of Political Science 12 (3): 419–38. doi:10.2307/2110137.

Cunningham, William. 1886. S. Austine and His Place in the History of Christian

Thought. London: C.J. Clay & Sons.


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Duquette, David A. 2014. “Hegel: Social and Political Thought.” Internet

Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed November 25. http://www.iep.utm.edu/hegelsoc/.

Dyson, R. W. 2006. St Augustine of Hippo: The Christian Transformation of Political

Philosophy. London; New York: Continuum International Publishing Group Ltd.

Figgis, John Neville. 1921. The Political Aspects of S. Augustine’s “City of God.”

London: Longmans.

Galtung, J. 1969. “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.” Journal of Peace Research

6 (3): 167–91.

Hanson, Donald W. 1984. “Thomas Hobbes’s ‘Highway to Peace.’” International

Organization 38 (2): 329–54.

Hobbes, Thomas. 1909. Hobbes’s Leviathan: Reprinted from the Edition of 1651.

Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kant, Immanuel. 1796. Zum ewigen Frieden, ein philosophischer Entwurf.

Frankfurt/Leipzig.

Kelsen, Hans. 1960. Reine Rechtslehre. 2nd ed. Wien: Franz Deuticke.

MacMillan, John. 1995. “A Kantian Protest Against the Peculiar Discourse of Inter-

Liberal State Peace.” Millennium - Journal of International Studies 24 (3): 549–62.

doi:10.1177/03058298950240030301.

Martin, Rex. 1972. “The Two Cities in Augustine’s Political Philosophy.” Journal of

the History of Ideas 33 (2): 195–216. doi:10.2307/2708869.

Mattox, J. Mark. 2011. “Augustine: Political and Social Philosophy.” Internet

Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/aug-poso/#SH3e.

Patterson, Eric D. 2012. Ending Wars Well: Order, Justice, and Conciliation in

Contemporary Post-Conflict. Yale University Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1nq51w.

Rawls, J. 1993. “The Law of Peoples.” Critical Inquiry 20 (1): 36–68.


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Schneider, Theodor, ed. 2013. Handbuch der Dogmatik, 2nd Volume. 5th ed. Düsseldorf:

Patmos Verlag.

Small, Melvin, and J. David Singer. 1976. “The War-Proneness of Democratic

Regimes, 1816-1965.” Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1 (4): 50–69.

Springborg, Patricia. The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’s Leviathan. Cambridge

University Press.

Zwitter, Andrej, and Michael Hoelzl. 2014. “Augustine on War and Peace.” Peace

Review 26 (3): 317–24. doi:10.1080/10402659.2014.937987.

1 Kant himself is critical about democracies in his Zum Ewigen Frieden; he believes that the democratic system

is incompatible with the republican system, since it supposedly would nullify the separation of powers. A

Kantian critique of liberal peace and about the relationship between liberal and non-liberal states can be found in

MacMillan 1995.

2 Augustine’s conception of the Church refers to the church of Christ, i.e. the unity of the faithful in Christ,

rather than the institutional church. Henceforth, we will refer to the Church in Christ with a capital C and the

institutional church without.

3 For an excellent treatment of Augustine's political thought in Civitas Dei see: Figgis, The Political Aspects of

Augustine’s “City of God.”

4 (All references to Augustine’s Civitas Dei refer in Roman capitals (XIV) to the book and in Arabic numerals to

the chapter (28) in the translation of Marcus Dods et al. published as ebook as: Augustine of Hippo 2012)

5 All references to Leviathan contain in brackets behind the page number in the book used for this chapter the

page number in the original print from 1651, printed for Andrew Crooke at the Green Dragon in St. Paul's

Churchyard.

6 All references to Kant’s Perpetual Peace refer to the original print of his Friedensschrift, Frankfurt/Leipzig

1796.

Kant 1796, 71–72, nota: “Even if we doubt a certain wickedness in the nature of men who live together in a

state, and instead plausibly cite lack of civilization, which is not yet sufficiently advanced, i.e., regard barbarism


32

as the cause of those antilawful manifestations of their character, this viciousness is clearly and incontestably

shown in the foreign relations of states.” All translations from Kant’s Perpetual Peace were obtained from:

https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm.

7 Kant chose the title Zum Ewigen Frieden in much of the same humorous tongue-in-cheek temperament as the

whole pamphlet is written in. But this satirical title, which Kant borrows from the sign above the door of a

Dutch tavern on which a graveyard was painted, also seems to imply the preludes of an allusion to a

metaphysical peace.

8 “But if we discard this definition of a people, and, assuming another, say that a people is an assemblage of

reasonable beings bound together by a common agreement as to the objects of their love, then, in order to

discover the character of any people, we have only to observe what they love.” (XIX.24).

peace and peace orders: augustinian foundations in hobbesian and kantian receptions

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