PAKISTAN’S TRADITIONAL AND NON-TRADITIONAL CHALLENGES

Air Commodore(R) Khalid Iqbal TI(M), Consultant to IPRI on Policy and Strategic Response

AbstractNational security agenda has gone beyond the preview of state and military. The existingstate-centred approach to national security, confined to the defence of a country againstterritorial aggression, has been widened to the idea of security inclusive of a larger set ofthreats to the people of the state. While the sphere of traditional security concerns is quiteprecise—threat arising out of military means, no similar concurrence exists in the context ofnon-traditional security. Broadly, non-traditional threat is perceived as: “Challenges to thesurvival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-militarysources, such as climate change, cross-border environmental degradation and resourcedepletion, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, peoplesmuggling, drug trafficking, and other forms of transnational crime”. Pakistan faces anassortment of traditional and non-traditional threats. However, none of these is seriousenough to be categorized as existential threat.

Introduction Global strategic environment is in a state of perpetual flux; whereby,the nature of threats and security discourses are incessantly shiftingpositions. The security agenda has gone beyond the preview of state andmilitary. Advocates of an alternative approach to security studiesquestion the conventional wisdom of restricting the expanse of securityto military dimension alone. Even a super power cannot adequately andsufficiently handle some non-traditional challenges. For example,Hurricane Katrina exposed huge gaps in the disaster management regime ofthe United States. It was one of the deadliest hurricanes ever to hitthe United States1. The impacts of these new NTS challenges are deep andwide ranging. For example earthquake of 2005 and flash floods of 2010caught the state and the people of Pakistan off guard and kept them offbalanced until international community extended a helping hand. V. R.Raghavan2 has observed that, “The existing state-centred approach tonational security, confined to the defence of a country against1 Kim Ann Zimmermann, Hurricane Katrina: Facts, Damage & Aftermath, Live Science ContributorDate: 20 August 2012 Time: 12:47 PM ET, http://www.livescience.com/22522-hurricane- katrina-facts.html 9 (accessed on July 10, 2013)

1

territorial aggression, has been widened to the idea of securityinclusive of a larger set of threats to the people of the state.” It istherefore becoming increasingly crucial to analyze how the non-traditional security threats are reshaping the global institutionalarchitecture3; singly as well as jointly with traditional securitychallenges. Conceptual Differentiation: Traditional and Non-Traditional SecurityThe sphere of traditional security concerns is quite precise; whereas nosimilar concurrence exists in the context of non-traditional security.According to Mely Caballero-Anthony4 non-traditional security threatsmay be defined as: “Challenges to the survival and well-being of peoplesand states that arise primarily out of non-military sources, such asclimate change, cross-border environmental degradation and resourcedepletion, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration,food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking, and other forms oftransnational crime.”5 During the Cold War, main threats to security were pegged around East-West rivalry and nuclear confrontations between the two blocs led by theUS and USSR, these military related threats were further extended by thetwo superpowers through their hydra-headed proxy wars. There was hardlyany conflict in the World where both super powers of that era did nothave covert or overt participation. In tandem were the threats like:environmental hazards; terrorism; organized crime and illegalimmigration. However, the fast moving military issues had overshadowed

2 Lt Gen (R) VR Raghavan is one of India’s leading military strategic thinkers. Heis currently the Director of the Delhi Policy Group and President, Centre forSecurity Analysis, Chennai. He is a member of India’s National Security AdvisoryBoard. http://www.csa-chennai.org/about/f-gen.htm (accessed on July 03, 2013).

3 Saurabh Chaudhuri, “Defining Non-traditional Security Threats”, Global IndiaFoundation, 2011.http://www.globalindiafoundation.org/nontradionalsecurity.htm (accessed onJuly 02, 2013).

Ibid.4 Dr Mely Caballero-Anthony is associate professor at the S. Rajaratnam School ofInternational Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Herresearch interests include multilateralism and regionalism in the Asia-Pacific,Asian security with particular focus on non-traditional security and human security,and conflict management. At RSIS, Dr. Anthony is coordinator of the Non-TraditionalSecurity Programme. She is also secretary general of the newly established‘Consortium on Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia’.

5 B H Chaudhuri , “Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia”, Defining Non-traditional Security Threats, Global India Foundation, 2011. http://www.globalindiafoundation.org/nontradionalsecurity.htm (accessed on July 02, 2013).

2

and relegated non-military threats to a second-class status. Though theera of heated rivalry between the US and Russia is over, world continuesto be sprinkled with regional conflict zones and sticky bilateralissues. However, these latent hotspots are not potentially over-loadedto graduate to a global level conflict. With the end of Cold War, andtermination of military threat, issues like economic instabilities andproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) have propped up tocentre stage. They have acquired the status of main sources of concernfor global security. Since the demise of Soviet Union, the non-traditional aspects of security have been an important area forresearch6; especially in the context of disintegration of the Empire,both without any external military intervention and in the absence ofany internal armed struggle.The parlance ‘non-traditional security’ is a contemporary buzzword andits usage is on the rise amongst the practitioners of statecraft,strategy and politics. However, as a concept, it still lacks a preciseand commonly accepted or, say, an authoritative definition. Militarydeterrence, diplomatic manoeuvrings and short-term politicalarrangements are ineffective and or inadequate in addressing non-traditional security issues. Tackling them essentially requires non-military means including comprehensive political, economic and societalresponses. It’s an ongoing process that can only be sustained throughrobustness of institutions, sufficiency of resources and participativeresponse from state(s) and society/ (societies). Now non-traditional threats are increasingly discussed at transnationaland multi-national levels in a comprehensive manner, which clearlyreflects the enormity and significance of these issues in thecontemporary world. Policy makers now portray these challenges as potentthreats to their national sovereignty and territorial integrity, as wellas the well-being of respective people and societies. This is asignificant development. If such ‘security framing’7 is to be effective,it must attract due attention to these challenges, convey a sense ofurgency, and develop the capacity to rapidly mobilise national andinternational resources and create elaborate institutional support for6 M. Aydin (Ed.), Non-Traditional Security Threats and Regional Cooperation in the Southern Caucasus

(Istanbul IOS Press, 2011), i-xii.http://academia.edu/987789/NonTraditional_Security_Threats_and_Regional_Cooperation_in_the_Southern_Caucasus

7 Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Non-Traditional Security Challenges, Regional Governance,and the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC)”. Asia Security Initiative PolicySeries, Working Paper No 7, September 2010. Centre for Non-Traditional SecurityStudies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies; Nanyang technologicalUniversity, Singapore.

3

commandeering these resources for their effective, efficient andequitable employment to mitigate these challenges and theirconsequences. Though this discourse has swayed the focus away from military power, asthe core and sole determinant of international order and security, toseveral non-traditional determinants, with a much enhanced role ofeconomic, political, and societal forces, it does not mean that themilitary dimension has become dormant or irrelevant. Coming in fullcircles, the concept of non traditional security shares much ground withthe ‘Fifth Generation Warfare (5 GW), generally called ‘unrestrictedwarfare’ that may be described as the employment of “all meanswhatsoever – means that involve the force of arms and means that do notinvolve the force of arms, means that involve military power and meansthat do not involve military power, means that entail casualties, andmeans that do not entail casualties”.8 Also, one could argue that within the umbrella of national strategy,some of the NTS challenges fall under the rubric of indirect strategy.Application of non-kinetic strategy9 also has overlaps with some of theNTS dilemmas. Causing climatic changes through, mystery surrounded,scientific military-funded High-frequency Active Auroral ResearchProgramme (HAARP) to unleash floods may fall in this realm10. Usage ofsoft power11 could also be a preparatory stage for inducting NTS8 Thomas PM Barnett, “System Administration’ based Global Transaction Strategy”,http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/ (accessed on May 24, 2013).

9 Timothy Noah, When warfare gets "kinetic.", Posted Nov. 20, 2002, at 6:40 PMhttp://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/chatterbox/2002/11/birth_of_a_washington_word.html/(accessed on July, 2012). In common usage, "kinetic" is an adjective used to describe motion, but theWashington meaning derives from its secondary definition, "active, as opposed to latent." Dropping bombs andshooting bullets—you know, killing people—is kinetic. But the 21st-century military is exploring less violent andmore high-tech means of warfare, such as messing electronically with the enemy's communications equipment orwiping out its bank accounts. These are "non-kinetic."

10 Austin Baird, HAARP conspiracies: Guide to most far-out theories behind government research in Alaska,posted on

September 20, 2011 http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/haarp-conspiracies-guide-most-far-out-theories-behind-government-research-alaska (accessed on July 10, 2013)

11 The term soft power was coined in the early 1990s by Joseph S Nye Jr, in his book,“Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power”. He refined the concept inhis follow up book in 2004: “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics”. InNye’s words Soft power is, ‘the attractiveness of a country’s political ideas andpolicy’. The term is now widely used in international affairs by analysts andstatesmen. The former US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates spoke of the need toenhance American soft power by "a dramatic increase in spending on the civilianinstruments of national security i.e. diplomacy, strategic communications, foreignassistance, civic action, economic reconstruction and development."

4

challenges and later pushing in the traditional security stampede.Likewise, in the domain of cyberspace, sub-activities like crime,conflict, competition and spying have a complementary overlapping zoneswhere both traditional and non-traditional security could concurrentlylay their claims upon. Whistle blowing by Snowden in the context ofcyber spying by the US, the UK and other countries have amplydemonstrate how a state with adequate cyber capacities could intrude onthe privacies of other states and individuals, and how in such pursuitspolitical borders become meaningless. It also brought to light the tacitcollusion of State with its own intelligence agencies. Hence national security needs an all comprehensive treatment whereby itcould prevent, minimize and mitigate the impact of both traditional andnon-traditional threats, which may be in a sort of perpetualorchestration, intricately interwoven in a well thought out benignlooking format up to a point when terminal transition takes place fromNTS to traditional phase— the final push. Benign looking non-traditionalthreats may soften the state to the extent that it is no longer capableof defending its territory and people against the traditional threat. Itis in this context that even a traditional enemy may make inroadsthrough non-traditional threats with intent to degrade the nationalpotential to ward off military threat planned for an appropriate time.Smart application of non-traditional means could even eliminate the needof application of traditional means, because the victim state may becomea pliant state due to erosion caused by non-traditional means; and bythe time it realizes as to what is eating it up, it may have lost thecapability and national will to resort to traditional defensive means.In a similar way, an apparently friendly country may be engaged inclandestinely generating, supporting and sustaining non-traditionalthreats. Whenever, norms of healthy competition are violated, a usuallybenign activity could crossover to the domain of non-traditional threat.Expanse, Scope and Speed of NTS Challenges. Mely Caballero-Anthony’sdefinition12 brings forth few common characteristics in the context ofnon-traditional security threats; ordinarily they are non-military innature and transnational in scope. These are neither totally domestic12 A variant of her definition of non-traditional security (NTS) has been adopted asthe working definition by the Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies inAsia, otherwise known as NTS-Asia. For more details, see the NTS-Asia Web site atwww.rsis-ntsasia.org ( accessed on July 03, 2013), where NTS is defined as:“Challenges to the survival and well being of peoples and states that ariseprimarily out of non-military sources, such as climate change, cross-borderenvironmental degradation and resource depletion, infectious diseases, naturaldisasters, irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking,and other forms of transnational crime”.

5

nor purely inter-state. These are transmitted rapidly due toglobalization and communication revolution13. Non-traditional securityissues are those which are termed in contrast to traditional securitythreats and refer to the factors other than military, political anddiplomatic conflicts, but can pose threats to the survival anddevelopment of a sovereign state and human kind as a whole.14

Therefore, these non-traditional threats are much more intimidating thanthe traditional ones as they require the national leadership to look notonly outwards to cultivate international cooperation, but also inwards,with an open outlook to execute internal socio-economic and politicalreforms15. These threats require maintenance of continuous capacity togenerate appropriate response with or without formal warning, forexample in case of floods, earthquakes and epidemics. Notwithstanding, the contemporary shift in the study and analysis ofsecurity and the world order from a traditional framework to a non-traditional approach16, one must avoid going overboard by making watertight compartment for the two. One may err in the comprehension unlessthere is a clear perception about the overlap zones. Non-traditionalissues can affect both government institutions and civilian populationsand these can originate from a variety of non-state human and naturalcauses; such threats may be upshots of certain acts by individuals orsocial groups, rather than the actions of states. Hence, one may observethat the outbreak of non-traditional issues is more unpredictable, andthe enhanced mobility and expanding activities of individuals enabletheir impacts to spread and proliferate far more quickly. As indirecteffects, such issues can cause tremendous economic losses to a region orthe whole world, as done by the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the

13 Saurabh Chaudhuri, “Defining Non-traditional Security Threats”, Global IndiaFoundation, 2011. http://www.globalindiafoundation.org/nontradionalsecurity.htm(accessed on July 02, 2013).

14 Saurabh Chaudhuri, “Defining Non-traditional Security Threat’, Global IndiaFoundation, 2011. http://www.globalindiafoundation.org/nontradionalsecurity.htm(accessed on July 02, 2013).

15 Saurabh Chaudhuri, “Defining Non-traditional Security” Threats, Global IndiaFoundation, 2011. http://www.globalindiafoundation.org/nontradionalsecurity.htm(accessed on July 02, 2013).

16 Saurabh Chaudhuri, “Defining Non-traditional Security Threats”, Global IndiaFoundation, 2011.http://www.globalindiafoundation.org/nontradionalsecurity.htm (accessed onJuly 02, 2013).

6

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak of 2002-200317 and thetsunami triggered Fukushima nuclear fiasco of 2010.The most comprehensive definition of the concept of non-traditionalsecurity was provided by Richard H. Ullman18 in 1983. According to himnational security should not be perceived in the ‘narrow’ sense ofprotecting the state from military attacks from across the territorialborders. Such a perception was, for him, “doubly misleading andtherefore doubly dangerous”, because it “draws attention away from thenon-military threats that promise to undermine the stability of manynations during the years ahead. And it presupposes that threats arisingfrom outside a state are somehow more dangerous to its security thanthreats that arise within it.” Ullman rather preferred to define athreat to national security as, “an action or sequence of events thatthreatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time todegrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or threatenssignificantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to thegovernment of a state or to private nongovernmental entities (persons,groups, corporations etc) within the state.”19 Branches of Non-Traditional SecurityGenerally, six broad branches of non-traditional security areidentified, namely: International Terrorism; Trans-national OrganizedCrime: Environmental Security: Illegal Migration: Energy Security; andHuman Security. However, one size does not fit all. Each nation islikely to have its own list, which may or may not include all six,likewise regional and sub-regional arrangements would also modify thegeneric list. Irrespective of the list, each item would ordinarilyrequire an independent analysis, with adequate attention upon the

17 Saurabh Chaudhuri, “Defining Non-traditional Security Threats”, Global IndiaFoundation, 2011.http://www.globalindiafoundation.org/nontradionalsecurity.htm (accessed onJuly 02, 2013).

18 Richard H. Ullman, Professor of International Affairs at Princeton University.During 1982-83 he was a Visiting Member of the Institute for Advanced Study inPrinceton. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/37968/richard-h-ullman/at-war-with-nicaragua (accessed on July 03, 2013).

19 Saurabh Chaudhuri, “Defining Non-traditional Security Threats”, Global IndiaFoundation, 2011.http://www.globalindiafoundation.org/nontradionalsecurity.htm (accessed onJuly 02, 2013). & Richard H Ullman, “ Redefining Security”, International Security, Summer(Vol: 8 No 1) MITPress, Massachusetts. http://www.scribd.com/doc/84675722/Redefining-Security-Richard-Ullman (accessed on July 03, 2013).

7

necessity of securitization of each issue. Likewise the response wouldvary as to each particular threat depending upon whether it affects aspecific set of people who may belong to one or more states. Transnational expanse and enormity of such NTS challenges means thatthey can no longer be sufficiently managed only by domestic resources,measures or strategies. As a consequence of increasing futility ofunilateral measures, there is growing realization about the necessity ofevolving sub-regional, regional and global approach. However, critical to building effective and credible regionalism is thepolitical will of governments to put in place systems, structures andresources to translate the regional plans into actionable deeds20. Role of Non-State Actors/Entities. Non state actors have a dual role toplay. They could generate a non-traditional threat; say by manipulatingthe market dynamics and playing with the intricacies of stock exchanges.An individual coming home on vacation from a distant county couldinadvertently be a carrier of a locally uncommon virus that could eruptin to an epidemic, against which the recipient country has little or nocountering capacity. High seas piracy is another no-traditional threatwhereby only a handful group of pirates could radiates a sense ofinsecurity over a wide area. On the other hand, non state actors, bothindividuals and entities, also have a role to play in mitigating theeffects of some of the non-traditional challenges. Domestic andinternational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) often network withthe state/governmental structures and create synergy in disastermanagement. Many philanthropic individuals and entities with variouspolitico-religious leanings have traditionally acted as an extended armof the government organizations likes National Disaster ManagementAuthority (NDMA), Civil Defence, and Red Crescent Society. However, ifleft to themselves, such entities are unable to carry out even handedand large scale activities, mainly due to capacity issues. If allowed tooperate for a long time some entities could also trigger non-traditionalthreats of other types through their doctrinal beliefs, practices andcultural incompatibility. State’s Central Role. Given that many NTS issues are transnationaland trans-regional, national efforts in addressing these issues need tobe complemented with multidimensional, multilevel, and multi sectoralinitiatives. Willing involvement of different regional actors can strikea delicate balance between the push and pull factor for greater regionalcohesion. Nevertheless, in spite of the crucial role that regional

20 Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas inSecuritization”, London: Ashgate, 2006.

8

commitments, frameworks and mechanisms have in coping with NTSchallenges, the central role and capacity of states towards gainfulintegration of the mobilised effort is very vital. While regional framework is critical for addressing common problems through resourceaugmentation, it is certainly not sufficient21; effected state has toplay central role and take charge for operationalising the regionaleffort. Pakistan’s Traditional Security ChallengesThese challenges emanating out of military inventory and doctrinalintent of potential adversaries comprise of external military threatand internal security dilemmas. During this era of science andtechnological advancement, threat does not necessarily emanate fromimmediate neighbours. Due to continental ranges of weapons and deliverysystem, extra regional forces can pose equally formidable nationalsecurity challenges without physically moving to close proximity.Moreover, internal and external threats may not be separable intotality, causes, planning, execution and effects may criss-cross invarious combinations. External threatPakistan has four immediate neighbours: China, Afghanistan, India andIran. Moreover there is a long coastline to the South. Pakistan has nothreat from China and Iran, in the traditional domain, there is nohistory of unmanageable threat from the sea side as well. Militarily,Afghanistan becomes a country of concern as and when it houses extra-regional forces on one pretext or the other; and threat recedes in-terms of military value when foreign forces depart, but Pakistan is,invariably left to deal with the debris of the conflict in the form offallout of war-cum drug economy in the shape of small weapons & drugproliferation and localized incidents of militancy. Pakistan has goodrelationship with China and Iran. Better relations with India andAfghanistan are the leading objectives of Pakistan’s foreign policy. IfPakistan can cultivate a peaceful neighbourhood, a very substantialpart of its traditional security dilemma gets sorted out. Traditional Threat Emanating From IndiaPakistan has a history of facing traditional threat from India in theform of use of or threat to use military force—resulting into threewars and numerous standoffs. This threat is of existential magnitude,In 1971, Pakistan lost Eastern part of the country due this factor.

21 Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas inSecuritization”, London: Ashgate, 2006.

9

Unfortunately, Pakistan-India relationship is perpetually ontenterhooks, ready to ignite on mildest pretext. On the outbreak of anycrisis, first thing that happens is breakdown of communications,followed by rapid climb on escalatory ladder, by India, to a level justa rung or two below actual shooting level, from where neither furtherclimb is tenable nor a graceful descent remains a viable option, henceending up in a prolonged stalemates in the form of protracteddeployment of militaries.

Pakistan needs a sustainable equilibrium in the South Asia. Higherconventional military asymmetry between India and Pakistan is one ofthe most serious threats to South Asian security. Indian actions andintent that radiate, aggravate and substantiate traditional threat are:India has a numerical advantage in personnel and inventory that variesbetween 1:3 and 1:5 in favour of India; and its defence budget is morethan five times the Pakistani defence budget. India’s robust economicgrowth supports such spending, thus creating dilemmas for Pakistan.Moreover, India has an inclination to embrace dangerous doctrinalconcepts which indicate provocative mindset of Indian military command.

Indian Doctrinal Gimmicks. Alongside an arm race, India has alsoembarked upon offensive sounding doctrinal gimmicks. Dangerous conceptslike “limited war under nuclear overhang, “Cold Start Doctrine” laterrenamed as “Proactive Operation”22 and rhetoric articulations aboutexecution of “massive nuclear strikes’ in case of terrorist attack onIndia originating from Pakistan; or in case Pakistan uses tacticalnuclear weapons (TNWs) against India23are regularly floated to keep22 Col. Anil Athale, “Cold Start Doctrine,” Indian Defence Review, 26:2 (April-June 2011),http://www.indiandefencereview.com/search/?idr_search=idr&search=cold+start+doctrine+&searchsubmit=Search (accessed October 22,2013). Under American pressure (on Pakistan’s behest), Indian government distanceitself from the term Cold Start Doctrine, terming it a military thought process.However, practically requisite military reorganization is at a fairly advanced stageunder the garb of “Proactive Operations.” Critics are of the view this through thisreorganization India is regressively embracing the erstwhile concept of“Blitzkrieg”. And by doing so strategic potential of the army would standcompromised.

23 Shyam Saran, head of the National Security Advisory Board articulated in April 2013that India would retaliate with strategic weapons against Pakistan if a 26/11 likeattack occurred on its land. He cast these remarks as his personal views. However,many in India and outside saw his statements as articulating official policy on asensitive issue, while maintaining deniability. The Times of India, for example,said Saran was “placing on record India’s official nuclear posture with the fullconcurrence of the highest levels of nuclear policymakers in Delhi.” He visualizesan escalatory ladder that triggers with a sub-conventional event or a terroristattack. After which Pakistan tries to dissuade India from carrying out punitive

10

Pakistan guessing about Indian intent. Moreover, Indian defence budgethas more than doubled since Operation Parakram.24 A monumental confusionin regard to India’s nuclear doctrine is quite evident in a recentarticle written by a well-known Indian defence analyst, PR Chari, aformer Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses(IDSA), the premier think-tank of New Delhi. PR Chari later headedanother prestigious think-tank, the Institute of Peace and ConflictStudies, and is now a Research Professor at the same institution. Asboth the institutions that Chari has associations with are governmentfunded, what Chari says reflects confusion within the ranks of theIndian nuclear establishment25.It is obvious that there are serious

conventional retaliation, by deploying its tactical nuclear weapons and Indiaresponds by using strategic weapons. Saran warns that any nuclear attack–whether bystrategic or tactical weapons –would be met by “massive retaliation” from India.This will be “designed to inflict unacceptable damage on its adversary.” “Anynuclear exchange once initiated, would swiftly and inexorably escalate to thestrategic level.” “Pakistan,” he declares, should “be prudent not to assumeotherwise as it sometimes appears to do, most recently by developing and perhapsdeploying theatre nuclear weapons.” Most importantly Saran’s escalatory scenariolays bare an underlying frustration that India’s Cold Start Doctrine has beenchallenged if not blunted by Pakistan’s TNW response. India is no longer committedto no-first-use nuclear. Its current policy is ready-arsenal and deterrence bypunishment.

24 Admiral Sushil Kumar, former Navy chief, “Operation Parakram was the most punishingmistake.” Last updated on November 4, 2011 19:36 IST. "There was no aim or militaryobjective for the Operation Parakram...I don't mind admitting that OperationParakram was the most punishing mistake for the Indian Armed Forces, Kumar said inNew Delhi, addressing a seminar on limited wars in South Asia-against a nuclearbackground. He maintained that the government then lacked any political aim orobjective for deploying the army along the Indo-Pakistan border,http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-nuclear-mindset-we-have-is-a-false-sense-of-security-admiral-sushil-kumar/20111104.htm (accessed October24,2014).

25 Ambassador Ali Sarwar Naqvi, “Confusion in Indian Nuclear Doctrine”,https://mail.google.com/mail/u/1/#inbox/14689ff8e0efbb42 (accessed on June 12,2014), .. [PR] Chari points out that its[Indian] nuclear capability has not deterredPakistan-based militants from cross-border attacks on the Indian Parliament in 2001 tothe Mumbai attack in 2008, not to mention Kargil in 1999. He says ‘More generally, itwould seem that Pakistan has acquired virtual impunity in launching terrorist attacksat will into India through organizations that enjoy its patronage’. He then refers toPakistan’s development of short range missiles. Seeing them as enabling Pakistan todeploy ‘tactical nuclear weapons in a battlefield mode’, he says that they are ‘meantto be used against invading Indian troop formations that Pakistan does not have theconventional capabilities to defeat’. Chari does not mention, in this context, theprovocative Cold Start doctrine that India first articulated in 2004. He thendismisses, the ‘massive retaliation’ doctrine in response to Pakistan’s development ofshort range missiles by saying that ‘the determinism inherent in India’s nucleardoctrine that any level of nuclear attack will invite massive retaliation is too

11

problems in India’s strategic thinking. In the first place, Indiansprofess a commitment to total and universal disarmament, but theypursue policies entirely contrary to this principle. Aggressive nucleardoctrine of a triad capability including sea-based missiles of 2002,followed by the highly provocative Cold Start doctrine of 2004, andfinally the concept of Mutually Assure Destruction (MAD) style massiveretaliation concept was floated last year. All these years, Pakistanhas been proposing a Nuclear Restraint Regime to India. Its developmentof a full spectrum credible minimum deterrence is a natural reaction toan aggressive Indian posture that gets more and more threatening. Chariconcludes that ‘the essential problem that remains and will tax thegovernment of Narendra Modi is how India plans to credibly engagePakistan in the interests of nuclear stability in South Asia’. It isonly to be hoped that India will finally come to terms with theinstability that its confused doctrinal hiccups have unleashed, andrestore rationality to its nuclear thinking. In the article, carried ina Carnegie Endowment posting, entitled ‘India’s nuclear doctrine:stirrings of change’, Chari addresses the issue of what exactly is hiscountry’s nuclear doctrine. He begins his piece with a reference to aspeech made by the former Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, atIDSA in April this year, in which Singh called for the creation of aglobal convention to pledge the non-use of nuclear weapons. Chariwrites ‘Why the Indian Prime Minister chose to make this major policydeclaration in the last hours of his term in office is a mystery’,which demonstrates his bewilderment at this position. He says that thisspeech led the BJP to state in its election manifesto that the partywould ‘study in detail India’s nuclear doctrine, and revise and updateit, to make it relevant to challenges of current times’. BJP leadersstarted saying that India’s no-first use policy would be reviewed.However, due to the concern raised in many quarters that India’s time-honoured position and ‘a central feature of India’s nuclear doctrine’ever since it conducted its nuclear tests would be altered withoutdebate, candidate Modi had to declare that there would be ‘nocompromise’ on no first use, ‘which reflected India’s culturalinheritance’. Given the BJP’s naturally aggressive posture, such

extreme to gain much credibility’. He says ‘It defies logic to threaten an adversarywith nuclear annihilation to deter or defend against a tactical nuclear strike on anadvancing military formation’. Chari concludes by saying that ‘It should be emphasizedthat neither former Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh’s last ditch attempt touniversalize India’s qualified no-first use policy nor the confusions created by BJPprotagonists regarding their commitment to this policy are to be commended. A detailedstudy of India’s nuclear doctrine is required to address all the relevant issues intheir totality’.

12

clarifications must be viewed with some skepticism and it is legitimateto explore what may be on the agenda. The no-first use formulation wasmade in August 1999 by the Vajpayee government and later endorsed bythe Cabinet Committee on Security, making it the official Indianposition for the last 15 years. Chari says ‘There are valid grounds torevisit India’s nuclear doctrine, as much has happened over theintervening years that challenges the assumptions made’ at that time.He maintains that ‘On the conceptual front, the limitations of nucleardeterrence have become apparent. In important ways, India’s acquisitionof nuclear weapons has not increased its security’. It is obvious thatthere are serious problems in India’s strategic thinking.26

Indian Military Build-up. Alongside the rhetoric of Cold StartDoctrine or Proactive Operations, Indian Military high command has beenable to convince the political leadership for an ambitious allocationworth US$ 120 billion, spread over a long term. This would result in amajor weapon system transition from low to mid-tech Russian equipmentto hi-tech American and European war machines. Space programme andcyber warfare are new capability additives. Ongoing integrated missiledevelopment programmes has been given additional boost to meet targetslike ICBMs with MIRV capability. Strategic capabilities like nuclearsubmarines, aircraft carriers, long range military air transportaircraft and around 150 high technology multi-role fighter attackaircraft are on order. An anti ballistic missile (ABM) system is beingsetup. Military formations have already undergone massivereorganization to keep pace with new doctrinal orientations.

These actions indicate that India is striving to enhance itsmilitary outreach well beyond the region. This capability could howeverbe unleashed entirely against Pakistan, on as require basis. Over 80percent of Indian arsenal is Pakistan specific and most of its militarycommand and control structure is Pakistan perched. India’s robusteconomic growth supports such rearming, thus creating dilemmas forPakistan. As of now Indian defence budget is seven times the Pakistanidefence budget. “SIPRI Fact Sheets” issued in March 2013 & 2014 statethat:-

“India was the world’s largest importer of majorconventional weapons in 2008–12. Its arms imports,accounting for 12 per cent of global imports, were 109 percent higher than those of China, the second biggest armsimporter. India imported 59 per cent more arms in 2008–12

26 Ibid.

13

than in 2003–2007. In 2008–12 it improved its long-rangemilitary capabilities with the import of such items as over100 Su-30MKI combat aircraft from Russia, 3 A-50E airborneearly warning aircraft (combining components from Israel,Russia and Uzbekistan), an Akula nuclear-powered submarinefrom Russia and the first of 8 P-8I anti-submarine warfareaircraft from the USA.27 “India’s imports of major arms increased by 111 per centbetween 2004–2008 and 2009–13, making it the world’slargest importer. Its imports—14 per cent of the globaltotal—were almost three times larger than those of China orPakistan... India received 90 of 222 Su-30MKI combataircraft ordered from Russia. It also received 27 of atotal of 45 MiG-29K combat aircraft ordered for use onaircraft carriers. India has 62 Russian MiG-29SMT and 49French Mirage 2000-5 combat aircraft on order. It has alsoselected, but not yet ordered, 144 Russian T-50 and 126French Rafale combat aircraft”28.

Strategic Dimension of Threat from IndiaEvery time India test-launches a new ballistic missile, officials fromthe defense industry go giddy about the next missile, which they saywill be bigger, more accurate, fly longer, and carry more nuclearwarheads.29 Moreover, the Defense Research and Development Organization(DRDO) had time and again indicated that all future missiles will bedeployed in large canisters on road or rail mobile launchers to get“drastically” shorter response time with an ability to launch in “just afew minutes.”30 If the Indian government has authorized quick-launchcapability, it is bad news for South Asia. The combination of multiple27 Paul Holtom et al, “Trends in International Arms Transfer, 2012,” SIPRI Fact Sheet,Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Solna, Sweeden: March, 2013),1,3,4,6.

28 Siemon T. Wezeman et al, “Trends in International Arms Transfer, 2013,” SIPRI FactSheet, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Solna, Sweeden: March,2014), 1,4,6.

29 Hans M. Kristensen, “India’s Missile Modernization beyond Minimum Deterrence.” HansM. Kristensen is director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation ofAmerican Scientists where he provides the public with analysis and backgroundinformation about the status of nuclear forces and the role of nuclear weapons. Hespecializes in using the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in his research and is afrequent consultant to and is widely referenced in the news media on the role andstatus of nuclear weapons, http://blogs.fas.org/ & http://www.fas.org/ (accessedOctober 9, 2013).

30 Ibid.

14

warheads, increased accuracy, and drastically reduced launch timeindicates that India is gradually moving from minimum deterrencedoctrine towards a more capable nuclear posture. The ability to launchquickly is only relevant if India plans to conduct a first strikeagainst its adversaries. Planning for first strike would contradictIndia’s no-first-use policy. Pressure to give up “No First Use” (NFU) iswell beyond loud thinking and the ruling BJP has recently passed aresolution to this effect, however, candidate Narendra Modi distancedfrom it. Nevertheless, capability and capacity for revoking NFU is, byand large in place. This could significantly decrease stability both inpeacetime – by stimulating Pakistani planners to further increase theresponsiveness of their nuclear missiles; and in a crisis time, theshortening of decision-making may profound the risk of miscalculation,overreaction and escalation. Most of the independent analysts tend toagree that India appears to be inching form nuclear war avoidancecapability to acquiring nuclear war fighting capability.31

Afghanistan Factor. Afghanistan has traditionally remained the focusof Indian regional policy.32 One of the objectives of this focus was tocounter balance Pakistan through politico-military pinpricks, on asrequired basis. Indian efforts in Afghanistan to re-establish itsinfluence have been broadly focused on three aspects: a major role inthe reconstruction process and economic development; building linkageswith the Central Asian States; and attempting to marginalize Pakistan’sinfluence in Afghanistan.33

On October 04, 2011, Afghanistan also signed a comprehensivebilateral Agreement on Strategic Partnership with India.34 Indiaprovides military training to Afghan police and Army. Through most ofthe innocent looking development projects like road building, trainingand health, India has been clandestinely proliferating its militaryfootprint by executing these activities though the Indian organizations

31 Hans M. Kristensen, “India’s Missile Modernization beyond Minimum Deterrence.”32 Fahmida Ashraf, “India-Afghanistan Relations: Post-9/11,” http://catalogo.casd.difesa.it/GEIDEFile/INDIA%C4%90AFGHANISTAN_RELATIONS_POST-9-11.HTM?Archive=191494691967&File=INDIA%ADAFGHANISTAN+RELATIONS+POST-9-11_HTM (accessed October 31, 2013).

33 “India’s Irons in the Afghan Fire,” Asia Times Online, 26 October 2004,http://atimes.com/

34 Agreement on Strategic Partnership between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan andthe Republic of India, http://mfa.gov.af/Content/files/Agreement%20on%20Strategic%20Partnership%20between%20Afghanistan%20and%20India%20-%20English.pdf (accessedNovember 14, 2013).

15

staffed mainly by its retired military /civil armed forces personnellike Border Road Organization etc. Indian direct investment inAfghanistan exceeds well above US$ 10 billion. Now based on thisinvestment India is laying claim for its role in shaping post 2014Afghanistan, and a permanent strategic role in that country. In itseagerness, India has of late floated the narrative that India is animmediate neighbor of Afghanistan and its direct contact is severed byPakistan’s illegal occupation of Indian territory—reference to Gilgit-Baltistan. Pakistan has expressed concerns regarding opening of Indianconsulates along Pak-Afghan border which are more than the legitimateconsular services in the area. There is credible evidence that theseConsulates are being used as launching pad for separatist and terroristelements in Balochistan and FATA.

India has many interests in Afghanistan, none of which posesexistential threats to Pakistan. Attempt to encircle Pakistan is notlikely to work. India is not likely to have a pliant government inAfghanistan irrespective of the composition of post 2014 Afghangovernment. In a provocative essay for Brookings, “A Deadly Triangle,”William Dalrymple argued that Afghanistan had become the site of anIndo-Pakistan proxy war. Pakistan’s attitude to India, he explained, isshaped by its fear of being caught in an Indian “nutcracker”: trappedbetween an age-old enemy to the south and a war-ridden, pro-Delhi stateto the north. But such analyses quickly collapse under scrutiny.India’s ability to construct a two front dilemma for Pakistan isgrossly over projected.

The Central Asia Factor.   An Indian analyst, Meena Singh Roy, hasobserved in one of her articles, “India as an extended neighbour ofCARs has major geostrategic and economic interests in this region.It was also concerned about Pakistan’s influence in the CentralAsian region. However, India needed the Afghanistan link to maintainits contacts with the Central Asian states.”

India has completed the refurbishment of a military base at Ayniin Tajikistan: the process began in 2002 and has been accomplished at acost of US$10 million.24 Apart from Russia, US, and Germany, India isthe fourth country to have a military air base in Central Asia.Initially, India was planning to deploy MiG-29 fighters at Ayni;however, due to the reservations expressed by Pakistan, Tajikistan hasallowed India to deploy only Mi-I7V1 helicopters. The base is ofstrategic importance to India, and existence of fighter attack jetcapable infrastructure is a point of concern for Pakistan, because suchbases can be activated within 48-72 hours for undertaking full spectrum

16

offensive air operations. As observed by an Indian analyst, SudhaRamachandran, “A base at Ayni allows India rapid response to anyemerging threat from the volatile Afghanistan–Pakistan arc …It alsogives New Delhi a limited but significant capability to inject specialforces into hostile theatres as and when the situation demands…in theevent of military confrontation with Pakistan, India would be able tostrike Pakistan’s rear from Tajik soil…Ayni has to do with India’sgrowing interests in Central Asia as well.”35

Traditional Security Challenges from Afghanistan Situation in Afghanistan after 2014 will not only determine theshape of the region but also the extended neighbourhood. Peace andstability in Afghanistan is crucial for the economic potential ofCentral Asia, South Asia, South West Asia and Asia Pacific tounleash itself at its optimal capacity. Main concerns that hamperforward movement in this direction are: allowing Afghan territoryfor launching attacks on Pakistani territory; illicit small arms anddrugs trafficking into Pakistan; logistical facilitation of India topursue its interventionist pursuits in FATA and Balochistan; influxof economic and political immigrants; ripple effect of Afghanistan’swar and drug economy; and provision of safe sanctuaries to TTP forcross border attacks in Pakistan. Afghanistan has serious economicissues at hand. And there is no foreseeable way of quick transitionfrom war into a normal economy. Operational and maintenance cost of Afghan National Army and policeis likely to be between US$ 3-4 billion per annum. Internationalcommunity must not let ANSF disintegrate; this would have disastrouseffects on the region. Border management is a week area and rootcause of many problems. Embedding Taliban into post 2014 arrangementis a prerequisite for any enduring political settlement. Lacklustreefforts regarding intra-Afghan reconciliation and integration couldonly lead to patchy outcome. Implications of signing of US-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) without co-optingTaliban would be serious. Any degeneration of Afghan security statusinto civil war like status, in post 2014 time frame, would createformidable traditional security dilemmas for Pakistan. The points ofimmediate importance between Afghanistan and Pakistan are:-

Political mistrust between the two countries has the potentialof turning into an uncomfortable stalemate; at worst it couldlead to a zero-sum attitude towards each other

35 “India Makes a Soft Landing in Tajikistan,” Asia Times, March 3, 2007,www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IC03Df0I.html (accessed October 6, 2013).

17

Cross border attacks’ capability has become quite potent; itcould perpetuate a sense of perpetual trans-border insecurityleading to security-insecurity paradox.

Border management is a week area and root cause of manyproblems.

Likely spill-over effects of intra-Afghan transitions—be theypolitical, military or economic transitions.

Strategy of embedding or neglecting Taliban into post 2014political arrangement.

Difficulties regarding transition of Afghan economy from war-drugs to modern format.

Effects of disenfranchisement of Afghan refugees lodged inneighbouring countries during both rounds of AfghanPresidential rounds in 2014.

Lacklustre efforts regarding intra-Afghan reconciliation andintegration.

Drug trafficking and small weapons proliferations. Implications of signing or otherwise of US-Afghanistan

Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). Inordinate delay in South Asia-Central Asia connectivity. Facilitation of launch pad to India for combatant and non-

combatant penetration into Pakistan. Peaceful repatriation of Afghan refugees and their socio-

political reintegration into Afghan society. New Afghan government may not be strong enough or influential

enough to effect intra-Afghan reconciliation leading tovoluntary demobilization of militants.

Way Forward. International effort for institutional capacityenhancement of Afghan institutions—especially the Afghan nationalSecurity forces must continue. There should be long term commitmentfor provision of budgetary support to Afghan government for creatingalternative economic opportunities for its people. Deployment of UNpeacekeeping mission for about 5 years to institute a cooling off”phase, between the departure of foreign forces and taking over byANSF, may be helpful. There should be mutual agreement between sixneighbours on Afghanistan on Border management Frame-work. Capacityof Afghan government should be enhanced for effecting adequateborder control arrangements on its side of the border. Options may

18

be explored for co-opting a personality of the repute of BishopDesmond Tutu for effecting intra Afghan integration.

Pakistan’s Internal Security ChallengesPakistan’s internal security challenges have three aspects:extremism leading to terrorism; porous borders; capacity issue ofcivilian LAEs—police, immigration, prosecution, forensics and lowerjudiciary.

Prior to 9/11, Pakistan was relatively a calm country. Though lowprofile infrequent incidents of violence did occur, they came withinthe purview of law and order, intensity of such events was limited intime, expanse and severity. After 9/11, Pakistan became the biggestvictim of terrorism that emanated from and via Afghanistan. Pakistanhas stood by the international community to combat terrorism.

Pakistan has carried out meaningful reforms in various sectors tocreate a hedge against facilitation of terrorism. Of special mentionsare Banking sector reforms; a lot of effort has also gone into gradualreform of Madrassah system as well. Pakistan has all along been making astrenuous effort to combat terrorism at home. To supplementinternational effort, Pakistan has employed its military, even intraditionally no-militarized tribal areas, to tackle the terroristoutfits. A number of major and minor operations have been launched totake the terrorists head on. While combating terrorism, Pakistan hassuffered over 60,000 civilian and over 6000 military casualties.Moreover, quantifiable economic loss is of the tune of US$ 100 billion.Rehabilitation and reintegration of militants are important steps ineradicating terrorism. Enormous international effort, in the form of amarshal plan may be required to create appropriate socio-economicenvironment to prevent relapse of those who renounce the militancy.Erstwhile concept of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) was abrilliant idea–now no one talks about it. Spirit of ROZs needs to becarried forth, may be under a different brand name. Pakistan army hasestablished and successfully ran some model skill enhancementrehabilitation programmes in Swat and some other areas. However, key tosuccess of such programmes is that once an individual acquires a skill,corresponding job should be waiting for him. This requires appropriatefunding. Government of Pakistan has issued a comprehensive nationalsecurity policy, with a special focus on internal security. It aims atcreating a multi-disciplinary effort to eliminate terrorism.

Pakistan is a playing an active role of global effort to eliminateterrorism. Pakistan is a part of counter terrorism effort launched in

19

the form of UNSC Resolution 1540. Pakistan has also signed a number ofagreements and protocols supporting this effort.

TTP is an umbrella organization of 16 major and around 50 mediumand small size militant outfits. Perpetuality of tactical levelterrorist activity and over-claiming of the incidents by the TTP helpedin larger than life projection of these terrorist entities. Beside widespread public perception, there are credible assessments that besidesother foreign support, Indian intelligence sources had made deepinroads into some of these entities; especially the outlawed sectarianorganizations. Indian intelligence agencies have heavily invested tomake their enduring contacts amongst these organizations and localnotable in FATA and Baluchistan for post 2014 usage.

A little is discussed about the financial sponsoring of terroristactivity. It is an expensive enterprise; its continuation is notpossible without regular flow of money and combat gear. According to acandid assessment, launching of one suicide bomber costs between 5 to10 million Rupees (about US$ 5000 to 10000). An opinion has it thatpart of money generated by pay-outs for Afghan route security, drug andtimber trade recycles through a complex process and ends up in thehands of Taliban—both Pakistani and Afghan. Lack of or collapse ofstate structures in Pakistan-Afghanistan trans-border zones makes itdifficult to reach out to their locations. Use of air power has its ownlimitations; when employed in anti-guerrilla role. Hence it isconsidered opinion that application for military only—no matter howlong—could not bring a lasting solution to terrorism. It is in thisspirit that government of Pakistan has engaged the TTP elements intopolitical negotiations aimed at persuading its cadres to give upmilitancy. However, even this process alone is not likely to bring anend to acts of terrorism.

There has to be comprehensive approach encompassing all facets ofterrorism, most importantly, rehabilitations of demobilized militants.Enormous international effort, in the form of a marshal plan may berequired to create appropriate socio-economic environment to preventrelapse of those who renounce the militancy as a result of politicalprocess and again become disgruntled due lack of adequate reintegrationplan.

As of now Terrorism is a major source of internal securitychallenges. Pakistan stands committed to contribute its bit towardseradicating terrorism, apart from application of military power againstterrorist individuals and entities there is need for a whole range ofnon-military measures to achieve the objective. This requiresinternational support and resourcing.

20

Pakistan’s Non-Traditional ChallengesA wholesome assortment of NTS challenges confronts Pakistan.Specifically these could emanate from: Extremism; Economy; EnergyCrisis; Demographic Challenges; Governance issues; Human Security;Border Security; Refugees and Illegal Emigrants; Trans-border/ trans-national crimes; Food Security, Climate Change; Fragile Politicalsystem; Foreign Policy Dilemmas, Foreign Influences; InstitutionalWrangling etc. In an interesting way most of these sub-systems areintricately interrelated. Moreover, most of these operatesimultaneously, hence accentuating the cumulative effects much more thanthe linear sum total. Of these, some also make interesting subsets, likeeconomy, energy and demographic challenges; posing hen and chickendilemma as to which one causes the others.36 While mapping Pakistan’smain NTS challenges Ali Tauqeer Sheikh37 states that:38 Climate change will continue to negatively affect human activitiesand livelihoods in Pakistan through increasingly frequent extremeweather events and changes in temperature and precipitation. With the“Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” (IPCC) conservativelyprojecting the average world surface temperature to increase from 1.4°Cto 5.8°C over the course of the 21st century39, it is evident thatalterations in the planet’s ecological, biological, and geologicalsystem will not only continue but also intensify. In Pakistan, low-probability and high-impact events such as floods, droughts, storms, andcyclones are now increasing in frequency. An analysis of data for thepast 60 years, taken from the “Centre for Research on Epidemiology ofDisasters” (CRED), shows that the number of natural disasters per decadehas increased considerably over the last two decades. Pakistan’s large population and high growth rate adversely affectsall aspects of society, the economy, and the environment. Populationgrowth creates and exacerbates vulnerabilities by endangering basiccivic amenities, leading to a lack of clean water and space for housingand ultimately burdening society.

36 Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas inSecuritization”, London: Ashgate, 2006.

37 Ali Tauqeer Sheikh is CEO, LEAD Pakistan & Director Asia, Climate and DevelopmentKnowledge Network (CDKN). http://apmen.iom.int/en/advisory-board/68-ali-tauqeer-sheikh (accessed on July 03, 2013)

38 Ali Tauqeer Sheikh, “Non-Traditional Security Threats in Pakistan”, The NationalBureau of Asian Research NBR Special Report #32, October 2011.

39 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), IPCC Third Assessment Report:Climate Change 2001 (Charleston: Biblio Gov, 2001).

21

Growth in agricultural productivity has broadly kept pace withaccelerating demand. However, medium-term food security challenges willbecome far more daunting if immediate attention is not paid to managingwater resources, both underground and in the Indus basin river system. Water security is the most serious challenge for Pakistan due toseveral factors, particularly the increasing pressure of population andurbanization, massive expansion of tube-well irrigation, reduced levelsof precipitation caused by climate change, and the accelerated retreatof Himalayan glaciers. He recommends that40:- Pakistan can mitigate the adverse effects of natural disastersthrough early warning systems, technological advances in building andinfrastructure construction, improved sanitation systems, increaseddisaster preparedness, and an organized health sectoral response.Expanding and enhancing the information and knowledge base on climatechange as well as mapping vulnerabilities, trends in internal migration,and new incidence of disease, can help create adaptive measures forreducing the effects of climate change. The successful implementation of mechanisms to address non-traditional security issues will require the South Asian countries towork together to adopt ecosystem-wide approaches that incorporatestrans-boundary strategies. South Asia faces numerous NTS threats that in most cases predatethe conventional security problems in the region. NTS threats make manyconventional security challenges intractable, as regional conflicts arefrequently rooted in the division or management of natural resources,ethnic divides, or ecosystem bifurcations. The progress in managing, let alone resolving, these NTS threatshas been slow, primarily because the negotiating parties do not viewthem in the broader context of ecological civilization or ecosystemintegrity. South Asia as a region has been slow in developing regionalapproaches to address NTS issues. Modest beginnings by the South AsiaAssociation for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) still require politicalwill, resource allocation, and operational mechanisms. Recent efforts todevelop shared positions on climate change have received a lukewarmresponse.41

40 Ali Tauqeer Sheikh, “Non-Traditional Security Threats in Pakistan”, The NationalBureau of Asian Research NBR Special Report #32, October 2011.

41 Ali Tauqeer Sheikh, “Non-Traditional Security Threats in Pakistan”, The NationalBureau of Asian Research NBR Special Report #32, October 2011.

22

Due to inadequate sub-regional and regional cooperative mechanisms,Pakistan like other countries of South Asia is often caught in the thickof some of the NTS challenges. Natural calamities related disastermanagement suffers from inadequacy of resources. Hence, initial responseis slow. Pakistan is yet to make up its mind whether it wishes to treatits high population growth as an asset or a liability. So far, theposition has been of jockeying between the two positions. Insecureborders pose illegal immigrants’ issue that entails transnationalcrimes. Conflict in Afghanistan is a major driver of pushing in largescale influx of refugees. Measuring against the yardstick of the UN laiddown MDGs, Pakistan’s performance is unenviable, it is under performingin all eight sectors, posting highest child mortality rate in SouthAsia42. According to a recent report released by a child rightsbody,43Pakistan has the second highest number of out-of-school childrenin the world, behind only Nigeria. Other South Asian countries are also42 The Nation (Islamabad), July 12, 2013.43 Pakistan has second highest 'out-of-school' children globally, News Track India,http://www.newstrackindia.com/newsdetails/2013/06/28/212-Pakistan-has-second-highest-out-of-school-children-globally.html (accessed on July 15, 2013). TheSociety for the Protection of the Rights of the Child (Sparc) stated in it's annualreport titled 'The State of Pakistan's children 2012' that one fourth of the 19.75million children in Pakistan who were aged five to nine were out of school andincluding adolescents, the figure rose to about 25 million. Of these children, sevenmillion aged three to five did not receive any primary schooling. The report addedthat Pakistan had reduced its spending on education from 2.6 percent to 2.3 percentof the GNP (gross national product) since the last decade, and it ranked 113th ofthe 120 countries included in the Education Development Index. On the brighter side,at the province level, Punjab had the highest NER (net enrolment rate) for childrenin primary schools at 61 percent along with Sindh at 53 percent, Khyber Pakhtunkhwaat 51 percent, while Baluchistan fared lowest at 47 percent. Overall, Pakistanrecorded an NER of 74.l percent for all age groups enrolled either in primary,secondary or higher education but the youth literacy rate was only 70.7 percent withonly 61 percent of girls are literate as compared to 79 percent boys in the agegroup of 15-24 years. The country is placed at the 129th position among the 135countries on the Gender Gap Index 2012, according to the Global Gender Gap Report,43 percent of children in Pakistan are afflicted with stunting; five years mortalityrate has declined from 122 to 72 per 1,000 births in 2011; and 30 percent of poliocases worldwide along with 2.1 million cases of measles are found in this part ofthe world, along with a high instance of HIV. The report further stated that a lotof children have been victims of drone strikes over the years and they were subjectto a lack of educational opportunities, poor health conditions, no protection forpoor and vulnerable children, miserable conditions in juvenile jails and employmentof minors in hazardous occupations. In the absence of a national database onviolence against children, it was difficult to account for the number of cases ofphysical violence, sexual abuse, trafficking, and recruitment in armed conflicts andacid attacks.

23

not far better. There is a need to evolve South Asian response towardssome of the NTS challenges which are transnational in nature and wherecollective resources could be utilised in a more efficient and effectiveway. Still on a larger canvas, there is a need for Asia level entity toaddress the challenges which have continent level outreach in terms ofeffects. For menaces like drug trafficking and terrorism, there is aneed for broader regional as well as global efforts. Though Pakistan isgrappling with a number of NTS challenges, survival of state and thesociety is not in an imminent danger of extinction. Hardshipnotwithstanding, the state and people of Pakistan would continue to inchforward and maintain their relevance in the regional and global affairs.EconomyLow performing economy is the root cause of most of the non-traditional challenges. Weak economy prevents accomplishment ofminimum essential socio-economical development goals and strongeconomy provides adequate resources for taking corrective andpreventive measures for eradication or mitigation of non-traditionalchallenges. Pakistan has had a low performing economy over a decadeof which has accentuated some of the non-traditional challenges—likehuman security and disaster induced damage.Climate ChangeClimate change will continue to negatively affect human activities andlivelihoods in Pakistan through increasingly frequent extreme weatherevents and changes in temperature and precipitation. There is a need forcomprehensive climate change mitigation/adaptation strategy. Pakistan isvulnerable to the impacts of climate change. It is a disaster pronecounty. Pakistan has topped the list of the Global Climate Risk Indexproduced by German watch, a non-governmental organisation that works onglobal equity issues.

In 2010, Pakistan was listed as the number one country in the worldaffected by climate related disasters; in 2011 it was ranked as numberthree and now country ranks in the top 10 list of the most vulnerablecountries in the world when it comes to suffering from the impacts ofclimate change. Pakistan is highly vulnerable to weather-relateddisasters such as cyclones, droughts, floods, landslides and avalanches.Pakistan faces a range of threatening climate change impacts: changingmonsoon patterns, melting glaciers, rising sea levels, desertificationand increasing water scarcity. Climate change effects could costPakistan’s economy up to $14 billion a year, and needed to be urgentlydealt with. Devastating floods in 2010 disrupted the lives of 20 million

24

people - many more than the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami - and cost $10billion. The country cannot run away from the effects of a changingclimate.

In the past 40 years, nine out of the top ten natural disasters inPakistan have been climate-triggered which shows the magnitude of thechallenge. Disasters per decade have increased considerably over thelast two decades. This incidentally is the period during which averageglobal temperatures have been the highest44. The Centre for Research onEpidemiology of Disasters (CRED) data as shown in Table 1 belowindicates how the number of climate induced disasters has increasedsince mid-twentieth century. Number of such disasters rose from 2 indecade 1941-50 to 36 during the decade 2001-10.

Climate Induced Natural Disasters in Pakistan: 1941-2010

Year Climate Induced DisastersStorms Tropical

CyclonesFloods Droughts Total

1941-50 0 1 1 0 21951-60 0 0 5 0 51961-70 0 2 2 0 41971-80 1 0 6 0 71981-90 3 0 6 0 91991-2000 6 2 14 1 232001-10 4 1 31 0 36Total 14 6 65 1 86

Source: Centre for Research on Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED)45.Note: CRED maintains a global database, called EM-DAT, of natural and technical

disasters from 1900 onward.Table 1

The first ever climate change policy, developed with the support of theUnited Nations Development Programme (UNDP), recommends some 120 stepsthe country could take to slow down the impact of global warming, aswell as adapt sectors such as energy, transport and agriculture.Measures include flood forecasting warning systems, local rainwaterharvesting, developing new varieties of resilient crops, promotingrenewable energy sources and more efficient public transport etc.44 Ali Tauqeer Sheikh, “Non-Traditional Security Threats in Pakistan”, The National Bureau of Asian Research NBR Special Report #32, October 2011,4.45 Ibid.

25

According to a recent Pew Research Centre survey only fifteen percent ofPakistani citizens view climate change as a major threat. Pakistan’sunderwhelming commitment to dealing with the effects of climate changestands in stark contrast to the threat it faces. Environmental expertsbelieve that the average annual financial losses in Pakistan due toenvironmental degradation are of the tune of approximately Rs 450billion ($5.2 billion USD). This is in addition to recent catastrophicnatural disasters like the 2010, floods, which caused an estimated $43billion in damage and killed over 1,700 people.46

Germanwatch’s ninth annual Global Climate Risk Index nattates: “Thelandfall of Hurricane Sandy in the US dominated international news inOctober 2012. Yet it was Haiti - the poorest country in the WesternHemisphere - that suffered the greatest losses from the same event,”said Sönke Kreft, team leader for international climate policy atGermanwatch and co-author of the index. Report shows that Haiti led thelist of the three countries most affected by weather-relatedcatastrophes in 2012. The others were the Philippines and Pakistan.

According to the report’s assessment, the extreme weathercalamities caused Pakistan losses worth 0.7% of the country’s GrossDomestic Product (GDP) over 20 years. Pakistan’s winter season isshrinking @44 hours per annum and the winters are becoming harsher.During the 2013 season record low level temperatures were recorded inalmost all parts of the country. The major response so far has been theNational Climate Change Policy (NCCP) that was developed by the Ministryof Environment and adopted by the Cabinet in September 2012 .The policywas formally launched by the Ministry of Climate Change on February 26,2013. National Climate Change Policy was formed after extensiveconsultations with the provinces.

Millennium Development GoalsThe MDGs are eight international development goals that were establishedin 2000 by UN and its member states for completion by 2015. These goals,comprising social and health issues, have been further divided into over60 indicators, of which Pakistan had pledged to 41. However, Pakistanaims to achieve only nine, missing out on over 30 key indicatorsfocusing on health, debt services, education and living standards.Pakistan’s performance is unenviable, other South Asian countries arealso not far better.

46 Ibid.

26

Reasons for missing most of the indicators include internal andexternal economic and non-economic challenges. Natural disasters,conflicts, administrative and political changes, weak commitments toeconomic reforms, lack of awareness, fading commitments by developmentpartners due to global recession of 2007 and belated ownership of MDGagenda at the sub-national level, are contributory reasons for failure.Impact of these challenges has reflected in slow progress and hence non-achievement of many of the indicators47.

The government is working to enhance the capacity of the peoplethrough human resource development which involved better education,health, population welfare, skill development services, improved accessto clean water and sanitation, and gender mainstreaming initiatives.Some of the under-way steps this regard are: provision of productiveassets, inclusion of micro finance and transitioning toward socialsafety net to protect the people against natural and manmade disasters.Poverty headcount had declined significantly under the Pakistan LivingStandards Measurement survey data – from 34.5% in 2001-02 to 12.4% in2010-1148.

Findings of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2013,has revealed that Punjab is far ahead in achieving the MDGs as comparedto other provinces. The findings also stated that no MDG will beachieved in entirety in Sindh, but that the province had madesignificant progress in certain indicators such as ‘ensuringenvironmental sustainability’ (MDG 7) and ‘promoting gender equality andwomen empowerment’ (MDG 3). Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa had made significantprogress in MDG 7 which reflected in its achievement of forest cover andprotection of land area for conservation of wildlife. Progress in otherMDG areas, however has suffered in part owing to the unprecedentednatural as well as manmade calamities which have afflicted the province.Balochistan is the worst performing province in most if not all areas ofthe MDGs. No MDG can be achieved in entirety in the province and in theaftermath of the floods, and the declining national economic indicators,even the achievements made so far in a few indicators are at risk ofbeing undone, the UNDP report stated49.The country is unlikely to meet six out of eight Millennium DevelopmentGoals (MDGs) by 2015, according to a report launched by the UnitedNations Development Programme (UNDP) on January 08, 2014. Pakistan is a47 The Express Tribune (Islamabad), January 09, 2014. http://tribune.com.pk/story/656715/lagging-behind-pakistan-off-track-on-millennium-development-goals/ (accessed on January10, 2014)48 Ibid.49 Ibid.

27

state that has consistently failed to help itself. The cumulativeeffects of the failure to reach a range of goals add up to aninstitutionalised inadequacy that ensures its position at the trail ofdeveloping nations. Population is growing at an unsustainable rate. Coupled together, theseform a picture of a state that has too many people, too few jobs,suffers from chronically poor health and demonstrates an inability orunwillingness to act decisively in respect of the blindingly obvious.The 2013 MDG report reveals poor performance in respect of poverty,primary education, the empowerment of women, child health and combatingcommon diseases. Pakistan Millennium Development Goal Report 2013highlights the country’s sluggish performance in reaching targetsassociated with poverty, primary education, child health, women’sempowerment, maternal health and combating diseases. UN AssistantSecretary General and UNDP Director for Asia and the Pacific Haoliang Xunoted the commendable performance of Nepal and Sri Lanka on achievingthe MDGs vis-a-vis Pakistan and emphasised the need for South-Southlearning. Four lessons from countries in South Asia on acceleratingprogress on MDGs were highlighted; social policies are as important aseconomic policies; investing in women and girls has multiple, strongbenefits for all MDGs; public sector expenditure on the social sector isimportant including education; and governance issues can be a majorconstraint50.Measuring Progress against MDGs Benchmarks51 Poverty and Hunger. Pakistan’s employable population has grown to 30.9%in 2010-2011, making the prospect of full employment by 2015 unlikely.The target for malnutrition is less than 20%, which is also unlikely tobe met.Primary Education. Pakistan targets 100% primary school enrolment, butrates of net primary enrolment and completion have been fluctuating.Pakistan targets 88% literacy rate, while at present there are 70%literate males compared to 47% females.Child Mortality. Pakistan has set the objective to reducing under-fivechild mortality by two-thirds. Pakistan is short of the MDG targets of

50 The Express Tribune (Islamabad), January 23, 2014. http://tribune.com.pk/story/662235/report-launch-meeting-mdgs-pakistan-still-has-a-long-way-to-go/ (accessed on January 24, 2014)

51 The Express Tribune (Islamabad), January 23, 2014. http://tribune.com.pk/story/662235/report-launch-meeting-mdgs-pakistan-still-has-a-long-way-to-go/ (accessed on January 24, 2014)

28

52 deaths per 1,000 live births for under-five mortality and 40 deathsper 1,000 live births for infant mortality.Maternal Health. Pakistan intends to reduce maternal mortality by three-quarters, but it has only been halved and ensure universal access toreproductive health. The fertility rate at 3.8 remains higher than 2.1.Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other diseases. Growth of TB and HIV casesand the proportion of people in high-risk areas for malaria who areusing effective prevention and treatment measures remains 75% againstthe target of 40%. Measles and Polio cases are on the rise. It is amatter of embarrassment that Pakistan is facing travel restrictions dueto its inability to counter polio. Coincidentally, on the same day that the MDG report was released so wasthe third Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey (PDHS) 2012-13. Thepopulation increase is unsustainable even though the rate has decreasedfrom 4.1 per cent in 2007 to 3.8 per cent in 2012, and although Pakistanhas made advances, it still lags way behind others in the region inexactly the same way as it trails in the MDG race. It is not that thereis no progress, but there is not enough to reach the set.52.ConclusionTraditional and non-traditional challenges being confronted by Pakistanare enormous. However, Pakistan is suitably anchored and none-of thechallenges is as grave to be categorized as existential threat. Being adeveloping country, Pakistan has to follow a long and arduous route ofhard work to safeguard its people against nature induced challenges,invest heavily to measure-up to UN Development Goals, develop allinclusive robust social security network and maintain compatiblemilitary readiness to deter potential aggressors. For that Pakistan hasclearly spelled out priorities. Central emphasis is on creating apeaceful neighbourhood, a robust economy and total destruction ofextremist and terrorist networks. In his quest for peacefulneighbourhood, Prime minister Nawaz Sharif has completed his first roundof visits to immediate neighbouring states. Economy has taken a positiveturn. As the economy pickup, in due course, Pakistan shall be able todevote more resources towards mitigation of non-traditional challengesand improve the quality of life of its people. In the context oftraditional challenges, the way forward is peaceful resolution of

52 The Express Tribune (Islamabad), Editorial January 24th, 2014. http://tribune.com.pk/story/662478/missed-targets/ (accessed the same day)

29

disputes. Pakistan’s proposal to India under the rubric of StrategicRestraint Regime is still on the table, it offers a sustainable road mapto mitigate traditional challenges.

Note: This article was published as Chapter 13 of Islamabad PolicyResearch Institute (IPRI)’s book titled: Pakistan’s StrategicEnvironment Post 2014. ISBN: 978-969-872-45-9http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Pakistan%E2%80%99s-Strategic-Environment-Post-2014.pdf

30