on reflection and negation

Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchInternational Phenomenological Society

On Reflection and NegationAuthor(s): R. A. MallSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Sep., 1974), pp. 79-92Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2106602Accessed: 22-06-2016 11:37 UTC

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ON REFLECTION AND NEGATION

Introduction: In this paper we propose to give, first, a brief analysis of the problem of negation in relation to reflection under different heads, e.g., perception, intention, language, imagination, and so on. Next, we propose to show that the problem of negation is not a perceptual problem, and negative statements are not perceptual in character. Negation is the process of negating statements already made directly or indirectly on the basis of perception, belief, or even faith. Negation takes place at a level of thinking we term here "reflective level." Almost all nonperceptual predication belongs to this field of our reflection. Further we shall argue that the so-called negative facts are in reality "reflective facts" - if facts at all - to be shown and interpreted operationally and methodologically. We shall next formulate our own theory of reflection and show that reflection is of different types and takes place in all critical discussions and in all logic as a tool of fundamental methodological research. The process of reflection is an iterative process of our critical thought. That our different theories as hypotheses have to be confirmed or falsified is the result of the fundamental insight into the endless "iteration" of our process of reflection.

The main purport of this paper is not a direct answer to the question, "Are there negative facts?", for this very question betrays its perceptual character. The paper inquires how we use the terms negation, negative expressions, and negative facts, and in what way they are contextually, operationally, and methodologically related to reflection. It embodies an attempt at an "operational founding" (operationale Begriindung) of negation. But this way of founding does not claim to give - implicitly or explicitly - an absolute, universal theory of reflection, for such a theory lacking confirmation is utopian in character. This operational and methodological founding of negation has very little or nothing to do with negation as a purely logical or metaphysical problem; e.g., is there any negation or negative fact in completed knowledge,' or is there anything ultimate cor-

1 Cf. Bradley, F. H., The Principles of Logic, Vol. I, Book I, Ch. 3, London, 1922; Mabbott, In: "Symposium on Negation," Aristo. Soc., supply. Vol. IX, 1929; Hegel, Phaenomenologie des Geistes, Hamburg, 1952.

79


80 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCHI

responding to negative statements, or is negation subjective or ob- jective, or is there any negative reality; for it is difficult, if not im- possible to talk clearly about completed knowledge, ultimate reality, and so on. The problem of negation is not so much a metaphysical one; it is rather a problem to be interpreted and explained after put-

ting it within the structure of our "reflexivity" which gives meaning and purpose to negative statements. We shall try therefore to steer

clear of our own discussion of negation of the two extreme views of negation as a purely logical, formal, and axiomatic one and as a metaphysical one. All negation is relative to reflection for it is methodologically and operationally a product of reflection; indeed, nega-

tion is reflection, to express the proposition linguistically.

No negation is, strictly speaking, a perceptual fact, for it occurs

at the level of reflection. Negative facts are "reflective" in character. As a result, the problem of negation, in the sense of negative facts and existences, is superfluous at least in our context. Since reflection is an unending process of further "iteration," any theory of reflection has to take this openness into consideration. This, as a consequence, entails that no theory can claim to give an absolute logical matrix of reflection. Reflection is thus the name of the very dynamically critical instance of our life of thought. Reflection, as used here, does not

mean a psychical or psychological event taking place in the life-history of an individual. Reflection stands for a method, a way, an operation towards interpretation, reconstruction, examination, and ex-

planation. A psychological explanation of negation is overloaded with emotions and desires - conscious or unconscious - and varies from

individual to individual and from time to time in the life-history of the same individual. Our task here is not so much to show and decide

which expressions are negative and which not, but rather to recon- struct and describe what is and can be meant by negative expres-

sions. That there are negative statements is our starting point to be understood and explained by a theory of reflection.

Negation as an act of denying a proposition is generally contrast- ed with the act of affirming it. This act of denial, when put in lin-

guistic form, gives rise to negative expressions.2 The meaning of negative expressions is not only the positive expression that some-

2 Cf. Frey, G., Sprache - Ausdruck des Bewusstseins, Stuttgart, 1965, and Philosophie

und Wissenschaft, Berlin, 1970.


ON REFLECTION AND NEGATION 81

thing else is the case.3 Leaving aside the very important question of our two or multivalued logic and consciousness, we want primarily to inquire into the actual and methodological relationship between reflection and negation, maintaining that negation is one of the reflective predicates. Hegel and his close followers make too much of negation in that they proceed to the construction of opposition thesis and antithesis - through reflection and negation as if negation were the sole predicate of reflection. Even the very removal in the synthesis is again a reflection on thesis and antithesis, a partial negation of both. The Hegelian dialectic and even dialectical materialism fail to see that this is only a special form of our reflective thinking and that negation is one of the special predicates of reflection. All the different reflective predicates are used not as perceptual predicates denoting a matter of fact at the level of an "object language," but as reflective predicates at a higher language level. For our present purpose, we may dichotomize the whole field of human enquiry and research into perception and reflection and see and solve the problems either at the level of perception or reflection. But this pro- visional dichotomy must not be pressed too far.

II. The positive character of perception: Every perception is positive in character and stands for the direct contact between our sense organs and their respective objects. Positively as the denoting character of perception is the presupposition of affirmative statements. Since these affirmative expressions are based on the positivity of perception, they are beyond all direct doubt. An indirect doubting of a perceptual report already implies the act of reflection. Of the two types of consciousness - perceptual and reflective - our doubting consciousness is of the latter type.

In order to answer the question, "How do we come to negative formulations," we must take into consideration a process of thinking we term here "reflection." When we make a negative statement, something "more" than our mere positive sensations and perceptions

3 Gilbert Ryle proposes a very simple explanation of the problem of the meaning of negation. "This wall is not blue" means that the color of the wall is other than blue. (cf. "Symposium on Negation," Aristo. Soc., suppl. Vol. IX, 1929). But the real problem is to show on what ground, in what way, and at which level we come to talk of our negative statements. The statement, "This wall is not blue" has a meaning of its own over and above the meaning that its color is other than blue, say, red. When we say, "There is no water in the glass," we do, of course, mean that the glass is empty, but we also claim to see the difference in way of meaning between "a glass full of water," "an empty glass," and "a glass with no water."

4 Cf. Russell, B., An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, London, 1951.


82 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

comes into play. This "something more" may be differently termed, e.g., conjecture, expectation, intention, failure, refutation, rejection,

opposition, and so on. In the unending process of partial verification and falsification of different hypotheses, we do need negation; for no

rejection is possible without putting it in form of a negative (reflective) statement. The act of reflection passes a judgment on a judgment already made. Our very common sense language betrays this "reflective structure" in our thinking.

This book has this particular color, has this particular form, and so on. We can describe and denote "this book before me" in so very many ways. If_ omething expected or preconceived fails to take place, we wonder about it and formulate it negatively. Or if our way of description or of doing something fails to make sense or is mis- understood, we take the help of negative formulations. The basis or the ground of such negative formulations is not perception, for it tells us what is the case and not what is not the case, but a nonperceptual level of reflection. Negation is thus no perception; it is the result of reflection. What positivity is to perception, negativity is to reflection.

The linguistic formulations of our pure, positive, and immediate perceptions must thus be affirmative sentences which are very much

analogous to the "protocol sentences" of the Vienna circle or to the "elementary" and "atomic sentences" of Wittgenstein and Russell.5 This fact of original positivity of perception along with the positivity of affirmative expressions leads to the certainty of individual perceptual judgments. The character of individuality of perception plays a very important role. If somebody asserts he has "seen" or "heard" something, there is hardly any direct possibility to doubt his asser- tion, for the person is simply translating his perception into linguistic form. If affirmative statements can be doubted at all, they can be doubted only in the sense of disbeliefs.

The process of experience is full of refutations and partial confirmations. My own experience may undo my affirmative statements made on the ground of my previous perceptions, but it does not make them false. Put into Popperian terminology of "conjectures

5 Wittgenstein maintains that the meaning of every sentence can be determined with the help of elementary or atomic sentences. The negative statements do not belong to these atomic sentences, for they are not, as K. DUrr rightly remarks, "urspriingliche Satze." What DUrr means by "urspriinglicher Satz" is more or less the same as is meant by atomic sentences. DUrr tries to show that Wittgenstein and Russell fail to show that negation can be determined by the "atomic sentences." (cf. "Die Bedeutung der Negation: Grundzilge der empirischen Logik," In: Erkenntnis, V. 1935).



and refutations" - our expectations must be included within the scope of conjectures - conjectures, when refuted, result in negation. But this negation has taken place at a perceptual level, for at that level there are always affirmations. "Not this" means "something other" than this.' The result of a refuted conjecture at a perceptual level is thus another affirmation, whereas the negative expression, e.g., it is not the case, must be explained and interpreted with the help of our activity of reflection which is - strictly speaking - the real seat and origin of negation. To show and lay bare this seat of negation in reflection is the task of an operational and methodological enquiry into the nature and function of reflection.

An attempt to describe and define negation in terms of affirmation with the help of the method of "exclusivism" also leads to the conclusion of the positivity of perception. The process of extreme or modified, partial or total exclusivism may undoubtedly be successfully carried out in the field of a limited set.' We can easily detect the thief from a limited number of four suspected persons by elim- inating one after the other. But this process cannot be carried out if

we take the set to be unlimited. Theoretically and methodologically speaking, we can put it like this: All that we can hope to arrive at, with the help of our competing theories as different hypotheses, is this: that all these theories are open to falsification, for the number of cases necessary for an absolute and ultimate confirmation of a particular theory is unlimited. There is no ultimate rational way of founding a particular theory for all time to come. Among other dif- ficulties, an attempt to found a universal matrix leads to the fallacy

of infinite regress.8 Negation is no percept, but a concept. Kant was very right in

talking of the "category of negation," for it is not to be mixed up with our perceptual knowledge. Perceptions and perceived states of affairs are positive, but negation is an act of reflection. There is thus

6 Husserl maintains in his Ideen that all negation presupposes the "universal field of Lebenswelt." Every negation is the negation of something, and noetically negation is the modification of some position. (Ideen, 27ff.)

7 J. A. Bahm in his paper, "Meanings of Negation," has worked out twelve different

types of negation in the theory of "organicism," using the method of exclusivismm."

(cf. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. XXII, 1961).

8 Cf. Popper, K. R., Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowl- edge, London, 1963; Lakatos, I., "Infinite Regress and Foundations of Mathematics,"

Proc. of the Aristo. Soc., supply. Vol. XXVI, 1962; Bartley, W. W., "Rationality versus the Theory of Rationality," in: The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy, ed.

by M. Brunge, London, 1964.



a reflective form of our consciousness.9 Negation of the perceptual statement, "This is blue," does not belong to the same perceptual

level, and it therefore needs a different level for its interpretation and understanding. Oskar Becker attacks the problem of negation from a different point of view and tries to work out the essence of

negation in his paper "Mathematische Existenz."10 We may describe the different levels from sensory perception to

reflection and negation, from affirmative expression as the result of the positivity and individuality of perception to the negative expression as the result of the level of reflection as follows:

Level 0: sensory (prejudgmental)

Level 1: perceptual (affirmative statements) Level 2: formation of conjectures and expectations Level 3: refutations and rejections

Level 4: reflection (negation and its formulation)

If we take level 0 statements to be nonlinguistic (prelinguistic) sensations and start in our enquiry from level 1, we can maintain that level 2 statements are no doubt related to level 1 statements in the sense of being the positive ground of conjectures and expectations, but they themselves are not of perceptual character. They belong more or less to the field of hypotheses. All the different belief- modalities belong to this level. All level 3 statements are the "nonfulfillment" - a term we shall explain under: Intention, Meaning, and Negation - of level 2 statements. Level 4 is the methodological instance of operationally and phenomenologically discovering the real seat of the origin of negation. Statements of this level are results of the activity of reflection on our "nonfulfillment" giving rise thus to negative expressions. Level 3 statements include confirmations too but in our present context they are of less importance.

III. Intention, Meaning, and Negation: The Problem of negation, as has been shown above, does not belong to the perceptual level. Let us try to see whether it can be maintained to belong to "intentional acts" along with "intended meanings" with their two main variants of "fulfillment" and "nonfulfillment." F. Brentano fixes the meaning of "psychical phenomenon" by saying that it stands for all that we find in our consciousness while performing the act of reflective analysis. What we want to emphasize here is not so much the voluntaristic side of intentional acts, but rather their functional side.

9 Negation is a "Funktionsform unseres Bewusstseins," says G. Frey. (cf. Sprache-

Ausdruck des Bewusstseins, p. 129). 10 Cf. Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und phanomenologische Forschung, Bd. VIII.



Husserl differentiates between two classes of intentional acts - one always intending something as its correlate and looking forward for the fulfillment (confirmation) while the other does not intend in this sense. The first class of acts may be termed "objectifying intentions." What we thus intend is "meaning" and what stands open to confirmation, i.e., to fulfillment, is this intended meaning.1 To be an expression is to be already animated by meaning. Meaning cannot be identi- fied with the method of verification as such. Meaning is more than mere verification, and the problem of verification belongs to the field of meaning-fulfillment. There are many scientific hypotheses which are of course meaningful without being at the same time fully verifiable. An expression thus must be meaningful before verification. Negation is not sensuous awareness; it is an unfulfilled, but intended meaning taking place operationally at a reflective level. An act of fulfillment seems to be more or less an event of positive nature, whereas an act of nonfulfillment - the real seat of negation" - is a reflective instance showing its nonperceptual, nonsensuous, reflective, and operational character. So the judgment "this or that is not the case" refers not to the speaker's private psychological experience, but to the operation of reflection which is equally available to all of us.

It follows from what has been said above that the term "intention" in our context is not to be interpreted psychologically, but only

methodologically, functionally, phenomenologically, and operationally. What is analyzed here is not desire - conscious or unconscious - working behind the act of intending, but the act, the process, the operation in the noetical sense of phenomenology. The above discussion of the relation between intention, meaning, and negation may be represented as follows:

Intention

(1) (2) meaning-intention intended meaning

(3) (4) meaning-fulfillment nonfulfillment

of meaning

11 Cf. Mohanty, J. N., Edmund Husseri's Theory of Meaning, the Hague, 1964. 12 "Disappointed expectation is what brings Not into our lives," says H. H. Price.

(cf. Thinking and E!kperience, p. 124, Harvard University Press, 1953). Husserlian phenomenology shows the origin of negation in that part of the life of

perception that does not run unanimously and it shows the sign of opposition repre- senting a clash with the expected unanimity. The conflict between the expected "red" and the perceived "blue" is what founds negation. (cf. Husserl, E., Erfahrung und Urteil, Hamburg, 1964).



(1) is - to put it into phenomenological terminology - the intending (noetic) act constituting the meaning of every expression. (2) is what is intended (the noematic correlate of the noetic act of intending).

(3) is the fact that (2) is confirmed and verified."3 (4) is the level of our reflective awareness giving rise to our reflective (negative)

experience. A process that travels only up to (3) and terminates there cannot give rise to any negation, for the real seat of negation is to be found not in the act of intending as such, also not in the intended meaning, but in our experience of the nonfulfillment of an already intended meaning.14 There may be and in fact are different ways of

meaning-fulfillment as well as of nonfulfillment. In some cases, fulfillment may be ruled out a priori, e.g., "round square" or "the present king of France"; in other cases, the whole process may have to wait for the verdict of scientific progress and discovery.

Following Husserl's philosophy of thinking,15 we may maintain here that negation as such is no part of knowing, for thinking con-

sists in the meaning-intending-act whereas knowing is the fulfillment of this intended meaning. Since there is no fulfillment in the case of negation, there is no knowledge. Negation is neither a "being" nor a ' relation" of beings which can perceptually be cognized. It is only meaning that has to be expressed either in a positive or in a negative statement. Negation is no intention; it is also not meaning, for mean-

ing is constituted through intention. Negation is rather the nonfulfillment of meaning.

IV. Reflection, Language, and Negation: Since negation is not a perceptual fact we may well put the problem of negative expressions in the field of the hierarchy of language. Mere perception is satisfied with the ordinary language denoting objects. Negation does not de-

note in the same way as perception does. This, as a consequence, entails that the level of language negation uses for itself is some sort

13 For our present purpose we may omit the discussion of the very tedious problem of verification.

14 G. Frey speaks of a "concrete negation" and relates it to our experiences contra-

dicting our expectations. "Erst indem ein Widerspruchserlebnis Grundlage fur ein Urteil wird, indem dieses auf das Widerspruchserlebnis sich beziehende Urteil begrifflich -

sprachlich zum Ausdruck gebracht wird, entsteht die konkrete Negation." (cf. Sprache

- Ausdruck des Bewusstseins, p. 136). 15 We may remark here that the future of Husserlian phenomenology as "Wesenss-

chau" does not lie so much in its strict claim to provide all human fields of enquiry with an absolute matrix, but in its claim to have shown the most fundamental way of founding theories and hypotheses. Phenomenology is more important than phenomenology as a particular system of philosophy. Its universality is the universality of its method.



of metalanguage, for it is essentially related to and constituted by reflection. The affirmative language of perception expresses positive matters of fact perceived in the act of perception. But the negative expressions cannot be said to copy or express a negative matter of fact, for negative statements take place at a reflective level and show a reflective structure of our language at that level. We do not thereby subscribe to the utopian view of the idealists that there is no place

for negation and negative statements in the "completed absolute knowledge."

Our ordinary language always expresses positive matters of fact and is related to them in an "intentio recta," but the language of negation showing a reflective form takes place in an intentiono obli- qua." In the scheme of the hierarchy of language negative expression- language belongs thus not to the original "primitive" language of denoting cases of concrete perception, but to a higher level or order. This, as a consequence, entails that the words "not," "nothing," "no," and so on do not occur in the lowest language order of our bare per-

ceptions. Words of the order "not," "no," and so forth occur in more complicated ways and cannot "mean" in the same way as the words "table," "blue," and so on. This is why we hardly succeed in giving an ostensive definition of "the book not being there on the table" whereas we can easily do it in the case of "the book being there on the table." This shows clearly that negation is essentially reflection. We shall come to this point later.

The words "no," "not," and so on may be classified as "logical words" (Russell) but still they belong not to the "object-language" or to the "primary language" but to the "secondary language." Russell describes the "primary language" as that in which "every word is directly related to an object, or to a set of objects."1' These two levels of primary and secondary language represent in our present context what may be termed as "perception" and "reflection language" re- spectively. We may as well extend our thesis and maintain that all the so-called logical words, such as "or," "all," "some," and so on, along with the words "true" and "false" belong to the reflection language.

In the act of denying we do seem to transcend the language ex- pressing only positivities, and negation therefore uses a language we term here the "language of reflection." This language of reflection

16 Cf. B. Russell: An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, pp. 19 ff., and 83 ff.



cannot legitimately be equated with the purely perceptual language." The reflective language of negation thus does not express a negative state of affairs (Sachverhalt), but shows the limit of perceptual lan-

guage which fails to talk in terms of metalanguage. We may thus say that something is true or false, probable or certain, possible or im- possible and so on, and all these predicates are reflective in character. The act of reflection may and does include the field of valuation. So

there is a large number of reflective predicates applicable to different fields of human enquiry. Without the use of a reflective language we could hardly converse. There is a language without reflective structure, but this judgment itself belongs to a reflective language.

V. Reflection and Negation: The following two points seem to have resulted from what has been said above: (i) Negation is a type

of reflection; indeed, it is reflection, and (ii) Reflection is the ground of negation, i.e., reflection is the method or the operation to show,

first how we really come to negative formulations, next what negation means, and further how it means what it means. Since the problem of negation belongs to the field of reflection and since the method of reflection has no metaphysical commitment, it is well suited to make us understand and explain the problem of negation in the field of metaphysics and pure logic.

All negation is no doubt reflection and is grounded in it; all reflection is not just negation, for reflection as operational method is also the ground of interpretation, explanation, and reconstruction of very many other problems of philosophy and science. Husserl goes so far as to identify reflection with the phenomenological method as such.

Reflection as a method of critical discussion and argumentation represents a kind of scientific and critical behavior, and negation originates within this field of argumentation. To say "no" is to have already reflected. This is why we maintain that reflection is the fundamental methodological instance of founding negation. All our negative formulations result from our activity of reflection which is an operational and functional instance. The negative judgments con- sist not in our pointing towards a positive state of affairs, but in pointing towards a positive perceptual fact where the negated is "reflexively" represented not to be there. The imagined presence of the negated object is absent. This is why we maintain that imagination plays an important role in the explanation of the problem of negation.

17 E. Gellner takes a similar view of "denial" although in a quite different context. (Cf. Words and Things, London, 1959).



When we say "the distance between Calcutta and Bombay is not 100 miles," we do not mean to show that there is such a state of affairs as "not being 100 miles distance between Calcutta and Bombay," for nothing corresponds to this negative statement in the geographical reality. Although negation is perceptually unreal, it is nevertheless a reflective fact.

VI. The problem of negative facts: It follows from the above discussion that there cannot be negative matters of fact in the sense of being perceptual correlates. If there is any meaning in saying that there are negative facts, then it consists mainly and primarily in showing methodologically the exact manner in which negative expressions get their meaning. This manner consists, as shown above, in the method of reflection leading to an explanation, interpretation, understanding, and analysis of negation and negative statements. Negative statements are not verified or falsified in the same way as the positive ones. There are no real ghosts verifying the statement "there are no ghosts." The so-called negative facts are reflective in nature.

The "mirror theory of meaning and thinking" - hoping to get "something" "somewhere" in the world corresponding to our different statements positive as well as negative - seems to have led many in the past to search for a positive and substantial "Not." They fail to see that perception language is a language denoting things perceived, and a theory of negation can hardly be built up successfully if we remain at the level of perception. Theory-building is not barely describing facts, but it is a process of creation wherein explanation is given. The "Not" is not seen or perceived but "thought of." Any search for negation at the perceptual, factual level leads to some form of "category mistake" resulting into the belief that there are negative facts analogous to positive ones. It also leads - directly or indirectly - to some type of "mystification" of negation, e.g., negation as "priva- tion," as "imperfection," as "evil," and so on. Seen from our point of view, even the existentialist philosophers seem to mystify the reflective category of negation. For them "Not" or "Nothing" is an entity or even an agent." They hypostatize a real non ens.

One may of course use negation in the sense of a "substantive," but one should not deceive oneself into believing that there is some "substance" corresponding to this merely grammatical substantive. Negation is a methodological issue. Because of the picture theory of truth we are generally led to think that our negative statements

15 Heidegger, M., Was ist Metaphysik?, Tubingen, 1953. Sartre, J. P., Being and Nothingness, London, 1957.



must copy some reality. The following two statements "there is bread on the table" and "there is no bread on the table" cannot be distin- guished from one another through a metaphysical or ontological rea- soning, for there is hardly any metaphysical principle that makes "table with no bread on it" more or less ultimate. The distinction is always made between these two statements at our reflective level at which the second statement "there is no bread on -the table" gets its meaning and explanation. If we are asked to draw a table with bread on it, we can easily do it. If we are asked to do the same in the case of a table with no bread on it, we hardly understand its meaning at the perceptual level. We may of course write "no bread," but this phrase "no bread" expresses the reflective character of our language. The table with no bread on it is thus drawn only "reflexively" and operationally. Still there is a difference between "a table with no bread on it" and " a table just empty." But this again leads us to our theory of reflection showing two different types of operations needed in reaching these two nonperceptual, nonfactual but meaningful statements. Reification of negation is nothing else but ontologization of the same.

Were there negative facts, the problem of a positive and ostensive verification of negative statements would not present any problem at all; then in that case one could easily point to the negative fact which might verify the negative statement. Logical positivists and the lan guage analysts decry the statement "God exists," for they rightly point to its unverifiable character. But they also maintain that this proposition is meaningless. In our context this proposition need not be meaningless although it is not perceptually verifiable.

What the philosophers advocating the "positivity of negation" take to be a substantial state of negation is perceptually nothing more than, say, the table before me. This table before me is the positive correlate of the statement "there is a table before me." An analogous correlate for the negative statements at the perceptual level can only be meaningfully found at the reflective level. Negative facts are reflective facts - if facts at all. Knowledge of negative facts is thus- put into Russellian terminology of "acquaintance" and "description" - not "knowledge by acquaintance," but "knowledge by description," and the method of reflection in our context is the method of description and explanation. The problem of negation, i.e., of negative statements and facts, belongs as much to the order of thought and reflection as the problem of contradiction for both of them are hardly plausible and possible in the field of naked, positive facts. When two things, heat and cold, oppose each other, there is no logical contra-



diction but only repulsion or exclusion between the two. There is no necessary logical relation between negation (also contradiction) on the one hand and impossibility on the other." Impossibility and in- compatibility may be shown to be there in the world of brute facts. But facts of negation are facts of reflection and must be treated like- wise.

VII. Negation and Imagination: It may well be objected that although we deny the existence of negative facts, we talk of reflective facts in relation to negation. We must say that our use of the term "fact" in relation to negation is just by way of equivocation. Negation, as we have already shown, cannot be a direct and original attitude of the mind as it is the case with perception. Negation is the work of reflection, and imagination, as mentioned above, plays an important role in it. The negated object "bread" is imagined to be present on the table. The cancellation of this imagined presence results in the absence of the bread on the table.

If negation does not belong to perception, it is more likely that we can classify it under inference meaning thereby that negative statements are more complicated and thus inferential in nature. They cannot be made if one remains at the level of perception. The tool of this inference is not so much the understanding, but our imagination showing us how to reflect on what is not, so that it may serve as the basis of negative statements. When we say "there is no book on the table," the basis of such a negative statement is not the sensation or perception of the absent book on the present table - for nothing corresponds to the "absent book" in reality at our perceptual level - but the "sensation is produced by the empty space."" The absent book is nothing but a representation called forth by memory, imagination, expectation, and so forth. In negative judgments of all sorts the role of imagination is thus predominant, and it is only in this respect true when we maintain that negative statements belong more likely to the field of inference and imagination.21 Statements like "I see only half of the stick and not the rest" contain both perception and imagination, for the remaining part of the stick judged not to be seen is imagined as being present giving rise thus to a negative statement.

19 Cf. Kraft, V., Erkenntnislehre, pp. 147 ff., Wien, 1960. 20 Cf. Stcherbatsky, F.Th., Buddhist Logic, Vol. I, New York, 1962, pp. 364 ff.

According to Buddhist logicians negation is not a direct way of cognizing reality, and it is therefore included in inference.

21 B. Russell considers the possibility of negative judgments belonging to inference when he says: ". . . given a judgment of perception "this is blue," we can infer "this is not red." (Cf. An Inquiry into AMeaning and Truth, p. 83.)



We may now describe and interpret negation "as the imagined presence" of a perceptually absent object. The absence is a presence

in the imagination; in other words, the presence is absent. The Bud-

dhist logicians go so far as to maintain that negation is predominant- ly imagination. Negation is not a perceptual act, and negative statements are not perceptual ones. All our ideals are thus "verified ab- sences," which, in our context, means that they are imagined presences. Not only theology, in this sense, is full of imagined presences, but even metaphysics, sociology, politics, and so on.

R. A. MALL

PORZ-ZUNDORF, GERMANY.


on reflection and negation

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