nikolai lossky's reception and criticism of husserl
TRANSCRIPT
Nikolai Lossky’s Reception and Criticism of Husserl
Frédéric Tremblay1
Published online: 22 January 2016
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016
Abstract Nikolai Lossky is key to the history of the Husserl-Rezeption in Russia.
He was the first to publish a review of the Russian translation of Husserl’s first
volume of the Logische Untersuchungen that appeared in 1909. He also published a
presentation and criticism of Husserl’s transcendental idealism in 1939. An English
translation of both of Lossky’s publications is offered in this volume for the first
time. The present paper, which is intended as an introduction to these documents,
situates Lossky within the Rezeptionsgeschichte of Husserl in Russia and explains
why he is central to it. It also explains what Lossky principally found in Husserl: he
saw in the latter’s critique of psychologism support for his own ontology, episte-
mology, and axiology. Lossky characterizes his ontology as an ideal-realism.
According to ideal-realism, both the realm of ideal beings (in Plato’s sense) and the
realm of real beings (i.e., the world of becoming) are mind-independent. Per his
epistemology, which he calls “intuitivism,” real beings are intuited by sensual
intuition and ideal beings by intellectual intuition. The realm of ideal beings
includes the subrealm of values, which is intuited by axiological intuition. This
thoroughly realist conception contrasted sharply with the subjectivist tendencies of
the time. So, when Lossky took cognizance of Husserl’s critique of psychologism,
he thereupon found an ally in his battle against the various subjectivisms. But, when
Husserl took the transcendental idealist turn, Lossky was at the forefront of the
backlash against the new direction Husserl wanted to give to phenomenology.
Nikolai Onufrievich Lossky is commonly held to be one of the first Russian
philosophers to have played a key role in introducing Husserl to the Russian
& Frederic Tremblay
1 Institut Jean Nicod, UMR, 8129, Pavillon Jardin, Ecole Normale Superieure, 29 rue d’Ulm,
75005 Paris, France
123
Husserl Stud (2016) 32:149–163
DOI 10.1007/s10743-015-9181-5
intellectual community. In “Ed. Husserl und die russische Philosophie,” for
instance, Boris Jakowenko says that Lossky was “first among the Russian
philosophers who took an interest in Husserl’s groundbreaking ideas, and who
were partially influenced by them.”1 In The Phenomenological Movement, HerbertSpiegelberg says “It seems that the philosopher chiefly responsible for [the] early
interest in Husserl was Nikolai Lossky” (Spiegelberg, 1976, p. 609). And, more
recently, Maryse Dennes said that “the most outstanding reaction to Husserl’s
Logical Investigations was that of N. O. Lossky.”2
Lossky was not the very first to mention Husserl in print, however. David
Viktorov, who had been Husserl’s student, quotes the Logische Untersuchungen in
his “Philosophical Views of Ernst Mach” (Филocoфcкie взгляды Эpнcтa Maxa),
published in the May-June 1904 issue of the journal Questions of Philosophy andPsychology (Boпpocы филocoфiи и пcиxoлoгiи). Lossky only mentions Husserl in
print for the first time a year later, in the May-June issue of the same journal, in a
paper entitled “The Foundations of Mystical Empiricism” (Ocнoвaниeмиcтичecкoгo эмпиpизмa) (Lossky 1905, p. 176). In the latter article, Lossky
relies on Husserl’s definitions of similarity and identity when arguing against
nominalism and conceptualism in favor of the realism of universals (Lossky 1905,
pp. 205-206). He also finds support in Husserl’s distinction between specifischeEinzelheit and individuelle Einzelheit (Lossky 1905, p. 210). This article will
eventually become a chapter of The Foundations of Intuitivism (Oбocнoвaнieинтyитивизмa) (1906). Although Viktorov was chronologically prior, Lossky may
nevertheless have been prior in power of influence. Viktorov was five years younger
than Lossky, and, by 1905, he had three full-length articles and several book reviews
in Boпpocы филocoфiи и пcиxoлoгiи (the main organ for philosophical publications
in Russia at the time), whereas Lossky had already published about fifteen full-length
articles in the same journal and had a book published in German translation. It is hard
to say with any amount of certainty who between the two was most influential at the
time. But Lossky was certainly more en vue than Viktorov and, as such, may have
been more susceptible to exert an influence on the Russian intelligentsia.
Gustav Shpet eventually became the greatest ambassador of Husserl’s thought in
Russia. Shpet studied at the University of Gottingen, where he took Husserl’s
seminar “Natur und Geist,” which Roman Ingarden also attended, during the winter
semester of 1912-1913. Upon his return to Russia, he played an important role in
disseminating Husserl’s ideas. His Appearance and Sense (Явлeниe и cмыcл)published in 1914 initiated a distinctly — albeit short-lived — Russian
phenomenological movement. But Lossky preceded Shpet chronologically by many
years and contributed to the initial impetus to Husserlian studies in Russia. There is
also reasonable ground to suspect an influence of Lossky on Shpet, because,
according to Vladimir Zinchenko, Boris Pruzhinin, and Tat’iana Shchedrina,
“Lossky was one of the few Russian philosophers whose ideas came under the direct
1 “Als Erster unter den russischen Philosophen, der sich fur die bahnbrechenden Ideen Husserls
interessierte und sich teilweise durch dieselben beeinflussen ließ, muß N. O. Losskij bezeichnet werden”
(Jakowenko 1929/1930, p. 211). Otherwise noted, all translations are mine.2 “la reaction la plus marquante aux Recherches logiques de Husserl fut celle de N. O. Lossky.” (Dennes1997a, p. 156).
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attention of Gustav Shpet” (Zinchenko, Pruzhinin, & Shchedrina 2011, p. 33). Shpet
seems to have had some esteem for Lossky,3 at least insofar as the non-religious
aspects of his work were concerned.4
We may thus agree that Lossky is central to the Rezeptionsgeschichte of Husserlin Russia. Let us now turn to Lossky’s philosophical background and program in
order to understand what he found in Husserl. Most historians of Russian
philosophy agree that Vladimir Solov’ev was the first great systematic Russian
philosopher.5 Solov’ev developed a syncretic system that we may describe —
although in a far too simplified way — as a sort of Christian Neo-Platonism, which
many believe to be characteristic of the Russian national way of thinking. This
philosophy implies a form of ontological realism. The most important philosophers
of the next generation, such as Nikolai Lossky and Semyon Frank, followed in
Solov’ev’s footsteps to varying extents. Given its realist inclination, Russian
philosophy remained relatively impervious to Kantianism and subjective idealism.
Russia had its fair share of Neo-Kantian philosophers, such as Alexander
Vvedensky.6 But, according to many historians, the Russian general philosophical
tendency was anti-Kantian. Frank, for instance, is of the opinion that “the
philosophical worldview of Vvedensky remains isolated in Russian philosophy.”7
Fichte had apparently almost no influence in Russia. Schelling and Hegel had an
immense influence, but what the Russian mind found typically attractive in them
3 We know that Shpet was a reader of Lossky. While in Gottingen in 1912, for instance, he wrote to his
wife, asking her if she could send him a copy of Lossky’s new book, Логика проф. Введенского (TheLogic of Prof. Vvedensky), in which Lossky criticizes Vvedensky’s Neo-Kantian account of the esselogicum (Shchedrina 2005, p. 53). We also know that in 1914 he recommended Lossky’s Основныяученiя психологiи (The Basic Teachings of Psychology) to Mikhail Gershenzon (Shchedrina 2005, p. 445).
Moreover, we know from Lossky’s correspondence with Shpet that in 1917 the latter was trying to get
Lossky to contribute articles to the journal Мысль и Слово (Thought and Word) of which he was the
editor (for Lossky’s letters to Shpet, see Shchedrina (2005, pp. 446-447)). Finally, the same year, Shpet
published a review of Lossky’s booklet Материя в системе органического мировоззрения (Matter andthe System of Organic Weltanschauung) (1916), which further suggests the importance of Lossky’s
thought for Shpet.4 Shpet’s review of Lossky’s Материя в системе органического мировоззрения was published under
the title “Нѣкоторыя черты изъ представленiя Н. О. Лосскаго о природѣ” (“Some Features of N.
O. Lossky’s Views on Nature”) in Мысль и слово in 1917. Shpet sent a copy to Lossky, who read it.
Lossky replied to Shpet: “I have read your article about me. The phrase ‘worldview that goes back to God
is a worldview going back to a whim’ was very upsetting to me, as to every man who believes in God and
who knows that He is; it gives the impression of something blasphemous” (Вашу статью обо мне ячитал. В ней фраза «миропонимание, которое восходит к Богу, есть мировоззрение, восходящее ккапризу» очень огорчило меня: на меня, как и на всякого человека, верующего в Бога и знающего,что Он есть, она производит впечатление чего-то кощунственного) (Shchedrina 2005, p. 446).5 E.g., “Soloviev evolved an original and independent system of philosophy. This happened in Russia for
the first time […] Soloviev was the first Russian truly original philosopher” (Lopatin 1916, p. 432) or,
again, Solov’ev is “arguably the first Russian philosopher worthy of that designation, certainly its first
systematic secular philosopher” (Nemeth 2014, p. ix).6 On Russian Neo-Kantianism and on Vvedensky in particular, see Nemeth (1998).7 “Wwedensky’s philosophische Weltanschauung steht in der russischen Philosophie ganz vereinzelt”
(Frank 1926a, p. 90).
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was not so much their idealism as the organic character of their systems, Schelling’s
World Soul and his Ungrund, Hegel’s Absolute and his dialectics, etc.8
Whether they are biased or not, many historians of Russian philosophy describe
the Russian mind as having a penchant for ontologism. In Russische Philosophie(1925), for instance, Ernest Radlov says that “[o]bjectivism draws the Russian mind
toward the objective world, grounds him to the earth.”9 In Die russischeWeltanschauung (1926), Frank claims that one of the main tendencies among
Russian philosophers “is their leaning toward realism, or better said, toward
ontologism, the impossibility for them of being satisfied with any form of idealism
or subjectivism.”10 In History of Russian Philosophy (Иcтopия pyccкoйфилocoфии) (1948), Vasily Zenkovsky says that, “[e]xcept for a small group of
faithful Kantians, Russian philosophers are very prone to so-called ontologism in
resolving epistemological questions.”11 Lossky himself says in his own History ofRussian Philosophy (first published in English) that the “view that the external
world is knowable is widely prevalent in Russian philosophy, and indeed is often
stated in its extreme form, namely, as the doctrine of intuition or immediate
contemplation of objects as they are in themselves. A keen sense of reality, opposed
to regarding the contents of external perception as mental or subjective, seems to be
a characteristic feature of Russian philosophy” (Lossky 1952, p. 403).
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Lossky was — along with Frank —
one of the main flag-bearers of the Russian realist reaction against Kantianism and
German idealism. He characterizes his own metaphysical position as an “ideal-
realism,” which may mislead one to believe that his philosophy is an attempt to
somehow synthesize German idealism and external-world realism. But that is not
the case. The idealism Lossky has in mind here is rather the Platonic one according
to which there is an objective realm of ideal being. His position is thus a double-
edged realism: a realism about the Platonic realm of intelligible forms as well as
about the external world (i.e., the sensible world of events and processes). On this
view, truth is about something ontologically independent — a conception that is
averse to logical psychologism and relativism.
So, when the first volume of the Logische Untersuchungen appeared, Lossky
found in Husserl an ally in his fight against the subjectivist approaches then still
prevalent in Germany. When the first Russian translation appeared in 1909, Lossky
was the first to publish a review of it. His review reflects this newly discovered
alliance: “At first sight, it seems undeniable that judgment, reasoning, and all
8 On this, see also Ernest Radlov, who says that “Fichte has exercised almost no influence, and only the
philosophy of nature and the ethics of Schelling as well as some elements of the Hegelian theory have
made an impression” (“Fichte hat fast gar keinen Einfluß ausgeubt, und nur die Naturphilosophie und
Ethik Schellings und einige Elemente der Hegelschen Lehre haben Eindruck gemacht”) (Radlov 1925,
p. 11). See also Frank (1926b, p. 11).9 “Der Objektivismus zieht den russischen Geist zur gegenstandlichen Welt, schmiedet ihn an die Erde”
(Radlov 1925, p. 13).10 “ist ihr Hang zum Realismus oder, besser gesagt, zum Ontologismus, die Unmoglichkeit fur sie, sich
mit irgendeiner Form von Idealismus oder Subjektivismus zu befriedigen.” (Frank 1926b, p. 11).11 “За исключением небольшой группы правоверных кантианцев, русские философы оченьсклонны к так называемому онтологизму при разрешении вопросов теории познания.” (Zenkovsky
1948, p. 17).
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thought processes in general are entirely of a psychic nature. That is why logic is
[considered to be] a science of psychic phenomena, is [considered to be] a ‘branch
of psychology’. No wonder, therefore, that psychologism is very common in logic.
The natural consequence of psychologism in logic must be the doctrine that teaches
that truth, as something determined by the human psychic organization, has only a
relative value (relativism).”12 What Lossky applauds here is above all Husserl’s
critique of psychologism and its anti-relativistic implications. He agrees with
Husserl that the liberation from psychologism must be achieved by clearly
distinguishing the act of judgment, which is a psychic process, from the meaning of
the judgment, which is not a psychic process but an ideal being that, to him, has an
independent existence in the Platonic sense.
Lossky developed a theory of knowledge that he calls “intuitivism,” which was
intended to be nothing less than “the overcoming of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reasonand justification of metaphysics as a science.”13 According to Losskyan intuitivism,
we have “immediate awareness of the externalworld.”14 Intuition can be of substances
as much as of properties, relations, causality, numbers, and so on. Real beings are
intuited via sensuous intuition, and ideal beings via intellectual intuition. Grounding
his own system of logic on intuitivism, Lossky claims that logic is concerned with the
realm of ideal being (i.e., superspatial and supertemporal being). On this view, “the
logical structure of judgments and inferences is at the same time the ontologicalstructure of reality” (Lossky 1930, p. 254). Lossky’s intuitivist logic is thus
“completely free from any tendency toward psychologism” (Lossky 1930, p. 254).
Some have seen in this theory an echo of Husserl’s theory of eidetic intuition
(see, e.g., Dennes 1997b, p. 49). But Lossky had probably already developed his
views on intuition before reading Husserl. In his Bocпoминaния (Memoirs), hewrites that in the summer of 1903 he still did not know who Husserl was,15 and that
he was already on his way to intuitivism in 1900.16 Lossky had already devoted a
section to the theory of intuition in “Fundamental Psychological Theories from the
Point of View of Voluntarism” (Основныя yчeнiя пcиxoлoгiи cъ тoчки зpѣнiявoлюнтapизмa) (1903a, b), and he had already published a series of articles on
intuitivism in Boпpocы филocoфiи и пcиxoлoгiи (1904-1905) before showing any
signs of being acquainted with Husserl.
12 “На первый взглядъ кажется несомнѣннымъ, что сужденіе, умозаключеніе, вообще процессымышленія цѣликомъ суть психическіе процессы, а потому логика есть наука о психическихъявленіяхъ, ест „вѣтвь психологіи“. Неудивительно поэтому, что психологизмъ широко распрос-траненъ въ логикѣ. Естественнымъ слѣдствіемъ психологизма въ логикѣ должно быть ученіе отомъ, что истина, какъ нѣчто обусловленное психическою организаціею человѣка, имѣетъ лишьотносительное значеніе (релативизмъ).” (Lossky 1909, p. 292).13 “преодоление «Критики чистого разума» Канта и оправдание метафизики, как науки.” (Lossky
1968, p. 121).14 “непосредственное сознаванiе внѣшняго мира” (Lossky 1904b, p. 325).15 “In the summer of 1903, I went on a trip to Gottingen […]. The philosopher Husserl was also in
Gottingen at this time, but I did not yet know his name” (На лето 1903 г. я получил командировку вГеттинген […]. Философ Э. Гуссерль был также в это время в Геттингене, но я не знал еще егоимени) (Lossky 1968, pp. 113-114).16 “в 1900 г. В то время я был уже на пути к своему интуитивизму.” (Lossky 1968, p. 97).
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Lossky would more likely have developed his concept of intuition in contact with
Solov’ev’s philosophy. In Обоснованiе миcтичecкoгo эмпиpизмa (Foundations ofMystical Empirism), he credits Solov’ev, who, he says, “has put forward a doctrine
of intuition both in respect to finite things and in respect to God. In his view, the
knowledge of anything, even of any finite thing, involves three aspects — the
mystical, the rational, and the empirical.”17 And he goes on to quote at length on
this issue from Solov’ev’s Кpитикa oтвлeчeнныxъ нaчaлъ (Critique of AbstractPrinciples) (1880) — a book that he had to read early on for his magister exam.18
He also credits Sergei Trubetskoy for “valuable additions” made in this regard to the
teachings of Solov’ev (Lossky 1904c, p. 501), as well as Aleksei Kozlov, who was
one of his earliest philosophical influences (Lossky 1904c, p. 504).19 Other possible
early sources for his concept of intuition are the concepts of Anschauung of TheodorLipps,20 Schelling,21 and Schopenhauer,22 amongst others.
But Lossky nevertheless sought support in Husserl in the same way that he
sought support in Bergson’s theory of intuition (Lossky 1913, 1914). In 1910,
Lossky apparently prepared an article entitled “On Husserl’s Intentionalism in
Relation to Intuitivism” (Oб интeнциoнaлизмe Гyccepля в cвязи cинтyитивизмoм) for the second volume of the journal Logos (1910), but the
article was never published.23 In 1911, he gave a course on “Husserl’s Intention-
alism” (Интeнциoнaлизм Гyccepля) at St. Petersburg University, where he was
then privatdocent (Boris Lossky 1978, p. 13). He saw an analogy between his own
intuitivism and what he calls Husserl’s “intentionalism,” for intuitivism posits a
relation of coordination between subject and object that is not unlike that of
intentionality (see, e.g., Lossky 1928, p. 86). Lossky calls it the relation of
17 “В. С. Соловьевъ, развившiй ученiе о мистическомъ воспрiятiи и въ отношенiи конечныъ вещей,и въ отношенiи къ Боду. По его мнѣнiю, знанiе о всякой, даже конечной вещи складывается изътрехъ элементовъ—мистическаго, рацiональнаго и эмпирическаго.” (Lossky 1904c, p. 499).18 “Даже из трудов Вл. Соловьева мне были знакомы только «Критика отвлеченных начал»,входившая в программу магистерского экзамена” (Lossky 1968, p. 195).19 For the influence of Solov’ev and Kozlov in general on Lossky, see Zenkovsky, who says that “besides
Kozlov’s indisputable influence […] he undoubtedly felt that of Solov’ev” (кроме бесспорного влиянияКозлова […], Лосский испытал несомненно влияние Вл. Соловьева) (Zenkovsky 1950, p. 201).20 In 1902, Lossky translated Lipps’ Grundzüge der Logik (1893) (Теодор Липпс, Основы логики,1902) — a work in which Lipps speaks of different kinds of Anschauung. On Lipps’ possible influence onLossky, see Kurennoj (2005, pp. 272-273).21 Zenkovsky says that Solov’ev took his own concept of intuition from Schelling’s intellektuelleAnschauung (Zenkovsky 1950, p. 31). If this is true, Schelling could have been an indirect influence. But
it could also have been a direct influence, or both a direct and indirect one, because, in 1901, Lossky
translated volumes IV, VII, and VIII of Kuno Fischer’s series Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, theseventh volume of which was “Schellings Leben, Werke und Lehre” (1902) and in which Fischer presents
Schelling’s theory of Anschauung and intellectuelle Anschauung.22 In his Memoirs, Lossky says that in 1896 he “was fond of reading the major works of Schopenhauer”
(Lossky 1968, p. 98), for whom the concepts of Anschauung and intellectuelle Anschauung are central.23 For the assertion that he prepared an article titled “On Husserl’s Intentionalism in Relation to
Intuitivism,” I am relying solely on a claim by T. A. Dmitriev (1998, p. 180). But there is no unpublished
article bearing that title in the Lossky-archives at the Institut d’Etudes Slaves in Paris.
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“epistemological coordination” (гнoceoлoгичecкoй кoopдинaциeй). That relationis not itself knowledge, for knowledge is something purely subjective, whereas the
relation of epistemological coordination extends beyond the subject.
Lossky also defends a realist axiology of Neo-Platonic inspiration. On this view,
positive values coincide with being, and values are grasped, as Max Scheler also
claimed, by way of axiological intuition. This theory of values implies the thesis of
the existence of a supernatural realm of values — a thesis that conflicts with the
tenets of naturalism understood as the belief that everything arises from natural (as
opposed to supernatural) causes. In his review of the Logische Untersuchungen,Lossky associates psychologism with naturalism: “along with psychologism and
relativism, in researches on logic takes root naturalism, i.e., the tendency to regard
thought processes, as bearing not on the norm, the ideal, but on the fact (on what is,not on what ought to be).”24 His concern is that grounding logic in psychic processesimplies a grounding of ideal being (thus, of what ought to be) as a whole in the
psychè, which in turn leads to naturalism and moral relativism. Naturalism (as
defined above) excludes all supernatural, spiritual, and — by implication — teleo-
logical explanation. It thus rules out the possibility of a supernatural ideal realm of
values, and thereby the postulation of a faculty of axiological intuition that would
give immediate access to such values. As a Neo-Platonist and a theist, Lossky
rejects the idea that nature contains all of what is. Moreover, his theory of values is
codependent with an eschatological view of the evolution of the universe, where
evolution is conceived as a gradual progress toward the Good. Any attempt to
naturalize the theory of values is thus, for him, not only deemed to fail, but also
dangerous to humanity. So, Lossky sees in Husserl’s early anti-psychologism a
rampart against moral relativism.25
Lossky repeatedly returned to Husserl’s ideas related to the main themes of the
Logische Untersuchungen afterwards. In Logic (Лoгикa) (1922-1923), he relies on
Husserl with regard to different issues, such as the latter’s critique of Mill’s
psychologism in the first volume of the Logische Untersuchungen. As he did earlier
in The Foundations of Intuitivism (Oбocнoвaнie интyитивизмa), Lossky also relies
here on Husserl for his theory of general concepts, for his argument against
nominalism, and for his concepts of similarity and identity. He also finds support in
Husserl’s supposed Platonism as well as in his theory of “ideating abstraction”
(ideierende Abstraktion). He furthermore discusses Husserl’s criterion of truth
(Wahrheitskriterium) or what Husserl also calls his “concept of evidence”
(Evidenzbegriff).
24 “вмѣстѣ съ психологизмомъ и релативизмомъ въ изслѣдованіяхъ по логикѣ долженъукорениться, т.-е. склонность разсматривать процессы мышленія, имѣя въ виду не норму, неидеалъ, а фактъ (то, что есть, а не то, что должо быть)” (Lossky 1909, p. 292). For Lossky, what “is”
and what “ought to be” are interdependent. This conception is characteristic of Russian religious
philosophy. It can also be found in Solov’ev, for whom “From the standpoint of genuine reality, it is more
fitting to speak of what ought to be, rather than of what is” (Съ точки зрѣнiя настоящей, наличнойдѣйствительности намъ приходится говорить болѣе о томъ, что должно быть и будетъ, нежели отомъ, что есть) (Solov’ev 1880, p. VIII).25 Lossky presents his theory of values in Цѣнность и бытiе (1931).
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At the time when Lossky published his review, Husserl was better known as a
logician than as the founder of phenomenology. But Lossky also took great interest
in Husserlian phenomenology later on.26 For him, a theory of knowledge “must be
free from assumptions.”27 He conceived of his own ideal-realism as a position that
begins with neither the assumption of naive realism, nor with that of idealism. What
we must begin with, he thought, is the phenomenon — hence his attraction to
phenomenology. However, he thought of phenomenology as a method of access to
being. Ideal-realism was, after all, an ontology and intuitivism a theory of our
knowledge of being.In 1939, while in exile,28 Lossky published an article entitled
“Tpaнcцeндeнтaльнo-фeнoмeнoлoгичecкiй идeaлизм Гyccepля” (Husserl’s Tran-
scendental-Phenomenological Idealism) in the émigré journal Пyть (The Way),29 inwhich he presents and criticizes Husserl’s transcendental idealist turn. In this paper,
Lossky interprets Husserl as a Neo-Kantian idealist. Regardless of whether this
interpretation is correct or not, Lossky is certainly not alone in interpreting Husserl
in this way. We need only mention the likes of Nicolai Hartmann, Roman Ingarden,
and Theodor Celms. Lossky finds support for his own interpretation in passages
such as the following one from the Nachwort, where Husserl says that “the real
world […] has an essential character of relativity to transcendental subjectivity”30
and that “only transcendental subjectivity has the existential meaning of absolute
being.”31 He also quotes the Méditations cartésiennes, where Husserl says that
“objects exist only for us and their essence is that they exist only as objects of actual
or possible consciousness.”32 He also relies on Ludwig Landgrebe, who says, in his
“Husserls Phanomenologie und die Motive zu ihrer Umbildung,” that many
successors of the Gottingen phenomenological school saw that Husserl was moving
away from “a realist turn to the object” (einer realistischen „Wendung zum Objekt“)
26 I specify here that the phenomenology in question is “Husserlian,” because Lossky had already taken
interest in Alexander Pfander’s pre-Husserlian Phänomenologie des Wollens (1900), which he discusses in“The Voluntarist Theory of the Will” (Волюнтаристическое ученiе о волѣ) (1902). This discussion was
afterwards republished in the book Основныя ученія психологіи съ точки зрѣнія волютаризма (1903).27 “Теорiя знанiя должна быть свободною отъ предпосылокъ” (Lossky 1904a, p. 217). See also
Lossky’s Memoirs, where he says that, already as a student, “The ideal for me were philosophers like
Descartes and Hume, who start their systematic doctrines absolutely from scratch, trying not to rely on
any preconceived doctrines and assumptions, but certainly on the basis of reliable facts” (Идеалом дляменя были такие философы, как Декарт или Юм, которые начинают свою систему ученийабсолютно сначала, стремясь не опираться ни на какие предвзятые учения и предпосылки, ноисходя из несомненно достоверного факта) (Lossky 1968, p. 100).28 Lenin exiled Lossky from Russia in 1922 along with other judged “anti-Soviet” members of the
intelligentsia. For a chronicle of this exile, see Chamberlain (2006).29 For a study of the émigré journal Путь edited by Nikolai Berdyaev, see Arjakovsky (2013).30 “die reale Welt […] wesensmaßige Relativitat hat auf die transzendentale Subjektivitat” (Husserl
1930, p. 562).31 “nur die transzendentale Subjektivitat den Seinssinn des absoluten Seins hat” (Husserl 1930, p. 562).32 “Les objets n’existent pour nous et ne sont ce qu’ils sont que comme objets d’une conscience reelle ou
possible” (Husserl 1931, p. 55).
156 Husserl Stud (2016) 32:149–163
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and was regressing to a theory that bore the “stamp of Neo-Kantian idealism”
(Idealismus neukantischer Prägung) (Landgrebe 1939, p. 301).
Among Lossky’s criticisms of Husserl is an accusation of inconsistency based on
Husserl’s very claim that his idealism is a transcendental one. Lossky says that
Husserl “claims that his system is a transcendental idealism, as opposed to a
psychological idealism, precisely because of the theory of transcendental intersub-
jectivity.”33 On Lossky’s interpretation, the only truly objective aspect in Husserl’s
transcendental idealism, if any, would be the community of transcendental egos. But
according to Lossky, Husserl is caught in a paradox because the transcendentality of
the other egos remains immanent to consciousness. Husserl himself speaks in terms
of “transcendental immanence” in the Méditations cartésiennes, and he himself
says: “From the phenomenological point of view, the other is a modification of ‘my’
I […]. In other words, another monad is constituted, by appresentation, in my
monad.”34 About Husserl’s self-characterization of his own brand of idealism as
“transcendental,” Lossky remarks that “It is clear that Husserl talks here, as
paradoxical as it may seem, about transcendence immanent to consciousness, just as
the one that Cohen talks about, reforming Kant’s notion of ‘thing in itself’.”35 For
Lossky, if whatever is transcendent is immanently transcendent, then this cannot be
transcendence in the proper sense of the term.
Lossky is sympathetic with Husserl’s use of Leibnizian terminology in calling
transcendental I’s “monads.” Nikolai Onufrievich adopted the Leibnizianism of his
mentor Alexei Kozlov.36 As he says in his Memoirs, Leibniz had become his
“favorite philosopher”37 and he was “deeply imbued with the tendency to
understand the universe as a system of monads in the spirit of Leibniz’s
metaphysics.”38 But Lossky is also critical of Leibniz. For Leibniz, monads do
not have “doors and windows.”39 Christian Wolff had criticized Leibniz on this
point; he argued that the possibility of causation and freewill requires that monads
33 “Онъ говоритъ, что его система есть трансцендентальный идеализмъ, отличный отъпсихологистическаго идеализма именно благодаря ученiю о трансцендентальнойинтерсубъективности” (Lossky 1939, p. 43).34 “Au point de vue phenomenologique, l’autre est une modification de « mon » moi […]. Autrement dit,
une autre monade se constitue, par appresentation, dans la mienne” (Husserl 1931, p. 97).35 “Ясно, что Гуссерль говоритъ здѣсь, какъ это ни парадоксально о трансцендентности,имманентной сознанію, подобно той, о которой говоритъ Когенъ, реформируя понятіе «вещи въсебѣ» Канта” (Lossky 1939, p. 41).36 For Kozlov’s influence on Lossky, see Lossky (1968, pp. 84-85). Kozlov was himself influenced by
Gustav Teichmuller’s Leibnizianism. On the intellectual lineage Teichmuller [ Kozlov [ Lossky, see
Ryzhkova (2013), and Schwenke (2013, esp. pp. 13-14). Of interest is also Kozlov’s article on
Teichmuller published in two installments (Kozlov 1894a, b, vols 24 and 25).37 “любимейший мною философ Лейбниц” (Lossky 1968, p. 110); “мой любимый философЛейбниц” (Lossky 1968, p. 193).38 “глубоко проникся склонностью понимать вселенную, как систему монад в духе метафизикиЛейбница” (Lossky 1968, p. 87).39 “Cela s’accorde avec nos principes, car naturellement rien ne nous entre dans l’esprit par dehors, et
c’est une mauvaise habitude que nous avons, de penser comme si nostre ame recevoit quelques especes
messageres et comme si elle avoit des portes et des fenestres” (Leibniz, Discours de métaphysique, §.XXVI).
Husserl Stud (2016) 32:149–163 157
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have windows and doors. Kozlov had likewise admitted intermonadic causation.40
Lossky, who fully agrees with this criticism, reads Husserl’s theory of intersub-
jectivity on the model of Leibniz’s monadology. On this reading, Husserl’s
transcendental idealism is not only a return to Kantianism, but also a return to
Leibnizianism. When transplanted in the context of phenomenology, as Husserl
does in the Méditations cartésiennes, the thesis of the impossibility of intermonadic
relations leads to the conception that egos are cut off from each other. Thus, for
Lossky, Husserl is repeating the Leibnizian mistake of making intermonadic
relations impossible, which, in turn, makes moral progress unachievable. Therefore,
the only aspect of Husserl’s transcendental-idealist phenomenology that could have
saved it from being nothing more than a return to subjective idealism, namely the
recognition of the objective existence of transcendental egos, is really not the
recognition of something existing objectively, but of something immanent to the
subject.
This sort of reaction and criticism of Husserl appears to have been characteristic
of a troika of philosophers born in the Baltic region corresponding to present-day
Latvia. Lossky was born in the city of Kraslava, which was part of the Vitebsk
Governorate in the Russian Empire, now part of Latvia. Another philosopher to
criticize Husserl on these grounds was Theodor Celms, who was born in the
Governorate of Livonia, which is also now in Latvia. In Der PhänomenologischeIdealismus Husserls (1928), Celms interprets Husserl’s phenomenological mon-
adology as a pluralistic solipsism.41 According to Celms, Husserl fails to solve the
problem of intersubjectivity, because his monadology only replaces a monistic
solipsism with a pluralistic one. As Celms says: “It is only with the help of the
metaphysical assumption of pre-established harmony that Husserl obtains his
phenomenological monadology. But the latter is in the strict sense no overcoming ofsolipsism, but rather only an extension of ‘monistic solipsism’ into a ‘pluralisticsolipsism’.”42 We may thus consider the possibility of an influence of Celms on
Lossky.
But Celms was himself influenced by Nicolai Hartmann.43 Hartmann, who was
born in Riga (then part of the Governorate of Livonia) and who studied with Lossky
40 On Kozlov’s Leibnizianism, see Zenkovsky (1950, vol. 2, pp. 172-217). For the claim that he admits
of intermonadic causation, or what he calls “substantial interaction” (взаимодействии субстанций), see(ibib., p. 178).41 “phanomenologische Monadologie Husserls als » Pluralistischer Solipsismus«” (Celms, 1928, p. 402).42 “Nur mit Hilfe der metaphysischen Annahme einer prastabilierten Harmonie gewinnt Husserl seine
phanomenologische Monadologie. Diese ist aber im eigentlichen Sinne gar keine Überwindung desSolipsismus, sondern nur eine Erweiterung des »monistischen Solpsismus« zum »pluralistischen Solip-sismus«” (Celms 1928, p. 404).43 In Teodors Celms: fenomenoloģiskie meklējumi, Maija Kule, Lıva Muizniece, and Uldis Vegners say
that in his “Konigsberg lectures, he mostly focused on the ontology of Nicolai Hartmann, who, in his
opinion, is the greatest contemporary systematic philosopher” (lekcijas Kenigsberga vins pieversas
lielakoties Nikolaja Hartmana ontologijai, kas, vinaprat, ir tagadnes lielakais filosofs sistematikis) (Kule
et al. 2009, p. 65). They also say that while in the United States, Celms continued his reflections on topics
including “Hartmann’s questions about the objective and personal spirit, realist issues about how to avoid
solipsism” (Hartmana jautajumi par objektıvo un personalo garu, realistu jautajumi, ka nenonakt pie
solipsisma) (Kule et al. 2009, p. 239). Celms developed Hartmannian themes notably in his manuscripts
158 Husserl Stud (2016) 32:149–163
123
at St. Petersburg University, was also critical of Husserl.44 In his correspondence
with Raymond Vancourt, for instance, he says: “I have from the outset seen
phenomenology differently from most contemporaries. Its representatives, espe-
cially Husserl, developed a theory that was half-psychological, half-transcendental;
I have to reject this theory, together with the Husserlian concept of consciousness
and the constraints of the new method of act and act-phenomena. It seemed to me
that we could just as well describe the object-phenomena and thereby re-establish
the priority of the outside world — the same phenomena that Husserl had abrogated
by his bracketing of real cases.”45 Hartmann saw in Husserl’s philosophy — at least
in its third phase — a “regress into idealism.”46 And he claimed in 1921 that
idealism inevitably has solipsism for consequence.47 This, by implication, would
make Husserl a solipsist. So, if influence there was, it could also be, at least in its
general lines, from Lossky to Celms via Hartmann. At any rate, the part of Western
Russia that is now Latvia turns out to have been — fortuitously or not — a breeding
ground of realist phenomenologists in the style of the Munich-Gottingen School.
Lossky also criticizes Husserl for not being sufficiently radical in his abstention
from judgments about existence. On Lossky’s reading of Husserl, the latter would
have inferred without evidence the phenomenal character of the objects of
experience immanent to consciousness. He would have failed to realize that this
conclusion was itself an existential judgment — “he did not include it in his
‘abstention’ and, therefore, was caught in its net.”48 For Lossky, we have to
distinguish between “immanence to consciousness and immanence to the subject ofconsciousness, i.e., the individual I: an object can become immanent to my
consciousness yet remain transcendent to me, the subject of consciousness.”49
Moreover, Lossky defends the view that consciousness is not a mere sphere of
objects, but “is an activity that can take the I beyond its psychophysical
individuality. Consciousness, in the case of my observation of the external world,
Footnote 43 continued
Zum Problem des Nichtmystischen Irrationalismus and Matemātikas filosofija (Kule et al. 2009, pp. 250-253).44 For the claim that Hartmann studied with Lossky, see the unpublished interview with Lossky in which
Herbert Spiegelberg notes that the link “with Nicolai Hartmann, who studied under L[ossky] in St.
Petersburg, was strong” (Spiegelberg 1960).45 “habe ich von vornherein die Phanomenologie anders gesehen als die meisten Zeitgenossen. Ihre
Vertreter, vor allem Husserl selbst, entwickelteten eine Theorie, die halb psychologisch, halb
transcendental war; diese Theorie, zusammen mit dem Husserlschen Bewusstseins begriff musste ich
ablehnen, desgleichen die Beschrankung der neuen Methode auf Akte und Aktphanomene. Es schien mir,
man musste genau so gut Gegenstandsphanomene beschreiben konnen und dadurch das Gewicht der
Aussenwelt wieder herstellen, das Husserl durch seine Einklammerung der Realfalle aufgehoben hatte”
(Hartmann 1945, p. 8, note 1).46 “in Idealismus zuruckfallt (Husserl)” (Hartmann 1925, p. 113).47 “Aber daß der subjektive Idealismus ihn [i.e., Solipsismus] als Konsequenz gar nicht vermeiden kann,
ist evident” (Hartmann 1921, p. 107).48 “онъ не включилъ ее въ составъ своего « воздержанiя » и потому попалъ въ плѣнъ ея” (Lossky
1939, p. 53).49 “имманентность сознанiю и имманентность субъекту сознанiя, т. е. индивиду-альному я:предметъ можетъ стать имманентнымъ моему созна-нiю, но оставаться трансцендентнымъ мнѣ,субъекту сознанiя” (Lossky 1939, p. 54).
Husserl Stud (2016) 32:149–163 159
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is a superindividual whole: the knowing subject and the cognizable portion of the
external world, united with it by the relation of coordination, form a unity.”50
Lossky’s insight here is that many psychic processes, such as awareness, attention,
differentiation, recognition, etc., are already transcendent to the subject as bearer of
consciousness. They act as relations of coordination between the subject of
consciousness and objects of the external world. As such, i.e., insofar as they extend
beyond, so to say, their bearer, they are themselves objective features of the world.
And if we are to be radical all the way in our abstention from judgment, and if
objects are given as external to the subject of consciousness—that is, if in the
epochè they appear as external to the I—then, to be consistent, we are forced to take
these objects as objective realities. Once we have recognized that there is a
multiplicity of acts of cognition that exist outside of the I, there is only one step to
make to infer that the objects that they are directed at exist outside of the I, too, and
are not projected, produced, formed, or framed by it.
Finally, Lossky adhered to what we might call an “epistemological primitivism”
according to which a civilized culture has sometimes more chance of being
embroiled in false artificial theories than a more primitive one. In “The Primitive
and the Civilized Mind” (1926), for instance, he says that “the comparison of
philosophical doctrines about the universe with the primitive man’s perception of
the world is particularly useful for making us realize what truths lie hidden in the
naive views of our younger brothers” (Lossky 1926, p. 152). Along the same lines
he says, in 1928, “Often intellectual culture brings with itself not only a liberation
from the primitive ‘naıvete’, but also a deplorable loss of its natural aspect that it
replaces by something artificial.”51 When the Weltanschauung of a civilized culture
has unfolded itself into an intellectual cul de sac, it is the role of other cultures to
show it the way back to a more primitive yet truer worldview. It is in this overall
spirit — quite congruent with Slavophilism and Russian messianism52 — that, in
1939, Lossky says that he has arrived at this “rehabilitation of naive realism by
means of its liberation from naivety and its formulation in the form of a theory of
intuitivism.”53 Lossky thus thought that he had completed the return to the things
that Husserl announced in the second part of the Logische Untersuchungen(“Einleitung,” § 2), but never achieved.
In 1962, i.e., three years before dying at 94 years old, the indefatigable Lossky
reused material published in “Husserl’s Transcendental-Phenomenological Ideal-
ism” for composing another paper on Husserl entitled “Two Ways of Refuting
50 “есть дѣятельность, могущая выво-дить я за предѣлы ею психо-физической индивидуальности.Сознанiе, въ случаѣ наблюденiя мною внѣшняго мiра, есть сверх-индивидуальное цѣлое: сознающiйсубъектъ и сознаваемый имъ отрѣзокъ внѣшняго мiра, спаянный съ нимъ отношенiемъ ко-ординацiи, образуютъ единство” (Lossky 1939, p. 54).51 “Souvent la culture de l’esprit apporte avec elle non seulement la liberation de la « naıvete » primitive,
mais aussi une perte deplorable de son cote naturel qu’elle remplace par un cote artificiel” (Lossky 1928,
p. 51).52 On Russian messianism, see, for instance, Solov’ev’s theory of the development of humanity and of
Russia’s mission presented in Three Forces (Три силы) (1877).53 “реабилитація наивнаго реализма путемъ освобожденія его отъ наивности и формулировки еговъ видѣ теоріи интуитивизма съ точно опредѣленными понятіями” (Lossky 1939, p. 54).
160 Husserl Stud (2016) 32:149–163
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Solipsism: A Critique of Husserl’s Phenomenology” (Lossky 1962).54 In this paper,
published in English in the Bostonian journal The Philosophical Forum, Losskyreformulates his criticism of Husserl’s theory of the transcendental ego, to which he
opposes, again, his homegrown intuitivism and his Neo-Leibnizian personalistic
metaphysics. For Lossky, the intuitivist theory of the immediate apprehension of
external objects is by itself a refutation of solipsism. Moreover, for him all is
immanent in all. So monads, or what he calls substantival agents, are partially
consubstantial with one another and are epistemologically coordinated in a way that
renders solipsism impossible. This paper, along with the review of the LogischeUntersuchungen and the 1939 paper, constitute the sum of Lossky’s published work
on Husserl.55
Acknowledgments Thanks are due to Thomas Nemeth, Rodney Parker, Frederick Matern, Nikolaj
Plotnikov, Elena Serdyukova, and Uldis Vegners for valuable comments, as well as to Maria Avril (néeLossky), who oversees the archives of her grandfather’s works at the Institut d’Etudes Slaves, Paris. Part
of the research leading to this paper has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework
Program (FP7/2007-2013 - MSCA-COFUND) under Grant agreement n°245743 - Post-doctoral program
Braudel-IFER-FMSH, in collaboration with the Institut Jean Nicod, Paris.
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