new voices from uzbekistan - central asia program

ed. Marlene Laruelle

Central Asia-Azerbaijan Fellowship Program

New Voices from Uzbekistan

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NewVoicesfromUzbekistan2019

MarleneLaruelle,ed.

CentralAsia-AzerbaijanFellowshipProgram

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TableofContentsPublicSectorInnovations?ExaminingSocialInnovationsinGovernanceinUzbekistanBakhromRadjabov…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..…p.5ReturnMigrationasaBrainGainforUzbekistan?TheChallengesofAttractingHighlyskilledUzbeksAbroadSherzodEraliev……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...…p.21ZiyarahTourismasaNewLinkageforTourismDevelopmentinUzbekistanSurayyoUsmanova…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...p.31Trends inInternationalizationofHigherEducation inUzbekistan:TheProliferationofForeignUniversityBranchesandHowTheyFitintotheBroaderHigherEducationSectorDilnozaUbaydullaeva………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………p.41HowPrivateSchoolsCanImprovetheUzbekEducationSystemFirdavsNavruzov……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..p.57TheNuancesofHijabattheCrossroadsofReligiosityandSecularisminUzbekistanDonohonAbdugafurova……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………p.65WhoAretheNewUzbekOpinionLeadersonSocialMedia?EldarAsanov…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….p.73OvercomingBarrierstoWomen’sEntrepreneurshipandEconomicEmpowermentinUzbekistanFotimaIsrailova……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….p.81HowIntegratingMinoritiesandVulnerableGroupsWillImproveHumanCapitalinUzbekistan:TheCaseoftheCentralAsianGypsyCommunityKamillaZakirova……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………...p.95

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PublicSectorInnovations?

ExaminingSocialInnovationsinGovernanceinUzbekistan

BakhromRadjabovBakhromRadjabovfocusesontheapplicationofpublicsectorinnovationsintheEurasianregion.HeworkedasaSeniorAdministrativeAssistantattheOSCE/ODIHRLimitedElectionObservationMissiontotheRepublicofUzbekistan.From2012-2014,heworkedatUNDPinUzbekistan,whereheledprogrammaticeffortsintheareasofpublicoutreachandsocialinnovationpromotion.HeholdsanMAinInternationalStudiesfromtheUniversityofTsukuba,Japan,andanMAinGlobalPoliticalEconomyfromtheUniversityofKassel,Germany.HeiscurrentlycompletinghisPhD,entitled“CriticalAnalysisofUNDP-SupportedSocialInnovationsinGovernance:CaseStudiesofArmenia,UkraineandUzbekistan,”attheUniversityofTsukuba,Japan.Uzbekistandeclared2018theyearofEntrepreneurshipandSupportforInnovativeIdeasandTechnologies,1therebysignalingthatinnovationinallspheresoftheeconomyandsocietywasthegovernment’spriority.Governance-sectoradministrativereformaimedatadvancingtheroleandstatusofcivilservants,aswellasintroducing innovations in the public service and governance, have been declared as prerequisites foreconomic, political, and civic development. Accordingly, Uzbekistan is now striving to implement “bestpractices”ofgovernance,includingbyintroducingnew,innovativemethodsfortheprovisionofgovernmentservices.

Inthescholarlyliterature,Coe,Paquet,andRoyarguethatinaneraofglobalizationanddevelopmentofnew informationand communication technologies, e-governance is increasingly the right approach togovernance.2Theyrecommendamorecommunity-drivenmodelofgovernancethatwoulduseinformationand communication technologies to initiate the economic, social, and political transition to smartcommunities.

In recent years,Uzbekistanhas taken several steps toward suchgovernance.Of these, electronicgovernmentservices,centersofgovernmentservices,thepresident’spublicreceptions,theprimeminister’spublicreceptions,andthepresident’sonlinereceptionarethebest-known.Evenbeforethis,startingin2012,the UNDP began supporting small-scale “social innovation” projects in local communities aimed atempowering individuals and fostering social innovation. These projects were designed to solvedevelopmentalproblemsbyaddressingissuessuchaswaterandelectricityscarcity,fosteringtheinclusionofpeoplewithdisabilities,andincreasingthetransparencyandaccountabilityoflocalpublicinstitutions.3

Despitethesemodernizationefforts,however,numerouschallengesareasyetimpedingthedynamicdevelopmentof thegovernance sector.This sector ismanaged inanold-fashionedwayandchangesareintroducedonlyslowly.

Given this status quo, the current policy paper analyzes the policy reforms launched in thegovernance sector of Uzbekistan, discussing the trajectory, pitfalls, and opportunities of these

1See“UzbekistanAnnounces2018asYearofSupportofActiveEntrepreneurship,InnovativeIdeasandTechnologies,”UzDaily,December22,2017,https://www.uzdaily.uz/en/post/42072.2AmandaCoe,GillesPaquet,andJeffreyRoy,“E-GovernanceandSmartCommunities:ASocialLearningChallenge,”SocialScienceComputerReview19,no.1(2001):80-93.3UNDP,“EvaluationofSocialInnovationandVolunteerisminUzbekistan:FinalReport,”2015,accessedJuly17,2019,https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/evaluations/detail/7433?fbclid=IwAR1ZfPTuUISiIJICFsY2wwdTRniF91hzldidGbews-KTUHUmTUhhO42EsJ8.

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transformationsontheirwaytowardtheprovisionofinnovative,people-orientedpublicservices.ThestudyconsiderstherecentpublicpolicychangesunderUzbekistan’sDevelopmentStrategyfor2017-2021;italsoscrutinizesthe“socialinnovation”projectsimplementedbytheUNDPin2012-2014.Afterdiscussingtheseservices,itassesseswhatchangesshouldbeintroducedtomakethemmoreinnovative,user-friendly,andsolution-focused.Theresearchquestionguidingthispaperisasfollows:

Howhave social innovations ingovernanceprogressedandwhatchallengeshavepreventedthemfrommakingUzbekistan’sgovernancesectortrulyinnovative?

Toanswer thisquestion, thepaperdrawsonbothqualitativedataandanalysisofdocumentsandotheravailablesourcesofinformation.Thequalitativedataincludein-depthinterviewswith:

1. UNDPstaffmembersinchargeofsocialinnovationsingovernance(localcommunities);2. Publicofficialsinchargeoftheintroductionofsocialinnovations;and3. Localcivilsocietyleadersimplementingsocialinnovationprojectsinlocalcommunities.

Thedocumentaryanalysislooksatavailablesourcesfocusedongovernancereformandinnovationsinthegovernance sector in Uzbekistan, with a particular focus on texts by international organizations, civilservants,andexpertsinthisarea.DefiningandAnalyzing“SocialInnovation”

Socialinnovationisadifficultconcepttodefine.Historically,theconcepthasbeenusedbysocialscientiststoexplaintransformationalchangesinasociety.1Marques,Morgan,andRichardsonidentifydifferenttypesofsocialinnovation,whicharedistinguishedby“thescaleandscopeofsocialchange.”2Inmorerecentyears,asDomanskiandKaletkaobserve,thescholarlydebatehasturnedtodefinesocialinnovation“eitherthroughsocialrelationsor[…]intermsofsocietalimpact.”3Somescholarsemphasizethatthattheconceptualdebaterevolvesaroundtheword“social”ratherthantheword“innovation.”4AccordingtoPhills,Deiglmeier,andMiller,“theterm‘social’isusedtoexplain‘improvement’inanyway.”5Here,“improvement”isunderstoodtomeanbetterwaysofsatisfyingbasicneedsandbettersocialrelationships.

Anothertrendinthescholarlydiscussionof“socialinnovation”istorelatethetermtootherconcepts.Forinstance,scholarshavedescribed“socialentrepreneurship”asasub-setofsocialinnovation.6Tofindthelinks between social innovation and other societal phenomena, Evers, Ewert, and Brandsen conductedresearchtostudytheroleofsocial innovationinsocialcohesion.7DomanskiandKaletkaarguethat,“theconceptofsocialinnovationcannotbelimitedtoonefocus,beitsocialentrepreneurshiporsocialeconomy[…]wideningtheperspectiveiscrucialforunderstandingsocialinnovation.”8

1BenoîtGodin,SocialInnovation:UtopiasofInnovationfromc.1830tothePresent(Montréal:ProjectontheIntellectualHistoryofInnovation,2012);PedroMarques,KevinMorgan,andRonaldRichardson,“SocialInnovationinQuestion:TheTheoreticalandPracticalImplicationsofaContestedConcept,”PoliticsandSpace36,no.3(2018):496-512.2Ibid.,501.3 Dmitri Domanski and Christoph Kaletka, eds., “Exploring the Research Landscape of Social Innovation,” SocialInnovationCommunity,Dortmund,Germany,June2017,21.4See, forexample,AdalbertEvers,BenjaminEwert,andTacoBrandsen,eds.,Social Innovations forSocialCohesion:TransnationalPatternsandApproachesfrom20EuropeanCities(Tübingen:WILCOConsortium,2014).5JamesA.PhillsJr.,KrissDeiglmeier,andDaleT.Miller,“RediscoveringSocialInnovation,”StanfordSocialInnovationReview (2008): 17; Dmitri Domanski and Christoph Kaletka, eds., “Exploring the Research Landscape of SocialInnovation,”SocialInnovationCommunity,Dortmund,Germany,June2017,21.6SI-Drive,AtlasofSocialInnovation:NewPracticesforaBetterFuture(Dortmund:EuropeanCommission,2018).7Evers,Ewert,andBrandsen,SocialInnovationsforSocialCohesion.8DomanskiandKaletka,“ExploringtheResearchLandscapeofSocialInnovation,”21.

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Thus,wecanseethatscholarshaveattemptedtodeploytheconceptof“socialinnovation”intwomainways:1)toapplytheconcepttoexplainsocial/societalphenomena,socialrelations,orsocialimpactindifferentfields;and2)toresearchtherelationshipbetweenotherconceptsand“socialinnovation.”Duetothelackofagenerallyagreed-upondefinitionof“socialinnovation,”thispaperwilldeployMarques,Morgan,andRichardson’sdefinition,whichencompassesthreemainelements:

First, social innovation actively promotes inclusive relationships among individuals,especiallythosethatareorhavebeenneglectedbypreviouseconomic,political,culturalorsocialprocesses.Inthissense,socialinnovationvaluestheprocessofimplementinganewideaasmuchas itdoestheoutcomesof that implementation.Second,social innovation isexplicitlyaboutaddressingneed,whetheritisinareassuchaseducation,health,governance,ormorebroadlyindealingwithsocialexclusion.Third,thoughthisisnotnecessary,socialinnovation is often aimed at specific domains such as education, health, migration, andgovernance. It is not necessary because there are human needs that fall outside thesedomains.1

Inaddition,sincethepaperdiscussessocialinnovationssupportedbytheUNDPingovernance,itusesthedefinitionofgovernanceprovidedbytheUNDPOsloGovernanceCenter:

Governance is about the processes by which public policy decisions are made andimplemented. It is the result of interactions, relationships and networks between thedifferentsectors(government,publicsector,privatesectorandcivilsociety)and involvesdecisions,negotiation,anddifferentpowerrelationsbetweenstakeholderstodeterminewhogetswhat,whenandhow.Therelationshipsbetweengovernmentanddifferentsectorsofsociety determine how things are done, and how services are provided. Governance isthereforemuchmorethangovernmentor‘goodgovernment’andshapesthewayaserviceor setof servicesareplanned,managedandregulatedwithina setofpolitical, social andeconomicsystems.2

“SocialInnovation”inUzbekistan:ConceptualizationandResultsThebureaucraticcontextofUzbekistanisverycomplex.ItisstilltransitioningfromtheSoviet(notcitizen-centered)approachtoamoreuser-friendlymodelofgovernmentservices.Thevastmajorityofservicesusedbycitizensareprovidedbygovernmententities,whichareusuallytheonlyserviceproviders.Thestatusquodoesnotencouragegovernmentorganizationstocompeteforcustomers,withtheresultthatthereislittleincentivetoimprovethequalityofserviceprovision.

To bring about change, theUNDP has encouraged increased decision-making by individuals andcommunities.Itbelievesthatmoreinclusive,human-centered,andcommunity-drivengovernancesolutionswill shift the status quo and make it possible to address the most pressing issues and problems thatindividuals face. To this end, the UNDP began experimenting in Uzbekistanwith “social innovations” indevelopment in general and in governance in particular. These projects have been striving for greaterinclusion, participation, and responsiveness through attempts to foster cooperation between localgovernment (local organizations) and community leaders, and through the use of technology, includinginformationandcommunicationtechnology,aswellaslocally-designedengineeringworks.

1Marques,Morgan,andRichardson,SocialInnovationinQuestion,”500.2UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme,“AUser’sGuidetoMeasuringLocalGovernance,”2009,accessedJuly17,2019, https://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/democratic-governance/dg-publications-for-website/a-users-guide-to-measuring-local-governance-/LG%20Guide.pdf.

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Tobesustainable,andtodiffuseacrossthegovernmentsector,theseprojectsneededgovernmentsupport. In practice, however, “social innovation” projects in Uzbekistan lacked this support, as myinformantshighlighted.

UmidGafurov,theleaderofthe“socialinnovation”projectINFOBOX,indicatedthat,“Inthecaseofthe government, INFOBOX could help them to interact with local people via the internet: answer theirquestions,helpsolvetheirproblems.Thisdidnothappen,though.”1UlugbekMusabekov,theleaderofthe“social innovation” project E-Diary, recalled that, “We tested our project in one school. It was possiblebecauseitwastheschoolwhereImyselfstudied,andteachersknowmethere.Tospreadmyprojectacrossthecity,Iwouldneedadditionalsupport.”2EmiliyaAsadovafromtheUNDPpointedoutthatalackofsupportfromlocalorganizationswasasystemicproblemfor“socialinnovation”projectsinUzbekistan.Sheexplainedthat,“Insomecases,iflocalorganizationsdidnotwanttopickitup,theproject‘died.’”3

Thesechallengespreventedtheprojectsfrombecominginstitutionalizedandsubsequentlydiffusedacrosssociety.4Ofthetotal,justtwoprojectswereinstitutionalized,fiveprojectswereclosed,and28projectshad only limited local impact.5 On occasion, the leaders of small-scale “social innovation” projects havesought to cooperate with local organizations. Doston Kholosboev, the leader of the Peers Club “socialinnovation”project,notedthatitwas“establishedincooperationwithNationalInstituteforMonitoringofCivilSociety.”6LolaYuldasheva,theleaderoftheFantasyClub“socialinnovation”project,mentionedthatsheworkedwiththelocalpublicschoolinhercommunitytogetaphysicalspaceforhercoursesforgirlswithdisabilities.Shedescribedthespaceas“aniceplacewheregirlscancomeandtakecourses.”7

Inthecontextofpost-SovietUzbekistan,theconceptof“socialinnovation”wasnotusedtoexplaincomplexphenomena, theirrelations,ortheir impactondifferent fields,norwas“social”seen intermsofimprovingsocialrelationsinordertosolvelargersocietalchallenges.Instead,localorganizationstendedtosubstitutetheconceptof“socialinnovation”withothertermsthata)areclearerto(betterknownby)thepartnergovernmentorganizationsandindividuals;andb)havesocialdevelopmentalovertones,becausetheprojectswereintendedtohaveadevelopmentimpact.Essentially,theconceptwasreplacedinordertomakeit easier for partner organizations and individuals to understand what should be done to make adevelopmentalchange.Indifferentcases,“socialinnovation”wassubstitutedbythefollowingterms:

• SocialinitiativeorsocialprojectSince the UNDP’s national partners see them as something directed toward development, they usuallyconsider them as something that should bring social value to society and to people. As such, from thepartners’perspective, regardlessofwhat theUNDPcalled theproject, itwasa social initiative.VeronikaPolyakovafromtheNationalLibraryexplainedthat,“‘Socialinnovation’issupportofareashelpingpeople,makingpublicgood.Becauseweliveinsociety, ‘socialinnovation’isasocialinitiativeandaformofcivicengagement.”8

Project-wise,intheviewofnationalpartners,a“socialinnovation”shouldbeaprojectthatsolvessocialissues.HusanMukimovfromtheCenterforYouthInitiativesobservedthat:“Ifit[socialinnovation]isaboutdoingsocialprojectstosolvesocialproblems,thenweattheCenterhavebeenimplementingsuchprojects.”9Thenationalpartnersof theUNDP/UNVProject focusedprimarilyonthesocialcomponentof

1UmidGafurov,personalinterviewwiththeauthor,Tashkent,November2017.2UlugbekMusabekov,personalinterviewwiththeauthor,Tashkent,November2017.3EmiliyaAsadova,personalinterviewwiththeauthor,Tashkent,August2017.4UNDP,“EvaluationofSocialInnovationandVolunteerisminUzbekistan:FinalReport,”3.5Ibid.,12.6DostonKholosboev,personalinterviewwiththeauthor,Tashkent,November2017.7LolaYuldasheva,personalinterviewwiththeauthor,viaIMOMessenger,November2017.8VeronikaPolyakova,personalinterviewwiththeauthor,Tashkent,August2017.9HusanMukimov,personalinterviewwiththeauthor,Tashkent,August2017.

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“socialinnovation,”completelyleavingoutthepointaboutinnovation.Thismeantthat“socialinnovation”inUzbekistanwasreducedtoasocialinitiativeorsocialproject.Socialinnovationcertainlyisaboutaddressingsocial issues—but focusing solely on its social dimension results in an incomplete (and inaccurate)perceptionoftheterm.

• CivicengagementorcommunityvolunteeringThe UNDP was combining two major activities: the promotion of social innovation and support forvolunteerism.Sincetheseactivitieswereorganizedinparallel,andsometimesevenoverlappedwitheachother,“socialinnovation”projectsthatwereledbyvolunteersandlocalcivilsocietyleaderswereconsideredcivicengagementorcommunityvolunteering.

Emiliya Asadova from the UNDP explained for instance that, “Since we were also promotingvolunteerism in theUNDP/UNVProject, ourpartners, especially from theNational Library, thought that‘socialinnovation’wasaboutcommunityvolunteeringorsomesortofcivicengagement.”1Inotherwords,social innovation projects were regarded as an arrangement of community or volunteering activities.Although social relationships among the individuals were important components of social innovationprojects,thiswasnotallthattheywereabout.FornationalpartnersoftheUNDPinUzbekistan,however,“social innovation”was about engagingwith community, prompting them to substitute the term “socialinnovation”withtermsthatseemedtodoabetterjobofexplainingwhatwashappeninginthelocalcontext. OnthebasisofthisdiscussionofsocialinnovationinUzbekistan,twoconclusionscanbedrawn.First,social innovation projects can be initiated by citizens. They can address the real needs ofcitizens/communities and can offer a new (innovative) solution to existing problems. They can beimplementedlocallybutbeintendedtodiffuseacrossthegovernancesector.Ofcourse,theseprojectsalsoneeded government support, which they usually lacked (or received only intermittently). Second, theconceptof“socialinnovation”wasusuallymisunderstoodasasocialprojectoracommunityengagementinitiative.Inotherwords,itwasimpliedandappliedassomethingpromotingsocialdevelopment,withoutsufficientattentiontotheinnovationaspect,whichchangesthewholedesignandapproachofanyprojectintroducedtothegovernancesphere.NewInitiativesintheGovernanceSector:RealInnovationsinGovernance?TheUzbekgovernmenthasgraduallybeenintroducingelectronicgovernanceservicesforcitizens.OneoftheprimaryinstrumentsofelectronicgovernanceisthePortalofInteractiveGovernmentService,2whichprovides308servicesfrom2,437governmentunits.3Theportalalsoregulatesthe“singlewindow”(odnookno) centers, which started out providing 16 services for entrepreneurs and are now available for allcitizenstouse.4Inaddition,theUzbekgovernmenthaslaunchedthePortaltoDiscussLegislativeActs,5toincrease its level of consultationwith citizens, and the Portal of Utilities and Housing,6 to facilitate theexchangeofinformationbetweentheownersofprivateapartments(houses),governmententitiesprovidinghousingandconstructionservices,andlegislators.7

Nevertheless,accordingtotheUNDP,communityandcitizeninvolvementingovernmentdecision-making in Uzbekistan remains between the second (consulting) and third (involving) levels of public

1EmiliyaAsadova,personalinterviewwiththeauthor,Tashkent,August2017.2Seemy.gov.uz.3 See SherzodkhodzhaKhabibyllakhuzhaevichKhabibullaev, “Razvitie elektronnogopravitel’stvavUzbekistane,”D-Russia.ru,March13,2017,http://d-russia.ru/razvitie-elektronnogo-pravitelstva-v-uzbekistane.html.4Ibid.5Seeregulation.gov.uz.6Seee-communal.uz.7Seeregulation.gov.uz.

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participationdevelopedbytheInternationalAssociationofPublicParticipation.1TheUNDPcontendsthatincreasedcivic engagement is required toensure citizens’ cooperationwith thegovernmentand furtherempowercitizenstoparticipateinthegovernmentdecision-makingprocess.ThiswillenableUzbekistantomoveuptheCitizenEngagementIndextowardthefourth(cooperation)andfifth(empowerment)levels.Byincreasingcivicengagement,citizens’satisfaction(basedontheLifeLadderIndexoftheGallupWorldPoll2)will increase, while corruption (based on the Control of Corruption Index of the World Bank’s WorldGovernanceIndices3)willdecrease.4

Inthiscontext,Gibson-GrahamandRoelvinkstatethatlocalsocialinnovationsshouldbeusedasananalyticaltoolforgovernancethatdrawsattentiontothepeopleinvolvedindecision-making,aswellastotheformsinfavorofsuchdecision-making.5Toresistprevailingmodesofthinkingandacting,innovativegovernancemustinvolvearangeofpeople,including“non-traditionalactors.”6Buttheissueisthatlimitedpublicresourcesusuallycurtailinnovation,whichrequiresresourcesforexperimentation.Inhisstudy,Pottsaddressesthisissue,arguingthat:

Theinnovationdeficitinpublicservices]canbeexplainedasanunintendedconsequenceofthe concerted public sector drive toward the elimination of waste through efficiency,accountabilityandtransparency.Yetinanevolvingeconomythiscanbeafalseefficiency,asitalsoeliminatesthe“goodwaste”thatisanecessarycostofexperimentation.Thisresultsina systematic trade-off in thepublic sectorbetween the static efficiencyofminimizing themisuseofpublicresourcesandthedynamicefficiencyofexperimentation.Thisisinherentlybiased against risk and uncertainty and, therein, explains why governments find serviceinnovationsodifficult.Inthedrivetoeliminatestaticinefficiencies,manypoliticalsystemshavesubsequentlyovershotandstifledpolicyinnovation.7Besidestheefficientuseofpublicresources,whichfollowsthesamelogicasserviceprovisioninthe

privatesector,anecessaryaspectisthepartnershipbetweencitizens,civilsociety,andgovernment.Thispartnershipcouldgeneratecreativesolutions for theprovisionofpublicservices.Accordingly, theOECDemphasizes the need for the government to partner with citizens and civil society organizations:“Partnershipofgovernmentwithcivilsocietyandcitizenscanoffercreativepolicyresponsesthatenablegovernments toprovidebetterpublicservices in timesof fiscalconstraints.However, implementationofsuch partnership involves risks, which governments need to take into account for their effectiveimplementation.”8TheOECDhasalsoexpressedconcern“abouthowthedifferentaspectsofpublicsectorgovernancecansupportinnovationatallstagesofitslifecycle,fromidentifyingproblemstogeneratingideas,developingproposals, implementingandevaluatingprojects,anddiffusingthemmorewidelythroughout

1 See “IAP2’s Public Participation Spectrum,” 2014, accessed July 17, 2019,https://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.iap2.org/resource/resmgr/foundations_course/IAP2_P2_Spectrum_FINAL.pdf.2SeemoreatGallup,“WorldPoll,”accessedJuly17,2019,https://www.gallup.com/analytics/232838/world-poll.aspx.3 See World Bank, “Data Catalog: Control Of Corruption: Percentile Rank,” accessed July 17, 2019,https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/control-corruption-percentile-rank.4Ibid.5 J.K. Gibson-Graham and Gerda Roelvink, “Social Innovation for Community Economies,” in Social Innovation andTerritorial Development, ed. DianaMacCallum, FrankMoulaert, Jean Hillier, and Serena Vicari Haddock (Farnham:Ashgate,2009).6Ibid.,29.7JasonPotts,“TheInnovationDeficitinPublicServices:TheCuriousProblemofTooMuchEfficiencyandNotEnoughWasteandFailure,”Innovation:OrganizationandManagement11(2009):34.8OrganizationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopmentPublicGovernanceReviews,“TogetherforBetterPublicServices,”OECD,Paris,2011,7.

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theorganization.”1Toempowercitizenstoparticipateingovernmentdecision-making,dataongovernmentactivities

and services should be available. Though Uzbekistan’s Open Data Portal2 is operational, it containsinsufficientdata—andavailabledataisnotupdatedinatimelyfashion.Moreover,specificdataabouttheactivitiesofdifferentgovernmententitiesisstilldifficulttoobtain.Conducting“socialinnovation”projectsthatwouldimprovegovernmentservicesandmakethemmorecitizen-orienteddependsonamoreextensiveuseofopendata.

Ontopofthis,governmentagenciesdonotencouragerelationshipswithcitizens,eventhoughthesecouldilluminatetherealproblemsthatcitizensexperienceonadailybasisandopenthewayforgovernmentandcitizenstoco-designsolutionstotheseproblems.Thusfar,thegovernmenthaspermittedmoreonlineconsultancyondifferentlegislativeactsbutrefrainedfromcrowdsourcingideasfromcitizensaboutwhatnewandinnovativemeasurescouldbetakentohelpthem.Thesameistrueofthedesignofgovernmentservices, where the top-down approach to generating ideas and implementing projects continues topredominate.

Inwhat follows, the paper discusses government-led changes and citizen-led “social innovation”projectsinthegovernancesphere.

Agency forGovernment ServiceProvisionunder theMinistry of JusticeandCenters forGovernmentServices

Anewgovernmententity—theAgencyforGovernmentServiceProvision—hasbeencreatedonthebasisofthePresident’sdecree“Onreformofthenationalsystemofgovernmentservicedelivery.”Themottooftheagencyis“Notthatpeopleshouldservethegovernmententities,butthatgovernmententitiesshouldservethe people.” The agency’s goal is to extend the “single window” services previously available toentrepreneurstocoverallcitizens.Accordingly,centersofgovernmentservicedeliveryhavebeenattachedtothePublicReceptionsofthePresidentineverycityandregion.Fifty-eightgovernmentserviceswillbemade available at these centers in the period from 2018 to 2020, including permissions for individualconstructionworks,householdaccesstowaterandelectricity,andreceiptofvariouspatentsandarchivaldocuments.3Inthisway,thegovernmentseekstoenshrinetheprinciple“documentsaremoving,notpeople.”

TheAgencyforGovernmentServicesDeliveryhasalreadyidentifiedthefollowingproblemsrelatedtotheworkofthecentersofgovernmentservicedelivery:4

• Centersofgovernmentserviceslackhigh-speedinternet• Lowlevelofinteragencyintegration• Absenceofelectronicarchives(manydocumentsareinpaperform)• Governmententitiesprovidingservicesandcentersofgovernmentservicesdonothavetherequired

equipment(computersandtechnicaldevices)forprovidinginnovativeservices• Licenseacquisitionremainsacomplicatedprocessthatusuallyresultsinviolations• Individuals’lowlevelofITliteracypreventsthemfromreceivingonlineservices

AlltheaforementionedproblemsaretechnicalorcausedbyalackofsufficientICTcapacity—and

theydonotaddressthewholescopeoftheproblemwiththequalityofthegovernmentservices.AccordingtoUNDPanalysis, theproblemis theverynarrowdefinitionofwhatconstitutes“governmentservice” in

1OrganizationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment,“FosteringInnovationinthePublicSector,”OECD,Paris,2017,11.2Availableathttps://data.gov.uz.3 See https://egovernment.uz/ru/press_center/publication/razvitie-elektronnykh-gosudarstvennykh-uslug/[currentlyunavailable].4 See “Chto izmenit’sia v sfere okazaniia gosudarstevennykh uslug?” Kun.uz, April 13 2018,https://kun.uz/ru/61405880.

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Uzbekistan,1whichshouldbeconnectedtothelargertopicofadministrativereform.Infact,theUNDPfindsthatthesystemofdeliveryofgovernmentserviceshasnotchangedyet:

Government service should not be understood as the right that is provided by thegovernment to the citizen. And for this to happen, the government service should beoptimized,meaningthatinter-agencygovernmentcooperationandmanagementshouldbeestablished.Yetthelegislationhasconfirmedtheinitialunderstandingofgovernmentserviceassomethingregulatedadministratively.2TheUNDPnotesthatUzbekistanistheonlycountryinCentralAsiathathasnotreformeditscivil

serviceanddoesnotyethavealaw“Onthecivilservice.”3OnSeptember8,2017,thePresidentofUzbekistanapprovedtheConceptofAdministrativeReforminUzbekistan,underwhichthefunctionsofthemorethan100 government entities should be revised. However, political economy and development expert YuliyYusupovthinksthatfirstofallthecivilserviceshouldbeseriouslyreformed,andthenadministrativereformshouldbedelivered.Yusupovthinksthat“nothingisdoneinthisarea.Buttomovereformsinotherareasforward,firstofalladministrativereformshouldbecarriedout.(…)Civilservantsshouldbeappointedbasedoncompetitiveselection.”4

Another issue with government services that has not been discussed is that the list of servicesprovided by the government is not complete. In other words, it is not clear how many services thegovernmentprovidestocitizens.Thisquestionshouldbeansweredevenbeforeattemptsatthedigitizationoftheseservices.Moreover,thereisnocomprehensivediscussionofwhichservicescurrentlyprovidedbythe government should be eliminated entirely. In many cases, citizens receive identical services fromdifferentorganizations;manyofthesecouldbeeithercanceledordelegatedtoasingleorgan.Thelaunchofcentersofgovernmentserviceshasbegunthisprocess,butitissometimesstilleasierandquickertoseekaservicethroughtherelevantgovernmentagencyratherthanthroughthecenter.

Inthecaseofpublicsectorinnovation,publicmanagersarecrucialactorsapplyingsocialinnovationsinpractice.AreportbytheUNDPGlobalCenterforPublicCenterExcellencementionsthreemajorfeaturesofsocialinnovationsforpublicmanagers:

First,socialinnovationbringsanexperimentalapproachtopublicservice.Experimentationentailsanevidence-basedapproach,acknowledgementofthelimitsofcurrentknowledge,multiplesmallbetsaboutwhatmightwork,andacceptancethatsomeattemptswillfailbutprovide learning that builds towards future success. Second, social innovation requiresdistributed systems where innovation and initiative are dispersed to the periphery andconnectedbynetworks.Publicmanagersmustsupportandpartnerwithsocialinnovators:peoplewhoinitiateandleadsocialinnovationinitiatives,andwhocanbefoundanywherewithinthesystem,buttendtobesemi-outsidersandboundaryspanners.Third,citizensandserviceusers canbring insights andassetstohelppublicmanagersachieve theirpolicyobjectives.Socialinnovationsaredeveloped“with”and“by”usersandnotdelivered“to”and“for” them. Co-design and co-production are common elements of social innovation. As aresult, social innovationcan build community capacity in addition to delivering direct

1 See “Administrativnaia reforma—cho ona vkliuchaet?” Gazeta.uz, March 14, 2019,http://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2019/03/14/reform.2Ibid.3Ibid.4See“Itogi2018: Iulii IusupovosamykhvazhnykhreformakhvUzbekistanezagod io tom,chtosdelanonebylo,”Spot.uz,December18,2018,https://www.spot.uz/ru/2018/12/18/yusupov/.

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projectimpacts.1

YetinUzbekistan,citizensdonotfullyparticipateintheprocessofdesigning“innovativeservices.”Thefocusisontechnology,which,althoughitiscertainlyimportant,distractsfromthemoreimportantpointaboutinnovation,namelythatitshouldbeuser-friendlyandhenceusersshouldparticipateinitsdesignandco-creation.Theend-usersofservicesalsoknowexactlywhatkindofgovernmentservicestheyneedandhowtheseservicesshouldbedesignedtomeettheirneeds.OnlineandOfflinePublicReceptionsofthePresidentofUzbekistan

ThePresidentofUzbekistan’sonlinereceptionsbeganonFebruary1,2018.2TheservicewasthesuccessortoShavkatMirziyoyev’sonlinereceptionasprimeministerandlateractingpresidentofUzbekistan,createdonSeptember24,2016,3onthesamewebsite:pm.gov.uz.Today,“pm”meansPrezidentgaMurojaat(QuerytothePresident).Theideaoftheonlinereceptionisthatcitizenscan:

• Obtainlegaladvice• Contacttheheadsofstateagencies• Acquireinformationaboutpeople’sreceptions

Userscanalsoindicatethelocalcommunity(mahalla)wheretheyareencounteringaproblem.Thisshouldhelptorapidlyaddresstheproblem,aswellasgeneratedatatoanalyzetheproblemsandseekshort-andlong-term solutions to them. It is also possible to inform the government about persecution, making itpossibleforlawenforcementtoactimmediately.Besidesonlinereceptions,offlinereceptionshavealsobeenintroducedtoeffectivelyfollowuponandsolvecitizens’problems.

ThePresident’sdecreeaboutthesereceptionswaspublishedonJanuary17,2019.4ItwasreportedthatinthefirsttwoyearsofMirziyoyev’spresidency,over2.5millionqueriesweresent,raisingover1.1milliondifferentproblemsthathavenotbeensolvedbylocalorganizations.Tosupplementpeople’sabilitytoaddressqueriesandcomplaintstothepeople’sreceptions,itwasdecidedthatthestaffofreceptionswouldvisit local communities to identify the most pressing problems. Additionally, it was decided that theinformationsystemHudud(Territory)wouldbeintegratedwithpeople’sreceptionstomakeitpossibletosendqueriesonline.

Thereceptionshavebeenusedquiteeffectivelytoestablishdialoguewithcitizensandallowcitizenstoovercomebureaucraticbarriers.Oflate,however,therehavebeeninstancesofabuses,withthereceptionsbeingabusedtosolvesomewhatsmallandirrelevantissues,andevenbecominganinstrumentforunfaircomplaints.5Mostofthecriticismthisservicehasreceivedhasrelatedtothefactthatithasnotofferedasystemicsolutiontotheproblemsbutonlydealtwiththeirconsequences.6

1UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgrammeGlobalCentreforPublicServiceExcellence,“SocialInnovationforPublicService Excellence,” January 1, 2014, accessed June 16, 2017,http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/capacity-development/English/Singapore%20Centre/GCPSE%20Social%20Innovation%20Summary.pdf,4.2 See “V Uzbekistane zapushchena novaia versiia Virtual’noi priemnoi Prezidenta,” Podrobno.uz, July 10, 2019,https://www.podrobno.uz/cat/tehnp/v-uzbekistane-zapushchena-novaya-versiya/.3Khabibullaev,“Razvitieelektronnogopravitel’stvavUzbekistane.”4 Decree of the President of theRepublic ofUzbekistan “OnMeasures for Further Improvement of the System forAddressingthePopulation’sProblems,”No.UP-5633,January17,2019,http://www.lex.uz/ru/docs/4166965.5 “Chto meshaet effektivnoi rabote narodnykh priemnykh Mirzieeva?” Sputnik.uz, May 4, 2017,https://uz.sputniknews.ru/society/20170504/5338882/Chto-meshaet-rabote-priemnyh.html.6Ibid.

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Suchproblemscouldberesolvedifthegovernmentweretoembedcivilsocietyorganizationsandsocial enterprises into the governance framework. Discussion of a new governance framework wouldcertainly raisedebates and resistance to the emerging innovative trend in governance.Many innovativeelementsarealreadybeingsuccessfully implementedandused ingovernancesystemsindevelopinganddevelopedcountries.

Social enterpriseshavebegun toplaya truly innovative role inpublicwelfareprovision. Indeed,Leadbeaterarguesthat,“Governmentneedsaframeworkforsocialinnovationinwhichsocialenterpriseislikelytoplayacriticalrole.Socialenterprisepolicyneedstobeframedwithinamorecomprehensivestrategyforsocialinnovationthatisdesignedtodeliversocialimpactbyfindingnewwaystoaddressunmetsocialneeds.”1 According toLeadbeater, theoutdatedgovernance framework isnot efficient enough todeliversocialimpact.Thiscouldbeconsideredtoconflictwiththerealitiesofwelfarestates,butwelfarestateshavein fact been among the leaders in recognizing theneed for social innovations in public servicedelivery,preciselybecausetheold-fashionedsystemofservicedeliveryhasbeenfailingtomeetsocialneeds.

Gibson-GrahamandRoelvinkemphasizetheimportanceoflinkingsocialenterprisestogovernancemechanisms. They argue that “innovation in governance is actually a usefulmetric for evaluating socialenterprises,asthescopeofsuccessandfailureextendsbeyondquantifiableoutcomesofparticularprojectstomoregeneralchangesinparticipation,practicesandvalues.”2Thus,socialenterprisesplayaroleinthesuccessofgovernanceingeneral.Theyalsonotethat“thesuccessofinnovativeenterprisesisnotsimplytobemeasuredbytheirlifespanandgrowthbutalsobythe‘seeds’and‘sediments’thatmayinfluencefuturepractice.”3Furthermore,theypointouttheneedtochangesocialrelationsandgovernancerelationsthroughinnovationthatwouldallowthegovernmenttoactasacollectiveactor.4

Anothersetofcriticismsrelatetocasesinwhichcomplaintssubmittedthroughtheonlineservicewererepeatedly forwarded togovernmententities thathadpreviously failed todealeffectivelywith theproblem.Thispracticecausedunderstandablefrustrationonthepartofusersofgovernmentservices.Infact, it isstilluncleartowhatextentcitizens’querieshavebeenappropriatelyrespondedto.Usually, thenumberofcitizens’requestsispubliclyavailable,butthisinformationdoesnotindicatewhetherandhowtheserequestshavebeensatisfied.There isnoguaranteethattheagencies inchargeofsolvingthe issueraisedbyacitizenaredealingwithitefficiently.Tomakeitpossibletomonitortheprocessandtheoutcome,the data on all citizens’ queries should bemade publicly available. Thiswouldmake online and offlinegovernment services towhich citizensappeal through theonline receptionmoreeffectiveandworkableinstruments,therebyincreasingcitizens’trustinthegovernment.

PrimeMinister’sReceptions

Thegovernmenthasrecentlycreatedprimeminister’sreceptionstoaddresstheproblemsofentrepreneursspecifically.5Themaingoalsofthesereceptionswillbe:

• Protectingentrepreneurs’rightsandinterests• Resolvingproblematicissuesandovercomingbureaucraticbarriers(includingissuesrelatedtoland

use,credits,gettinglegalpermissions)• Monitoring and analyzing systemic problems impeding the development of entrepreneurship,

attractingforeigninvestment,andimprovinglegislation

1CharlesLeadbeater,“SocialEnterpriseandSocialInnovation:StrategiesfortheNextTenYears,”UKCabinetOffice,OfficeoftheThirdSector,2007,14.2Gibson-GrahamandRoelvink,“SocialInnovationforCommunityEconomies,”293Ibid.,30.4Ibid.5 “V 2018 godu pri narodnykh priemnykh poiavatsia Tsentry gosuslug,” UzReport, December 13, 2017,https://www.uzreport.news/society/v-2018-godu-pri-narodnih-priemnih-poyavyatsya-tsentri-gosuslug.

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Forthispurpose,theonlineportalbusiness.gov.uzwillbecreated.Itistooearlytoevaluatetheeffectivenessofthisservice,asithasyettostartoperatingandshowingresults.Atpresent,therefore,theaforementionedrecommendationsforthedesignandimplementationofsimilarservicesinUzbekistanshouldbeconsideredequallyapplicabletotheprimeminister’sreceptions.

MinistryofInnovationalDevelopmentUnder PresidentMirziyoyev, theMinistry of Innovational Developmentwas created in 2017 to supportinnovationsinvariousareasoftheeconomic,industrial,andsocialspheres.1Followingthiscreation,apublicdiscussionoftheConceptofInnovationalDevelopmentofUzbekistanwasconducted.In2018,theMinistryofInnovationalDevelopment,theCenterforDevelopmentStrategy,andtheKonradAdenauerFoundationorganizedtheFirstInternationalForumonInnovationsintheSocialSphere,wheresocialinnovationswerediscussedwithexperts,governmentofficials,andrepresentativesofcivilsocietyorganizations.

DespitethemanyeffortsthattheMinistryismakingtointroduceinnovations,variousproblemsarestillinhibitingthespreadofinnovationsacrossdifferentsectorsoftheUzbekeconomyandsociety.ProfessorYulbarskhonMansurov, theDeputyMinisterof InnovationalDevelopmentofUzbekistan,hashighlightedseveralproblems:

First of all,we areworking to create an innovations ecosystem.This is not easy, andwesometimeshavetopushdifferentactorstocooperate,toshowthatcooperationisbeneficial.Wehavetomakebanksandscientistsworktogether.Wehavetotakecareaboutpatentingpolicy and copyright issues. Second,we have to dealwith the problem of the scarcity ofspecialists in ourMinistry. Basically, whenwe started, it was only theMinister and twoDeputies. We have tried to invite one big expert, our compatriot, but we could not, fordifferentreasons.[…]Plus,manyyoungpeople,almost50percentofourstaff,havelefttheMinistry.[…]Third,wealreadyhavetheconceptofinnovationaldevelopmentofUzbekistan,butwehavenotevenstarteddiscussingitwithotherministers.Andwehavetobeamongthetop50mostinnovativestatesbytheyear2030.[…]ThisiswhereIlosesleep.2Evidently,theMinistryisdealingwithnumerousproblemsinitseffortstosupporttheinnovational

developmentofUzbekistan.Thoughthegovernmenthasdeterminedpriorityinnovationsforintroductiontodifferentsectorsandcreatedanewministrytoregulategovernmentinnovationpolicy,manychallengesremain tobeaddressed. Importantly, thestatusof theMinistryshouldberaised,enhancing itsability toimplementthegovernment’s innovationpolicy.Actually,tobecomeatrulyinnovativecountry,thewholegovernmentshouldinnovate.Toinjectinnovations,variousinstitutionaloptionshavebeenalreadytriedandtestedinothercountries.Oneoptionmightbeanagencyadvisingthewholegovernmentoninnovations.Anothermight be a governmental entity that dealswith particular areas (e.g., education, infrastructure,entrepreneurship,etc.)that,ifcombinedwithotherareasofgovernmentaction,helptosupportinnovations.Thelistofconfigurationsandpolicyoptionsisextensive.Uzbekistanshoulddecideonanoptionappropriateforachievingthetargetthecountryhassetforitself:tobeamongthetop50mostinnovativecountriesintheworld.

“SocialInnovations”LedbyCitizens

1Seehttp://mininnovation.uz/en.2See“ChtonetaksinnovatsiiamiinaukoiUzbekistana?Interv’iuszaminnistraIu.Mansurovym,”YouTubevideo,47:27,uploaded by “Laboratoriia Biznesa,” February 10, 2019, accessed July 10, 2019,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1sYs0dvGURQ.

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InUzbekistanin2012-2014,the“SocialInnovationandVolunteerisminUzbekistan”projectledbyUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP)andUnitedNationsVolunteers(UNV)becamethefirst—andtodatetheonly—projectsupporting“socialinnovations.”TheUNDPappliestwomodalitiesforimplementingdevelopmentprojects:1)DirectImplementationModality(DIM),and2)NationalImplementationModality(NIM).TheprojectfallsunderthemodalityofDirectImplementation,meaningthatitwasimplementedbythe UNDPwithout a national partner (aministry or local organization in Uzbekistan). The project wasdirectly implemented by the UNDPGood GovernanceUnit jointlywith the UNV Program in Uzbekistan.CooperationwithnationalpartnerorganizationswasbasedonMemorandaofUnderstanding.Theprojectwas an umbrella organization for 33 small-scale “social innovation” projects implemented locally.1 Oneexampleofa“socialinnovation”projectsupportedbytheUNDPisdescribedbelowtoprovideinsightintohowandwhytheUNDPpursuedsocialinnovation.

Infobox“Infobox”isamobileappcontaininginformationaboutBukharacity.Itisavailabletotouristsandlocals.TheprojectwasdesignedbyateamofindividualsfromthelocalcommunityinBukharacityinaccordancewiththecriteriaofsocial innovationappliedbytheUNDP.Theprojectaimedtoaddressthe issueofa lackofinformation about the city and its remarkable places. Since it was designed by locals from Bukhara, itcorrespondedwiththehuman-centereddesignrequiredofa“socialinnovation”project.Thelocalpopulationandtouristsalikewerestrugglingtoaccesscomprehensiveinformationaboutthecityanddidnotknowhowtogethelpfromthelocalgovernmentifsuchhelpweretobeneeded.

Thehuman-centereddesignofthis“socialinnovation”projectmadeitpossibletoinventamobileappthatprovidesinformationaboutBukharaandtocommunicatewiththelocalgovernmenttoaccessitsservices when required. The UNDP supported local community leader Umid Gafurov in designing andimplementingthisproject.TheprimarygoaloftheprojectwastomapthetouristdestinationsinBukharaandtoprovideinformationonhowlocalauthoritiesandagenciescanbeaccessedbytouristsandlocals,ifneeded.ThisservicewassupposedtomakeBukharamoretourist-friendlyandboosttourisminthecity,inturncreatingmorelocaljobs.Thelocalauthoritiesdidnotparticipateinthisprojectandremainuninterestedinscalingitsresults.

Other types of small-scale “social innovation” projects supported by the UNDP that have beenintroducedinthesamewayasInfoboxinclude:

• NewICTprojectstosolvesocialproblems• Newengineering/infrastructureprojects• Education/trainingsandworkshopstoprovidenewskillsforsolvingsocialproblems• Newprojectsaimedatpeoplewithdisabilities• Filmandartsasnewmeansofsolvingsocialissues,etc.

ConclusionandPolicyRecommendationsTheimplementationof“socialinnovation”projectsin2012-2014wasthefirstattempttointroducesocialinnovations in the local context of post-SovietUzbekistan. These projects have been striving for greaterinclusion, participation, and responsiveness through attempts at cooperation between local government(publicorganizations)andcommunityleaders,andthroughtheuseoftechnology,includinginformationandcommunicationtechnology,aswellaslocally-designedengineeringworks.

Theseprojects,however,sufferedfromalackofsupportfrompolicymakers.Thispreventedthemfrombeinginstitutionalizedandlaterdiffusedacrossthegovernmentandsociety.

1Seetheappendixformoreinformation.

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Anotherproblemwith“socialinnovation”inUzbekistanwasthemisuseoftheconceptlocally.Theconceptwasusuallysubstitutedbyothertermsthatweremorefamiliartolocalorganizations.Itwasimpliedand applied as something promoting social or societal development, without sufficient attention to theinnovationaspect.Thus,localorganizationswerenoteagertoapplynewsocialinnovations’predominantlyhuman-centricapproachtotheirprojects.Subsequently,socialinnovationprojectswereco-designedbylocalorganizations in the old-fashioned manner. An even bigger problem with the misuse of the concept of“innovation”or“socialinnovation”isthatitmighteasilyturnintoanelusivebuzzword.Thedangerofthis,inpractice,isthattheconceptwillbeappliedfrequentlywithoutproducinganyinnovation.

Since2017,innovationshavebeenapriorityatthegovernmentalandpresidentiallevels.Aseriesofinstitutionalchanges(e.g.,creationoftheMinistryofInnovationalDevelopment)andlegaladjustments(e.g.,ConceptofInnovationalDevelopmentofUzbekistan)havebeendevelopedandintroduced.Inthegovernancesector,changeshavealsobeenfosteredintensively.Onlineandofflineservices,includingthepresident’s—andlateralsotheprimeminister’s—receptionsaimedattheprovisionofbetter-qualitygovernmentservices.Thoughtheyhavebeenshowntosolveseveralproblemsraisedbycitizens,systemicsolutionshaveyettobeachieved.Unlikethe“socialinnovation”projectsconductedin2012-2014,thenewinitiativesingovernancewere better institutionalized and scaled across the country due to government support. However, thegenerationandintroductionofinnovations(andsocialinnovations)ingovernanceremainstheprerogativeof the government; citizens, NGOs, and other non-governmental actors are insufficiently involved in theprocess.

Along with larger systemic reforms such as administrative reform, the adoption of the law “OnGovernmentService,”andanincreaseintheinstitutionalroleandauthorityoftheMinistryofInnovationalDevelopment,otherstepstowardinnovations(socialinnovations)ingovernanceshouldbetaken:

1) Dataongovernment(nationalandlocal)activitiesandservicesshouldbemadeopenlyavailable

tocitizensandto“socialinnovation”projectsinthegovernancesphereledbythem.Accordingly,aLaw“Onopendata”shouldbedevelopedandintroduced.

2) Citizen-/community-driven social innovation solutions in governance shouldbedesigned andgenerated.Morecivicparticipationingovernmentdecision-makingshouldbeencouraged.Morecitizen-drivensocialinnovationsolutionsingovernanceshouldbesupported.

3) To promote social innovation in governance, social enterprises should be involved in serviceprovisionforcitizens.Publicmanagersselectedonacompetitivebasisshouldbeemployed.Inotherwords,governmentserviceshouldbeimproved.

4) Toimprovegovernmentservices:1)aLaw“Onthecivilservice”isneeded;2)changestotheLaw“Onelectronicgovernment”shouldbeintroduced,towidenthespectrumofgovernmentservicesbeyondmeredigitization;

5) Finally, work to improve ICT literacy and the capacity of government service providers andconsumers should continue. Technical and infrastructural problems in government serviceprovision,alreadyidentifiedbythegovernment,shouldbefurtheraddressed.

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Appendix1SocialInnovationProjectsSupportedbytheUNDPinUzbekistanAreas Projects/DescriptionICT (for peoplefrom vulnerablegroups)

▪ “ITMasters”:teachingITskillstounemployedindividualstohelpthemaccessbetterjobopportunities;

▪ Muynak:awebsiteforasmalltownexperiencingenvironmentaldisasterandeconomicchallenges,toboostlocalandinternationaltourism;

▪ E-diary: an electronic diary for parents to follow the in-class grades andaccomplishmentsoftheirkidsatschool;

▪ Infobox.uz: a mobile app containing information about Bukhara city, available totouristsandlocals.

Engineering andinfrastructure

▪ “MobileElectro-Station”:anengineeringconstructionallowingthegenerationofwindenergy;

▪ “EnjoyingOldAge”ResourceCenter:aphysicalspaceforelderlypeopletolearnnewskillsandcommunicatewitheachother;

▪ “ShowerandWaterSupply”:awatersupplysystemenablingtheefficientcollection,storage,anddistributionofwaterforhygienicpurposesinruralareas(farms).

Education andtrainings andworkshops

▪ SummerCampandDIYLabsinMuynak:trainingsandworkshopsonusingthe“Do-It-Yourself”mentalitytosolvelocalissues;

▪ DebateTournamentinAndijan:trainingyouthindebatingtechniquesandmethodstostrengthentheirroleinthelocalcontext;

▪ TrainingonreproductivehealthamongRomapopulation:trainingbasedonpeer-to-peermethodologytopromotereproductivehealthamongathusfarneglectedpartofpopulation;

▪ Module “All themoney under control”: means of keeping funding accountable andmanageable;

▪ Awarenesscampaignsonbreastcancerpreventionamongwomenin Jizzakh:anewapproachtopromotingbreastcancerawareness;

▪ “Inspired Teachers”: a new methodology for preparing English teachers for localschools;

▪ “Englishguides”:newguidesoneffectiveEnglishteachingundersupervision;▪ SocialEntrepreneurshipskills:trainingonteachingsocialentrepreneurshipskills;▪ Constructor: a scheme increasing young people’s interest in science through the

developmentofdesignandconstructionskills;▪ Peersclub:aclubofpeersenablingskillsandknowledgeexchange,aswellascoaching

eachother;▪ CaféScientifique:aprojectpromotingsciencethroughanon-traditional(outsidethe

classroom)approach;▪ Volunteerengagement(intheNatLib):educatingvolunteersfortheNationalLibrary

ofUzbekistan;sharingthecultureandvaluesofvolunteerism.Specificallyaimed at peoplewithdisabilities

▪ “Fantasy-Club” Initiatives:coursesonbeadingand jewelry forgirlswithdisabilities,plusanewapproachtomarketingthegoodsproducedbythegirls;

▪ “MohirHunarmand”:teachingnewskillstokidsfromorphanages(includingkidswithdisabilities);

▪ “Theweekoffootball”:afootballtournamentforpeoplewithdisabilities;▪ TranslationsofaudioandvideofortheDeafandHardofHearing:creatingpublicly-

availableaudioandvideomaterialsforpeoplewithdisabilities;

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▪ Taxiforpeoplewithdisabilitieswith“Perekrestok”Taxi:ataxiredesignedspecificallyfordriverswithdisabilities.

Filming/Arts ▪ “Afishka”Festivalofauteurtheoryandsocialfilms:afestivalofshortmoviesonsocialissues;

▪ FilmonTBprevention:moviethatapproachedthetuberculosisprobleminamannerunusualfortheUzbekcontext;

▪ VoiceofVolunteers:radioprogramonpressingsocialissues,designedbyvolunteers;▪ Theatrebychildren:children’stheatrewithafocusondescribingandsolvingsocial

problems;▪ VideoprojectaboutpeoplelivingwithHIV:newapproachtoraisingpublicawareness

oftheproblemofHIVinUzbeksociety.Others ▪ Eco-bagswithKorzinka.uz:producingeco-bagsbysocialenterprisesandsellingthem

throughthe“Korzinka”supermarketchain;▪ Promotionoflocaltourisminsocialnetworks(withLGSPproject):newapproachto

promotinglocaltourism;▪ IactVolunteersplatform:newonlineplatformconnectingthosewhoneedvolunteers

withthosewhowishtovolunteer.▪ DoItYourself(DIY)Lab:conducting“Do-It-Yourself”methodologythroughlabworks

indifferentpublicplaces,toencourageproblem-solvingthroughlocalmobilizationofhumanresources.

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ReturnMigrationasaBrainGainforUzbekistan?TheChallengesofAttractingHighlyskilledUzbeksAbroad

SherzodEraliev

SherzodEralieviscurrentlyapostdoctoralresearcherattheAleksanteriInstituteoftheUniversityofHelsinki,where he is a member of the research team“Migration, Shadow Economy and Parallel Legal Orders inRussia”.He has extensivework experiencewith localmedia and international organizations in Uzbekistan,including UNDP. His research interests include migration policies, migration regimes, skilled migration,migration and religion, and politics in Central Asia/Eurasia. He received his MA from the University ofManchester,UK,andhisPhDfromtheUniversityofTsukuba,Japan.

With the leadership change in Uzbekistan in 2016, the government announced the launch of economicreforms.However,thecountrystillfacesalackofskilledspecialistswhomightimplementthesereforms.1ThegovernmentmadeitclearthatitwouldencourageitscitizenstrainedabroadtoreturntoUzbekistantosharetheirinternationalworkcompetencies.OneofthefeasibleandtangiblestepsthegovernmenttookinthisregardwastheestablishmentoftheexpertcouncilBuyukKelajakinMay2018.Theexpertcouncilisaplatform for discussing development strategies for Uzbekistan. Its nearly 300members, originally fromUzbekistan,mostlyliveindevelopedcountriesandworkinthefieldsoflaw,finance,medicine,governance,andacademia,amongothers.Themaingoalofthecouncilistohelpdevelopreformprogramsinthepolitical,economic,andsocialspheresinUzbekistan,includingcreatingadevelopmentmodelupto2035.2

Anotherconvincingsignofthenewleadership’sstakeinUzbekslivingabroadistheestablishmentof the El-yurt Umidi Foundation for training specialists abroad and dialoguing with compatriots. Thegovernmenthasalsoadoptedaconceptdocumentthatdeclaresoneofitsgoalstobe“attractingcompatriotsfromamonghighlyqualifiedspecialiststoworkinseniorpositionsingovernmentmanagementbodies,localexecutiveauthorities,andotherstateorganizationsoftheRepublicofUzbekistan.”3Aspartofthispolicy,severalhigh-levelpositionswereofferedtoUzbekcitizens.Theseincludedthepostsofdeputyministerofinnovationdevelopment,4advisortothefinanceminister,5chairmanofthenationalchamberforinnovativehealthcare,6anddeputychairmanofXalqbanki,7amongothers.

However,itisstillearlytotalkaboutbraingainforUzbekistan.Notwithstandingtheongoingcallanddeclaredincentives,Uzbekcitizenswhohaveachievedsignificantsuccessintheirfields,mostlythankstothe

1See,forexample,PresidentMirziyoyev’smeetingwithMFAstaffandambassadorsonJanuary11,2018:“Prezidentimiztashqisiyosatmasalalarigaoidyig‘ilishio‘tkazdi(“O’zbekiston24”,11.01.2018y),”YouTubevideo,2:39,uploadedby“Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Uzbekistan,” January 13, 2018, accessed May 3, 2019,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DskU5WKJ6JA.2SeetheBuyukKelajakwebsite,accessedMay3,2019,http://uzexpertsovet.com/about-buyuk-kelajak/.3“StatePolicyConceptoftheRepublicofUzbekistanonWorkingwithCompatriotsLivingAbroad,”October25,2018,accessedMay9,2019,http://lex.uz/docs/4022649,4.AdetailedanalysisoftheConceptisprovidedlaterinthepaper.4 “Naznachen zamministra innovatsionnogo razvitiia,” Gazeta.uz, August 7, 2018,https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2018/08/07/mininnovation/.5 “Sotrudnik HSBC stal sovetnikom ministra finansov,” Gazeta.uz, September 18, 2018,https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2018/09/18/mf/.6 “Rovshan IzamovvozglavilNatsional’nuiupalate innovatsionnogozdravookhoraneniia,”Uzdaily.uz, September25,2018,https://www.uzdaily.uz/articles-id-39573.htm.7 “Farkhod Salamov naznachen zamestitelem Predsedatelia AK ‘Khalk Bank,’” Uzdaily.uz, October 16, 2018,https://www.uzdaily.uz/articles-id-39902.htm.

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educationtheyreceivedabroad,areinnorushtoreturntotheirhomecountry.Thispaperthereforeaimstoanswerfollowingquestions:

RQ1:Whatare thechallenges facingUzbekistan in itsefforts toattracthighly skilledUzbekcitizenscurrentlybasedabroad?RQ2:HowcanUzbekistanbestutilizeitsdiasporasabroad?Iarguethattheleadershipchangeandthelaunchof(albeitlimited)economicandpoliticalreforms

inthehomecountrymayinfluencethereturndecisionsofhighlyskilledmigrantsabroad.However,averylimitednumberof émigréswill likely return if offered incentives (for example, high-levelpositionswithassociated benefits). A government can encourage the return of its highly skilled citizens only byimplementing full-fledgedpolitical andeconomic reformsandshowing signsof economicgrowth.At thesametime, forthemajorityofmigrants,changes inthehomecountrywillnotnecessarily influencetheirdecisionstoreturn. Instead,social(culture,adaptation),personal(success/failure),andfamily issuesaremore likely toplay the crucial role in their returndecisions.A combinationof institutional reformsandeconomicgrowthwithcareeropportunitiesandsocialfactorsmaycatalyzethemtoreturn.

This paper consists of the following sections. First, I analyze the existing literature on returnmigrationofhighlyskilledexpatriates.Next,Idescribemyresearchmethods.Afterthat,Idiscusstheresultsofmyinterviews.Thefinalsectiondrawsconclusionsabouttheresearchfindingsanddiscussesavenuesforfurtherresearch.

LiteratureReviewIntheireffortstounderstandthephenomenonofmigration,scholarshavefocusedmainlyonthreeresearchareas:whypeoplemove,howpeopleintegrateintoreceivingsocieties,andhowmigrationaffectssendingsocieties.

Theimpactofmigrationonsendingsocietiesisoneofthelessresearchedareasofmigrationstudies.Moreover, only a few issues in this area have been investigated thoroughly. The impact of monetaryremittancesonsendingsocietiesisoneofthesetopics.Remittanceswereinitiallyviewedasatemporaryandunreliablesourceofincomethatproduced“remittance-dependence”insendingeconomies.1Anotherstrandofliteraturehighlightsbothpositiveandnegativeaspectsofremittances.2Thereisnointernationallyagreed-upondefinitionofahighlyskilledmigrant.TheIOMdefinesahighlyskilledmigrantas“apersonwhohasearned, eitherby tertiary level educationoroccupational experience, the level of qualifications typicallyneededtopracticeaprofession.”3

Thereisincreasingcompetitionbetweenthedevelopedcountriestoattracttalent.4Intheracefortalent, developed countries, including the US, Canada, Australia, and the UK, have adopted immigrationpoliciestostimulatetheflowofhighlyskilledpeople.In2010,almost28millionhighlyskilledmigrantswerelivinginOECDcountries.AlthoughOECDcountriesconstitutelessthanone-fifthoftheworld’spopulation,

1HeinDeHaas,“InternationalMigration,RemittancesandDevelopment:MythsandFacts,”ThirdWorldQuarterly26,no.8(2005):1269-84.2 Hein De Haas, Remittances and Social Development (Geneva: UNRISD, 2007); Caglar Ozden and Maurice Schiff,“Overview,” in International Migration, Economic Development Policy, edited by Caglar Ozden and Maurice Schiff(Washington,DC:WorldBankandPalgraveMacmillan,2007),1-16;DilipRatha,“Workers’Remittances:AnImportantandStableSourceofExternalDevelopmentFinance,”EconomicsSeminarSeriesPaper9(2005);DilipRatha,“TheImpactofRemittancesonEconomicGrowthandPovertyReduction,”MigrationPolicyInstitutePolicyBrief,Washington,DC,2013.3InternationalOrganizationforMigration,GlossaryonMigration,2ndedition(Geneva:IOM,2011).4 Ayelet Shachar, “The Race for Talent: Highly SkilledMigrants and Competitive Immigration Regimes,”New YorkUniversityLawReview81(2006):148-206;BenWildavsky,TheGreatBrainRace:HowGlobalUniversitiesAreReshapingtheWorld(Princeton,NJ,andOxford:PrincetonUniversityPress,2010).

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theyhosttwo-thirdsofhighlyskilledmigrants.1Theemigrationofhighlyskilledmigrants, labeled“braindrain,”2wasalsoinitiallyperceivedasanegativefactor.3Itwasseenasazero-sumgameinwhichsendingcountries lost out as receiving countries sucked away themost talentedmembers of their populations.Developingcountrieswereinvestingtheirresourcesintraininghumancapital,onlyforthathumancapitalto leave and contribute to the economies of developed destination countries. This loss of skilled peopleundermined poor countries’ chances of developing. Scholars have thus debated whether states shouldrestricttheemigrationofhighlyskilledcitizens.4

Later on, scholarship started to pay attention to the potential gains of emigration by thosewithskills—“braingain.”AsMeyerhasstated,“thepresenceofhighlyskilledexpatriatesabroadshouldnotbeseenasalosstothecountrybutasanassetthatcanbemobilized.”5Proponentsofthisviewsuggestthatskilledmigrationmay have positive effects in the long term. These effects includemonetary and socialremittances,thecreationofnetworks,andeventhereturnofhighlyskilledprofessionals.6Themorerecentliteraturegoeseven further, claiming that “thepossibility forpeople to ‘sell’ theirhumancapital abroadgeneratesincentivestoinvestmoreinhumancapital,andademandforhigherquality,moreinternationallytransferrableeducation,whichultimatelyalsobenefitsthosewhodonotemigrate.”7Evidencealsoshowsthathighlyskilledreturnmigrantshaveanimpactoneconomicdevelopmentbyactingasbothinvestorsandinnovatorsintheirhomecountries.8However,insomecases,migrationofthehighlyskilledhasresultedin“brain waste,” where skilled migrants find themselves compelled to take low-skilled jobs in receivingcountries.9

Withtheavailabilityofdataondifferentcountriesandtheadvancementofmigrationstudies,amoreneutral“braincirculation”modelhasrecentlybeendeveloped.10Itpresentscomplexlinkagesbetweenhighly

1OECD,OECDFactbook2013:Economic,EnvironmentalandSocialStatistics(Paris:OECD,2013).2Theterm“braindrain”firstappearedin1960storefertotheexodusofBritishscientiststotheUS.Somescholarsused“humancapitalflight”asanothertermfor“braindrain.”3NadeemHaqueandSe-JikKim,“‘HumanCapitalFlight’:ImpactofMigrationonIncomeandGrowth,”IMFEconomicReview42,no.3 (1995):577-607;WilliamCarringtonandEnricaDetragiache, “HowExtensive Is theBrainDrain?”Finance and Development (IMF Quarterly) 36, no. 2 (1999),https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1999/06/carringt.htm; Michel Beine, Frederic Docquier, and HillelRapoport, “Brain Drain and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence,” Journal of Development Economics 64, no. 1(2001):275-89;FrédéricDocquier,OlivierLohest,andAbdeslamMarfouk,“BrainDraininDevelopingCountries,”TheWorldBankEconomicReview21,no.2(2007):193–218.4GillianBrock,“DebatingBrainDrain:AnOverview,”MoralPhilosophyandPolitics3,no.1(2016):7-20;GillianBrockandMichaelBlake,DebatingtheBrainDrain:MayGovernmentsRestrictEmigration?(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2015).5Jean-BaptisteMeyer,“NetworkApproachversusBrainDrain:LessonsfromDiaspora,”InternationalMigration39,no.5(2001):91-110.6AndrewMountford,“CanaBrainDrainBeGoodforGrowthintheSourceEconomy?”JournalofDevelopmentEconomics53 (1995): 287-303; Oded Stark, ChristianHelmenstein, andAlexia Prskawetz, “A Brain Gainwith a BrainDrain,”EconomicLetters55 (1997):227-34;YevgenyKuznetsov,ed.,DiasporaNetworksand the InternationalMigrationofSkills:HowCountriesCanDrawonTheirTalentsAbroad(Washington,DC:WorldBank,2006);AndresSolimano,TheInternationalMobilityofTalent(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2008).7HilelRapoport,“WhoisAfraidoftheBrainDrain?ADevelopmentEconomist’sView,”CEPIIPolicyPaper14(2017),http://www.cepii.fr/PDF_PUB/pb/2017/pb2017-14.pdf,129.8BrittaKlaggeandKatrinKlein-Hitpass,“High-SkilledReturnMigrationandKnowledge-BasedDevelopmentinPoland,”EuropeanPlanningStudies18,no10.(2010):1631-51.9ArmandoGarciaPires,“BrainDrainandBrainWaste,”JournalofEconomicDevelopment40,no.1(2015):1-34.10AnnaleeSaxenian,“FromBrainDraintoBrainCirculation:TransnationalCommunitiesandRegionalUpgradinginIndiaandChina,”StudiesinComparativeInternationalDevelopment40,no.2(2005):35-61;DamtewTeferra,“BrainCirculation:UnparalleledOpportunities,UnderlyingChallenges, andOutmodedPresumptions,” Journal of Studies inInternationalEducation9,no.3(2005):229–250;AdrianFavell,MirianFeldblumandMichaelPeterSmith,“TheHumanFaceofGlobalMobility:AResearchAgenda,”inTheHumanFaceofGlobalMobility,editedbyMichaelPeterSmithandAdrianFavell(NewBrunswick:TransactionPublishers,2008);RiccardoCrescenzi,NancyHolman,andEnricoOrru,

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skilled migrants, their home countries, and business relationships in which they are involved.1 “Braincirculation”accountsfor“thefrequentbackandforthmovementofmigrants,ideas,knowledge,information,andskill sets that isnowa routinepartof contemporary transnationalism.”2 Sendingcountries can thusbenefitfrom“braindrain”eveniftheirskilledcitizensstayabroad.

Returnmigrationofthehighlyskilledisoneoftheleastexploredtopicsinthemigrationliterature.TheIOMdefinesreturnmigrationas“themovementofapersonreturningtohisorhercountryoforiginorhabitualresidence,usuallyafterspendingatleastoneyearinanothercountry.Thisreturnmayormaynotbevoluntary.”3BiondoandMonteleonidefineitastheflowofmigrantswhoreturntotheirhomecountryafter a period spent abroad for activities usually related to a job or to human capital accumulation.4 Atpresent,theliteraturefocusesmainlyonthereturnoflow-skilledmigrants;5researchonthereturnofhighlyskilledmigrantshasonlyrecentlystartedtogrow.Bobovaarguesthatreturnmigrationisnotthefinalstageofajourney,butaprocessinwhichcountriesoforiginanddestinationarelinkedbysocialrelationshipsthatexistacrossgeographicalborders.6

Scholarshavetriedtodeterminewhatfactorsincentivizeskilledmigrantstoreturn.Chackoarguedthat highly skilled migrants would return to their countries when economic growth occurred andprofessionalopportunitiesbecameavailable.7Harveyobservedthathighlyskilledmigrantsfromdevelopingcountries hold a greater desire to return to their home countries than those from developed countriesbecauseofpotentiallybetterprofessionalopportunities(growingmarkets,governmentalincentives,etc.).8Institutionalconditionsimpedeaswellasfacilitatethereturnofhighlyskilledmigrants.9Governmentsofsendingcountriesmayalsoinfluencehighlyskilledprofessionals’decisiontoreturn.10However,KivistoandFaisthaveobservedthatsomegovernmentsmaynotseektoencouragepermanentreturnmigration,butaremoreinclinedtoencouragetemporaryreturns.11

“WhyDoTheyReturn?BeyondtheEconomicDriversofGraduateReturnMigration,”AnnalsofRegionalScience59,no.3(2017):603-27.1Saxenian,“FromBrainDraintoBrainCirculation.”2Favell,Feldblum,andSmith,“TheHumanFaceofGlobalMobility,”12.3InternationalOrganizationforMigration,GlossaryonMigration,2ndedition(Geneva:InternationalOrganizationforMigration,2011),86.4AlessioEmanueleBiondoandSimonaMonteleone, “ReturnMigration in Italy?WhatDoWeKnow?”UniversityofCataniaWorkingPaperSeries,April2010.5See,forexample,YaohuiZhao,“CausesandConsequencesofReturnMigration:RecentEvidencefromChina,”JournalofComparativeEconomics30,no.2(2002):376-94;Jean-PierreCassarino,“TheorisingReturnMigration:ARevisitedConceptualApproachtoReturnMigrants,”EUIWorkingPapersRSCASno.2(2004);GaliaSabar,“Africa-Israel-AfricaReturnMigrationExperiencesofAfricanLabourMigrants,”MigrationLetters10,no.1(2013):57-70.6NadyaBobova,ThereandBackAgain:Post-ReturnExperiencesofHighly-SkilledBelarusianProfessionals (PhDdiss.,UniversityofTrento,2016).7ElizabethChacko,“FromBrainDraintoBrainGain:ReverseMigrationtoBangaloreandHyderabad,India’sGlobalizingHigh-TechCities,”GeoJournal68(2007):131-40.8 William S. Harvey, “British and Indian Scientists in Boston Considering Returning to Their Home Countries,”Population,SpaceandPlace15(2009):1-16.9Favell,Feldblum,andSmith,“TheHumanFaceofGlobalMobility”;ChristianDustmann, ItzhakFadlon,andYoramWeiss, “ReturnMigration,HumanCapitalAccumulationand theBrainDrain,” JournalofDevelopmentEconomics95(2011):58-67;NilDemetGungorandAysitTansel,“BrainDrainfromTurkey:ReturnIntentionsofSkilledMigrants,”InternationalMigration52,no.5(2012):208-26.10LuoKeren,FeiGuo,andHuangPing, “China:GovernmentPoliciesandEmergingTrendsofReversalof theBrainDrain,”inReturnMigrationintheAsiaPacificeditedbyRobinIredale,FeiGuo,andSantiRozario(Northampton:EdwardElgar,2003),88-111;Chin-lungTsay,“Taiwan:Significance,CharacteristicsandPoliciesonReturnSkilledMigration,”inReturnMigrationintheAsiaPacificeditedbyRobinIredale,FeiGuo,andSantiRozario(Northampton:EdwardElgar,2003),112-35.11PeterKivistoandThomasFaist,BeyondaBorder:TheCausesandConsequencesofContemporaryImmigration(LosAngeles:PineForgePress,2010).

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Economicandpoliticalconsiderationsarenottheonlyfactorsshapingthereturndecisionsofhighlyskilled migrants. Education, labor market, and career opportunities, as well as family circumstancesincludingmarriage,childbearing,andeldercare,caninfluenceandshapemigrants’decisions.1Returnalsodepends on such factors as kinship relations, social ties, culture, and lifestyle. Inmy own research, forexample, respondents articulated that parenting and family obligations played a significant role in theirdecisions(not)toreturn.Itseemsthusimpossibletoconcludethatthereisonlyonesetoffactorsshapingthe return decisions of highly skilledmigrants. Rather, a combination of different factors—institutional,economic,and/orpersonal—affectthedecision.

MostoftheliteratureonmigrationinUzbekistanseesitmainlyasasendingcountryoflabormigrants(mostly toRussia andKazakhstan).Only a handful of scholars have focusedon the social and economicimpactofmigrationonUzbekistan.2Thereisverylimitedresearchonthetransnationallivesofmigrantsandsocialchange3ortheimpactofmonetary4andsocial5remittancesinUzbekistan.AnalyzingtheemigrationofhighlyskilledfemalemigrantsfromUzbekistan,Kayumovaarguedthat“braindrain”shouldnotbeviewedasentirelydetrimentaltothecountry;onthecontrary,thiscantransforminto“braingain”inthelongrun.6InlightoftheleadershipchangeinUzbekistanin2016anditsevolvingrhetorictowarditsnationalsabroad,theissueof“braindrain”and“braingain”shouldbethoroughlystudied.Thisresearchaimstopartlyfillthatgap and contribute to the literature on the return migration of highly skilled migrants to their homecountries.

MethodsThematerialforthispaperwascollectedthroughin-depthinterviewswith18highlyskilledUzbekmigrants.FouroftheintervieweeshavereturnedtoUzbekistanatthegovernment’sinvitation.Thosewhocurrentlylive abroad (in OECD countries) are university lecturers, researchers, lawyers, doctors, journalists, andspecialistsininternationalorganizations.Respondentswerechosenaccordingtothefollowingcriteria:

• TheyobtainedtheirfirsttertiaryeducationinUzbekistan;• Theyhavelivedinforeigncountriesforatleastthreeyears;and

1See,forexample,RonaldL.Whisler,BrigittesS.Waldorf,GordonF.Mulligan,andDavidPlane,“QualityofLifeandtheMigrationoftheCollege-Educated:ALife-CourseApproach,”GrowthandChange39,no.1(2008):58–94;MelissaKelly,“UsinganIntersectionalLifeCourseApproachtoUnderstandtheMigrationoftheHighlySkilled,”inResearchingtheLifecourse:CriticalReflectionsfromtheSocialSciences,editedbyNancyWorthandIreneHardill(Bristol:PolicyPress,2015),231-46;AnuKou,LeovanWissen, JoukevanDijk, andAjayBailey, “ALifeCourseApproach toHigh-SkilledMigration:LivedExperiencesofIndiansintheNetherlands,”JournalofEthnicandMigrationStudies41,no.10(2015):1644-63.2MadeleineReeves,“Migration,Masculinity,andTransformationsofSocialSpaceintheSokhValley,Uzbekistan,”inMigrationandSocialUpheavalastheFaceofGlobalization inCentralAsia,editedbyMarleneLaruelle(Leiden:Brill,2013),307-31;IrinaMalyuchenko,“LabourMigrationfromCentralAsiatoRussia:EconomicandSocialImpactontheSocietiesofKyrgyzstan,Tajikistan,andUzbekistan,”CentralAsiaSecurityPolicyBriefs21,OSCEAcademy,Bishkek.3RustamjonUrinboyev,“Migration,Transnationalism,andSocialChangeinCentralAsia:EverydayTransnationalLivesofUzbekMigrantsinRussia,”inEurasiaontheMove:InterdisciplinaryApproachestoaDynamicMigrationRegion,editedbyMarleneLaruelleandCaressSchenk(Washington,DC:GWUCentralAsianProgram,2018).4 Erica Marat, Labour Migration in Central Asia: Implications of the Global Economic Crisis (Washington, DC, andStockholm:CentralAsia-Caucasus Institute&SilkRoadStudiesProgram,2009);FarrukhIrnazarov, “LaborMigrantHouseholdsinUzbekistan:RemittancesasaChallengeorBlessing?”inUzbekistan:PoliticalOrder,SocietalChanges,andCulturalTransformationseditedbyMarleneLaruelle(Washington,DC:CentralAsiaProgram,2017),62-71.5BakhromRadjabov,“SocialRemittancesCreatedbyUzbekStudentsStudyinginKassel,GermanyandTsukuba,Japan,”EurasiaCultura3(2017):57-88.6MarinaKayumova,“Emigrationof‘CremedelaCreme’inUzbekistan:AGenderPerspective,”inUzbekistan:PoliticalOrder, Societal Changes, and Cultural Transformations, edited by Marlene Laruelle (Washington, DC: Central AsiaProgram,2017),52-61.

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• Theyhaveachievedacertainlevelofsuccessintheirrespectivefieldsinforeigncountries.AsignificantnumberofrespondentsaremembersoftheBuyukKelajakadvisorycouncilofUzbekexpertslivingabroad.Mostintervieweesaremembersofmypersonalnetwork;otherswereapproachedviasocialnetworks.Thepoolwaschoseninsuchawayastomaximizegeographicaldiversity:respondentslived/arelivingintheUS,Germany,Austria,Australia,theUK,Sweden,Finland,Kazakhstan,etc.Approximatelyone-quarter of respondents are female. Several of my contacts indicated that they were in the process ofnegotiatingwiththegovernmentofUzbekistananddidnotwanttosharedetailsatthisstage.

Interviewsfollowedasemi-structuredformat.Semi-structuredinterviewshelptoexplore“howthey[interviewees]understand theirworld, i.e.what everyday concepts and interpretation theyuse tomakesenseofit.”1Thein-depthinterviewsweredesignedtoallowrespondentstoexpandonthenarrativesaroundtheirexperiences.Theyfocusedonfactorsthatmayfacilitateorimpedethereturnofhighlyskilledmigrants,aswell ason theirpersonalandprofessionalaspirationsandmotivations.Respondentswereallowed topursuetheirresponsesfully.Allinall,theseconversationsallowedmetocollectdatathat“giveanauthenticinsightintopeople’sexperience.”2

Interviews in the US, Finland, and Sweden were conducted face-to-face. I interviewed otherrespondents in calls via Skype and other messengers. In view of time constraints, one respondent, agovernmentofficial,askedtouseinterviewshegavetothemediaashiscontributiontotheresearch.Mostoftheface-to-faceandphoneinterviewswererecorded,thoughafewrespondentspreferredtospeakofftherecord.When speaking about the problems associatedwith returning to Uzbekistan, some respondentsaskedthatInotexplicitlymentiontheirjobs(orpositionstheywereoffered)norgivedetailedinformation.

BackgroundTherearenoofficialstatisticsonhowmanypeopleborninUzbekistanarecurrentlylivingabroad,butthisnumbercertainlyreachesintothemillions.In2017,morethan1.8millionUzbekcitizensindicatedlaborasthe purpose of their visit when entering Russia.3 There are also large Uzbek migrant communities inKazakhstan,SouthKorea,Turkey,theUS,Europe,andtheGulfstates.Althoughthemajorityofthesepeoplearelabormigrantsemployedinlow-skilledjobs,thousandsofthemhavelearnednewskillsandadvancedtheireducation.ThenewgovernmentofUzbekistanishopingthatatleastsomeofthesehighlyskilledUzbekswillreturntohelpreformthecountry.

Oneof the first clear signsof thisdesirecameduring theUzbekpresident’svisit toNewYork toparticipateinUNsessionsin2017.ShavkatMirziyoyevmetwithagroupofUzbekémigréslivingintheUS—doctors,professors,bankers,lawyers,andbusinessmen—andinvitedthemtoreturntoUzbekistan,offeringthem high-level positions in the government with decent salaries and other benefits.4 Since then, thegovernmenthasadoptedstatepoliciesonworkingwithcompatriotslivingabroad.5TheStatePolicyConceptof the Republic of Uzbekistan on Working with Compatriots Living Abroad identifies three groups ofcompatriots: a)Uzbek citizenswho live abroad for education,work, family, or other reasons; b) foreigncitizens(andtheirdescendants)whohaveleftUzbekistanandhaveculturaltiestoUzbekistan;andc)foreigncitizenswhoidentifythemselvesasUzbeksandwanttohaverelationswithUzbekistan.TheConceptaimsat,amongothers,thefollowinggoals:

1NormanBlaikie,DesigningSocialResearch:TheLogicofAnticipation,2ndedition(Cambridge:PolityPress,2010),120.2DavidSilverman,InterpretingQualitativeData:MethodsforAnalysingTalk,Text,andInteraction(London:Sage,2006),118.3“PolovinuizzaregistrirovannykhvRossiiv2017goduinostrantsevsostavilipriezhieizTsentral’noiAzii,”FerghanaNews,February2,2018,http://www.fergananews.com/news/28175.4“PrezidentMirziyoyevvatandoshlarganimadedi?”YouTubevideo,5:51,uploadedby“@AmerikaOvozi,”September21,2017,accessedMay3,2019,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3K2MNA9HNCo.5StatePolicyConceptoftheRepublicofUzbekistanonWorkingwithCompatriotsLivingAbroad.

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• toattracthighlyskilledcompatriotstoworkinseniorpositionsingovernmentmanagementbodies,

localexecutiveauthorities,andotherstateorganizations;• to issue multiple-entry and long-term visas, as well as residence and work permits, to foreign

citizens;• toimplementfast-trackprogramsforobtainingcitizenship;• tooffersocialandotherbenefitspackagesforthosewhoagreetoworkingovernmentpositions.

ItisinterestingtonotethatthegoalisnotonlytobringbackhighlyskilledUzbekcitizens,butalso,

morebroadly,toattracthighly-trainedprofessionalswithforeigncitizenship.TheEl-yurtUmidiFoundationfor training specialists abroad and dialoguing with compatriots under the Cabinet of Ministers wasdesignated as the government body responsible for implementing this policy. As mentioned in theintroduction,severalofmyrespondentshavereturnedtoUzbekistan,takinghigh-leveljobsingovernmentagencies,includingpostsasdeputyministers.

“TheMotherlandNeedsUs”ThereareseveralwaysinwhichhighlyskilledUzbekcompatriotscanbehiredinUzbekistan.Usually,thePresident’s Administration contacts Buyuk Kelajak to fill a vacancy. If someone in the expert pool isinterestedintheposition,thejobresponsibilitiesandrenumerationarediscussedwithhimorherdirectly.Severalinterviewsandmeetingsareorganizedatdifferentagencies,dependingontheleveloftheposition.Thiscantakesixmonthsormore.Dependingonhis/herskillsandexpertise,acandidatecannegotiatesalary,workingconditions,benefitspackages,etc.Notallthenegotiationsaresuccessful,butseveralmid-tohigh-levelpositionshavebeenfilledthroughthepoolofBuyukKelajakexperts.Theseincludethepositionsofdeputyministerofinnovationdevelopment,advisortothefinanceminister,directorofthecapitalmarketsagency,directoroftheNavoifreeeconomiczonedirectorate,etc.

A fewof the author’s interviewees reported that theyhadbeen contactedbyUzbek governmentofficials through its embassies but had to decline for various reasons. People who have returned toUzbekistan since the leadership change gave different reasons for their decision. A thread that runsthroughoutalmostalltheseanswersisthatrespondentswereimpressedwiththechangesandwantedtobeapartofthem.

ReforminUzbekistanwasthus,forsome,aseriouscatalystindecidingtoreturn.“Ibelieveinthereformsthepresidentinitiated.Thisisanopportunitytotakepartintheseprocessessothattheybearresultsin5-10yearsandIcanbeproudofmyself.ThisisespeciallytruegivenmypreviousactivityinUzbekistan,”said one respondent.A specialistwith extensive experience in strategic planning inWesternEurope, herecentlytookupapositionintheministryforinvestmentandforeigntrade.

Someotherpeoplehadmorepragmaticreasons.“MyfriendswereaskingmewhyIwasleavingmycomfortzone,everythingIhad.IknewIwouldnothavethesalaryinUzbekistanIusedtohaveintheUS(whichissohighbecauselivingexpensesaresohighthere).Ihadnopoliticalexperienceatall.ButIsawit[thejoboffer]asaonce-in-a-lifetimeopportunity.IfIdidn’tusethischancenow,ImightnothaveoneinthefutureandImightregretit.TheMotherlandneedsusnow,”saidanotherreturnee.

ToReturnorNottoReturn?As most interviews showed, not many people are eager to return to Uzbekistan, for different reasons.Corruption,1alackofpublicadministrationreforms,old-stylebureaucracy,absenceofgenuineinterestby

1Uzbekistanranked158thoutof180countriesonTransparencyInternational’sCorruptionPerceptionsIndexin2018—see Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2018,” accessed May 13, 2019,https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018.

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government bodies, and insufficient health and education services for children were the main issuesreturneesfacedorexpectedtofacewhenandiftheyreturned.

Theneedtoworklonghoursandonweekendswasdescribedasaproblembysomeofthosewhodecidedtoreturn.AreturneewithaPhDdegreeinlawfromaEuropeancountrydescribedhisexperience:“Although Iwaspromisedahighsalary, Ihad towork for free forseveralmonthswaiting fora securityclearance.Theworkwasdifficult,wehadtoworklonghours,andIwasaskedtocomeinmostweekendsaswell.It’sgoodthatmyfamilydidnotcomewithmeimmediately,otherwiseIwouldnothavebeenabletosustainmyself.”

Another respondent, who was appointed to a mid-level position in the government, answeredsimilarly:“OneneedstobepatientifheorshewantstoreturntoUzbekistan.Someorganizationsarequicktoimplementchanges;somearenot…Onemayhavetoworkforfreeforthreeorfourmonths,working12-14hoursaday,toprovethatheorsheisthe‘rightasset.’Ihadtogothroughthesesteps.Moreover,exceptfortheMinistryofFinance,whichisreallyinterestedinmeritocracy,notallgovernmentorganizationsareeagertohireforeignspecialistsandreadytopayhighwages.”

ThreerespondentsreportedthattheyhadbeenatacertainlevelofnegotiationswithrepresentativesoftheUzbekgovernment.Fromtheiraccounts,Icanconcludethatgovernmentofficialsshowdifferentlevelsofenthusiasminnegotiatingwithpotentialreturnees.Onerespondentdidnotseemuchenthusiasmwhenheapproachedthemwithalistofserviceshecouldprovide,whileanotherreportedconstantinterestbygovernmentofficials.

“Idonotconsidermyselfahigh-caliberprofessionalthattheembassyoragovernmentofficialwouldreachouttoandaskifIwanttoreturn.IwashappywhenthegovernmentestablishedtheEl-yurtUmidiFoundationandannounceditsstrategyofbringingthehighlyskilledhome.However,IcouldnotfindoutwhatIshoulddoifIplantoreturntoUzbekistan.IfyouvisittheEl-yurtUmidiwebsite,youmaynotfindrelevant and up-to-date information. They have a lot of information on sendingUzbek professionals fortraining(includingMAandPhDstudies),butnotmuchoninvitingthosewhoalreadyhavethistrainingtoreturn,” reported a respondent with more than five years of work experience in an internationalorganization.

One respondent claimed that the government should be open and engaging in working withcompatriots. In particular, he spoke about those Uzbeks who have lost their citizenship and do notnecessarilyacquiredforeigncitizenship.Accordingtoonereport,startinginmid-2014theGovernmentofUzbekistandeprivedhundredsofitsnationalslivingoutsidethecountryofcitizenshipwithoutthelatter’sknowledge.1Assuch,itiscurrentlyalmostimpossibleforthesepeopletovisitUzbekistan.

TheremayalsobepeoplewhocannotofferexpertiseandknowledgethatisrelevanttoUzbekistan’scurrentneeds.Apersonwhowasinvolvedingovernmenteffortstobringskilledpeoplehomesaidthatnotallcandidatesarenecessarilysuitableforthejobthatisbeingoffered.Heindicatedthatafterpeoplereturnandstartwork,itsometimesbecomesclearthattheyeitherwillnotdelivertheexpectedresultsorcannotwithstandthestressesoftheworkload.Consequently,hesaid,severalreturneesendedupleavingagain.

Inmyresearch,Ifoundthattheeconomicandpoliticalreforms,aswellasthegovernment’scallforcompatriots to return, may not be enough to attract highly skilled migrants. This is also confirmed byempiricalevidencefromseveralcontexts.2Evidently,therefore,therearereasonswhyaskilledmigrantwillorwillnotreturnthatgobeyondchangesinhisorherhomecountry.

Family issues are one of the factors that may shape skilled migrants’ return decisions. Havingchildrenwhoarealreadyenrolledinpubliceducationinthenationallanguagesofdestinationcountriesmaybeaseriousreasontopostponeone’sreturn.Onerespondentreportedthattheyhadactuallyreturnedto

1“Chetdagiminglabuzbekistonliklaruzlaribilmaganvaistamagankholdafukarolikdanmakhrumkilinishimumkin,”Minbar,May16,2019,https://minbar.uz/post/fuqaro-kambagal-degani.2See,forexample,ElizabethThomas-Hope,“ReturnMigrationtoJamaicaanditsDevelopmentPotential,”InternationalMigration37,no.1(1999):193-207,orRusselKing,“GeneralizationfromtheHistoryofReturnMigration,”inReturnMigration:JourneyofHopeorDespair,ed.B.Ghosh,(Geneva:IOM,2000),7-55.

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Uzbekistanseveralyearsagobuthadtomigrateagainbecausetheirchildrencouldnotadapttothelocalcontext.Thequalityofeducationandhealthcareservicesforchildrenwasalsoanissueofconcernforsomehighlyskilledmigrants.

Labormarketopportunitiesandcareerprospectsalsoplayacertainrole.Onerespondentsaidthathewouldhavetoworkabroadforatleasttwomoreyearsinordertogainexperiencethatwouldgivehimthe“power,”orleverage,tonegotiatehistermswiththegovernmentandgetahigherposition.“IfIreturnrightnow,myknowledgemaynotbeenough;they[theUzbekgovernment]maynottakemeseriouslywithmycurrentstatus,”hesaid.

Forasmallnumberofrespondents,theirreturnwasduetoarecognitionthattheirinitialmigrationfromUzbekistanhadbeenabaddecision.Onerespondentwhohaslivedinadestinationcountryfortenyearssaid, “MyreturntoUzbekistan is justaquestionof time.And it isnotaboutpoliticalchange inmycountry.IwillreturntoUzbekistananyway.”TurningBrainDrainintoBrainGainAnotherquestionthatdrawsattentioniswhetherasendingcountryshouldtrytobringinasmanyofitshighlyskilledcompatriotsaspossible.ThecasesoftheChinese,Indian,andArmeniandiasporasshowthathighlyskilledmigrantsdonothavetoreturnhomeinordertohelpdeveloptheirhomecountry.AsKuznetsovnotes,“expatriatesdonotneedtobeinvestorsormakefinancialcontributionstohaveanimpactontheirhome countries. They can serve as ‘bridges’ by providing access tomarkets, sources of investment, andexpertise. Influential members of diasporas can shape public debate, articulate reform plans, and helpimplementreformsandnewprojects.”1

One example of this is so-called “diaspora bonds,”2 where immigrants buy bonds issued by thegovernments of their countries of origin. These bonds can provide a source of funds for developmentprojects.Inrecentdecades,IndiaandIsraelhavesuccessfullyraisedoverUS$35billionthroughdiasporabonds,whileArmeniarecentlyannouncedthatitwouldissuesuchbonds.3However,diasporabondsmayonlybesuccessfulforcountrieswithlargeandwealthydiasporasabroad.

CountrieslikeUzbekistan,whichhaverelativelysmalldiasporasinWesterncountries,shouldseekbenefitsfromotherareas.Firstofall,aswesawintheprevioussection,agovernmentcannotandshouldnotseektobringbackallofitscompatriotsabroad:amigrant’sdecisiontoreturnhomedoesnotalwaysdependonchangesinthehomecountry.Second,acompatriot’sworkinadestinationcountrymayplayapositiveroleforbothsendinganddestinationcountries.

“InordertoserveUzbekistan,onedoesnotneedtobethere.IbelieveIcanhelpmycountryevenwhileIamhere[intheUSA].IamgoingtoinitiateacademicexchangeprogramswithUzbekuniversities.PeopleknowmehereasarepresentativeofUzbekistan,soitisalsogoodforUzbekistan’spositiveimage,”said one respondent. I received almost the same answer from other respondents in academia. AnotherrespondentisactivelyinvolvedintheUzbekEmbassy’sdifferentinitiatives(includingtourismandculturepromotion, work with the Uzbek diaspora, etc.), providing advice and using her connections in thedestinationcountry.

An Uzbek lawyer counsels Uzbeks, both those who are planning to immigrate and those whocurrently live inthedestinationcountry,on immigrationmatters.Healsopublishesarticles intheUzbekmediaonlegalissues,thuscontributingtolegalliteracyanddiscussionsoflegalreformsinthehomecountry.Nolessimportantaretheremittancesthathighlyskilledimmigrantssendhome,whichmightbeusedtopaythetuitionfeesofyoungerfamilymembers.

1Kuznetsov,DiasporaNetworksandtheInternationalMigrationofSkills,3.2 Suhas L. Ketkar and Dilip Ratha, “Diaspora Bonds: Tapping the Diaspora During the Difficult Times,” Journal ofInternationalCommerce,EconomicsandPolicy1,no.2(2010):251-63.3 “Q&A: Why Armenia is Rolling Out Diaspora Bonds for Development,” Devex.com, August 15, 2018,https://www.devex.com/news/q-a-why-armenia-is-rolling-out-diaspora-bonds-for-development-93275.

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ConclusionTheliteratureontalentmobilitychangeditsevaluationofthephenomenon,turningfromanegative“braindrain”toapositive“braingain.”Inrecentyears,theriseoftransnationalisminmigrationstudiesandtheavailabilityofevidencefrommanycontextshavegivenrisetothemoreneutralterm“braincirculation.”Theconnections between institutional changes in sending countries, highly skilled migration, and returnmigrationareunsystematicandscatteredinthetheoreticalliterature.Moreover,thereisverylittleknownaboutthereturnmigrationofhighlyskilledindividualsfromCentralAsiancountries.

MyinterviewsrevealedwhichfactorsincentivizehighlyskilledUzbekstoreturnandwhichposeanobstacle. For those who returned, patriotism, a sense of belonging, pragmatism, and opportunity weredecisivefactors.Peopleexplainedthattheywerekeentobepartofthechangesintheirhomecountry.Atthesametime,thewidespreadold-stylebureaucracy,corruption,alackofrealeconomicandpoliticalreforms(includingpublicadministrationreforms),andlowlivingstandardswerethemainfactorsthatmadeothershesitant toreturn.Someexpressedhope that thegovernmentwouldspeedup itseconomicandpoliticalreformsandthatthelevelofbureaucracywoulddiminishsoon.

Anothergroupofrespondentswereskepticalaboutanypossibilityofreturn.Theydidnotbelieveinthesincerityandsuccessofthechangesintheirhomecountry.Theyhavemadetheirdecisiontoleavethecountryandhaveinvestedtheirtimeandcapitalinadaptingtoadestinationcountry.Theinterviewsalsoconfirmedthenotionthatinstitutionalandeconomicchangesinthehomecountrymightnotinfluencethereturn decisions of highly skilledmigrants. In some cases,migrants’ family circumstances (for example,childbearingoreldercareresponsibilities),socialissues,andprofessionalandpersonalreasonsmayeitherpushthemtoreturnorpreventthemfromreturning.

Theresearchalsoconfirmedthatasendingcountrycanbenefitfromitshighlyskilledcompatriotseven if they stay in destination countries. Such benefits could be reaped through the establishment ofbusinessnetworks,academicexchangeprogramsbetweensendinganddestinationcountries,monetaryandsocialremittances,thepromotionofapositiveimageofthehomecountry,andtheuseofcompatriotsasaculturalbridge.

NotwithstandingacertainlevelofinterestamongUzbekcompatriotsinreturningtoUzbekistan(andtheactualreturnofafewofthem)sincetheleadershipchangeandthelaunchofeconomicreforms,Tashkentstillneedstodomoretoencourageitscompatriotstoreturnhome.Thefollowingrecommendationscouldhelp Uzbekistan attract asmany highly skilled people as possible and promote a positive image of thecountry:

• Thegovernmentshouldadoptalawonpublicservicesandspeeduppublicadministrationreforms,

whichshouldfocusonreducingbureaucracy,promotingmeritocracy,andfightingcorruption;• TheEl-yurtUmidiFoundationshouldbemoreactiveandconsistentinitsworkwithcompatriots,

providingup-to-dateinformationandsupportingcompatriotspost-return;• UzbekEmbassiesshouldbemoreactiveinworkingwithUzbekdiasporas,includingengagingwith

thosepeoplewhohaveinadvertentlylosttheirUzbekcitizenship.

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ZiyarahTourism

asaNewLinkageforTourismDevelopmentinUzbekistan

SurayyoUsmanovaSurayyoUsmanova teaches Public International Law and International Tourism Law at theUniversity ofWorldEconomyandDiplomacy,whereshealsoleadstheCouncilofYouthScientistsfortheInternationalLawFaculty inUzbekistan.Her research interests include international security law, IslamicLaw, international-legalaspectsoftourism,andlegalissuesofparliamentarydiplomacy.SheearnedaBAinInternationalLawandanMA in Diplomatic and Consular Law at the University ofWorld Economy and Diplomacy, where she iscurrentlyaPhDcandidateinInternationalLaw.Tourism is a stable source of foreign exchange earnings and has a positive impact on the expansion ofinternationalrelations,alongwithasignificantroleinnationaleconomies.Thissectoralsopromotesnewmultilateral networks, advancing the economic, social, legal, and political development of states. Theannouncementof2017asthe“YearofSustainableDevelopmentofTourism”bytheUnitedNationsWorldTourism Organization (UNWTO) and the elaboration of the first Universal Framework Convention onTourism Ethics within the framework of the UNWTO have further enhanced this sector's role on theinternationalscene.1Theannualgrowth in thenumberof touristsandthetourismindustry'ssubstantialshare of gross domestic product (GDP) of different states confirms the relevance of tourism in today’seconomy. InIslam,ziyara(h)(Arabic: ةرایز ziyārah,visit)orziyarat(Persian: ترایز ,ziyārat,pilgrimage)isaformofpilgrimagetositesassociatedwithveneratedfiguresinIslam,suchastheProphets,theSufiauliya,andIslamicscholars.2Pilgrimagesitesincludemosques,mausoleums,andbattlefields.Traditionally,thistypeoftourismwasassociatedwithHajjandUmrahinSaudiArabia.Today,however,ziyarahtourismisdefinedmorebroadly,asallformsofIslamicpilgrimagetourism,includingnotonlythetwoholydestinationsbutalsomanynewplaceswhereMuslimtouristscancombinesightseeingwithreligiousduties. AnoutgrowthofthisriseinziyarahtourismhasbeenaboominhalalproductsandservicesdesignedtocaterspecificallytoMuslimtasteandbusinesstravelersacrosstheglobe.TheMuslimtourismmarkethaswitnessedrapidgrowthovertheyearsandemergedasoneofthefastest-growingsegmentsoftheglobaltourismmarket.In2017,thenumberofMuslimtouristsamountedto131millionpeopleandtheincomefromMuslimtourismhitUS$142billion.Itisexpectedthatby2020thenumberofMuslimtouristsintheworldwillreach160millionpeople;by2026,therevenuefromthistypeoftourismwillbeUS$300billion.3

Uzbekistan is locatedat thecrossroadsofCentralAsia,bridgingnorth, south,east,andwest.Therepublic,whichhas a rich cultural, historical, andnatural heritageofmore than4,000architectural and

1SeeStuartMitchell,“UNWTOCodeofEthicsforTourismBecomesanInternationalConvention,”EthicalMarketingNews, September 19, 2017, last accessed August 10, 2018, http://ethicalmarketingnews.com/unwto-code-ethics-tourism-becomes-international-convention.2 “Ziyarah—Oxford Islamic Studies Online,” Oxford Islamic Studies, accessed August 6, 2018,www.oxfordislamicstudies.com.3See“Vstolitseproshlapress-konferentsiiamposviashchennaiaZierat turizmu,”UzbekTourism,accessedApril27,2019,https://uzbektourism.uz/ru/newnews/view?id=216.

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cultural-historicalmonuments,including20onUNESCO’slistofworldculturalheritage,1iscurrentlylookingtoattractmoreforeignandnationaltouristsandfinditsplaceintheglobaltourismmarket.ConsideringthattheHanafimadhhabfollowedinUzbekistanalsopredominatesintherestofCentralAsia,Pakistan,Turkey,Albania,BosniaandHerzegovina,Greece,andBulgaria,2Uzbekistanhasgoodpotentialtoattractpilgrimagetourists.Furthermore,Islamisthefastest-growingreligionintheworld:itisprojectedthattherewillbe2.2billionMuslimsby2030.3Assuch,Muslimpilgrimswhowanttoavoid“touristtraps”willincreasinglyseekoutundiscovereddestinations.

ThroughananalysisofongoingreformsinthesphereofziyarahtourisminUzbekistan,thispaperidentifiesnumerouswaystodevelopIslamicpilgrimagetourisminUzbekistan.First,itexplorestworegionalinstitutional frameworks—the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Shanghai CooperationOrganization—and their potential role in improving ziyarah tourism inUzbekistan. Next, it looks at theimplementationofinstitutionalandlegalbestpracticesinrelationtoMuslim-friendlytourism.PotentialofIslamicPilgrimageTourisminUzbekistanUzbekistanhasauniqueheritageofIslamiccultureandhistoricalmonuments.Assuch,itshouldbeofgreatinteresttotouristsfromMuslimcountriesandhasstrongpotentialtoattractthem.ThecountryishometoimportantcitiesfortheMuslimworld,especiallyBukharaandSamarkand.ThenamesofsuchgreatsasImamAl-Bukhari, ImamAt-Termizi, ImamAl-Maturudi,Baha-ud-DinNaqshbandi,andAz-Zamakshariy,all frompresent-day Uzbekistan, are well-known. Baha-ud-Din Naqshbandi is now recognized as the “Sultan ofSufism,”4potentiallymakinghiman importantdraw forSufipilgrims.SamarkandpossessessuchuniquetourismsitesasAl-BukhariyMausoleum,theTombofSt.Daniel(prophetofthreemajorreligions),RuhobodMausoleum(burialplaceofSheikhBurhanuddinSagardji,thespiritualmentorofAmirTimur),theShakhiZindanecropolis,etc.Tourismandmanagementresearchershavealreadyorganizeda7-daytourforpilgrimsthatvisitsmorethan30destinationsfromTashkenttoBukhara.5 However,Uzbekistandoesnotyethaveawell-developedbrand forpilgrimage tourism.Asurveyconductedbyforeignexpertsoverseveralmonthsin2017foundthatjust2.2percentoftotalvisitorsinthatperiodcameforanypilgrimage-relatedactivities.6ThisprovesthatmostoftheresourcesdirectedtowarddevelopingUzbekistan’stourismindustryarefocusedonhistoricalandculturalissuesratherthanreligiousones.IntheCrescentRatingthatranksnationsonhalaltourism,Uzbekistanheldjust29thplacein2017.7

SinceShavkatMirziyoyevbecamepresidentinDecember2016,therehavebeenongoingreformsandchangesinthetourismsector.Already,morethan50lawsandbylawshavebeenadopted.8Upontheadoption

1N.Faizibaeva,“Evropakakodinizvazhneishikhturisticheskikhtsentrovmira,”Mezhdunarodnyeotnosheniia:politika,ekonomika,pravo4(2012):60.2See“Kakovageografiiarasprostraneniiamazhabovvovsemmire?”IslamToday,October14,2015,accessedApril27,2019,https://islam-today.ru/veroucenie/vopros-otvet/kakova-geografia-rasprostranenia-mazhabov-vo-vsem-mire/.3 Onur Akbulut and Yakin Ekin, “Reflections of Hajj and Umrah Pilgrimage on Religious Stores in Mugla-Turkey,”InternationalJournalofReligiousTourismandPilgrimage6,no.3(2018):11.4BakhtiyorNavruz-ZodaandZebinisoNavruz-Zoda,“TheDestinationMarketingDevelopmentofReligiousTourisminUzbekistan,”InternationalJournalofReligiousTourismandPilgrimage4,no.7(2016):9-10.doi:10.21427/D7G01X.5Ibid.SeetheAppendix,“Proposed‘SufiTour’ThroughSufiShrinesinUzbekistan.”6CentreofBusinessandTourismDevelopment(CBTD),“2017UzbekistanInternationalVisitorTrendSurveyReport,”Khiva, Uzbekistan, 2018, accessed July 24, 2019, http://www.visitkhiva.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/surveyreport20180303-web.pdf,30.7“HalalTourisminUzbekistan?Sure!”ConsulateoftheRepublicofUzbekistaninNovosibirsk(viaUzbekistanToday),May 23, 2018, accessed May 1, 2019,http://www.uzbekistan.nsk.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10291:halal-tourism-in-uzbekistan-sure&catid=40:tourism&Itemid=91.8 See “Turizm v Uzbekistane—2018,” report, Uzbek Tourism, accessed April 29, 2019,https://uzbektourism.uz/newnews/download?url=21.02.rus.pdf,43-47.

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of the “ActionStrategy forFurtherDevelopmentof theRepublicofUzbekistan,”datedFebruary7,2017,tourismbecameastrategicsectorofthenationaleconomy.TheDecreeofthePresidentoftheRepublicofUzbekistan “On measurements for intensified development of the tourism industry in the Republic ofUzbekistan”andthecontinuationofthesereforms1hasbeenanimportantsteptowardfurtherreformsinthissector.Themostrecentimportantpolicydocumentonthisissueisthe“ConceptoftourismdevelopmentintheRepublicofUzbekistanin2019-2025,”producedbytheStateCommitteeforTourismDevelopmentoftheRepublicofUzbekistan. Sofar,themajorityoftouristscomingtoUzbekistan(518,666outof549,454inMarch2019)werefromtheCIS(CommonwealthofIndependentStates).Veryfewtouristscomefromthecountriesoftheso-called far abroad.2 Uzbekistan has yet to live up to its potential to attractMuslim tourists. Some publicresistancemustbeacknowledged:increasingMuslimtourismisseenbysomeasincreasingtheriskofthedevelopmentofradicalIslaminthecountry.Yetthisisalimitedview,asreasonsforradicalismareoftenhomegrownandnotrelatedtointernationalfactors;moreover,UzbekIslamisalreadybeingincorporatedintotheglobalUmmahbymanyothervectors.UsingtheOrganizationofIslamicCooperationtoDevelopZiyarahTourismTheOrganizationof IslamicCooperation(OIC)haspreparedastrategic roadmap for thedevelopmentofIslamictourismamongitsmemberstates.Theroadmapprovidesamethodologicalframeworkforenhancingcooperationbetweenmember-statesinthefieldoftourism.CooperationinIslamictourismiscomprisedoffiveareas:dataandmonitoring;policyandregulation;marketingandpromotion;destinationandindustrydevelopment;andcapacitydevelopmenttopromoteinter-Islamiccooperationandimprovetheecosystemof Islamic tourism in OIC member-states.3 Uzbekistan was admitted to the Organization of IslamicCooperation(OIC)asanobserverinOctober1995.ItbecameafullmemberoftheOrganizationonOctober2, 1996. Uzbekistanmaintains a bilateral partnership for tourism development—the IntergovernmentalCommissiononTradeandEconomicCooperation—withtheUnitedArabEmirates. ThepromotionofziyarahtourismhasbeenfeaturedinseveralbilateralagreementsoverthepasttwoyearsbetweenUzbekistanandotherMuslimcountries.Forexample,agreementsontheorganizationofspecialpilgrimage tours inUzbekistanhavebeenmadewithPakistan,Malaysia, Indonesia, andTurkey.4However,giventhattheOIChas57member-states,manynewbilateralagreementscouldbesigned,andtheflowoftouristsfromMuslimcountriesremainsmodest.

Table1.DistributionbycountryofthenumberofvisitorswhoenteredUzbekistanbetweenMarch2018andMarch2019

1 See theDecreeonAdditionalMeasures for Improving theDevelopmentof theTourismSphere,” January5,2019,accessedFebruary8,2019,http://lex.uz/docs/4143188.2 See “Kolichestva inostrannikh turistov za mart 2018 i mart 2019,” Uzbek Tourism, accessed April 28, 2019,https://uzbektourism.uz/ru/research.3 APP, “OIC Prepares a Roadmap to Promote Islamic Tourism,” The Express Tribune, January 15, 2018,https://tribune.com.pk/story/1609017/1-oic-prepares-roadmap-promote-islamic-tourism/.4Thisinformationwaslearnedduringtheresearcher’sfellowshipattheStateCommitteeforTourismDevelopmentoftheRepublicofUzbekistan(November2017-May2018).

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Source:TheCommitteeforTourismDevelopmentoftheRepublicofUzbekistan,

https://uzbektourism.uz/ru/research.TheUzbek authorities have also taken several other steps todevelopziyarah tourism, including, amongothers:

• Theintroductionofavisa-freeregimeforaperiodof30daysforcitizensof64countries,includingIndonesia,Malaysia,Turkey,andtheUnitedArabEmirates;

• The introductionofa “pilgrimvisa” forup to twomonths for foreigncitizenswhocometomakepilgrimages and study the cultural, historical, religious, and spiritual heritage and traditions ofUzbekistan;and

• TheintroductionofhalalstandardsincateringandrestaurantsinUzbekistansinceFebruary2018.1 InFebruary2019,theBukharaDeclaration,whichrecognizesUzbekistanasacenterofziyarahtourism,wassignedwithintheframeworkoftheFirstInternationalForumonZiyarahTourism.Oneoftheparticipants,AzatAkhunovfromKazanFederalUniversity,emphasizedthatUzbekistan,withitshistoricalandreligiouspotential, could develop ziyarah tourism. In particular, he indicated, the country possesses uniquedestinationsforfollowersoftheHanafimadhabandSufism.2 Theimplementationofthe“Muslim-FriendlyTourism”and“IslamicPilgrimageTourism”projectsintheframeworkoftheStateCommitteeforTourismDevelopmentofUzbekistan,withinvestmentfromtheOICandIDB(IslamicDevelopmentBank),wouldencouragethegrowthoftourismfromMuslimcountries.ShanghaiCooperationOrganisationasaZiyarahTourismMarketforUzbekistan?

1UzbekTourism,“Vstolitseproshla.”2AkhunovAzatMarsovich,personalinterviewwiththeauthor,TheGeorgeWashingtonUniversity,Washington,DC,May2019.

299

67

173

48

467

106

234

13

56.2

58.2

35.3

-72.9

-100 0 100 200 300 400 500

Malaysia

Saudi Arabia

Indonesia

Qatar

indicator in% 2019/03 2018/03

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Oneofthemainregionalorganizations,ofwhichUzbekistanhasbeenamembersince2005,istheShanghaiCooperation Organization (SCO), which brings together Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, andTajikistan,aswellas(morerecently)PakistanandIndia,nottomentionfourobserverstates,sixdialoguepartners,andfourguests.Atpresent,itseightmembersaccountfor80percentofEurasia'slandmass,43percentoftheworld’spopulation,andaquarteroftheworld’sGDP.Intermsofgeographiccoverageandpopulation size, it is the largest regional organization in theworld.1 Even in SCO countries that are notmajority-Muslim,Muslimsrepresentimportantminorities:172millioninIndia,14millioninRussia,2and20millioninChina, including10millionHanChineseMuslims.Moreover,Chinabecametheglobal leaderintourismspendingin2017,withatotaloutboundexpenditureofUS$258billion,significantlyhigherthanthesecond-rankedUnitedStatesofAmerica.3 Consequently, the SCO could be used to develop ziyarah tourism in Uzbekistan. Article 3 of theCharteroftheShanghaiCooperationOrganization(2002)andArticle19oftheTreatyonLong-TermGood-Neighborhood,FriendshipandCooperationoftheShanghaiCooperationOrganizationMemberStates(2007)statethatthepartieswillendeavortoexpandanddevelopequitableandmutuallybeneficialbilateralandmultilateralcooperationinthefieldoftourismwiththepurposeofformationofacommontourismspaceonthebasisoftheprevailingcultural-historicalandeconomicrelations. Regionalrelationsinthefieldoftourismarecarriedoutonthebasisofspecialnormscommonfordifferentareasofcooperationandinternationallegalnormsonpartnershipandcooperation.InternationallegalregulationoftourismwithintheframeworkoftheSCOisdefinedbytwobasicnorms:

1. “StrategiesfortheDevelopmentoftheSCOuntil2025,”adocumentthatlaysoutguidelinesandparametersforthefurtherdevelopmentoftheOrganization,4includingtourism.

2. The joint tourism development program developed by Russia Tourism, adopted by theleaders of the states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on June 24, 2016. Themain goal of thedocumentistopromotetheexpansionanddevelopmentofequal,mutuallybeneficialcooperationinthefieldof tourism inorder to forma common tourist spacebasedonexisting cultural, historical, andeconomicconnections. These measures will contribute to the intensification of tourist exchanges, the growth ofincomes received from this sphere by all the SCO member-states, the creation of new jobs, and theimprovementofcitizens’qualityoflife.

The tourism development program emphasizes the formation of a single tourism space andensuringtourists’safety.Themaintaskistoincreasetouristflowsandupgradetourismservices.Forthispurpose,member-statesareinvitedtoexchangeexperiencesintherealizationofpublicpolicyinthisarea,strengthen relationsbetween theirNGOs, organize tourist fairs, createnew tourist routes, and regularlyexchange information about the tourismmarket and resources.Member-stateswill develop cooperationwithin the framework of the leaders’ meeting of national tourism administrations and will work out acorrespondingdocumentaboutcollaborationinthisarea.5

AsafullmemberoftheSCO,theRepublicofUzbekistansupportstheimplementationoftheSCODevelopmentStrategyuntil2025andthejointprogramforthedevelopmentoftourism,whichwassigned

1SeeInternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies,“TheEvolutionoftheShanghaiCooperationOrganisation,”accessedApril30,2019,https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2018/shanghai-cooperation-organisation.2 See Alan Cooperman, Neikha Saigal, and Anna Schiller, “Religiia i natsional’naia prinadlezhnost’ v Tsentral’noi iVostochnoiEvrope,”PewResearchCenter,May10,2017,accessedMay16,2019,https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2017/05/CEUP-Overview-Russian-FOR-WEB.pdf.3 SeeUnitedNationsWorld TourismOrganization, “StrongOutboundTourismDemand fromBoth Traditional andEmergingMarketsin2017,”April23,2018,accessedMay16,2019,https://media.unwto.org/press-release/2018-04-23/strong-outbound-tourism-demand-both-traditional-and-emerging-markets-2017.4ThestrategywasdevelopedinaccordancewiththeDecisionoftheCounciloftheHeadsofStateoftheSCONo.3fromSeptember12,2014,inDushanbe.5 S.B. Usmanova, Mezhdunarodno-pravovoe regulirovanie turizma v ramkakh ShOS. Vstrechi trekh pokoleniiRespublikanskaianauchno-prakticheskaiakonferentsiia(Tashkent:TGIuU,2017),34-36.

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inTashkent.1ThemainpartnersoftheUzbektouroperatorsaretravelorganizationsfromWesternEurope,South-EastAsia,andthePacific.Theymaintaindirect linkswith theUzbeksideanduse itsservices.TheinitiativeofestablishinganongovernmentalorganizationforthetouroperatorsofSCOmember-states—theUnion of theAssociation of TourOperators—has not yet been approved by the governmental bodies ofUzbekistanbutwouldbeafirststepforward.

The creationof theUnionof theAssociationofTourOperatorsof the SCOmember-stateswouldincreasecompetitionamong the tourismcompaniesofCentralAsia,whichmight lead toadecline in theincomesofUzbektouroperators,aswellas limitingrevenuesfromthetourismsector intheRepublicofUzbekistan.Atthesametime,however,thistypeofcooperationwouldhelptoimprove“close”relationshipsbetween thenongovernmental tourismsectorsofmemberstates. Itwouldhelp todevelopa face-to-facedialoguebetweentouroperators.Competitionbetweenthemwouldalsoleadtorapidimprovementintheservicesoftouroperators.Itwouldbeworthwhiletoproposeavisa-freeregime(orshort-termvisa-freestayofatleast30days)amongtheSCOmember-states.

MalaysiaasaRoleModelforBecomingaHalalTourismHubHalal tourism as a concept has had different names—including Sharia tourism and Muslim-friendlytourism—but none of these terms is universally understood.2 Halal tourism is a unique term that issimultaneously familiar and unfamiliar in Uzbekistan. Halal means “permissible” according to Islamicteachings.3Sinceithasamajority-Muslimpopulation,Uzbekistanrecognizesthehalalconceptinfoodsanddaily activities. However, it was not until 2017-2018 that Tashkent began to give special attention toorganizingahalal tourismsupplychain in thecountry.Asapost-Sovietsecularcountryafraidof Islamicterrorism and extremism, Uzbekistan did not pay sufficient attention to Islamic tourism before 2017.Certainly,today’sUzbekistanhasthefacilitiestomeetthefundamentalneedsofMuslimtourists(includingmosquesandprayerroomsatsomehotelsandstations)buttheseremainverylimited. The improvementofziyarah tourism isdirectly connected to thedevelopmentofahalal tourisminfrastructure.ThemaincomponentsofIslamictourismareconsideredtobe:

• Halalhotels,someof themain indicatorsofwhichare:noalcoholorgambling;halal foodonly;Quran,prayermats,andarrowsindicatingthedirectionofMeccaineveryroom;bedsandtoiletspositioned so as not to face in the direction ofMecca; prayer rooms; conservative staff dress;Islamicfunding;andseparaterecreationalfacilitiesformenandwomen.

• Halaltransport(airlines),whichfeaturecleanlinessandnonalcoholicdrinks;• Halalfoodpremises:foodsservedinarestauranthavetobehalal.Allanimalsmustbeslaughtered

accordingtoIslamicprinciples.Noalcoholicdrinksshouldbeserved.• Halaltourpackages:ThecontentofthetourpackagesmustbebasedonanIslamictheme.Islamic

tourpackagesincludevisitstomosquesandIslamicmonuments,aswellasspecialreligiouseventsduringRamadan.

1Thefollowingareconsidered“drafts”and“studies”oftheCommitteeforTourismDevelopmentofUzbekistan:• DraftRegulationsoftheSCOMemberStatesPermanentExpertGrouponCooperationintheSphereofTourism;• Draft Program for theDevelopment of Cooperation on Tourism of the Shanghai CooperationOrganizationMemberStates,submittedtotheCabinetofMinistersoftheRepublicofUzbekistanonJuly14,2015.ThisinformationwaslearnedduringmyfellowshipattheStateCommitteeforTourismDevelopmentoftheRepublicofUzbekistan(November2017-May2018).2TheStatistical,EconomicandSocialResearchandTrainingCentreforIslamicCountries(SESRIC),“SESRICActivityReport:ImplementationofOICFrameworkforDevelopmentandCooperationintheDomainofTourism,2016-2017,”reportsubmittedtotheTenthSessionoftheIslamicConferenceofTourismMinistersoftheOICMemberStates,Dhaka,Bangladesh,February5-7,2018,accessedJuly25,2019https://www.oic-oci.org/docdown/?docID=1771&refID=1071.3MohammedBatour,“MuslimTravelBehaviorinHalalTourism,”inMobilities,TourismandTravelBehavior—ContextsandBoundaries,ed.LeszekButowski(InTechOpen,2018),4,http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.70370.

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• Halalfinance:Thefinancialresourcesofthehotel,restaurant,travelagency,andairlinehavetobeinaccordwithIslamicprinciples.Ingeneral,Islamicfinancerequiressharingtheprofitandlossbetweenallpartiesinvolvedinanenterprise.1

Theongoingchangesandreformsdirectedtoward“halal”tourisminUzbekistanshowthatseveral

stepshavebeen already taken. These include the introductionof halal certification,2 the organizationoftrainingsonhalaltourism,3andtheconstructionofhalalhotels.4Whatshouldbedonetofurtherdevelophalal tourism?Andhowshould itbeorganized?Learningaboutand implementing foreignbestpracticescouldbeonewaytofindanswerstothesequestions. Withmorethan35yearsofexperience,MalaysiahassuccessfullybrandeditselfasanIslamicandhalalhub.SinceUzbekistanisasecularstateandlackshalalregulationsof itsown, itcouldbaseits legalregulationsonthoseusedbyMalaysia.InMalaysia,themainlegalactsrelevanttohalalfoodareconsideredtobetheFoodAct(1983)andtheFoodHygieneRegulation(2009),whichindicatethata“foodhandler”isapersonwhoisdirectlyinvolvedinpreparingfood,comesintodirectcontactwithfood,orhandlespackagedorunpackaged foodon the foodpremises. Clause33of theFoodHygieneRegulationalso addresses thepersonal hygieneof a foodhandlerwhile handling, preparing, packing, carrying, storing, displaying, andservingfoodtoconsumers.5In2011,thecountryadoptedtheTradeDescriptionAct,whichwasintendedtocombatfraudulenthalalcertificationandfraudulentuseofthehalallogoinrelatedindustries.6 Malaysia’slegalbasisforhalaltourismconditionsincludesseveralotherdocuments,amongthem:

• MalaysiaStandard1500:2009,whichregulatesthepersonalhygiene,clothing,devices,utensils,machinesandprocessingaidsandthepremises forprocessing,manufacturing,andstorageoffood(Clause3.4)7;

• Manual Procedure Pensijilan Halal Malaysia (MPPHM) 2014. This manual lays out halalproceduresforhotelkitchensandrestaurants.Point6.2.2.4mentionsthattocomplywithhalalrequirements, an organization needs to appoint at least 2 Muslim people for eachkitchen/premisesanddevelopHalalAssuranceSystemguidelines;8

• HalalAssuranceSystem(HAS)2012.Ittakesmoreprecautionswithhalalcontrolandassuranceactivities in logistics, transport, business procedures, and methods.9 According to point 4.5,organizationsorhotelsthatintendtohavehalalcertificationneedtoestablishafour-memberInternal Halal Committee (IHC) responsible for purchasing, developing, monitoring, andcontrolling the halal assurance system to ensure its effectiveness and have Internal HalalCommitteemeetingstodiscusscurrentissuesrelatedtoHalalAssuranceManagementSystems,

1M.AkyolandO.Kilinc,“InternetandHalalTourismMarketing,”ElectronicTurkishStudies8/9(2014).2 See “HalalCertification inUzbekistan forUnhinderedAccess to theMalaysianMarket,”UzDaily,August20,2018,https://www.uzdaily.uz/en/post/45359.3See“Khalial’turizm:VTashkentestartovaltreningsuchastiemmezhdunarodnykhekspertov,”Kun.uz,November13,2018, https://kun.uz/ru/news/2018/11/13/halal-turizm-v-taskente-startoval-trening-s-ucastiem-mezdunarodnyh-ekspertov.4See“VUzbekistanereshilisdelat’khalial’-otel’,”Sputnik(viaRepost.uz),May14,2018,https://repost.uz/halyal-hotel.5 See Nor Amrina Dahlan, Fadilah Abd Rahman, and Azlina Muhammad, “An Overview of the Halal RegulatoryFramework forHalal CertificationofHotel inMalaysia,” Journal of AppliedEnvironmental andBiological Sciences 6(2016):5.6Ibid.7 See Department of StandardsMalaysia, “Malaysian StandardMS 1500:2009-Halal Food Production, Preparation,Handling and Storage-General Guidelines (Second Revision),” 2009, accessed July 24, 2019,https://law.resource.org/pub/my/ibr/ms.1500.2009.pdf.8SeeHalalMalaysia,“ManualProsedurPensijilanHalalMalaysia(semakanketiga)2014,”2014,accessedJuly24,2019,http://www.halal.gov.my/v4/images/pdf/MPPHM2014.pdf.9M.Tieman, J.G.vanderVorst,andM.C.Ghazali, “Principles inHalalSupplyChainManagement,” Journalof IslamicMarketing3,no.3(2012):217-243.

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asstatedinpoint2.1/2.2(HAS).Moreover,theHalalCriticalPoint(HCP)principleneedstobefocused onmonitoring and controlling the entire supply chain to avoid the risk of non-halalcontamination.Further to this, continuous training isvery important toensure that theHalalAssuranceSystemiswell-maintained.1Thistrainingwillstrengthencommitteemembers’skillsandknowledgeofthehalalcertificationrequirements.2

In the caseofUzbekistan, the government shouldprovidemore investments to implement theseconditions in order to gradually attract Muslim tourists. The term “Muslim-oriented tourism” is moreapplicablethan“halal”because,accordingtothereligiousunderstandingofthepopulationofUzbekistan,thelattertermisonlyusedforfood,while“Muslim-orientedtourism”isabroadertermthatcanbeappliedtoproductsandinfrastructure. Previously,adraftActionPlanwasadoptedforvoluntarycertificationofproductsandservicesundersuchlabelsas“halal,”“kosher,”and“vegan.”TheimplementationofthiscertificationssystemwilldependnotonlyontheStateCommitteeoftheRepublicofUzbekistanfortourismdevelopment,butalsoonothergovernmental and non-governmental structures. In particular, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry ofArchitecture,theCommitteeofReligiousAffairs,theMinistryofAgriculture,etc.,shouldcollaborate.ThisprocessdemandscoordinationbytheCabinetofMinistersoftheRepublicofUzbekistan,specificallybyitsCoordinationCouncilforTourismDevelopment.Forthispurpose,itisrecommendedtoadopttheBylaws(Decrees)oftheCabinetofMinistersoftheRepublicofUzbekistanon“MeasurementsfortheEstablishmentofMuslim-OrientedTourismConditionsintheRepublicofUzbekistan”andtoelaboratearoadmapaboutthem.ConclusionsandRecommendationsOneofthemostimportantgoalsofdevelopingtourisminUzbekistanistoemploytheworkingpopulation,which is a prerequisite for economic growth and social stability. Tourism is among the world’s mostimportantexportsectorsandislabor-ratherthancapital-intensive,whichmeansthatithasagreatcapacityto create new jobs. In general, the development of tourism infrastructure could reduce unemployment,especially inprovincial cities.Considering thatpeoplewill beemployed innumerous sectors—includinghotelsandrestaurants,handicraft-making,smallbusinesses,etc.—itwillhelpdeveloptheprivatesectorandsmall-scaleentrepreneurshipthatdoesnotrequirehighskills. In light of the aforementioned factors and the important geostrategic position of Uzbekistan inCentralAsia,thefollowingsuggestionsarerecommendedtodevelopcooperationinthissphere:

1. StrengthenpartnershipwiththeOICtoimproveziyarahtourisminUzbekistanby:• SigningMemorandumofUnderstandingbetweentheOICandtheRepublicofUzbekistan

forthedevelopmentofziyarah(pilgrimage)tourisminUzbekistan;• Establishingan institutionalmechanismfor therealizationof theMemorandumin the

form of an Interagency Committee with representatives from multiple governmentministriesandagencies.

2. Signaspecialagreementonavisa-freeregimebetweenSCOmember-states.ThisagreementwillinfluencesubsequentdevelopmentsintheframeworkoftheSCO,including:

• The creation of a nongovernmental tour operators’ and tourism associationsorganization—theUnionoftheAssociationofTourOperatorsoftheSCOMember-States—

1W.S.W.Zulkifli,S.A.Rahman,K.W.Awang,andY.B.C.Man,“DevelopingtheFrameworkforHalalFriendlyTourisminMalaysia,”InternationalBusinessManagement5,no.6(2011):295-302.2 See: Department of Islamic Development Malaysia, “Guidelines for Halal AssuranceManagement System,” 2012,accessedJuly24,2019,www.halal.gov.my/v4/images/pdf/halalassurancesystem.pdf.

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and the elaboration of its institutional-legal framework through a discussion betweenmemberstates;

• The adoption of a special roadmap to develop prospective types of tourism, includingziyarahtourism.

Inconnectionwiththedevelopmentofpilgrimagetourism,Uzbekistanshouldstrengthenitslegalregulationsbyintroducinginternationalstandardsandspecialtermsandconditionsthatwillsupportthedevelopment of Muslim-oriented tourism in Uzbekistan. The following recommendations are made todevelopthelegalandinstitutionalframeworkforziyarahtourisminUzbekistan:

1. Amendmentof theLawonTourismto includetheterm“Islamicpilgrimagetourism”or“ziyarahtourism.”Thiswouldbethefirststeptowardthecreationofalegalfoundationforziyarahtourismdevelopmentinthecountry.Specifically,itissuggestedthatziyarahbeaddedasavarietyoftourismin the article of thenewdraft of theLawonTourism thatdiscusses “the formsandvarieties oftourism”;

2. Adoption of the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan on theEstablishment and Maintenance of Muslim-Oriented Tourism, including standards for halalcertification,trainingofqualifiedpersonnel,andrequestedinfrastructure;

3. EstablishmentofaMuslim-orientedInternalWorkingGroupforTourismundertheStateCommitteeforTourismDevelopmentandtheCommitteeofReligiousAffairsoftheRepublicofUzbekistan;

4. Organization of Islamic Tourism Promotion Centers under the Embassies of the Republic ofUzbekistaninMuslimcountriesthatmightsendtourists.

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TrendsinInternationalizationofHigherEducationinUzbekistan:

TheProliferationofForeignUniversityBranchesandHowTheyFitintotheBroaderHigherEducationSector

DilnozaUbaydullaeva

DilnozaUbaydullaevaisaneducationexpertandresearcherwhostudiedtrendsintheinternationalizationofhighereducationinUzbekistanwhileatGW.DilnozaearnedaBAandanMAinEnglishPhilologyandLinguisticsfromtheStateUniversityofWorldLanguages,Uzbekistan.ShealsoholdsaMAinInternationalStudiesfromtheUniversityofTsukuba,Japan.According to a 2014WorldBank study,1 the tertiary education system inUzbekistan is one of the leastefficient in the world. Although Uzbekistan has one of the highest shares of recent school graduatesinterestedinpursuinghighereducationglobally,thetertiaryeducationsystemcanabsorbjust10percentofitsmorethan500,000applicantsperyear.Thesamestudyfoundthat“[t]ertiaryenrolment,ataround9percent, is lowbyregionalandinternationalstandards,andcontrastswithnearlyuniversalenrolmentinprimaryandsecondarylevelsinUzbekistan.”Forcomparison,neighboringKazakhstanhas53.25percentenrollmentinhighereducation.2

Table1.Universityadmissionsrateforthe2017-2018academicyear

Source:StateTestingCenterwebsite,www.dtm.uz,2019OfficialdataontheexactnumberofhighereducationinstitutionsinUzbekistanisconfusing.Onitsmainwebpage,theMinistryofHigherandSecondarySpecializedEducation(MHSSE)claimstohave91localhighereducation institutions and 8 foreign university branches.3 However, on its official news channel onTelegram,4theMinistryissuedastatementdatedMay10,2019,inwhichitconfirmedthattherewere85localhighereducationprovidersand17foreignuniversitybranches.

ThecountrydoesnotcurrentlyhaveanyuniversitiesintheoverallTimesHigherEducationWorldUniversityRankings(eveninthe801-1,000bracket).5Recentmediadiscourse6indicatesthattheMHSSEhas

1 World Bank, “Uzbekistan: Modernizing Tertiary Education,” 2014, accessed July 10, 2019,http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/236211484721686087/Uzbekistan-Higher-Education-Report-2014-en.pdf.2DatafromTimesHigherEducation(THE)WorldUniversityRanking,“StudyinKazakhstan,”accessedJuly10,2019,https://www.timeshighereducation.com/student/where-to-study/study-in-kazakhstan#survey-answer.3 Data from Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education (MHSSE), accessed July 10, 2019,https://edu.uz/uz/otm/index.4 Official Telegram channel of the MHSSE, May 2019, accessed July 10, 2019,https://web.telegram.org/#/[email protected](THE)WorldUniversityRanking,“StudyinUzbekistan,”accessedJuly10,2019,https://www.timeshighereducation.com/student/where-to-study/study-in-uzbekistan#survey-answer.6PressServiceofMHSSE,“TheMinistryofHigherandSecondarySpecializedEducationSignedCooperationAgreementwiththeInternationalRankingAgency,”February27,2019,https://edu.uz/uz/news/view/1155.

Numberofapplicants Numberofadmittedstudents Admissionrate(%)729,707 65,875 9.03

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begundiscussionswiththeTimesHigherEducationRankingsonaddingUzbekhighereducationinstitutions.Obviously,beforebeingranked,theUzbekhighereducationinstitutionsmustfirstmeettherequirementsofinternational ranking systems. They currently lack liberal admissions policies, market-based fees, andreputable international facultymembers.Most importantly,highereducation inUzbekistan iscompletelydetached from the needs of the economy in terms of skilled labor.While countries likeKazakhstan andKyrgyzstanhavechosentointernationalizetheirhighereducationsectors,inUzbekistantheauthoritieshavebeencautiousasfarasinternationalizationisconcerned.

SinceShavkatMirziyoyevbecamepresidentinSeptember2016,theauthoritieshaveshowninterestinreforminghighereducation.DeputyPrimeMinisterAzizAbduhakimovgaveaninterviewtoalocalnewsagency clarifying the government’s higher education policy. Among other things, he stated that “theGovernment[ofUzbekistan]isworkingonaconceptforturningUzbekistanintotheeducationhubofCentralAsiawithinthenext10years.”1AccordingtoUzbekistan’sDevelopmentStrategyfor2017-2021,“improvingthe quality and effectiveness of higher education institutions through the introduction of internationalstandardsoftrainingandassessmentofthequalityofteaching,gradualincreaseinadmissionquota”isoneofthetoppriorities.2

Recentreformsinthesector includeapresidentialdecreeissuedonSeptember6,2018,allowingonlineeducationattertiaryinstitutions.Thesamemonth,forthefirsttimeinthehistoryofUzbekistan,thegovernment allowed local universities to admit an additional number of students after the universityentranceexamswerecompleted.3Applicantswhofailedtheentranceexamsbutachievedatleastone-thirdof themaximumpossiblescoreontheexamcannowgainadmissionbypayingextraordinarilyhigh feesrangingfromUS$10,000toUS$35,000inthefirstyearofenrollment.Fromthesecondyearofenrollmentonward,thesestudentspaytheusualfees(approx.US$1,000-2,000).

AmongthemostnoticeablechangesinthehighereducationsectorinUzbekistanistheproliferationofbranchesofforeignuniversities.Suchbrancheswererecentlyexemptedfromalltaxes,4whichisexpectedtoattractmoreplayerstothemarket.Indeed,universitiesfromtheUS,Russia,SouthKorea,India,andChinahave already taken advantage of these favorable conditions to cash in on the high demand for tertiaryeducation.Thenumberofsuchbranchesalmosttripledinrecentyears,from7in2016to19asofMay2019(seeAppendix1).

WhileforeignuniversitiesarenotnewtotheUzbekhighereducationsystem,itshouldbenotedthattheKarimovgovernmentwasverycautiousaboutlettingforeignuniversitiesin.Ittook20yearstoopenthefirstsevenbranch-campuses,whilethecurrentgovernmentallowedsevennewforeignuniversitiestoopenbrancheswithinthespaceofthreemonths.Whiletheabove-mentionedchangesarelongoverdue,recentdevelopments show that there is a lack of a well-thought-out reform strategy in the sector, and theproliferationofforeignuniversitybranchesseemstobetheleast-plannedofthesedevelopments.

Thisarticleanalyzeshowthegrowingnumberofforeignuniversitybranchesinthecountryfitintothe broader trend of Higher Education (HE) reforms in Uzbekistan and what challenges as well asopportunitiesthistrendmaycreate.ThisresearchisimportantasitopensupaconversationaboutpotentialreformsinHEandsuggestsreformingtheoldSoviet-styleHEmanagementandgovernance.ItseemsclearthatUzbekistanwantstoreformitshighereducationsystem,howeverthegovernmentdoesnothaveaclear

1 See an interview of Deputy Prime Minister Abdukhakimov to Gazeta.uz: “Za 10 let Uzbekistan dolzhen stat’obrazovatel’nym khabom Tsentral’noi Azii,” Gazeta.uz, September 18, 2018,https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2018/09/18/education/.2 See “Uzbekistan's Development Strategy for 2017-2021 Has Been Adopted Following Public Consultation,” TheTashkent Times, February 8, 2017, http://tashkenttimes.uz/national/541-uzbekistan-s-development-strategy-for-2017-2021-has-been-adopted-following-.3 See “Uzbekistan Sets Super Tuition Fees for Universities,” UzDaily.uz, August 16, 2018,https://www.uzdaily.uz/en/post/45314.4 See “Foreign Universities Receive Tax Benefits Until 2023,” UzDaily.uz, December 31, 2017,https://www.uzdaily.uz/en/post/42191.

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strategy or publicly available selection criteria on the basis of which it establishes branches of foreignuniversities.

Thesubjecthasnotbeenstudiedbyacademicsthusfar.Untilrecently,Uzbekistanwasclosedtothemajorityofacademicresearch.IvetaSilova,aprominentscholarofCentralAsianeducationstudies,studiedprivatetutoringacrosstheentireregionbutcouldnotaccessUzbekistan.1MostoftheacademicarticlesthatexistontheeducationsystemofUzbekistaninparticulararefocusedonrudimentaryreformsinthehighereducationsectorandlimitedtodescription.2Theremainderlikewisehaveclearshortcomings.WhileRuzievandBurkhanovclaimthattheintroductionofacentrallyadministeredtestingsystemtohighereducationadmissionsin1994replacedthecorruptSoviet-styleoralandwrittenexaminationsconductedinindividualuniversitiesinUzbekistan,theyfailtonotethatthecentralizedtestingsystemhasbeenfoundtobenolesscorruptthantheoldsystem.3Anothergroupofscholarsstudiedtheredevelopmentofhighereducationinpost-SovietCentralAsiaincomparativeperspective,4buttheyfailedtoprovideacomprehensivestudyofUzbekistan’shighereducationinternationalizationpolicyinthepost-independenceperiod.

There is, however, a good body of social research by international organizations on HE inUzbekistan5 that, based on various factual evidence, lays out concrete steps toward modernizing andliberalizingtheHEsector.Thatbeingsaid,theirfindingsarelimitedtorecommendationsonhowtoimprovetertiary education, and thusneglect to studyhow theUzbekGovernment’s relianceonopening foreignuniversitybranchesisaffectingthecountry’shighereducationsectorasawhole.ThecurrentliteratureonHEinCentralAsiaingeneral,andinpost-SovietUzbekistaninparticular,failstocoverUzbekistan’smodelof“importedinternationalization”ofHEintheformofforeignuniversitybranchesandhowthisaffectsthenationaltertiarysector.

The present research does not focus on the overall or individual performance of any foreignuniversitybranchinUzbekistan.Nordoesitaimtoassesstheacademicornon-academicachievementsofstudentsgraduatingfrombranchesofforeignuniversities.Analysisofthecurriculumorgovernanceofanindividual institution is outside the scopeof this research. Instead, thispaper looks at how the trendof

1SeeIvetaSilova,“PrivateSupplementaryTutoringinCentralAsia:NewOpportunitiesandBurdens,”UNESCO-IIEP,Paris,2009,47.SeealsoIvetaSilovaandGitaSteiner-Khamsi,eds.,HowNGOsReact:GlobalizationandEducationReformintheCaucasus,CentralAsia,andMongolia(WestHartford,CT:KumarianPress,2008).2 Kobil Ruziev and Umar Burkhanov, “Uzbekistan: Higher Education Reforms and the Changing Landscape sinceIndependence,” in 25 Years of Transformations of Higher Education Systems in Post-Soviet Countries: Reform andContinuity, ed. JeroenHuisman,AnnaSmolentseva, and IsakFroumin (Hampshire:PalgraveMacmillan,2018);KobilRuzievandUmarBurkhanov,“HigherEducationReformsinUzbekistan:ExpandingVocationalEducationatthe ExpenseofHigherEducation?,”HigherEducationinRussiaandBeyond8,no.2(2016).3SeerecentmediaarticlesoncorruptioninthetestingsystemadministeredbytheStateTestCentreinthecasesofTashkentOrientalStudiesInstituteandtheStatePedagogicalUniversity:“OTMgakirishimtihonidayordamberishgava’da qilgan shaxslar qo‘lga olindi,” Gazeta.uz, July 28, 2018, https://www.gazeta.uz/oz/2018/07/28/pora/;Zamdekana Gospeduniversiteta zaderzhana po podozreniiu v poluchenii vziatki,” Gazeta.uz, July 13, 2017,https://www.gazeta.uz/ru/2017/07/13/guvd/.4JohnC.WeidmanandBrianYoder,“PolicyandPracticeinEducationReforminMongoliaandUzbekistanDuringtheFirst TwoDecadesofthePost-SovietEra,”ExcellenceinHigherEducation1,no.1&2(2010);JoseJoaquinBrunnerandAnthony Tillett, “Higher Education in Central Asia: The Challenges of Modernization–an Overview,” World Bank,Washington,DC,2007.5WorldBank,“Uzbekistan:ModernizingTertiaryEducation”,2014;UNDP,“HigherEducationinUzbekistan:StructureDevelopment and Reform Trends,” 2009,http://www.uz.undp.org/content/uzbekistan/en/home/library/un_in_Uzbekistan/policy-brief--1--2009---higher-education-in-uzbekistan--structur.html; Asian Development Bank, “Education Reforms in Countries in Transition:Policies and Processes: Six Country Case Studies,” 2004,https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281294309_EDUCATION_REFORMS_IN_COUNTRIES_IN_TRANSITION_POLICIES_AND_PROCESSES_SIX_COUNTRY_CASE_STUDIES_COMMISSIONED_BY_THE_ASIAN_DEVELOPMENT_BANK_IN_AZERBAIJAN_KAZAKHSTAN_KYRGYZ_REPUBLIC_MONGOLIA_TAJIKISTAN_AND/link/55e0977a08aecb1a7cc4c28d/download.

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openingforeignuniversitybranchesatarapidpacewhilebeingslowtoreformthestagnantnationalsectormayaffectthecountry’stertiaryeducationsector, lookingatwhatchallengesandopportunitiesthismaycreate. It argues that sustainablehighereducation reform inUzbekistanneeds togobeyond thecurrentrelianceonopeningbranchesofforeignuniversities.

Inordertosupportthisargument,thepaperwillfirstlookathowHEprovidersinUzbekistanreachedtheir current stagnation. Second, itwill usediscourse analysisof the current governmentpolicy (officialdocuments,statements,legislation)aswellassemi-structuredinterviewswithtertiaryeducationteachingstaff and specialists on establishing foreign university branches to answer its research question. Theinterviewswere heldwith current teaching staff at two local universities (for the privacy and safety ofrespondents,thenamesoftheuniversitiesarenotmentioned)andwiththemanagementandteachingstaffof two leading foreignuniversitybranches inUzbekistan. InterviewswerealsoheldwithananonymousUzbekgovernmentofficialandwithanAmericanCouncils forInternationalEducationexpertworkingonUzbekistan’sHEinternationalizationproject.HigherEducationinPost-SovietUzbekistanAfterthecollapseoftheSovietUnionin1991,UzbekistanemergedasanindependentstatewithitsownmodeloftransitionfromtheSoviet-styleplannedeconomytoamarketeconomy.Thecountry’sHEwasprofoundlyaffectedbythedisintegrationoftheSovietUnion,ashighereducation“wasmorefullyintegratedacrosstheUnion”thansomeothersectors.1AsUzbekistanwasnolongerreceivingfundingfromMoscowforsocialprogramsaswellaseducationandresearch,2ithadtoconsiderrestructuringitseducationsystemin a way that aligned with its political and economic agenda. Among other socio-economic reforms,transition-erareformsincludedthereorganizationofthestructureandcurriculumofHEinstitutions.WhileKazakhstanandKyrgyzstanoptedfor“masshighereducationenrollment,”UzbekistanseemedtoprefertokeepHEan“elite”systemwithlowerenrollmentrates.3Throughoutthisprocess,theUzbekgovernmentmaintainedcompletecontrolovertheHEsector;thereformsthattookplacewereof“top-down”nature.4

Onitspathtoredeveloptheeducationsystem,theGovernmentofUzbekistanadoptedafirstLawonEducationin1992.In1997,the“NationalProgramforPersonnelTraining”—anotherlegalbasisfortheoperation of the education system,which represents a long-term strategy of reinforcing the educationsystem—was adopted. Uzbekistan introduced a National Quality Assurance system known as StateStandards forHigherEducation(Oliy ta’limningdavlat ta’limstandartlari)5 in2001,but thesystemasawholeremainsunderstrictgovernmentcontrol.6Uzbekistanhasnotgivenuponimprovingtheaccessibilityofhighereducationbuthasdoneitinitsownpeculiarway:it increasedthenumberofnationaltertiaryeducation providers, but did not necessarily want the Kyrgyz, Kazakh, or Eastern Europeanmodes ofinternationalization and privatization of the HE sector. For instance, the number of higher educationinstitutions in Uzbekistan increased from 43 in 1989 to 78 by 2015.7 However, this success has beenunderminedbytheincreaseinthesizeofthepopulation,whichhasgrownfrom20millionin1990to31millionin2015.Thenetresultisthataccesstohighereducationhasinfactdeclined.Indeed,demandfor

1BrunnerandTillett,"HigherEducationinCentralAsia,”8.2Ibid.3Ibid.4RuzievandBurkhanov,“Uzbekistan:HigherEducationReforms.”5SeeDecreeoftheCabinetofMinisters“ОлийтаълимнингдавлаттаълимСтандартларинитасдиқлашТўғрисида[Oliy talimning davlat talim standartlarini tasdiqlash togrisida]” No. 343, August 16, 2001,https://nrm.uz/contentf?doc=15087_o‘zbekiston_respublikasi_vazirlar_mahkamasining_16_08_2001_y_343-son_oliy_talimning_davlat_talim_standartlarini_tasdiqlash_to‘g‘risidagi_qarori&products=1_zakonodatelstvo_respubliki_uzbekistan.6SeeAlexKrouglov,“TransformingHigherEducationinUzbekistan:FromQualityControltoQualityAssuranceCulture,”inTheRiseofQualityAssuranceinAsianHigherEducation,ed.MahsoodShahandQuyenDo(Elsevier,2017).7RuzievandBurkhanov,“HigherEducationReformsinUzbekistan,”1.

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higher education is almost ten times higher than supply, leading to very high corruption at theadministrativelevelofthehighereducationsysteminUzbekistan.1

Perhapsthebiggestimpedimenttothede-SovietizationofhighereducationinUzbekistanhasbeenthegovernment’sapproachtoreforms.Uzbekistan’s“gradualistapproachtotransitionwasuniqueintermsofthepace,sequencing,andprioritizationofreforms,resultingintheso-called‘Uzbekmodel’2ofeconomicdevelopment.”3Theimpactofthisapproachonhighereducationcanbesummarizedasstatedirigism(inparticular,tertiaryeducationasafunctionofthestateonlyandhighereducationascitizenryeducation,notanindividualrightforeachcitizen)andgradualism(extremecautionwithregardtochangesandlackofacleartimelineofreforms).ThisstrictlyauthoritarianapproachtoreformsdidnotleadtoimprovementinanyareaoftheHEsector,fromenrollmentratestothequalityofthecentrally-dictatedcurriculum.

Furthermore, “[s]imilar toUzbekistan’spoliticalandeconomicreformprocesses, thecreationofeducational lawsandthestagesofreformhavebeenverycentralized.”4Ultimately,duetotheslowandcentralizednatureofreforms,UzbekistanhassufferedstagnationintermsofaccesstoHE,managementand governance of the HE sector, the independent review of individual faculties/schools within HEinstitutions,staffretention,andstudentexperience,aswellasfinancingissues.AWorldBankreportonUzbekistan’shighereducation,conducted in2014,concludedthat thecountry’sgeneralapproachtoHEreformshasbeentop-downandstrictlycentralized,offeringlittleornoautonomytolocalinstitutionsonmattersconcerningcoursedesign,studentintake,andmanagementoftheirfinances—aplethoraofissuesthatmighttakeyearstoaddress.5

ForeignUniversityBranchesinUzbekistan:ASignofReform?Incontrasttotheslowandnon-market-basedreformsofthesectoroverthepasttwodecades,therapidgrowthinthenumberofforeignuniversitiesinUzbekistanisindeedasignofwillingnesstoreform.However,howsustainable isthistypeofreform?Howdoforeignuniversities fit intothehighereducationsystem?Whichoftheexistingissuesaretheseforeignuniversitiesexpectedtoaddress?Sofar,thegovernmentdoesnotappeartohaveclearanswerstothesequestions.

TheLawonEducation6andtheNationalProgramforPersonnelTraining(theNationalProgram)arelegalbasesforthenationalpolicyinthefieldofeducation.AreviewoftheLawonEducationrevealsthatthereisnoreferencetoestablishingforeignuniversitybranchesnortotheiroperationinthecountry.TheLaw,however,statesthat:

The education system of the Republic of Uzbekistan consists of: state and non-stateeducational institutions that implement educational programs in accordance with stateeducationalstandards.

It is not clear whether foreign university branches fall under the umbrella of “non-state educationalinstitutions.”TheonlyreferencetoforeigneducationalinstitutionsisinArticle33,whichprovidesthat:

1 Ararat Osipian, “Corruption Hierarchies in Higher Education in the Former Soviet Bloc,” International Journal ofEducational Development29,no.3(2009):327.2The five pillars of the “Uzbekmodel” of developmentwerethe priority of economyover politics, the state as theonly reformer, the supremacyof law, gradualismof reforms rather than shocktherapy, and strong social policy. 3 Kobil Ruziev andUmarRustamov, “Higher Education in Uzbekistan: Reforms and the Changing Landscape sinceIndependence,”EconomicsWorkingPaperSeries,2016.4WeidmanandYoder,“PolicyandPracticeinEducationReform,”60.5WorldBank,“Uzbekistan:ModernizingTertiaryEducation.”6TheLawoftheRepublicofUzbekistanonEducation,No.464-I,August29,1997,http://lex.uz/docs/15622.

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Educationalinstitutionsparticipateininternationalcooperationoneducationalissues,havetherighttoestablishdirectlinkswithrelevanteducationalinstitutionsofforeigncountries,tocreatejointeducationalinstitutionswiththemintheorderprescribedbylaw.

AlthoughtheArticlestatesthateducationalinstitutionscanestablishdirectlinkswithforeigneducationalinstitutions,itdoesnotcoverthecompletelyseparatecaseofforeignuniversitybranchesoperatinginthecountryasautonomoushighereducationinstitutions.TheArticlefurtherstatesthat“TheeducationsystemoftheRepublicofUzbekistanisunifiedandcontinuous,”whichagainmakesitambiguousastowhetherthelaw envisions the current lack of synergy between national higher education providers and“internationalized”branchesofvariousforeignuniversities.Toputitsimply,theLawonEducationdoesnotaddresstheinternationalizationofUzbekistan’shighereducationsectoringeneralandtheestablishmentofbranchesofforeignuniversitiesinparticular.

TheNationalProgram,1adoptedbytheParliamentoftheRepublicofUzbekistan,representsalong-termstrategytoreinforcetheeducationsystem.Itliststhegoals,tasks,andstagesofthedevelopmentofthenationalmodelofeducation,fromprimaryeducationtopost-graduateeducation.Yet,theprogramdoesnotrefer to the internationalizationof thecountry’shighereducationsystemthroughtheopeningof foreignuniversitybranches,nordoesitprovideanexplanationofhowsuchinstitutionsfitintoUzbekistan’scurrentsystem.This clearly shows that theestablishmentof foreignuniversitybranchesat suchapacewasnotenvisagedatthetimethatthestrategicdocumentsonhighereducationwerewritten.

OtherimportantlegaldocumentsgoverningthedevelopmentoftheHEsystemincludeDecreesofthePresidentoftheRepublicofUzbekistanandResolutionsoftheCabinetofMinistersofUzbekistan.TheResolutionoftheCabinetofMinistersoftheRepublicofUzbekistanontheAdoptionofStateEducationalStandards for Higher Education2 mentions that one of the purposes of adopting these standards is tointegrate Uzbekistan into the global educational system. However, once again, the resolutionmakes nomentionoftheroles/responsibilitiesofforeignuniversitybrancheswithregardtomeetingthesestandards.

ThisreviewoftheexistingdocumentsshowsthatUzbekistan’scurrentHEpolicyincludesnolegalbasisfor—andnoclearstrategyorpolicyon—establishingforeignuniversitybranches.Assuch,thevariousforeignuniversitybranchesthatareoperatinginthecountryusingtheirownadmissionspolicies,curricula,strategies,andgovernance,nottomentiontheirownbudgetmodels,areemergingasaparallelsystemtothenationalhighereducationsystem.To illuminate thispoint, adetailedcomparisonof thegovernanceofanationalhighereducation institution (UzbekStateWorldLanguagesUniversity) anda foreignuniversitybranch(ManagementDevelopmentInstituteofSingapore)isprovidedinAppendix4.

Thisrealityreinforcesthepaper’sargumentthatHEreformsinUzbekistancannotbesustainablebyrelyingontheopeningofforeignuniversitybranchesalone.TwoParallelHigherEducationSystems:Long-TermGoalsvs.Short-TermGainsAmongstudiesontheinternationalizationofeducation,thereisabeliefthatforeignuniversitybranchesareperceivedtobe“asinglethingthatcanmagicallysolveeducationalwoes.”3Thecurrenttrendofopeningforeignuniversitybrancheswithoutasolidlegislativebasisfortheiroperation,aswellaswithoutaclearstrategy,doesindeedgivetheimpressionthatthegovernmentwantstofixhighereducationissuesinthecountrybyopeningbranchesofforeignuniversities.However,theauthoritiesarenotpayingattentionto—

1TheNationalProgramforPersonnelTraining,No.463-I-son,August29,1997.2ResolutionoftheCabinetofMinistersoftheRepublicofUzbekistanontheAdoptionofStateEducationalStandardsforHigherEducation,No.343,August16,2001,http://lex.uz/docs/359620.3ChristopherHill, “TheFuture isBright forBranchCampuses,butNotasWeKnowThem,”TimesHigherEducation(blog), June 12, 2018, https://www.timeshighereducation.com/blog/future-bright-branch-campuses-not-we-know-them#survey-answer.

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orareclosingtheireyesto—thefactthatthesebranchesareinthecountryforcommercialreasonsratherthantobringanyimprovementtoUzbekistan’sstagnantnationalhighereducationsystem.

TheofficialinformationonthenumberofbranchesofforeignuniversitiesinUzbekistanandontheprocessbywhichtheywereestablishedisnotreliable.Forexample,onApril6,2018,itwasreportedthattheUzbekMinistryofPreschoolEducationhadsignedanagreementtosetupabranchofSeojeonUniversityinTashkent.1Severalnewsoutletscoveredthisagreement.2However,morethanayearaftertheagreementwasapparentlysigned,SeojeonUniversityisstillnotontheMHSSE’slistofbranchesofforeignuniversitiescurrentlyoperatinginthecountry.Assuch,thereisnowaytosaywhetherthebranchhasbeenopenedornot.

This shows how disorganized theMinistry itself iswith regards to its foreign university branchpolicy.Italsoshowsthatnewbranchesarebeingestablishedhaphazardly.Often,thisdisorganizationreflectsthefactthatagreementswithforeignuniversitiesarebeinginitiatedbyUzbekembassiesaroundtheworld,3and not necessarily by theMHSSE itself. Moreover, theMinistry’smost recent list of foreign universitybranchesdidnotincludeYeojuUniversity—abranchthatisalreadyoperatinginthecountry.4Thisfactisanotherexampleoftheuncoordinatednatureoftheso-called“internationalization”ofhighereducationinUzbekistan.

Withitscurrentpolicy,thegovernmentseemstobeseekinganimmediatesolutionforaddressingthelowqualityofitsSoviet-stylehighereducationwithoutcommittingtolong-termstrategicreforms.Theopeningofforeignuniversitybranchesmightbeperceivedbythegovernmentasanimmediatesteptowardimproving the image of the sector. However, this trend is creating two parallel yet very distinct highereducationsystems.Drawingoninterviewswiththestaffoflocaluniversitiesaswellasthestaffofforeignuniversitybranches,thispaperidentifiesseveralhugedifferencesintheteachingandoperationsofnationaluniversitiesandforeignuniversitybranchesthathavecausedtheemergenceoftwoparallelsystems.

Myresearchrevealedthatlocalstateuniversitiesdonothavetheacademicandfinancialautonomythat foreign university branches currently enjoy. Although the government says it plans to make localuniversities academically and financially autonomous, such independence is not currently a reality. Thesecond gapbetween the two systems is in international standards of teaching and learning. Students atbranchesofforeignuniversitieshaveachoiceofelectivecoursesinadditiontotheirmajor,whereasinstateuniversitiesallsubjectsarecompulsoryandstudentsdonothaveanyexposuretointernationalstandardsofteachingandacademicsupport.Third,differencesinmanagingandinternationalizingtheteachingstaffoflocaluniversitiesandforeignuniversitybranchesisakeyissuethatcontributestothedevelopmentoftwocompletelydifferent,parallelhighereducationsystems.Lastbutnot least, there isahugegap instudentexperienceandemployabilitybetweenlocaluniversitiesandforeignuniversitybranches.ThecurrentHEpolicydoesnotindicatethatlocaluniversitiesaregoingtoadoptthegovernanceandteachingpracticesoftheforeignuniversitybranches.

Autonomy—AcademicandFinancial

1 See “University of Sejong to Open Branch in Tashkent,” Tashkent Times, April 6, 2018,http://tashkenttimes.uz/national/2230-university-of-sejong-to-open-branch-in-tashkent-2.2 See “Toshkentda Sozhong universiteti filiali ochiladi,” Gazeta.uz, April 6, 2018,https://www.gazeta.uz/uz/2018/04/06/sejong/;“ToshkentdaSozhonguniversitetifilialiochiladi,”Xabar.uz,April7,2018,http://www.xabar.uz/jamiyat/toshkentda-sojong-universiteti-filiali-ochiladi.3Anonymousgovernmentofficial,personalinterviewwiththeauthor,April2019.4 See the website of Yeoju Technological Institute in Tashkent, accessed July 10, 2019,https://www.ytit.uz/index.php/en/main-page/.

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Foreignuniversitybranches inUzbekistanhavecompleteautonomyover theiracademiccurriculumandfinancialmanagement.Asconfirmedbya leadinggovernmentofficial, foreignuniversitybranchesdecidewhat courses to teachandwhich textbooks touse foranygivendegreeprogram.Thesamegovernmentofficialobservedthat thegovernmentofUzbekistandoesnotask foreignuniversitybranches toaddanycoursestotheiracademicprograms.AmemberoftheteachingstaffataleadingforeignuniversitybranchinTashkentconfirmedthatnotonlydouniversitiesandfacultiesenjoyautonomy,butsotoodoacademicstaffinteachingtheircourses.Myinterviewsrevealedthattheleadingforeignuniversitybranchdoesnotteachpro-governmentcoursessuchasMa’naviyataboutnation-buildingoridentityformation.

Fortheirpart,localuniversitiesfollowtheMHSSE’srulesandregulationsbothforcurriculumandfinances.NoristheMHSSEtheonlyactordeterminingthefinancesofalocaluniversity.Otherplayersincludethe Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy. My interviews indicate that staff in local highereducationinstitutionsspendalotoftimepreparingunnecessaryreportstosubmittotheMHSSE.Infact,theyspendlesstimeonlessonplanningthantheydoonpreparingtheconstantstreamofpaperworkdemandedby higher offices. Local universities lack the academic and financial autonomy that foreign universitybranchescurrentlyenjoy.Thisiswherethetwoseparateandyetparallelsystemsofhighereducationbegintoemerge.InternationalStandardsofTeachingandLearningIntheworldofforeignuniversitybranches,studentsaretaughtaninternationalcurriculumthatisdesignedtofitthedegreetheywillbegetting.Studentsinsuchinstitutionsalsohavetherighttochooseelectivesinadditiontocoursescompulsoryfortheirmajor.Testingandassessmentduringthecourseofthestudyarecompletedinlinewithinternationalstandards(aspermyinterviewswithcurrentandformerstudentsofforeignuniversity branches inUzbekistan). Students are taught the basics of academicwriting from theoutset and arewarned that plagiarism is a breachof academic conduct. If anyone is caught engaging inacademicmisconduct,theyfailthatexam/assignment,justlikeinmostinternationalcontexts.

Innationalhighereducationinstitutions,meanwhile,studentsstillattendclassesfromMondaytoSaturdayandthescheduleissetupbytheFaculty/SchoolManagement.Allclassesarecompulsoryandthereisnochoiceofelectives.1Theassignmentsandthequalityofexaminationprocessesarequitedifferentfromthose in foreignuniversitybranches.Most teaching staff,much less students, arenotawareof academicwriting standards. There areno softwareprograms to check the level of plagiarism in students’writingassignments, nor is there support for students to acquire academic writing skills. In such educationalsettings, students’writingassignments caneasilybe copiedandpasted fromany sourcewithoutproperacknowledgment.TeachingMethodsandCultureInmost,ifnotall,nationalhighereducationinstitutions,teachingmethodsandclassroomsettingsareSoviet-style. Student are obliged to attend all lectures. Student are also expected to respect and follow theinstructionsofthelecturer.Thisshowsthedominanceofcollectivistcultureinnationalhighereducationinstitutions. Moreover, in local universities, the management seem to pay more attention to whetherstudentsarewearingappropriateattirethantotheteachingqualityofthefaculties.Asastaffmemberatalocaluniversitymentioned,“…studentsarestrictlycheckedfortheiruniforms.[Women]areencouragedtowearatopandaskirt.Nofancyclothingorskinnypantsareallowed.Onlyinwinter(whenitiscold)arestudentsallowedtowearclassicblackpantstotheUniversity.”2

1MyinterviewsindicatedthattheUniversityofWorldEconomyandDiplomacyandTashkentStateUniversityofLaw(TSUL)haveintroducedelectivecoursesfortheirstudents.2StaffmemberatalocaluniversitybasedinTashkent,personalinterviewwiththeauthor,Tashkent,April2019.

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Atbranchesofforeignuniversities,teachingmethodsandclassroomattendancepoliciesarequitedifferentfrominthenationalsector.Coursesaredesignedtodeploystudent-centeredteachingmethods.Insomeuniversities,studentsarenotobligedtoattendthelecturesoftheirelectivesubjects;theycanaccessallcourseinformation,includingtherecordedlecture,onlineononlinelearningplatforms(similartoMoodleorWattle).Moreover,unlikeinthenationalsector,foreignuniversitybrancheshaveinternationalteachingstaffwhoencouragestudentstodeveloptheircriticalthinkingskills.Eventhelocalstaffworkinginforeignuniversitybranchesare trained to teachstudents toquestion ideasandconcepts. Ifnational institutionsteachstudentswhattothink,studentsinforeignuniversitybranchesaretaughthowtothink.Thisdifferenceissubsequentlyreflectedintheacademicandprofessionalactivitiesoflearners.InternationalFacultyandStaffRetentionWhileitistruethatnotallfacultymembersinforeignuniversitybranchesareinternationallyrecruitedstaff,there are international teaching staff in every foreign university branch. They usually teach the coresubjects/coursesinwhichthebranchspecializes.Eventhelocalstaffworkinginforeignuniversitybranchesarewelltrained,withqualificationsfromEuropeanorAmericanuniversities.Foreignuniversitybranchestrytoattract leading international facultyto improvetheirrankings inthemarket—andtheyoffermuchhighersalariesandmorefavorableworkconditionsthanpublicuniversitiesdo.Theydevelopstaffretentionstrategiestokeepthebestandmosttalentedprofessorsintheirinstitutions,includingofferingprofessionaldevelopmentopportunitiestolocalstaff.Asaresult,studentsinforeignuniversitybranchesareexposedtointernationalandinterculturalperspectivesthroughouttheirstudies.

Inmostlocaluniversities,staffoftenworkunderpressuretoprepareallthenecessaryreportsfortheMinistry.Localuniversitiesandinstitutesdonottrytocompetewithbranchesofforeignuniversitiesintermsofattractingthebestresearchers/professorsinthefield.Nordotheycareaboutretainingexistingfacultymembers.Asaninterviewwithamemberofstaffataforeignuniversitybranchrevealed:

Lecturers here at X university arepaid considerablybetter than in local universities.Butsalary is not the real motivator. Most locally hired lecturers stay at foreign universitybranchesbecausetheylikeworkinginanenvironmentwheretheyhaveautonomy,learningopportunities,andfreetime!Theysimplydon’twanttowastetimeonpreparinguselessandendlessreportstotheCenter.”

Thus,thedifferencesinthemanagementandinternationalizationoftheteachingstaffoflocalandforeignuniversitybranchesisanotherkeyissuethatcontributestothedevelopmentoftwocompletelydifferenthighereducationsystemsoperatinginparallel.StudentExperienceandEmployabilityInmostforeignuniversitybranches,studentsareencouragedtotakeadvantageofacademicsupporttogetacademic advice during their studies.Moreover, they have access to a qualitywifi connectionwhile oncampusandcanuseup-to-date librarycollections.Studentsatbranchesof foreignuniversitiesareoftenexposedtointernationalspeakersonvarioustopicsrelevanttotheirdegrees.Theyarealsoencouragedtofind and apply for internship opportunities. Students receive career counseling as part of the studentexperience,andoncompletionoftheirdegrees,theyareusuallyawardedadiploma(ortwodiplomas)thatisvalidbothinUzbekistanandabroad(usuallyinthecountryfromwhencetheforeignuniversitybranchoriginates).Thisallowsthemtobemorecompetitivethantheirpeerswhostudiedatlocalhighereducationinstitutions.

Itisunclearwhatthesituationiswhenitcomestonationalhighereducationproviders,especiallythose located in remote provinces. However, interactions with teaching staff in several national highereducation institutions show that students in thenational sectordonot seem tohaveevenadecent free

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internetconnectiononcampus,letaloneotherprivileges.Stafffromlocaluniversitiesconfirmedforinstancethattherewaswifiontheircampus,but“itwouldonlyopenthewebpagesapprovedbythewebteamoftheUniversity.”1Unfortunately,thefactthatauniversityshouldnotonlyofferclassesbutalsoprovideapositivestudentlearningexperienceislittle-knownandreceiveslimitedattentioninlocaluniversities.Interviewswithstafffromnationaluniversitiesgivetheimpressionthattheconceptof“studentexperience”isnotevenconsideredinlocalsettings.

Aslongasstudentsareattendinglessonsandsittingexams/submittingpapers,theneverythingisasit should be. Career counseling or advice on internship placements are not normally provided by localuniversities.Studentsusuallyreachoutthemselvestopotentialemployersandtrytodevelopnetworkswhileenrolled in their studies.On completionof their studies, students receiveadiploma that is validonly inUzbekistan.Duetotheirlackofindependenceandlimitedcapacitytointernationalizetheirprograms,Uzbekuniversities are not actively establishing partnerships for dual-degree programs/articulation programs.Thus,studentsatlocaluniversitiescontinuetobedisadvantagedintermsofcareerguidanceandpotentialemploymentopportunities.

Theemergenceof twoparallelHigherEducation systems is creating anumberof issues that thegovernmentandsocietywillneedtoface.Asindicatedabove,thecreationofforeignuniversitybranchesisnotasustainablewaytoreformor“internationalize”thesector.Inotherwords,foreignuniversitybranchesarenotsolvingtheissuesofthenationalhighereducationsector.ThenationalsectorwillcontinuetooperateinaSoviet-stylemannerwhilethegovernmentopensitsarmstoforeignuniversities/branches.Itwillthusfurtherstagnate,andstudentsofnationaluniversitieswillcontinuetobedisadvantagedincomparisontostudentsinforeignuniversitybranches.Toaddresstheissuescreatedbytheemergenceoftheseparallelyetunequal higher education systems, local higher education institutions should be subject to the sameliberalizationpolicy. The reform should ensure that each local higher educationprovider independentlydecides its own finances, curriculum, internationalization strategy, and staff retention and studentexperiencepolicies.Thefinalsectionofthispapercontainstargetedpolicyrecommendationsforhowtore-structureUzbekistan’snationalhighereducationsector.ConclusionThegovernmentofUzbekistan iswilling toprovidewideraccess tohighereducation.Therearesignsofreforminthesector,mostlycomingtop-downfromtheCabinetofMinisters,notnecessarilytheMinistryofHigherEducation.TheofficialdiscourserepresentstheproliferationofforeignuniversitiesinUzbekistanasasignofthereformandinternationalizationofthesector.However,thereisasyetnopubliclyavailablelegalbasisfortheoperationofforeignuniversitybranchesinthecountry.Noristhereacleargovernmentstrategyinrelationtotheseinstitutions;theprocesslooksquitehaphazard.Ifthecurrenttrendcontinues,itmayendupdividingUzbekistan’shighereducationsectorbetweenamodernized,liberalforeignsystemandanold-fashioned,isolated,andlow-qualitynationalsystem.Suchadivisionwouldmakethenationalsystemevenpoorer,detachedfrominternationalizationandthejobmarketandabletoattractonlyalow-qualitycohortof students. To avoid the emergence of two parallel higher education systems, the government shouldelaborateacomprehensivehighereducationreformstrategy.

PolicyRecommendationsThefindingsofthisresearchindicatethatthereisanurgentneedtoreconsiderandre-structurethecurrentSoviet-stylehighereducationsystemofUzbekistan.Thisstudyprovidesfeasiblepolicyrecommendationstogovernmentandotherstakeholdersforcompletelyrestructuringthesector.

1Staffmemberatalocalhighereducationinstitution,personalinterviewwiththeauthor,Tashkent,April2019.

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Inmyview,thefirststeptowardreformingthesectoristheestablishmentofaworkinggroupundertheCabinet ofMinisters ofUzbekistan consistingof leadinghigher education specialists, academics, andconsultants.Thisworkinggroupshouldstudysuccessfulhighereducationstructuresinleadingstates—i.e.,theUS,Australia,andtheUK—withinadefinedtimeframe.TheWorkingGroupshouldthenpresentthegovernmentwithaHigherEducationReformPackage.

On the basis ofmy findings, I recommend that the reforms should first address the structure orhierarchyoftheHigherEducationMinistry.Whereastherearecurrentlymultipleplayersinvolvedinhighereducationreform(includingtheSocialComplexofCabinetofMinistersforoverallmanagementofthesectorandtheMinistryofFinanceforthesector’sfinancesandbudgets),IrecommendthattheMinistryofHigherEducationbemadetheonlygovernmentagencyresponsibleforhighereducation.TheMinistrycanthensetup/reformagenciesandinstitutesunderitsportfolio.TheHigherEducationReformPackageshouldinclude:

• Makinguniversitiesself-governingbodies(withtheirownbudgetmodelsandcurricula).• Developing an internationalization policy thatwill formalize the process for establishing foreign

universitybranchestomakeitmoreconsistent.Individualuniversitiescanusethispolicytodeveloptheir own local internationalization strategies for establishing international partnerships withuniversitiesworldwide.

• Encouraging universities, as autonomous institutions, to have Boards through which the bestcandidatesareselectedformanagementpositions.RectorsshouldnotbeappointedbytheCabinetofMinisters.Managementpositionswithinuniversities shouldbeannouncedpublicly inorder toattractqualityapplicantsfromaroundtheworld.

• Allowinguniversitiestoworkwithindustryandbusinesstoattractfundsandencouragingacademicstafftoattractfunds/grantsfortheirresearch.Writinginstructorsandresearchmanagementteamswillberequiredinorderforacademicstogaintheskillsnecessarytowritegoodgrantproposals.

• Adopting a policy on credit and grading inhigher education that alignswith international creditstandards.

• Rewritingpositiondescriptionsof academic appointments inHE institutions to include teaching,research,andotherservicestotheuniversity;introducingacompulsoryresearchcomponenttomostacademicappointments.

Appendix1.Foreignuniversitybranchesalreadyoperatinginthemarket

NameofForeignUniversityBranchandyearofitsestablishment

Mainteachingareas

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Plekhanov Russian University ofEconomics(since1995)

Economics,Business,andFinance

WestminsterUniversity(UK)(since2002) Business/Management/Marketing, Business InformationSystems,CommercialLaw,Economy/Finance

Lomonosov Moscow State University(Russia)(since2006)

AppliedMathematicsandInformatics,andPsychology

GubkinRussianStateUniversityofOilandGas(since2007)

OilandGas

Management Development Institute ofSingapore(since2007)

Business and Management, Engineering, Fashion Design,Information Technology, Life Sciences, MassCommunications, Psychology and Travel, Tourism andHospitalityManagement

TurinPolytechnicUniversity(Italy)(since2009)

MechanicalandEnergyEngineering;InformationTechnologyand Automation Systems in Industry (ICT); Industrial andCivilEngineeringandArchitecture

InhaUniversity(SouthKorea)(since2014) ComputerScienceandEngineering,InformationandCommunicationEngineering,Logistics

*Yeoju Technical Institute in Tashkent(YTIT) (South Korea) (7-8 September2018)*Thisuniversity, interestingly, isnoton theofficial list of foreign universities (orbranches)oftheMHSSE.TheuniversityhasbeenoperatingsinceJuly2018.

Architecture and Urban Planning; Alternative Energy;BusinessManagement;Tourism

WebsterUniversity(US)(sinceSeptember5,2018)

TeachingEnglishasaSecondLanguage(TESL).Thedegreeisoffered jointly by Webster University and a local partneruniversity–UzbekStateUniversityofWorldLanguages.

Moscow Institute of Steel and Alloy(Russia)(sinceSeptember24,2018)

Mining; Metallurgy; Automatization and Management ofTechnologicalProcessesandProduction

Branch of Information SystemsManagement Institute (Latvia, sinceSeptember28,2018)

The Branch was established in Ferghana. The followingfacultieswerelistedinthelocalmedia:Undergraduate courses: Tourism, Hotel Management,Management of Cultural Heritage, Small BusinessManagement,ITMaster’s courses: Business Management, InformationSystems

Amity University (India, since October 3,2018)

ThelocalmediaspreadthenewsthatnegotiationsonopeningabranchofAmityUniversityinUzbekistanhadstarted.

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Moscow State Institute of InternationalRelations(Russia,October4,2018)

OnOctober4,2018,theRectorofMoscowStateInstituteofInternational Relations visited Uzbekistan, where he heldtalks about the establishment of a School of InternationalRelations within the University of World Economy andDiplomacy(Uzbekistan).

BranchofBucheonUniversityinTashkent(SouthKorea,July2018)

TheBranchwasestablishedby theDecreeof thePresidentdatedJuly2,2018.Itofferspreschooleducationdegrees.

Branch of National Nuclear ResearchUniversity under Moscow Institute ofEngineering and Physics (Russia, July 10,2018)

Uzbekistan and Russia agreed to open the branch of theNational Nuclear Research University, which was recentlyfoundedinRussiaonthepremisesoftherenownedMoscowInstitute of Engineering and Physics. Students will beadmittedfromacademicyear2019-2020.

Ajou University in Uzbekistan (not aBranch)(SouthKorea,November30,2018)

Undergraduate degrees in Architecture or ConstructionEngineeringcommencingfromacademicyear2019-2020.

Branch of Moscow University of PhysicalTraining,Swimming,YouthandTourisminSamarkandregion(February13,2019)

More than150studentswillbeaccepted in the2019-2020academicyeartoprogramsonvolleyball,basketball,tennis,swimming,etc.

ShardaUniversityBranchinAndijanregion(India,April2019)

An agreementwas signed at the Embassy ofUzbekistan inIndiabetweentheKhokimofAndijonregionandtheHeadofShardaGroup.

Source:compiledbytheauthorbasedonlocalmediaanduniversitywebsites.Appendix2.ListofLocalPrivateUniversitiesAkfaUniversityProgram offered by Gachon University (SouthKorea,partnershipsinceOctober3,2018)

Gachon University and Akfa Medline signed anagreement on opening the branch of GachonUniversity’s College of Medical Science—currentlyknown as Akfa University—in Uzbekistan. Theadmissions to 6-year undergraduate studies willcommence in 2019. The newly-established AkfaUniversitywillrunGachon’sacademicprograms.

Appendix3.ForeignUniversityBranchesthathavesignedagreementswiththeUzbekGovernmenttooperateinthecountry(asofMay2019)Name Details

The Gerasimov Institute ofCinematography(Russia)

July 25, 2018—President of Uzbekistan ordered that anagreementbereachedwiththeRussiansidetoopenabranchofthe institute in Tashkent in 2020. Negotiations are planned tostartinDecember2018.

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Branch of Nanjing PolytechnicInstitute(China)

ItisplannedthatthelanguagesofinstructionwillbeEnglishandChinese

Branch of “Universiti TeknologiMalaysia—UTM” (MalaysiaTechnologicalUniversity,Malaysia)

NegotiationswereheldonJanuary27,2019.

UniversityofTechnology(China)

TheChinesesidevisitedthecountryfornegotiationsonJanuary25,2019.

Branch of Kyung-in Women’sUniversity(SouthKorea)

AnMoUonestablishingthisBranchwassignedonApril20,2019.TheBranchwillfocusonprogramsuchastextile,design,fashion,aviationandtourism,healthcare,andKoreanstudies.

Branch of Turkish HealthcareStudies University on the premisesof Bukhara State Medical Institute(Turkey)

TheagreementwiththeTurkishsideonopeningthisbranch inthe2019-2020academicyearwassignedonApril1,2019.

Branches of Moscow OncologicalResearch Institute in Tashkent andSamarkand(Russia,newsfromApril25,2019)

ThenewsonnegotiationswiththeRussiansidewaspublishedonApril25,2019.

Branch of Seojeong University inTashkent (South Korea, April 6,2018)

AnMoUwassignedonApril6,2018.

Appendix4.NumberofPlayersinPublicandForeignUniversityBranches:ComparisonofUzSWLUwithMDISUzbekistanStateUniversityofWorldLanguagesistheleadingpublicuniversityforforeignlanguageteachinginthecountry.ManagementDevelopmentInstituteofSingaporeinTashkent(MDIS)isoneoftheolderforeignuniversitybranchesinthecountry,havingbeenoperatingsuccessfullysince2007.MDIShascompleteautonomyaslongasitmeetsNationalQualityAssuranceStandards.Table1.NumberofplayersingovernanceofUzSWLUOrganization ResponsibilitiesincludeCabinetofMinisters • DevelopmentofstrategyfortheHEsector

• DeterminingthequotasforentrancetoHEIs• Settingthestipendsforallstudents• AppointmentsofRectorsofHEIs

MHSSE (Higher EducationMinistry)

• ConsolidatingannualbudgetbidspreparedbyHEIs• Reallocationofannualbudgetfunds(approvedbytheMinistry

ofFinance)betweenHEIs• Organizing the academic year (length of semesters, dates of

examinationsandholidays)MinistryofFinance • ApprovalofconsolidatedannualbudgetofHEI

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MinistryofEconomy • Forecastingmarketdemandfordifferentsectors,whichbecomesthe basis for setting admission quotas toHEIs (determined inconsultationwithMHSSEandMLSP)

StateTestingCentre • DevelopingandorganizingnationaltestingforadmissiontoHEIsSource:UzWLUwebsiteandinterviewswithUzSWLUstaffTable2.NumberofplayersingovernanceofMDISOrganization ResponsibilitiesincludeMDISBOARDOFDIRECTORS

• DevelopmentofMDIS’sstrategy• Determiningadmissioncaps• AppointmentofVice-President• Developingbudgetmodels• Researchandinnovation• Studentrecruitment• Studentexperience• Studentemployability

Source:MDISwebsiteandinterviewswithMDISstaff

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HowPrivateSchoolsCanImprovetheUzbekEducationSystem

FirdavsNavruzov

Firdavs Navruzov manages the language and tutoring school “LTC Leader” and the private school “TheKnowledgeAcademy”inBukhara.In2015,heparticipatedintheEdmundS.MuskieInternshipProgramattheU.S.DepartmentofEducation.HeearnedaBAandMAinEnglishPhilologyandLiteraryCriticismfromBukharaStateUniversity,aswellasanMAinTeachingEnglishasaSecondLanguagefromMinnesotaStateUniversitywhileonaFulbrightForeignStudentFellowship.ThispaperdiscussestheimportanceoftheacademicindependenceoftheprivatesectorintheUzbekcontext.Sincethepresidentialdecreeonthedevelopmentofprivateeducationwasadopted inSeptember2017,1therehasbeenatremendousriseinthenumberofprivateschoolsthroughoutthecountry,with86privateschoolsasofApril1,2019.2Themainobjectiveofthedecreewastoimprovethequalityofeducationandtodevelopnon-governmentaleducationalinstitutions.However,thepolicythatfollowedthedecreemaintainsthatthecurriculumelaboratedbytheMinistryofPublicEducationforpublicschoolsshouldbefollowedbyprivateschoolsaswell.Iwouldchallengethis,arguingthatprivateschoolsneedatleastpartialacademicindependenceinordertoenablethequalityofeducationtoimprovefaster.

Inthelasttwodecades,thecontentoftheUzbekstatecurriculumhasnotseensubstantialchange,despitetheglobalcontextofatechnologicalboom.Asaresult,mostschoolgraduatescannotgainadmissiontotheirdesireduniversitiesoracquireemploymentinthemodernworkforce.Withoutexternalhelpsuchasprivatetuitionorspecialvocationalcourses,theysimplydonotmeetemployers’expectationsintermsoftheirskillset,whetherwemeanbasicsoftskillsorlanguageandcomputerskills.Eventhoughtheyarethemain venue for economic and human capital development, public schools are unable to respond to theessentialchallengesfacingthecountry.

Ithasnowbecomeobviousthatgovernmentsalonecannotmeetthedemandforinformationandknowledgeinthemodernworld.Publicschoolsandprivateschoolsarerequiredtosupporteachother,onesteppinginwhentheotherfallsshort.ThisisparticularlytrueinadevelopingcountrysuchasUzbekistan.Thegovernment’seffortstorespondtocultural,economic,andtechnologicalchangesandtransformationshavecausedpublicexpenditurestoincreaseexponentially(theprognosisfor2019suggeststhatastaggering26.5percentofGDPwillbespentoneducation,withmorethanhalfofthatsumbeingdirectedtosecondaryeducation3).However,thisstillfallsshortofnecessaryexpenditureoneducation;thegovernmentdoesnothavealargeenoughbudgettobeabletospendasmuchasitideallywould.Thisiswheretheprivatesectorstepsin.

Preliminary evidence shows that theunit costs of private schools are lower than thoseof publicschools.Inadditiontomobilizingrevenueforthestate,therearemoreobviousbenefits.Themostimportant

1Decreeof thePresidentof theRepublicofUzbekistan“OnMeasures forFurtherDevelopmentofActivities for theProvision of Non-State Educational Services,” PP-3276, September 15, 2017, accessed July 22, 2019,http://lex.uz/docs/3343085.2OrderofthePresidentoftheRepublicofUzbekistan“OntheApprovaloftheConceptofDevelopmentoftheSystemofNational Education of the Republic of Uzbekistan until 2030,” UP-5712, April 29, 2019, accessed July 22, 2019,http://lex.uz/docs/4312783.3 Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Uzbekistan, “Biudzhet dlia grazhdan: proekt 2019,” Tashkent, 2018,https://www.mf.uz/media/file/press/budget_2019.pdf.

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ofallisthatariseinthenumberofprivateschoolswillinevitablycreatehealthycompetitionbetweenprivateandpublicschools.Toenticestudentstotheirschools,thepublicsectorwillhavetoimprovethequalityanddeliveryof itsprograms, teacherqualifications, facilities andamenities, etc.However, for competition toarise,privateschoolsneedtobeabletocreatetheirownprograms.

ThispaperwillfirstdiscussthecurrentpolicyinUzbekistanandtheroadmapforthedevelopmentof education up to 2030 elaborated by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. It will then look at the researchconductedontherelationshipbetweenpublicandprivateschoolsandachievementindifferentpartsoftheworld.Onthebasisofthis,itwillconcludewithrecommendationsforanewpolicyofacademicindependenceforprivateschools.

BackgroundontheEducationSystemofUzbekistan

In2017,Uzbekistanchangeditsschoolsystemfrombeing12years(nineyearsatschoolandthreeyearsataspecializedcollegeorlyceum)tobeing11yearsofobligatoryprimaryandsecondaryeducation,startingattheageofseven.Thisrequirementincludesfouryearsofprimaryschoolandtwocyclesofsecondaryschool,lasting five and two years respectively. Preschool education is provided to children aged 3-6 years inkindergartens. Preschool education is not compulsory. While the formal eleven years of education areoverseenbytheMinistryofPublicEducation,preschooleducationisoverseenbytheMinistryofPreschoolEducation.

General(basic)educationisprovidedinseveraltypesofbasiceducationschools:schoolswithonlyprimaryeducation(Grades1-4)andthosewithcomplete(Grades1-11)education;adulteducationcenters;and specialized schools and boarding schools for students with disabilities. General education is alsoavailableinsuchinstitutionsasgymnasiaandlyceums(Grades10-11),someofwhichareattachedtohighereducation institutions. Colleges, vocational and technical schools, which lasted 3 years and have beenreplacedbyhighschooleducation(Grades10-11),arenowpost-secondaryeducationestablishmentslastingfrom 6 months to 2 years. Additionally, since 2017 Uzbekistan has recognized private schools or non-governmentaleducationalinstitutionsforprimaryandsecondaryeducation.

Education is mainly financed by the government. Higher and specialized secondary educationinstitutionsare financedbythestatebudget,whilesecondaryschoolsandkindergartensare financedbymunicipalbudgets.Thereisasystemoffinancialsupportforallstudentsathigherandsecondaryspecializedinstitutes.About70%ofthefinancingforspecializedsecondaryschoolscomesfromlocalauthorities,20%from the Ministry of Higher Education, and the other 10% from contracts with industry, employmentservices,fee-payingcourses,andthesaleofproducts.1

AsofApril1,2019,basiceducationwasbeingprovidedin9,691institutionswithanenrollmentofabout5.8millionstudents.Therearealso13,800studentsreceivingeducationat86privateschoolsornon-governmentaleducationalinstitutions.Apartfromthis,therehasbeenasurgeinextracurriculareducationalinstitutions:over140,000childrenattend5,540extracurricularfacilitiestodeveloptheirartisticskills.TheMinistryofPublicEducationalsooversees86specializedschoolsand21boardingschoolsforphysicallyandpsychologicallydisabledchildren(20,610atschoolsand13,437athome).2

CurrentIssuesinPublicEducationandtheRoadmapThepresidentialdecree3identifiesfiveproblemareasofpubliceducationandsetsoutaroadmapforsolvingthem.Theareasareasfollows:

• Managementofpubliceducation;

1UNESCO,“Uzbekistan:GeneralInformation,”lastaccessedJuly22,2019,http://uis.unesco.org/country/UZ.2OrderofthePresidentoftheRepublicofUzbekistan“OntheApprovaloftheConcept…”3Ibid.

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• Stafftrainingandprofessionaldevelopment;• Organizationofeducationalprocesses;• Materialandtechnicalequipmentofschools;and• Financingthesystemofpubliceducation.

Managementofpubliceducation.Themainissuesintermsofmanagingpubliceducationinclude

theabsenceofalegalandinstitutionalframeworkfordealingwithnewreformsineducation,analysisoftheoperationsofeducationalinstitutions,anddeterminingtheactualstateofeducationinregions.Thelowlevelof use ofmodern communications technology toprovide state educational services,manage educationalinstitutions,andconductplanningandorganization impedesmonitoringandeffective implementationofdecisions;italsoleadstoexcessivebureaucratizationofpublicadministrationandincreasescosts.

Staff training and professional development.There is a serious lack of pedagogical staff in anumberofsubjects,andduetotheabsenceofscholarshipsorfinancialsupportforstudentsfromremoteregionswho seek admission to higher educational institutions, there is an evenmore acute shortage ofteachers inmountainous and desert areas. Higher educational institutionswith teacher-trainingmajorsteachsubjectsthatareofnousetofutureteachers;theoutdatedcontentofcourses,aswellastheoutdatedteachingpracticesystem,adverselyaffecttheprofessionaldevelopmentoffutureteachers.Intermsofjobplacement, there are no specific requirements for determining teachers’ qualifications during hiringprocesses.Thelackofnationalstandardsdescribingwhatteachersandprincipalsneedtoknowandbeableto do hinders their growth and makes the existing procedure for selecting and appointing heads ofinstitutionsinefficient.

Organizationofeducationalprocesses.Over-largeclasssizesinmostcentralizedschoolshaveledtoa sharpdeterioration in thequalityof education. Sinceparents inmost regionsofUzbekistanarenotrestricted to a given local area in their choice of schools, the quality of both high-enrollment and low-enrollmentschoolshasslumped.Duetothecorruptionofcertainschooladministrators,someclasseshave45-50studentsperroom.Ontopofthis,therigidityofthetextbookdevelopmentprocessrequirespublisherstoadheretocertainprerequisites,withanegativeimpactontheircontent,methodology,andpublicationquality. Moreover, while state educational standards seek to develop competence, textbooks—not tomentionteachingandassessmentmethods—workagainst thisby focusingondescribing information forstudents tomemorize, therebyhindering thedevelopmentofcritical thinking, independentretrievalandanalysisofinformation,etc.

Material and technical equipmentof schools.Due to ahistorically lower level of statebudgetexpenditureonmaterialandtechnicalequipmentofschoolsandsomecorruptioninschooladministration,thereisaneedforadditionalequipmentin28percentofschools,50percentofequipmentisobsoleteandmustbereplaced,morethan3,000generalschoolsneedcanteenstoprovidenutritiousmealstostudents,and2,907secondaryschoolsneedconstructionandrepairwork.

Financing the system of public education. Most of the funds allocated to public educationinstitutionsfromthestatebudgetarespentonwages,whilenotenoughfundsarebeingspentonupdatingschool equipment and repairing schools. Funds must be distributed and used more efficiently andtransparently.

Theroadmapforthedevelopmentofthesystemofpubliceducationuntil2030highlightsfourmaintargets:

• Improvingtheeffectivenessofeducationalcontentandimprovingthequalityofstaff• Raisingthestatusofteachersinsociety• Improvingthematerialandtechnicalbaseofeducationalinstitutionsandincreasingcompetitionin

thepubliceducationsystem• Putting into practice a set of measures, including five initiatives, aimed at creating additional

conditionsfortheupbringingandtrainingofyoungpeople

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Eachtargetrespondstooneormoreoftheaforementionedissueswiththepubliceducationsystem,aswellas to other limitations that are hindering Uzbekistan from participating in international programs andassessments(PISA,TIMSS,PIRLS1).PracticesaroundtheWorld

Colemanetal.’spioneeringstudy2openedthewaytoawaveofempiricalresearchontheperformanceofprivate and public schools in awide range of educational contexts. The findings and conclusions in theliteraturetodayregardingthisissuearemixedandhighlycontext-based.Thediversityoftypesofprivateschools (independent, charter, low-cost, recognized, unrecognized, etc.) and levels of quality in publicschoolsaroundtheworldmakeitdifficulttocometoanydefinitiveconclusion.Asidefromthis,thereisaneedtocontrolfordifferencesinthepersonalandsocio-economicbackgroundofstudents,aswellasthelevelofgovernmentinterferenceintheeducationprocess.

Althoughanumberofstudiespositthatprivateschoolsarelessefficientthanpublicschools3orevencondemnprivateschoolsasathreattodemocraticequalityandsocialcohesion,4itiswidelyassumedthattheyarelikelytoperformbetterthanpublicschools.Studiesshowthatindependentprivateschoolsproducesubstantialrevenuemobilizationforgovernments,5aswellasanumberofaddedbenefits.First,inprivateschools,high-ability,low-incomestudentsreceivetuitiondiscounts,largelymitigatingthefearof“elitism.”Second,schooladministratorsbecomemoreresponsivetotheneedsofstudentsandtheirparents,therebyimprovingtheefficiencyofeducationprovision.Finally,ariseinthenumberofprivateschoolswillcreatehealthycompetitionbetweenprivateschoolsandpublicschools.6Anumberofarticlesonthisissue7haveshownthatstudentsinprivateschoolsachievemore,especiallyinlanguagesandmathematics,thantheydoinpublicschools,creatingacompetitionthatforcesstateschoolstoimprove.

AMutuallyBeneficialRelationship

1Ibid.2JamesColeman,ThomasHoffer,andSallyKilgore,HighSchoolAchievement:Public,CatholicandPrivateSchoolsCompared(NewYork:BasicBooks,1982),1-12.3D.BrentEdwards,Jr.,StevenKlees,andJanetWildish,“DynamicsofLow-FeePrivateSchoolsinKenya:GovernmentalLegitimation,School-CommunityDependence,andResourceUncertainty,”TeachersCollegeRecord119(2017):1-42;G.BrunelloandL.Rocco,“EducationalStandardsinPrivateandPublicSchools,”TheEconomicJournal118(2008):1866-1887, doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02194.x; Muhammad Iqbal, “Public versus Private Secondary Schools: AQualitativeComparison,”JournalofResearchandReflectionsinEducation6,no.1(2012):40-49.4 R. Marples, “What's Wrong with Private Schools,” Journal of Philosophy of Education 52 (2018): 19-35,doi:10.1111/1467-9752.12275.5EmmanuelJimenez,MarlaineE.Lockheed,andVicentePaqueo,“TheRelativeEfficiencyofPrivateandPublicSchoolsinDevelopingCountries,”TheWorldBankResearchObserver6,no.2(1991):205-218;StephenJ.CaldasandSylvainBernier,“TheEffectsofCompetitionfromPrivateSchoolingonFrenchPublicSchoolDistrictsintheProvinceofQuebec,”TheJournalofEducationalResearch105,no.5(2012):353-365.6RichardArum,“DoPrivateSchoolsForcePublicSchoolstoCompete?”AmericanSociologicalReview(1996):29-46;Jimenez,Lockheed,andPaqueo,“TheRelativeEfficiencyofPrivateandPublicSchools.”7 JoséManuelCordero,DiegoPrior,andRosaSimancas,“AComparisonofPublicandPrivateSchoolsinSpainUsingRobustNonparametricFrontierMethods,”CentralEuropeanJournalofOperationsResearch24,no.3(2016):659-680;SunkuHahn,Tae-HwanKim,andBoyoungSeo,“EffectsofPublicandPrivateSchoolsonAcademicAchievement,”SeoulJournalofEconomics27 (2014):137-147; JitendraGouda,KailashChandraDas,SrinivasGoli, andLadumaiMaikhoApolloPou,“GovernmentversusPrivatePrimarySchoolsinIndia:AnAssessmentofPhysicalInfrastructure,SchoolingCostsandPerformance,”InternationalJournalofSociologyandSocialPolicy33,no.11/12(2013):708-724.

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Private schools decrease the state budget expenditure on schools. Financial constraints limit the state’sabilitytoexpandfreepubliceducation.Thisisespeciallytrueinpooranddevelopingcountries,wherethedemandforschoolingisprojectedtoincreasedramaticallyinthecomingdecades.Privateschoolscanhandleatleastpartoftheexpansionbyreducingexpensessuchasteacherwages,costallocationperstudent,andconstruction and/ormaintenance of school facilities. They can also assist governments by reducing theexcessive number of students in public school classrooms. Finally, private schools—which are moreautonomousandresponsivetostudentsandtheirparents—willdelivereducationinacost-effectiveway.

Hoxby’sseminalpaper1studiesthebehaviorofschoolsinthreestatesintheUSwhenexposedtocompetition. In each state, student performance improved substantially,while expenditures per studentwerelessaffected.ThestudywascorroboratedbyGreeneandKang2andDee.3GreeneandKang,whostudytherelationshipbetweencompetitionandexpenditure,alsofoundthatforthemostpartcompetitionreducestheproportionofthebudgetspentonnon-instructionalpurposes,butitmightencouragespendinginthenon-instructional categories.Dee’s research focuses on the overall link between expenditure and schoolperformancebutmentionshowcompetitionfromprivateschoolspositivelyaffectspublicschools.Thestudywas later repeated by Caldas and Bernier4 in Quebec, where they came to the opposite conclusion:competitionbetweenprivateandpublicschoolsdidnotseemtohaveasignificanteffectontheacademicperformance of students, but it significantly reduced total expenditures per student by French-speakingpublicschooldistricts.

AchievementGap Assessingtheacademicperformanceofprivateschoolsincomparisontopublicschoolshasbeenthefocusofmanyresearchersfromdifferenteducationalcontexts.Thefindingsofthevastliteraturedevotedtothisissuearemixed.Somestudiesfindthatprivateschoolsperformbetteraftercontrollingfordifferencesinthepersonalandsocio-economicbackgroundofstudents.5Otherscontendthatthedifferencesdisappearwhenthosevariablesaretakenintoaccountandthatpublicschoolscanevenoutperformprivateones.6Ingeneralterms,however,itiswidelyassumedthatprivateschoolsarelikelytoperformbetterthanpublicschoolsbecausemarketcompetitionforcesthemtoachieveamoreefficientuseofresourcesandbecauseoftheirobligationtoberesponsivetostudentsandtheirparents. It is interestingtonotethat themostvividexamplesofanachievementgapbetweenprivateandpublic schools canbe seen in the caseofdeveloping countries. Indeveloping countries, the efficiencyofprivateschoolsishighlydependentontheinstitutionalregimeandtheincentivestructureunderwhichtheyoperate. For example, such incentivesas contracting for educational services in thePhilippines, vouchersystemsinChile,orpublic-privatesubsidyprogramsinPakistanshowconsiderableimprovementofprivateschools’ academic achievement. In some countries—like India, Nigeria, Jordan, and Pakistan—research

1CarolineMinterHoxby,“SchoolChoiceandSchoolCompetition:EvidencefromtheUnitedStates,”(2003):9-65.2KennethV.GreeneandByung-GooKang,“TheEffectofPublicandPrivateCompetitiononHighSchoolOutputsinNewYorkState,”EconomicsofEducationReview23,no.5(2004):497-506.3ThomasS.Dee,“ExpensePreferenceandStudentAchievementinSchoolDistricts,”EasternEconomicJournal31,no.1(2005):23-44.4CaldasandBernier,“TheEffectsofCompetition.”5EugeniaFroedgeToma,“PublicFundingandPrivateSchoolingacrossCountries,”TheJournalofLawandEconomics39, no. 1 (1996): 121-148; JosephG. Altonji, ToddE. Elder, andChristopherR. Taber, “Selection onObserved andUnobservedVariables:AssessingtheEffectivenessofCatholicSchools,”JournalofPoliticalEconomy113,no.1(2005):151-184; Jaap Dronkers and Péter Robert, “Differences in Scholastic Achievement of Public, Private Government-Dependent,andPrivateIndependentSchools:ACross-NationalAnalysis,”EducationalPolicy22,no.4(2008):541-577.6VincentVandenbergheandStephaneRobin,“EvaluatingtheEffectivenessofPrivateEducationacrossCountries:AComparisonofMethods,”LabourEconomics 11,no.4 (2004):487-506;Chang-TaiHsiehandMiguelUrquiola, “TheEffects of Generalized School Choice on Achievement and Stratification: Evidence from Chile's Voucher Program,”JournalofPublicEconomics90,no.8-9(2006):1477-1503.

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showsthatprivateschoolsoutperformpublicschoolsincertainsubjects(English,arts,etc.)butnottheirnativelanguage,forinstance.

Thereisstillmuchdenialabouttheefficiencyofprivateschoolsandsomestudiesheavilysupportthe“onlygovernmentwilldo”positiononsecondaryeducation.Gradually,however, theprivatesector isbeingacknowledgedbyinfluentialpolicymakersingovernments,philanthropy,andcharity.Thesuccessesofprivateownershipandmarketsforschoolingaregraduallybeingrecognized.Proposals

The cumulative research mentioned above and the issues with public education point to one solution:Uzbekistan needs to open the door to the private sector as an important partner in educating futuregenerations.Thispaperposits twopossibleoptions for improving theacademic independenceofprivateschoolsinordertoensuretheirprogressandcreatecompetitionbetweenprivateschoolsandpublicschools.

A) Grantfullacademicindependence

TheMinistryofPublicEducationcouldallowprivateschoolstodeveloptheirowncurriculaandprograms.Thisoptionhastwomainadvantages.First, itwoulddiminishtheministry’scontroloverthecurriculumdevelopmentprocess.Theschooladministrationwouldbeabletochoosethenumberofhoursallocatedtoeachsubjectandaddoreliminateanysubjectitdeemedirrelevanttothecurriculum.Second,itwouldhelpprivateschoolsavoidputtingstudentsunderextrapressure.Mostprivateschoolsaddextrasubjectstotheirprogram but cannot retract any mandatory ones, therefore increasing time constraints on students.Academic independencewouldallowprivateschools to replacesomesubjectsand thusavoidburdeningstudents.

Ontheotherhand,thereareclearconcernsregardingthisoption,suchastheabuseofthisfreedombyprivateschools.First,thereisariskofunderminingoverallacademicachievement.Schoolsmaywanttofocusexcessivelyonselectsubjectsandnotmeettheminimumeducationalstandardsofthecountry.Second,someschoolsmayfabricatetestresultstogettheirstudentsintobetterinstitutionsorotherschools.Ascanbe seen from the arguments above, while Option A has compelling upsides, its outcomeswould be toounpredictableinthelongrunandlessthanaccountabletothestudentbodyandtheirparents.

B) Grantgreateracademicindependence

TheMinistryofPublicEducationcouldcomeupwithanassessmenttooltosupportandevaluateprivateschools’curriculumdevelopmentprocesses.Themainadvantageofthisoptionisthatitwouldhelpeliminateineffectivecurricula.Basedonpreviousexperiences,theministrycouldsupportprivateschoolsincreatingtheirowncurriculabyallocatingeducationaladvisorsfromtheRepublicanCenterofEducation,anofficeundertheMinistryofPublicEducationresponsibleforstatecurriculumdevelopmentandevaluation.Thiswouldensurethatnoschoolcouldunderminestudents’futureeducationalandprofessionalprospectsbyignoringminimumeducationalstandards.

Second,withsupportfromtheministry,schoolscouldcreatecurriculatheyconsiderefficientintheirspecific contexts. These diverse curriculamight lead to healthy competition between private and publicschools. Third, the process of creating diverse curricula could benefit the ministry as well, helping thegovernment to identify and eliminate the issues in thepresent curriculum. It couldpave theway to theintroductionofmoreforeignexperiencesandmethodologies.SubjectsundertheSTEAMumbrellacouldbemorerigorouslytaught;teacherswouldalsohavetheopportunitytoretraininsciencesandIT.ThiscouldpotentiallypreparestudentsforthejobmarketnotonlywithinthebordersofUzbekistan,butalsoinmoredevelopedcountries. Thereisariskofexcessivegovernmentintervention.Thegovernmentmayexertexcessivecontroloverschools’curriculumdevelopmentprocessesinsteadofguidingandsupportingthem.Anotherconcern

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withthisoption is thescopeforcorruption.Someschoolsmight trytobribethepersonsresponsible forcurriculumevaluationtogettheircurriculacertified.Finally,allthecurriculacreatedfordifferentschoolswillneedtobepilotedforevaluation,whichcouldadverselyaffecttheacademicachievementofthestudents.However,theseissuescouldlargelybemitigatedinthefollowingways:

• The policy could stipulate the specific parameters of government involvement in the process ofcurriculumdevelopment.Thiswouldminimizethedangerofexcessiveinterventionbythestate.

• Thepartsofthecurriculadevelopedbyprivateschoolscouldbepostedonlineforthewiderpublicto see. This could prevent private schools from developing inefficient curricula and bribing thepersonsinvolved.

• Acurriculumcouldbepilotedwithonlyasmallnumberofstudentstoevaluateitsefficiency.Untilityieldspositiveresults,theschoolcouldcontinueimplementingthestateprogram.

RecommendationsandConclusionBasedonthisstudy,followingaresomerecommendationstotheMinistryofPublicEducation:

• DirecttheRepublicanCenterofEducationtoevaluateandsupportprogramdevelopmentinprivateschools.Thecentercanallocateateamofexpertstoworkwithprivateschoolstodeveloptheirowncurriculaandensurethequalityoftheirprograms.

• Pilottheprogramsdevelopedbyschoolsandthecentertoevaluatetheirefficiency.Toensurethatthe whole student body at schools does not undergo experimental programs, they should beevaluatedwitharepresentativepilotgroup.

• Issue a policy granting private schools greater academic independence in terms of curriculumdevelopment,professionaltraining,andassessmentofstudentknowledge.

Inconclusion,grantinggreateracademicindependencetoprivateschoolswouldcreateameanstodealwiththeissueofuniformityandwouldhelpcontextualizecurricula.Itwouldthusleadtoadiversityofideasandhealthycompetitionthatwouldsupportacademicandhumancapitalachievement.Bysupportingschoolsthroughouttheprocessofcurriculumdevelopment,theministrycaneliminatethepossibilityofanacademicachievementandestablishspecificminimumeducationalstandardsforschoolstofollow.Finally,itwouldgenerateaconstantstreamofideasforfurtherimprovementofbothpublicandprivateschoolsthatcouldinformtheworkoftheMinistryofPublicEducation.

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TheNuancesofHijabattheCrossroadsofReligiosityandSecularisminUzbekistan

DonohonAbdugafurova

Donohon Abdugafurovaearned a BA in Uzbek Philology fromNamangan State University and anMA inCurriculumandInstructionfromtheUniversityofWyoming.DonohoniscurrentlyaPhDCandidate(ABD)intheIslamicCivilizationsStudiesProgramatEmoryUniversity.Herresearchinterestsaregender,CentralAsianintellectual history, Sufism,women’s literature and lifewriting, education, upbringing, and ethics inUzbeksociety.HerarticleshavebeenpublishedinCentralAsianAffairsandtheGeorgetownJournalofGenderandtheLaw,amongothers.

Priorto2016,theUzbekauthoritieswereverycautioustowardanynon-state-controlledformofIslam.Withthe arrival in power of the new president, ShavkatMirziyoyev, some restrictions on religious practices,includingwomen’sveiling,haveindirectlybeeneased.Althoughtherewasnoovertpropagandaadvocatingveiling,newexpressionsofpietyappeared.Asaresult,notonlyprivatespacesbutalsopublicplacessuchasschoolssawveilingbecomeawidespreadpractice.MirziyoyevhasencouragedtherevivalofIslamthroughQuranrecitationcompetitions,allowingprayercallstobeheardthroughmosques,andtheestablishmentofnewmosques,inspiringpeopletoexpresstheirreligiosityandpietymoreopenly.1HavingbeenencouragedtobeproudoftheirIslamicidentityandheritage,peoplehavebeenshockedbyrecentdiscussionsaboutbanningthehijab.

In this paper, I concentrate ondiscussions around themanifestation of religiosity inUzbekistan,especiallyonthenuancesofwearinghijab.ThepaperfirstdealswithUzbekistan'spositiontowardreligionandsecularism.Next,itdiscussestheissueofhijabinbroadertermsaswellasintheUzbekcontext.Afterthat,itintroducessomewomen’svoicesonhijabtohighlightthemultifacetedmotivationsforwearingtheveil.Throughthisresearch,IarguethatthestateistryingtofindabalancebetweenacceptingandrejectingculturalelementsthatareassociatedwithIslam.

Uzbekistan’sPositiononReligionandSecularismIt shouldbenoted that theplaceof Islam ina societydoesnotalwayscorrespondwith the relationshipbetweenthestateandIslam.DespitethecurtailmentofreligiousexpressioninSoviettime,Islamhasbeenpracticed in everyday life in Central Asia.2 Today, although people feel wholeheartedlyMuslim in theireverydaylives,theindependentstatesbornin1991arecautioustowardreligionbecauseofthe—realorsupposed—dangers of fundamentalism. InBeingMuslim in Central Asia: Practices, Politics and Identities,Marlene Laruelle argues that the relationship between Islam and the state in Central Asia has “aschizophreniccharacter”:

1DecreeonCreating IslamicCivilizationsCenterunder theCabinetofMinistriesof theRepublicofUzbekistan, theCollectionofLawDocumentsoftheRepublicofUzbekistan,Number31,point782,2017;NationalDatabaseofLawDocumentsnumbers09/19/23/0576,01.17.2018;http://www.lex.uz/docs/3296658.2ForadiscussionofpoliciesonIslaminSovietandpost-SovietUzbekistan,seeShoshanaKeller,ToMoscow,NotMecca:TheSovietCampaignAgainstIslaminCentralAsia(Westport,CT:GreenworldPublishingGroup,2001);AdeebKhalid,IslamAfterCommunism:ReligionandPoliticsinCentralAsia(Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,2007);MariaElizabethLouw,EverydayIslaminPost-SovietCentralAsia(NewYork:Routledge,2007).

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Islam has been glorified as a religion of the nation, the local pilgrimage sites have beenvalorized,andthegreatnational figures linkedtoSufismhavebeencelebrated,butat thesametimereligiouspracticeshavebeenmonitored,sermonsinthemosquesareincreasinglycontrolled,religiouseducationishighlyrestricted,andinteractionswiththerestoftheUmmaarelookeduponwithsuspicion.1

Notingthecomplexitiesoftheissue—whichtakeitbeyondthedichotomyofgoodandbad—Laruellearguesthat “interaction between state and society emerges as much more complex than the black and whitenarrative of advocacy groups criticizing the lack of religious freedom in the region and [the] repressivepracticesofthestatestructurestowardreligion.”2

IntheKarimovera,UzbekistanembracedarestrictedunderstandingofIslamwhilemaintainingthebans on Arabic teaching, the hijab, and religiosity in public spaces in the names of secularism.3 Thegovernment has long tried to maintain secularism in public places such as schools by limiting visualmanifestationsof religiosity,making suchmanifestations subject to anadministrativepenalty (ma’muriyjazo)forcontraveninginstitutionaldresscodes.4TheUzbekword“secular”(dunyoviy)alsorefersto“politicalpluralism,thecoexistenceandrecognitionofmultiplereligiousviewpointsandinterethnicharmony,”thusemphasizing toleranceasan importantaspectof thecountry’smultiethnicandmulti-faithcommunities.5LookingatIslaminpost-SovietUzbekistan,JohanRasanayagamdefinessecularism“asapracticethroughwhichthestateseekstoclassifyandregulateallaspectsofsociety,includingwhatconstitutesasreligious.”6

Another government-controlled sphere is education.Uzbekistan's educational policies,which arekey to the state’s developmental mission, demonstrate that secularism applies to non-Islamic religiousbelieversaswell.ThesecularagendahasremainedevidentinMirziyoyev’seducationalpolicy:anApril2017decreerequiresforinstancethatstudentsinsecondaryschoolsandvocationaltrainingcollegesobtainanunderstandingofsecularvaluesandreligiousrelationsbylearningphilosophy,asubjectthatincludesclassesonaesthetics,religiousstudies,andtheindividualandsociety.7Inschoolcurricula,Islamistaughtasawayoflivingasamoral,ethicalcitizenofUzbekistan.8Theseparationofteachinginreligionfromteachingaboutreligionisimportantinthiscontext.IfteachinginIslammeanseducationinthespiritofIslamortoprepareMuslimleaders,teachingaboutIslamapproachesthesubjectfromasecularpointofview.9

Indefiningtherelationshipbetweenthestateandreligion,scholarsSvanteCornellandJakobZennidentifyfivetypesofsecularism:1)the“Fusion”model,inwhichthespiritualandpoliticalpowermerge;2)the“DominantReligion”model,inwhichtheprincipalreligionisrecognizedatthesametimeasminority

1MarleneLaruelle,BeingMusliminCentralAsia:Practices,PoliticsandIdentities(Leiden:Brill,2018),4.2Laruelle,BeingMuslim,4.3EmmanuelKaragiannishighlightsstateinterventionsontheissuesofpoliticalIslamintheCentralAsiancontext.SeePoliticalIslaminCentralAsia:TheChallengeofHizbut-Tahrir(London:Routledge,2009);andTheNewPoliticalIslam:HumanRights,Democracy,andJustice(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,2018).4DecreeNo.168oftheCabinetofMinistersoftheRepublicofUzbekistanonAmendmenttotheLawonFreedomofConsciences and Religious Entities, Chapter 14, paragraph 5, May 1998. http://lex.uz/docs/65108, Law onAdministrativePenalty,Chapter184(1).http://www.lex.uz/acts/-97664.5 JohanRasanayagam, Islam inPost-SovietUzbekistan:TheMoralityofExperience (NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress),107.6Rasanayagam,IslaminPost-SovietUzbekistan,98.7 DecreeNo. 187 of the Cabinet ofMinisters of the Republic of Uzbekistan onApproving Education Standards forSecondarySchoolsandVocationalTrainingInstitutions,April6,2017;Annex2,Paragraph22onTeachingPhilosophy.8AdeebKhalid,“ASecularIslam:Nation,State,andReligioninUzbekistan,”InternationalJournalofMiddleEastStudies35, no. 4 (2003): 573–98, doi:10.1017/S0020743803000242; Donohon Abdugafurova. “Islam,Morality and PublicEducation:ReligiousElementsofEthicsandEtiquetteintheUzbekSchoolCurriculum,”CentralAsianAffairs5,no.3(2018):212-232.9SvanteCornelland JakobZenn, “ReligionandSecularState inUzbekistan,”SilkRoadPaper,CentralAsiaCaucasusInstitute&SilkRoadStudiesProgram(June2018):18.

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religionsareacknowledged;3)the“StateNeutrality”model,suchastheoneusedinAmerica,whichproposesthatreligiousmattersarecivicandprivate;4)the“Skeptical/Insulating”model,liketheFrenchlaïcité,whichseparatesthestatefromtheinfluenceofreligion;and5)themodelof“Intolerance”toanymanifestationofreligion.

AccordingtoCornellandZenn,Uzbekistan,whileassuringthedominanceofIslam,recognizestheethnicandreligiousdiversityofitspopulation.Thestatealsopositionsitselfasseparatefromtheinfluenceofreligion,justliketheFrenchlaïcitémodel,“yetinpromotingtherestorationofthetraditionalreligiouspractices of Central Asia, it borrows from the dominant-religionmodel prevalent in nineteenth-centuryEuropeanmonarchieswithstatechurchesorinMeijiJapan.”1Evidently,therefore,Uzbekistanhasitsownapproachtoreligionthatdefieseasycategorization.

Here,IarguethatUzbekistan'spositionvis-à-vissecularismalsoincludesthefusionmodel,wherespiritualitymergeswithpolitics.TheacceptanceofSufism,inwhichtherelationshipoftheBelieverandtheBelievedisemphasizedinamysticalandspiritualway,keepstheIslamicnarrativealiveevenwithoutthevisualmanifestationoforthopraxy.Naqhbandiyahtariqa,whichencourages“Dilbayorudastbakor”(yourheartwithGodandyourhandatwork)—inotherwords,keepingone’smindonGodwhileatthesametimedealingwithworldlyaffairs—wasahandymethodforthegovernmenttoencouragemoderateIslamandbeinga“goodMuslim”.2TherecognitionoftwoIslamicholidays—RamazonHayit(Eidal-Fitr)andQurbanHayit (Eid al Adha)—as national celebrations provides a further indication that Islamic spirituality isimportantinthestatediscourse.However,ifspiritualitybecomesmanifestedinthepublicspace,thisisaproblemintheeyesofthestate.DecreeonSchoolUniformsandHijabDiscussionLikeitsCentralAsianneighbors,Uzbekistandoesnotallowthehijabtobeworninschoolsettings.3InAugust2018,adecreeestablishingschooluniformswasadopted.4Article7statesthatstudentshavetobewithoutanyheadgear(boshkiyimsiz),effectivelybanningthehijabfrombeingwornonschoolgrounds.AlthoughIslamicclothingisnotforbiddenperse,nomanifestationsofreligiosityarepermitted:

Becausetherearedifferentnationalitiesandreligiousconfessions,andpubliceducationissecularinUzbekistan,itisforbiddentoaddadditionalelements(hijab,kipa,kashaya,cross,andothers)thatrepresentbelongingtoanyreligious,confessionalandsubculturalgroupstoschooluniforms.5

ThedocumentdoesnotnamereligionsbutlistsartifactsrepresentingreligionssuchasIslam(hijab),Judaism(kipa),Bhuddism(kashaya),andChristianity(cross).Inregardtothedocument,onedidnotheardiscussionsaboutwearingacross,kipaorkashayainschools:therealissuehasbeentherightornottowearthehijab.Inimplementingtheschooluniformdecree,schooladministrationsinterpretedtherulesasanti-hijaband

1Ibid.,18.2LouwEverydayIslamInPost-SovietCentralAsia,49.3 Marianne Kamp and Noor Borbieva, “Veiling and Unveiling in Central Asia: Beliefs and Practices, Tradition andModernity,” inRoutledgeInternationalHandbookonVeilingandUnveilingPractices,ed.Anna-MariAlmilaandDavidInglis(NewYork:Routledge,2018),84-93.4Thisdecreespecifiedthattheuniformlawwouldcomeintoforceinacademicyear2019-2020.However,theCabinetofMinistersofUzbekistandelayedthisuntil2024-2025.SeeDecreeNo.509ofJune18,2019,AmendmenttotheLawonProvidingUniformsinPublicSchools,Article3.NationalDatabaseofLegalDocuments:http://lex.uz/docs/3866498.5Thedecreegoesontodescribethedresscodeforboysandgirlsinregardstoappearance:“Additionally,thefollowingareforbidden:Boyscomingtoschoolwithtattoodrawingsontheopenpartsofthebody,withpiercing,beard,andwithhairlongerfrom2-3centimeters,brightlycolored;Girlscomingtoschoolwithtattoodrawingsontheopenpartsofthebody,orwithpiercing,withbrightlycoloredhair,extrememakeup,withmorethanonepairofearringsintheirears,wearingrings,havingnailpolishandlongnails.”DecreeNo666oftheCabinetofMinistersoftheRepublicofUzbekistanonProvidingUniformsforPublicSchoolStudents,August15,2018;chapter2,section7.http://lex.uz/docs/3866498.

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outlawed students wearing it. In reality, the document does not define “hijab”: it does not explicitlydifferentiatebetweenthetraditionalCentralAsianheadscarf,theTurkish-styleveil,andtheblackdressandheadpieceworninSaudiArabia.Judgingfromhowschoolshaveimplementedthepolicy,itisassumedtorepresentalloftheabove.

Thecurrentpolicyinschools—forbiddingthehijabalongwithotherreligioussymbols—hasbeentransferred to the university level as well. Students who defy the rules are expelled from schools anduniversities. The tension reached a peakwhen students from International IslamAcademywere deniedentrancetothefacilitiesbecauseoftheirhijabs.Thetensionbetweentheparentsofthefemalestudentsandthereligiousauthoritiesincitedvividpro-andanti-veilingdiscussiononsocialnetworks.Recently,appealstohighercourtshavehelpedtodifferentiatetraditionalheadscarvesfromthehijabandallowedstudentstoweartheheadscarfinthetraditionalway—thatis,tiedatthebackoftheneck,asopposedtocompletelycoveringone’sheadandneck.1

HijabIssueWomen’sveiling isasubjectofdiscussions,heatedarguments,andpoliticalactions inmanycountries. IfsomeMuslim-majoritycountries,suchas IranandSaudiArabia,promotewomen’sveilingasasupposeddefense against incitingmen’s sexual desire, France and Uzbekistan consider veiling to be an excessivemanifestationof religiosity that isoutof stepwith theagendaof laïcitéorsecularism.Uzbekistan,whileacknowledgingitsIslamictraditionsandculturalheritage,deemsthecurrentveilingstylestobeanimportedidentity,astheyreplicatethestylesofwomenfromTurkey,Iran,andtheMiddleEast.Somestatethatthisresemblance linkstheCentralAsianwomentothe“transnational IslamicCommunity.”2 InTajikistantoo,anti-hijabpropagandalabelsitaforeignimportthatistiedtooutsideideology.3

Inordertopromotelaïcitéorsecularism,manifestationsofreligiositymustberestrictedtoplacesofworship and thehome.4 Comparative studies of the government’s involvement in veiling in theU.S. andFrench contexts indicate the state’s control ofminorities,while a comparison of France andUzbekistanhighlightstheissueofhijabfromtheperspectiveofhumanrightsandespeciallyofwomen’srights.5

Concentratingontheinternationalexperience,HilalElveranalyzestheissueoftheheadscarffromtheanglesofsecularism,humanrights,Islamophobia,religiousdiscrimination,andthelaw.Shearguesthattheconceptofsecularismdoesnotincludeallthenuancesoftherelationshipbetweenthestateandreligion,assecularismvariesfromstatetostatedependingonthecontext,includingthepoliticalcontext.Asaresult,thehijabhasbecomean international referencepointnotonly forreligious freedombutalso forhumanrights.6

ThediscussionofthehijabintheUzbekcontextcastsintoreliefthedividebetweenordinarypeopleandthevisionofthestatereligiousauthorities.Accordingtothestatevision,nationalistidentityandideology

1 “O’zbekiston: Islom Akademiyasi Ro’molni O’zbekona o’rashga ruxsat berdi,” BBC, April 1, 2019,https://www.bbc.com/uzbek/uzbekistan-47778332.2 David Abramson, “Engendering Citizenship in Postcommunist Uzbekistan” in Post-Soviet Women EncounteringTransition: Nation Building, Economic Survival and Civic Activism, ed. Kathleen Kuehnast and Carol Nechemias(Washington,DC:WoodrowWilsonCenterPress,2004),72.3HélèneThibault,TransformingTajikistan:StateBuildingand Islam inPost-SovietCentralAsia (London: I.B.Tauris,2018).4JohnRichardBowen,WhytheFrenchDoNotLikeHeadscarves:Islam,TheStateandPublicSpace(Princeton:UniversityPress,2007).5 Abdullahi An-Naim, “HumanRights and Islamic Identity in Freance andUzbekistan:Mediations of the Local andGlobal,”Human Rights Quarterly 22 (2000): 906-94; Jen'nan Ghazal Read, “Introduction: The Politics of Veiling inComparativePerspective,”SociologyofReligion.68,no.3(Fall2007):231-236.6HilalElver,TheHeadscarfControversy:SecularismofReligion(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2012),4-5.

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should override religious identity and ideology.1 To institute this, it has determined that the hijab is anexcessivemanifestationof religiosity.Thestate’sefforts tocontrol the issuehavemadeUzbekwomen—whom the state sees as bearers of national identity—objects of state politics. Islam is among the keyingredientsinthestate’snation-buildingagendaandsocialengineering,2butlikethegovernmentsofotherCentralAsiancountries,theUzbekauthoritiesdonotwantwomentoimitatetheclothingofforeignpeersbuttomaintainlocalIslamicheritageandinfusemodernitywithnationalvalues.Itmightthusbesaidthattheauthorities’goalistomaintainsocialcohesionbypreventingtheriseofasupposed“Islamicradicalism”withoutexoticizingtheissueofIslam.3

Theartificialdistinctionofpublicandprivatespheres,andthedeterminationthatreligioussymbolscannotbeworninthepublicsphere,isproblematicinrelationtotheveilingofwomeninUzbekistan.Thehijabisintendedtobewornspecificallyoutsidethehome(i.e.,inthepublicsphere)toprotectgirlsfromthegazeofmenwhoarenotfamilymembers.Womenwhochoosetowearthehijabconsideritamanifestationoftheirpietyandawayofperformingtheiridentity.Beyondthis,thehijabcanserveasaprotectivetoolforwomenwhoareactiveinthepublicspace.4Women’sVoicesonHijabDiscussionsaboutthehijabarewidespreadamongbothmenandwomenduetoitsreligiousandpoliticalimplications.Inthispiece,Ifocusonwomen’svoices,elucidatingtheirvaryingmotivationsforwearingthehijab.While someemphasize themorality sideof theveil, otheralsoassociate itwith fashionandbeingbeautiful.5StudyingMuslimwomeninBritain,EmmaTarloarguesthatwearingthehijaballowsawomantotransitionfrom“simplybeingMuslimtobecomingvisiblyMuslim.”Whateverawoman’sreasonsforwearingthehijab,“becomingvisiblyMuslim”canbechallenging:“copingwiththisvisibilityisnoeasymatter,notleastbecauseofthemultipleprojectionsandinterpretationsofothers.”6

Wecanclassifymotivations forwearingthehijab into threemaincategories:piety,morality,andbeauty/fashion.7Manywomenexpresstheiropinionaboutthehijabthroughsocialmediaandblogs.Thereare for instance specific Telegramgroups concerning the religiousduties ofwomen, hijab, and life aftercommittingtowearingit.OpenUzbek-speakingchannelssuchas“ILoveHijab”haveattractedmorethan9,000subscribers.8Ononechannel,thequestion“Whodoyouseewhenyoulookinthemirror?”generatedmany responses fromwomen. One respondent indicated that close family and friendswere against herdecisiontowearthehijabbutthatshewantstoovercometheseobstaclesandbelievesinthelife-changingpowerofthehijab:

1 Presidential Decree on Improving the Productivity of Spiritual and Educational Affairs, July 28, 2019,http://www.lex.uz/docs/-4071203?ONDATE=29.07.2017%2000#-4071284.2ForthenarrativeofsocialengineeringofSovietpoliciesinthecontextofUzbekistan,seeDouglasNorthrop,VeiledEmpire:GenderandPowerinStalinistCentralAsia(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,2004);onwomen’sparticipationinsocialengineeringpractices,seeMarianneKamp,NewWomeninUzbekistan:Islam,ModernityandUnveilingunderCommunism(Seattle:UniversityofWashingtonPress,2006).3InthecontextofKyrgyzstanandTajikistan,women’sclothingislikewisediscussedintermsofnationalidentity.SeeMarlene Laruelle, ed.,Being Muslim in Central Asia (Leiden: Brill 2018), particularly part 4, chapters 10-12: EmilNasritdinovandNurgulEsanamonova,“TheWarsofBillboards:Hijab,SecularismandPublicSpaceinBishkek,”233-257; Shahnoza Nozimova, Hijab in a Changing Tajik Society, 258-279; and Marintha Miles “Switching to Satr:EthnographyofParticularinWomen’sChoicesinHijabCoveringsinTajikistan,”280-300.4Nozimova“HijabinaChangingTajikSociety,”271-272.5KampandBorbieva,“VeilingandUnveiling,”91.6EmmaTarlo,VisiblyMuslim:Fashion,Politics,Faith(Oxford:Berg,2010),75.7OnMuslim.uz,aformalIslamicwebsiteinUzbekistan,thereisaspecialpagerelatedtowomen'sissues.Musimaat.uzservesMuslimwomenintheUzbeklanguage.8Thenumberofsubscriberstothechannelisrisingrapidly.InApril2019,ithadmorethan8,300andasofJune2019,ithasover9,000subscribers.

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WhenIlookinthemirror,Iseeaweakgirlwithfrailstamina.JustlikeotherMuslimgirls,Iwanttowearthehijabverymuch,butmyfamilyisagainstthis.Iliketodressmodestly(Yopiqkiyinishniyaxshiko’raman).ButIamtiredofquestionssuchas“Whydoyoudresslikethis?Whyareyoulikethis?”IwanttoresistthemallandwearthehijabandbecomethepersonwhomIwanttobe.AndIbelievethatonedayIwillresembleinthemirrorthegirlwhomIwanttosee.

Communalexpectations,familymembers,andpeersinfluencewomen'sclothing,andreactionstotheveildifferbasedonethnicity,region,andfamilyexpectations.1Therespondentquotedaboveisonaspiritualquestforself-realization.Sheisfirminherdecisiontowearthehijabandiswaitingfortheopportunitytoovercomethechallengesinthewayofthemanifestationofherdesiredidentity.Anotherrespondentwasfurtheralongintheprocessandwasenjoyingherdecisiontowearthehijab:

WhenIlookinthemirror,Iseeagirlwhohaslearnedhowtobethankful.Ialsoseeagirlwhofeelsmorebeautiful,gentle,andradiant,whodoesnotwanttoputonmakeup(becauseAllahcreatedheralreadybeautiful),whoishumbleandsimple,whoenjoyswearing long, loosedresses(emojiwithastar).MayIsaysomething?(Emoji)Iamjealousevenofmyself.BecausesinceIstartedwearinghijab,Ihavestartedtoconsidermyselfverybeautiful(emoji).Girlswhodonotwearhijabyet!YOUFEELREALBEAUTYAFTERYOUSTARTWEARINGHIJAB(emoji).

Anotheruser’snotealsoemphasizedtheblissofwearingthehijab.Hermotivationwasnotbeautyor

makingagoodmarriage.Rather,itwaspiety,whichputsherabovethosewhodonotwearthehijab:Iwore thehijab!Notwith thegoalofmarryingagood,piousmanor tobe seenasmorebeautiful,butforthesakeofAllah!IhaveseentheproofofthesayingthatAllahgivesfaithtobelovedservants…Slowly,faithcametomyheart.NowIhavestartedtofeelpitywhenseeinggirlswithouthijab.Hijab-fard!Allahcommandedthis.IfIimaginethefateofgirlswithouthijab,ontheonesideIfeelpity;ontheother,IgivethanksthatamongthosepeopleAllah[gave]mefaith.2

Womenwho decide to wear a veil put their Islamic identity at the forefront, emphasizing their

increasedpiety.Sometimes,aspiritualhierarchybecomesvisiblebetweenwomenwhowearthehijabandwomen who do not. The respondent quoted above already elevates herself to the desired purity andseparatesherselffromthosewhoarenotpurebecausetheydonotwearhijab.

Somewomenthinkthatwomen’s immodestclothingincites immorality.OnMuslim.uz,oneofthemainUzbekwebsitesdevotedtoIslam,acontributorunderthenameofNilufarBozorboyQiziindicatedthat“Ithinkallindecentthingsstartfromwomen'swearingofopenandshamelessclothingthatshowsofftheirfigures.Loosedressandheadscarfprotectwomen’sdignity,solemnity,andcourtesyfrommaliciousgazes.”3Thereasoningthatmoraldecayisoccasionedbywomen’sclothingisechoedinanotherTelegrampostwithapictureofagirlinhijabandanotereading:“Youtakeoffyourclothesforpraise.WedressupforAllah.You

1KampandBorbieva,“VeilingandUnveiling,”89.2ThisisarepostfromanotherTelegramchannel.Theadministratorofthechannelmischievouslywriteswithemoji“hackedfromneighborchannel”[Qo’shnikanaldanuxlatildi.emoji].Interestingly,thereisnomoralconcernaboutthisact.3NilufarBozorboyQizi, “BegonalarNazarigaNishonBo’lmang” [DonotbeaTarget forTheGazeof theStrangers],accessedMay14,2019,http://muslim.uz/index.php/rukn/ayollar-sahifasi/item/9227.

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areawayfromfaith;weareawayfromagaze!”1ThisYou-versus-Usmoraljudgmentdeclaresthatgirlswhodonotwear thehijab lack faith,while thosewhodo are close toAllah. Themoral hierarchybecomes aspiritualoneinwhichotherwomen’sdegreeoffaithisdeterminedbytheiroutwardappearanceintheeyesofthehijab-wearer.

Somewomenalsoargueagainstwearinghijabinschools,buttheyseemtobefarfewerinnumberthanthoseadvocatingforit,especiallyonTelegram.Thismaybebecausesuchnarrativeswouldnotattractsubscriberstoachannel.Otherreasonsforabstainingfromadvocacymaybethatwomenarenotyetsurehow they feel aboutwearing the hijab or simply do notwant others to judge their faith. In a personalinterview, a middle-aged woman argued that modesty is not taken away by the introduction of schooluniforms.Shebelievesthatthereshouldbecontrolofreligiousissuesinordertopreventfundamentalism.2

ConclusionCaughtbetweenwhatisperceivedastheriseofradicalismanditslong-establishedsecularism,theUzbekgovernment is attempting to control religious expression in public places in the name of protecting theinterestsofthemultiethnicandmulti-confessionalpeopleofUzbekistan.Fromthisverybriefsketch,wecanseethepluralismofUzbeksocietyandthestate’sstrugglestofindtherightbalanceinitsrelationshiptoIslam. The authorities are afraid that recognizing more religious rights will embolden the religiouspopulationandshrinkthesecularbasisofthestate.IntheBelgianportcityofAntwerp,forinstance,aschoolfoundthatitfacedincreasingdemandstoaccommodatereligiousbeliefsaftertheprincipalallowedgirlstowearthehijab.Theproportionofthegirlswearingthehijabalsoincreasedfrom50%to80%inthreeyears.As a result, girls who did not wear the hijab came under pressure to wear it. Efforts to supportmulticulturalismwereruinedbytheever-increasingdemandsofIslamicconformity.Thus,whenanewtermbegan,theschoolbannedthehijab.3 WoulditbepossibleforUzbekistantofindacompromisethatprovidessomerelieftobothsides:thoseinfavorofmaintainingsecularismandthosewhowanttogivemorevisibilitytoIslaminthepublicspace?Tofostersuchacompromise,Iproposethefollowingrecommendations:Tothegovernment

• Establishacleardefinitionofhijab—whichformsarepermittedandwhicharebanned.• Create working groups to analyze the experiences of other secular Muslim countries, such as

Malaysia,Indonesia,andTurkey.• Developpara-school teachings about religion. Considering the secular nature of school curricula,

classes on religion by certified teachers should be offered, but outside normal school hours, toaccommodatebothsides.

1“Sizolqishuchunyechining!BizAllohuchunkiyinamiz!Siziymondanbizesanazardanholimiz!”Telegrampost,April30,2019.2Personalinterview,May24,2019.3“MuslimHeadscarves:TheControversyWillNotDie,”TheEconomist,September10,2009.CitedinElver,TheHeadscarfControversy,109-110.

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WhoAretheNewUzbekOpinionLeadersonSocialMedia?

EldarAsanov

Eldar Asanov is a journalist and linguist. He serves as editor of the Daryo.uz news portal and is a juniorresearcher at Tashkent State University of Uzbek Language and Literature. He also founded the “AsanovFormat”scientificblog.ManyexpertsclaimthattheproblemsUzbekistanfacesare intricately linkedwiththe lackof freedomofspeech.UnderKarimov’srule,allmediaoutletswereunderthedirectorindirectcontrolofstatestructuresandsubjecttocensorship.Specialagenciescontrolledinformation,andnewspapershadtocoordinatetheiractivitywiththem.Journalistswerepersecuted,fired,and/orforcedtofleetoothercountries.Insomeothercases, they were arrested and handed prison sentences on charges of defamation and disloyalty. Self-censorshipbecameatestofloyalty,whilestigmatizationwasusedtosuppressmanifestationsofdisloyalty.Norwas this necessarily a top-down process: Uzbek society, being traditional, easily rejected ideas andpracticesconsidered“alien”or“unspiritual.”In July 2019, ReportersWithout Borders published a newWorld Press Freedom index.1 Uzbekistan hasimproveditsposition,climbingfiveplaces.Ontheonehand,thismaybeevidenceofimprovementsinthemassmediaandinformationspace.Ontheotherhand,thecountryisstilltowardthebottomoftheindex,ranking 160th out of 180 countries. According to Reporters Without Borders, three years after IslamKarimov’s demise, a thaw has begun in what was one of the planet’s harshest dictatorships. The lastimprisonedjournalists—someofwhomhadbeenheldfornearly20years—havebeenreleased,althoughnot rehabilitated. Live political broadcasts have made an appearance and somemedia outlets are nowcoveringsensitivesubjectssuchascorruptionandforcedlabor.Uzbekistanhasreopeneditsdoorstoforeignjournalists and Uzbek journalists-in-exile;many permanent accreditations have been issued. Yet, it stillremainsprohibitedtocriticizethehighestlevelofgovernment.Theauthoritiesmaintainasignificantlevelofcontroloverthemedia.Surveillance,censorship,andself-censorshiparestillpresent.Anumberofnewswebsites continue to be inaccessible. Facebook and YouTube were often blocked in 2018 and severalbloggerswerearrested.ThisrealityillustrateswellthecontradictionsofMirziyoyev’sUzbekistan.In response, the politically active segment of Uzbek society, filledwith protest sentiments, developed atoolkit for self-expression that could get around these official and unofficial obstacles. In a context ofcensorship,lackofindependentmedia,andlackofpoliticalcompetition,socialmediahasbecometheonlyplatformforcivicactivismintheUzbekmediaspace.TheUzbekcornersofFacebook,Twitter,Telegram,andothersocialmediaplatformshavebecomeplaceswherepeoplecanfreelydiscusspoliticalissues,economicproblems, and the cultural transformationof society. This trendhas grown sinceMirziyoyev’s arrival inpower,tothepointthatanewgenerationofinfluentialUzbekopinionleaderscannowbefoundonsocialmedia.

1 See “2019 World Press Freedom Index,” Reporters Without Borders, 2019, accessed July 31, 2019,https://rsf.org/en/Uzbekistan.

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NewFaces,NewVoicesTheendoftheKarimoverafirstpromptedfearforthefutureamongmembersofUzbeksociety.Thechangesthatfollowed,however,quicklyrevivedoptimismamongthepopulation.Thenewpresidenthaswonpopularsympathy by unexpectedly becoming a supporter of a politicaldétente. Political activists, public figures,bloggers, and journalistswho believe that the new authorities are sincere in their desire to change thesituationforthebetterbegantoraisesharpquestionsandoffertheirvisionsofthefuture.Fortheirpart,theauthoritieseagerlyreachedouttothesemediafigures,attemptingtoshowthattheirintentionsweregenuinebymeetingthemedia’sminimumrequirements.

Theseprocessesofchangeranupagainstanumberofchallenges.Firstofall,thepoliticalelite,whohadtakendecisivestepsattheverybeginningofthecountry’sliberalizationjourney,becamemorecautious,carefully navigating the seemingminefield of ideas and visions. Second, thepolitically activepart of thepopulation became increasingly polarized. Three main groups stand out: supporters of Islamization,traditionalization,andmodernization.Eachgroupishierarchicalanddividedintosubgroups.Thesefactionsmayenterintoconflictwitheachother,aswellasperiodicallyforgingalliancesorengagingindialogue.Theauthorities,inturn,aretryingtobalancebetweenthesegroupsandmanagetheirsocialactions.

AnewgenerationofUzbekopinion-makershasthusbecomemoreactiveinthepublicarenaandisinvolvedindiverseideologicaldebatesonnationalism,Islamism,andliberalism.Duetotheirexperienceofcensorship under Karimov’s rule, traditional media outlets such as newspapers and TV have distancedthemselvesfrompoliticalandsocialactivism.Websitesandsocialmediahavethereforebecomethemainplatformforideologicaldebatesandprovidingalternative(unofficial)news.

Publicopinionleaders—bloggers,journalists,andactivists—arenowtryingtobuildtheirownhubsforideologicaladvocacyanddiscussionofsocialproblems.ThemostconvenienttoolforthisistheTelegrammessenger.Atleast500newTelegramchannelshavebeencreatedinthepasttwoyearsbypopularbloggers,journalists,activists,andyoungprofessionals,aswellasnewssites,governmentagencies,etc.EvenPresidentMirziyoyevhasanofficialTelegramchannel,whichhas242,000followers.Between150and200ofthesechannelshavemorethan2,000followers.Themost-followedpopularnewssitesareKun.uz(666,000)andDaryo.uz (507,000). The most popular personal Telegram channels are Khushnudbek.uz (lawyerKhushnudbekKhudayberdiyev—111,000),Oqituvchi(teacherIsroilTillaboyev—68,000),Troll.uz(bloggerUmidGafurov—41,000),andDavletov.uz(journalistKobilbekKhidirov—32,000).

Although there has been a boom in Telegram blogging, activists do not limit themselves to thismessenger. Many new YouTube channels and Twitter pages have also emerged; Facebook activism islikewise thriving.Categorizing thissocialmediaactivism isquitechallengingandwouldrequirebigdataresearch. Here, I briefly present the threemain ideological groupsmentioned above: the supporters ofIslamization,traditionalization,andmodernization.“AllRoadsLeadtoIslam”Forthreedecades,UzbeksecularauthoritarianelitesremovedIslamicleadersfromthepoliticalstruggleanddrovethemtotheroadsideofhistory.Themostradicalfiguresfled;therestnegotiatedwiththegovernment.Yethaving lost theirpolitical influenceandeven theirmosques (whichare stillunder the controlof thespecialservices),religiousleaderspressedon.Theyfoundtheirwayintobusiness:publishing,catering,IT,etc.Gradually,theyhaveshapedanaudiencearoundthemselves,startedwebsites,andpublishedsamizdatbooks.SinceKarimov’sdemise,thenumberofInternetusersdemonstratinghighreligiosity,aswellasthenumberofreligioussitesandchannelsonvariousplatforms,hasincreaseddramatically.Imamsofseveralmosques and some members of the Spiritual Board joined the informal leaders, leading the charge incondemningtheunfairtreatmentofbelievers.

Twoyears ago, religious siteswerewrittingmostly about thegood, tolerance, themiracleof theQuran,Islamicvalues,andother“safe”topics.Nowadays,theyinsistontherestorationofviolatedreligiousrights.Islamicbloggersadvocateforopeningmoremosques;prayerroomsinairports,publicplaces,and

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offices; the implementation of religious education in schools, etc. They also openly confront officialsregarding religious rights: they for instance demand that teenagers be allowed tomosques. On severaloccasions,theyhavetakenlegalactionagainststateuniversitieswherestudentswereforbiddenfromhavingbeardsorwearinghijab.

These religious activists oftenwrite about social and family issues. This approachhelps them togathernon-religiouspeoplearoundthemselvesandemphasizethattheyareinterestednotonlyinreligiousmatters,butinthewelfareofsocietyasawhole.SincemostUzbeks,evenwithoutbeingactivebelievers,consider themselvesorthodoxMuslims, theyareusuallysympathetic toreligiousadvocacy.TheRussian-speakingpartofthepopulation,meanwhile,ismuchmorecautioustowardthem.In2017,Rahmatullahkari,imamofoneofthemosquesofTashkent,indicatedforinstancethatmenshouldbeforbiddenfrombecominggynecologists.ThisproposalshockedsomeoftheRussian-speakingactivists,whoimmediatelydeclaredthereligiousleaderanextremist.Stormydisputesbetweenthetwosidesensued.Sometimelater,RahmatullahkaripubliclycriticizedUzbekatheists.Hewaseventuallyfiredfromhispositionasimamofthemosque.

The reputation of religious activists is spoiled by the fact that their fight for the restoration ofreligiousrightsseekstolimittherightsofsecularpeople.Theyhavemadesignificanteffortstofightagainstatheism,“immorality,”“rottenWesterncivilization,”andthe“Jewishconspiracy.”Forinstance,thereligioussiteAzon.uzonceharshlycriticizedapopularTurkishTVseriesbeingbroadcastonapublicchannel.1Theauthorsofthesiteaccusedtheseriesof“immorality”andthe“destruction”oftheinstitutionofthefamily.Since“immorality”isapointofgreatconcernforIslamistsandsecularconservativesalike,theywereabletogettheseriestakenofftheair.2

Nowadays, themostpopularUzbekIslamicbloggersareMubashshirAhmad,AbrorMukhtorAliy,andAbuMuslim.Thethreemendifferintheirrhetoric,whichineachcasereflectstheideasofoneofthethreemaincampsofIslamicopinionleaders.MubashshirAhmadgraduatedfromtheIslamicUniversity,thenworkedforsometimeattheCommitteeonReligiousAffairs(whichreportstotheCabinetofMinistersofUzbekistan).Heiscurrentlyinvolvedinmediaprojects,havingfoundedtheQaqnusmediapublishinghouse,theAzon.uznewsportal,andtheAzon.uzTVonlinechannel.MubashshirAhmadisnotactiveinpublicpolemics.Heusuallyavoidsconflictandmainlywritesshortopinionpostsaboutreligiousissues.DuetohisownershipofAzon.uzTV,hebecameinvolvedinthepolemicsabouttheTurkishseries,butheemphasizedthatauthorswithIslamicviewshavetherighttoexpress their opinion even if their claim is offensive. Mubashshir Ahmad is considered a supporter ofmoderate Islam, but some opponents are sure that he is secretly a conservative. His website, Azon.uz,frequentlypublishesarticles thatharshlycriticize the“immorality”ofsecular life.Whateverhispersonalopinionsmaybe,hiswebsiteprovidesaplatformformoreradicalIslamicideas.AbrorMukhtorAliygraduatedfromTashkentStateUniversityandtheIslamicUniversity.Heworkedforsome time as an assistant imam in theMinormosque in Tashkent.He is currently involved in businessprojects,servingasabusinessanalystfortheSalSalrestaurantchainandtheChusty’sCuisinerestaurant.AbrorMukhtorAliyisoneofthemostcontroversialfiguresintheUzbekblogosphere.Hedoesnotconfinehimselftotextsbutpublishesmanyvideoandaudiomonologuesinwhichhesharplycriticizeshisopponents.Helikestogivehisopiniononallquestionsdiscussedonsocialmedia.Heengagesnotonlywithatheistsandsecularbloggers,butalsowithotherIslamicauthorsaboutIslamicvalues,radicalism,etc.HeisoneofthefewIslamicbloggerswhoopenlycriticizesISIS—ironically,manymoderateIslamicauthorsprefertoignoreISISandIslamicterror,consideringthatitmay“discredit”IslamicvaluesorIslamicsolidarity.AbrorMukhtorAliyconsidershimselfafollowerofthetruevaluesoftheAhliSunnahva-lJamaa’mazhab.Inhisview,ISIS

1 See the Azon.uz criticism at: “Millat xoinlarini tanib oling!,” Zamin.uz, February 14, 2018,https://zamin.uz/oz/madaniyat/32442-millat-xoinlarini-tanib-oling.html.2 See “O‘zbekiston televideniyesida namoyishi oxiriga yetmay to‘xtatilgan seriallar,” Daryo.uz, February 23, 2018,https://daryo.uz/2018/02/23/ozbekiston-televideniyesida-namoyishi-oxiriga-yetmay-toxtatilgan-seriallar/.

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andotherradicalgroupssuchastheQuranists(thedirectionofIslamthatdeniestheauthorityofSunnaandconsiderreligiouspracticesshouldbebasedonlyonthelifeoftheProphet),aswellasthesupportersofamoderateIslamare“falseMuslims.”AbuMuslim is fromTurkistan,SouthKazakhstan,andgraduated fromthe InternationalKazakh-TurkishUniversity.Hehasneverheldanofficialpostandisprimarilyengagedinblogging.HeisthefounderofanumberofIslam-orientedwebsites,suchasIslom.uz,IslamOnline.uz,Islam.uz(inRussian),etc.Aroundfiveyearsago,hestartedhisowncateringbusinessandopenedtherestaurantBeshbarmoq.LikeMubashshirAhmad, Abu Muslim is not a controversial person. He avoids discussions on sensitive issues. UnlikeMubashshirAhmadandAbrorMukhtorAliy,AbuMuslimdoesnotwriteaboutissuesrelatedtoIslamiccanonlaw,Sharia’,hijab-wearing,beards,etc.HispostsgenerallyadvocateforIslam,broadlyunderstood.Onhiswebsites,hepublishesarticles translated fromTurkishandRussian,mainly focusingonthe“goodnews”about Islamand the Islamicworld; the “badnews”aboutChristianity; the “RottenWest”; “newscientificfindings”that“proveIslamisatruefaith”orthe“crisis”ofDarwinism.Inadditiontothesethreeopinionleaders,wecanseetheriseofotherideologicaldirections.PopularbloggerMusannifAdhamandexiledpoliticalscientistKamoliddinRabbimovopenlydemonstratesympathywiththeideasoftheMuslimBrotherhood.KamoliddinYoldash,anUzbekbloggerfromKazakhstan,andDilnurKamilov,apopularsingerandactivistfromKhorezm,aretryingtogatheranaudiencearoundQuranism.Blogger and political scientistSardor Salim is promoting the development of a “Neo-Jadid” (moderate)interpretationofIslam.“OurGreatAncestorAmirTemur…”Thesecondgroupofopinionleadersisconstitutedbysupportersofso-calledtrueUzbeknationalvaluesortraditionalists.AnentiregenerationofyoungpeoplethatgrewupunderKarimov’srulehasbeenaffectedbythenotionsofMustaqillik(Independence),Ma’naviyat(Spirituality),andMilliyqadriyatlar(NationalValues).

Schooleducation,whichemphasizedapatrioticteachingofUzbekhistoryandencouragedchildrento joinKamolot, theUzbek equivalent of theKomsomol, helped shape a very loyal youth—the so-called“ChildrenofIndependence.”Aneworganization,theYouthUnion,isactuallycontinuingKamolotpolicies.GovernmentrepresentativesaretryingtoshifttheonlinebalancebyattractingYouthUnionleaderstoonlineactivism.Manythousandsoftheorganization’smembershavebecomeveryactiveonline,usinghashtagsandflashmobstopromote“nationalvalues”andthememoryof“greatancestors”celebratedunderKarimov,suchasTimur.Theyareoftenusedasaninstrumenttobadgeractivistsfromotherideologicalcamps.Towit,whenNikitaMakarenko,themostfamousRussian-speakingUzbekjournalistandblogger,publishedapiececriticizing “Spirituality,” he immediately became the target of a bullying campaign carried out bygovernmentalmediaoutletsandYouthUnionactivists.Withsignificantfinancialresources,thelattercanaffordtoconductmassiveandexpensiveinformationcampaigns.Despitethis,YouthUnionactivistshaveaverylimitedimpactintheUzbekcornerofsocialmediaandusuallybecometheobjectofironicmemes.Theyveryrarelymentionsocialproblems,sayingnothingabouteconomicissues,thelackofpoliticalcompetition,orfreedomofspeech.

Many Uzbeks criticize Youth Union activists not for their promotion of “national values” and“Spirituality,”butfortheirsilenceabouttherealproblemsfacingsociety.Thisisnotthecaseoftheothertraditionalistbloggers,whocombinebothaconservative,nationalistagendawithdiscussingpressingsocialissues.Alargesegmentoftheonlinepopulationindeedagreewiththeideasof“Spirituality”and“Uzbek-style morality” and many independent bloggers support the government in its efforts to fight against“immorality,” “rottenWestern civilization,” pop culture, homosexuality, atheism, and other “destructive”ideas. During these debates, traditionalists usually enter into short-term alliances with Islamic opinionleadersagainstthemodernistsandliberals.ButtheirpathstypicallydivergeagainwhenthedebatecomestoconcernreligiousrightsandIslamiclife.

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Thefollowing individualsarethemostpopularUzbekbloggerswhoarepartof this traditionalisttrend. This group of public opinion leaders has the greatest impact on Uzbek society and is the maincompetitorofIslamicopinionmakers,althoughthetwosupporteachotheronmanyissues.Khushnudbek Khudayberdiyev is a lawyer and blogger who founded the Khushnudbek.uz Telegramchannel, which has 111,000 followers. Khudayberdiyev is famous for his posts on legislative issues: heprovidesshortpostsdecipheringnewlawsandotheractsinsimple,intelligiblelanguage.Heisalsowell-knownforhispostsdevotedtolegalwaystofightagainstforcedlabor,corruptioninhighereducation,andmonopolies. He almost never shows his ideological preferences. However, in some cases, he expresseshimselfpublicly.LikemanyUzbektraditionalists,hewas for instanceagainst thecelebrationofMay9—VictoryDay,seenasaSoviettradition.Inaddition,hehasspokenpubliclyseveraltimesagainsttheactivityofatheistsandinsupportofreligiousleaders.

InJune2019,Khudayberdiyevwasawardedthestatemedal“Kelajakbunyodkori”(BuilderoftheFuture)byprimeministerAbdullaAripov,showinghowauthoritiesnowunderstoodtheneedtoinvestinsocialmediaopinionleaders.Inrewardingatraditionalistblogger,thegovernmentsentapowerfulsignaltootherideologicalgroups.AsmentionedbyRussian-speakingblogger“Dobryipiarshik”(theGoodPRMan),bloggerswhohavebeenawardedstatemedalscanstillcriticizestateagencies,butwillnotbecomesharpdissidents. Another popular Uzbek blogger, Kobilbek Khidirov, founder of the Davletov.uz Telegramchannel,famousforsharinginsidernewsfromtheinnercircleofgovernment,wasawardedthestatemedal“Shukhrat,”asweresomepopularjournalists.ThisreverberatedthroughtheUzbekbloggercommunity,withpeopletakingmixedviewsofthisinvolvementofstateauthoritiesintothesocialmediaworld.UmidGafurovisabloggerandthefounderoftheTroll.uzbrand.Hehasmorethan40,000subscriberstohisTelegramchannel.Heisnowworkingonother,mainlybusiness-oriented,projects.UmidGafurovusuallylimitshisactivitytopictures-memesandveryshortpostsintwolanguages—RussianandUzbek.Heisoneof the fewUzbekbloggerswhowrites inboth languages.Heraisessocial issues,suchastheproblemsinhighereducation,butoftenalignshimselfwiththegovernment.Hewasthemostactivesupporterof thegovernment proposal to organize only “modest” weddings to decrease people’s expenditures duringeconomic crisis time. He also categorically denies the ideologies of Islamism and Turkic solidarity, andemphasizesthetraditionalvaluesofUzbeksasanation-buildingproject.Yet,morerecently,hetooksomedistance with state initiatives, for instance criticizing the new project of modifying the Latin script, bydeclaringthatmovingfromCyrillictoLatinhadalreadyhugeconsequencesonliteracy.Somemonthsago,he joined the Uzbek atheists and agnostics group on Facebook and began to act there as a “neutraltraditionalist”.Healsosupportedtheatheists’ideaoffoundinganewpoliticalparty(seebelow).ShahnozaTurakhojaevaisaphilologist,publisher,andjournalist.OneofthemostpopularUzbekwomenbloggers,sherankedfirstinthebloggers’championshipheldin2018ontheinitiativeoftheYouthUnion.Shehasabout3,500followersonTelegramandmorethan10,000followersonFacebook.Liketheotherbloggers in this group, she focuses on social problems: higher education, forced labor, women’s rights,freedomofspeech,etc.Inmattersof“morality”and“spirituality,”shedoesnotdepartfromthetraditionalistperspective,andforinstanceadvocatesforlanguagepurification.WecanalsomentionsuchbloggersasDimaQayum,asimplestove-seller inRishtan,a farcornerof theFerghana Valley, and probably the most famous “provincial blogger.” He became popular for his shortsatiricalpiecesonFacebookandpublishedsomebooksbasedonhisFacebookandTelegramposts.Hethenexpandedhisactivitiesbyorganizingcharitableacts.HeisnowplanningtostandfordeputyfromRishtandistrict.“MoralityisPrimary,ReligionisSecondary”

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InAugust2017,anunknownyoungjournalistnamedKhurshidYuldoshevpublishedanarticleonreligionandmorality. He claimed in his piece thatmorality is primary and religion is secondary; that religiousmoralitywasgoodfortheMiddleAges;andthatmodernpeoplearemoremoralthanthefirstChristiansandMuslims.HealsonotedthatmodernMuslimsareactuallyforcedtoadjustIslamicmoralitytomodernity.ThearticlestronglyresonatedontheUzbekInternet.TraditionalistsandIslamistswereoutragedbythefactthatanunknownyoungauthorhadclaimedthatitwaspossibletobemoralevenwithoutreligionornationalvalues.KhurshidYuldoshevwentontopublishacoupleofarticlesonsimilartopicsandwas involvedinsensitivedisputeswithreligiousopinionleaders.ThiscaseisremarkableinthatitwasthefirsttimethattheUzbek liberalsmadethemselvesknown.Evenmoreremarkable is the fact thatYuldoshev’sarticleswerepublishedonthesiteofIslamicbloggerSardorSalim,whoadvocatestheliberalizationofIslam.YuldoshevwasthusabletocreateanalliancewithsupportersofmoderateIslamagainsttraditionalistsandIslamists.

Today,therearealreadyseveralhundredsocialnetworkuserswhoarestrivingfortheliberalizationof society and its “modernization” in aWestern sense. They have thousands of followers, even if theiraudience isnoticeably smaller than for their twomaincompetitors.Representativesof thismodernizingtrendhaveparticipatedindebatesaboutTurkishTVshows,religiousdresscode,etc.SomeIslamicactivists,such asAbrorMukhtorAliy andAbuMuslim, consider them theirmain ideological opponents andhavededicatedasubsetoftheirarticlesandvlogsto“exposing”“atheists”andother“agentsoftheWest.”

Twoonlinegroupswithclosenames—“UzbekAtheistsandAgnostics”and “TheCaféofAtheists”(Ateistqahvaxonasi)—werecreatedonFacebook.Despitetheirnames,thegroupshavebecomethehomeformanysupportersofnon-standardideologies:Quranists,Tengrists,UzbekconvertstoChristianity,secularMuslims,etc.ThesegroupshavehostedanumberofdiscussionsontopicsthatremaintabooformostUzbeks:homosexuality,atheism,criticismofIslamandnationalism,etc.SomemembersofthesegroupsareplanningtouseMirziyoyev’sthawtocreatealegalpoliticalplatformtoprotecttherightsofatheists,agnostics,andsecularandliberalminorities—theMovementofUzbekLibertarians(O‘zbeklibertarianlaripartiyasi).KhurshidYuldoshevisaphilosopher,journalist,andblogger.HeworkedformanyyearsatthemagazineTafakkur. He also took part in launching newmedia projects such as Turon24.uz andMinbar.uz, and iscurrentlyaprojectmanageronthenewmediaprojectTogri.uz.Yuldoshevispopularamongliberal-mindedyouth,althoughheavoidspublicattentionanddoesnotparticipateinFacebookandTelegramgroups.Headvocatesafreesocietyandequalrights.Hesharplycriticizesreligiousleadersfortheir“duplicity,”sayingthattheyaresimultaneouslyfightingfortheirrightsthroughdemocraticmechanismswhilecondemningthe“immorality”ofdemocracy.Havingspentsomeyearsasastudentatamadrasah,heisverywell-informedaboutIslam,theArabiclanguage,andtheQuran.ThroughtheeffortsofYuldoshevandSardorSalim,aswellasNargizaSaidova,thedirectorofTuron24.uz,andJamshidNiyozov,anothersupporterofliberalIslamism,threewebsites—Taraqqiy.uz,Turon24.uz,andMinbar.uz—havebecomethefirstUzbekoutletstopublisharticlescriticizingIslamand“Uzbeknationalvalues”andpromotingatheism.NikitaMakarenko is amusician, actor, andRussian-language journalist for one of the oldest andmostpopularUzbeksites,Gazeta.uz.HehasalsobecomeextremelypopularamongtheUzbek-speakingaudiencedue to his critical articles. His paper “Why IsMa’naviyat Killing Tashkent?” offended the conservativesegmentofthesocietysomuchthatanentirebullyingcampaignwasorganizedagainsthim.Butithadtheoppositeof the intendedeffect andmost socialnetworkusersdefendedMakarenko.ThemajorityofhisfollowersareRussian-speakingUzbekistanipeoplewhoconsidertraditionalistsasUzbeknationalistsandareafraidofIslamists.FiruzAllayev,ablogger,tourismexpert,andyoungbusinessman,foundedtheelectronicsdeliveryserviceAsaxiy.uz.Allayevgainedpopularityforhisblogpostsabouttravel,plurality,democracy,thechallengesofdoingbusinessinUzbekistanetc.HestudiedinFranceandreturnedtoUzbekistanmuchinfluencedbytheideasofFrenchdemocracy.FiruzAllayevskillfullyusessocialmediamarketing,payingattentiontosocialissues.WhenforinstancethereligioussiteAzon.uztouchedoffthecontroversyaboutthe“immorality”of

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TurkishTVseries,Allayevpostedafunnyadonsocialnetworks:“DoyouwanttowatchaTurkishTVseries?BuyabigTVon‘Asaxiy.uz.’DoyouwanttoexpressdissatisfactionwithaTurkishseries?Buyagoodmobilephoneon‘Asaxiy.uz.’”FiruzAllayevalsolaunchedtheprojectAsaxiyBooksfortranslatingandpublishingpopularfictionandnon-fictionbooksfromaroundtheworld.Allofthemsoldveryquickly.ButascandalarosearoundYuvalNoah’sSapiens.ABriefHistoryofHumankind,accusedofadvocatingatheism—itendedwiththeresignationofAllayevfromthepostofdirectorofAsaxiy.uzandAsaxiyBooks.Comedian,journalist,andbloggerNozimjonSafarovdeservesanhonorablementiononthislist.Hehasbeeninvolvedinmanydebatesaroundreligion,secularity,socialproblems,etc.,andhasachievedpopularityinUzbeksocialmedia.Hisactivityhelpedtofindpointsofagreementamongideologicalgroups.ConclusionSignificantchangeshaveoccurredinUzbekistanoverthepastthreeyears.Ithasbecomepossibletocriticizegovernment agencies and engage in public discussions on topics that were banned in Karimov-eraUzbekistan. Islamic leadersexploitedthesituationbystartingwithsocialproblems, thentransitioningtoadvocating for the protection of religious rights. Traditionalist bloggers likewise gained popularity veryquickly, trying to establish nationalism as a middle ground between modernization and Islamization.Anothergroupofstronglyideologizedbloggers—supportersofmodernizationorliberalization—begantoemergesomewhatlater,astheywerefewerinnumberandhadasmalleraudience.

Despitetheemergenceofamorediversifiedpublicdebate,theUzbeksocietyremainunderthestronginfluence of so-called national traditions and Islamic values. Therefore, the position of the liberals,whodefendatheistsandgays,anddeclaretherelativityofmorality,remainsincomprehensibletothemajorityofUzbeksocialmediausers.However,theseliberalbloggerswerestillablenotonlytofindanaudience,butalsogettingsupportersfromsomeopposedfigures,attachedtotheideaoffreedomofspeechforall.Willthisnewonlineactivismhelpconsolidatingapluralityofopinioninthesociety,potentiallyresultinginamoreformal, institutionalized, diversity and a culture of respect fordiversity ofworldviews?As cliché as thissounds,onlytimewilltell.

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OvercomingBarrierstoWomen’sEntrepreneurshipandEconomicEmpowermentinUzbekistan

FotimaIsrailova

FotimaIsrailovaworksfortheUnitedNationsDevelopmentPrograminTashkent,Uzbekistan.SheearnedaBAinBusinessAdministrationfromWestminsterInternationalUniversityinTashkent.Genderinequalityissueshavebecomeoneofthemostsignificantchallengesfacingsocietyinthetwenty-firstcentury.Acentralmisconceptionaboutgenderequalityisthatitonlybringsbenefitsforwomen,butthemost recent research tells a different story. TheMcKinseyGlobal Institute shows that increasing femaleemployment rates could addUS$28 trillion in return on investment to the global economy annually by20251—afigureequaltotheentireChineseandU.S.economiestodaycombined.2Moreover,empoweringwomenthroughemploymentinthebusinesssectorisapowerfultoolforeradicatingruralpovertyandfoodinsecurity.

In Uzbekistan, women’s role in economic development is often overlooked. Currently, only 10percentofUzbekistan’s16millionwomenareengaged inbusiness,demonstrating thatwomenstill faceobstacles togaining fullaccess toself-employment.3There isalsoasubstantialemploymentandpaygapbetween the two genders. According to a report from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), health andeducationaretraditionallyconsideredwomen’sfields,andworktraditionallyperformedbywomenislower-paying thanwork in fields dominatedbymen.4 As shown in Figure1,women either occupy low-payingpositions(healthcare,socialwork,andeducation)orperformunskilled labor in informal labormarkets.5Femaletradersarehighlyvisibleintheinformalindustryofshuttletrading,theexportandimportofsmallquantitiesofgoodsforsaleacrossregionalborders:670-80percentofwomeninbusinessworkinbazaars,of whom 50 percent are engaged in bazaar-based shuttle trade.7 ExpertDinaraAlimdjanovaclaims thatwomen’sunemployment in rural areas continues togrow inUzbekistan, leavingmoreandmorewomenstrugglingtomakeendsmeet.8

1 LauraColby, “HowDoYouBoostGDPby$28Trillion?GenderEqualityWouldDo It,McKinseySays,”Bloomberg,September 24, 2015, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-24/mckinsey-says-gender-equality-would-boost-gdp-by-28-trillion.2Ibid.3 “Chamber of Commerce and Industry and UNDP Examine Challenges Women in Uzbekistan Face in Starting aBusiness,”UzDaily,October13,2017,https://www.uzdaily.uz/en/post/41195.4 Asian Development Bank, “Uzbekistan Country Gender Assessment Update,” 2018, accessed July 23, 2019,https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/479841/uzbekistan-country-gender-assessment-update.pdf.5ShoirakhonNurdinova,“HumanDevelopmentandWomenEmploymentinUzbekistan:SituationandProblems,”2014,accessed July 23, 2019,https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274204869_Human_Development_and_Women_Employment_in_Uzbekistan_Situation_and_Problems.6AsianDevelopmentBank,“UzbekistanCountryGenderAssessmentUpdate.”7Ibid.8 Dinara Alimdjanova, "Women Farmers in Uzbekistan: Experience during the Period of Institutional Reforms,”EconomicandRuralDevelopment4,no.2(2008):7-15,http://erd.asu.lt/erd/article/view/55/54.

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Figure1.Wageratesbysector

Source:ShoirakhonNurdinova,“HumanDevelopmentandWomenEmploymentinUzbekistan:SituationandProblems,” accessed July 29, 2019, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274204869_Human_Development_and_Women_Employment_in_Uzbekistan_Situation_and_Problems.

Figure2.Women-ledbusinessesbysector,2017

Source:AsianDevelopmentBank,“UzbekistanCountryGenderAssessmentUpdate,”December2018,accessedJuly29,2019,https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/479841/uzbekistan-country-

gender-assessment-update.pdf.Figure2breaksdownwomen-ownedbusinessesby sector.Aswe can see, services, trade, andnon-foodproductionarethethreeleadingwomen-ledbusinesssectors,with36percent,16percent,and16percent,

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respectively.1Women-led farmingenterprisesconstituteonly5percentof the totalonaverage,althoughthereissignificantregionalvariation:thelowestproportionisintheSyrdaryaregion(0.75percent)andthehighestinKarakalpakstan(14percent).2FocusgroupsconductedbytheUNDPandChamberofCommerceandIndustryamongwomenentrepreneursrevealedthatwomenfacechallengesinopeningbusinessesinsectorsasvariedasagriculture,tourism,sewing,anddairyproduction.ManyregulationshavebeenenactedandprogramsestablishedinUzbekistantofightgenderdiscriminationbyensuringwomen’srightstoeducation,health,andparticipationintheeconomy.Thatbeingsaid,thereisahugegulfbetweenpolicyandpractice.Womenstillfaceobstaclesthatpreventthemfromgainingfullaccesstoself-employment,ofwhichthispaperwilldiscussthree:culturalbarriers,levelofeducationalattainment,andaccesstofinancialcredit.CulturalBarriersThe Convention On the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination againstWomen (CEDAW), to whichUzbekistan has signed on, stipulates thatmen andwomen have equal rights and prohibits any kind ofdiscriminationonthebasisofgender.3Inreality,however,womenaretreatedunequallyinUzbekistanasaresultofbeliefs,norms,andtraditionsthatarerootedinculturalhistory.

Cultural pressure is considered one of the strongest deterrents preventing women from takingadvantageoftheequalrightsthattheytechnicallyenjoyunderUzbeklaw.4AsJohannaHiggswrote:

InUzbekistan,womenareraisedtobegoodhousewives.Theyareexpectedtolivewiththeirhusbands’families,towakeupbeforesunrise,sweepthestreet,cook,andgiveuptheirowncareers.Inrarecaseswherewomendowork,theyareexpectedtogivealltheir[hard-]wonincometo[their]mother-in-lawandhavenocontrolovertheirownfinances5

Consequently, women face stereotypes and prejudices that discourage them from undertakingentrepreneurial activities. In rural areas, there is a widespread perception that women cannot leadbusinesses, creating a glass ceiling forwomen entrepreneurs. After conducting a group discussionwithwomen entrepreneurs in rural areas, the ADB Project concluded that women lacked self-esteem andexperienceddoubts.6Itwouldseemthatthegenderstereotypesrelatedtosocialnormsandtradition-boundnotions of motherhood, family, and children directly affect young women’s approaches to careerdevelopment.

FertilityratesinruralareasofUzbekistancontinuetogrow,andlocaltraditionsencouragefamiliestohavemanychildren.Asaresult,childcareisanimportantpartoflifeintheregions—andwomenspendabout three times asmuch time providing it as domen.7 Inadequate access to affordable childcare andpreschooleducationlimitsruralwomen’sabilitytoengageinpaidwork.AccordingtoaUNICEFreport,only

1AsianDevelopmentBank,“UzbekistanCountryGenderAssessmentUpdate.”2Ibid.3UNConventionontheEliminationofDiscriminationAgainstWomen(CEDAW),Article14(1979),accessedJuly23,2019,https://www.refworld.org/publisher,CEDAW,CONCOBSERVATIONS,UZB,,,0.html.4Women Economic Empowerment, “Women Economic Empowerment—Women Entrepreneurship in Uzbekistan,”2004,accessedJuly29,2019,http://www.womensilkroad.com/women_entrepreneurship.html.5 JohannaHiggs, “UzbekManTakesaStandonViolenceAgainstWomen,”MoroccoWorldNews,February24,2018,https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2018/02/241451/uzbek-man-takes-stand-violence-women/.6AsianDevelopmentBank,“UzbekistanCountryGenderAssessmentUpdate.”7ESCAP,“ExaminingWomen’sEconomicEmpowerment inSPECACountries,”UNECE,2018,accessedJuly23,2019,https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/Gender/SPECA_WG_Gender/Meetings/2018/Background_paper-Women_s_economic_empowerment_EN.pdf.

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about one in every four children receives some form of preschool education.1 Not only are preschoolinstitutionsandkindergartensconcentratedinlargetownsandcities,butruralhouseholdscannotaffordthesefee-basedestablishments.

Ruralwomenalsospend45.9percentoftheirfreetimeonunpaiddomesticwork,comparedtothe16.6 percent of a rural male’s free time that is occupied by such activities.2 As a result, rural womenexperience time poverty, which prevents them from realizing their potential and undertakingentrepreneurialactivities.AscanbeseenfromFigure3,thenumberofunemployedwomenhasnotchangedsince2007andisalmostequaltothatofmen,at8percentand8.5percent,respectively.3

Figure3.UnemploymentratesinSPECAcountries,2007and2016

Source:UNESCAP,“ExaminingWomen’sEconomicEmpowermentinSPECACountries,”April23,2019,

accessedJuly29,2019,https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/Gender/SPECA_WG_Gender/Meetings/2018/Background_paper-Women_s_economic_empowerment_EN.pdf.

EducationalAttainmentAccordingtotheLawonEducation,everyUzbekcitizenshouldreceiveatotalof11yearsofprimaryandsecondaryeducation.4However,girlsarediscouragedfromenrollingintertiaryeducation,asevidencedbytheGenderParityIndex(GPI)inEducation.5

1FoodandAgricultureOrganizationoftheUnitedNations,“CountryGenderAssessmentSeries,”FAORegionalOfficeforEuropeAndCentralAsia,2019,accessedJuly23,2019,http://www.fao.org/europe/resources/gender/en/.2Ibid.3Ibid.4 Maksim Yeniseyev, “Education in Uzbekistan—The Borgen Project,”Central Asia News, August 2, 2017,http://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2017/08/02/feature-01.5Nurdinova,“HumanDevelopmentandWomenEmployment.”

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Figure4.Genderparityindexineducation

Source:ShoirakhonNurdinova,“HumanDevelopmentandWomenEmploymentinUzbekistan:Situationand

Problems,”accessedJuly29,2019,https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274204869_Human_Development_and_Women_Employment_in_Uzbekistan_Situation_and_Problems.

AsFigure4shows,genderparity intertiaryeducationhasbeendecliningyearonyearalmosteversinceUzbekistan became independent. ILO statistics on the percentages ofmen andwomen graduating fromtertiaryeducationinstitutionsshowsimilargraduationpatternsoverthepastdecade.1ItisclearfromFigure5thatfewerfemalesinUzbekistancompletedhighereducationin2016thandidtenyearsearlier.2

Today,61.8percentofstudents inhighereducationaremale,compared to38.2percentwhoarefemale.3ThisisdueinparttothecontentofcurriculausedintheUzbekhighereducationsystem,whichhavenot been adapted to the new requirements of the labor market. Not only are the existing educationalprograms for women in business not well linked with labor market needs, but education in finance,management,andITisavailableonlytowomenlivinginTashkent.

Thereareseveralotherreasonsforthecomparativelylowshareofwomeninhighereducation.Firstofall,qualityhighereducationisfee-based.Familiesprefertoinvestineducatingtheirsons,consideringthatanyinvestmentinadaughter’seducationwillnotbringanybenefittoherfuturefamily.4Second,womenaregettingmarriedatanearlyage.Uzbekfamiliesprioritizegirls’marriagesovertheirhighereducation.Thisisparticularly true inruralareas.5Therefore, thenumberofwomentertiaryeducationgraduateshasbeengraduallydecliningsince2011,fromapproximately44%ofthetotaltertiarygraduatesin2011toonly35%in2017.

1 David Anthony et al., “Generation 2030: Uzbekistan,” UNICEF, July 2018,https://www.unicef.org/uzbekistan/media/686/file/Generation%202030%20Uzbekistan.pdf.2Ibid.3AsianDevelopmentBank,“UzbekistanCountryGenderAssessmentUpdate.”4Ibid.5Higgs,“UzbekManTakesAStand.”

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Figure5.Highereducationgraduationfiguresformenandwomen,2006-2016(%)

Source:DavidAnthony,YoonieChoi,YuliaOleinik,andUmidAliev,“Generation2030:Uzbekistan,”UNICEF,July2018,https://www.unicef.org/uzbekistan/media/686/file/Generation%202030%20Uzbekistan.pdf.

Toavoidchildmarriages,in2009,aninternalregulationwasadoptedbytheSpiritualAdministration

ofMuslimsofUzbekistanthatstatesthatIslamicmarriage(nikah)mustonlybecarriedoutbyanofficialimamandonlyaftertheofficialregistrationofamarriage.However,tobypassthelaw,somecouplesstartedasking religious figures from their districts to performnikah instead of officialmosque imams.1 Duringinterviewswithchildspouses,itwasdeterminedthatreligiousleadersdidnotaskabouttheirageorthecompletionofstateregistration.2Thismakesgirlsextremelyvulnerable.

Figure6.Fertilityrateper1,000womeninUzbekistan,2000-2013

Source:LanaTshay,“KvoprosuorozhdaemostivUzbekistane,”Demoskop,June17,2014,

http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2014/0617/analit02.php#_ftn1.

1 UNFPA Uzbekistan, “Child Marriage in Uzbekistan,” Girlsnotbrides.org, 2012, accessed July 23, 2019,https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/UNFPA-Child-Marriage-in-Uzbekistan-2014.pdf.2Ibid.

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Finally,andonarelatednote,women’stertiaryeducationisaffectedbytheirreproductivefunction:Uzbekfemalesintheirtwentieshavethehighestrateofchildbearing.AsshowninFigure6,between2000and2013,mostbabiesinUzbekistanwereborntowomenaged20-24.1All inall,women’senrollmentinhighereducationinUzbekistanhasbeendecreasingyearonyearalmostsinceindependence,whereasithasbeenremainingconstantorrisingintheotherCentralAsiancountries(andintheworldatlarge)overthesameperiod—seeFigure7.

Figure7.PercentageofwomenintertiaryeducationacrossCentralAsia

Source:EmmaSabzalieva,“GenderGapsinHigherEducationAcrossCentralAsia,”UniversityWorldNews,July

8,2016,https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20160707140807406.AccesstoCreditIn2014,theWorldBankcomparedfemales’accesstocreditfrombanksandfinancial institutionsinfourCentralAsiancountries:Kyrgyzstan,Kazakhstan,Tajikistan,andUzbekistan.2ItisevidentfromFigure8thatUzbekwomenwerenotasabletoaccessloansfrombanksandfinancialinstitutionsastheircounterpartsinthe other countries studied.Whereas 32 percent ofwomen in Kazakhstan and 30 percent ofwomen inKyrgyzstanhad takenout loans in thepastyear,onlyaround10percentofUzbekwomenhaddoneso.3Instead,Uzbekwomenrelyprimarilyonfamilyandfriendsforstartupfunding.Theyseethislackofaccessto credit as one of themain barriers to business development.4 Other impediments towomen openingbusinessesincludehighincometaxes;theinterestrateonloanstomicro,small,andmediumenterprises;highcustomertaxesonimportedgoods;andregulargovernmentinspections.5

1AsianDevelopmentBank,“UzbekistanCountryGenderAssessmentUpdate.”2 Saviya Khasanova, “Zhenshchiny Tsentral’noi Azii: Ekonomicheskie Vozmozhnosti (Infografika),” Central AsiaAnalyticalNetwork,2019,accessedJuly23,2019,https://caa-network.org/archives/9753.3Ibid.4ESCAP,“ExaminingWomen’sEconomicEmpowerment.”5SaroshSattar,“OpportunitiesforMenandWomeninEmergingEuropeandCentralAsia,”WorldBank,2012,accessedJuly 23, 2019,http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/479131468250293544/pdf/659310WP00PUBL065737B0Gender0Report.pdf.

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Figure8.TheshareofwomenwhoobtaincreditandloansinCentralAsiancountries

Source:SaviyaKhasanova,“ZhenshchinyTsentral’noiAzii:Ekonomicheskievozmozhnosti(infografika),”CentralAsiaAnalyticalNetwork,2019,https://caa-network.org/archives/9753.

Moreover,althoughwomenandmenenjoyequalrightstoownpropertyunderthelaw,thereisadiscrepancybetweenthislawandcustomarypractice.1Thevalueofpropertyregisteredinawoman’snameaccountsforjust22.3percentofallpropertyrecordedwiththenationalregistryandcadastresystem.2Ruralhouseholdsareusuallyledbymen;themajorityofhouseholdrealestateisregisteredtothem.Otherfamilyassets—likecars,livestock,farmingmachinery,andequipment—arealsotraditionallyconsideredthepropertyofmalehouseholdmembers.Whenamanwants toobtaina loan fromthebank, theseassetsserveascollateral,allowinghimtofinanceanewbusiness.

Thisrealityinevitablyputsfemalehouseholdmembersatadisadvantage.Theyexperienceproblemsprovidingcollateralwhentheyapplyforaloanfrombanksorotherfinancialinstitutionsbecauseallfamilyassets are in the husband’s name. This can be especially problematic in rural areas,wheremale familymembersmaymigrateforworkforyearsatatime,leavingwomenandchildrenbehindwithoutthemeanstoaccessfinancialservicesandusethiscredittoincreasethefamily’sincome.Akhunovalsopointsoutthatwomen-ledbusinesseshavetoprovideahighervalueofcollateralthanmen-managedbusinesses.3

Alackofunderstandingofcreditprocessesisalsoafactorinwomen’slackofaccess.Inthe2018ADBsurvey,manyfemaleparticipantsindicatedthattheynotonlylackedlegalpossessionofmachineryorrealestatebutwouldbehesitanttoleveragepropertyforcollateralbecausetheywereafraidoftakingrisks.4

Compounding the problem is the fact thatUzbekistan enjoys very low access to formal financialservices.Ninety-fivepercentof the financial sector isoccupiedbybanking, leaving therestof thesectorunderdeveloped.AccordingtoHolzhacker,theinsurancemarket,stockmarket,andleasingmarketarenotwelldevelopedandthemainplayersaresubsidiariesofbanks.5Themajorityofinvestmentsareinternally

1AsianDevelopmentBank,“UzbekistanCountryGenderAssessmentUpdate.”2Ibid.3MuzaffarAhunov,“FinancialInclusion,Regulation,andLiteracyinUzbekistan,”ADB,2018,accessedJuly23,2019,https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/441226/adbi-wp858.pdf.4AsianDevelopmentBank,“UzbekistanCountryGenderAssessmentUpdate.”5 Hans Holzhacker, “Uzbekistan Diagnostic: Assessing Progress and Challenges in Unlocking the Private Sector’sPotentialandDevelopingaSustainableMarketEconomy,”EuropeanBankofReconstructionandDevelopment,2018,accessedJuly23,2019,https://www.ebrd.com/.../uzbekistan-diagnostic-paper.pdf.

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generated,settingUzbekistanapartfromitscounterpartsintherestofCentralAsia.1Onlyaround25percentofSMEsevenhavebankloans.2

Asaresult,microfinanceinstitutionsarecomparativelylargerplayersonthefinancialservicesscene.According to Naser, microfinance institutions provide 35 percent of credit worldwide. In Uzbekistan,meanwhile,theyaccountfor80percentoftotalloans(seeFigure9).3However,theseprovidersservejust60,000 borrowers inUzbekistan; in neighboringKyrgyzstan,meanwhile,microfinance institutions serve175,000borrowers.4Thesefactscombinetocausewomenseriousproblemsinaccessingfundingsources.

Figure9.Microfinanceinstitutions’shareofcreditprovision

Source:MuhammadAbuNaser,“Microfinance,PovertyAlleviation&WomenEntrepreneursinthe

BangladeshiCommunity:RhetoricandRealities(PhDdiss.,DeMontfortUniversity,2018),https://www.dora.dmu.ac.uk/handle/2086/16549.

Thegovernmenthas introducedprogramstohelpovercomethe lackofaccesstocredit.For instance,nocollateralisnowrequiredfromanagriculturalborrowerexceptforpledgingthesaleofcrops.DecreeofthePresident#2844 (March17, 2017) “Onmeasures for further simplificationof themicrocredit systemofentrepreneurship subjectsand thebroaderpopulation”evenallows individualentrepreneursand familybusinessentitiesinruralareastoobtainaloanof$41,000fromthePreferentialCreditingFundatarateof7percentper annum;goodspurchased for conducting thebusiness canbeusedas collateral.5 Inpractice,however, banks still rely heavily on collateral—which women cannot provide because they lack legalownershipofanyequipmentandrealestate.Banksmayalsorefusetoletthemusetheassetstheyhaveas

1Ibid.2Ibid.3MuhammadAbuNaser,“Microfinance,PovertyAlleviation&WomenEntrepreneursintheBangladeshiCommunity:RhetoricandRealities(PhDdiss.,DeMontfortUniversity,2018),https://www.dora.dmu.ac.uk/handle/2086/16549.4ChristophKneidingandRichardRosenberg,“VariationsinMicrocreditInterestRates,”CGAP,2008,accessedJuly23,2019,https://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-Brief-Variations-in-Microcredit-Interest-Rates-Jul-2008.pdf.5AsianDevelopmentBank,“UzbekistanCountryGenderAssessmentUpdate.”

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collateral, inturnenablingthemtoturndownawoman’srequestforaloan.1 Intotal, justonepercentofagriculturalbusinessesobtaincreditfromfinancialservices.2

Otherprogramshavebeenequally ineffectiveon the ground. InFebruary2017, thePresidentofUzbekistanestablishedaGuaranteeFundforthedevelopmentofsmallbusiness.3TheideawasthattheFundcouldsecureloansgrantedtosmallbusinessesandtherebyimprovethebusinessclimateinUzbekistan.4YetasofMay2017,theFundhadyettobeginoperations.5

In2018,the“EveryFamilyanEntrepreneurialFamily”projectwasadoptedtoengageeveryfamilyin entrepreneurial activities. The main purpose of this project is to push the unemployed population,particularly youth, into economic activity and help them establish a stable source of income. It wasaccompaniedbytheMarch7,2019,decree“Onadditionalmeasuresforthewidespreadinvolvementofthepopulationinentrepreneurshipandthedevelopmentoffamilyentrepreneurshipintheregions,”whichlaysouttheprocessbywhichthisprojectshouldbeimplemented.6TheUzbekgovernmentprovidedmoneytoengage every family in entrepreneurial activities such as fish farming, weaving, sewing, handicrafts,beekeeping,poultryfarming,cattle-fattening,andgreenhouse-building.Sofar,accordingtothepresident,thenumberofnewentitieshasrisenby2.3times.7

However,anumberofproblemswiththeprojecthavebeenobserved.Foronething,entrepreneursstill face extortion and red tape on the local level, as evidenced by the 16,000 appeals the Chamber ofCommerceandIndustryhasreceivedfrombusinesspeople.8Ofthese,about2,000mentionofficials’lackofactiontakentoimplementthe“EveryFamilyanEntrepreneurialFamily”program.

Foranotherthing,theavailableresourcesarenotbeingusedproperly.Just19percentoftotalfundshave been allocated, limiting their impact on entrepreneurship.9 In some cases, funds have even beenmisappropriated:officialsofHalqBankillegallyprovidedloanstosomecitizens.10ThekhokimsoftheregionsandTashkentcityhavealsofailedtocarryouttheirtaskofallocatingemptylandandbuildingstopeoplewhocouldusethemforagriculturalandmanufacturingactivities.

Ontopofthis,fewwomenandyoungadultsaregettinginvolvedintheprogram,limitingitsimpactonfamilies’materialwellbeing—andtherehasbeenlittlefocusonlow-incomefamilies.Thepresidentarguesthatthelowlevelofinvolvementintheprogrambywomenandyoungadultsisanimpedimenttoimprovingthematerialwell-beingoffamilies.Overall,the“EveryFamilyanEntrepreneurialFamily”projecthasbeenimplementedinanunsatisfactoryway.RecommendationsBasedontheanalysisofthesethreedimensionsofdiscrimination—culturalbarriers, levelofeducationalattainment,andaccesstofinancialcredit—Iadvancethefollowingrecommendations.Tothegovernment:

1“GuaranteeFundtoAppearinUzbekistaninSupportofSmallBusiness,”American-UzbekistanChamberofCommerce,February17,2017,http://www.aucconline.com/news.php?news_id=1366.2“President’sReportProposedLoanandGranttotheRepublicofUzbekistanfortheAgricultureDiversificationandModernization Project,” IFAD, 2017, accessed July 23, 2019,https://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Content/DE/Trade/Fachdaten/PRO/2017/11/Anlagen/PRO201711305004.pdf?v=1.3Ibid.4American-UzbekistanChamberofCommerce,“GuaranteeFundtoAppearinUzbekistaninSupportofSmallBusiness.”5Morerecentinformationdoesnotappeartobeavailable.6 “‘Every Family Entrepreneur’ Program Execution is Critically Analyzed,” UzDaily, May 2, 2019,http://www.uzdaily.com/en/post/49540.7 ChamberofCommerceand IndustryofUzbekistan, “NewSystemPending Introduction toConsiderAppeals fromEntrepreneursandInvestors,”Chamber.Uz,2019,accessedJuly29,2019,http://www.chamber.uz/en/news/4655.8Ibid.9Ibid.10Ibid.

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● Invest inwomen’sbusinesseducation.Developshort-andmedium-termprofessionaltrainingsto

pushwomen to enter theprivate sectorbydeveloping their entrepreneurial competencies.Theyneedtoknowhowtowriteabusinessplan,howtomakeabudget,howtodevelopabusinesspitch,howtocarryoutamarketanalysis,etc.

● Developwomen’sfinancialandmanagerialliteracybyopeningindependentinstitutionsandcentersintheregionsofUzbekistan.

● Create consultation centers where women can access legal advice on such issues as taxation,employmentlaw,property,bankaccounts,andapplyingforloans.

● Replicate the “Women’s Entrepreneurship Challenge,” launched to support 130 growth-orientedbusinesses in Vietnam, in rural areas of Uzbekistan.1 The program includes capacity-building,coaching,peerlearning,andentrepreneurshipdevelopment.

● Monitor financial inclusion by using gender-disaggregated data on women-owned small andmedium-sized enterprises to assess the effectiveness of financial products.Mandate that certainindicatorsbeincludedinregularmonitoringandreporting.

● Strengthen the capacities of National Statistical Offices and provide sufficient funds to conductcomprehensivesurveysoncritical issuesfacingwomeninruralbusinessesandunpaidcarework(socialexpectations,needs,responsibilities,domesticroles,andfamilydecision-makingdynamics).

● Expand and strengthen the financial infrastructure by creating collateral registries and creditbureaustosupportwomen’scredithistoriesintheirownnamesanddecreasethecostofborrowingmoney.

● Increase women’s ability to leverage and own assets by addressing issues with housing deeds,property,inheritances,andbankaccounts.

● Addressthehighlevelofinformalityintheagriculturalfield.● Encouragepublic-privatedialoguebyinvolvingbusinesswomen’sorganizationsindecision-making

onpolicyimplementationandfundingforeconomicdevelopment.● Fosteranenvironmentthatfacilitatessmartfinancialinvestmentsfromawidespectrumofsources.

Conductthematicresearchonruraldevelopment,engagingwithorganizationsthathavethecapacityto conduct the relevant research (think tanks, the Women’s Committee, and civil societyorganizations).

● Strengthen childcare anddomestic support by developing subsidized childcare facilities in everyregionofUzbekistanandsimplifyingprivatechildcarearrangements.

● Targetmeasurestoredistributetheburdenofdomesticworkandunpaidcarebyincludingflexibilityinworkingarrangementsandcarefacilitiesforbothchildrenandadultdependents.

● Introduce specialmeasures to ensure gender balance in students’ selection of academic areas ofstudy. Set quotas for enrollment, scholarships, and internships to boost women’s entry into thebusinesssector.Analyzecontributingfactorsinthedeclineoffemaleenrollmentinhighereducation,includingthoserelatedtowomen’seconomicstatus.

● Increasepunishment for religious leaders, officials, andparentswhoallowearlymarriage. Largefinesandimprisonmentarerequiredincaseswherethelawhasbeenbreachedrepeatedly.Organizeanawareness-raisingcampaignontheharmfulaspectsofchildmarriageforstudentsandparents.Carryoutin-depthmultidisciplinaryqualitativeandquantitativeresearchonchildmarriage.

TotheWomen’sBusinessOrganization:

1 World Bank, “Female Entrepreneurship: Program Guidelines and Case Studies,” 2013, accessed July 29, 2019,http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGENDER/Resources/FemaleEntrepreneurshipResourcePoint041113.pdf.

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● To combat social stereotypes and discrimination, the Women’s Business Organization shoulddevelopmediacoverageofwomen-ownedbusinessesthatwillraisepublicawareness,encouragewomen to participate in the economy, and feature the advantages of sharing domesticresponsibilitiesbetweenspouses.Themainmessageshouldbethetransformativepowerofwomen’seducation:helpingagirlstayineducationandsucceedintheprivatesectorcansupportUzbekistan’seconomicdevelopment.

● Advocate forchangestopolicies thatpresentbarriers to theriseofwomen-ownedbusinessesbyassigningwomentheprimaryresponsibilityforhouseholdactivities.

● Host competitions for business growth targeted at women-owned small and medium-sizedenterprises,cooperatingwithfinancialinstitutionstooffergrantstoselectedwinners.

● Createguaranteeassociationsamongwomen-ownedbusinessesandcreatevenuesforeducation.● Developpartnershipswithbusinesscompaniestoshareentrepreneurialskillsrangingfromgeneric

knowledge(eg.,literacy)tospecializedskills(eg.,accountancy).● Implement national strategies and policies for rural development and agriculture that will be

inclusiveandgender-responsive.Policiesshouldbebasedonevidenceandglobally-recognizedbestpractices.Targetsandadedicatedbudgetshouldalsobetakenintoaccount.

Tointernationalfinancialinstitutions(IFIs):

● SharereportsofthesuccessesoffinancialproductsforwomeninAfricaandIndia.Thisshouldhelpincreasebanks’interestintargetingwomenentrepreneursanddeveloptheirknowledgeoftheriskprofilesofwomenclients.1

● Disseminateinnovativeapproachestoloanregistration,suchasthoseusedinMalawi.2● Promoteactiveparticipationofwomenindecision-makingrelatedtopropertyandland.● Replicate efforts like Capital Sisters International, which provides zero-interest $1,000 bonds to

microfinanceinstitutionstosponsormicro-businessloansforpoorwomenindevelopingcountriesin Asia and Latin America.3 Their vision is that investment will be directed toward 10 micro-enterprisesandwillbereturnedwithinone, two, three,or fiveyears.ThestoryofCapitalSistersInternational demonstrates how the government could make microfinance an effective tool toencouragefemaleentrepreneurialventures.

● Allowgraceperiods:inanexperimentinIndia,thisapproachincreasedreturnoninvestmentby6percentanddoubledthelikelihoodofopeninganewbusiness.4Thisstrategyisnotonlyfocusedonhelpingwomentoruntheirbusiness,butalsoguaranteesthataloanwillberepaid.This,inturn,willcontributetothedevelopmentofUzbekistan’seconomy.

● Initiate communication between women’s entrepreneurial associations, NGOs, and governmentinstitutionstoimprovecoordinationofactions.

● Supportproactivemeasures to ensure thatwomenare able to fullyparticipate in local decision-making.

● Createloanproductsthatmeetsector-specificmarketneedsinwhichwomenareneededtogrowbusinesses.ItiscrucialfortheeconomyofUzbekistantoinvolvewomeninsuchindustriesassewing,dairy,agriculture,andtourism.

1JanP.MaesandLarryR.Reed,“ThePromiseofMicrofinanceandWomen'sEmpowerment,”EY,2014,accessedJuly23, 2019, https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY_-_Microfinance_and_womens_empowerment/$FILE/EY-The%20promise-of-microfinance-and-womens-empowerment.pdf.2XavierGiné,JessicaGoldberg,andDeanYang,“CreditMarketConsequencesofImprovedPersonalIdentification:FieldExperimentalEvidencefromMalawi,”AmericanEconomicReview102,no.6(2012):2923-2954.3VarshaRaghunandan,“ChangingEquations:Empowerment,EntrepreneurshipandtheWelfareofWomen,”JournalofInternational Women’s Studies 19, no. 3 (2018), accessed July 23, 2019,https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/336b/52519579cb8c3de9301a8bee29b661fb2466.pdf.4MaesandReed,"ThePromiseofMicrofinance.”

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● Developpartnershipswithmicrofinanceinstitutionsandcommercialbankstoensureguaranteeandrisk-sharingagreementsforwomen-ownedsmallandmedium-sizedenterprises.

● Createspecialfinancialproductsforwomen.Researchers,microfinanceinstitutions,andregulatorsneedtoevaluatemicrofinanceprogramsonthebasisnotonlyoffinancialindicatorsbutalsoofsocialperformance parameters that focus on women’s economic development of Uzbekistan. Gender-responsivebudgetingisanimportanttoolforequaldistributionofresourcestomenandwomen,girlsandboys,inordertomeettheirprioritiesandneeds.

● Encouragedepositswithrepaymentschedulesandfollow-uptextmessages.● Proposealternativetypesofcollateral:

o For instance Access Bank of Nigeria Gender Empowerment Program allows jewelry,debentures,andbillsofsaletobeusedascollateral1

o Development Finance Corporation Uganda (DFCU) created a land loan to combat thecollateral problem: women could purchase property that could eventually be used ascollateral.2

● Encouragebankstoinnovatebyorganizingstafftrainingsfocusedonwomen.Staffneedtooffernon-financialservices,takingintoaccountthevariousfinancingoptionsopentowomen,documentationrequired,collateral,risks,andcosts.Bankscouldbecomebusinesswomen’spreferredsourceofnon-financialservicessuchasfinancialeducationtrainingandadvisoryservicesonfinancialproducts.

● Incentivize lending institutions to create procedures and policies thatwill targetwomen-ownedSMEs.

● Openupthesector fornewplayerstomakethefinancialsectorasanefficientsourceof funding;restructurestate-ownedbanksbystrengtheningsupervisionandsettingupnon-bankchannelsforfinancialintermediaries.

● Guarantee stability in the banking system, adjust customs rates on imported goods, andprovidesupportforthesociallyvulnerablepartofthepopulationinruralareas.

1WorldBank,"FemaleEntrepreneurship:ProgramGuidelinesandCaseStudies.”2Ibid.

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HowIntegratingMinoritiesandVulnerableGroupsWillImproveHumanCapitalinUzbekistan:TheCaseoftheCentralAsianGypsyCommunity

KamillaZakirova

KamillaZakirovahasworked for theEurasiaFoundation’sUzbekistanteamsince2016, focusingonsocialentrepreneurship,socialinclusion,vulnerablepopulations,andcombatinghumantrafficking.Herexperiencealso includesworking for a leading telecommunications company in Uzbekistan, engagementwith theU.S.MissiontotheOSCE,andconsultingforaWashington,D.C.-basedthinktankoncounterterrorism.SheearnedaBAfromTashkentUniversityofInformationTechnology.

LuligirlsfromUzbekistan

PhotobyAlexanderBarkovskiyUzbekistanisCentralAsia’smostpopulouscountry.Thedemographicdatacountmorethan17ethnicgroupslivinginthecountry.Thelastcensuswasconductedin1989,butaccordingtoofficialestimates1updatedin2017,ofatotalof32.1millionpeople,theUzbekmajoritycomprisedover26.9million(83.8percentofthepopulation),whileTajiksamounted to1,544,700 (4.8percent).Other sizableminorities includeKazakhs(803,400—2.5 percent), Russians (750,000—2.3 percent), Karakalpaks (708,800—2.2 percent), Kyrgyz(274,400—0.9 percent), Tatars (195,000—0.6 percent), Turkmens (192,000—0.6 percent), Koreans(176,900—0.6percent),andUkrainians(70,700—0.2percent).

Whilethecountryenjoyedsuchethnicdiversitythroughoutmostofthetwentiethcentury—dueinparttotheSovietUnion’sinternationalismpolicy—theawakeningofnationalidentitybroughtsomeserious

1StateStatisticsCommitteeoftheRepublicofUzbekistan,“DemograficheskaiasituatsiiavRespublikeUzbekistana,”July20,2017, accessed July29,2019,https://stat.uz/ru/433-analiticheskie-materialy-ru/2055-demograficheskaya-situatsiya-v-respublike-uzbekistan.

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challenges,includinginterethnicconflicts.Thetragiceventsof1989intheFerghanaValley,wheremorethanfiftymembersoftheMeskhetianTurkishminorityweremurdered,isoneofthemostpronouncedandbest-rememberedexamplesofinterethnictensions.1TheFerghanaValleyhasalsowitnessedviolencebetweenKyrgyzandUzbeksinthecityofOsh.

Today’s Uzbekistan grants equal constitutional rights to citizens without regard for nationality,ethnicity,orreligion.ThegovernmentcontinuestofundpublicschoolstaughtinthelanguagesoftheRussian,Tajik,andKarakalpakminorities,aswellasethnicandreligiouscelebrations.Yetthecountryranked47thonthe2018PeoplesunderThreatindex,atwo-placefallfromthe2017ranking.2CommunitiesatriskincludeTajiks,Russians,andKarakalpaks,aswellassomereligiousminorities.

PerhapsuniqueamongtheseethnicminoritycommunitiesaretheCentralAsianGypsiesorRoma,knowninUzbekistanasLuli.ThetermCentralAsianGypsyisusuallyunderstoodbythegeneralpublictodenote a social group that is united by a common lifestyle, occupation, and particular ethnic-culturalcharacteristics.What separates them fromotherminority groups is the fact that despite their long-timepresence in the region, there are no accurate data on them, and they have one of the lowest levels ofintegrationintothepubliceducationsystemandthegenerallabormarket.

Inthispaper,IdelveintothecurrentsituationofLuliinUzbekistan,havingcollectedthelimiteddataavailableonthem,andoutlineaprospectiveNGOthatwouldworkwithLuliandothervulnerablegroupsfacingdiscriminationtofosterintegrationandreinforcethecohesionofUzbeksociety.CentralAsianLuli:AShortHistoryCentralAsianGypsiesareusuallycalledLuliinUzbekistan.TheyarealsoknownasJughi(inTajikistan)orMultani (in some regions of Uzbekistan). The Luli describe themselves using the termMughat, a termreportedlymeaning“firecultfollowers”.LuliorMughatareprimarilySunniMuslims.TheyhaveinhabitedtheterritoriesofCentralAsiaforcenturies,eversincetheirancestorsmigratedfromthePunjabinpresent-dayPakistan.

ManylegendsandsuperstitionssurroundtheLuli,explainingtheiroriginsandappearanceamongthepopulationsofCentralAsia.Generally,theselegendsdepictapeopleoflowsocialstatus,tellingstoriesaboutcursesandexiles, imbuing themwithdivinestatusasangelsorquasi-apostles,ordescribing theirexecutionsbyfire.Fromahistoricalpointofview,themostplausiblenarrativeisthattheLulirelocatedfromIndia.According toShahnameh3 (TheBookofKings)by thePersianmedievalpoetFerdowsi, in the fifthcentury, about 10,000 artists, Indianmusicians, andLuri4 singerswere sent as gifts to thePersian king,BahramGur.

InanotherpotentialindicationoftheirIndianorigin,someresearchersassociatetheethnonymLuliwiththenameofthecityArur,orAl-Rur,whichwasthecapitalofthemostancientRajas5ofSindh,oneoftheprovincesofmodern-dayPakistan.

TheLuliareconsideredoneoftheworld’smostmarginalsocieties.Yethistoricalevidenceshowsthattheywere not always consideredpariahs in Central Asia.Multani held positionswithin the court of theKokandKhanate,receivedarecognizedstatusinthecensus,andoftenpaidtaxesasnormalcitizens.6That

1 Francis X. Clines, “57 Reported Dead in Uzbek Violence,” The New York Times, June 7, 1989,https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/07/world/57-reported-dead-in-uzbek-violence.html.2 “Uzbekistan,” Peoples Under Threat 2019, accessed July 29, 2019,https://peoplesunderthreat.org/countries/uzbekistan/.3 K.E. Eduljee, “Zoroastrian Heritage: Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh,” Heritage Institute, accessed July 29, 2019,https://www.heritageinstitute.com/zoroastrianism/shahnameh/.4LursareanIranianpeoplelivingmainlyinwesternandsouth-westernIran.SeeAmanolahiSekandar,“TheLursofIran,” Cultural Survival Quarterly (March 1985), https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/lurs-iran.5RajaisatitleforamonarchorprincelyrulerintheIndiansubcontinentandSoutheastAsia.6TimurBeisembiev,TheLifeofAlimqul(London:Routledge,2015).

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statusseemstohavechangedatsomepointbetweentheRussianRevolutionof1917andtheSecondWorldWar.InasocietyasregimentedastheSovietUnion,itseemsstrangethattheMultaniorLuliwereallowedtoexistasamarginalizedcommunity.

Accordingtoresearch1conductedbyElenaMarushiakovaandVesselinPopov,thereareanumberofdifferent communities that fall under the umbrella of Luli. In their study, the authors divide these into“intermediatecommunities”and“Gypsy-likecommunities.”Theythensubdividethemintothegeographicalregionswithwhichtheyarehistoricallyassociated,e.g.Samarkandikho,Karshigikho,Mug’atoiBukhorgi,etc.,andintopatronymicclans(tupar),whichareinturncomprisedofseparateextendedfamilies(avdol)—seeTable1.2ThiscategorizationshowsthattheLulicommunitymaytosomedegreehavepreservedtheIndiancastesystemandhierarchy.

Table1.CentralAsianLuli

Gypsies Intermediatecommunities “Gypsy”–likeCommunitiesLuli Tavoktarosh/Kosatarosh/

Sogutarosh/KoshuktaroshChistoni

Jughi Mazang KavolMultoni Agha BalujGhorbat Parya

Source:ElenaMarushiakovaandVesselinPopov,GypsiesinCentralAsiaandtheCaucasus(Hampshire:PalgraveMacmillan,2016).

InCentralAsiatoday,therearetwomainGypsycommunities:theTajik-andUzbek-speakingMuslimLuli,andtheRussian-speakingChristianTsygane.ThetermTsygane,used inSoviet timesand in today’spost-Sovietspace,referstotheRussian-speakingRomacommunity.MarushiakovaandPopovprovidecensusdataonthenumberofLulilivinginCentralAsiaoverthecourseofthetwentiethcentury(seeTable2).Aswecanseefromthecensusdata,thelargestconcentrationofLulihaslongbeenintheterritoryofUzbekistan.

Table2.HistoricaldataonnumberofLulibycountriesanddates

Year Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan1926 Seenumbers

forUzbekistan 3,710

1939 4,257 776 1,193 190 5,4871959 7,265 776 1,556 103 7,8601970 7,766 863 1,171 218 11,3711979 8,626 1,927 1,139 357 12,5811989 7,165 990 1,791 119 16,397

Source:ElenaMarushiakovaandVesselinPopov,GypsiesinCentralAsiaandtheCaucasus(Hampshire:PalgraveMacmillan,2016).

1ElenaMarushiakovaandVesselinPopov,GypsiesinCentralAsiaandtheCaucasus(Hampshire:PalgraveMacmillan,2016).2Ibid.

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LuliinContemporaryUzbekistan:AMarginalizedCommunityAccording to Paul Salopek, an American journalist and National Geographic photographer, there arecurrentlyabout12,000Luli living inUzbekistan.1However,researchsuggeststhatthisnumbermaybeahistoricalfiguredrawnfromtheaforementionedstoryinShahnameh.TherearenoaccuratecontemporarydataontheLulipopulationbecauseitdoesnotparticipateinthegovernment-conductedcensusandmanymembersoftheLulipopulationneverobtainlegaldocuments.

Duetothenegativestigmaattachedtotheirethnicgroup—theyareoftenconsideredfilthy,cursedsorcererspracticingwitchcraft—Lulitendtodisguisetheiridentity,oftendeclaringthemselvestobeTajik.Theyaregenerallymultilingual,withnative-levelfluencyinUzbekandTajik,andoftenalsoinRussian.Lulicommunitiesmaintainarigidlyclosedsocietyandpreserveacastesystem.Atleastinpart,however,thisisduetothesignificantgapbetweenthemajorityofthepopulationandmembersofthisminoritygroup.Peoplebelieve that the Luli do not want to integrate, not obey the laws due to their freedom-loving andresponsibility-avoidingsouls.

Traditionally, Luli lived a nomadic lifestyle, migrating for certain seasons to rented homes oragriculturalbuildingsinruralsettlements.Generally,theyliveinseparatecommunitiescalledLo’liMahalla2orJugikhona,whichareconsideredano-gozonebythegeneralpopulation.Mostmenengageinhorse-anddonkey-trading,sellingsmallgoods,tradingwithlocalresidents,andrecyclingvaluablematerials,aswellasprovidingseasonalagriculturallabor,musicforcelebrations,andcuresforhumansandanimals.Themostpopularoccupationsbothformenandwomenareworkingintrashfacilitiesandcollectingcuthair.3Womenandchildrenaregenerallyoccupiedwithbegging,fortune-telling,andotherfolk-healingpractices.Althoughchildrenareeligibletoattendpublicschools,attendanceisverylow.SchoolsorganizedbyLulicommunityleaders,meanwhile,havepooracademicoutcomes.

Thereareseveralpublicopinionsurveys,mostlyconductedbythepro-governmentPublicOpinionResearch Center Ijtimoiy Fikr, that contain some information on Luli. These include “Uzbekistan—To aCommonHome,” conducted from 1999 to the present; “National Identity,” conducted from 2001 to thepresent;“Uzbekistan:YearsofIndependence,”conductedfrom2001tothepresent;and“Uzbekistan:PublicOpinion,”conductedfrom1998tothepresent.WhilethenumberspresentedbyIjtimoiyFikrareinteresting,they may not be reliable. The Center is notorious for providing inaccurate data and conclusions, oftenmanipulatingresultsinordertoconcealexistingproblemsinthecountry.WhileIjtimoiyFikrmayindeedhavepolledtheLuli,thelattermayhavebeenobliged,underpressure,toprovidepositivefeedbackontheirlivingconditions.Moreover,Lulicommunitiesareveryclosedtooutsidersandcontrolledbylocalleaders(knownas“Baron”amongtheTsygane),usuallymenwithpowerandauthoritywhostrictlyregulate thelifestylesofcommunitymembers.

Referring to an Ijtimoiy Fikr poll,4 the Director of the National Center for Human Rights of theRepublicofUzbekistan,AkmalSaidov,statedthat99percentoftheLulirespondedthattheydonotfeelanytypeofdiscrimination.Themajorityofrespondentsindicatedthattheirrighttoacquirecitizenshipisnotinfringedandthatthereisnodiscriminationintheiraccesstoeducationatalllevels.Accordingtothesurvey,1.4percentofLulihavehighereducation,13.9percenthavecompletedsecondaryeducation,20.8percenthaveincompletesecondaryeducation,and63.9percenthaveprimaryeducation.Theymainlyliveinprivatehomes(92percentofrespondents),with just8percentsayingthatthey live inapartmentbuildings.ThemajorityofrespondentsarecitizensofUzbekistan(84percent),whiletheothershavea“residencepermit.”

1 Paul Salopek, “Trading in Tresses,” National Geographic, January 17, 2017,https://www.nationalgeographic.org/projects/out-of-eden-walk/articles/2017-01-trading-tresses/.2“Lo’liMahalla”istheUzbek-languagetermfor“Lulineighborhood.”3Ibid.4 Akmal Saidov, Director of theNational Center for Human Rights of the Republic of Uzbekistan, “Terpimost’ i nediskriminatsiia. Voprosy Roma i Sinti” (speech to the OSCE, Warsaw, October 1, 2015), accessed July 29, 2019,https://www.osce.org/ru/odihr/187971?download=true.

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Accordingtoanotherstudy,1conductedbytheMinistryofHigherandSecondarySpecialEducation,notasingleLulistudentwasenrolledinacollegeoruniversityin2010-2012.ThesurveyalsorevealedthatLuliliveinsmallfamiliesconsistingof4-6peopleanddisprovedthecommonmythofpolygamy:themajorityofrespondents(84.4percent)haveonespouse.Wheninneed,respondentsdeclarethattheyreceivematerialassistanceinmostcasesfromthestate(75percent)andtheneighborhoodcommunity,themahalla(13.7percent).Theabsolutemajorityofinterviewed(86.0percent)confirmedthattheydidnotexperienceanyrestrictionsorinfringementsoftheirrighttoeducation.Accordingtothesamepoll,anabsolutemajorityofLulichildrenattendsecondaryschool.

However, the reality suggests that children do not typically attend schools. ProfessionalphotographerandartistAlexanderBarkovskiy,2aswellasAnzorBukharskiy3andBekhzodBoltaev,4areafewof the limitednumber of people that the Luli havepermitted to film andphotograph their lifestyle.BarkovskiyfilmedasmallLulitwo-roomschool inaremoteruralareaofSurkhandaryoregion5 thatwasestablishedinabarnandobservedthatamaximumoffourtosixchildrenattendedclasses.Accordingtohim,theLuliarecurrentlyundergoinganational“elimination”oftheiridentities.Eveniftheyobtainanationalpassport, their ethnicity is often changed to Uzbek or Tajik, demonstrating that the authorities do notrecognizetheLuliasaseparateethnicgroup.Barkovskiy’sobservationsalsoshowstrongdiscriminationbygovernmentagenciesagainsttheLuli:“TheentireLulivillage inTashkent’sVodnikdistrictwasforcedtomoveawayfromtheirneighborhood.Thereasonforthisforcedrelocationwastoconstructanelitechildren’seducation center in the area and to avoid annoying high-ranking government officials who visited theneighborhood.”

In Tashkent, the Luli communities are concentrated in the Kuyluk, Vodnik, Sergeli, and Sputnikneighborhoods.In2016,Podrobno.uz6postedanarticleaboutthereconstructionofChashmamahalla7 inBektemirdistrictofTashkent,whichledtomassrelocationofLulifamilies,andestimatedthatmorethan250familieshavebeenforcedtomovefromtheOldTown.InaninterviewwithPodrobno.uz,themayorofTashkentstatedthat,“Itisnotyetclearthattheywillmoveclosertous.Nobodywillforcethemtomove.Weprovidedthemwithfreechoice;theymaketheirowndecisions.”8

InavideointerviewwithFergana.ru,9aLuliwomanstatedthatUzbekswouldnotallowthemtojointhe labormarketor attend schools, adding that they canhardly getmedical carewithoutpayingbribes.AlthoughthereareveryfewcaseswhereLuliarephysicallyattackedorbecomevictimsofhatecrimesbasedontheiridentity,therearestillstrongstigmasattachedtothem.AnewtrendislabormigrationofLulimentoRussiaandneighboringcountries.Facingeconomichardship,likethemajorityofUzbekmen,Lulihave

1Ibid.2DengizUralov,“AmongtheMugat,”TransitionsOnline, January24,2013,http://www.tol.org/client/article/23567-among-the-mugat.html.3 Irina Sklyar, “Asian Lyili Gypsies in Anzor Bukharskyi Photo Series,” Bird in Flight, May 25, 2015,https://birdinflight.com/inspiration/project/asian-lyili-gypsies-in-anzor-bukharskyi-photo-series.html.4SeeBezhodBoltaev’sInstagrampage:https://www.instagram.com/_behzod_boltaev_/(accessedJuly29,2019).5“Segodniavshkoluneposhel480P,”YouTubevideo,6:42,uploadedby“AleksandrBarkovskii,”May13,2019,accessedJuly29,2019,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NSMFdXvOAfE&t=139s.6 “Krupneishaia makhalla tsygan-liulei v Tashkente mozhet byt rasshirena,” Podrobno.uz, July 28, 2016,https://podrobno.uz/cat/obchestvo/krupneyshaya-makhallya-tsygan-lyuley-v-tashkente-mozhet-byt-rasshirena-/.7AmahallaisanurbancommunitydivisionusedtodayinUzbekistan,Kyrgyzstan,andTajikistan.Historically,mahallaswereautonomoussocialinstitutionsbuiltaroundfamilialtiesandIslamicrituals.BeforetheestablishmentofSovietrule inUzbekistan,mahallas fulfilled localself-government functions,connectingtheprivatespherewiththepublicsphere. Religious rituals, life-cycle crisis ceremonies, resource management, conflict resolution, and many othercommunityactivitieswereperformedatmahalla(orneighborhood)level.8Podrobno.uz,“Krupneishaiamakhalla.”9“LiulivUzbekistane,”YouTubevideo,9:33,uploadedby“Ferganainformagentsvo,”October7,2013,accessedJuly29,2019,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5m3_4sWSX0A&feature=youtu.be.

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startedmigrating toRussia forwork, usually leavingwomen alonewith several children—a reality thatdrivesthemtobegonthestreets.

AfterPresidentMirziyoyevopenedtheborderswithneighboringcountries in2017,LulicarryingUzbekpassportsflowedintoJalal-Abad,Kyrgyzstan.AsLuliexplainit,theymigratetoneighboringcountriesonly after the cotton-picking season inUzbekistan ends in order to try andmake a living bybegging inneighboring countries. InDecember 2017,NastoiachsheeVremia published an article about the regionalmigrationoftheLuli.1When14-year-oldOyatbekwascaughtinthecitymarketinJalal-Abad,hesaidthattwodaysearlier,hehadcomefromthecityofKara-Su.Afterthedeathofhismother,therewasnoonetofeedthesixsiblings.Itwasalmostwinter,yettheteenagerwaswearingflip-flops:“Icametoearnsomemoneyforschoolclothes.Mymotherdiedlongago,myfatherliesathomebecauseofakidneydisease.Welivewithastepmother.Inwinter,youneedtobuyflourandotherproducts.Iamthefifthofsixchildren.Nobodygivesmeajobbecauseofmyage.Wehavenochoicebuttogooutbegging.Idon’tevenhaveshoes,butIstillhavetobuyaschooluniform.Wetrynottomissclasses.”WhichIntegrationExperiencefortheLuli?SovietExperienceProfessor Khol Khalikovich Nazarov of the Samarkand Medical Institute, who has been studying thecommunity formore than forty years andwas himself born into aMughat family,writes that themosteffective integration projects were implemented during the Soviet period. Special Luli kolkhozes2 werecreatedandchildrenwereforcedtoattendpublicschools.SergeyAbashin,aprofessorintheDepartmentofAnthropologyattheEuropeanUniversityatSt.Petersburg,hasalsowrittenabouthowSovietauthoritiestookvariousmeasurestobindtheGypsiestoapermanentplaceofresidence,findjobsforthem,arrangeschoolsforchildren,andcreateastratumofGypsyintellectuals.3

In the 1920s and 1930s, a Gypsy kolkhoz and artels were created in Central Asia. During thecollectivizationperiod,thefirstgypsycollectivefarmsappearedintheFerghanaandTashkentregions.4Bytheendofthe1930s,andnotwithoutadministrativecoercion,13collectivefarmshadbeenestablished,themembers of which were predominantly Tsygane and Luli. True, in 1938, when the national policy ofsupportingminoritieswascurtailed,manyofthesecollectivefarmsfellapart.In1925,MizrabMakhmudov,a Luli communist, who was a collective farm movement activist, was elected to the Central ElectionCommitteeoftheUzbekSSR.5

Gypsieswerealsoorganizedinartisanalartelsandpushedtoworkinfactories. In1928,thefirstGypsy scrap collection labor community, known asMekhnatkash Luli,6 was established in Samarkand,employingmorethan61Luli.SimilarartelsofwoodworkersexistedinKokandandBukhara,aswellasanartelformakingtoysinTashkent.Specialschoolswereopenedwithinkolkhozes.7

1 Radio Azattyk, “Pochemu ulitsy Kyrgyzstana zapolonili uzbekskie tsygane-poproshaiki,” Nastoiashchee Vremya,December2,2017,https://www.currenttime.tv/a/28890711.html.2 Akolkhoz, short for “kollektivnoekhoziaistvo” (collective ownership), was a form ofcollective farmin theSovietUnion.3LevGumilevCenter,“Sredneaziatskietsygane-liuli,”August22,2014,accessedJuly29,2019,https://www.gumilev-center.ru/sredneaziatskie-tsyigane-lyuli/.4 ElenaMarushiakovaandVesselinPopov,GypsiesinCentralAsiaandtheCaucasus(Hampshire:PalgraveMacmillan,2016). 5 Ibid. 6MekhnatkashLuli(Uzbek)translatesto“HardworkingLuli.”7Ibid.

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Today,therearenosuchstate-sponsoredpoliciestowardtheLulicommunity.SeveralprojectsbytheUNDP1 have included these communities, but only as part of broader efforts focused on local economicdevelopment.Thegovernmenthasalso implementedaproject tohelpLuliacquire legaldocuments.2Butthere are no projects working on eliminating stigma, raising awareness, inclusion, or public educationintegration.InternationalExperienceThemostsuccessfulprogramsofRomaintegrationarebeingimplementedintheEuropeanUnion.

LERI,ortheLocalEngagementforRomaInclusionProject,coversItaly,Bulgaria,Slovakia,Spain,theUK,andseveralotherEuropeancountrieswithlargenumbersofRoma.Theprojectbringstogetherlocalauthoritiesandresidents, inparticularRoma,to investigatehowtheycanbestbeinvolvedin integrationactionsandtoidentifywhichaspectsoftheseactionswork,whichdonot,andwhy.Theaimoftheprojectisto facilitate the engagement of all local stakeholders in joint efforts to bolster inclusion of the Roma.Specifically,theLERIprojectinStrasbourg,France,couldserveasamodelforUzbekistan.TheprojectaimstosupportthemunicipalityinincreasingtheparticipationofRomaineffortstoimprovelivingconditionsinslums and open additional temporary accommodations. The projectis working with two authorizedmunicipalcampsinhabitedpredominantlybyRomanianRomainordertoincreasetheirparticipationinlocalcouncilinitiatives,toensuretheirfurtherinclusion,andtofightdiscrimination.

SeveralsuccessfulRomaprojectshavealsobeensupportedinRomaniaandBulgariabytheEuropeanEconomicArea (EEA) andNorwayGrants.3 TheMissionPossible project, fundedunder thePublicHealthProgramof theEEA andNorwayGrants, aimed to reduce social inequality by improving the sexual andreproductivehealthofyoungpeople.ItwasimplementedontheoutskirtsofthevillageofKovachevtsi,about40 km from the Bulgarian capital Sofia.4 Of the around 300 Roma people living in 43 houses in theneighborhood, only three houses had running water. Most of the families were marginalized, with noeducationorjobs,andreliedonsocialbenefits.Manygirlsdroppedoutofschoolduetoearlymarriagesandpregnancies.Mostofthemneversawadoctorbeforegivingbirth.Over50,000Romabenefittedfromthemeasures takenby theproject. Theproject report stated that over300doctors, nurses, andhealth carespecialistscametoworkdirectlyinRomacommunities,thusincreasingtheirknowledgeofhealthrisksandneeds.DirectinteractionbetweenmedicalspecialistsandRomapatientshelpedovercomemutualbiasesandmistrust,asevidencedbyanincreaseinthenumberofRomawomenusingmainstreamhealthcareservices.5

TheexperiencegainedfromthisprojectcanhelptodeveloptoolsforimplementationandmonitoringofLuliintegrationeffortsatthelocallevelinUzbekistan.Conclusion:ImplementationoftheTenglikProjectValuestendtochange.BiasandstigmatowardtheLulipopulationisnotinevitableandcanbeeliminated.Asthe late Swedish physician and author Hans Rosling wrote in his book Factfulness, “Cultures, nations,religions,andpeoplearenotrocks.Theyareinconstanttransformation.”6

1UNVolunteers,“MakingYouthVolunteerstheDrivingForceBehindDevelopment,”Tashkent,August2012,accessedJuly29,2019,https://www.unv.org/news/making-youth-volunteers-driving-force-behind-development.2 “Uzbekistondagi lulilarning uzligi,” BBC, May 11, 2016,https://www.bbc.com/uzbek/uzbekistan/2016/05/160511_identity_centralasian_gypsies.3EEAandNorwayGrants,“WhoWeAre,”accessedJuly29,2019,https://eeagrants.org/Who-we-are.4 “ReportonRomaProjects:VisibleAchievementsandPositiveChanges,”October13,2017,accessedJuly29,2019,https://eeagrants.org/News/2017/Report-on-Roma-projects-Visible-achievements-and-positive-changes.5Ibid.6HansRosling,withOlaRoslingandAnnaRoslingRönnlund,Factfulness:TenReasonWe'reWrongAbouttheWorld—andWhyThingsAreBetterThanYouThink(NewYork:FlatironBooks,2018).

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BasedonthisanalysisoftheinternationalexperienceofworkingwiththeRomaminorityandthecurrentcontext inUzbekistan, I advocate for the launchofanewproject,Tenglik(meaning “equality” inUzbek), aimed at eliminating stigma toward minorities within Uzbek society and encouraging betterintegrationofmarginalizedgroups.Thelong-termobjectiveistosupportminoritiesandtoprovideequalsocio-economic opportunities for them.Theproject’s long-termgoals include thedevelopment of publicpoliciesthatwillprotectthebasicrightsofdifferentminoritiesinthesociety.

Thefollowingactivitiesshouldbedevelopedandimplementedduringtheproject:

• Master classes and courses for youngandadult Luli to improve their skills. Thesemight includeprofessionaltrainingsandEnglishandRussianlanguageclasses

• Tutoringprogramsbothforadultsandchildren• VocationaltrainingforLuliyouth• Basiccomputerclasses• Medicalconsultations,includingworkshopsoncontraceptionforyoungwomenandworkshopson

HIVandSTDawarenessforteenagers

The project should collaboratewith local photographers to facilitate the sharing of personal illustratedstories of the Luli on social media, in turn shedding light on the issues facing the community. BetterintegratingCentralAsianGypsies intonon-segregatedpubliceducation institutions,professional trainingprograms,andthelabormarketcanonlyhelpimproveUzbekistan’shumancapital.