The cover of the book was inspired by the above visual. The symbolic use of the visual, captures the emotions of

anguish and helplessness, and the white knots symbolize hope. The colour green represents the Muslim community as in the national flag. The cover therefore, symbolically captures the conflicts that arise when cultural diversity is

not respected and protected.

MUSLIMSINPOST-WARSRILANKARepression,Resistance&Reform

1

Contents

Foreword....................................................................................................................................................................3

RadhikaCoomaraswamy

Editor’sNote.............................................................................................................................................................5

ShreenAbdulSaroor

Introduction..............................................................................................................................................................7

RajanHoole

TheCurrentStateoftheFreedomofReligionorBeliefinSriLanka....................................14

RiaSamuel

DiscriminationandViolenceagainstMuslimsinSriLanka.......................................................26

GehanGunatilleke

TheNewEnemy:AttacksagainsttheMuslimCommunityandtheCultureofImpunityinSriLanka.............................................................................................................................................................40

BhavaniFonseka

InSriLanka,WeSpeakLuxuriouslyof‘Peace’...................................................................................52

AmaliniDeSayrah

WhenHateGoesViral:AnExplorationintoCOVID-19relatedOnlineAnti-MuslimSpeechinSriLanka............................................................................................................................................64

HashtagGeneration,SenelWanniarachchi,PriheshRatnayakeandHarindriniCorea

#JusticeForIshalini:WhenHateSpeechDominatesPowerfulCallsforJustice.............81

SakeenaRazickandHashtagGeneration

TerrorisingMinoritiesthrough‘Counterterrorism’.......................................................................90

ShreenAbdulSaroorandMytiliBala

2

ShiftingbetweenDesperationandRejection:SriLankanMuslims’RelationshipwithDemandsforJusticeandAccountability............................................................................................110

Dr.FarahMihlar

WalkingonaTightrope................................................................................................................................123

FathimaNabeelaIqbal

MuslimMarriageandDivorceAct:TheStruggleforReform..................................................136

AmeerFaaiz

OfContinuingInjusticesandContinuingConversations:Women’sCollectiveSupportAcrossEthnicitiesinBatticaloa...............................................................................................................151

AneesaFirthous,SaralaEmmanuelandPonniArasu

“Theydidnothing”:MuslimsandaHostileandViolentState................................................162

AmbikaSatkunanathan

LivingRealitiesofSriLankanMuslimWomen

ToCoverorNot?TheGenderedIslamophobiaintheAftermathof21/04....................175

MuqaddasaWahid

TheEvictionandReturnoftheNorthernMuslimsandtheQuestionofCoexistence..........................................................................................................................................................191

ShreenAbdulSaroorandMahendranThiruvarangan

3

Foreword

RadhikaCoomaraswamy*

Thisvolumewithresearchandwriting fromsomeofSriLanka’sbestyoungscholars isa

pioneeringefforttoreflectonthelastfewyearsandtheparticularexperienceofSriLanka’s

Muslimcommunity.TheyanalysetheEasterSundaybombings,attacksagainstMuslimsand

theirproperties,thedemandsfornon-discrimination,justiceandaccountability,thedespair

ofdisplacement,theexperienceofbeingatthereceivingendofcounterterrorismstrategies,

theparticulardilemmasrelatedtowomen’srightsandMuslimwomen’sexperiencesduring

thesedifficulttimes.

For years thenarrative of thepoliticalmainstream in Sri Lankawas to paint Sri Lankan

Muslimsastheperfectminority.BeginningwithProfessorLornaDewaraja’sworkonthe

Kandyan Kingdom, the Muslims were portrayed as a fully integrated, loyal and reliable

minorityasopposedto theTamilminority thatwasseenasviolentandrebellious.Many

individual Muslim police and army officers contributed to the war effort against the

LiberationTigersofTamilEelam(LTTE).Oncepeacecametheseeffortswereforgottenand

theMuslimcommunityisnowtheonethatfacesthebruntofethnicmobilisationandhate

speech.

TheMuslimcommunityhasfacedbrutalityfrombothsidesoftheethnicconflict.Inthe1990s

theywere driven out of their homes in the northernprovince by the LTTE into a life of

displacement and fear. As captured in this volume many have not recovered from the

violencetheyfaced.AwholegenerationofMuslimyouthhasgrownupinthesedisplaced

settings,watchingthepainoftheirparentsbeingthrownoutofanareawheretheyhadlived

forcenturies.

MuslimshavealwaysfacedalevelofdiscriminationbytheSriLankanstateandsocietyas

described in this book but in recent years they have been physically attacked and their

propertiesburntindifferentpartsofSriLanka.Inaddition,thecounterterrorismmeasures

that have been taken after the Easter Bombings have traumatised and victimised the

communitywiththefearthatmoreyoungmenwillbecomeangeredandradicalised.The

recent laws on rehabilitation where young men and women are subject to rigorous

brainwashing andmilitary style discipline iswhatmust say is a new era in the criminal

justicesysteminSriLanka.

*ChairpersonInternationalCentreforEthnicStudies.

Dr.CoomaraswamyservedpreviouslyservedasUNUnder-Secretary-GeneralandSpecialRepresentativeonChildrenandArmedConflict,andwasformerlyUNSpecialRapporteuronViolenceAgainstWomen.InSriLanka,wastheChairpersonoftheHumanRightsCommissionbetween2003-2006.

4

TherootcausesoftheseactionsagainstMuslimsbystateandsocietyareanalysedindetail

inthisbook.Theyoriginateinlocalrivalries,nationallevelprejudicetoregionalmajoritarian

influences,totheinternationalcampaignassociatedwiththewaronterroranditsresultant

Islamophobia.Thedestructiveroleplayedbysocialmediaandtheimpunitygiventolocal

actors, especially religious actors, expressing hate and engaging in violence against the

Muslim community cannot be understated. Chapters in the book also recognise the new

politicsof forceddemographic change thathas further endangeredandmarginalised the

Muslimcommunity.

Asonereadsthelucidchapterscontainedinthisvolumeoneisremindedofthewritingsof

scholarslikeProfessorVeenaDasonthenatureofviolenceinSouthAsia.Alongwiththerest

oftheworldthereisthestrugglebetweenterrorismandcounterterrorismleadingtoagreat

dealofsufferinghardshipandharassment.TheuseofthePreventionofTerrorismActand

therecentlawsonrehabilitationareexamplesofthedraconianmeasuresstateshavetaken.

But inSouthAsia, there isalsothe ’ethnicriot’wherecitizensofthemajoritycommunity

attackmembersoftheminoritycommunityandtheirpropertiesoftenencouragedbythe

stateanditsoperatives.ProfessorVeenaDasfoundthistypeofviolencetobeparticularly

pernicious, tearing apart the social fabric, creating permanent fault lines and perpetual

tension.Understandingtherootsof thisviolenceandbuildingsolidarityat the local level

remainsanimportantneedinSriLanka.

ThebookhasveryimportantchaptersontheexperienceofMuslimwomen,theirdemand

forequalitywithinthecommunity,themarkersoftheiridentityasMuslimsandtheirbodies

anddressbecomingasiteofethniccontestation.Thebookalsorecognisestheirroleaspeace

builders,reachingouttoothercommunitiesandethnicgroupsinatraditionofpeaceand

reconciliation.Womenpeacebuildershaveemergedinallthelocalcommunitiesaswomen

reachouttobuildbridges,worktowardreconciliationandattempttoprotecttheirfamilies.

Thisvolumeisthereforeareviewoftherecentpast,focusingontheMuslimcommunitybut

also pointing to the major fault lines and gaps in Sri Lanka as a whole — unbridled

majoritarianism, impunity for violent crimes, terror and counter terror and a general

disregardforthehumanrightsofsomeofthepeoplelivingwithinitsborders.Atthesame

time,thereisalsopositivenewsofwhichthisvolumeisanexample.Peopleareresistingand

mobilisinginsmallanddeterminedwaystofightagainstsocialinjusticeandtokeepalive

theflameforabetterfuture.Againstimmeasurableoddstheycontinuetostriveforward.

5

Editor’sNote

ShreenAbdulSaroor

Onthe21stofApril2019,awell-coordinatedseriesofsuicidebombingskilledatleast269people,mostly children, andwounded over 500,whoweremainly Catholicworshippers

attendingEasterSundaymass.TheheinouscrimewascarriedoutbyalocalIslamistgroup

withallegedlinkstoglobalterrorgroupISIS.Thesesuicideattackswerethedeadliestsince

theendofthearmedwarin2009.Theytargetedthreechurches(inColombo,Negomboand

Batticaloa),aswellasfourhotelsinColombo.

Adayaftertheattacks,afewofusdecidedtogotoNegombo.Iwasanxiouswhenentering

the road that took us to the devastated St. Sebastian’s Church. There we saw Ayesha’s

janazahbeingcarriedtothePeriyamullamosque.Ayeshawasa12-year-oldchildborntoa

Muslim father and a Catholicmother. Her grandmother had taken her to St. Sebastian’s

ChurchforSundaymassonthatfatalday.WeprayedforherandwalkedontheKatuwapitiya

roadthatledtoSt.Sebastian’sChurch.AcoupleofMuslimmenwhohadclosetiestovictims

decidedtowalkbehindusbecausetheytoofeltanxiousaboutwalkingintoanareawhere

their close friends and acquaintances lived. The Islamist terror attack portrayed them

‘enemies’ of a once close-knit community. What I saw there brought back childhood

memories of living in thewar-torn North: white flags all over the streets, bannerswith

victims’photographsoneveryhousewall(sometimestheentire familyweredepictedon

thosebanners);relativesweepingandconsolingeachother.Wefeltconfusedanddidnot

knowwhat to do other than to crywith them. Body-bagswere brought in, and in some

houses,therewasnoonelefttoacceptthem.Asateenager,Iwitnessedthebloodyclashes

betweenTamilmilitantmovements,theatrocitiesoftheIndianPeaceKeepingForce(IPKF),

thearrogantSriLankanstate’sbombardmentofinnocentciviliansinvillages,andtheLTTE

turning intoabrutaloppressorofdissent.Seeingblownupbodiesanddisfiguredhuman

remainshadbeennormalinthesocietyIlivedinthen.Therehadbeenmanybombingsof

placesofworship inwhichcivilianssoughtrefuge in theNorth too.Yet theKatuwapitiya

carnageevokedadifferentfearinme.Itseemstodepicttheclashbetweentwofaiths,driven

globally.Notsolongago,wewitnessedwarcrimesandcrimesagainsthumanitywhenthe

statefinishedoffthewar.Wehavenotevenbeguntodigestit.Andnowwemustgrapple

withanotherconflictinvolvingIslamistterror,whichhasbroughthometheglobalwaron

terror.

ThegrowthofIslamicreformistmovementshasbeenontheriseinSriLankasincethe90s.

TheseincludetheTablighiJama’at,andJama’at-IIslami.Groupsconnectedtothethowheeth

ideology becamemore prevalent, especially in the East. Intolerance towards each group

grewrapidlyandvisibly.Onesuchincidentcomestomind.ExtremistsforciblyexhumedSufi

Muslim leaderAbdulPayilvan’sbodyonthe3rdofDecember2006anddumped itontheroadsideasawarningtothosewhopreachedviewsdifferenttotheirinterpretationofthe

6

HolyQuran.TheyalsoclaimedthatsuchpreacherscannotbeburiedinKattankudysoil.We

continuedtowitnessSufishrinesandtheirburialsites(siyaarams)beingdestroyedandleft

tobedilapidated.TherewasamovetoseekexclusivityandanIslamicidentitythatmostly

showedoffoneasmorepiousthantheotherbasedonwhich‘Islamic’ideologyand‘sect’one

followed.Suchregressiveideaswereimposedmostlyonwomenandchildrenintheformof

dresscode,controloftheirmobility(speciallyminglingwithothercommunities),denialof

accesstopropereducationorapushtowardsreligiouseducation,andstrictlyadheringto

halalcertificationandIslamicbanking.KattankudyinBatticaloatodaystandsasonesuch

exampleofMuslimsseekingnotonlypersonalexclusiveidentitybutalsoterritorial,withits

datetreesandtoweringmosqueswithvariousMiddleEasternarchitecture.

A few of us within the Muslim community started to critically examine these identity

manifestations in relation to the Easter Sunday carnage. After the attacks, we asked

ourselveswheredidwegowrong,howdidwefailtoseewhathasbeentakingplacearound

us,andwhatcanbedone?Well,thenatureoftheSriLankanSinhala-Buddhiststateandits

racisttreatmentofminorities,includingreligiousminorities,inthepost-warcontextiswell

known.Butweponderedaboutthequestionofhowafewpeoplewererecruitedtocarryout

thispoliticallylethalproject,whichmusthavebeeninthemakingforsometime.Unlessthe

Muslimcommunityfindsasolutiontothisproblem,wewillneverbeabletostopfurther

destruction.

Thisbooknotonlydetailsthesufferingof,andviolenceanddiscriminationagainst,Muslims,

but also offers a critical and introspective account of religious identity politics. The

conversationsIhavehadovertheyearswiththeauthorsofthevariousarticlesinthisbook

havebeenvibrantandvividandcapturesomeofthesecomplexities.Theseconversations

arestillongoing. Iamgrateful formy fellowauthors’ time,wonderfulconversations,and

tireless commitment to resist Islamophobia, racism, and radicalisation. I thank all the

contributorsfortheirdedicatedwork—notonlyforwritingtheiressaysbutalsofortheir

activeinvolvementinaddressinginjusticesacrossthecommunities.Inaddition,Ialsothank

SakeenaRazickforhelpingmewithproofreading,MahendraRatnaweeraandAmeerFaaiz

for their critical comments, Madhri Samaranayaka for the cover design, Jayachithra

Velayudanforpage-settingandDr.RadhikaCoomaraswamyandDr.RajanHooleforwriting

theforewordandintroductionrespectively.

The idea of putting together a collection of essays of this nature emerged during

conversationswith Prof. Qadri Ismail earlier this year. Sadly, he left us so early and his

contributiontothiscollectionremainsunfulfilled.

7

Introduction

RajanHoole*

WhilefocusingonviolenceanddiscriminationaffectingtheMuslimcommunity,thebroader

issues these essays raise, pertain to the law being rendered hostage to a majoritarian

ideologythathasdefinedthestatefromtherunuptoindependence.Theorders-in-council

of1946thatconditionedtheBritishgrantofindependenceenabledthePlantationTamils,

whowerethecornerstoneofLanka’seconomy,tobedeniedthevotein1949byasimple

majorityinParliament.Itseffectwasvirtualenslavementofacommunity.

ThepositionofMuslimsinthepolityremainedambivalentaftertheSinhalese-Muslimriots

of1915.However,T.B.JayahfromColomboCentralwastheleadingvoiceforequaltreatment

ofminorities,especiallythePlantationTamils,duringthedaysoftheLegislativeandState

Councils. InApril 1940, Jayah expressed alarmat 12,000 voters beingdropped from the

electoralregister inColombofollowedbytheImmigrationandRegistrationBillsof1941,

whenBandaranaikewasMinisterofLocalAdministration.Heprotestedvehementlyagainst

the implicit threat to treat theMuslims andpersons of Indian origin, born here, as non-

Ceylonese(Hansard14April1940and27March1941).Thispressurewasthebackdropto

JayahandA.R.A.Razik(SirRazikFareed)joiningD.S.Senanayake’sUnitedNationalParty

(UNP),perceivedin1946asthefuturegovernment.

WhileJayah’searlierpositionshadbeenscholarlyandprincipled,SirRazik’sweredifferent.

AddressingtheStateCouncilon27March1941,heremindedtheHouseofthespecialhonour

conferredon‘Moormen’bytheBritishfortheir‘fidelity’inthe1815Proclamationfollowing

the suppression of the Kandyan rebellion. While Anagarika Dharmapala, the father of

Sinhalesenationalism,hadreviledallnon-SinhalesewhocompetedforthetradeinPettah,

SirRazikmadeitveryclearthathejoinedtheSinhaleseleadersinsupportingtheBillsabove

targeting Indian residents, chiefly because Indian traders had come to dominate Pettah,

whichwasearlieraMuslimpreserve.

Rather than making peace with the Sinhalese leaders, Sir Razik’s position amounted to

storinguptrouble for the future.However, itwas justaswell for theUNP,whichthough

relyingontheSinhalesenationalistbaseofSenanayakeandBandaranaike,faredmiserably

in the 1947 elections, winning just 42 of the 95 contested seats. That underscored the

importance of the Muslim vote base and commercial hub in Colombo Central, and its

conservativeholdonMuslimreligiousorganisationsisland-wide.

TheUNP’sdisasteratthe1947electionsredoubledtheSinhalesenationalistobsessionwith

curbingtheelectoralpoweroftheminorities.Bylackofprincipleandabsenceofforesight,

*PhDinmathematicallogic.FormerseniorlecturerattheUniversityofJaffnaandauthorofmanybooksincluding‘TheBrokenPalmyra’and‘TheArroganceofPower’.

8

theminoritymembers of parliament (MPs) doomed their futurewhen, out of 13 Ceylon

TamilMPsinParliament,onlythreevotedagainstthe1948CitizenshipBill.Suchashowof

TamileliteopportunismmadeiteasyforallthesixMuslimMPstosupporttheBilldepriving

PlantationTamilsofcitizenshipandvotingrights.

Dr.FarahMihlar’sobservationthattheMuslims’‘historicalpoliticalcultureofpanderingto

themajority and their broader deprioritising of human rights approach has shaped this

relationshipwithjustice’couldalsobeappliedtotheTamilsuntilthe1950splacedthemat

thereceivingend.Fromthestart,governmentshaveusedstatepatronagetoforgealliances

with conservative segments of the minorities who are comfortable with Sinhalese

majoritariandominance.Theresulthasbeencurious.Therulingpartieshavecometoterms

withabuseandviolenceagainstMuslimsaspartoftheritualofgovernance.Whiledoingso

thestatehasignoredpersistentdemandsforreformcomingfromresponsiblesectionsofthe

Muslimcommunity,particularlyof theMuslimMarriageandDivorceAct (MMDA),which

wouldaddressfearsaboutMuslims.

ThefearsaboutMuslimsarerootedindifferentialtreatmentofMuslimsinfamilylaws,which

Muslim women are fighting against. Basically, there is a pact between the conservative

Muslimleadershipandthemajoritarianstate,whichallowstheleadershiptoimposeitsrules

onprogressivesectionsofthecommunityinreturnfortheMuslimleadershipallowingthe

statetoinflictviolenceandhumiliationonthecommunity.

Apointregularlymadeasstatedinanarticlebelowis‘theslightstatisticalincreaseinthe

overallpopulationshareofSriLankanMoorsbetween1981and2012—from7percentto

9.2percentunderscoresthefear[particularlyoftheSinhalesemajority].’Ratherthanany

faultoftheMuslims,asAmeerFaaizforcefullypointsout,itistodowithobstructingMuslim

demandsforreform:

“The ill-effects of the MMDA include directly marginalising women and children. Early

marriages and childbearing cost them their education, employability, financial

independence,andaccesstolivelihood.Manysuchwomenarelaterabusedandabandoned.

Theyandtheirchildrenbecomedestitute.Cumulativelythesecontributetostrengthening

the vicious cycle of abject poverty.Many of the poverty-stricken children seek solace by

enrolling inmadrasas that can provide food, shelter, and teach only theQuran.…These

detailsshockedtheconscienceofall—withtheexceptionoftheMuslimmales…”

Whilethestate,byitsdependenceontheconservativeMuslimlobbyhasopposedreforms

that would modernise Muslim civil laws, it has acted with crude aggression against

PlantationTamils,whoratherneedsocialwelfarethatrespectsequality.Astudydoneby

SasikumarBalasundaramshowsthatintheabusiveregimeoffemalesterilisationpractised

on Plantation Tamils, official figures in 2007 show that against a national sterilisation

9

average amongmarried non-estatewomen of less than 16 percent, the figure for estate

womenis41.1percent.1

Thepolityisthusonethattreatstheminoritiesasathreatandhasarmeditselfincreasingly

with harsh means of repression, bringing us close to the reality that a parliament that

legislatesoutside the law, leavesus facinganarchy,whereeachhas todecide the lawfor

himself (Chief JusticeHolt, 1701). Britain has kept a zealous eye on protecting themost

fundamentaloflawofpersonalfreedom,namelyaperson’srightunderthewritofhabeas

corpus,not tobedetainedexceptunder judicialwarrant.Thecourt’s jurisdiction isnever

nullified.Thus,officersofthesecurityforceswhocommitcrimesunderastateofemergency

areliabletobeplacedontrialoncetheemergencylapses.ThePublicSecurityOrdinance,the

finalactpassedbytheStateCouncilin1947ontheeveofCeylon’sindependence,removed

thisprotection.

ThePreventionofTerrorismActof1979wasafurthermilestoneinstrengtheningthestate’s

arbitrary powers of detention, themost ironical to this addition being the International

CovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR)Actof2007.ThisisdescribedbyShreenAbdul

SaroorandMytiliBalathus:

“Theoriginalaim,drawnfromtheICCPR,wastoprotectvulnerableminoritygroupsfrom

violence and discrimination. Instead, the state uses the ICCPR Act solely as a tool of

repression,arrestingminoritiesongroundsthattheirspeechorpetitioningactivitydisrupts

‘communalharmony.’”Consequently‘rehabilitation’hasbecomeaeuphemismforarbitrary

detentionandevendisappearance:“BycodifyingrehabilitationproceduresunderthePTA,

thegovernmentnowseeks to formaliseabuses thatwerepreviouslypossibleonlyunder

emergencyrule.”

Thishystericalnotionofsecurity,asIhavearguedinSriLanka’sEasterTragedy2,multipliessecurity agencieswhile in fact compromising security ashappened in theEaster attacks.

When tested institutional controlsare ina stateof confusion, including theall-important

InspectorGeneralofPolice(IGP)beingsidelined,thestatehadnocoherentresponse.The

President,theapexofthesystem,expendedhisenergiesnotseekingtopreventthedisaster

ofwhichhewasamplywarned,butrathersearchingforscapegoatstoshifttheblame.Steady

warningshadinfactbeencomingfromalocalwomen’sgroupthathadagoodestimateof

Zahran.

AneesaFirthous andher allies faced abuse and threatsbyZahranandhis assistants like

MohamedNiyas.In2016thiswomen’sgroupcomplainedtothePoliceandobtainedajudge’s

1SasikumarBalasundaram,‘StealingWombs:SterilizationAbusesandWomen'sReproductiveHealthinSriLanka'sTeaPlantations’(July-Dec2011)41(2)IndianAnthropologist.

2RajanHoole,SriLanka’sEasterTragedy:WhentheDeepStategetsoutofitsDepth(RavayaPublications2019).

10

orderrestrainingNiyasunderabondfortwoyears.Describingtheensuingperiod,thisgroup

ofwomensaysintheiressaybelow:

“ThisperiodofattackscoincidedwithanincreaseinZahran’sdeclarationsofviolenceasthe

meanstotakeforwardhisideas.Asthesecallsincreasedwomenbegantobackawayfrom

his group and he surrounded himself with thug-like persons who felt comfortable with

violenceratherthananaverageperson,whomayhaveattendedhismeetingsearlier,but

begantofeeluncomfortablewithallthistalkofviolence.”AneesaFirthousetalfurtheradd

thatin2017,ZahrandisappearedcompletelyfromthepublicsphereinKattankudywithan

arrestwarrantagainsthimandhisassociates.

The book Easter Tragedy adduces testimony from journalists and other sources that

Zahran’sNationalThowheedJamaat(NTJ)wasaidedbyoneormorestatesecurityagencies

atthetimehedisappearedfrompublicviewin2017.ThechangeoftheobjectofZahran’s

wrath fromBuddhist priests in February 2019 to Christianworshippers on 21st of April2019, suggests Zahran’s outfit was persuaded by its handlers to review the objects of

destruction.

A group of womenwho felt alarmed by the talk of violence that in the secondweek of

February2019sentleadinggovernmentandoppositionfiguresavideorecordingreleased

byZahran,whereheemphaticallythreatenedtoengulfinthefiresofhell,Buddhistpriests

and their allieswho have killedMuslims, desecrated theirmosques and destroyed their

properties.AsadmittedbySriLankaMuslimCongress(SLMC)leaderRauffHakeem,when

PrimeMinisterWickremasingheaskedhimaboutthevideo,he,tothebestofhisbeliefthen,

minimiseditssignificance.

ThefactthattheimminenceoftheEasterbombingswasroutinelypickedupontheradars

of foreign intelligence agencies, especially Indian, raises the question of whether local

paralysiswas lethargy or somethingmore sinister? The countdown beganwith the first

Indianwarningon4thApril2019.Thiswaslocallycommunicatedtoseveralheadsofsecurityon9thAprilfromcommunicationoriginatingfromtheStateIntelligenceServices(SIS).Otherexternalwarningstoocamerightuntilthefinalblowonthe21st.WiththeIGPsidelinedandthePresidentleavingforIndiaandSingaporeon16thApril,therewaspoliticallyacontrivedleadershipvacuum.AlthoughtheIGPhadthestatutorypowertoact,hehadbeenreducedto

amereornament.

WhileMinisterProf.G.L.PeirisswearsbeforetheHumanRightsCommissionthatSriLanka

wouldnottolerateanyforeigninterference,itwasfinallyexternalwarningsthatifheeded

couldhaveavertedthedisaster.TheauthoritiesignoredwarningsfromMuslimwomen,the

first to challenge Zahran, who in February 2019 saw from his video that he had been

transformed from a village bully to a lethal instrument. The Terrorism Investigation

Division’s(TID)monitoringofZahranshowedthathismovetowardsasuicidebomberdated

fromtheattackonMuslimsinAmparaiinFebruary2018.

11

ItisapttosayafewwordsoncontributorGehanGunatilleke’sthesisthat‘thepersistenceof

such violence suggests that the drivers of anti-Muslim violence and discrimination are

entrenchedwithinthesocio-politicalfabricofthecountry.’Hehadsaidearlierinhisbook

‘The Chronic and the Entrenched: Ethno-Religious Violence in Sri Lanka Colombo, ICES,

2018’:

“The entrenched nature of ethno-religious violence in Sri Lanka reflects a disconcerting

reality about the Sri Lankan state. Both ultra-nationalist and relatively pluralistic

governments have tolerated such violence to varying degrees, while consistently

maintainingtheoverallimpunitywithwhichitisperpetrated.Inthiscontext,itappearsthat

the Sri Lankan state itself embodies a certain structural dispensation towards ethno-

religiousviolence.”

Thisrepresentsatrendinsocialsciencediscourse,whereitismoreacceptabletoblamean

intangiblecollectiveforanoutburstoflawlessnessthantoapportionindividualblameeven

whenitstaresusintheface.Accordingly,inattackingTamilsorMuslims,theSinhaleseare

driven,asitwere,bythelikenessofthefatalattractionofamothtotheflame.Contrarily,a

closestudyofcommunalviolencepointstodeliberateprovocationbypoliticalagents,who

pointtoaparticularcommunityasanexistentialthreattotheSinhaleseBuddhists(1956–

1958inDeVotta3,1977and1983inHoole4).

Withregardto the1977communalviolence,directresponsibility fallsonPrimeMinister

Jayewardene. Following the change of government, the IGPwas kept in his office on the

sufferanceofJayewardene,whileseveralofhistopsubordinatesranamoksuperintending

violence against Tamils as recorded in the Sansoni Commission’s report and hearings.

Jayewardene’sroleintheviolenceof1983wasnolessplain,butscholarsarecautiousabout

repeatingwhatwascommonknowledgewithinlivingmemory.5TheEasterTragedyshowsthatritualtrustreposedonthoseatthetopcanbedangerous.

Army Mohideen, who was an intimate associate of Zahran, was also a known regular

informanttooneormoreofthestateservices.AStateIntelligenceServices(SIS)officertold

thePresidentialCommissionof Inquiry intotheEasterattacks,on23rd July2020, thatontheiradviceSIDiasandSergeantNandalaloftheCriminalInvestigationDepartment(CID)

hadgoneinsearchofArmyMohideeninPasikudahon7thMarch2019,apparentlyatthesameaddressgiveninDirectorSIS’smemoon11thApril2019.Buttheyfailedtoarresthim.On24thApril,threedaysaftertheEasterattacks,theSISwentwiththetwoCIDofficersabove

3NeilDeVotta,Blowback:LinguisticNationalism,InstitutionalDecay,andEthnicConflictinSriLanka,(StanfordUniversityPress2004).

4RajanHoole,ArroganceofPower,(UTHR,Jaffna2001).

5ibid.

12

andarrestedMohideeninOddamavady,inthesamearea.6AvailablereportageindicatesthatitwasthearrestofMohideenthatledtoraidsonthe26theveninginSainthamaruthu(wheresome of Zahran’s family had beenmoved) and Sammanthurai (that had an arms factory

wheresuicidevestsweremade).7

WhatcomesoutquiteclearlyfromtheforegoingisthatMohideenmoreorlessstayedwhere

hewasandmadenoattemptatescapeorconcealment.Hewastheclassicdoubleagentwho

feltheservedthecommonobjectivesofbothormultiplemastersandgavesatisfactiontoall.

Indeed, at the point of arrest, he had appealed to Sergeant Nandalal to exonerate him.

Mohideen must have been closely watched by his handlers. His moving away some of

Zahran’s family threedaysbefore theblastsuggestsheknew,aswouldhavesomeofhis

handlersandthelatters’patrons.Indianwarnings,itseems,mayhavebeenredundant.

HavingheardandreadsomuchaboutArmyMohideen,thelatesttowonderabouthimwas

Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith, several of whose churches had been attacked, at a press

conferenceon13thAugust2021.ArmyMohideenwasarrestedmorethantwoyearsagoandwithinweeksheshouldhavebeenproducedandchargedincourt,butnotastirsofar.Atrial

wouldnodoubthavebeendevastating.Butfortunatelyforthoseinauthority,ourlawsare

formulatednottoexposeandarrestwrongdoing,buttofacilitatedisappearance.

Thatbringsusbacktoanearlierquestion.Theentrenchmentandoverallimpunityreferred

tobyGunatillekearemutuallydestructiveandcannotsustainaunifiedSinhalesepolity.The

‘entrenched’violenceagainstTamilsin1983,undertherubricofthesameimpunity,ledto

thebanningofthreeleftparties,includingtheJanathaVimukthiPeramuna(JVP)inafutile

attempttoshifttheblame.Fightingforpowerandsurvivalwiththesameweaponoflawless

cynicism, the JVP paralysed the country for more than two years. The Jayewardene

Government’s opening of the Tamil insurgency in the East in April 1985 by dispatching

MinisterM.H.Mohamed’sMuslimthugsfromColomboCentraltoattackTamilsinKaraitivu

intheEast,ledintimetotheformationofMuslimparamilitaryunits.OftheseZahranand

ArmyMohideenarelatermanifestations.

In 2018, the size of theMuslim votewas amajor concern for the Rajapaksas’ Sri Lanka

Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), which had acquired notoriety over anti-Muslim violence. In

March2018columnistD.B.S.JeyarajpointedtoaleadingSLPPparliamentarianashaving

plannedtheanti-MuslimviolenceinAmparai.8Inhisdefence,theparliamentariandidnotdenyasallegedthathehadbeenintheareameetingsupportersandpolicemenafewdays

6‘QuestionsraisedatPCoIoverCID’sfailuretoarrest‘ArmyMohideen’’,AdaDerana,(23July2020)<http://www.adaderana.lk/news/65801/questions-raised-at-pcoi-over-cids-failure-to-arrest-army-mohideen>accessedSeptember2021.

7ITVNews.

8D.B.S.Jeyaraj,‘‘WandaPethi,’‘Digakalliya’andtheviolenceinAmpara’,DailyFT,(17March2018)<https://www.ft.lk/front-page/Wanda-Pethi-Digakalliya-and-the-violence-in-Ampara/44-651431>accessedSeptember2021.

13

before the attack on26th February night,whichwas followedby the arrival of over 100Sinhalese youths in vehicles to advance the attack. The incident was the immediate

provocationforZahran.

Theutterinappropriatenessofdescribingtheviolencetobeentrenchedisseeninthecase

ofDr.Shafi,thedoctorfromKurunegalaaccusedofdeliberatelysterilisingalargenumberof

Sinhalesewomen.Thedistrictpolicevisitedhishomethesamedayasthe2019Easterblast

and began the kangaroo trial of Shafi organised by leading doctors at the hospital. The

accuserswere joined by a throng of supporters of the SLPP andViyathMaga, Gotabaya

Rajapaksa’sbrainstrust,whichincludedaprofessorofpharmacologyandbigwigsfromthe

GovernmentMedicalOfficers’Association(GMOA),whodescendedlikeaswarmoffliesto

feastonShafi’swounds.CIDofficerNishanthaSilvadecisivelydebunkedtheShafiepisodeas

ashammountedforpoliticalpropaganda.

Whatmanyof thewomenwriters of these articles have asked for is to be allowed their

freedomtomanage their lives in their localities, free from inhuman impositionswhether

they stem from religion, custom or ideology. Rights under habeas corpus are the most

compactandpowerfulstatementoftheserights—noonemustbeconstrainedexceptbythe

operationoflaw.StartingwiththePublicSecurityOrdinancewehavepracticallydestroyed

these.WehadtheEastertragedywhichmadeusalaughingstock.Thesolemnceremoniesof

thestatehideemptinessandparalysis.Ifwritersandanalystsaretomakeadifference,it

urges us that truth be told bluntly. We are ruled by a sectarian ideology that relies on

permanent enemies for its survival. Because of its very nature, it cannot yield progress,

developmentorfriendship.Itsparadoxisplacedinstarkreliefbynoactionbeingtakento

preventtheEasterbombingswhentherehadbeenintelligencewarnings,withimpunityfor

attacksoninnocentMuslims,includingDr.Shafi.

14

TheCurrentStateoftheFreedomofReligionorBelief

inSriLanka

RiaSamuel

1.Introduction

Thepastdecade inSriLankahasseenagradualbutsignificantdecline in the freedomof

religious expression and practice and a rise in religiously motivated violence and

intimidationagainstreligiousminorities.Inparticular,withtheconclusionofthewar,there

wasavisibleincreaseinanti-minoritysentiment,fuelledbyrisingreligiousnationalismand

extremism.Forinstance,since2009,therehasbeenanintensificationofchronicandacute

formsofviolenceandactsofdiscrimination,including,amongothers,attacksonminority

placesofworship,intimidationandsurveillance,legalrestrictionsandhatespeechagainst

religious communities.1 Further, at least four large scale religious riots against MuslimcommunitiesoccurredinAluthgamain2014,Gintotain2017,Diganain2018andfollowing

theEasterattacksin2019.TheEasterSundayattacks,whichkilledover250peopleinsuicide

bombings targeting churches and hotels by an extremist Islamist group was a further

highlightofthedeterioratingstateofthefreedomofreligionorbelief(FoRB)inthecountry.

DifferentreligiouscommunitiesinSriLankahavefacedvaryingtypesofFoRBviolations.For

instance,theChristiancommunityhasfacedchronicformsofviolenceincludingattackson

membersoftheclergyandplacesofworship.Further,churcheshavealsobeenthesubject

ofdiscriminatoryactionbyStateofficials.Thisincludestheuseofrestrictiveregulationsto

curbreligiousgatherings.

TheMuslimcommunity,ontheotherhand,hasfacedacute,mass-scalecommunalviolence

targetingMuslim-ownedhomesandbusinesses.Moreover,Muslimcommunitieshavealso

beentargetedinhatecampaignsonsocialaswellasmainstreammedia.Twonarrativeshave

appearedtodrivediscriminationagainstMuslims—theperceivedcultural‘peculiarities’of

Muslims(e.g. Islamic lawsandreligiousattire)andthefearofMuslimencroachmentand

extremism.2

Incomparison,theHinducommunityhasfacedtheissueofthereplacementofHinduplaces

ofworshipwithBuddhistshrinesandtemples.Forinstance,suchincidentswerereportedin

1Ontheincreaseofreligiouslibertyviolationsagainstminorityreligiouscommunitiesinthepost-warperiod,see:JayanthadeAlmeidaGuneratne,KishaliPinto-JayawardenaandRadikaGuneratne,NotThisGoodEarth;TheRighttoLand,DisplacedPersonsandtheLawinSriLanka(LawandSocietyTrust2013)221.

2VeritéResearchandNCEASL,PrejudiceAndPatronage:AnAnalysisofIncidentsofViolenceAgainstChristians,Muslims,andHindusInSriLanka,(1stedn,Minormatters2021).

15

theNorthernandEasternprovincesofthecountryfollowingtheendofthewar.Moreover,

Hindushavealsofaceddiscriminationoverlandissuesandinmattersconcerningcontested

archaeologicalsites.3

Moreover,theCOVID-19pandemichashadasignificantimpactonthestateofFoRBinSri

Lanka.For instance,MuslimandChristiancommunitieswereaggrievedasaresultof the

state’spolicytomandatorilycrematethosedeceasedasaresultofCOVID-19infection.The

cremations policy, which was in contravention to the World Health Organization’s

guidelines, caused intensedistress to religious communities. Thedecisionwas, however,

laterrevokedinFebruary2021.

ReligionandreligiousidentityhavebeencommonlyusedinSriLankatoconsolidatepolitical

power.Thishas,inturn,resultedinthepoliticisationofreligionandhasformedthebasisfor

ethno-religiouspolitics.Accordingly,politicalpartieshaveresortedtohardlinenationalist

stancesandfollowedabrandofpopulistpoliticswithahighdegreeofanti-minorityrhetoric

andsentiment.Suchtrendsandpoliticalstrategieshave,unfortunately,continuedtodateto

define and shape the political landscape and adversely impact the FoRB situation in Sri

Lanka.

2.HistoricalProgressionofFoRB

Historically,thefreedomofreligionorbeliefhasbeenacontentiousissueinthecountry.The

colonial period, in particular, had a significant influence on relations between religious

communitiesandthefreedomofreligionasawhole.Onapositivenote,thesigningofthe

KandyanConventionin1815provedtobealandmarkmomentinSriLanka’shistoryasit

recognised religious freedom as a legal right in the country. This followed Lord North’s

proclamationinSeptember1799,whichdeclaredthegovernmenttobesecularandprovided

forthelibertyofconscienceandthefreeexerciseofreligiousworshiptoallpersons.4

The 1915 anti-Muslim pogromwas another significantmoment in Sri Lanka’s history in

relation to FoRB. In May 1915, communal tensions erupted into violence between the

BuddhistandMuslimcommunities.TheMuslimswereIndianMoors,whoweredistinctfrom

theCeylonMoors,whohadbeenlivinginCeylonpeacefullyforoverathousandyears.The

violencewhicheruptedinKandyintheCentralProvincespreadtofourotherprovinces.As

theriotingcontinued,CeylonMoorsalsocameunderattack,asdistinctionsbetweenthetwo

groupsofMoorswerenotmaintained.WidespreadattackstookplaceagainstMuslimhomes,

businesses and places of worship in the following days. The riots continued for

approximatelyninedaysandresultedin25deaths,fourrapes,andleft189peoplewounded.

3ibid.

4CharlesW.Karunaratna,'BuddhismandChristianityinCeylon(1796-1948)'(PhD,UniversityofLondon1974).

16

Moreover, 17 mosques were burned and 4000 Muslim-owned shops were looted. The

situationwaseventuallybroughtundercontrolbythestatethroughtheimplementationof

martiallawbetweenJuneandAugust1915.However,theauthoritiesalsocommittedgrave

atrocities against innocent Sinhalese in the months governed by martial law, including

unlawful executions and imprisonmentwithout charges.5 The 1915 anti-Muslim pogromproved tobea significant incident inSriLanka’shistory in relation toFoRBas it further

brought out the issue of fixed identities of communities as Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim.

Subsequently,inthepost-colonialeraaspoliticalpartiesbegantoform,theyusedreligion

andethnicityastoolstogarnerthefavoritismofthepopulation,whichthenresultedina

widely adopted brand of identity politics based on ethnicity. For instance, the electoral

victoryofS.W.R.DBandaranaike’scoalitionin1956hadasignificantimpactinthisregard.

ThisisbecauseheusedtherhetoricofvictimisationofBuddhistsandtheneedforastronger

frontforBuddhisminthenation.ThiswasfollowedbythecommissioningoftheBuddhist

commissionreport in1956.Thereportwas titled ‘BetrayalofBuddhism’andprovideda

narrativeofBuddhistdeclinesincethePortuguesecolonisationinthe16thcentury.ThiswasthenfollowedbytheestablishmentoftheBuddhaSasanaCommissionin1957,whichwas

mandatedtoinvestigatethedemandsmadebytheAllCeylonBuddhistCongress(whichwas

foundedin1919)forspecialBuddhistlegalprivileges.6

The1972Constitutionanditsprovisioninarticle6gaveBuddhismtheforemostplacefor

thefirsttimeinthecountry’sconstitutionalhistory.The1978Constitutionthenfollowed

suit,continuingtoaccordBuddhismaspecialstatus,whileassuringallotherreligiousbeliefs

rightsprotected inarticle10andarticle14(1)(e)of theConstitution.Theconstitutional

entrenchmentofBuddhism,however,seemedto fuelstaunchBuddhistnationalismwhile

alsoincreasingtheprominenceandinfluenceoftheBuddhistclergyinmattersofpolitics.7

Anotherkeymoment in thehistoryofFoRB inSriLankawas the1991NGOCommission

appointedbyPresidentRanasinghePremadasa.TheCommission,whichwasmandatedto

look into the activities of the non-governmental organisations (NGOs), focused also on

religiousgroups,whowerethenaccusedofengaginginunethicalconversions.8Thisresultedinawaveofhostility,especiallyagainstChristianchurchesinthecountry.9

In2001,PresidentChandrikaBandaranaikeKumaratungacommissionedtheBuddhaSasana

Presidential Commission to investigate the grievances of the Buddhist community. The

Commissionreportrecommendedlawstoprohibitreligiousconversionsandclaimedthat

religious conflicts in Sri Lanka had taken place due to alleged unethical conversions.

5ShamaraWettimuny,CatalogueofEventsOfFreedomOfReligionOrBelief(Minormatters).

6ibid.

7ibid.

8IndiRuwangiAkurugoda,NGOPoliticsinSriLanka:LocalGovernmentandDevelopment,(2017)57.

9ShamaraWettimuny,CatalogueofEventsOfFreedomOfReligionOrBelief(Minormatters).

17

Subsequently,in2004and2008,therewereattemptstointroduceanti-conversionlawsin

SriLankaasaresponsetoallegationsofunethicalconversions.10

Religiousidentity,therefore,hasbeenakeyfactorinSriLanka’spoliticalnarrative,gaining

prominenceduringthecolonialeraandthencontinuingtogrowinimportanceinthepost-

independence period. As a result, it could be posited that the politicisation of religious

identityhasandcontinuestohaveasignificantbearingonthefreedomofreligionorbelief

and,inparticular,thestatusofreligiousminoritiesinthecountry.

3.RecentTrendsinFoRBViolations

AccordingtoGehanGunatilleke,therearethreemaindriversofethno-religiousviolencein

SriLanka.Theseinclude:(1)theentitlementcomplexoftheSinhala-Buddhistmajority;(2)

the existential fears of the Sinhala-Buddhist majority; and (3) monastic exceptionalism

applicabletotheSinhala-Buddhistclergy.11Gunatillekepositsthatanti-minorityviolenceispredominantly driven by the ‘entitlement complex and existential insecurities’ prevalent

amongst the segmentsof themajority community.He further states that the entitlement

complex is largely driven by the inherent belief held by some segments of themajority

community,thatinfacttheyholdalegitimatehistoricalclaimtothecountry.Ineffect,this

complex gives rise to a host-guest dynamic entrenched in the majority mindset, where

Sinhala-Buddhists are viewed as the primary citizens and minorities as guests.12 Thisrhetoric,intherecentpast,hasbeenincreasinglywhippedupbyextremistgroupsviasocial

media,targetingspecificallyyoungerpopulationswhohavebeenmoresusceptibletosuch

messaging.

a) SinhalaBuddhistnationalismandtheriseinreligiousextremism

Following the end of the war in 2009, there was a noticeable rise in Sinhala-Buddhist

triumphalisminSriLanka.Thiswascoupledwithtacitstateapprovalenjoyedbyextremist

elementssuchastheBoduBalaSena,SinhalaRavayaandRavanaBalayawhocarriedout

attacksonreligiousminoritieswithimpunity.Forinstance,thepost-2009periodhasseena

dramaticincrease,incomparisontothepre-2010period,inthefrequencyinwhichincidents

ofreligiousviolencehavetakenplace.13

10ibid.

11GehanGunatilleke,'TheConstitutionalPracticeOfEthno-religiousViolenceInSriLanka'(2018)13AsianJournalOfComparativeLaw.

12GehanGunatilleke,TheChronicandtheEntrenched:Ethno-religiousViolenceinSriLanka(EquitasandICES2018)70.

13VeritéResearch,InactionAndImpunity:IncidentsOfReligiousViolenceTargetingChristians,MuslimsAndHindus(NCEASL2021).

18

Moreover,therehasalsobeenanemergenceofHinduextremisminthecountry,influenced

byHinduextremistgroupsinIndiasuchastheShivSena.Moreover,Islamicradicalisationandextremismhavealsobeenontherise.SomescholarshavestatedtheriseofIslamophobia

inSriLankahasledtotheMuslimcommunityfeelingthreatened,whichhas,inturn,paved

thewayforcertainyouthfromwithinthecommunitytobesusceptibletohardlinerhetoric

fromextremistfactions.14

TherecentriseinreligiousextremismcouldbeidentifiedasapotentialsourcefortheEaster

terrorattacksinSriLanka.TheimmediateordirectcausefortheEasterterrorattackswas

attributedtotheNationalThowheedJama'athanIslamicextremistoutfitwithitspresence

mainlyintheEasternpartofthecountry.AccordingtoLRCJayasuriya(Ref),SriLankahas

experienced a spread ofWahhabism in the recent past. But, as noted by Jayasuriya, the

ideologyhasbeenwieldednottowardsthemajoritycommunity,butatthebroaderMuslim

communitythemselves.However,itisalsoimportanttosituatetheriseinIslamicextremism

in the light of the spread of anti-Muslim sentiment and Islamophobia in Sri Lanka,

particularlysince2012.15Forexample,since2012,therehavebeenlargescaleincidentsofmob violence against theMuslim community such as the violence in Aluthgama (2014),

Ginthota(2017),DiganaandTeldeniya(2018)andGampahaandKurunegala(2019).This

hasbeencoupledwithrampanthatespeechonsocialmedia.

NewdynamicsconcerningreligiousextremismhavealsoalteredthelandscapeofFoRBin

thecountry.Forinstance,upuntiltheEasterSundayattacks,violentincidentstargetingthe

Christiancommunitywerecharacterisedasbeingoflowintensity.Moreover,theincident

alsomarked an emergence of a new dynamic that departed from the typical pattern of

violenceperpetratedbySinhalaBuddhistextremistfactions.Thishasledtoanewvictim-

perpetratordichotomyinSriLankabetweenChristiansandMuslimsinthecountryaswell.16

b) Stateinvolvement

Ina studycarriedoutbyVeritéResearchon the incidentsof religiousviolence targeting

Christians,MuslimsandHindusbetween2015and2019,itwasreportedthatthestatewas

anactiveperpetratorin40percentoftheincidentsreportedagainstChristiancommunities.

ThiswasfurthercorroboratedinamorerecentstudybyVeritéResearchofFoRBviolations

againstChristiansinSriLankaduring2019-2020,whereitwasrevealedthatstateofficials

wereinvolvedasperpetratorsinthemajorityoftherecordedincidents.Stateofficialshere

mainly comprised local level actors such as grama niladhari (village officers), divisional

14A.R.M.Imtiyaz,'TheEasterSundayBombingsandTheCrisisFacingSriLanka’sMuslims'(2019)55JournalofAsianandAfricanStudies.

15S.M.Aliff,'Post-WarConflictInSriLanka:ViolenceAgainstSriLankanMuslimsAndBuddhistHegemony'(2015)59InternationalLettersofSocialandHumanisticSciences.

16VeritéResearch,InactionAndImpunity:IncidentsOfReligiousViolenceTargetingChristians,MuslimsAndHindus(NCEASL2021).

19

secretaries,pradeshiyasabha(localgovernmentauthority)officersandthepolice.Overall,

theyweretheoffendingpartyin65percentoftheincidentsanalysedthathadanegative

bearingonChristians.17

Further, the research also indicated that there was a nexus between the state’s use of

authority and its display of prejudice against Christians or ‘negative biases’ towards the

Christiancommunityinepisodesofnon-physicalandstructuralviolence.18Inparticular,theresearchidentifiedthatparticularpoliceaction,forthemostpart,wasactivelyinvolvedor

wasinactiveduringtheincidentsofreligiousviolencerecorded.Forinstance,inonlyoneof

the63incidentsanalysedwaspoliceactionrecordedasactivelypositive.Moreover,outof

the41instancesinwhichstateofficialstargetedChristians,thepolicewereidentifiedasthe

keyperpetratorinatleast27oftheseinstances(66%).Intermsofthegeographicalspread,

violenceagainstChristianswererecordedin16outofthe25administrativedistricts,with

theBatticaloaandPolonnaruwadistrictsrecordingthehighestnumberofincidents.19

Thepolicealsoseemedtoprotectfellowstateofficialswhodisplayednegativebiastowards

Christians.Thirty-oneoutof41times(76%)thepoliceactivelyortacitlysidedwithstate

officialsbynotactingindefenceoftargetedgroupsorindividuals.Incertaincases,thepolice

weresilentwhenstateofficialsexplicitlythreatenedorspokestronglyagainstChristians(at

leastseveninstances).20

Further, minority religious communities have also stated that law enforcement officials

appear to engage in acts of surveillance,making inquiries about the legality of places of

worship,thenumberandidentityofcongregants,anddetailsaboutpastorsandthechurch

leadership.

AsinthecaseofChristians,researchalsoshowsduring2019-2020thestatewasinvolvedin

discriminationandviolenceperpetratedagainst theMuslimandHinducommunities.For

instance, the state introduced certain policies and bodies thatwerewidely criticised for

discriminatingagainstMuslimsandHindus(e.g.mandatingcremationforCOVID-19victims

and the Presidential Task Force for Archaeological HeritageManagement in the Eastern

Province). Further, Muslims and Hindus have also raised concerns over institutional

discrimination, particularly with the increasing involvement of military officials in civic

administration.

17VeritéResearch,PrejudiceAndPatronage:AnAnalysisOfIncidentsOfViolenceAgainstChristians,Muslims,AndHindusInSriLanka(September2019–September2020)(NCEASL2020).

18ibid.

19Ibid.

20ibid.

20

c) Restrictivelaws

Registrationofplacesofworship

SriLankaboastsofalegalframeworkthatonpapersafeguardsthefreedomofreligionor

belief. However, the problem lies in its implementation. Further, with the COVID-19

pandemic, there has also been a marked rise in authoritarian rule that has led to the

introductionofmorestringentlawsandregulations,whichhasnegativelyimpactedreligious

minorities.

In2008,therewasamovebythestatetoregisterreligiousplacesofworship.Forinstance,

acirculardatedOctober2008wasissuedbytheMinistryofBuddhaSasanaandReligious

Affairsdemandingthatall ‘newconstructions’ofplacesofworshipshouldobtainapproval

fromthesaidMinistry.Subsequently,authoritieshavecrackeddownonChristianchurches

and mosques, requiring them to register with the state or discontinue their religious

activities.Thiswas in contravention to Sri Lankan law,which doesnot requireplacesof

worshiporreligiousbodiestoregisterwiththestate.

However, the thenMinistryofBuddhaSasanaandReligiousAffairs instructedprovincial

councils and divisional secretaries to comply with this requirement before approving

applications for theconstructionofplacesofworship. Interestingly, thecircularexempts

‘traditional religions’ from submitting documentary evidence to prove their bona-fide. In

viewofthefactthattherearenoguidelinesastowhatconstitutesa‘traditionalreligion’,the

Ministryandlocalgovernmentofficialsoftenmadedecisionsto‘grantordenypermission

based on their own understanding or biases’. This circular, accordingly, has resulted in

minority faith communities being routinely denied permission to construct places of

worshipsolelybecausetheyfailedtogetapprovalfromtheMinistry.

WhiletheCircular2008isclearlyapplicableonlytonewconstructionsanddoesnothave

retrospective effect, it is alsooftenmisapplied andusedbygovernmentofficials to close

downexistingchurches.

In2017,inarighttoinformationrequestmadetotheMinistryofBuddhaSasanaandthe

Department of Christian Affairs, it was stated that the circular in question was only

applicable to Buddhist places of worship and that it was no longer applicable to other

religiousgroups.However,governmentandlawenforcementauthoritieshavecontinuedto

utilise thecircularagainstminorityplacesofworshipdespitebeingmadeawareof these

developments.

Otherrecentrestrictiveregulations

Since2020,otherregulations,suchasthePreventionofTerrorism(De-radicalizationfrom

holdingviolentextremist religious ideology)RegulationsNo.01of2021,was introduced

following a recommendation by the Presidential Commission of Inquiry on the Easter

21

Sunday attacks of 2019.21 This expansion of the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Actprovidesforthedetentionofanypersonsuspectedofcausing‘religious,racial,orcommunal

disharmony’. Further, the attorney general is vestedwith the power to recommend this

remedy in lieu of constituting criminal procedure against a surrenderee or a detainee.22AmongotherdiscretionarypowersoftheMinisterofDefence,Regulation7(2)ofRegulation

No.01of2021empowerstheministertoextendtheperiodofrehabilitationofadetaineefor

aperiodofsixmonthsatatime,upto12months.Theregulationshavebeensubjectedto

heavycriticismbymanyinternationalentitiesincludingtheUnitedNations,aswellasmany

SriLankanprogressives.For instance,HumanRightsWatchhasrequestedtheimmediate

withdrawaloftheregulationsasitthreatensminorities.23

Further,thegazettenotificationissuedonrehabilitatingpersonssuspectedofengagingin

extremistactivitieshavealsoviolateddueprocessnormsandisliabletodisproportionately

targetminoritiesinthenameofpreservingnationalsecurity.Similarly,theproposedbanon

face coverings has also disproportionately targeted Muslim women and their right to

manifesttheirfaiththroughtheirattire.

Moreover,recently,whiletherehavealsobeencallsfortheintroductionofanticonversion

laws in Sri Lanka, based on allegations of unethical conversions, another proposed

legislation has sought to censor, review, and regulate publications onBuddhism and the

characteroftheBuddha.24Thisregulationhasthepotentialtoseriouslyinfringetherightsof Buddhist groups whose religious beliefs do not conform to the state’s accepted

interpretationofBuddhism.

d) Judicialbiasandimpunity

JudicialsentimentconcerningFoRBissuesofreligiousminoritieshavelargelylackedintent

in Sri Lanka. For example, a 2016 study conducted by Verité Research found that the

SupremeCourthadatendencytouseaproceduralapproachwhendeterminingoutcomes

21‘‘De-radicalization’regulationsshouldbeimmediatelywithdrawn’(InternationalCommissionofJurists18March2021)<https://www.icj.org/sri-lank-de-radicalization-regulations-should-be-immediately-withdrawn/>accessed3September2021.

22Regulation5(4)ofthePreventionofTerrorism(De-radicalizationfromholdingviolentextremistreligiousideology)RegulationsNo.01of2021.

23‘ReligiousDisharmony’OrderThreatensMinorities,HumanRightsWatch,SriLanka,(March2021)<https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/16/sri-lanka-religious-disharmony-order-threatens-minorities>accessed3September2021.

24HiranyadaDewasiri,Buddhism-relatedPublicationstobeCensored,TheMorning,24March2021:<https://www.themorning.lk/buddhism-related-publications-to-be-censored/>accessed3September2021.

22

thatprotectminorityreligiousrights.25Accordingtothestudy,thisapproachhadoftenledtothefailureofthejudiciarytosubstantiallyexpandthejurisprudenceonthestate’sroleto

promote,protect,andfulfilanindividual’sfreedomofreligion.Incontrast,thestudystates

the court has adopted a substantive approachwhen dealingwith cases that restrict the

freedom of religion, particularly ofminority groups. Furthermore, the judiciary has also

shownatendencytoperceiveanyovertattempttopropagatereligioninSriLankaasathreat

tothesocio-culturaldominanceofBuddhismasseeninaseriesofjudgementsgivenbetween

2001and2003inrelationtotheincorporationofthreeChristianorganisationsbywayof

privatememberbills.26

e) Disinformationandhatespeech

In Sri Lanka, extremist elements have implemented targeted disinformation campaigns

against the country’s minorities. For instance, while Christians have been accused of

engaginginunethicalconversionsofBuddhists,Muslimshavebeen‘othered’citingcultural

particularitiesandallegationsoflandacquisitionandencroachment.Hinducommunities,on

theotherhand,havebeenaccusedoftakingoverBuddhistarchaeologicalsites.Forinstance,

theAthiLingeswararHinduTempleatVedukkunarihasbeenclaimedbytheArcheological

Department as a Buddhist site.27 Similarly, 2000 other sites in the Eastern province aresubject to archaeological examination according to Ven. Ellawala Medhananda Thero, a

memberofthePresidentialTaskForce(PTF)forArchaeologicalHeritageManagement.28

WithregardtoMuslims,extremistelementshaveperpetuatednotionsthatMuslimshave

certainlaws,customs,andpracticesthatwere‘atoddswiththatoftheSinhalese-Buddhists’

andwhichdiscouragedculturalassimilation.Whenviewedwithinthehost-guestdynamic

mentioned previously, the ‘majority-host’ are seen to interpret the perceived cultural

‘peculiarities’ of the ‘minority-guest’ as attempts to change the host-guest dynamic.

Insecurities held by certain segments of the population in this regard have resulted in

increased scrutiny and propaganda against Muslims’ religious attire, sharia law, Islamic

financialsystems,andtheconsumptionofhalalcertifiedfood.

25SabrinaEsufally,JudicialResponsestoReligiousFreedom:ACaseAnalysis(VeriteResearch/NCEASL,Colombo2016).

26SeeTeachingSistersoftheHolyCrossoftheThirdOrderofSaintFrancisinMenzingenofSriLanka(Incorporation)S.C.SpecialDeterminationNo.19/2003;S.CSpecialDeterminationNo.2/2001andS.C.SpecialDetermination2/2003.

27VellupillaiThangavelu,'GotabayaRajapaksaGovernmentHadOpenedAnotherBattleFrontAgainstHinduTamils-ColomboTelegraph',ColomboTelegraph,(2021)<https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/gotabaya-rajapaksa-government-had-opened-another-battle-front-against-hindu-tamils/>accessed3September2021.

28ibid.

23

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the perceived cultural ‘peculiarities’ of Muslims were

overemphasised as threats to public health on two occasions. First, during the initial

outbreakofthevirusinSriLanka,Muslimswereblamedforreportedlyprioritisingcultural

practices and habits over public health concerns. Negative stereotypes of Muslims also

surfaced during this time, directing public anger towardsMuslims. For example, several

reportshighlightedthatMuslimstendtoliveinlargegroupsthatcouldacceleratetheriskof

spreadingCOVID-19.SomenewsreportsclaimedthatMuslimswerepredisposedtolieand

wereconcealingvital informationrelatingtoCOVID-19.Theracialprofilingofpatientsor

highlighting of patients from Muslim majority areas by media personnel were also

normalisedinthedailynewscycle.

Another preconceptions against the Muslim community are the notions of population

rebalancing and economic prosperity. There seems to be this notion within the Sinhala

Buddhist community that the Muslim community in Sri Lanka is more economically

prosperous. This narrative has contributed to two negative outcomes. Firstly, Sinhala

consumers are encouraged to boycott Muslim-run businesses. Secondly, this narrative

generally precedes actual incidents of anti-Muslim violence where Muslim-owned

businessesaretargeted.

DespiteSriLankahavinghatespeechandfakenewslawsinthecriminalandpenalcodes,

andinparticulartheICCPRAct2007,theselawshaveonlybeenusedagainstreligiousand

ethnicminorities,or,ofevengreaterconcern,againstthosewhohavehaddissentingviews.29AsnotedbyGunatilleke,sinceitsenactment,notasingleindividualwhohasincitedviolence

againstminoritycommunitieshasbeenconvictedundertheAct.30

In a study commissionedby theMinorityRightsGroup in 2020,31 103posts, tweets andcommentsweretrackedoverathree-monthperiodfromMarchtoJune2020;53inSinhala

and50inTamil.Themajorityoftheposts,tweets,andcommentstargetedMuslims,although

therewerealargenumberattackingChristiansaswell.Ofthe103postssurveyed,60(58%)

attacked Muslims or Islam on a variety of grounds. Thirty-one of the posts attacked

Christians (30%) and five attacked Tamils or Hinduism. Of the Sinhala language posts

surveyed,alargenumberattackedMuslims.Forinstance,ofthe53postsinSinhalathatwere

surveyed,42(or79.2%)wererantsagainstMuslimsorIslam.Ontheotherhand,theonline

attacksinTamilweredividedmoreequallybetweenMuslimsandChristians.Importantly,

thestudyhighlightedacontinuationofhatespeechfromtheEasterbombingsof2019with

Muslimsbeingportrayedaspurveyorsofterrorismin2019,andaspurveyorsofthevirusin

29SeeforexamplethecaseofTheDemocraticSocialistRepublicofSriLankavJSTissainayagam[2008]HC4425/2008wherethePreventionofTerrorismActwasusedtoconvictajournalistforaninnocuousstatementmadeonanonlinejournal,andthecaseofShakthikaSathkumaradiscussedbelow.

30GehanGunatilleke,'BrokenShieldAndWeaponOfChoice',VeritéResearch(firstpublishedinTheMorning),(2019)<https://www.veriteresearch.org/2019/06/24/iccpr-act-sri-lanka/>accessed22September2021.

31MinorMatters,HateSpeechInSriLankaDuringThePandemic(MinorMatters2020).

24

2020.Further,thestudyalsohighlightedadiscerniblepartialitytoMuslimsintheSinhala

postswhilethehatespeechintheTamillanguageattackedbothMuslimsandChristians.

4.PotentialChallengesAhead

Undergirdedbyabrandofdivisiveandnationalistpolitics, risingauthoritarianismanda

growing culture of impunity has continued to pose increased challenges to Sri Lanka’s

religiousminorities.Further,statebiases,restrictiveregulations, theproliferationofhate

speechanddisinformationandthesystematicuseofviolencetocurbthe freepracticeof

religionhasfurtherdeterioratedthestatusofthefreedomofreligionorbeliefinSriLanka.

Accordingly,thefutureseemsladenwithchallengesforreligiousminoritieswhoarelikely

toexperiencetheeffectsandimpactofrisingreligiousextremism,authoritarianruleandthe

prevalenceofacultureofimpunityinthecountry.Inthepast,suchtrendshaveresultedin

acuteandchronicformsofviolenceagainstreligiousminoritiesfromextremistfactionsand

restrictions and discrimination from state actors. This was irrespective of the political

inclinationsof thegovernments thathavebeen inpower.The future, therefore, seems to

implymoreofthesameforSriLanka’sreligiousminorities,whohavelongbeenvictimsof

divisivepoliticalrhetoricthathaswhippeduptheentitlementcomplexes,existentialfears

ofthemajorityandfueledstatebiasagainstminorities.

5.TheWayForward

ConsideringthehistoryandpresentcontextofthefreedomofreligionorbeliefinSriLanka,

itisimportantthatcertainpolicychangesareintroducedtoaddresssomeofthegrievances

ofminorityfaithcommunities.Mostimportantly,theissueofinactionandbiasbylocalstate

institutionsandofficersandtheirlackofliteracyonFoRBneedstobeaddressed.Moreover,

the vulnerability of youth, from the different religious communities, being enticed by

extremistgroups,isanotherconcerningissue.

Presently,SriLankaiswitnessingagrowthinonlinecommunities.This, inturn,presents

newopportunitiesandchallengestoFoRB.Whileononehanditpresentsnewavenuesto

harness thepowerandpotentialof thedigital realm tocreatepositivesocial changeand

improvesocialliteracyonFoRB,ontheotherhandithasexacerbatedtheissueofhatespeech

and disinformation againstminorities. For example, in order to harness the potential of

growing digital communities, MinorMatters, a national campaign to advance FoRB and

promotereligiousharmonyinSriLanka,recentlylaunchedamobilegametosensitiseyouth

onissuessuchashatespeech,fakenewsanddiscrimination.32

32‘MinormattersLaunchesFirstMobileGameForSocialChange’,DailyFT,(20July2021)<https://www.ft.lk/it-telecom-tech/MinorMatters-launches-first-mobile-game-for-social-change/50-720664>accessed3September2021.

25

In Sri Lanka,misconceptions that communities have of each other have been one of the

principal drivers of religious tensions andFoRBviolations.When looked at closely, such

misconceptions,whichhavethenbrewedmistrustofcommunitieshavealsostemmedfrom

the perpetuation of biased historical narratives. This calls for interventions to improve

understandingandbuildtrustbetweencommunities.

Forexample, inorder to improve thehistoricalawarenessconcerning theprogressionof

FoRB, andmoreparticularly, relationsbetween religious communities, theMinorMatters

campaign is also currentlydeveloping aVirtualMuseum to trace200years of history in

relationtoFoRBinSriLanka.Theinitiativealsocomprisesane-Learningplatformtoequip

key target groups such as youth, civil society actors, faith leaders andmedia personnel

amongothersonFoRBrelatedissuessoastopromoteFoRBliteracyinthecountry.

Any effort to tackle the issue of FoRB violations in Sri Lanka requires a multi-pronged

approach. This includes advocacy for policy change, education for key stakeholders,

documentation of right violations and cultural transformation at a societal level.

Importantly, however, root causes require careful consideration as well. In fact, any

interventionsmadetoadvanceFoRBshouldbecognisantofrootcauseswhichincludethe

existentialfearsandentitlementcomplexesofthemajorityandtheproblemofimpunityor

exceptionalism that has shielded those responsible for tensions and right violations.

Therefore, itcouldbeconcludedthat it is importanttoaddressunderlying issues first, in

ordertoexperienceachangeinthecurrentlandscapeconcerningthefreedomofreligionor

belief.Thisalsorequireseffort,whichgoesbeyondthetraditionalstereotypingofissues,and

callsformethodsforinterventionsleadingtonovelformsofengagementwithcommunities

anddiscoursessothatmuchneededculturaltransformationcouldbebroughttobearinthe

country.

26

DiscriminationandViolenceagainstMuslimsinSriLanka

GehanGunatilleke*

DiscriminationandviolencetargetingtheMuslimcommunityinSriLankahaveproliferated

sincetheconclusionofthearmedconflictin2009.Thecommunalconflictthatpreoccupied

SriLankainthepost-independenceerahasbeen‘ethno-linguistic’innature.Yet,withthe

end of the armed conflict between the Sri Lankan state and Tamil separatists, inter-

communal conflict inSriLankahaswitnessedanadded ‘ethno-religious’dimension.This

particular dimension is not new. Itwas observedduring the pre andpost-independence

periods. For instance, it drove anti-Muslim sentiment in the late nineteenth and early

twentieth centuries, and led to anti-Muslimviolence in1915.Nevertheless, thepost-war

periodhaswitnessedanunprecedentedandrapidriseindiscriminationandviolenceofa

distinct ethno-religious nature. Such discrimination and violence has coincidedwith the

emergence of Sinhala-Buddhist militant groups such as Bodu Bala Sena (BBS), Ravana

Balaya,andMahasonBalakaya,whoseprincipaltargethasbeentheMuslimcommunity.

Thisarticlediscussesanti-MuslimdiscriminationandviolenceinSriLanka.Itispresented

infoursections.Thefirstbrieflyexaminesthelegalframeworkrelevanttodiscrimination,

andviolenceinSriLanka,andlistssomeoftheweaknessesevidentinthisframework.The

second section presents recent data on anti-Muslim violence in Sri Lanka, and discusses

severalcasestudiesinvolvingdiscriminationagainstMuslims.Thethirdsectionexplainsthe

majordriversofanti-Muslimsentimentinthecountry,andhighlightssomeofthefaultlines

that shape antagonism towards the Muslim community. This section also explores how

certain transnational discourses influence such antagonism. In the concluding section, I

analysethemannerinwhichvariousphenomenaandfactorsconvergetocreateandsustain

discriminationandviolenceagainstMuslimsinSriLanka.

LegalFramework

SriLanka’sconstitutionalframeworkisrepletewithprovisionsthatrecognisefreedomand

non-discrimination. The chapter on fundamental rights in Sri Lanka’s Constitution

recognises the freedom of religion or belief, and the right to non-discrimination on the

groundsofreligion.Article10recognisesthefreedomofthought,conscience,andreligion,

and article 12 recognises the right to equality and non-discrimination. Article 12(1)

provides:‘Allpersonsareequalbeforethelawandareentitledtotheequalprotectionofthe

law’,andarticle12(2)provides:‘Nocitizenshallbediscriminatedagainstonthegroundsof

race, religion, language, caste, sex, political opinion, place of birth or any one of such

*Attorney-at-law;DPhil(Oxon);LL.M(Harvard).

27

grounds.’Article14(1)(e)meanwhilerecognisesthefreedomofa‘citizen…tomanifesthis

religionorbeliefinworship,observance,practiceandteaching’.

Despitethisfairlyexpansivelegalframeworkpertainingtodiscriminationandviolence,Sri

Lanka’s constitutional text contains certain doctrinal weaknesses that enable

majoritarianism.First,article9of theConstitutionstipulates thatBuddhismbegiven the

‘foremostplace’,andimposesadutyonthestateto‘protectandfoster’theBuddhaSasana.1Article9goesontomentionthatthestateshouldassure‘toallreligionstherightsgranted

byarticles10and14(1)(e)’, i.e. the freedomof thought,conscience,andreligion,andthe

freedomtomanifestreligionorbelief.Inpractice,however,thisclausehasshapedtheway

thestatejustifieslimitationsonthereligiousfreedomofminorities,particularlywhenthe

impugnedconduct isperceivedasthreateningthestatusofBuddhisminthecountry.For

example,theSupremeCourtincasessuchasKaruwalagaswewaVidanelageSwarnaManjula

etalv.Pushpakumara,Officer-in-Charge,PoliceStation,Kekirawaetal(2018)2andProvincialoftheTeachingSistersoftheHolyCrossoftheThirdOrderofSaintFrancisinMenzingenofSri

Lanka(Incorporation)Bill(2003)3hasfoundthatnon-BuddhistsinSriLankadonothavethefreedomtopropagatetheirreligionduetoarticle9oftheConstitution.

Second,article15(7)authorisesthestatetoimposelimitationsonreligiousfreedomandthe

righttonon-discriminationonextremelybroadgrounds.Limitationsmaybeimposed‘inthe

interestsofnationalsecurity,publicorderandtheprotectionofpublichealthormorality,or

forthepurposeofsecuringduerecognitionandrespectfortherightsandfreedomsofothers,

orofmeetingthejustrequirementsofthegeneralwelfareofademocraticsociety’.Whatis

ultimatelyevidentisthat,despitetherecognitionofreligiousfreedomandtherighttonon-

discrimination in Sri Lanka’s Constitution, the limitation grounds found in article 15 are

broadly framedandofferconsiderable latitudeto thestate to impose limitationsonsuch

freedomsandrights.

DataonDiscriminationandViolence

Asignificantnumberofanti-MuslimattackstookplaceinSriLankaduring2013and2014.

Therewere241reported incidentsofviolenceagainstMuslims in2013,andat least200

reportedincidentsin2014.4ManyoftheattacksinvolvedthreatsandintimidationagainstMuslim-ownedbusinesses,andanti-Muslimpropagandaandhatespeech.Episodicviolence

featuring largescale physical violence against Muslim homes, businesses, and places of

worshipalsotookplace.InJune2014,forinstance,anti-Muslimmobviolencebrokeoutin

1BuddaSasanaisatermthat,inaspecificsense,referstotheteachingsoftheBuddha,andinamoregeneralsense,referstotheBuddhist‘community’or‘nation’.

2SC(F.R)No.241/14.

3SCSpecialDeterminationNo.19/2003.

4VeritéResearchandNCEASL,SilentSuppression:RestrictionsonReligiousFreedomsofChristians(1994-2014)(NationalChristianEvangelicalAllianceofSriLanka2015),21-24.

28

Aluthgama,andneighbouringareas.Theviolencebrokeoutfollowinganincendiaryspeech

byVen.GalagodaAththeGnanasaraThera,theGeneralSecretaryofBBS.Themonkspokeat

a large rally in Aluthgama and called for retaliation against members of the Muslim

communityforallegedlyattackingaBuddhistmonkinthearea.5Theensuinganti-Muslimviolenceledtothedeathofatleastfourpersonsandthedamageordestructionofovera

hundredMuslimhomesandbusinesses.

Anti-Muslimviolencecontinuedthroughouttheperiodbetween2015and2018.Atleast64

attacks onMuslimswere recordedduring the periodbetweenNovember 2015 and June

2016.6In2017,aspateofattacksonMuslim-ownedbusinesseswasrecordedinAprilandMay.7 Then on 17 November 2017, in Gintota in the Galle district, communal tensionsfollowingatrafficdisputeeruptedintoanti-Muslimviolenceresultingindamageto‘dozens

ofMuslimhomesandbusinesses’.8Theviolencecontinuedduring2018,andinMarchthatyear,theworstanti-MuslimviolentepisodeinSriLanka’spost-colonialhistorytookplacein

Digana,Teldeniya,andsurroundingareasinthedistrictofKandy.Theviolencefolloweda

trafficincidentthatledtothedeathofaSinhaleselorrydriver,andresultedintwodeaths

anddamagetofourmosquesandover400Muslim-ownedbusinessesandhomes.9

On Easter Sunday, 21 April 2019, an Islamist group called National Thowheed Jamaat

launchedsimultaneoussuicidebombingsagainstthreeChristianplacesofworshipandthree

hotels. The attacks claimed the lives of over 250 persons.10 Up until that point, Islamistmilitant groups had rarely featured in Sri Lanka’s intercommunal confrontations.11Therefore, littlewasknownaboutthemotivesofthegroupatthetime.Thenatureofthe

targets—Christianplacesofworshipandtouristbuildings—didnotfitwithanyofthelocal

5FarzanaHaniffa,HariniAmarasuriyaandVishakhaWijenayake,WhereHaveAlltheNeighboursGone?AluthgamaRiotsanditsAftermath:AFact-FindingMissiontoAluthgama,DhargaTown,ValipannaandBeruwela(Law&SocietyTrust2014),1.

6RoshiniWickremesinhe,ConfrontingIntolerance:ContinuedViolationsagainstReligiousMinoritiesinSriLanka(MinorityRightsGroupInternational2016),15.

7HilmyAhmed,‘EscalatingViolence:RenewedassaultsontheMuslimcommunity’,Groundviews,(22May2017)<http://groundviews.org/2017/05/22/escalating-violence-renewed-assaults-on-the-muslim-community/>accessed7September2021.

8DharishaBastians,‘Gintotaandtheshadowsofextremism’,DailyFT,(23November2017)<www.ft.lk/opinion/Gintota-and-the-shadows-of-extremism/14-643843>accessed7September2021.

9ManeshkaBorham,‘Kandycommunalviolence:Mainsuspectarrested’,TheDailyNews,(9March2018)<www.dailynews.lk/2018/03/09/local/145064/kandy-communal-violence-main-suspect-arrested>accessed7September2021.

10PamelaConstableandJoannaSlater,‘BrothersofSriLankabombingmastermindsaidtobekilledinsafehousebattle;CatholicswatchMassonTV’,TheWashingtonPost,(28April2019);AmreshGunasingham,‘SriLankaAttacks:AnAnalysisoftheAftermath’(2019)11(6)CounterTerroristTrendsandAnalyses8-13.

11FarzanaHaniffa,‘HowtheEasterBombingsLeftSriLanka'sMuslimsWithNoPathForward’,TheWire,(18October2019)<https://thewire.in/communalism/how-the-easter-bombings-left-sri-lankas-muslims-with-no-path-forward>accessed7September2021.

29

intercommunalcontextsthatpre-existedtheattacks.

Anti-MuslimdiscriminationandviolencecontinuedsoonaftertheEasterSundayAttacks.In

May2019,mobsattackedMuslimsintheKurunegalaandGampahadistrict.12TheviolenceleftscoresofMuslim-ownedhomesandbusinessesdestroyed.Thetimingof theviolence

suggeststhatitwasopportunisticallyconnectedtotheEasterSundayAttacks.

Apartfromthesemajorepisodesofviolence,theMuslimcommunityinSriLankahasbeen

subjectedtodiscriminationinseveralareasofreligiousandeconomiclife.Threecasestudies

furtherillustratetheextentofsuchdiscrimination.Thefirstcaseconcernsthereligiousattire

of Muslims; the second concerns the construction of Muslim places of worship and

educationalinstitutions;andthethirdconcernsMuslimfuneralrites.

Religiousattire

InjustoveraweekaftertheEasterSundayattacks,thestatepromulgatednewemergency

regulationsunderthePublicSecurityOrdinanceof1947(PSO).On29April2019,itissued

Regulation32A,whichprovided: ‘Noperson shallwear in anypublicplace anygarment,

clothingorsuchothermaterialconcealingthefullfacewhichwillinanymannercauseany

hindrancetotheidentificationofaperson.’Theprovisionalsoclarifiedthat‘fullface’meant

‘thewholefaceofapersonincludingtheears’.

The seemingly neutral prohibition on face coverings had a particular impact onMuslim

women, as the niqāb — a full face covering worn by some Muslim women — was

consequentlyprohibitedinpublicplaces.ThenewregulationappearedtotargettheMuslim

community in particular, and was framed as necessary to enable the identification of

suspects.However,thepolicyquicklyunlockedaspateofharassmentandintimidationof

Muslimwomen.Evenaftertherelevantregulationlapsedfollowingthediscontinuationofa

stateofemergency,discussionswithrespecttointroducingapermanentbanonfaceveils

havecontinued.Infact,inApril2021,theCabinetofMinistersapprovedaproposaltoban

faceveils.13

The prohibition on face coverings such as the niqāb and burqa, pursuant to emergency

regulations,isinrealityarestrictionthatalignswithpre-existingmajoritarianantagonism

towardsMuslimreligiousattire.Sinhala-BuddhistmilitantgroupssuchastheBBShaveoften

capitalisedontheseprejudices,andhaveruncampaignscallingforthebanoffaceveils.14

12MeeraSrinivasan,‘Mobsattackmosques,Muslim-ownedshopsandhomesinSriLanka’sKurunegalaDistrict’,TheHindu,(14May2019)<https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/mobs-attack-mosques-muslim-owned-shops-and-homes-in-sri-lankas-kurunegala-district/article27119473.ece>accessed7September2021.

13‘SriLankacabinetapprovesproposedbanonburqasinpublic’,AlJazeera,(28April2021)<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/28/sri-lanka-cabinet-approves-proposed-ban-on-burqas-in-public>accessed7September2021.

14MegaraTegal,‘BBSCallsforBanonNiqab’,TheSundayLeader,(24June2013).

30

Constructionofreligiousinstitutions

Thephysicalrealmofland,propertyandthepublicsphere,haslongremainedanarenaof

inter-religiouscontestationinSriLanka.Thisnextcasestudyfocusesonstaterestrictions

onMuslimreligiousinstitutions,includingplacesofworshipandeducationalinstitutions.A

circularissuedbytheMinistryofReligiousAffairsandMoralUpliftment(asitwasknown

then)in2008,andasimilarcircularin2013,remaintheprimarymeansthroughwhichsuch

restrictions are imposed. The circulars, which are currently in operation, require prior

permissionfromtheministryinchargeofreligiousaffairstobeobtainedwhenconstructing

aplaceofworshiporsimilarinstitution.Thesecircularsareroutinelyenforcedbythepolice

and local authorities to prevent the construction andmaintenance of places of worship

belongingtominorityreligiouscommunities.

The 2013 circular was assessed by the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka in Faril et al v.

Bandaragama Pradeshiya Sabha et al (2017).15 The case concerned the proposedconstruction of an Islamic educational institution in Bandaragama. Themembers of the

Muslimgroupthatwishedtoconstructtheinstitutionfiledafundamentalrightsapplication

beforetheSupremeCourtcomplainingthattheirrightstoequalityandnon-discrimination

had been violated. Local Buddhist monks and villagers had protested the construction,

claimingthataMosquewasbeingconstructedasopposedtoaneducationalcentre.Itwas

duetotheseproteststhatthepoliceandlocalauthorityofficialsorderedthesuspensionof

theconstruction.TheSupremeCourtdismissedthepetition,andupheldthedecisionofstate

officialsonthebasisthat‘dueconsideration’hadtobegiventotheproteststo‘avoidacrisis

situationwhichcouldspread tootherareasofourcountry’.16TheCourtsuggested thatathreatto‘publicorder’mightensueiftheconstructionwasnothalted.However,indoingso,

it legitimised the majoritarian interests at play. The construction of a Muslim religious

institutionwasaccordinglyperceivedasathreattotheSinhala-Buddhistcommunityinthe

area,andtherestrictionontheconstructionwasultimatelyupheldtoappeasethemajority

communityanddissuadethemfromcausingunrest.

Funeralrites

Funeralritesformanessentialpartofthereligiousmanifestationofmanycommunities.In

Sri Lanka, the act of burial is ordinarily associated with the Muslim and Christian

communities,whereasBuddhistsusuallydisposeofthedeadthroughcremation.Following

theoutbreakofCOVID-19 inSri Lanka, thegovernment introducedpolicymeasures that

regulatedthedisposalofcorpses.On27March2020,theMinistryofHealthissuedguidelines

titled‘2020ProvisionalClinicalPracticeGuidelinesonCOVID-19suspectedandconfirmed

patients’.Theguidelinesstipulatedthat‘cremationorburialisallowed.However,burialis

15SC(FR)ApplicationNo92/2016(JudgmentoftheSupremeCourtofSriLanka,28June2017).

16ibid,11.

31

allowedprovidedthatallstepstopreventcontactwithbodyisensured’[sic].17Thenon30March,thefirstCOVID-relateddeathofaMuslimtookplacewhilethesaidregulationswere

inforce.YetthatMuslimbody(janazah)18wasforciblycrematedagainstthewishesofthefamily of the deceased. On 31 March, the guidelines were amended to prohibit burials

altogether, and the cremation of the corpses of Muslim persons suspected of COVID-19

continuedthereafter.Atthetime,theguidelinesdidnothavetheforceoflaw,astheywere

not issuedunder anyparticular law. Later, on11April 2020, theMinister ofHealth and

IndigenousMedicalServicesissuedRegulation61AundertheQuarantineandPreventionof

DiseasesOrdinanceof1897,anddeclaredthat ‘thecorpseofapersonwhohasdiedor is

suspectedtohavedied,ofCoronavirusDisease2019(COVID-19)shallbecremated’.19

ThenewregulationhadadirectbearingonthereligiousritesofMuslims,asthecremation

of deceased persons is understood by many Muslims as contrary to Islamic teaching.20

Incidentally,theWorldHealthOrganization(WHO)guidelinesontheissueclearlystatethat

cremationshouldnotbemademandatory,andthatthedeceasedcouldbeeithercremated

orburied.21

It should be noted that the forced cremation policy was not introduced in response to

majorityaversiontothepracticeofburials.AlthoughcremationisthetraditionalBuddhist

meansofdisposingcorpsesinSriLanka,thereisnoevidenceofanyBuddhistaversionto

burials. In fact, burials arewidely practiced among a number of communities, including

among Buddhists. Although all communities practice burials, it is only the Muslim

community that asserts that their faith specifically prohibits cremation. Therefore,

mandatory cremation— even if framed as a neutral policy—had an obvious disparate

impact on Muslims. In this context, the forced cremation policy was mostly an act of

opportunismtoappeaseanti-Muslimsentimentdrivenbyotherfactorsincludingfearsover

populationgrowth,economiccompetition,andaversiontoIslamicsymbols,suchascertain

typesofattire.Thepolicyresonatedwiththesebroaderprejudicesandthespecificprejudice

concerningtheallegedculpabilityoftheMuslimcommunityinspreadingthevirus.Atthe

time,MahindanandaAluthgamage,agovernmentminister, claimedonnational television

thatamajorityofthosewhoviolatedlockdownregulationsinaparticularareawereMuslim,

17MinistryofHealth,2020ProvisionalClinicalPracticeGuidelinesonCOVID-19suspectedandconfirmedpatients(27March2020),28.

18JanazahtranslatestoMuslimfuneralrites(prayerandburial).InSriLanka,thetermisalsousedtorespectfullyrefertoadeceasedbody.

19GazetteExtraordinaryNo.2170/8,11April2020.

20ShamilaDawoodetal,MemorandumontheDisposalofBodiesofCovid-19Victims(April2020).

21WorldHealthOrganization,InfectionPreventionandControlforthesafemanagementofadeadbodyinthecontextofCOVID-19:InterimGuidance(24March2020).

32

althoughtherewasnoverifiablebasisforthatclaim.22

Despite thescientificevidence to thecontrary, thegovernmentpersistedwith the forced

cremationpolicy,andjustifieditonthebasisthatcremationwasasafermeansofdisposing

corpses and mitigating the spread of infection. The policy was finally reversed on 25

February 202123 amidst increasing international pressure (particularly from theOrganisationof IslamicCooperation)on theeveof the46th sessionof theUnitedNationsHumanRightsCouncil.

DriversofDiscriminationandViolence

Muslimvictimisationhaspersistedregardlessofthegovernmentinpower.Therefore,itis

notpossible toexplain theemergenceandpersistenceofanti-Muslimdiscriminationand

violencebymerelypointingtothenatureofthegovernmentinpower.Somegovernments,

suchas thegovernmentduring theperiod2010 to2015couldbedescribedas relatively

more‘nationalist’,andlikelytoholdandsupportmajoritarianviews.Itispossibletoargue

that Sinhala-Buddhist militant groups thrived under such a government because their

politicsinmanywaysreflectedthoseofthegovernmentatthetime.However,thedataon

violencedoesnotsupporttheclaimthatanti-Muslimsentimentismerelyassociatedwith

thegovernmentincharge.Thegovernmentthatcameintopowerin2015wascharacterised

asrelativelymore‘minority-friendly’,andinfactpromisedaccountabilityforthosewhohad

engaged in anti-Muslim violence. However, at least four major episodes of anti-Muslim

violencetookplaceduringthatgovernment’stenure:Gintota2017,Amparai,andDiganaand

Teldeniyain2018,andKurunegalaandGampahain2019.Thepersistenceofsuchviolence

suggeststhatthedriversofanti-Muslimviolenceanddiscriminationareentrenchedwithin

thesocio-politicalfabricofthecountry.

Twomutuallyreinforcingphenomenaperpetuateviolenceanddiscriminationagainst the

Muslimcommunity.First,therearedeep-seatedfearstowardstheMuslimcommunity,and

thesefearsoftenunderliediscriminationandviolence.Eachof thecasestudiesdiscussed

aboveillustratesaconnectionbetweenexistentialfearsamongthemajority,andaparticular

Muslimactivityorpractice.TherearefearsthatMuslimpopulationgrowthinSriLanka,and

perceivedMuslimdominanceover trade, threaten thenumericalmajorityof theSinhala-

Buddhist community.The slight statistical increase in theoverallpopulation shareof Sri

LankanMoorsbetween1981and2012—from7percentto9.2percent24—underscores

this fear. Moreover, competition between certain Islamist groups in Sri Lanka has

22S.M.MBazeer,‘AnothernailinthecoffinforreligioustoleranceinSriLanka’,DailyFT,(18April2020)<http://www.ft.lk/columns/Another-nail-in-the-coffin-for-religious-tolerance-in-Sri-Lanka/4-698925>accessed7September2021.

23GazetteExtraordinaryNo.2216/38of25February2021.

24DepartmentofCensusandStatistics,CensusofPopulationandHousingofSriLanka(2012).

33

incentivised more overt assertions of Muslim identity and piety, thereby increasing the

overall visibility of Muslim religious practices. Typical examples of such external

manifestationsincludewomenwearingtheniqāb,andmenwearingthewhitejubba.25Thisvisibilityhas‘createdanillusionofanincreaseintheMuslimpopulation,addingtothefear

andsuspicionofthemajoritytowardsthemotivesoftheMuslimcommunity’.26RestrictionsonMuslimattire—ostensiblyfortheaimofprotectingnationalsecurity—areoftendriven

by thesepre-existing fearsaroundMuslimpopulationgrowthand Islamist radicalisation.

Highly visible assertions of Muslim identity through particular forms of attire have

underscoredethno-religiousconflicts.Moreover, restrictionsonreligious institutionsand

burialritesareconnectedtopre-existingfearsabouttheperceivedexpansionofIslaminthe

country. These fears have underscored actual examples of violence and discrimination

againsttheMuslimcommunity.In2018,aMuslim-ownedrestaurantinAmparaiwasfalsely

accusedofmixing sterilisationpills in food, and suchdisinformationdirectly led to anti-

Muslimmobviolenceinthearea.27In2019,amedicalprofessionalbythenameofDr.ShafiShihabdeenwasarrestedforallegedly‘sterilising’4,000Sinhalesewomen.Theallegations

laterturnedouttobecompletelyfalse.28YetthecasereceivedwidespreadmediacoverageandplayedtothefearsamongtheSinhala-Buddhistmajoritythattherewasaconspiracy

againstthem.

TheeconomicconditionsofSriLankaalsoinfluenceanti-Muslimsentiment.Thefailureof

successivegovernmentstodeliveronthepromisesofeconomicprosperityfollowingtheend

ofthearmedconflictin2009hasledtothescapegoatingofMuslimsinvolvedintradeand

business enterprises.29 Post-war governments were therefore able to deflect potentialcriticismof its policiesby fostering a cultureof paranoia about theMuslim community’s

monopolisation of economic gains. Islamophobic discourses in the economic domain are

thenconnectedtodeepergeneralfrustrationsamongtheSinhala-Buddhistcommunitywith

25Ananklelengthrob-likegarmentusuallywithlongsleeves.

26ibid,1and22.

27ManeshkaBorhamandDimuthuAttanayake,‘TensioninAmparaafterfake‘sterilizationpills’controversy’,TheSundayObserver,(4March2018)<http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2018/03/04/news/tension-ampara-after-fake-%E2%80%98sterilization-pills%E2%80%99-controversy>accessed7September2021.

28‘CIDinformsCourtnoevidencefoundforallallegationsagainstDr.ShafiShihabdeen’,DailyFT,(28June2019)<https://www.ft.lk/front-page/CID-informs-Court-no-evidence-found-for-all-allegations-against-Dr--Shafi-Shihabdeen/44-680838>accessed7September2021.

29AhilanKadirgamar,‘ThePoliticalEconomyofAnti-MuslimAttacks’,TheIsland,(2March2013)<http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=73829>accessed7September2021.

34

respecttounemploymentandclassstratification.30Therefore,existentialfearsinteractwitheconomicfrustrationstoincentiviseanti-Muslimbehaviour.

Therearesomespecificexamplesofanti-Muslimdiscriminationworthcitingasillustrative

of how economic existential fears can drive discrimination and violence. For instance,

Sinhala-Buddhist economic associations in localities such as Amparai Town and

Kiribathgodahaveattempted toexcludeMuslim-ownedenterprises fromoperating.Even

organsofgovernmentatthelocalleveloccasionallyengageinsuchpractices.Forexample,

intheaftermathoftheEasterSundayAttacks,theWennappuwaPradeshiyaSabhabanned

Muslim vendors from selling goods at the Dankotuwa public market citing ‘security

concerns’.31ThedecisionwaspromptedbycomplaintsreceivedbySinhaleseresidentsandbusiness groups following the Easter Sunday Attacks, but were clearly motivated by

economiccompetitionandprejudicetowardstheMuslimcommunity.Thecabinetdecision

inSeptember2020tobancattleslaughter32oughttobeunderstoodwithinthisoverarchingcontext.

Meanwhile,observersinKandyintheaftermathofthe2018anti-Muslimviolencepointedto

theunderlyingeconomicdimensionsoftheviolence.33Forinstance,itwasobservedthatthetimingoftheviolenceinMarch2018,amonthbeforetheSinhaleseNewYearcelebrationsin

April,wasnotcoincidental.Thisperiodmarksanotableincreaseinconsumerspurchasing

goods,asthe‘new’yearoftenentailspurchasing‘new’itemsofclothing,food,andhousehold

equipment.ItwasobservedthatSinhala-Buddhistbusinessinterestsstoodtobenefitfrom

callstoboycottMuslimbusinessesandthedestructionofMuslimshops,asMuslimtraders

wereoftenindirectcompetitionwithSinhala-Buddhisttraders.Therefore,thereisagreat

dealofspeculationthattheSinhala-Buddhistmilitantgroupsthatperpetratedtheviolence

werefundedandsupportedbySinhala-Buddhistbusinessgroups.

Avarietyofpoliticalactorsoftenengageinchauvinistandnationalistpoliticalrhetoricthat

resonateswiththeexistentialfearsofthemajoritycommunity.Thesecampaignsbothfeed

off and sustain such existential fears, and have helped certain political actors to secure

notableelectorallegitimacy.TheBBS,forinstance,contestedtheparliamentaryelectionof

30NewtonGunasinghe,‘TheOpenEconomyanditsImpactonEthnicRelationsinSriLanka’inDeborahWinslowandMichaelD.Woost(eds.),Economy,Culture,andCivilWarInSriLanka(IndianaUniversityPress2004),99.

31‘LetterbytheWennappuwaPradeshiyaSabha’,ColomboTelegraph(25June2019)<https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/wennapuwa-a-land-of-its-own-pradeshiya-sabha-bans-muslim-vendors/>accessed7September2021.

32‘SriLankabanscattleslaughter’,NewIndianExpress,(29September2020)<https://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2020/sep/29/sri-lanka-bans-cattle-slaughter-2203474.html>accessed7September2021.

33TheauthorconductedaseriesofinterviewsinMay2018intheaftermathoftheanti-MuslimviolenceinDiganaandTeldeniyaintheKandydistrict.

35

2020onaplatform tobanmadrasas (Muslimschools) and theburqa,34 and securedoneparliamentaryseat.

Second,systemicprejudicewithinlawenforcementandsecurityforceshasfosteredaculture

of impunity with respect to violence against Muslims. On numerous occasions, law

enforcementofficersandmilitarypersonnelhavebeenobservedstandingbyasviolentmobs

attacked Muslim homes, businesses, and places of worship. In fact, the Human Rights

CommissionofSriLankaformallywrotetotheInspectorGeneralofPolicefollowingtheanti-

MuslimviolenceinKurunegalaandGampahain2019andnotedthatthepolicehadfailedto

takeadequateactiontoprotectMuslimsfromtheviolence.35Anti-Muslimmilitantgroupsarenodoubtemboldenedby thegeneralcultureof impunity thatprevails in thecountry

owing to a long history in which perpetrators of violence against minorities (including

TamilsandChristians)haveescapedaccountability.

Suchsystemicprejudiceisparticularlyevidentintheselectivityinwhichlawsareapplied.

Ontheonehand,perpetratorsfromthemajoritycommunity,andparticularlymembersof

theBuddhistclergy,haveenjoyedimpunity.Agoodexampleofamonkwhohasenjoyedsuch

impunity is Ven. Ampitiye Sumanarathana Thera, the chief incumbent monk of the

Mangalaramaya Temple in Batticaloa. Video footage and photographs of the monk

destroying public property, verbally abusing state officials, and assaulting civilians have

permeatedthemedia.36Yetthemonkisstilltofacecriminalchargesforhisactions,whichhehasjustifiedonthebasisofprotectingSinhala-BuddhistsinBatticaloa.37Meanwhile,BBSGeneral Secretary, Ven. Gnanasara Thera has enjoyed exceptional status, which is

demonstratedbythestate’sfailuretoarresthimforincitingviolenceintheleaduptothe

Aluthgamariotsandtheconsistentgrantingofbaildespitehishistoryofevadingarrests.38Thisexceptionalismhasaccordinglydrivenacultureofimpunitywithrespecttoanti-Muslim

violencecommittedbymilitantgroupsfrontedbyBuddhistmonks.Suchaculturehasinturn

contributedtowardstheperpetuationofsuchviolence.

Ontheotherhand,Muslimlawyers,activists,andartistshavebeentargetedforadvocating

Muslimrights.ThetargetingofMuslimsthroughtheselectiveapplicationofcriminal law,

and specifically counter-terrorism law, reflectsdiscrimination inherentwithin the justice

34INFORM,RepressionofDissentinSriLankainJuly2020,(InformHumanRightsDocumentationCentreSeptember2020);‘RathanaTheracallsforbanningburka,madrasas’,TheIsland,(8July2020).

35HumanRightsCommissionofSriLanka,LettertotheActingInspectorGeneralofPolice,(23May2019).

36‘AmpitiyeSumanarathana:TheUntoldTruth’,Frontpage,(29November2016)<http://www.frontpage.lk/page/Ampitiye-Sumanarathana-The-Untold-Truth/16809>accessed7September2021.

37ibid.

38‘GnanasaraTheragetsbailtwiceintwodays’,DailyNews,(22June2017)<http://www.dailynews.lk/2017/06/22/law-order/119728/gnanasara-thera-gets-bail-twice-day>accessed7September2021;‘PresidentpardonsGnanasaraThero’,DailyFT,(23May2019)<http://www.ft.lk/front-page/President-pardons-Gnanasara-Thero/44-678714>accessed7September2021.

36

sectorinSriLanka.ThecaseofHejaazHizbullahremainsanemblematicexampleofsuch

targeting.Hizbullah,anoutspokenconstitutionallawyerdirectlyinvolvedinactivismwith

respecttoanti-Muslimdiscriminationandviolence,wasarrestedinApril2020underthe

PreventionofTerrorismAct(PTA)of1979andhasbeenincustodysince.Afteroverayear

ofdetention,hewasformallychargedunderthePTAandtheInternationalCovenantonCivil

and Political Rights (ICCPR) Act of 2007 for allegedly radicalising young students.

Incidentally,Hizbullah’sarrestcamedaysafterheco-authoredareportontheMuslimburial

issue.HewassubsequentlyrecognisedasanAmnestyInternationalPrisonerofConscience

inJuly2021.InanotheregregiousincidenttargetingMuslimactivism,RamzyRazeekwas

arrestedanddetainedfollowingaFacebookpostcallingforanideologicalstruggleforjustice

anddemocracy.39Moreover,AhnafJazeem,aMuslimpoet,wasarrestedinMay2020underthePTAforpublishingaTamillanguagebookofpoetryandremainsindetention.Authorities

alleged that the poems contained ‘extremist messaging’. However, a number of Tamil

languagescholarshaveevaluatedthepoetryandhaveobservednosuchmessaging.40

ThestatehasalsoactedswiftlytoinvestigatethecomplaintsoftheBuddhistclergyagainst

practices seen as inimical to Buddhism. For example, writer Shakthika Sathkumarawas

arrestedin2019forwritingafictionalshortstorythatinsinuatesanabusivehomosexual

relationshipbetweenaBuddhistmonkandthemainprotagonist.Followingthepublication

oftheshortstoryonSathkumara’sFacebookpage,acomplaintwaslodgedbytheBuddhist

InformationCentre’sdirectorVen.AgulugalleSiriJinanandaTheraclaimingthatthestory

violatedboththeICCPRActandthePenalCodeof1883.Sathkumarawasarrestedandkept

incustodyforseveralmonthsbeforebeingeventuallyreleased.

Meanwhile, a number of transnational influences also contribute towards anti-Muslim

sentiment in Sri Lanka and create conditions for discrimination and violence. Four such

influencesareworthnoting.

First,thecrossfertilisationofideasamongmilitantBuddhistgroupsinSriLankaandother

TheravadaBuddhist countries such asMyanmar has shapedmajoritarian ideology in Sri

Lanka.Thereareparallelsbetweentheanti-MuslimdiscourseinMyanmarandSriLanka.

Militantgroupssuchas969andMaBaTha ‘haveplayedapivotalroleinpropagatinganti-

Muslimsentiment’inMyanmarsince2012.41ThesegroupshavebeenknowntohavedirecttieswithSriLankanmilitantgroupssuchasBBS.Forexample,inOctober2014,BBSand969

signed amemorandumof understanding following a visit from969 leaderUWirathu to

39Z.L.Mohamed,‘RamzyRazeek:AnextraordinarystruggleforanordinarylifeofserviceupendedbyaPolicearrest’,DailyFT,(9May2020)<http://www.ft.lk/opinion/Ramzy-Razeek-An-extraordinary-struggle-for-an-ordinary-life-of-service-upended-by-a-Police-arrest/14-699917>accessed7September2021.

40‘ArrestofMannarpoetunderPTA:Academics,writersandactivistscryfoul’,DailyFT,(6January2021)<http://www.ft.lk/news/Arrest-of-Mannar-poet-under-PTA-Academics-writers-and-activists-cry-foul/56-711244>accessed7September2021.

41DhammikaHerath,‘ConstructingBuddhistsinSriLankaandMyanmar:ImaginaryofaHistoricallyVictimisedCommunity’(2020)44(2)AsianStudiesReview315-334,325.

37

Colombo.42TheserelationshipshaveaddedtothemomentumsoughtbyBBSwithrespecttotheir‘cause’:theprotectionandpreservationofBuddhismnotonlyinSriLanka,butaround

theworld.IthasframedtheexistentialcrisisimaginedbytheSinhala-Buddhistcommunity

asonethatissimilartothosefacedbyotherBuddhistcommunitieselsewhere.Centralto

thiswidernarrativeistheideathatMuslimsposethegreatestthreattoBuddhism.

Second,HindutvagroupsinIndiahaveincertainwaysinfluencedtheTamilHindunationalist

movementinSriLanka.Forinstance,localHindunationalistgroupssuchasSivaSenaihave

securedthesupportofmoreestablishedmilitantgroupsinIndiasuchasShivSena.43Theserelationshipsshapespecificantagonismsaswell.Forexample,thecallsforbanningcattle

slaughter, although ostensibly rooted in Buddhist moral principles, draws from Hindu

discoursesinIndia.Somescholarshavenotedthatmovementssuchasthecowprotection

movementhasbeen‘awayofconstructingHinduidentityinthefaceofnon-HinduIndians

— often Muslims’.44 Accordingly, Hindu antagonism towards Muslims in India, oftenmanifesting in discrimination and violence, has influenced and encouraged mirror

antagonismstowardsMuslimsinSriLanka.

Third,growing Islamophobia inChinahashadan impact inSriLanka,particularly in the

contextofthecurrentgovernment’scloseproximitytoChina.ChinahasframedtheUighur

communityasathreattonationalsecurityintheXinjiangregion.AccordingtosomeUnited

Nationsestimates,overamillionUighurshavebeendetainedinsecret‘re-education’camps

inChina,andmanyaresubjecttotorture,andcruel, inhumananddegradingtreatment.45Interestingly, inMarch 2021, the Sri Lankan government promulgated the Prevention of

TerrorismRegulationNo.1of2021.Thepurposeofthisregulationisthe‘de-radicalisation’

of individuals and preventing them from ‘holding violent extremist religious ideology’.46Chinahassoughttoadvertiseitsso-calledcounter-terrorismstrategyinXinjiang,andhas

evenaireddocumentariesonXinjiangonstatetelevisioninSriLanka.47Thesetriumphalist

42BenjaminSchonthalandMatthewJ.Walton,‘The(New)BuddhistNationalisms?SymmetriesandSpecificitiesinSriLankaandMyanmar’(2016)17(1)ContemporaryBuddhism81-115,82.

43‘SivaSenaiinSriLankagetsShivSenasupport’,TheIsland,(14October2016)<http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=153748>accessed12July2018.

44SandriaB.Freitag,‘SacredSymbolsasMobilizingIdeology:TheNorthIndianSearchfora“Hindu”Community’(1980)22(4)ComparativeStudiesinSocietyandHistory597-625,610.

45StephanieNebehay,‘U.N.saysithascrediblereportsthatChinaholdsmillionUighursinsecretcamps’,Reuters,(10August2018)<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-rights-un/u-n-says-it-has-credible-reports-china-holds-million-uighurs-in-secret-camps-idUSKBN1KV1SU>accessed7September2021.

46PreventionofTerrorism(De-radicalizationfromholdingviolentextremistreligiousideology)RegulationNo.1of2021–GazetteExtraordinaryNo.2218/68of12March2021.

47LiuXinandFanLingzhi,‘Raredocumentaryrevealscounter-terrorismperseveranceinXinjiang’,GlobalTimes,(6December2019)<https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1172486.shtml;https://twitter.com/ChinaEmbSL/status/1253714261811085312?s=20>accessed7September2021.

38

discourses on countering ‘Muslim extremism and terrorism’ no doubt reinforce

IslamophobiainSriLanka,particularlyintheaftermathoftheEasterSundayAttacks.Such

discourse,similartowhatisseeninMyanmarandIndia,promotetheideathatMuslimsare

‘threats’tonationalsecurityandtheculturaldominanceofthemajoritygroup.

Finally,globalIslamistdiscourseshavealsoshapedMuslimvictimisationinSriLanka.There

is littledoubt thatradical Islamistgroupshaveemerged inSriLankaandare fairlyvocal

politicalvoices.IslamistgroupshaveproliferatedparticularlyintheEasternProvince.Many

of these groups receive funding from Middle Eastern, and specifically Saudi Arabian,

sources,48andadoptradicalandultraconservativepositionsinanefforttooutbideachotherandattractandsustainsuchfunding.DennisMcGilvrayobservesthatthese‘sharpinternal

conflicts’regardingthepracticeofIslamhavemanifestedthroughsymbolic‘Islamisation’in

the form of Arabic dress, public theological disputes, and the erection of new places of

worship.49Inthiscontext,boththeTablighiJamaatandThawheedJamaatgroupspromoteultraconservative ideology. The All Ceylon Jamiyyathul Ulama has for instance strongly

resistedreformstotheMuslimMarriageandDivorceActof1951andhasalsopromoted

conservativereligiousattire,onthepretextthatitismoreauthenticallyIslamic.Meanwhile,

severalThawheedJamaatgroupshaveemergedovertime,andincludetheColombo-based

DharusSalaf,theAllCeylonThawheedJamaat,andtheSriLankaThawheedJamaat.These

Colombo-basedgroupsexertideologicalinfluenceovertheMuslimcommunityatanational

level. Moreover, groups such as the Batticaloa-basedDharul Adhar, and the (originally)

Kattankudy-basedNationalThowheedJamaat(NTJ)havehadanimpactatthesub-national

level.Ofcourse,theNTJreachedinfamyasitwassubsequentlyassociatedwiththeEaster

Sunday attacks of 2019. These Islamist discourses and groups have been exploited by

politicalactorsandmilitantgroupstofeedtheexistentialfearsofothercommunities,and

haveaddedmomentumtoanti-MuslimdiscriminationandviolenceinSriLanka.

Conclusion

A plethora of phenomena and factors converge to produce and sustain anti-Muslim

discriminationandviolenceinSriLanka.Thesephenomenaandfactorsareoftenmutually

reinforcing,andhavecontributedtowardsageneralcultureofimpunityinwhichthestate

eitherfailstointerveneinthediscriminationorviolence,oractivelypromotesthem.

Thecyclicalrelationshipbetweenmajoritariandiscourses,transnationalinfluences,Islamist

radicalism,andultimately,Muslimvictimisationisborneoutinthedataandcasestudieson

anti-Muslim discrimination and violence. Islamophobic discourses feed off deeper

majoritarianexistentialfears,wheretheMuslimcommunitycomestosymbolisea‘threat’to

48Gunasingham,‘SriLankaAttacks:AnAnalysisoftheAftermath’,9.

49DennisMcGilvray,‘SriLankanMuslims:BetweenEthno-NationalismandtheGlobalUmmah’(2011)17(1)NationsandNationalism45-64.

39

theSinhala-Buddhistcommunity,andoften,otherregionalmajorities.Thisstatusofbeinga

‘threat’ is then seemingly legitimised by intra-Muslim competition that ultimately

incentivisesIslamistradicalism.GroupssuchastheBBShavesuggestedthatsuchIslamist

radicalismvindicatestheirpublicconcernswithregardtotheMuslim‘threat’.Theensuing

discourse is often filledwith hate and antagonism, andhas directly contributed towards

discriminationandviolenceagainsttheMuslimcommunity.

Anti-Muslim discrimination and violence can then circle back to incentivise some

disenchantedmembersoftheMuslimcommunitytogravitatetowardsIslamistradicalism.

TheEasterSundayAttacksof2019insomewaysreflecttheplausibleconnectionbetween

MuslimvictimisationandIslamistradicalism.Itisplausiblethatexperiencesofanti-Muslim

discriminationandviolence,andoutrageoversuchinjustices,motivatesomeyoungMuslims

to gravitate towards militant Islamist groups seeking to recruit disenchanted young

followers.50 However, once they join such groups, agendas that are not particularlyconnected to or interested in local contexts may be prioritised. This prioritisation may

explain why the chosen targets of the Easter Sunday Attacks were Christian places of

worship rather than Buddhist places of worship— despite the perception that Sinhala-

Buddhist militant groups perpetrated violence against Muslims. The choice of Christian

placesofworshipismuchmorealignedwithglobalradicalIslamistagendas.51

TheEasterSundayAttackshavebecomeawatershedevent likelytocreatenewwavesof

majoritarianexistentialfearsthatunderlieprejudicetowardstheMuslimcommunityinSri

Lanka. Perceptions concerning theMuslim community that are already shaped by deep-

seated prejudices are likely to be compounded by these attacks. Therefore, the attacks

themselvesaddtothecycleoffear,radicalism,discrimination,andviolence.Unfortunately,

MuslimvictimisationinSriLankaislikelytopersistaslongasthecyclicalphenomenaand

factorsthatdrivesuchvictimisationendure.

50SmrutiS.Pattanaik,‘SriLanka:SecuritisingMinorityAlienation’,TheManoharParrikarInstituteforDefenceStudiesandAnalyses,(29April2019)<https://idsa.in/idsacomments/sri-lanka-securitising-minority_sspattanaik-290419>accessed7September2021.

51EmmaGreen,‘HowSriLanka’sChristiansBecameaTarget’,TheAtlantic,(24April2019)<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/04/sri-lankas-christians-faced-new-persecution/587842>accessed7September2021.ForaninterestingdiscussiononthisissueintheIndonesiancontext,seeMelissaCrouch,‘RegulatingPlacesofWorshipinIndonesia:UpholdingFreedomofReligionforReligiousMinorities’(2007)SingaporeJournalofLegalStudies96-116.ForadiscussionontheNigeriancontext,seeLangMichaelKpughe,‘ChristianChurchesandtheBokoHaramInsurgencyinCameroon:DilemmasandResponses’,(2017)8(8)Religions143.

40

TheNewEnemy:AttacksagainsttheMuslimCommunityandtheCultureofImpunityinSriLanka

BhavaniFonseka

The repeated failure to deal with the root causes of the conflict has posed recurring

challengestoSriLanka’sfragilepeace.Post-waryearswitnessednewdynamicstosustain

conflictsincludingthecontinuousmarginalisationandtargetingoftheMuslimcommunity

inmany differentways, such as the spate of ethno-religious violence, the prohibiting of

burials on unsubstantiated grounds during 2020-2021, the proposed restrictions on

women’sattire,andotherrestrictionsimposedintheguiseofnationalsecurityandpublic

health. Against the backdrop of the Easter Sunday attacks and fears of extremism, the

community isnowconfrontedwithnewlevelsofracismandviolence.Thesetrendsmust

alsobeexamined in termsofpastcyclesofviolence linkedtoextremeSinhalaandTamil

nationalism.Caseslinkedtothestateincludeincitement,complicity,inactiontopreventthe

violenceandnotholdingperpetratorstoaccount.Violenceisalsolinkedtonon-stateactors

suchastheLiberationTigersofTamilEelam(LTTE)thatincludesthe1990expulsionofthe

MuslimsfromtheNorthandthemosqueattacksinEravurandKattankudyintheEast.

WhiletheviolencefacedbytheMuslimcommunitygoesbackdecades,heightenedracism

and violence as witnessed in more recent years needs to be examined with the rise of

extremeSinhalaBuddhistmajoritarianism.UndertheMahindaRajapaksapresidency(2005-

2015), ethnonationalism received traction and emboldened sections of society to pursue

racistpractices.Thisperiodwitnessedanincreaseinnewcampaignstargetingminorities

andtheemergenceofseveralextremistgroupswhoportrayedthemselvesastheprotectors

of Sinhala Buddhism. Groups such as theBoduBala Sena (BBS), Sinhala Ravaya,Ravana

Balaya,andMahasonBalakayathrivedundertheMahindaRajapaksaregime,withseveral

linkedtoincidentsofincitementandviolenceagainsttheMuslimcommunity.Aswitnessed

duringthisperiod,theregimewasbothovertlyandcovertlyappeasingtheseelements

Thispublicationisatimelyinitiativethatcapturesthedifferentdimensionsofviolencefaced

by the Muslim community. This article in particular briefly examines recent incidents

targetingtheMuslimcommunityinSriLankaandtheorganisedmannerofsuchevents.It

brieflydiscussesthestatuswithjusticeinrelationtoseveralemblematiccaseslinkedwith

theMuslimcommunityandnotesthecountlessindignitiesandtraumathecommunityhas

hadto faceat thehandsofboththestateandnon-stateentities.Asthearticlehighlights,

regardlessoftheavailabilityofevidencelinkedtoseveralincidents,littletonostepshave

beentakentoinvestigateandprosecuteperpetratorsofsuchincidents.Thisisinacontext

where emblematic cases face numerous setbacks with the culture of impunity deeply

entrenchedinSriLanka.Thus,theMuslimcommunitynotonlyhastofacecontinuousvitriol

andviolencebutalsothefactthatjusticewillcontinuetobeelusive.

41

IncitementandAttacksinRecentYears

Post-waryearswitnessedaspateofviolencetargetingtheMuslimcommunityincludingthe

destructionofmosques,attacksonbusinessproperties,andeconomicventuresownedby

and linked to theMuslim community.1Several attacks onMuslim-owned properties alsooccurred in the holymonth of Ramazanwith apprehension and fear heightened further

withinthecommunityinthelead-uptoandduringthisperiod.Suchattacksimpactedthe

communityeconomically,notonlyviatheuseofviolencebutalsocallstoboycottandcreate

fearamongothercommunitieswhofrequentedMuslim-ownedbusinesses.Arangeofissues

hasbeenattributedtotheincreasedtargetingoftheMuslimcommunity:mythsofpopulation

growth and economic factorswith all connected to the insecurity faced by themajority

community. Inaddition, the levelsofsuspicionwithwhichthecommunitywasperceived

increasedandwithit,impactingfragilereconciliationandco-existenceinitiatives.

The attacks on business premises soon transitioned into more sinister and organised

violence.TheincidentsinAluthgama(2014),Ampara(2018),andKandy(2018)aresome

instances that resulted in deaths, injuries, attacks on places of religious worship, and

destruction to properties and contributed to further marginalizing the community. As

documentedinseveralinstances,violencehadanorganisednaturewithmobsmovingabout

freelydespitetheimposingofcurfew.Inmanyinstances,eyewitnesstestimonyandmedia

reports identify perpetrators and raise questions of collusion by others. In several cases

documentation also showed the presence of some Buddhist clergy and extreme Sinhala

nationalistforcesatsitesofviolence.Forinstance,inbothAluthgamaandKandy,Gnanasara

Thero,theleaderoftheBBSwasseenatthelocationspriortotheviolence.Asdiscussedin

thisarticle,despitereportsdocumentingthetimelinesandroleofparticularactors,thereis

no known case where perpetrators were held accountable. It is this impunity that has

emboldened extremist forces and exacerbated the fear and apprehension of theMuslim

community.

Further,inseveralinstances,civilsocietyandcommunitygroupsintherespectiveareashad

alerted authorities of extremist groups and the potential for violence. For example, in

Aluthgama,Muslimcivilsocietygroupshadurgedtheauthoritiesofthepotentialforviolence

ifaplannedmeetingbytheBBSwasallowedtotakeplace.Despitethewarnings,themeeting

wasallowedwhichwassubsequentlyfollowedbymobviolenceandtargetingoftheMuslim

community.Similarly,authoritieswerewarnedofpotentialviolencesoonaftertheEaster

Sundayattacks.2Despitewarnings,theauthoritiesfailedtotakenecessarystepstoprotect

1FarahMihlar,‘Religiouschangeinaminoritycontext:transformingIslaminSriLanka’(2019)40(12)ThirdWorldQuarterly2153-2169;VijayNagrajandFarzanaHaniffa,TowardsRecoveringHistoriesofAnti-MuslimViolenceintheContextofSinhala–MuslimTensionsinSriLanka,(InternationalCentreforEthnicStudies2017).

2JeffreyGettleman,MujibMashalandDharishaBastians,‘SriLankaWasWarnedofPossibleAttacks.WhyDidn’tItStopThem?’TheNewYorkTimes,(22April2019)

42

the Muslim community, religious places of worship, and properties owned by the

community.Notablealsoisthefactthatdespiteacurfewimposedandwithheavypoliceand

military presence, organisedmobswere able tomove aboutwith death and devastation

evidentinseveralinstances.

Acombinationofinaction,complicity,andwilfuldisregardhascontributedtoacultureof

impunityandtheveryrealperceptionthatperpetratorswillbeprotected.Moreover, it is

thisbeliefofnopunitive sanction thatgalvanisedcertaingroups,providinga convenient

shieldtomanywhoperpetrateviolenceagainsttheMuslimcommunity.Inthewakeofthe

EasterSundayattacks,moreviolenceandhatecampaignswerecarriedout,posingmultiple

challenges to the community with real fears for their physical security but also the

fundamentalquestionastowhycitizensofSriLankawererobbedoftheirdignity.

Inaddition,socialmediahadaroleinspreadingpostsandclipsthatperpetuatedhatewith

concerns raised that these resulted in exacerbating tensions andviolence.As a result, in

several instances, authorities tookmeasures to restrict access to socialmedia platforms.

Whileurgentactionwasneededduringsomeoftheseincidentstorestrictthespreadoffake

news, fears have also been raised whether such responses to specific incidents set a

precedent and may result in introducing restrictions on freedom of expression, and

increasedsurveillanceintheguiseofnationalsecurity.

Asthisarticleargues,theeventsinthepost-warcontextdemonstratethemultiplemethods

of perpetuating hate and violence against the Muslim community. Moreover, national

security and the pandemic have provided cover for racist elements in government and

society at large to continue this policy. In the absence of genuine action to address

discrimination, incitement, and violence, impunity has thrived. And it has raised serious

doubtsastowhetherminoritiesareabletoliveasequalcitizenswithdignityinSriLanka.

EmblematicCases

SriLanka’sexperiencewithobtainingjusticeforviolationsofthepastisdismalwithalong

listofemblematiccases.Previousstudieshighlightarangeofissuesforthesetbackswith

justice in the domestic context including a lack of political will, security considerations,

worryingconcernswithprotectionforvictimsandwitnesses,andstructuralandlegalgaps

thathavecontributedtojusticebeingelusive.3

Thelackofprogresswithaccountability,amongothers,resultedinseveralresolutionsbeing

adopted at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) concerning failureswith

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/22/world/asia/ntj-warning-sri-lanka-government.html>accessed6September2021.

3'RevisitingTenEmblematicCasesinSriLanka:WhyJusticeRemainsElusive'(CentreforPolicyAlternatives,20January2021)<https://www.cpalanka.org/revisiting-ten-emblematic-cases-in-sri-lanka-why-justice-remains-elusive/>accessed6September2021.

43

domesticmechanisms.In2015,aspateofambitiousreformswaspromisedwhenthethen

governmentco-sponsoredResolution30/1which includedstepswith transitional justice

and confidence-buildingmeasures. Despite subsequent resolutions, limited progress has

beenmadewiththesepledges.Since2019,therehasbeenasteadyrollbackonthelimited

progressmadewithincreasingfearsofheightenedsecurityandrightsviolations.4

IncreasedlevelsofincitementandviolenceagainsttheMuslimcommunityinthepost-war

yearshavereceivedattentionandcondemnationnationallyandinternationally.Theethno-

religiousviolenceseenin2014inAluthgama,2018incidentsinKandy,2019incidentspost

theEasterSundayattacks,andmorerecentlytheincitementinapandemiccontextaresome

instancesofviolencefacedbythecommunity.Italsohighlightsthatthesearenotisolated

incidents,butoccurunfortunatelywithinregularintervalswiththeeffectofinstillingfurther

fearandapprehensionwithinthecommunity.

Thepandemiccontexthasalsoseentheintroductionofracistpoliciesthatblatantlytargeted

theMuslimcommunity,suchas the forcedcremationpolicy introduced in2020.5DespitetherebeingnoscientificdatatobacktheneedforcremationsofCOVID-19victims,thepolicy

continuedtobeinuseforabouttenmonths,robbingthecommunityofthedignitytofollow

religiouspracticesfortheirdeceased.Theill-advisedpolicywaseventuallyoverturnedin

February2021followingconcertedadvocacybythecommunity,civilsocietyandothersin

thelead-uptothevoteattheUNHRCinMarch2021.6

The below list, whilst not exhaustive, is an indicator of recent incidents where the

communityhasfacedincitementandviolenceinpost-warSriLanka,withnoknownsteps

takentoholdperpetratorstoaccount:

Aluthgama/DhargaTown2014

On15thJune2015,mobviolenceeruptedintheareaafteraninflammatoryspeechmadebythe Buddhist hardlinemonk, Gnanasara Thero of the BBS. Considering the possibility of

violence,Muslimcivilsocietyhadrequestedsecuritybeforethespeechandprotest.Reports

indicatethatstone-peltingstartedtheviolence.Subsequently,acurfewwas imposedasa

4UnitedNationsHumanRightsOfficeoftheHighCommissioner,SriLankaonalarmingpathtowardsrecurrenceofgravehumanrightsviolations–UNreport'(UNHumanRightsOfficeoftheHighCommissioner,27January2021)<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26695&LangID=E>accessed6September2021.

5JoannaSlaterandPiyumiFonseka,‘InSriLanka,auniquepandemictrauma:Forcedcremations’,TheWashingtonPost(12February2021)<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/sri-lanka-cremations-covid/2021/02/12/b97719a6-6562-11eb-bab8-707f8769d785_story.html>accessed6September2021.

6BhavaniFonsekaandUvinDissanayake,SriLanka’sVistasofProsperity&Splendour:ACritiqueofPromisesMade&PresentTrends(CPAJuly2021).

44

result.Despite thecurfew,violencecontinued in theareaswitheyewitnessesstatingthat

mobswerearmedandorganised.CurfewcontinuedforseveraldayswiththeSTFandArmy

deployed.7

The violence resulted in deaths, injuries, and the destruction of property. Eyewitness

testimonyspokeoftheinactionbythepolicedespiterequestsforsecurityandevidenceof

themobmoving into thearea.Documentationof the incidentsbefore theviolence raises

severalquestionsaroundtheeventsbeforetheviolenceerupted,includingwhyaprocession

wasalloweddespiteappealsmadeto lawandorderauthoritiesandthe inaction.Despite

initialarrests,thereisnopubliclyknowncasewhereperpetratorswereprosecuted.

Ampara2018

Violenceinthisinstanceisdirectlylinkedtotherumoursofthepresenceofsterilisationpills

foundinafoodoutletownedbyaMuslimshopowner.8Theallegationsweresubsequentlycounteredwithexplanationsthatthewhitesubstancewaslinkedtoflour,buttheseattempts

didnotpreventtherumoursfromspreading.Thefearresultingfromthisbaselessrumour

sawviolenceeruptingandtargetingtheMuslimcommunity.Notableherewasthesilence

fromthehealthauthorities,whodidnotmakeanofficialcommenttodispeltherumours.

Asseenwithotherinstances,rumours,misinformation,andmisconceptionscontributeto

fearsamongthemajoritycommunitywhichpropelledincitementandviolence.Theinaction

and silence from officials, including health officials in this instance to dispel rumours,

exacerbatedfearsandhadanimpactontheviolence.

Kandy2018

TheviolenceislinkedtoaroadaccidentbetweenaSinhalesedriverandfourMuslimyouth

in February 2018with the four youth arrested for the accident and assault. The driver

subsequentlysuccumbedtohisinjurieson3March2018.Tillthen,therewerenoreportsof

violence in the area. On 4th March, Gnanasara Thero, Ampitiya Samitha Thero from

Batticaloaandseveralothersidentifiedwithnationalistgroupshadvisitedthefuneralhome.

Ithasbeenreportedthatmobshadarrivedinseveralbusesfromoutsidethedistrictsand

theattackshadcommencedwithinafewhours.Inamatterofhours,amobhadgathered

andattackedMuslim-ownedpropertiesandplacesofreligiousworshipinseveralareasin

7AmanthaPerera,‘Anti-MuslimViolenceReachesNewHeightsinSriLanka’,(19June2014),InterPressServiceNewsAgency<http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/06/anti-muslim-violence-reaches-new-heights-in-sri-lanka/>accessed6September2021.

8ManeshkaBorhamandDimuthuAttanayake,‘TensioninAmparaafterfake‘sterilizationpills’controversy’SundayObserver,(4March2018)<http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2018/03/04/news/tension-ampara-after-fake-‘sterilization-pills’-controversy>accessed6September2021.

45

Kandy.9One Muslim youth died of smoke inhalation in Digana and several residences,businessproperties,andmosquesweredestroyed.

Severalclaimedthattheinactionbythepolicecontributedtothespreadofviolence.This,

whenpoliceandSTFwerepresentonthegroundduringtheinitialdaysbutwereunableto

contain the violence. Further, a state of emergency was imposed with the

TelecommunicationandRegulatoryCommissionimposingrestrictionsontheinternetinthe

Kandyareatocontrolthecirculationofpostsonsocialmediaplatforms.

IwasinKandyon7thMarchandwitnessedfirst-handtheviolencespreadinAkuranaand

otherareaswherearmedSinhalesemobswereroamingfreelyandattackingMuslimowned

properties. Despite a curfew, mobs were able to travel freely and were not stopped or

arrestedbythepolice.Imetseveralwhoweredirectlyaffectedbytheattacks,withmany

scared of the violence escalating and also spreading to other areas. Several within the

communityspokeofhowtheattacksoccurred,howMuslimownedpropertiesweretargeted,

with no genuine efforts taken by the authorities to stop the violence.What I personally

witnessedandtestimoniesbyvictimsraisedquestionsastohowviolencespreaddespitethe

apparentcurfewandtheroleofthestateinthiscycleofviolence.Amidsttheinactionand

inabilitytopreventtheviolence,manyinthearearaisedconcernsaboutwhetherthedelays

bytheauthoritiestorespondweredeliberate.Severalalsoraisedthetroublingquestionas

tohowtheattacksseemedpre-planned,withperpetratorsknowingwhichpropertieswere

ownedbyMuslimsandnotharmingadjacentbuildingsownedbythemajoritycommunity.

The combinationof the targetednatureof attacks, themobviolence and the inactionby

authoritiesinstillednewfearsamongtheMuslimcommunity,remindingthemofpastcycles

ofviolenceandtheroleofthestateinsuchincidents.

Theviolencewasfinallybroughtundercontrolafterthemilitarywascalledin,severaldays

afterthefirstreportsofmobviolenceoccurred.Someindividualsallegedlyinvolvedinthe

attackswerealsoarrested.10Despiteseveralarrests,thisisyetanothercasewhere,todate,no one has been prosecuted for incitement and violence. Further, documentation

demonstratesthebuild-uptotheviolenceandearlywarningsignswithinactiononthepart

oftheofficials.

ThesilenceofseveralleadingBuddhistclergywasalsonotable,especiallytheMalwattaand

AsgiriyaChaptersinwhoseareastheviolenceoccurred.ThissilencefromBuddhistclergy,

theirinabilitytocondemntheviolenceandtourgecalm,speakstotheapathyamongmany

inthefaceofdiscriminationandviolencefacedbyminoritiesinSriLanka.Inthisparticular

instance,evidenceshowedtheinvolvementofahardlineBuddhistclergyintheincitement

thatcontributedtothesubsequentdaysofviolence.Despitethis,therewassilenceamong

9LawandSocietyTrust,Fact-findingReportontheAnti-MuslimViolenceintheKandyDistrict(LawandSocietyTrustMarch2018).

10RangaSrilal,‘SriLankaarrests10foranti-Muslimviolenceastownssmoulder’,Reuters,(8March2018)<https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-sri-lanka-clashes-idUKKCN1GK0FD>accessed6September2021.

46

theclergy.Suchinactioninthefaceofviolenceandintheirbackyardwasnotonlyhugely

disappointingbutalsoareminderoftheinactionandcomplacencybysomeintimesofperil.

EasterSundayAttacksandResultingViolence

Post-warSriLanka’sworstterroristattackwaswitnessedwiththeEasterSundayattacksin

2019, which saw attacks against several churches in Colombo, Negombo, Batticaloa and

hotelsinColombo.11Subsequentinvestigationshighlightedmultiplefailuresofgovernanceand intelligence. It was also highlighted that the Muslim community had warned the

authorities of increasing levels of extremism that were ignored, indicating that the

communityhadmadeeffortstowarnofthepotentialdangersofextremistgroups.12

TheParliamentarySelectCommitteethatinquiredintotheattacksalsomadesomeworrying

revelationsof theroleofpoliticians, intelligence,andothersandtheir inaction.Theyalso

notedthetimingoftheattacksandtheirimpact.“TheEasterSundayattacksandsubsequent

communalviolence inpartsofSriLankawitnessednewlevelsof fearamongthepublicand

criticismtowardsthepoliticalleadershipandsecurityestablishment.Itwasalsoatimewhen

calls emanated fora changeof regime.These cannotbe takenas coincidentalandmustbe

investigated further. It is also paramount to question the role of some sections in the

intelligence apparatus and their attempts to shape security, the electoral process, political

landscape,andthefutureofSriLanka”.13Soonaftertheattacks,andamidstheightenedlevelsoffearandhate,thecallforastrongleaderemergedandwassoonfollowedbycandidate

GotabayaRajapaksaclaiminghewasreadytocontestthePresidentialelectionsinNovember

2019.

Despitethenumerousinvestigations,questionspersistastothereasonsfortheattacksand

whowastogainfromsuchviolence.Thesequestionshavebeenraisedbysomeofthepresent

government’s supporters. Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith has questioned the delays with

accountabilityaroundtheattacksandclaimedthatthe“EasterSundayattackwasnotaresult

ofacrazeoverreligionbutanattempttocaptureandsafeguardpower”.14Thiswasfurther

11‘SriLankaattacks:WhatweknowabouttheEasterbombings’,BBC,(28April2019)<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48010697>accessed18September2021.

12‘BeforeSriLanka'sEasterAttacks,Muslims'WarningsAboutTerrorismWentUnheeded’,npr,(12December2019)<https://www.npr.org/2019/12/12/786639735/before-sri-lankas-easter-attacks-muslims-warnings-about-terrorism-went-unheeded>accessed18September2021.

13ReportoftheSelectCommitteeofParliamenttolookintoandreporttoParliamentontheterroristattacksthattookplaceindifferentplacesinSriLankaon21stApril2019(ParliamentofSriLanka)<https://www.parliament.lk/featured-on-the-sri-lanka-parliament/1715-sc-report-april-attacks>accessed6September2021.

14YohanPerera,‘EasterSundayattacksaresultofpoliticalextremism,notreligiousextremism-Cardinal’,DailyMirror,(19April2021)<https://www.dailymirror.lk/front_page/Easter-Sunday-attacks-a-result-of-political-extremism-not-religious-extremism-Cardinal/238-210123>accessed6September2021.

47

compounded by the outgoing Attorney General who spoke of the ‘grand conspiracy’

surroundingtheattack,raisingquestionsaboutthemotivesbehindtheattacks.15

Thedeadlyattacksresultedinhundredsofdeathsandmanymoreinjuredandimmeasurable

devastation.Theviolencethatsooneruptedwasequallydevastating.Followingtheattacks,

withincreasingfearsthattheMuslimcommunitywillbetargeted,manyappealedforpeace

andforstepstobetakentomitigateanyethno-religiousviolence.Withindaysoftheattacks

anddespiteSriLankabeing inastateofemergency,mobviolencecommencedinseveral

parts of Sri Lanka.16 Reports also indicated tomobs arriving in buses, demonstrating anorganisednaturetotheattacks.17Muchofthisoccurredwhenareaswereundercurfewandwithheavypolice andmilitarypresence.Theviolence resulted indeath,displacementof

manyMuslimfamilies,anddestructionofpropertybelongingtothecommunityandplaces

ofreligiousworship.Aswithpreviousincidents,thecirculationofvideoclipsandotherposts

onsocialmediacontributedtotheviolence.

Documentationfromtheseincidentsdemonstratestheorganisednatureofattacksandthe

fastmobilisationofgroupsperpetratingviolence.Itmustalsobenotedthatthemobviolence

wasone-sided,withsectionsinthemajoritycommunitytargetingadefencelesscommunity.

Similar toprevious incidents, thereweredelays in taking action toprevent theviolence.

Therewerealsoreportsofpoliticalinterferenceinthecriminaljusticeprocessandinaction

witharrests.

Theseincidentsalsooccurredamidstracistrhetoric.Forexample,aseniorBuddhistclergy

calledforthestoningtodeathofMuslimsandallegedthatsterilisationmedicinewasfound

inMuslim-ownedrestaurantsthatweremeanttoreducetheSinhalaBuddhistpopulation.18SuchincitementandfalseinformationbyaseniorBuddhistclergycouldhavehadserious

repercussions against the backdrop of the Easter Sunday attacks and violence and hate

targetingtheMuslimcommunity.Despitecallstoinvestigatethisstatement,noknownaction

was takenagainst theclergy.This isoneamongseveral instanceswhereBuddhist clergy

havebeenheldunaccountableforincitementofviolence,creatingaperceptionthatBuddhist

clergyandotherswiththerightconnectionsareabovethelaw.

15‘SriLankaAttorneyGeneralclaims“grandconspiracy”behindEasterattack:reportCardinal’,EconomyNext,(18May2021)<https://economynext.com/sri-lanka-attorney-general-claims-grand-conspiracy-behind-easter-attack-report-82074/#>accessed6September2021.

16‘CPAPressStatementonIncidentsofCommunalViolenceinMay2019'(CentreforPolicyAlternatives,13May2019)<https://www.cpalanka.org/cpa-press-statement-on-incidents-of-communal-violence-in-may-2019/>accessed6September2021.

17MeeraSrinivasan,‘Dozensarrestedafteranti-MuslimviolenceinSriLanka’,TheHindu,(14May2019)<https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/one-killed-in-anti-muslim-riots-in-sri-lanka/article27123889.ece>accessed6September2021.

18‘SriLanka:MuslimsFaceThreats,Attacks;AuthoritiesShouldActAgainstIncitementbyBuddhistNationalists',HumanRightsWatch,(3July2019)<https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/03/sri-lanka-muslims-face-threats-attacks>accessed6September2021.

48

Equally worrying is that the incitement and violence targeting the Muslim community

occurred amidst the dominant narrative propagated by extremist majoritarian forces.

Despite evidence in the public domain and several complaints made to authorities to

investigate,thereisnoinformationinthepublicdomaintoindicatewhethertherewasany

action taken to investigate statementsmade by leading Buddhist clergy and others that

amount to incitement. Silence and inaction on several fronts in this regard speak to the

specialstatusenjoyedbyreligiousleadersandothersandtheimpunitythatgoeswithit.

WeaponisingtheLawandTargetingIndividuals

Recent years have alsowitnessedmultiple caseswith individuals targeted, arrested, and

detainedbasedonvariousallegations.Severalofthesecaseshavealsoseenthemisuseof

lawssuchasthePreventionofTerrorismAction(PTA)andtheInternationalCovenanton

CivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPR)Acttoarrestanddetainindividuals,withquestionsraised

overdueprocessandwhethersuchcasesarepoliticallyandraciallymotivated.Thisisalso

inacontextwherethePTAhasbeenusedfordecadestotargetminoritiesandcritics,with

manylanguishingforyearswithoutcharge.Althoughrepeatedcallsweremadetorepealthe

PTA,successivegovernmentshavecontinuedtouseit.Therecentintroductionofregulations

titled ‘De-radicalization fromholdingviolent extremist religious ideology’under thePTA

raisesfurtherconcernsasitiscouchedinvaguelanguage,removessafeguards,andcanbe

usedtodetainapersonforuptotwoyears.19

Since2019,thePTA,ICCPR,andotherlawshavebeenusedtoarrestanddetainhundredsof

Muslims. Many were arrested soon after the Easter Sunday attacks under the guise of

national security.Otherhigh-profilearrests suchasDr.SheguShihabdeenMohamed(Dr.

Shafi)raisequestionsaboutwhetherthearrestswerepoliticallymotivated.Inthiscase,Dr.

Shafi was arrested soon after a news report in a Sinhala nationalist paper alleged the

sterilisation of women after performing Caesarean deliveries. His arrests sparkedmuch

publicityanddebates,includingtheinvolvementofnationalistgroupsandBuddhistclergy

who promoted conspiracies of population control targeting the majority community.

FollowinginvestigationsbytheCID,itwasrevealedtheallegationswerebaselessbutalso

highlightedlargerforcesatplaytotargetDr.Shafi.20

19‘ConcernsRelatingtotheRecentRegulationsIssuedUnderthePreventionofTerrorismAct'(CentreforPolicyAlternatives,18March2021)<https://www.cpalanka.org/concerns-relating-to-the-recent-regulations-issued-under-the-prevention-of-terrorism-act/>accessed6September2021;UnitedNationsHumanRightsOfficeoftheHighCommissioner(9August2021)<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26575>accessed6September2021.

20‘SriLankapoliceuncovercriminalconspiracyoversterilizationclaims’,EconomyNext,(10August2019)<https://economynext.com/sri-lanka-police-uncover-criminal-conspiracy-over-sterilization-claims-15068/>accessed6September2021.

49

More recently, several other individualshavebeenarrestedanddetainedusing thePTA,

ICCPR,andotherlaws.Oneofthemosthigh-profilecasesisoflawyerHejaazHizbullahwho

wasarrestedinApril2020forallegedlinkstotheEasterSundayattacks.21Thecasehasbeenshroudedwithquestionsandanomaliesindueprocesssafeguards.Anotherwasthearrest

ofRamzyRazeekwhowasarrestedundertheICCPRActforaposthewroteonFacebookfor

an“ideologicalJihad”tostoporganisedanti-Muslimpropaganda.22Afterseveralmonthsofdetention,hewasreleasedonbail.AnothercasewherethePTAhasbeenusedisinthecase

ofpoetAhnafJazeemwithhimlanguishingindetentionforoverayearwithnochargesyet

filedagainsthim.23

Theseandothercasesdemonstratehowthelawisusedtotargetindividualswithlittletono

safeguardsinplace.Insomeofthesecases,questionsremainwiththeallegationsmadeand

thenatureofevidenceusedtodetainindividuals.Dr.Shafi’scasestandsoutasanexception

astheCIDinvestigationsunearthedcollusionbetweenhealthofficialsandthelawandorder

officialsinKurunegalaandexposedthefalseallegationsmadeagainsthim.Othershavenot

beenasfortunatewithmanydetainedforoverayear,othersmore.

ThesecasesdemonstratetheweaponizingofthelawtotargettheMuslimcommunity,and

withitcreatingfearandhelplessness.ThesuspicioncreatedintheaftermathoftheEaster

Sunday attacks and the rhetoric of national security have provided sufficient grounds to

continuethiscampaignoftargetingacommunity.Yet,thesearenotnew.Suchpracticesgo

back to earlier years when state-sanctioned racist campaigns and support to extremist

groupsfacilitatedaconduciveenvironmenttovilifyandmakeMuslimsthenewenemyinSri

Lanka.

ConcernsfortheFuture

ThetargetingofminoritiesisnotnewinSriLanka,withsuccessivegovernmentsresorting

toethnomajoritarianpolicies.Despitetheendofthewarin2009,post-warSriLankahas

continued to see new conflicts and the targeting of a new enemy.With the propaganda

campaign in full swing, the demonising of the Muslim community is moving forward

unabatedwithnogenuineeffortstakentopreventthevitriolandviolence.

21‘OnHejaazHizbullah:ThelatestvictimofSriLanka’sdraconianPreventionofTerrorismAct'(AmnestyInternational,15July2020)<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/07/sri-lanka-on-hejaaz-hizbullah-and-the-prevention-of-terrorism-act/>accessed6September2021.

22‘RamzyRazeekreleasedonbailafter5monthsofSriLankandetention’,DailyExpress,(19September2020)<https://dailyexpress.lk/glocal/2183/>accessed6September2021.

23‘Poeticinjustice:AnotherwriterlanguishesinprisonunderPTA’,TheDailyFT,(14December2020)<https://www.ft.lk/news/Poetic-injustice-Another-writer-languishes-in-prison-under-PTA/56-710172>accessed6September2021.

50

Someoftheincidentsdiscussedinthisarticlehighlighttheorganisednatureofcampaigns,

statesupportorcomplicity,andinactionwhencomplaintsweremadetoholdperpetrators

toaccount.Thespateofattacksinrecentyearshascontributedtofurthermarginalisinga

communityanditsyouth.NewregulationsissuedunderthePTAinMarch2021raisefurther

fearsastowhetherminorities,aswellaspoliticalopponentsandcriticsofthegovernment,

canbetargeted.This,inacontextwheretherhetoricofextremismandderadicalisationhas

receivednewtractionposttheEasterSundayattacksandisusedtofurtherdemonisethe

Muslimcommunity.

Further,despitetheexistenceofrelevantlawstoprosecuteforincitementandviolence,no

informationisavailableinthepublicdomainastowhetherperpetratorslinkedwithattacks

againsttheMuslimcommunitywereheldtoaccount.Instead,thelawhasbeenweaponised

totargetsomeinthecommunity.

This also is in the context of increasingdivisionswithin theMuslim community.Despite

targetingthecommunity,sectionsofthecommunityhaveovertheyearschosentoengage

with successive governments in the hope such engagement may provide protection. As

evidencedbysubsequentincidents,suchanapproachdidnotprovidethedesiredprotection.

Further,theinabilityoftheMuslimpoliticalleadershiptotakeastandinthefaceofviolence

and authoritarianism has impacted their standing and ability to put pressure on the

authorities.Moreover,therecentinstancessuchasthesupportbysomeMuslimmembersof

parliamenttoenact theTwentiethAmendmenttotheConstitution in2020raisesserious

doubtsregardingtheprioritiesandintegrityoftheMuslimpoliticalleadership.

Considering the present challenges, a collective and uncompromising position is needed

fromtheMuslimleadershipandcommunitythatprioritisestherightsofthecommunityand

ensuresjusticeisserved.Itisalsokeythatsuchpositionsaredevoidofpoliticalcompromises

and economic incentives. As long as perpetrators remain free, with some even enjoying

protection from being arrested and prosecuted, the Muslim community as a whole will

continuetofacethepossibilityofincitementandviolence.Inabilitytomakejusticeapriority

willalsoemboldenracistcampaigns,andfurthermarginalisethecommunity.

Moreover,thisisamomentforthemajoritycommunitytoreflectandlearnfromourpast.

WewitnessedviolenceperpetratedagainsttheTamilcommunityanddidlittletopreventit.

Such inaction emboldened the perpetrators and normalised violence in Sri Lanka. Our

silence and inaction over the decades perpetuated ethno majoritarian practices,

strengthenedauthoritarianismandsetSriLankabackinaspiringtobeastableandpeaceful

Asian leader. Despite an opportunity to correct past wrongs, post-war years are seeing

furthersetbackswherewereproduceconflicts,exacerbatemilitarisationandauthoritarian

ruleandentrenchimpunity.This,inacontextofunprecedentedhealthandeconomiccrisis

whichhaswitnessednewlevelsofincitementandrepression.

Wehavepreviouslyignoredwarningsbutwillwefinallytakeastand?Willwefindmoral

courageandcalloutthosewhoperpetrateviolence?Willwestandinsolidaritywiththose

underattack?Willwedemandforaccountability?Toomanyopportunitiesweresquandered

51

inthepastanditistimethemajoritycommunitytakesastandagainstallformsofracism

andviolenceanddemandsforjustice.Inabilityorunwillingnesstostepupnowwillcarry

irreversibleconsequences.

52

InSriLanka,WeSpeakLuxuriouslyof‘Peace’

AmaliniDeSayrah

Forapopulacethatexperiencedaprotractedwaroverseveraldecades,thecurrentsituation

ofnobombexplosionsisindeedarelief,moresoforthosewhoweredisplaced,injuredor

lostlovedonestothecarnageanddestruction.

Significantly theconceptofviolence—theabsenceof it isgaugedbythe fact there isno

combat.

Tothecontrary,thepassivityofthesoldierwatchingonasamobburnsahousetoashesis

violenceinpractice.Thedisplayofprintmaterialthatbarscertainformsofyourpersonal

attireinanestablishmentwouldbeperceivedviolence.Adirectivethatstatesyoumustburn

yourlovedone’sbodyagainstthebeliefofyourfaith,isalessapparentbutnolesshaunting

formofviolence.

MuchofwhatIknowaboutrecentSriLankanhistory,Igainedfromwitnessingandlistening.

Witnessingtheinnersufferingsofthepeoplewhocallittheirhome,bothinaphysicalsense

andemotionally.Ihearthevoicesthatcarrythattollofsuffering,eveniftheychoosenotto

speakaboutitallthetime.

As12yearspasssincetheendoftheactivecombatofwar,thispieceaimstoprovidecontext

totheincidentsofviolenceagainsttheMuslimcommunitywhichhadaspanofunderhalfof

thattime.

Iofferthemfromtheperspectiveofawriterwhomadecontactwiththeseplacesandpeople

whiletheviolenceunfolded.Inthosemoments,thebiggerpoliticalpictureseemedtofade

away,anditwastheexperienceofthoseinimmediatedespairthattookprominence.Itwas

onlydays,orsometimesweeks,aftermeetingthesepeople—afterprocessingthegriefthey

hadbeencarryingormadetocarry—thatawiderviewemerged.

ItbecomesmostapparentasIendeavourtolinkallincidentstogethertowritethispiece;

howthesemomentsofdespairareintertwinedtoformachainoflargerviolenceandcruelty.

Weoftenhearthewords‘cyclesofviolence’thrownaroundinreferencetoSriLanka’spost-

independencehistory.Perhapsbecausenothingquiteaswellcaptureshowviolenceremains

— ismade to remain, actively—and to reoccur. Itmaybe true that violencehad taken

differentformsovertheyearsbutnonethelesskeepsresurfacing.

Watching these events unfold— and knowing that they make up just a fraction of the

spectrumofinjusticethatminoritycommunitiesinSriLankaaremadetosuffer—itisclear

tome that cyclesof violenceareones that are constantly triggeredand,notaspassively

recurringaswe’dliketothink.

53

2017

InthegroundsofamosqueinDhargaTown,amanissqueezinggratedcoconut,astreamof

itsmilkrunningintoapotathisfeet.Ametreaway,anothermanstirsahugevatofkanji

(riceporridge)overanopenflame.Itisbeforenoon,andthey’vebeenpreparingthekanjifor

ifthar1fromaround8amthatmorning.Manyfamiliesinthearearelyonthekanjithemosquedistributes for free, as it relieves themof theheavy cost of cooking their ownmeal. The

interiorsofthemosquearegleamingnew.

Itwasthesecurityforceswhowereentrustedthetasktorebuildthemosquedamagedinthe

riots.Itwashardlyreassuringasthepeoplenarratedfactthatitwastheverysamesecurity

personnel who had both passively allowed the violence to rage and had even actively

participated in the riots.The residentswhosehouseswere reconstructed,whohadbeen

hiding in back rooms as the violence raged, said they approached their homes with no

comfortingassurancesassadnessstillhauntedtheirrebuiltdoorways.

Atahouse furtherdown the lane, a teacherexplained thatherhousewas the lastof the

Muslimhousesonthatlane—everythingafteritwasa‘Sinhalaarea’.Crossingthatinvisible

line,shesaid,requiredalotofstrength,andtheverypresenceofthatareacausedheralot

ofanxiety.

Shetoldushowtheylefthomewhentheyfirstheardtherallywastobeheld,therallywhere

GnanasaraThero’shatefulandviolentspeechwouldbethe‘tippingpoint’forthoselooking

toattackthesurroundingMuslimareas.

Threeyearslater,theyhadtheirbagspackedwhenawarrantwasissuedforGnanasara’s

arrest.Why?theyfearedretaliation.Ithoughtaboutthemonthedayhewaspardonedby

thePresident,andIwondernowhowtheyfeel,asheissettotakeaseatinParliament.

Violencetowardsminoritycommunities—incitingit,facilitatingit,inactionasithappens—

nowformssuchakeypartofthepoliticalmachinethatnoonebatsaneyelidwhenitoccurs.

Where itshoulddrawoutrage, it insteadbringsstate-levelappointments,servicemedals,

electionvictories,andseatsinthehighestchambersofpowerinthecountry.

2018

Theroadcurvesonthebendofthe4thmilepostatAkurana,asmallbridgerunningoverarockystream.Atthebendisalowbuilding,paintedwhiteontheoutside,yethollow—in

manyways—ontheinside.Darksmokestainsthewallsandtheceiling,thefloorisacarpet

ofbrokenglass,plasterandwood,alldarkshadeofgrey.

1IftharofiftaristhemealtakenbyMuslimsduringsundowntobreaktheirday’sfastduringtheholymonthofRamadan.

54

KilometresawayinPallekele,asmallmosquebythemainroadlooksthesameway.Evenin

theglaringnoonsunlight, thesmokeon thewalls leaves it feelingdarkandeerie.Empty

windows,shardsofglassandchunksofplasterlitteritsfloor.

Themenwhowalkedmethroughtheseplacescarefullystepoverthedebrisintheiropen

slippers.Thestoryofhowtheycametobethiswayisthesame.Peopletheythoughtwere

neighboursandacquaintancesturningonthem.Thosewhoweresupposedtoprotectthem

tookactionfartoolate.Theyremainedbothhopefulandskepticalthatthingswouldevergo

backtowhattheywere—physicallyandotherwise.

Walking through those structures, reduced in part to rubble, you notice that the world

outsideiscarryingonasitusuallywould.Iseethemanmovingfallenwiresawayfromthe

mihrab2 of the destroyed mosque, so that even in this state of ruin the place remainssomewhatsacred.Iseetheothermanshiftingsomeglassoftheshophespenthislifetime

buildingup.Inthosemoments,Iamdistraught;Icanheartheweightofthesorrowintheir

words. Ithangsheavy in theair,heavier thanthedarkness thesmokehas left. I feel that

weightsomewhereinsidemychest,sittingheavyattheintersectionofreasonandemotion.

Iwentthereasareporter,eventuallytoputtogetheralongstoryonhowpolitics,peopleand

paincametogetherinKandythatyear.Butinthatmoment,oryearslaterasIwritethis,I

canbetterdescribetoyouhowoneman’sgazecloudedoverasheexplainedtousthefire

thatnight,orthetensionontheother’sfacewhenhesaidpeoplestillavoidhisshop.

Readingreportsoftheanti-MuslimriotsthatspreadacrosstheKandydistrictthatyear,and

eventuallyreportingonthemtoo, illustratedthe ‘cyclesofviolence’ formeinresounding

clarity.Readingtheheadlinesthatflewaroundontheinternetfeltlikere-readingheadlines

fromarchivedoldnewspapersaboutBlackJulyof1983,orfromthosereportingthroughthe

mediablackoutinAluthgamaafewyearsahead.

Thereisoneviolentactthatgiveswaytoandisseentolegitimiseviolencedisproportionate

toitssize.Mobsbegintogroup,takingwell-definedroadsthattheyareclearlynotcharting

on the go, alluding to planning and information. Authorities put in place to protect the

innocentareseen tobeactivelyhelping themob,orpassivelynotdoingany ‘protecting’.

Peoplearemadetofeelunsafeintheirownhomes,justforbeingwhotheyare.

Seeingtheyearsofnear-identicalnewsreportsthatmarkhowthecyclerepeatedlyturns

invokestwoquestionsthatIonlyhavefragmentsofanswersfor.

Howhavewenotlearnedfromourpast?

Becausewechoosenotto.

Forhowlongmorewillwekeepfailing?

Foraslongasdivisionandsufferingbenefitssomebody.

2Amihrabisaprayernicheinthewallofamosque,placedfacingthedirectionofMecca(thedirectionatwhichthecongregationatamosquepraystowards).

55

Whatwasperhapsmoreupsettingthanthedestructionintheaftermathwasrevisitingthe

samelocationayearlatertofindthatverylittlehadbeendoneintermsofreconstruction.

Themen,theirbusinessesslowlyshutteringastheircustomersstayedaway.Themosque,

stillstrewnwithdebrisbecauseofthebureaucraticfrenzytoapprovebuilding.

Thesecycles then,areones thatwedeviseourselves.Weallowthemto turn,orwestick

somethinginthespokesthatkeepitfromeverworkingproperly.Theoppressionleadsto

violence, which ismet by paltry reparations that offer little relief. Most importantly, an

underlyingtensionthatisneverallowedtodissipate.

2019

Anelderlymaninawhitet-shirtisarrangingflowersandcandlesatastatuedowntheroad

from St. Anthony’s Church Kochchikade. Less than 24 hours before that he had been

arrangingbodies,andpiecesofbodies,inprotectivebagsinaline,waitingforambulances

topick themup. I could feelmychest tightenasheexplained thedamagedone to those

bodiesby thebombdetonated thatEasterSunday.Theshardsofglassoutside the iconic

shrinedidnotcomparetothedestructioninside.

Some20kilometresaway,womenmournoverthebodyofayounggirl.Onemomentsome

areprayingjanazah3overher,andminuteslater,somearerecitingtherosaryasshelayin

hercoffin.Sorestful,shealmostlookedlikeshewassleeping.Sheisborneontheshoulders

of the crowd to her final restingplace.Woven into her bodywere complex identities—

Christianmother,Muslimfather—andtracesofviolencethatdidnotdiscriminate.

Thehoursafterthenewsfirstbrokeofthebombingswerepassedinfrenziednumbness—

somuchtodoyetstillunabletoprocessanythingproperly.Everyonesaidheadingtosome

ofthesitesthedayafterwasabadidea,butsomethingcarriedustherethatIcouldn’tput

intowords.Whiteflagsflutteredfromlampposts,andmourningcrowdswalkedhouseto

house,andstill,otherspeeredinfromallpossiblevantagepointstoassessthedamagedone

tothebarricadedchurches.Inthatmomentitcamedowntotheweightofhowmanywehad

lost—anumberthatisstillgrowing—andtheviolenceinnocentshadbeensubjectto.

IdidnotattendchurchthatEasterSunday.IamChristian,andCatholicifonewantstoget

technical,andamnotaregularchurch-goer,buthadhopedtoattendalaterservice.Hearing

thenewsbreakandexperiencingeverythingintheaftermathfilledmewithasenseofguilt.

Not only for not having attended mass that morning, but because the incident — and

particularly,thedestructionatthechurches—hadshakenmedeeply,inawaythattothis

dayIcan’texplain.EverytimeIamoverwhelmedwiththoseemotions,alittlepartofmeasks

3JanazahtranslatestoMuslimfuneralrites(prayerand/orburial).InSriLanka,thetermisalsousedtorespectfullyrefertoadeceasedbody.

56

if there are any who would consider me not a good enough practicing Christian to be

experiencingthisgrief.Iknowitseemslikeanirrational,incorrectworry,butithauntsme.

IfeelitwhenIhearprayersatthememorialsdeclaringallthosewhodiedinKochchikade

andKatuwapitiya‘martyrs’fortheirfaith.ThisunsettlesmebecauseIfeel,withlittledoubt,

thateveryonewhowenttochurchthatdaydidn’twanttoorchoosetodie.Thisisevidentin

themeals half-prepared at homes, in the familieswho hadwaited to see loved ones for

celebrationslaterthatday.MaybeI’mmissinganydeepertheologicalreasonforcallingthem

anythingbutjustinnocents.Innocentswhofellvictimtoatragedythattheycouldn’thave

knownabout,thatstateentitiesknewaboutbutdidnothingtoprevent.

I feel this also because I firmly believe that any retelling of that Easter is not complete

withoutaccountingforthewidespreadIslamophobiainsocietyandthestatethatcameafter

it. Violence as barbaric as the bombings legitimizes violence even further — not my

statement,butanobservation.

ChristiansandCatholicspridethemselvesnow,onnothaving‘respondedviolently’tothe

bombings. Though there was no physical retaliation, and a flurry of public posts about

‘comingtogetherasanation’,therewerealsotheWhatsAppforwards,crypticprayersand

hissedrumoursthatsometimesborderon,butarequiteoftenfully-fledgedIslamophobic.

This type of messaging spread island-wide and turned to violence in the attacks in

Minuwangodaaswell.Tothisday,itpainsmetoseethekindofhatredthat‘butyousaw

whattheydidtoourchurches’haslegitimised.

Themeasuresthestatetookto‘respond’tothecrisisseemedtobeconstructedknowingthat

therewouldbenoquestionsaboutthem,andtheywerecorrect.Hijabi(personwearingthe

hijab, a head scarf)womenwalking on the roadwere refused tuk-tuk rides. Youngmen

carryingbackpackswhoseusernamesweredistinctlyMuslimwereprofiledandreportedby

theride-sharecabdriverstheyhired.Owningacopyofthebookmostholytoyourfaithwas

causeforarrest.

“TheCID4thFloorseemsliketheinsideofamosquenow.4SomanyMuslimmen,callingeachothertoprayerandduringRamazantobreakfast,”saidtherelativeofadetainee,one

ofhundredslanguishingwithoutcharge.

Tothisday,afterthetimewe’vehopefullyhadtoreflectonwhatledtothetragedyandhow

weresponded to it,peopleand leaderscontinue tosingleout theMuslimcommunity for

accountability.Muslimsmustbevigilantofpossibleextremismintheircommunity,Muslims

must denouncewhat is passed off as ‘religion’ by these groups,Muslimsmust condemn

extremistactstoshowtheircountrymenthattheycareforpeace.

4CIDreferstotheCriminalInvestigationDepartment(CID).ItistheprimaryinvestigativearmoftheSriLankanPolice.

57

ProbablythemostheartbreakingmessageIreceivedintheaftermathofthatAprilsaid‘I’m

sorry for everything that happened,my community failed you’— itwas from aMuslim

womanwhoIhadconnectedwithovertheinternet.Thattheentirecommunitywasmadeto

feeltheyneededtoapologizefortheactionsofsevenpeople,evenwhentheywerethefirst

toraisealarmsaboutZahranHashim’sactivityyearsago,shouldbeashametousall.5

2020

Aftermonthsofstaringatonlyscreens,wearefinallyabletositinthecommunityofwise

andwonderfulwomen.Resilient, strong,andallotheradjectives thatareusuallyused to

speakofwomenwho’vehadnochoicebuttobeso,owingtothesocial,politicalandeconomic

realitiesthey’vebeenmadetoface.

Aswespeak,Iamfeelingasenseofshamethatithastakenmethislongandtheoccasionof

a landmark ‘anniversary’ to visit thesewomen.They areNorthernMuslimswho, evicted

from their homes in 1990 by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), have either

returnedtotheirlandsorsetdownrootsinnewplaces.

Wearesippingteaandeatingvadai(savouryfriedsnack)inahomeinMullaitivuwhenthe

azaan(Islamiccalltoprayer)oftheclosestmosquecanbeheard.Whatthewomenhavesaid

hangsheavyasthevoiceintheloudspeakersreverberatesintheconfinesofthesmallhouse.

Theytellusofleavingwiththeclothesontheirbackandasmallshoppingbagfilledwith

preciousitems,muchofwhichwasconfiscated.Ofyearsspentlivingincamps,dependingon

thegenerosityofothers.

TheStoriesGoTwoWaysfromHere

Thereare thosewhoreturned to theplace theycalledhome,only to find ithadchanged

without leaving space for them. Though they spoke the same language,many still feel a

barrier—strengthened by their history and the current local administration—between

themandtheTamilpeople.InJaffna,thoughtheazaanringsfromthemosquesinthesmall

lanesandthesmallshopfrontsarefilledwithshorteatsthroughouttheday,wewalkedpast

empty homes or the traces of their foundations on overgrown land. Houseswherewild

plantsgrowtofilltheirspaces,vinesreachingoutoftheirwindows,claiminghomeinaplace

thathaslongstoodempty.

So, they are ‘back home’ but not really, especially as they note themanywho have not

returned.

Then thereare thosewho,nowrooted in theirplaceofdisplacement, forwhomareturn

wouldbea secondupheaval.Rooted,butnot always securely, for they remain ‘different’

5ZaharanHashimwasoneofthesuicidebombersoftheEasterSundayattacks.

58

Muslimstothosearoundthem.Thisdifferenceiscauseforyetanotherbarrier.Seekingthese

storiesinPuttalam,wespoketooneofthemostcourageousandcommittedwomenactivists

Iknow.Sherecalledherovernightdisplacementintearsandrebuildingalifewithherfamily

overthreedecades.So,shesaid,theyremaininastateofsuspensionalmost,betweentwo

‘homes’,thatbotharen’tassafeasahomeshouldideallyfeel.

TheirexistingsenseofnotbelongingislayerednowwiththescrutinyplacedonallMuslims

aftertheEasterbombings,withthefear(basedonlies)thatMuslimsspreadCOVID-19.Each

oftheseanotherturnofthecycle,tilltheiroppressionsareascompoundastheiridentity.

Twelve years of discussions, books, reports, fact-finding missions, conferences about

‘transitionaljustice’afterthewar,andthesewomenfeeltheircommunityhasbeenleftout

ateveryturn.Doyouseeusmentionedinanyactionplansaboutgoingforward,oneasks—

truthbetold,no.

Whereistherereconciliationforus,theyask,awordthatwithtimehascometomeanso

little,awordthatfeelsthatmuchemptiertothem.

Ididnotknowthishistoryofmyfamilytillveryrecently,ayoungwoman’s lamentspills

outsidetheconfinesofasmallmessagebox.Thestoryof theNorthernMuslims joinsthe

manyothersthatremainuntoldwidelyinSriLanka,becausetellingallourstorieswould

require confrontingandunderstanding—thingswenever seemready todo, things that

couldpossiblybreakthecycle.

2021

Thebaby’smotherlefttheroomasherhusband,thefather,pulledoutaplasticboxfilled

withbabyitems—combs,powder,lotion,cologne,softcloth—fromthebottomofapacked

cupboard.Heflippedopenitslidashespoketous,asifwhatlittlesoulandmemorywasleft

oftheirbabywaspreservedinthislittlecompartmentedboxoftransparentpinkplastic.The

childwasablessingthattheywaitedsixyearsfor,andhewastakenawayfromthemalltoo

soon.

Theyounggirlisfoldingalongdressthathasblueflowersonit.Hermother,whowouldhave

preparedherandwalkedwithhertoschool,nowlivesoninhermemory,andtheseobjects

thatremain.Forcedtogrowuptooearly,sheworriesthatshemightnotbeabletocontinue

schoolasshehastotakecareofthefamily.

Themanwhosevoiceshookasmuchashishandsdid,asheheldontoasmallpassport-sized

photo.Hismother,whohebathedandfed,andcombedherhairwithoutknowingitwould

be the last time hewould see her. Between the bureaucracy and the general haphazard

procedureofthehospitalshewasat,thenexttimeheheardofherwaswhentheycalledto

informhimofherdeath.

TobeSriLankanduringthepandemicmeantwantingtobesafeandnotcatchCOVID-19.

59

TobeaSriLankanMuslimatthetimemeantaferventwishthatyouwouldnotdieforas

longasthegazettemandatingcremations—defyingscience,reasonandempathy—wasin

place.

Iusethewordempathyhereveryintentionallybecauseittakesaspeciallackofempathyto

expect people to perform ‘last rites’ for their loved ones that directly oppose the rites

dictatedbytheirfaith.Thethoughtthatpromptedthatgazette,itssigningandpublication,

inthiscaseactingasanotherturninthecycleofhurtthatkeepsturning.

Alongtheouterfenceatthekanatte(cemetery)inBorella,whitepiecesofclothflutterinthe

wind.Theyarethefewthatremainfromthemanytiedtherebyasmallbutstronggroupof

peoplemonthsback,insolidarityandmourningthatturnedtodefiance.

TheideafortheclothsonthegateofthecemeteryhadcomefromsomeonewhosenameIdo

notknowyet.Thesimpleacthadbecomedefiantwhentheclothswereremovedbysecurity

personnelincivilianclothing,nodoubtonthebiddingofsomeonepowerfulyetthreatened

byafewwhitecloths.

Iremembervividlythefeelingofanxietyasyoungpeople—mostlyMuslim—calledand

sentmessagestosaytheyhadbeenstoppedandquestionedbyPolicewhentheywenttotie

aclothinsolidarity.Thestate’sapparentfearatsomethingassimpleasapieceofwhitecloth

maybeindicatedthattheclothswereinfact,morethansimple,thattheywieldedapower

weunderestimated.Afewdayslater,wewentwithagrouptotieclothsagain.Thedefiance

grew,asphotosemergedofthesewhiteflagstiedondoorhandles,gatesandChristmastrees.

Theyweretiedonthefencesofadministrationofficesbysmallgroupsofprotestorsaround

thecountry.

Allofusengagingintheseactionswerewellawarethatwewereminuteincomparisonto

thosewhobelieved—forracistandotherreasons—thatcremationsweretheonlypossible

way.Wewereminuteincomparisonwiththeirnumbersandalsogivenhowmanyinpower

endorsedthisdiscriminatorypolicytoo.

More often than not, these are the ratios; what feels like a whole universe that needs

improvement, and a small group seeking justice. However, ifwewere to calculate these

ratios and commit only to causes where we can foresee change immediately with our

demands,we’dprobablynevercommittoacauseatall.Ideally,weshouldbetakingastand

becauseitisrightandimportanttodoso,notonlybecauseweseeguaranteed‘victory’.

Andtheissueofcremationsseemedaworldawayfromthat.Monthaftermonth,evenafter

these actions, promises from leaders continued to ring hollow, and their statements

backtrackedonandcontradictedeachotherbytheday.

It was a few months after these incidents — but after close to a year in total — that

mandatory cremation was reversed, and burial allowed. Reversed as part of a larger

geopoliticalgame,andnotinresponsetothemultiplevoicesthat,fortheentire11months

60

prior,hadbeencallingoutingriefandhopethatthisstrainonthemandtheircommunity

wouldbelifted.

Burials,thoughpermitted,werenotmadeeasy.Anyfamily—orspecifically,twomembers

ofeachfamily—wishingtodosomustmakea200kmjourneytotheoppositecoastofthe

islandtoprayandintertheirlovedone’sbody.Inthepandemicsituation,thatsometimes

meant families spending hours frantically searching for vehicles to transport their loved

one’s janazah fromwhere theyarebeing treated, to theColombomorgue, fromwhere it

wouldbedispatchedtotheburialsite.Addinghassletogrief,asifthehurtwasn’tenough.

Undercurrent

Whatremainsundertheselayersofhurt?Or,moreaccurately,thisonelayerofhurtinthe

manythatplagueminoritiesandvulnerablepeopleinthiscountry.Alongwiththepolitical

gamesthatmaintaintension,theviolentspeechinmediaandelsewhereisanotherelement

thatremainsconstantacrossthestoriesfromtheseyears.

Knowing,withoutasenseofdoubt,that‘home’doesnotwantthemhere.

Wehaveabagpackedandourdocumentsready—theteacherinAluthgamawasthefirst

personwhotoldmethis.AfterDigana,aftertheEasterSundayattacksandduringtheperiod

of forced cremations, Iwouldhear this again inmanyvarying forms.Hushedvoices at a

gathering,orWhatsAppmessagesthatsomehowmanagedtotransmittheveryheavinessof

thewords.MuslimsIkneworfamiliesImetwhilereportinghadthisplanreadytoenactif

needed.

ManysaythatSriLankamovedfrombeinghostiletowardsTamilstonowhostiletowards

Muslims.Ifeelasifitwasanadditionandnotjustashiftin‘target’.Tamilsremainwaryof

thesituationhereinLanka,andbynomeanshasanygovernmentsincethewar’sendtruly

givenmostTamilsareasontofeelfullywelcomehere.TheMuslimsnowjointheminfeeling

thisinsecurity.

Forallweknow,many familieswhohad theirdocumentspreparedhavealready left the

island’sshores.Icanonlyhopethatthelandstheyleftto,welcomedthemandaretreating

thembetterthanSriLankadid.

Eveniftheyaren’t,maybethat’sagamblesometake—whereanyplaceisbetterthanthe

‘home’inwhichonefeelslikeastranger.

I’mnotsure ifallSriLankans,eventhoseofuswhoprideourselves inbeing ‘aware’and

‘engaged’,fullyunderstandwhatitmeanstobeputinapositionwhereyouneedtocross

oceansjusttofeelsafe,whatitmeansthattheplacethatshapedyouandthatyougaveyou

energyto,nownolongerwantsyou.

61

Thissoundsdramaticallypoeticinanabstractsense,anditisimportantthatIdon’tleaveit

justatthat.Itisthecombinationofpoliticalagendasandyearsofpolarizinginsocietythat

makesminoritycommunitiesfeelunwelcomehere.

Knowingtheserealities,knowingthatsuccessivegovernmentshaveplacedormaintained

targetsonthebackoftheirowncitizens,manystillquestionthe‘loyalty’ofpeoplefromthese

communitieswhentheyexpresstheirdesiretoresideelsewhere.

Whatexactlydotheyneedtobeloyalto?

Solidarity

Iwasasked tospecifically reflectonsolidarity for thispiece,what itmeans for someone

Christian/Catholic to regularly amplify issues faced by minority communities. There is

simultaneouslyalotandverylittletounpackhere.

Christianshavealsobeenatthereceivingendofdiscriminatorypoliciesandpracticesbythe

SriLankanstate.EvenaweekbeforetheEasterSundaybombings,agroupattackedasmall

Evangelicalchurch.Intheyearsafterthewar,thesechurcheshavebeensubjecttopressures

fromlegalmeans—exhaustiveprotocolswereputinplacebeforenewchurchescouldbe

established — and attacks against the pastors of these small churches have also been

documentedextensively.Theseincidentsareregularenoughthattheyshouldconcernusbut

becausetheyhavebeenrelegatedtotherankof‘lowintensity’incidents,theyarenotgiven

wideattentioninmediaandotherconversationspaces.

Catholicswho claim they arediscriminatedagainst for their faithmustbear inmind the

relativeprivilegewehave.Theproximitytoandfavourwiththoseinpowerthattheleader

of the church occupies shields the community from the weight that other Christian

denominations face, to the point that the said leader downplays the violence that small

evangelicalchurchesaresubjectto.Thesedetailswereevidentinthereconstructionafter

EasterSunday.ThetwoCatholicchurches—St.Anthony’sKochchikadeandSt.Sebastian’s

Katuwapitiya — were refurbished within two and three months of the tragic incident

respectively.

However,threemonthsafterthebombing,IstoodatthegatesoftheevangelicalZionChurch

Batticaloa—thedebrishadjustbeenclearedout.Oneyearlater, itstill lookedthesame,

pictures indicating that reconstruction had halted. To this day, the reconstruction of the

originalchurch,thatthegovernmentundertakesviathesecurityforces,remainsincomplete.

In addition to these, I can’t confidently say that Christians activelyworked to dispel the

hatreddirectedattheMuslimcommunityattheirexpensebythewidersociety,butmayhave

addedtoitthemselves.

FortheyearthatwejoinedourMuslimcomradesincallingforthereversalofthemandatory

cremations policy, people askedme “The rest of the Christians don’t have an issue, the

Catholicchurchdoesn’thaveanissue,what’syourproblem?”.

62

Withinayear,myfamilylosttwograndparents.Onewasburied,andtheotherwascremated.

Knowing that this is an option even outside of pandemic times, a method not directly

conflictingwitheverythingwebelievein,madememoreconsciousofwhatwasbeingasked

ofMuslimsatthistimealreadyladenwithgrief.

Asthesepastincidentshaveunfolded,anothermessagethatI’vereceivedalotisthatmany

Muslimsfeelthatnotmanypeoplespeakontheirbehalf,especiallyintermsofnon-Muslims.

Itisgut-wrenchingtohearfromsomanythattheyfeeltheirfriendsfromothercommunities

either don’t really care, or justify the oppression, or don’t want to be seen speaking up

publicly.

ItakestrengthinseeingandknowingseveralmembersoftheChristianclergywhoactively

takeastanceagainstinjusticeandexploitationofvulnerablepeople.Theyattendprotests,

butalsoworkquietlyintheirparishesbehindthescenestobuildbetterlivesforthepeople

intheirlocalities,whateverfaiththeymaybe.Theseindividualsintheirdailylivespractice

thekindofradicallovethatdistantinstitutionsonlypreach.

Idon’twantto,andshouldn’thaveto,listreasonsofallthethingsthattheMuslimcommunity

has given us in terms of culture, or that individual Muslims have given us in terms of

friendship,asapleatothosewhowouldratherstaysilent.Oursolidarityandcareshouldn’t

beatransaction.ThisiswhyIsayit’sverysimple,orseeminglyatleast.

WhenI—amongothers,Iambynomeanstheonlyone—speakoutaboutdiscrimination

againstMuslims,manyfriendsfromthecommunityask‘wheredoyougetthecourage?’To

be completely honest and straightforward, courage is not something one aims forwhen

takingastand.Yousaythingsbecausetheyneedtobesaid,becausepowerneedstobeheld

to account. It’s onlywhenpromptedwith this question, orwhen someone tells you that

you’vebeencourageous,doesitregisterinhindsight.Inthemoment,it’sverymuchabout

standingwiththosewhoneedyoursolidarityandsupport.

Intheyearssincetheendofthewar,howmuchhasbeenshiftedbythoseofuswhoseekto

record its layersof truthandexperiences?Ourclimate—indicated in the legal,political,

socialandothermethodswe’verespondedtoduringthesemorerecentevents—remainsin

manywaysdifferentbutalsosimilartowhatwelivethroughtoday.WhenI‘lookback’at

theseincidents—orlookaround,consideringhowpervasivetheireffectsare—Iwonder

whatI’veactuallybroughttothetableintalkingaboutthemorwritingaboutthem.

Idon’tthinkanyofuswhodothisworkhaveanyillusionoftheinfluenceandimpactthat

wehave.Wearewellawareoftheforcesweareupagainst—thepower,themoney,the

willingness to sacrifice people’s humanity for those things, and the complicity and

complacencythatallowsthemtohappen.

Maybeit’sspendingtimelisteningtopeoplewhoeitherfelttheyhavenotbeenlistenedto

before,orwhofeeltheirwordsaremisinterpretedbyotherstoservetheiragendas.Listening

andobservingmorethanjustthefactsofthestoriesbutforthehumanitythatunderpins

63

them—thefalteringwhisper,thedefiantvoice,thehandsclaspedtogetherandthequiet

smilesladenwithhope.

Maybeit’sinputtingonrecordthethingsthatthestateandsocietyarecapableof—violence

andhatredthatwe’dprefertodistancefrom,thatwe’drathergounwrittenorwrittenabout

inawatered-downmanner.Inacountrywherepoliticalwillforjusticeissoscarce,wecan’t

even be assured that recording this will inform any change, but we must record it

nonetheless.

Maybeit’sthesimpleactoflettingpeoplewhosaytheyarefacinginjusticeknowthatyou

hear them and that youwill not accept this aswell. It’s in asking questions that dissect

decisionsandrealitiesthatwouldotherwisegounquestioned.

Peopleusetheterm‘activism’toindicatetheportionofthisworkthatisactuallyvisible—

postsonsocialmediaorparticipationinaprotest.Somuchofitactuallyhingesonthetime

spentwithpeople,andthattheyknowtheirvoicesareheard.Asthesituationworsensfor

MuslimsinSriLanka,Ithinkoftenofthepeoplewhosestoriesarenarratedhereandcan

onlyhopethattheyknowtheirstorieshavenotgoneuntold.

Wedothemost thatwecan—eventhough itmayseemsmall in theoverwhelmingand

difficultrealitythat—inthehopesofbuildingsomethingbetter.

64

WhenHateGoesViral:AnExplorationintoCOVID-19relatedOnlineAnti-MuslimSpeechinSriLanka

HashtagGeneration1

SenelWanniarachchi,PriheshRatnayakeandHarindriniCorea

Background

Internet penetration in Sri Lanka has continued to grow in recent years. Social media

platforms, such as Facebook, have established themselves as key platforms for the

circulation of news, analysis and opinions in Sri Lanka’s public sphere. Social media

dominatesasasourceofnewsonlinewithFacebookandYouTubebeingthemostpopular

socialmediaplatformsinSriLanka.2Assuch, inthisageofhyperconnectivityenabledbysocial media, the speed at which false and hateful messages, including rumours and

conspiracy theories about minority communities and slurs that dehumanise particular

individuals and communities, spread and circulate has accelerated to an unprecedented

degree.3Theeaseofaccessoftheseplatforms,aidedbytheabilitytoremainanonymous,have facilitated the reach of such messages transcending national boundaries and

internationalborders.

Hatespeech—inmainstreammediaandsocialmedia4—hastriggeredreal-lifeviolence

againstminoritycommunitiesinSriLankaincludingandespeciallytheMuslimcommunity

blurringthelinesbetweentheonlineandtheofflineworlds.Intheisland,onlinespaceshave

beenusedtomobiliserioterstoattackminoritycommunities including intheirspacesof

1HashtagGenerationisanorganisationledandrunbyagroupofyoungtech-savvySriLankansadvocatingformeaningfulcivicandpoliticalparticipationofyouth,especiallyyoungwomenandyouthfromminoritygroups.Thegroupadoptsanon-partisanapproachandworkswiththestrongconvictionthatdecision-makingatalllevelsshouldremaintransparentandinclusiveinordertoremainsustainableandbuildlastingpeaceinSriLanka.Wemobilisesocialandnewmediatoolstoraiseawarenessandcatalysedialogueonimportantsocialissues.Ourworkhasrangedfromadvocatingforyouthparticipationindecision-making,strengtheningwomen’scivicandpoliticalengagement,advocacyfortherightsofethnic,religiousandsexualminoritiesandraisingawarenessontheimportanceofcybersecurityandcounteringmisinformationandonlinehatespeech.HashtagGenerationalsohasanongoingsocialmediamonitoringexercisewhereonlineharmfulspeech,includinghatespeech,disinformation,harassmentandorganisedadvocacyofviolenceareflagged,archivedandanalysed.Thissubmissionisinformedby(amongotherthings)thefindingsofthismonitoringexercise.

2NalakaGunawardene,SriLankaMediaAudienceStudy2019:ConsumingNewsinTurbulentTimes,(IMS2020).

3CatheringBlaya,‘Cyberhate:Areviewandcontentanalysisofinterventionstrategies’,(2019)45AggressionandViolentBehavior163-172.

4Whilewehavedistinguishedbetween‘mainstream’andsocialmediahereforanalyticalpurposes,wehavearguedelsewherethatsuchabinarydoesnotexist.

65

worship,residenceandenterprise.ThiswasseeninDigana,AmparaandAluthgama,where

Facebookwasusedasaplatformtoconvene individualsand incitegroupsofpeople into

committingviolenceontheground.5

TheCOVID-19pandemicinfluencedsocialanddigitalmediaconsumptioninSriLanka,as

wasthecaseglobally.Withthespreadofthecoronaviruswhichoverburdenedhealthcare

systems,awaveofhatespeechanddisinformationcampaignsalsobegantocirculate,within

thebodypolitic.Someofthesecampaignsalsoledtotheincreasedstigmatisationofminority

groupsandinsomecases,ledtothelegitimisationofharassmentandviolenceontheground.

We have termed this kind of speech, COVID-19 related hate speech, i.e. speech that

encompassesabroadrangeofstatementsagainstcertainindividualsandgroupsthathas

emergedorbeenaggravatedasaresultofthenewcoronavirusoutbreak.Theseinclude,but

are not limited to, scapegoating, stereotyping, stigmatisation and the use of derogatory,

misogynistic,racist,xenophobiclanguageincludingandespeciallyanti-Muslimlanguage.

InSriLanka,thepoliticalclimateofethno-nationalismandmajoritariantriumphalism,6thatemergedintheaftermathoftheendofthecivilwarin2009,formsthebackgroundtothe

emergence of anti-Muslim narratives and violence against Muslims.7 As Nirmal RanjithDewasiri says, “During the civil war the LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] was

perceivedasthemainthreatthatovershadowedpotentialothersagainstSinhala-Buddhist

wellbeing”.8Consequently,post-warSriLankasawtheriseofanewwaveofextremistultra-nationalism that framed the Muslim minority as ‘another Other’. Sinhala-Buddhist

ethnonationalistgroups,suchastheBoduBalaSena(BBS)“turnedontheMuslimcommunity

and began to see them as demographic and economic threats”9 to the Sinhala Buddhistnation.AttacksagainstMuslimsescalatedinsubsequentyears.Theanti-Muslimmovement10

5‘OpenlettertoFacebook:ImplementYourOwnCommunityStandards’(CentreforPolicyAlternatives,10April2018)<https://www.cpalanka.org/open-letter-to-facebook-implement-your-own-community-standards/>accessed17May2021.

6NirupamaSubramanian,‘InSriLanka’santi-Muslimviolence,anechoofpost-warSinhalatriumphalism’,TheIndianExpress(7March2018)<https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/sri-lanka-emergency-s-anti-muslim-violence-an-echo-of-post-war-sinhala-triumphalism-5088617/>accessed17May2021.

7ASarjoon,MAYusoff,NHussin,‘Anti-MuslimSentimentsandViolence:AMajorThreattoEthnicReconciliationandEthnicHarmonyinPost-WarSriLanka’,(2016)7(10)Religions125.

8NirmalRanjithDewasiri,NewBuddhistExtremismandtheChallengestoEthno-ReligiousCoexistenceinSriLanka,(InternationalCentreforEthnicStudies2016).

9C.H.Ivarsson,‘Lion’sblood:socialmedia,everydaynationalismandanti-MuslimmobilisationamongSinhala-Buddhistyouth’(2016)27(2)ContemporarySouthAsia.Abingdon:Taylor&Francis.

10FarzanaHaniffa,‘ThreeattemptsatpeaceinSriLanka:AcriticalMuslimperspective’(2011)6(1)JournalofPeacebuildingandDevelopment49-62.

66

andtheuseoftheethnicriotasapoliticalinstrumentofmajoritarianism11wasreflectedintheanti-Muslimriotsin2014and201812andintheaftermathoftheEasterSundayattacksof2019.13

Much of these post-war ethno-nationalist mobilisations were aided by social media

conspiratorialism.Thisgrowth inharmful speechagainstMuslimshasbeendocumented,

especiallyintheaftermathoftheEasterSundayattacks14andwithrelationtotheCOVID-19pandemic.15

Objectives

Themainobjectiveofthisarticleistoinvestigatetheprevalenceofharmfulspeechagainst

theMuslim community and the increasing normalisation of anti-Muslim sentiments and

rhetoricintheSriLankanCOVID-19pandemiccontext.

ResearchDesignandMethods

Thefindingsofthisstudyarebasedonthesocialmediamonitoringoperationconductedby

HashtagGeneration16asperoutlinedinthestep-by-stepprocessbelow:

1.Identificationofsocialmediaplatforms

2.Useofmonitoringtools/software

3.Developmentofalexicon

4.Developmentofarepositoryof‘actorsofconcern’

11PremakumaradeSilva,FarzanaHaniffaandRohanBastin,‘EthnicityandViolenceinSriLanka:AnEthnohistoricalNarrative’,(2019)inS.Ratuva(ed.),ThePalgraveHandbookofEthnicity,PalgraveMacmillan,Singapore.

12RohanaGunaratna,‘Sinhala-MuslimRiotsinSriLanka:TheNeedforRestoringCommunalHistory’(2018)10(4)CounterTerroristTrendsandAnalyses1-4.

13AlanKeenan,‘SriLanka’sEasterBombings:PeacefulCoexistenceUnderAttack’InternationalCrisisGroup(23April2019)<https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/sri-lankas-easter-bombings-peaceful-coexistence-under-attack>accessed17May2021.

14ReportoftheSpecialRapporteuronfreedomofreligionorbelief(2020).

15TheInternationalMovementAgainstAllFormsofDiscriminationandRacism(IMADR)(2020)Inputsforthematicreportontheriseofanti-semitismandotherformsofracism,racialdiscrimination,xenophobiaandrelatedintoleranceintimesofCOVID-19.

16‘HashtagGeneration–PromotingCivicConsciousness’(n.d.).HashtagGeneration<https://hashtaggeneration.org/>accessed1February2021.

67

5.Developmentofdefinitions/categoriesforharmfulspeech

6.Documentation/archivingofharmfulspeechinSinhala,TamilandEnglish

The process focuses on the identification, collection and analysis of content that would

amount to harmful speech, including hate speech and disinformation. The monitoring

exerciseisconductedbyadedicatedteamofsocialmediaanalystswithtrilingualcapability

in Sinhala, Tamil and English.Monitoring via social listening tools is supplementedwith

searches based on keywords from a comprehensive lexicon (of slurs etc.) as well as

proactivelymonitoring‘actorsofconcern’.

Facebook and YouTube as the most popular social media platforms in Sri Lanka are

monitored regularly. After conducting the monitoring exercise and determining what

content constitutes harmful speech, such content is recorded and archived. Finally, the

documentationprocesscapturesdisaggregateddemographicdatawheresuchinformation

is publicly available. Recording data in this manner enables the compilation of a

comprehensive database. It also enables comparative analysis, trend analysis, the

identificationofperpetratorsofharmfulspeech,andtheidentificationof‘hotspot’locations

forharmfulspeech.

The following analysis presents some of the findings from social media monitoring

conductedfromApriltoDecember2020.

FindingsofAnti-MuslimHateSpeech

The outbreak and spread of the COVID-19 pandemic in Sri Lanka in 202017 led to anintensification of anti-Muslim rhetoric online, including hate speech, disinformation and

harassment. 25.7 percent of all recorded harmful speech content between March and

December2020wastargetedattheMuslimcommunity.Thisaccountedfor84.7percentof

allcontentaimedataparticularethnic/religiousgroup(othercontenttargetedwomenor

variouspolitical actors for example). This points to the increasingnormalisationof anti-

Muslimsentimentaswellasthewidespreadcirculationofrumoursandconspiracytheories

targetingtheMuslimcommunityduringthisperiod.

17DilanthiAmeratungaetal,‘TheCOVID-19OutbreakinSriLanka:ASynopticAnalysisFocusingonTrends,Impacts,RisksandScience-PolicyInteractionProcesses,’(2020)8Progressindisasterscience.

68

WhenthefirstCOVID-19relateddeathinSriLankaoccurredonthe28thofMarch202018,therewaskeeninterestamongsocialmediauserstoidentifytheethnicityofthevictim19intheaftermathofthedeath,demonstratingthedeeplyentrencheddivisionsinthecountry.

This also led to an increase in anti-Muslim rhetoricwhich suggested thatMuslimswere

‘spreadingthevirusdeliberately’.

Thedecisiontoimposemandatorycremationforallvictimsofthediseasewastakenbythe

state20despiteprotestsfromtheMuslimcommunityandcivilsocietyactorsthatcremationwasaviolationofIslamicburialpractice.Theseactorsalsopointedoutthatthebestpractices

stipulatedbytheWorldHealthOrganization(WHO)permittedeitherburialsorcremations

forthosewhohavediedfromthecoronavirusinfection.21Thismandatorycremationpolicy22hasbeenatthecentreofanti-MuslimnarrativesrelatedtotheCOVID-19pandemic.Anti-

Muslimnarrativeswhichhavesustainedovertheyearsincludingparanoiathatthereisan

‘Islamic invasion’ in Sri Lanka with the Muslim community seeking to establish a

demographicmajoritywithintheislandthroughthe‘sterilisation’ofthe‘Sinhalarace’and

‘invasion’ of the Sinhala ‘motherland’, were intensified with allegations that the Muslim

communityis‘alwaysaskingforspecialtreatment’,thattheMuslims‘arenotwillingtomake

anysacrificesevenduringanationalemergency’andthat‘PresidentGotabayaRajapaksahas

a democraticmandate from 6.9million Sri Lankans that voted for him during the 2019

Presidential Election to continue the mandatory cremation policy as this is what his

constituents want.’ Several ‘experts’ including a doctor, attempted to provide ‘scientific

legitimacy’totheseclaimsbystatingthat‘MuslimswantedtoburyCOVIDbodiessothatthey

couldlaterbeusedasabio-weapon’.23

18‘SriLankaRecordsFirstDeathDueToCoronavirus,’TheTimesofIndia,(29March2020)<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/sri-lanka-records-first-death-due-to-coronavirus/articleshow/74872037.cms>accessed17May2021.

19KshamaRanawana,‘SriLanka:FightingCoronaandtheLiesinitsWake,’InternationalMediaSupport,(2April2020)<https://www.mediasupport.org/fighting-corona-and-the-lies-in-its-wake/>accessed17May2021.

20‘SriLankaMakesCremationsCompulsoryforCoronavirusDeaths,’AlJazeera,(12April2020)<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/4/12/sri-lanka-makes-cremations-compulsory-for-coronavirus-deaths>accessed17May2021.

21WorldHealthOrganization,InfectionPreventionandControlfortheSafeManagementofaDeadBodyintheContextofCOVID-19,(2020).

22‘SriLanka:CompulsoryCremationofCOVID-19BodiesCannotContinue,sayUNExperts’,(OfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRights,OHCHR25January252021)<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26686&LangID=E>accessed17May2021.

23‘Smallfearwhetherthedeadbodieswiththeviruscanbeusedasbiologicalweapons-Dr.ChannaPereratellsBBC,’LankaLeader,(16April2020)<https://english.theleader.lk/news/690-small-fear-whether-the-dead-bodies-with-the-virus-can-be-used-as-biological-weapons-dr-channa-perera-tells-bbc>accessed17May2021.

69

Anti-MuslimrhetoricreachedapeakwhentheleaderoftheSriLankaMuslimCongressRauff

HakeemissuedastatementagainstthecremationofthesecondvictimofCOVID-19whowas

a Muslim.24 This event triggered a large scale hate campaign and targeted harassmentdirectedatHakeeminparticularandtheMuslimcommunityingeneral.

The behaviour of mainstream media platforms along with the statements25 made byprominentfigures,especiallypoliticians26fuelledanti-Muslimsentiments.BytheendofthefirstweekofApril,therewereatleast4800postsonFacebookaroundvariousanti-Muslim

sentiments.Theseincludesstatementsmadeonthecompulsorycremations27;someofthesestatements referred to Muslims as ‘bio-terrorists’28 and ‘super spreaders’29 of the virus.Thesepostsgarnered292,500interactionsintotal.

24YohanPereraandAjithSiriwardana,‘CivicResistanceIfGovt.DoesNotAllowBurialofMuslimCOVID-19Victims:Hakeem’,DailyMirror,(23April2021)<http://www.dailymirror.lk/breaking_news/Civic-resistance-if-Govt-does-not-allow-burial-of-Muslim-COVID-19-victims-Hakeem/108-201586>accessed17May2021.

25OmarSuleiman,‘LikeIndia,SriLankaisusingcoronavirustoStigmatiseMuslims,’AlJazeera,(20May2020)<https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/5/20/like-india-sri-lanka-is-using-coronavirus-to-stigmatise-muslims>accessed17May2021.

26S.Qazi,&A.Thasleem,‘AnguishAsSriLankaForcesMuslimstoCremateCOVID-19Victims,’AlJazeera,(3April2020)<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/4/3/anguish-as-sri-lanka-forces-muslims-to-cremate-covid-19-victims>accessed17May2021.

27ArjunaRanawana,‘HakeemCallsCremationofMuslimCOVID19Victim“Reprehensible,’EconomyNext,(31March2020)<https://economynext.com/hakeem-calls-cremation-of-muslim-covid19-victim-reprehensible-63220/>accessed17May2021.

28‘කැ#රාව'(නමකබදාෙගන/ණටකැස්ස45ගලයා89බඳෙපා<=ය>පර?කර@’,NewsNow,(25April2020),<https://www.newsnow.lk/%E0%B6%9A%E0%B7%90%E0%B6%9A%E0%B7%92%E0%B6%BB%E0%B7%8F%E0%B7%80-%E0%B7%84%E0%B7%92%E0%B6%B8%E0%B7%92%E0%B6%B1%E0%B6%B8%E0%B6%9A-%E0%B6%B6%E0%B6%AF%E0%B7%8F%E0%B6%9C%E0%B7%99%E0%B6%B1-%E0%B6%B8/>accessed17May2021.

29MeenakshiGanguly,‘SriLankanOfficialsStokeCovid-19CommunalHate,’HumanRightsWatch,(19May2020),<https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/19/sri-lankan-officials-stoke-covid-19-communal-hate>accessed17May2021.

70

ThefollowingpostsweresharedwidelytowardstheendofthemonthofMarch:

As an example of such a post on

Facebook,whichstatesthat‘lasttime

nana(aderogatorycolloquialtermfor

Muslimmales)didit,seemslikenana

willdoitthistimetoo’.

The‘it’referredtoherearethe2019

EasterSundayattacksandCOVID-19

surges,respectively.

71

Theseposts inferred thatMuslimsare ‘putting theentirepopulationatriskbyspreading

coronavirus’while alsomaking references to the Easter attackswhich took place in the

previous year (2019). The posts insinuate that ‘this time too the Muslims have put the

countryanditspeopleindanger’.

ThefollowingpostsarefromthebeginningofApril:

Thispoststates, ironically, that ‘they

should have let Rauff Hakeem, the

leaderofthemainMuslimparty,and

everyoneelsewhowascryingtohug

and kiss the body before it was

buried’.

Thepostinquiresastowhowouldlike

tohearofRauffHakeempassingaway

due toCOVID-19.The implication,of

course,iswishingCOVID-19infection

anddeathuponHakeem.

72

MP Rauff Hakeem was the target of hateful messaging after his remarks about the

government’sdecisionagainstallowingburialsforCOVIDdeaths.Manyofthesemessages

wished death uponHakeem. According toHashtag Generation’s data, April recorded the

highest amount of Anti-Muslim content and the backlash received by Hakeem was the

biggestdriverofsuchspeech.

Itmustbenotedthatexpertsfromthemedico-scientificcommunityincludingtheSriLanka

MedicalAssociation(SLMA),30theCollegeofCommunityPhysiciansofSriLanka(CCSPL),31andaneleven-memberExpertPanelappointedbytheMinistryofHealth32subsequently(inJanuary2021)confirmedthatbothcremationandburialsareacceptableinaccordancewith

therecommendationsoftheWHO.Furthermore, inresponsetothemandatorycremation

policyand the forcible cremationof a twentydaysold infant,33 against thewishesof theparents,organisedexpressionsofoutragebyMuslimCommunityorganisations,theirallies

and civil society organisations began to emerge.34 This included a campaign to tiewhitehandkerchiefs at the entrance of the Borella Kanaththa (cemetery) crematorium in

Colombo.35Thisformofsilentprotestwasalsoadoptedinotherpartsofthecountry,bytyingapieceofwhiteclothingaroundthewrists,ongatesofresidencesandattheentrancesof

somegovernmentoffices.36Thehashtag#StopForcedCremationsrecordedover2000postsonFacebook.However,itwasalsoreportedthatSriLankaPoliceremovedthebannersand

whitehandkerchiefs/ribbonsthatweretiedbytheprotestorsattheBorellacrematorium,

violatingtheirrighttopeacefulprotest.

30‘SriLankaCanBuryitsCovidVictims,’Newsfirst,(3January2021)<https://www.newsfirst.lk/2021/01/03/sri-lanka-can-bury-covid-19-victims-slma/>accessed17May2021.

31‘CCPSLSaysNoSolidEvidenceIndicatingBurialofCovid-19VictimsIncreasesSpreadofVirus,’DailyFT,(1January2021)<http://www.ft.lk/news/CCPSL-says-no-solid-evidence-indicating-burial-of-COVID-19-victims-increases-spread-of-virus/56-710986>accessed17May2021.

32‘CremationVs.Burial:ExpertPanelRevisesRecommendationtoIncludeBothCremationAndBurialofCovid-19DeadBodies,’ColomboTelegraph,(2January2021),<https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/cremation-vs-burial-expert-panel-revises-recommendation-to-include-both-cremation-and-burial-of-covid-19-dead-bodies/>accessed17May2021.

33‘Covid-19:SriLankaForciblyCrematesMuslimBabySparkingAnger,’BBC,(26December2020),<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55359285>accessed17May2021.

34‘SriLanka:Covid-19ForcedCremationofMuslimsDiscriminatory,’reliefweb,(18January2021),<https://reliefweb.int/report/sri-lanka/sri-lanka-covid-19-forced-cremation-muslims-discriminatory>accessed17May2021.

35‘WhiteHandkerchiefsTiedAroundTheGateofBorellaCemeterytoCommemorateForcedCremationOf20-DayInfantRemovedOvernight,’AsianMirror,(14December2020)<https://asianmirror.lk/news/item/32647-white-handkerchiefs-tied-around-the-gate-of-borella-cemetery-to-commemorate-forced-cremation-of-20-day-infant-removed-overnight>accessed17May2021.

36Amalini,‘Photosofacitizens'campaignacrosstheNorthernandEasternProvincescallingonGoSLtorespectminorityreligiousrightsand#StopForcedCremations’,(Twitter,16December2020)<https://twitter.com/Amaliniii/status/1339097556702404608>accessed17May2021.

73

TheannouncementbyPrimeMinisterMahindaRajapaksainFebruary202137thatburialsofCOVID-19 victimswouldbe allowed and the subsequent publication of anExtraordinary

GazettenotificationofficiallyallowingtheburialofCOVID-19victims38ledtofurtheranti-MuslimcontentwhichwasmainlyobservedonYouTube.Overall,therevocationofthepolicy

wasnotpositivelyreceivedbymanysocialmediausers.WhilemostMuslimswelcomedthe

move,otherswereobservedtobecriticalofit,citingitadeviationofthegovernment’s‘one

countryonelaw’concept.Severalpagesandgroupspostedsatiricalpostssuggestiveofthe

opposition mocking this decision as a contravention of the government’s usual

ethnonationalisttone,whichonlyfuelledtheongoinganti-Muslimcontent.

AnincidentwhereitwasreportedthatanindividualhadvisitedatempleinKekirawaand

‘coughedsoastospitonthefaceofthemonk’wastrendingonFacebookinthelastweekof

April2020.A totalof160postsamounting toaround14000 interactionsreferredto this

incident.Manyobservationsontheincidentsuggestedthatitwasa‘bio-terroristmovebya

Muslim’whohad‘enteredthetemplebyforceandsubsequentlyfledthescene’.However,

the police have since refuted the claim. Furthermore, the police complaint filed by the

Buddhistmonkdoesnotspecifytheethnicorreligiousbackgroundofthesuspect.

Furthermore, the Chairperson of the Public Health Inspectors’ (PHI) Union of Sri Lanka,

duringaninterviewonapopularmediachannelinApril2020,suggestedthatthespreadof

COVID-19couldbeattributedtothreeindividualsfromthreeMuslimmajorityareasinSri

Lanka(i.e.threeMuslims)39whichattractedsignificantattentiononsocialmedialeadingtofurtheranti-Muslimconversations.

TheresurgenceoftheCOVID-19pandemicinOctober2020wasreportedasarisingfroma

clusterofcasesinapparelfactoriesbelongingtoBrandixApparelLimited40.Amidstconcernsandcriticismregardingtheemergenceofthe‘BrandixCluster’,therewaswidespreadanti-

Muslimcontentonsocialmediawhichtargetedmembersoftheseniormanagementofthe

company.ThecontenttargetedAshroffOmar,theChiefExecutiveOfficerofBrandix.Some

of thecontentcirculatedsuggestedthat this ‘Muslimcompany’sSeniorManagement’was

‘moreevilthanZahran’,theallegedleaderofthegroupthatperpetratedtheEasterSunday

attacksof2019.

37‘SriLankatoAllowCOVIDBurialsforMuslimsafterOutcry,’AlJazeera,(10February2021),<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/10/sri-lanka-allows-first-covid-burial>accessed17May2021.

38‘GazettePublishedAllowingBurialofCovid-19Victims,’AdaDerana,(25February2021)<http://www.adaderana.lk/news/71873/gazette-published-allowing-burial-of-covid-19-victims>accessed17May2021.

39AyeshaZuhair,‘DisinformationIsDamagingSriLanka’sCOVID-19Response’,DailyFT,April132020,<http://www.ft.lk/columns/Disinformation-is-damaging-Sri-Lanka-s-COVID-19-response/4-698822>accessed17May2021.

40‘BrandixClusterPasses1,000ConfirmedCasesInSriLanka’sBiggestCOVID-19OutbreakYet,’EconomyNext,(7October72020)<https://economynext.com/brandix-cluster-passes-1000-confirmed-cases-in-sri-lankas-biggest-covid-19-outbreak-yet-74514/>accessed17May2021.

74

This image contains a photo of Brandix chief operating officer Ashroff Omar. The

accompanyingtextstatesthatOmarhasmanagedto‘manipulatethePresidentwhocould

notbedefeatedintheelection,andhadheapedmiseryontheentirecountry’,referringto

theCOVID-19outbreakataBrandixplant inMinuwangoda.Thecaptionstatesthat ‘even

Zaharanwasunabletocausethismuchharm’.

InteractionBetweenHarmfulSpeechandDisinformation

InSriLanka,avastmajorityofanti-Muslimharmfulspeechonlineisoftenfoundintheforms

of disinformation. These include assertions that Muslims are sterilising women of the

majoritySinhalacommunitythroughfoodservedatMuslim-ownedrestaurants41orclothingitemssoldatMuslim-ownedbusinesses.42There isalsoanarrative that therehasbeena

41‘WhenTheUneducatedAre....NourishedonADietofMythsAnd‘InfertilityPills,’DailyMirror,(23March2018)<http://www.dailymirror.lk/expose/When-the-uneducated-are-Nourished-on-a-diet-of-myths-and-infertility-pills/333-147668>accessed17May2021.

42‘Women’sBodies,MasculinitiesandEconomicInsecurities,’DailyFT,(22March2018)<http://www.ft.lk/columns/Women-s-bodies--masculinities-and-economic-insecurities/4-651751>accessed17May2021.

75

growthintheMuslimpopulationinrecentyearstointentionallyoutnumbertheSinhalese.43Suchanenmeshmentofdisinformationandhatespeech isnotanewphenomenon inSri

Lanka. Ina2019report,HashtagGenerationnoted44 that “thecombinationofmisleadinginformationandhate speechwithinethno-nationalistpages...potentially endangers social

cohesioninSriLanka.”

Anotableincidentwheretheboundariesofhatespeechanddisinformationwereblurred

wastheaccusationdirectedatDoctorShafiShihabdeen—aMuslimphysicianwhopracticed

at theKurunagala government hospital— that he ‘sterilised 4,000 Sinhalesewomen’. In

2019Dr.ShafiwasarrestedunderthePreventionofTerrorismActonsuspicionofillegally

gainedwealth.However,aftertwomonth’sdetention,Shafiwasreleasedonbailasnational

policeinvestigatorstoldthecourtthattheyhadnotfoundevidenceforanyofthecharges

againstDr.Shafiandaccusedlocalpolice,themagistrateandhospitalofficialsoffalsifying

documents.45

Similarly, inApril2020,manylocalnewssites,especially ‘gossippages’reportedthatthe

GovernoroftheEmirateofSharjah,intheUnitedArabEmirates(UAE)has‘bannedburials

ofthosewhodieofCOVID-19’.This‘news’wassharedwidelyalongwithcaptionssuggesting

thatSriLankanMuslimsaremaking‘unreasonable’demandstoburytheirdeadwheneven

‘Muslimcountries’arebeingmore ‘accommodating’.However,theEmbassyoftheUAEin

Colombosoonissuedastatementclarifyingthattherestrictiononburialswasonlyimposed

onaspecificareaofthecity‘duetothelackofspace’butnosuchcity-widebanhadbeen

imposed.46

Severalanti-Muslimdisinformationnarrativessurroundingtheissueofcremationreceived

widespreadcirculation.Forinstance,inNovember2020,aletter,signedbytheSecretaryof

Muslim community organisation Ceylon Thowheed Jamath (CTJ) and published on their

official Facebook page, thanking the government for approving burial for Muslims who

succumbtoCOVID-19,receivedwidespreadviewsonline.Theconversationalsodrewlarge

volumes of ethnonationalist responses. Pages alignedwith opposition political parties in

particularcapitalisedonnarrativessuchasthosearoundtheCTJletterattemptingtosuggest

43SrinivasMazumdaru,‘anti-MuslimNarratives'InflameSriLankaCommunalTensions,’DeutscheWelle(DW),(7March72018)<https://www.dw.com/en/anti-Muslim-narratives-inflame-sri-lanka-communal-tensions/a-42868563>accessed17May2021.

44DemocracyReportingInternational,‘SocialMediaAnalysisWhatFacebookTellsUsAboutSocialCohesionInSriLanka,’(February2019)BriefingPaper97.

45‘SriLankamagistrategrantsbailtoillegallydetainedMuslimdoctor,’EconomyNext,(25July2019);‘Dr.Shafitofiledamagesagainst‘witch-hunters’’,TheSundayObserver,(4August2019).SriLanka’stopobstetricianshavecastdoubtontheaccusationsagainstDr.Shafi.‘Delvinginto‘SterilisationStory’,DailyMirror,(7June2019).

46‘UAEEmbassyDeniesReportsofBanningtheBurialofCOVID-19Victims,’TheMorning,(6April2020)<https://www.themorning.lk/uae-embassy-denies-reports-of-banning-the-burial-of-covid-19-victims/>accessed17May2021.

76

thatthegovernmentwhichrantheirelectioncampaignonamandateto‘promoteBuddhism’

has‘givenin’tothepleasoftheMuslimminority.

Inthesamevein,inJanuary2021,avideofeaturingapopularbiologytuitionteachernamed

Tissa Jananayake received widespread traction. In the video, Jananayake discusses ‘the

COVID-19virus’spotentialtotransmititselfviadeadbodies’. Jananayakeisawell-known

figurewithalargesocialmediafollowing,particularlyamongyoungpeople—asofJanuary

31st 2021, his Facebook page had 576,937 likes and his YouTube channel had 486,000subscribers.BytheendofthemonthofJanuary,thevideoinquestionhadrecordedover

370,700 views on Facebook and 216,824 views on YouTube. Of the reactions the video

garneredonFacebook,thevastmajoritywerepositivewithover13,000 ‘likes’and2,000

‘heartreactions’.Hisstatusasateacherprovideshimwithwhatmanyseeasanauthoritative

voice.

Bale,J.M.suggeststhatconspiracytheoriesfulfilcertainimportantpsychologicalneedsby

making’complexpatternsofcauseandeffectinhumanaffairsmorecomprehensiblethrough

meansofreductionismandoversimplification’.47ThewordconspiracyisderivedfromtheLatinwordconspirewhichmeans‘tobreathetogether’and‘neednotsuggestanythingmore

sinisterthanpeoplegettingtogethertoholdaprivatemeeting’.Withinanti-Muslimrhetoric,

false information is often presented as self-evident facts, with no need for further

explanation.

OnlineandOfflineDynamicsofHarmfulSpeech

Thecasestudydiscussedbelow,onavillagenamedAtalugamafromtheKalutaraDistrict,

demonstrateshowharmfulspeechemergesandproliferatesonlineasareaction tonews

reportsfrommainstreammediaplatforms,adevelopmentwhichwasobservedthroughout

2020.

Atalugamaemergedasa‘hotspot’foronlineharmfulspeechin2020.Forinstance,inMarch

2020,mediareportsonAtalugamahighlightedthatthevillagehadbeenputunderlockdown

after family members of a COVID-19 patient from the area had shown symptoms of

contractingthevirus,drawingaviolentreactiononline.Similarly,mediareportsemergedin

MaythatagroupofjournalistscoveringEid(festivalcelebratedbyMuslims)celebrationsin

Atalugamawereassaultedbysomeresidentsofthearea,drawingresponsesthatincluded

dangerousspeech.Furthermore,inOctober,mediareportsstatedthatagroupofresidents

fromtheareaattackedsomepoliceofficersthatwereonduty,drawingasimilarreaction.In

December,morehatespeechcontentwasobservedwhenreportsemergedthattheresidents

ofAtalugamawere‘notcooperating’withthedecisionstakenbythegovernmenttoregulate

COVID-19.Thesereportsincludedastatementbyapublichealthinspectorthathewas‘spat

47J.M.Bale,‘Politicalparanoiav.politicalrealism:ondistinguishingbetweenbogusconspiracytheoriesandgenuineconspiratorialpolitics’,(2007)41(1)InPatternsofPrejudice.

77

on’byaresidentofthevillage.OtherpostsstatedthatagroupofCOVID-19positiveresidents

from the areawere ‘spittingwhile en route to aquarantine facility’.Area residentshave

deniedthesereports.

These posts feature mainstream media reports of the Atalugama spitting incidents, the

accompanyingtextincludeavariationofanti-Muslimsentiment.Thereisreferencetothe

mandatorycremationpolicyasonepoststatesthatMuslims‘don’tcaretopreventCOVID,

they’reonlyconcernedaboutwhathappenstothedeadbody’,whileanotherurges‘Sinhala

Buddhists’todistancethemselvesfromMuslims,thatthereis‘nothinglefttodobutboycott

Muslimbusinesses’.

78

This post states that two busloads of COVID infected Muslims from Atalugama had

deliberately spat in the surroundings. They should be cremated alive, which is also a

referencetothemandatorycremationspolicy.

In each of these cases, itwasmedia reports bymainstreamnews outlets that led to the

generationofhatespeechonline.Sucharepetitionofaseriesofsuchincidentsfromthesame

villageisacauseforconcern.Assuch,theareawasdesignatedbyHashtagGenerationasa

‘hotspot’fortheemergenceofonlineharmfulspeechin2020.

In themonths that followed,more allegationsweremade againstMuslims in relation to

allegedlandencroachmentofthePottuvilMuhuduMahaViharayaandtherewereinstances

whenMuslimswerenotpermittedtoenterabankandasupermarket.Theunderlyingtone

oftheseallegationsweretoindicatethatMuslimsareresponsiblefortherapidspreadofthe

virusandtheir‘lackofdisciplineisputtingeveryoneatthreat’.

Co-ordinatedInauthenticBehaviour

Coordinatedinauthenticbehaviour,iswhereseveralpagesareseentobeamplifyingasingle

narrative.Itwasobservedthatcertainpagesandgroupspublishedthesameorrelatedposts

atoraroundthesametimespan,amplifyingeachother’scontent.Thecontentisfocusedon

keypoliticalissuesandsuchtargetedandwell-coordinatedcampaignswhichamplifyand

spread inauthentic content can severely distort public perceptions; for example, by

increasingantagonismagainsttheMuslimcommunity.

79

In addition to coordinated posts, bots (applications that perform automated tasks) and

inauthentic(fake)accountswerealsousedto fuelethnic tensions.For instance,accounts

createdwithMuslimnameswhichweremostprobablyamixofbotsandfakeaccountswere

seenmaking‘haha’reactionstonewsitemsofnationalsignificance(suchasthecrashofa

SriLankaAirForceaircraftinoneparticularinstance)suggestingthattheseaccountswere

‘makingfunofaserioustopic’.Thescreenshotsofthesereactionsarethensharedonseveral

pages,insinuatingthat‘Muslims’aretreatingnationallyimportantissueslightly.Needlessto

say,suchpostsdrawviolent,hatefulresponses.

Whilethemajorityofanti-MuslimharmfulspeechwasdirectedattheMuslimcommunityin

general,MinisterofJusticePresident’sCounselAliSabrywasthemainindividualtargetof

anti-Muslimharmfulspeech,aspartofapatternofcoordinatedinauthenticbehaviour.Since

hisappointment,theMinisterhasbeenportrayedasan‘advocate’foronlytheinterestsof

theMuslimcommunitywithinthegovernment.

For example, on the 12th of January 2021, a number of Facebook pages, including‘Thambapanni’,whichhas close to 60,000 followers and is administered fromSri Lanka,

AustraliaandtheUAEbegancirculatinganimageallegingthatMinisterSabryisbeginninga

‘Jihad police’ in Sri Lanka. Within hours, several individual Facebook profiles began to

resharethisimageonFacebookgroupswithalargenumberofmembers.Later,thesameday

many ethnonationalist pages including ‘Jana’ (41,000 followers and managed by

administrators based in Italy and Sri Lanka) and ‘Sinha Handa’ (62,000 followers and

administeredfromSriLanka)alsoresharedthesameimage.Thisisjustoneexampleofsuch

coordinatedharassmentfacedbyMinisterSabry.

Conclusion

Whilst being collectively blamed for the Easter Sunday attacks of 2019 and being at the

receiving end of the violence that unfolded in its aftermath such as attacks onmosques,

Muslim-ownedbusinesses,andhomes,theMuslimcommunityisnowfacinghatredacross

socialmediaplatformsduringtheCOVID-19pandemic.ConspiracytheoriesthatMuslimsare

‘constantly seeking to impose their ideas on the rest of society’ and that the community

bendsrulestotheirconvenienceanddisobeysthelawarenownormalisedinsociety.Online

platformshaveplayedakeyroleinsuchanormalisation.Afear,hatred,andhostilitytoward

IslamandMuslimsthatisperpetuatedbynegativestereotypes,resultingindiscrimination,

hasconsolidatedtheofflinemarginalisationandexclusionofMuslimsfromsocial,political,

andciviclife.

The mandatory cremation policy and the consequent intensification of hate speech and

disinformation reveal that the propagation of a large amount of hate speech could be

attributedtoactorswhotendtosupporttheethnonationalistdecisionsofthegovernment.

Thisisexacerbatedbythelackofgovernmentactiontoopposesuchhatespeech.

80

Thepermissibilityofhatespeechstrengthensexistingdiscrimination,consolidateshistorical

prejudicesandcanmakethepathtowardssocialcohesionmorechallenging.Afatalvirus

suchasCOVID-19providesanenablingenvironmentforuncertaintyandmistrustbetween

communitiestodeepen.Insuchacontext,socialmediabecomesavehicleforsuchhatred

anddoubtespeciallysincethereisminimalaccountability.Assuch,thearticledemonstrates

thatthecirculationofsuchdivisiveanddangerousrhetoricintensifiedduringtheCOVID-19

pandemic period suggesting that such narratives can affect healthy debate, skew public

opinionanddamagesocialcohesionandco-existencebetweendifferentcommunitiesinSri

Lanka.

*Imagesusedhavebeentakenfromsocialmediaassharedpublicly.Namesofindividualaccountshavebeenremovedfromtheaboveimages.

81

#JusticeForIshalini:

WhenHateSpeechDominatesPowerfulCallsforJustice

SakeenaRazickandHashtagGeneration1

In July 2021, the death of a young domesticworker led to loud demands of justice and

accountability. The series of events uncovered after — from the confines of the young

worker’sroomtotheintricaciesofanemployer’shousehold—furtherrenewedthepublic’s

callforchange.However,theincidentsoongavewaytoanincreaseinhatespeechonsocial

mediathatoverpoweredallotheronlinediscourse.

Sixteen-year-old Ishalini Jude Kumar passed away while receiving treatment for burn

injuries.2 According to initial investigation reports, Ishalini was seen running across thehouseonfirethatpersonsinthehousedoused.3ShewasthentakentotheColomboNationalHospital, and after several days of medical treatment, succumbed to her injuries. The

severity of her burn wounds raised initial concern and a necessary investigation. A

subsequentpost-mortemconfirmedlong-termsexualabuse.4

Ishalini’sdistraught familytravelled fromtheirhometownintheNuwaraEliyadistrict to

endurealossaswellasaninvestigationunderextremepublicscrutiny.Atthetime,Ishalini

had been employed at Member of Parliament (MP) Rishad Bathiudeen’s residence. MP

BathiudeenistheleaderofthepoliticalpartyAllCeylonMakkalCongressandwaspreviously

amemberoftheSriLankaMuslimCongress.Hehasbeentiedtosomecontroversialcasesin

thecountryandisalsonotedforhisrepresentationasaMuslimpoliticianinparliament.In

1Thisisacasestudyaccompanyingthepreviousarticle‘WhenHateGoesViral:AnExplorationintoCOVID-19relatedOnlineAnti-MuslimSpeechinSriLanka’.Itisadeeperlookintoharmfulspeechonsocialmediaaroundoneincident.SeepreviousarticleformoreonHashtagGeneration.

2Deathof16-year-oldgirlatMPRishad’shouse:Postmortemrevealsgirlsexuallyexploited’,Newswire,(19July2021)<https://www.newswire.lk/2021/07/19/death-of-16-year-old-girl-at-mp-rishads-house-postmortem-reveals-girl-sexually-exploited/>accessed6August2021

3ImeshRanasinghe,‘Deathofteendomesticaide:SriLankaMP’sfamilymemberstobeproducedincourt’,EconomyNext,(26July2021)<https://economynext.com/death-of-teen-domestic-aide-sri-lanka-mps-family-members-to-be-produced-in-court-84299/>accessed6August2021.

4‘CivilSocietystatementcallingonanendtoimpunityonchildlabour,trafficking,andsexualexploitation’,(CentreforPolicyAlternatives23July2021)<https://www.cpalanka.org/statement-calling-on-an-end-to-impunity-on-child-labour-trafficking-and-sexual-exploitation/>accessed6August2021;‘Deathof16-year-oldgirlatMPRishad’shouse:Postmortemrevealsgirlsexuallyexploited’,Newswire,(19July2021)<https://www.newswire.lk/2021/07/19/death-of-16-year-old-girl-at-mp-rishads-house-postmortem-reveals-girl-sexually-exploited/>accessed6August2021;andManjulaFernando,‘Secondpost-mortemonIshalini’sbody’,SundayObserver,(1August2021)<https://www.sundayobserver.lk/2021/08/01/second-post-mortem-ishalini%E2%80%99s-body>accessed6August2021.

82

April2021,hewasdetainedunderSriLanka’sPreventionofTerrorismAct(PTA)foralleged

linkstothe2019EasterSundayattacks.5

During the early weeks following Ishalini’s death, MP Bathiudeen’s wife, father-in-law,

brother-in-law, and the broker involved in bringing Ishalini for employment in Colombo

werearrestedandremanded.6InlateAugust,MPBathiudeen(whileinremand)wasnamedasafifthsuspect.7

Meanwhile, reports by law enforcement authorities and local media highlighted

discrepanciesintheprecedingevents.Somenewsreportssuggestedanunexplainedtime

lapsebetweentheinitialtimeoftheburningandwhenIshaliniwasfinallyadmittedtothe

hospital.8InJuly,thePoliceSpokespersonconfirmedthatIshalini’sroomwallheldwrittenwordsimplyingsuicide,althoughtheprosecutionhassinceruledthisoutastheonlypossible

causeofdeath.9TheconditionsofIshalini’sworkandlivingquarterstooweredebated(inreports and online) — ranging from small dark quarters with no electricity to MP

Bathiudeen’s wife’s lawyer denying any mistreatment.10 Mid-investigation, two formerdomesticworkers (at separate instances) came forwardwith reports that theyhadbeen

sexuallyabusedbyBathiudeen’sbrother-in-law.11

5MeeraSrinivasan,‘MPheldoverSriLankaEasterattacks’,TheHindu,(24April2021)<https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/mp-held-over-sri-lanka-easter-attacks/article34402733.ece>accessed6August2021.MPBathiudeenwasarrestedinApril2021,anarrestBathiudeenclaimsispoliticallymotivated.Hehaspreviouslybeeninvolvedincontroversiessuchason‘Wilpattudeforestation’.

6‘FourincludingRishad’swifetobeproducedbeforeCourt’,DailyNews,(26July2021)<https://www.dailynews.lk/2021/07/26/law-order/254907/four-including-rishad%E2%80%99s-wife-be-produced-court>accessed6August2021.

7‘Rishad’swife,threeothersremandedtillAugust9’,DailyNews,(27July2021)<http://www.dailynews.lk/2021/07/27/local/255001/rishad%E2%80%99s-wife-three-others-remanded-till-august-9>accessed6August2021;L.Sooriyagoda,‘Rishadmadefifthsuspectoverdeathofgirlathishouse’,DailyMirror,(24August2021)<https://www.dailymirror.lk/print/front_page/Rishad-made-fifth-suspect-over-death-of-girl-at-his-house/238-218874>accessed6August2021.

8‘Rishad’swife,threeothersremandedtillAugust9’,DailyNews,(27July2021)<http://www.dailynews.lk/2021/07/27/local/255001/rishad%E2%80%99s-wife-three-others-remanded-till-august-9>accessed6August2021.

9ZulfickFarzan,‘TheCauseForMyDeath’–DetectivesdiscoverwordswrittenonthewallofIshalini’sroom,’Newsfirst,(7March2018)<https://www.newsfirst.lk/2021/08/03/the-cause-for-my-death-detectives-discover-words-written-on-the-wall-of-ishalinis-room/>accessed6August2021.

10KrisThomasandPallaviPundir,‘HowaDeathExposedaHistoryofSexualAssaultataRichPolitician'sHome’,ViceWorldNews,(12August2021)<https://www.vice.com/en/article/7kvqaa/death-domestic-worker-sexual-assault-srilanka-bathiudeen>accessed6August2021.

11ibid.;and‘Rishad’sBrother-in-Lawarrested’,DailyNews,(24July2021)<https://www.dailynews.lk/2021/07/24/law-order/254774/rishad%E2%80%99s-brother-law-arrested>accessed6August2021.

83

The nature of the details disclosed sparked public conversation online. In addition, the

politicianandhisfamily’sassociationaddedanotherdimensiontothereportsofIshalini’s

death.Amongtherallyingcriesonlineandofflineforjusticewasanunderlyingsentimentof

more—anoverwhelmingintoleranceforthe‘Bathiudeen’s’ofthecountryandanincreasing

hatredtowardstheoverallMuslimcommunity.

TheKeywordsthatMissedtheMark

According to data captured byHashtagGeneration, socialmedia conversation (including

misinformationanddisinformation)increasedafterIshalini’sdeathon15July,allthrough

totheendofthemonth.

Although online conversation began with concern and anger over Ishalini’s death, the

conversation continued to ‘trend’ primarily due to MP Bathiudeen’s involvement. For

instance,databetween1Julyto31JulycapturedthetoptenSinhalakeywordsusedbysocial

mediausers.InSinhala,thesekeywordsincludedදැ#ය(girl),ෙමෙහකාර(worker),andෙස්වය(service), as well as #ෂා/ (Rishad),බ1234ෙ5 (Bathiudeen’s) andබ1234 (Bathiudeen).Whilewellover20percentofSinhalasocialmediapostsaroundthisissuemadereference

tothepolitician,Ishalini’snamewasnotthemainentrywayintoonlinediscussion,andonly

emergedlaterduringthemonth.AcrossTamilonlinemediaandsocialmedia!ஷா$னி(Hishalini) and இஷா$னி (Ishalini), both variants of Ishalini’s name, featuredprominently but was once again overpowered by the many keywords associated with

Bathiudeen.

Thefirstpostrelatedtotheincidentwasreportedonsocialmedia(SM)on6July,threedaysafterIshaliniwasadmittedforhospitalcare,mainlyamongSinhalaSMusers.Until15July2021,therewerelessthan50postsaroundthisissuewithverylittletractiononline.

84

Note:SinhalaSMusersaccountforSriLanka’slargestproportionofSMusersandthereforecontributetohighernumbersinpostsandengagement.Alsonote,TamilSMusersinthecountryarediverseandspreadacrossgeographiesandcommunities.ThelargestSMvoicesfromthiscommunity,aroundthisincident,stemmedfromtheHillCountryTamilcommunity(thatIshalinibelongedto).TheHillCountryTamilcommunitymakesupaconsiderablysmallerpartofthetotalTamilspeakingcommunityinSriLanka.

MostsocialmediapostscriticisedMPBathiudeen,his‘character’,andhisworkinpolitics.

Usersdidnotholdback inbringinguphisalleged links to theEasterSundayattacksand

terrorists.Somecommentsaskedthe ‘public’ to ‘burnallof thepeople in theBathiudeen

household’,whileothersdirectedhatespeechtowardsMuslimsingeneral.Onlinecomments

generalisedtheincidenttoclaimthatall‘peoplewhofollowIslamarealwayslikethis’and

thatthe‘religionharasseswomen’.Theanti-MuslimharmfulspeechframedallMuslimsas

‘womanisers’andinsinuatedaconnectionbetweenMuslimsandsexualharassmentas‘they

[Muslims]‘canhavefourwives’,‘abusemaids’and‘detonatethemselvesfortheirdesireto

sleepwith72virgins’.12

12Islamiclaw(sharia)practicedinSriLankaandmostothercountriesallowsmalestomarryuptofourwomen,undercertainconditions.

Thepoststatesinstand-alonesentencesandsome slang: ‘a religion that allows men tomarry four women; abuses workers thatcomehome;andnotenough, intheirdesiretosleepwith72virginstheydetonatebombsand kill others. Do you not have anotherworld other than women?’. This post wasshared by a minimum of 305 accounts onFacebook.

85

SocialmediausersalsodirectedmisogynisticcommentsandhatespeechatMPBathiudeen’s

wife, Ayesha Rishad.13 Hashtag Generation’s analysis has revealed a trend across socialmedia:inanykeyincidenttakingplace,womenandLGBTQI+personsinvolvedreceivean

addedlayeroftargetedsexualandgender-basedviolence.Asaresult,AyeshaRishadwasthe

targetofdehumanisingslursandcommentsthatdemandedthatshebe‘raped’forher‘role

inIshalini’sdeath’.Someuserssharedpicturesofherandlikenedhertoananimalandstated

that‘sheislookinginawaythatsheneedssevenmen’.Othercommentsreferredtothewife,

MPBathiudeen’s sisters, aswell as allMuslimwomen as ‘prostitutes’. However, gender-

specific hate speech was not limited to MP Bathiudeen’s family. On social media, some

criticisedIshaliniandhermotherbycallingthem‘loosewomen’anddelvedintodiscussions

around themother’s secondmarriage. Certain pages that have awiderMuslim audience

accusedIshaliniandhermotherandspeculatedthatthesexualabusemayhaveoccurred

beforeIshalinimovedtoColombo.Thesepagesspreaddisinformationandclaimedthatthe

entirecasewasaconspiracyand‘politicalrevenge’againstpoliticianRishadBathiudeen.

Offline,derogatoryandhatefulcommentsmadebycertainlocalpoliticiansincitedfurther

harmful speech online. At a press conference, former ColomboMunicipal Council (CMC)

MemberNadarajahRavikumarmadehatefulcommentsagainstMuslimwomen.Advocating

SriLanka’srecentdecisiontobanthewearingoftheburqainpublic,Ravikumarclaimedthattheburqa,althoughmeantforreligiouspurposes,isnotusedasso.14Headdedthatwhile10percent of Muslim women wear the burqa for its stated purpose, 90 percent do so totransportdrugsandengageinprostitution.15Thelocalpolitician’sstatementsweresharedwidelyandquicklyacrosssocialmediaandothermediachannelsuntil(afterreportsbysome

users)Facebookremovedtheoriginalpost.Inresponse,severalMuslimuserscondemned

thelocalpoliticiansandhisstatementsfor‘damagingunityacrossethnicities’.16

Inasimilarincident,harmfulspeechagainstMuslimsspecificallytargetingthecommunity’s

revered Prophet Muhammad was circulated online. The content, attributed to a local

politicianfromtheAmparadistrict,violentlycriticisedProphetMuhammadandlabelledhim

13Bathiudeen’swifeisalsoreferredtoasSihabdeen/ShiyabdeenAyeshaacrosslocalmedia.Inapreviousletter,herfullnameisidentifiedas‘AyeshaRishad’.SeeRishadBathiudeen,‘LettersentbyAyeshaRishad’,(Twitter,3May2021)<https://twitter.com/rbathiudeen/status/1389154039523287043?lang=en>accessed10September2021.

14‘SriLankacabinetapprovesproposedbanonburqasinpublic’,AlJazeera,(28April2021)<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/28/sri-lanka-cabinet-approves-proposed-ban-on-burqas-in-public>accessed7August2021.

15DinithaRathnayake,‘Allegedanti-MuslimstatementsbyLGpoliticos:CMCMuslimForumcomplainstoWPSDIG’,TheSundayMorning,(5August2018)<https://www.themorning.lk/alleged-anti-muslim-statements-by-lg-politicos-cmc-muslim-forum-complains-to-wp-sdig/>accessed7August2021.

16IrfanVlogs,(FacebookAugust12021)<https://www.facebook.com/Irfanvlogs199/posts/348851196909661>accessed7August2021.

86

asa ‘childmolester’.However, in response, thepoliticiandenied involvement in the said

statementandclaimedthattheincidentwasa‘plot’bytheSriLankanGovernment.

Meanwhile, nationalist and pro-government social media pages shared harmful speech

against civil society activists and politicians belonging to minority ethnoreligious

communitiesfortheirapparent‘lackofoutrage’overIshalini’ssexualabuseanddeath.The

conversationaroundtheinvestigationscontinuedtobedilutedbydiversestrandsofharmful

speech,allwithinacontextofaworseningCOVID-19pandemic.

ALostStory

Onthestreets,protestsfortruthandaccountabilitywereheld.ResidentslivinginIshalini’s

hometownandelsewheredemandeda formal inquiryandarrestsof those responsible.17Socialistandwomen’srightsmovementsandgroupsheldprotestsoutsidetheNationalChild

ProtectionAuthority.Atmerely16yearsofage,Ishaliniwasaminoremployedasadomestic

worker,oneofthefewoccupationsthathavelittleplaceinSriLanka’s‘robust’labourlaw

framework.18 Domestic workers and domestic worker unions too protested, demandingjusticeandaneffectivelegalframeworkfordomesticwork.19Whilemostonlineuserswerereceptivetotheoutcryanddemonstrations,somesocialmediausershighlightedthatthe

protestsseemedtohavestrayedawayfromthemainincident.

Suddenly,Ishalinihadbecometheposterchildforamixofcalls:theemploymentofunderage

workers,thelackofalegalframeworkthatsupportsdomesticworkerrights,theplightof

Malaiyaha Tamils (Hill Country Tamils) bound to the tea estates with a history ofdisenfranchisement and socio-economic challenges; the culture of silence around sexual

abuse;aswellagatewaytojustifythehatespeechagainstMuslims.

Ishalini grew up on the tea plantations in central Sri Lankawhich consists primarily of

Malaiyaha Tamilswho have historicallyworked as a permanent plantation labour force.Theiroriginsspanback to immigrants fromIndia,and theirhistory includesa lossofSri

17PragasGnanapragasam,‘ProteststagedinHatton’,(Twitter,18July2021)<https://twitter.com/PragasGnanam/status/1416729504572010500?s=20>accessed7August2021;andDinasenaRatugamage,‘Jaffnaprotestersurgegovt.toexpediteprobeintoIshalini’sdeath’,TheIsland,(29July2021)<https://island.lk/jaffna-protesters-urge-govt-to-expedite-probe-into-ishalinis-death/>accessed7August2021.

18ShanySadanandanandAnjuMaryPaul,‘Invisibleunderthelaw:TheconsistentneglectofdomesticworkersinSriLanka,’TheSundayTimes,(13June2021)<https://www.sundaytimes.lk/210613/sunday-times-2/invisible-under-the-law-the-consistent-neglect-of-domestic-workers-in-sri-lanka-446321.html>accessed7August2021;andSabrinaEsufally,SriLanka:DomesticWorkers,AnAnalysisofTheLegalandPolicyFramework,(VeritéResearchMarch2015).

19‘Inpictures:Domesticworkersfightfortheirrights’,TheSundayTimes,(2August2021)<https://www.timesonline.lk/news-online/In-pictures-Domestic-workers-fight-for-their-rights/2-1134451>accessed8August2021.

87

Lankancitizenshipuntil2003.20TheMalaiyahaTamilscontinuetofaceconsequencesfromdecadesofdenialofbasicstatecare,andremainoneofthemosteconomically,socially,and

politicallymarginalisedcommunitiesinthecountry.21Todate,thereisasystemoftraffickingand‘selling’ofunderageworkersgenerallyfromtheteaestateregion,aswellasnumerous

casesofgender-basedviolencethatareundocumentedorscarcelyaddressed.22

Ishalini’sstoryisonescatteredamongthemanythatbarelymakeheadlines.Reportsand

casesof rapeand trafficking struggle to see through theendofa longandwinding state

system,withlittletonojusticeaffordedtotheyoungsurvivorsortheirfamilies.23AlsoinJuly, news reports revealed that a 15-year-old minor has been trafficked and sexually

exploited.Theyounggirlhadbeen‘advertised’onwebsitesandsocialmediaandhadbeen

‘sold’ to third parties over a period of three-fourmonths.24While this incident receivedsignificantattention,SinhalasocialmediaconversationonIshalini’scasewasalmosttwice

more.SuchvividattentionaffordedtoIshalini’sdeathsuggeststhatitwasmorethansimply

aboutapublic’sindignationoverayounggirl’ssexualabuse.

Throughout July, both Sinhala and Tamil social media users discussing the events

surroundingIshalini’sdeathfollowedsimilarpatterns.Theseusersfocusedprimarilyonthe

investigationandsubsequentarrests.However,oneof thekeyareaswhere conversation

divergedwasonthedissatisfactionoverthe‘politicisationofIshalini’sdeath’.Tamilsocial

mediauserspickedupsuchstatementsmadebyMPShanakiyanRasamanickamandState

MinisterJeevanThondaman.SpeakingatParliamenton3August,MPRasamanickamsaid

thattheSriLankanGovernmentisusingthisincidenttocreateariftbetweentheminority

MuslimandTamilcommunities,whileStateMinisterThondamanclaimedthat ‘some’are

tryingtopoliticisetheissue.25

20VeritéResearchandInstituteonStatelessnessandInclusion,HillCountryTamilsofSriLankaTowardsMeaningfulCitizenship,(August2019).

21ibid.;andYasminGunaratnam,‘SoapandsolacescarceasSriLanka'steapickerstoilonamidlockdown,’TheGuardian,(24April2020)<https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/apr/24/soap-and-solace-scarce-as-sri-lankas-tea-pickers-toil-on-amid-lockdown>accessed6August2021.

22DepartmentofState,USA,TraffickinginPersonsReport2020,20Edition(June2020),463.

23PiyumiFonseka,‘ChildsexualabusecrisisinSriLanka’,DailyMirror,(21August2020)<https://www.dailymirror.lk/recomended-news/Child-sexual-abuse-crisis-in-Sri-Lanka/277-194218>accessed7August2021.

24PavaniHapuarachchi,‘17arrestedinMt.LaviniaChildsextraffickingring,’Newsfirst,(30June2020)<https://www.newsfirst.lk/2021/06/30/17-arrested-in-mt-lavinia-child-sex-trafficking-ring/>accessed7August2021.

25‘‘Govt.usingHishalini’sdeathtoinciteTamil-Muslimhatred..’–MPRasamanickam(Video)’,Newshub.lk,(4August2021)<https://newshub.lk/en/2021/08/04/govt-using-hishalinis-death-to-incite-tamil-muslim-hatred-mp-rasamanickam-video/>accessed7August2021;and‘‘InvestigationsintothedeathofHishalinisatisfactory…’–JeevanThondaman’’,Newshub.lk,(26July2021)<https://newshub.lk/en/2021/07/26/investigations-into-the-death-of-hishalini-satisfactory-jeevan-thondaman/>accessed7August2021.

88

SriLankaisnostrangertoanti-minoritysentiment,andoverthelastdecade,theprimary

target of harmful speech has been the Muslim population. The country witnessed anti-

Muslimmob riots inbursts fuelledbydisinformationandhate speechon socialmedia.26Facebookwasidentifiedashavingplayedaroleinsomeoftheriotsof2014(Aluthgama),

2017(Gintota),and2018(Ampara,Digana,andTeldeniya).27Followingthis,the2019EasterSundayattackswereamajorcatalysttoexistinganti-Muslimhate.28Addtothisacultureofimpunityforinstigatorsofanti-Muslimspeechandthecontinuingwidecirculationofsuch

speech—distrusttowardstheMuslimcommunityhasonlyworsened.

Hashtag Generation’s data has confirmed that Muslims are currently the most targeted

ethnoreligiousgroupinSriLanka,acrosssocialmediaplatforms.Injustthelastyear,several

eventsinthecountryhavebeenovershadowedbyanti-Muslimsentiment.Alargeportionof

onlineconversationthattookplaceduringthefirsthalfofSriLanka’sCOVID-19pandemic

centred around the cremation-only policy that marginalised the wishes of the Muslim

community.29 Similarly, steps to curtail Muslim traditional clothing and regulate Islamicschoolinghasseenquickerprogressthanaccountabilityand justice for thevictimsof the

EasterSundayattacks.30

Once again, calls for change are overshadowed by minority-majority politics and a

fragmentation of the main issue, amidst a backdrop of worsening anti-Muslim feelings.

Ishalini’s story is set within a broader framework of class-based and gender-based

hierarchies and violence. While her circumstances around employment and sexual

exploitationhaveledtoamuch-neededcallforaction,ithasalsorevealedthecomplexities

ofpositioningthesedemandsonthestill-ongoingcase31ofoneyounggirl.Ithasrevealedanundercurrentofharmfulspeech,onlineandoffline,thatiseagertotakeoverandchangethe

26RohanGunaratna,‘Sinhala-MuslimRiotsinSriLanka:TheNeedforRestoringCommunalHistory’,(2018)10(4)CounterTerroristTrendsandAnalyses.

27‘SriLanka:Facebookapologisesforrolein2018anti-Muslimriots,’AlJazeera,(13May2020)<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/5/13/sri-lanka-facebook-apologises-for-role-in-2018-anti-muslim-riots>accessed6August2021.

28AnbarasanEthirajan,‘SriLanka'sMuslims'demonised'afterEasterbombings,’BBC,(13August2019)<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49249146>accessed6August2021.

29OmarSuleiman,‘LikeIndia,SriLankaisusingcoronavirustoStigmatiseMuslims,’AlJazeera,(20May2020)<https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/5/20/like-india-sri-lanka-is-using-coronavirus-to-stigmatise-muslims>accessed6August2021.

30TasnimNazeer,‘SriLanka’sBurqaBanIsMoreAboutIslamophobiaThanNationalSecurity,’TheDiplomat,(17March2021)<https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/sri-lankas-burqa-ban-is-more-about-islamophobia-than-national-security/>accessed6August2021.

31Asat17September2021,MPBathiudeen’swife,father-in-law,brother-in-law,andthebrokerwerereleasedonbail.MPRishadBathiudeenwasfurtherremanded.‘Ishalinicase:Rishad’swife&father-in-lawgrantedbail’,Newswire,(17September2021)<https://www.newswire.lk/2021/09/17/ishalini-case-rishads-wife-father-in-law-granted-bail/>accessed20September2021.

89

courseofpublic conversation.Theoriginal ‘story’has lost itsplace inbroaderpolitically

motivatedprejudices.

In this very incident, the deep-rooted anti-Muslim sentiments come out clearer than the

demands for change. As threats to Sri Lanka’s unstable ethnoreligious community

relationshipscontinue,#JusticeForIshalini?

Thatisyettobeachieved.

*Imagesusedhavebeentakenfromsocialmediaassharedpublicly.Namesofindividualaccountshavebeenremoved.

90

TerrorisingMinoritiesthrough‘Counterterrorism’

ShreenAbdulSaroorandMytiliBala

InSriLanka,historyrepeats.BeforeitwasTamilsandtheJanathaVimukthiPeramuna(JVP)

who bore the brunt of the counterterrorism efforts; now it is Muslims, dissenters, and

minority rightsactivists. Harnessing thePreventionofTerrorismActof1979(PTA), the

statehasroundeduphundredsofordinaryMuslimsforprolongeddetentionwhileshielding

monkswhospreadcommunalstrifeanddraggingitsfeetinprosecutingactualperpetrators

of theEasterattacks. TheglobalCOVID-19pandemichasadded fuel to the fire,withthe

governmentrampingupmilitarisationanddisregardingreligioussentimentsofminorities,

particularly of Muslims, under the guise of public health efforts. Now, taking cues from

China’streatmentofUyghursandMyanmar’spost-coupmilitaryrule,SriLankaseemskeen

to strengthen the draconian PTA through deradicalization regulations that coerce

‘rehabilitation’.OnlyaftertheEuropeanUnion(EU)Parliamentrecommendedwithdrawal

ofpreferentialtradestatus(GSP+)inJunedidthegovernmentmakeoverturespurporting

toreformthePTA.Butitsactionsbetrayitswords.

In this piece,weprovide an overviewofwhereMuslims, dissenters, andminority rights

activistsstandtoday,twoyearsaftertheEasterattacks.SectionIdescribeshowthestatehasapplieddraconiancounterterrorismlawstoplacecollectiveblameontheentireMuslim

community for the Easter attacks. Section II describes how conditions have worsenedduringtheCOVID-19pandemic,andhowincreasingmilitarisationofcivilfunctionsfurther

threatensminorityrights.SectionIIIdiscussesproposedderadicalizationregulationsthattakeacuefromChina’sUyghurplaybookinfurtherstrengtheningthePTA.Similarly,SectionIVhighlights how state efforts to proscribe certainMuslim groups by far overreach anylegitimate security concernandhurt an alreadyvulnerable community at large.Drawing

these themes together, Section V concludes by evaluating current overtures towardreforming the PTA amidst state actions failing to protect minority communities. As we

explain,whatisneededisnotPTAreformbutwholesalerepealofrepressivelawstorestoreminorityrightsanddemocraticgovernance,livesandcommunitiesarehangingprecariously

inthebalance.

I.EasterSundayanditsAftermath

OnEasterSunday2019, IslamicState (IS)-inspired terroristsmurdered269Catholicand

Christianworshippersandtouristsinahorrificspateofsuicidebombings.Inthetwoyears

since,thestatehasdonenexttonothingtodeliverjusticetovictimsoftheattacks.Todate,

Batticaloa’sZionEvangelicalChurch,wherefourteenchildrenwerekilled,remainslocked

91

withanoticeonthegateclaimingitan‘armyconstructionsite’.1Withthestatedoingsolittle,many victim families have taken it on themselves to rebuild places of worship and

commemoratetheirdead.

Insteadofrebuilding,thestatehascynicallyleveragedtheEasterattackstodeepenethnic

strife.Havingignoredwarningsfrominternationalintelligenceagencies2andlocalMuslims3beforetheattacks,itovernightbrandedanentireMuslimcommunity—almost10percent

of Sri Lanka’s population — as terrorists. Emergency rule from April to August 2019

facilitatedwidespread discrimination. A ban on face coverings uniquely targetedniqab4-wearingMuslimwomen, resulting in rampantharassmentand intimidationof thosewho

veiled.5 Vigilante mobs raided Muslim villages, destroying homes, businesses, schools,madrasas(Islamicteachingschool)andmosqueswhilepoliceandintelligenceofficialsstoodby.PakistaniandAfghanirefugeesandasylumseekerswereevictedandleftwithnoplace

togo.Newspaperspropagatedbaselessrumors, includingone thataMuslimgovernment

doctor had sterilised thousands of Sinhala women. Extremist Buddhist monks urged

boycotts of Muslim restaurants, spreading rumours that they would poison Sinhalese

customers.TheyalsoforcedthemassresignationofMuslimmembersofparliament(MPs).6

Throughoutemergencyrule,thestatearrestedhundredsofordinaryMuslimsonflimsyor

fabricatedcharges.7SomewerearrestedforpossessingwritingsinArabicscript;onewomanwas detained on the mistaken belief that she wore a dress depicting the Buddhist

1[Seeauthor’sphotosaccompanyingarticle]ShreenSaroor,‘Newde-radicalisationregulationswillfurtherdehumaniseMuslims’,TheMorning,(21April2019)<https://www.themorning.lk/new-de-radicalisation-regulations-will-further-dehumanise-muslims/>accessed12thAugust2021.

2JeffreyGettleman&DharishaBastians,‘SriLankaAuthoritiesWereWarned,inDetail,12DaysBeforeAttack’,NYTimes,(29April2019)<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/29/world/asia/sri-lanka-attack-warning.html>accessed21stAugust2021

3‘LaurenFrayer,BeforeSriLanka’sEasterAttacks,Muslims’WarningsAboutTerrorismWentUnheeded’,NPRNews,(12December2019)<https://www.npr.org/2019/12/12/786639735/before-sri-lankas-easter-attacks-muslims-warnings-about-terrorism-went-unheeded>accessed21stAugust2021

4NiqabisafaceveilwornbyMuslimwomen,usuallycoveringallofthefaceexcepttheeyes.

5HilaryMargolis,‘SriLanka’sFace-CoveringBanaWrongheadedResponsetoEasterBombings’,HumanRightsWatch,(2May2019)<https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/05/02/sri-lankas-face-covering-ban-wrongheaded-response-easter-bombings#>accessed12thAugust2021.

6InternationalCrisisGroup,AfterSriLanka’sEasterBombings:ReducingRisksofFutureViolence,InternationalCrisisGroup,(27September2019)<https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/302-after-sri-lankas-easter-bombings-reducing-risks-future-violence>accessed12thAugust2021(hereafter“ICGReport”).

7Lawyersreportedthatatleast500Muslimsweredetainedintheimmediateaftermathoftheattacks.SeeMarisadeSilva,‘PTA:TerrorisingSriLankafor42years’,ColomboTelegraph,(17November2020)<https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/pta-terrorising-sri-lanka-for-42-years/>accessed12thAugust2021.TheInternationalCrisisGroupplacedthatfigureat1,800.SeeICGReport,22.

92

dharmachakra.8Over twohundred individualsarrestedafter theEasterattacks remain indetention two years later, many in overcrowded facilities with no access to counsel.9Meanwhile, mass arrests have continued unabated in the post-emergency context. In

Kattankudyalone,about78men,womenandteenageboyshavebeenlumpedunderasingle

Easter bombing investigation. By lumping these individuals together under one case

(B427/2019), authorities have not only derailed bail for thosemistakenly held but also

complicatedtheappealprocess.Manyinthisgrouphavebeenlockedupwithoutchargefor

over18months,whichisthemaximumperiodallowedunderthePTA.

Fordecades,thestatehasusedthePTAtodetainTamils,politicalopponents,journalists,and

humanrightsactivists.ThePTA’soverbroadprovisionsallowsuspectstobeheldupto18

monthswithoutcharge,permittheMinistryofDefencetorestrictfreedomofexpressionand

association without means for legal redress, and incorporate evidentiary rules that

incentivisethepolicetoobtaincoercedconfessionsthroughtorture.10JustasthePTAwasonceusedagainstthousandsofTamilssuspectedofhavingtiestothemilitancy, it isnow

beingusedtoarresthundredsofordinaryMuslims.

Hand-in-handwith thePTA, authorities are also increasinglydetainingpeople under the

InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(ICCPRActof2007.Thestatedpurpose

oftheICCPRActistoprotectpersonsfromspeechthatincitesdiscrimination,hostility,or

violence against a national, racial, or religious group. The original aim, drawn from the

International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, was to protect vulnerable minority

groupsfromviolenceanddiscrimination.11Instead,thestateusestheICCPRActsolelyasatoolofrepression,arrestingminoritiesongroundsthattheirspeechorpetitioningactivity

disrupts‘communalharmony’.AslawyerGehanGunatillekeputsit,theICCPRActisnomore

8ICGReport,22;seealso‘SriLanka:MuslimsFaceThreats,Attacks’,HumanRightsWatch,(3July2019)<https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/03/sri-lanka-muslims-face-threats-attacks>accessed12thAugust2021;‘SriLanka:RespectHumanRightsintheAftermathoftheEasterAttacks’,AmnestyInt’l,(3May2019)<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa37/0297/2019/en/>12thAugust2021;AnbarasanEthirajan,‘SriLanka’sMuslims‘demonised’afterEasterBombings’,BBCNews,(13August2019)<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49249146>accessed12thAugust2021.

9SarathWeerasekara,theMinisterofPublicSecurity,heldapressbriefingon6April2021atwhichheindicatedthat75individualssuspectedoftiestotheEasterattacksarecurrentlybeingheldunderdetentionorders,while211areunderremandcustody.‘RingleadersbehindEasterattacksidentified:SarathWeerasekara’,AdaDerana,(6April2021)<http://www.adaderana.lk/news/72860/ringleaders-behind-easter-attacks-identified-sarath-weerasekara>accessed12thAugust2021.

10ErmizaTegal,UnderstandingRuleofLaw,HumanSecurityandPreventionofTerrorisminSriLanka,(Law&SocietyTrust2021)16-20,24-25.

11GehanGunatilleke,‘SriLanka’sICCPRAct:BrokenShieldandWeaponofChoice’,TheMorning,(23June2019)<https://epaper.themorning.lk/Home/ShareArticle?OrgId=9985a873&imageview=1>accessed12thAugust2021.

93

than“aweaponwieldedbymajoritarianpowertosuppressthosewhooffendmajoritarian

sensibilities”.12SimilartothePTA,itpermitsextendeddetentionwithoutbail.13

SomehavebeendetainedunderthePTAandICCPRActfortheirwritings,whicharresting

officerswoefullymisconstrued.InMay2020,twenty-six-year-oldMuslimpoetAhnafJazeem

wasarrestedinMannarunderthePTAfor‘promotingextremism’.Todatehehasnotbeen

producedbeforeamagistrate.Hewasarrestedforpublishingaphotographofapersonina

Taliban-styledressbesideoneofhispoems,butthepoemitself(whichthepoliceevidently

did not read) denounced Islamic terrorism.14 Similarly, before his release on bail lastSeptember,RamzyRazeekwasdetainedundertheICCPRActforaFacebookpostadvocating

‘ideological jihad’ — as in ‘struggle’ —to fight racism ‘using the pen and keyboard as

weapons’.15

ManyMuslimshavebeendetainedforhappenstancecontactwithoneofthesuicidebombers

orforhavinglistenedtoasermonofthenow-bannedNationalThowheethJamaath(NTJ)

group.16Aworking-classmannamedMohamedIrfanwasarrestedinKattankudybasedonthe allegation that he had once delivered food in his tuk-tuk to one of themain suicide

bombers.Similarly,acomputerteacherwasarrestedbecausehiscompanywaspaid,backin

2015,tocreateawebpageforacharitymanagedbyanNTJmosque.17Fifty-five-year-oldJufaithiyawasarrestedbecauseshelistenedtoabannedNTJsermononasingleoccasion.A

cancerpatient,shehasbeendeniedtreatmentwhilebeingheldattheTangalleNavycamp.

Ingeneral,womensufferdisproportionately fromarbitrarydetention.Whentheyarenot

themselvesdetained,theystandattheforefrontstrugglingtogettheirspousesandchildren

released. They visit their kith and kin in far off detention centres and, with household

12‘MisuseoftheICCPRActandJudicialSystemtoStifleFreedomofExpressioninSriLanka’,Civicus,(May17,2019)<https://monitor.civicus.org/updates/2019/07/05/iccpr-act-and-judicial-system-being-misused-stifle-freedom-expression-sri-lanka/>accessed12thAugust2021;‘SriLankaabusingUNlawtomakearrests:Rightsgroup’,TimesofIndia(Jun.17,2019),<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/69825080.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst>accessed12thAugust2021.

13ICGReport,supra,22,fn.109.

14‘Poeticinjustice:AnotherwriterlanguishesinprisonunderthePTA’,DailyFT,(14December2020)<http://www.ft.lk/news/Poetic-injustice-Another-writer-languishes-in-prison-under-PTA/56-710172>accessed12thAugust2021.

15‘SriLanka:DueProcessConcernsinArrestsofMuslims’,HumanRightsWatch,(23April2020),<https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/23/sri-lanka-due-process-concerns-arrests-muslims>accessed12thAugust2021.

16TheNJTisalocalgroupidentifiedasbeingbehindtheEasterSundayattacks.

17MarisadeSilva,‘PTA:TerrorisingSriLankafor42years’,ColomboTelegraph,(17Nov.2020)<https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/pta-terrorising-sri-lanka-for-42-years/>accessed12thAugust2021.

94

breadwinners behind bars, must find newways to earn tomake endsmeet and secure

releasefortheirlovedones.

Prominentlawyersandpoliticianshavenotbeenshieldedfromindiscriminatearrest.After

hegaveacriticalmediainterview,formerColomboDeputyMayorAzathSalleywasarrested

anddetainedforoveramonthundertheICCPRActandPTA.18MPRishadBathiudeenandhisbrotherwerearrested in themiddleof thenighton23April2021andordered tobe

detainedforthreemonthsunderthePTA.19LeadingoppositionMPHarinFernandofacedpossiblearrestforaparliamentaryspeechgivenon21April.20LawyerHejaazHizbullah,awell-known advocate for the rule of law andminority rights, was ultimately charged in

March2021underthePTAandICCPRActafternearlyayearindetentionduringwhichthe

statepropagatedamedianarrativeconnectinghimtotheEasterattacks.21

Asanti-terror lawsareweaponisedagainstminoritiesanddissenters,extremistBuddhist

monksandmediachannelsfomentstrifewithimpunity.22 In2014,BoduBalaSena leader

18‘AzathSalleyarrestedanddetainedunderPTAandICCPR–AG’sDept.’,EconomyNext,(16March2021)<https://economynext.com/azath-salley-arrested-and-detained-under-pta-and-iccpr-ags-dept-79827/>accessed12thAugust2021;‘NormanPalihawadane,SalleyarrestedunderthePTA’,TheIsland,(17March2021)https://island.lk/salley-arrested-under-pta/accessed12thAugust2021.

19‘SriLankaarrestsMuslimleaderover2019EasterSundayattacks’,AlJazeera,(24April2021),<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/24/sri-lanka-arrests-muslim-leader-over-easter-attacks>accessed12thAugust2021;‘FormerLankanministerarrestedforaidingbombersresponsibleforEasterSundayattacks’,TheWeek,(24April2021),<https://www.theweek.in/news/world/2021/04/24/former-lankan-minister-arrested-for-aiding-bombers-responsible-for-easter-sunday-attacks.html>accessed12thAugust2021;‘ZulfickFarzan,D/OobtainedtointerrogateRishad&brotherfor90days’,Newsfirst,(27April2021),<https://www.newsfirst.lk/2021/04/27/d-o-obtained-to-interrogate-rishad-brother-for-90-days/>accessed12thAugust2021.

20Harin,‘ManushaRockParliamentWithExposes:WhoDidEasterSundayBombersCall‘Sonic-Sonic’And‘TheBoss’?’,ColomboTelegraph,(21April2021),<https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/harin-manusha-rock-parliament-with-exposes-who-did-easter-sunday-bombers-call-sonic-sonic-and-the-boss/>accessed12thAugust2021.

21‘AmnestyInt’lPublicStatement,IncreasedMarginalization,DiscriminationandTargetingofSriLanka’sMuslimCommunity,AmnestyInternational,‘(19March2021)<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa37/3866/2021/en/>accessed12thAugust2021;‘Hizbullah’sFamilyDecries“Vicious”MediaCampaignAfterConfidentialStatementsProvidedtoJudgeLeaked!’,ColomboTelegraph,(14May2020),<https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/hizbullahs-family-decries-vicious-media-campaign-after-confidential-statements-provided-to-judge-leaked/>accessed12thAugust2021.SeealsoUrgentAction,AmnestyInt’l,SriLanka:ConcernsMountforDetainedLawyer:HejaazHizbullah,ASA37/2221/2020(Apr.27,2020),<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ASA37/2221/2020/en/>accessed12thAugust2021;‘SriLanka:ICJRaisesConcernsAbouttheArbitraryArrestandDetentionofLawyerHejaazHizbullah’,Int’lComm’nofJurists,(21April2020)<https://www.icj.org/sri-lanka-icj-raises-concerns-about-the-arbitrary-arrest-and-detention-of-lawyer-hejaaz-hizbullah-calls-for-repeal-and-replacement-of-the-prevention-of-terrorism-act/>accessed12thAugust2021.

22VisittoSriLanka:ReportoftheU.N.SpecialRapporteuronfreedomofreligionorbelief,U.N.Doc.A/HRC/43/48/Add.2(Aug.25,2020),paragraphs23-27.Seealso‘MisleadingclaimcirculatesthatMuslimsignoredCOVID-19curfewatSriLankanmosque’,AFPFactCheck(8April,

95

GnanasaraTherosignedapactwithAshinWirathu,theleaderofMyanmar’s969movement

who once called himself ‘the Burmese bin Laden’. The two vowed to build anti-Islamic

networks within hardline Buddhist groups.23 Thereafter Sri Lanka erupted in spates ofviolenceinspiredbyracistmonksagainstMuslims.NoonewasprosecutedundertheICCPR

Act for attacks in 2014, 2017, 2018, and 2019. Gnanasarawas briefly jailed forwitness

intimidationofanti-disappearanceactivistSandyaEknaligodabutlaterpardoned.24Defyingamagistrate’sorderinSeptember2019,hecrematedadeceasedBuddhistmonkonHindu

templegrounds inMullaitivuwhilepolice stoodby idly.25Nochargeshavebeenbroughtagainsthimforcontemptofcourt,whileTamilsandjournalistswhoprotestedagainstthe

incidenthavefacedharassment.Incredibly,thePresidentialCommissionofInquiryonthe

EasterSundayattacksrecommendedthatGnanasarabeinvestigatedforhisroleinpastanti-

Muslim violence; yet only Rishad Bathiudeen, against whom the Commission deemed

allegationsunfounded,remainsincustodyunderthePTA.26

Thestatehasshieldednotonlyracist‘monks’buttheveryIslamicterroristslinkedtothe

Easterattacks.InJanuary2021,threemenwerechargedintheUnitedStateswithaidingandabettingtheEasterattacksandconspiringtoprovidematerialsupporttoISIS: Mohamed

Naufar,MohamedRiskanandAhamedMilhan.27Althoughthethreehave longbeeninSri

2020)<https://factcheck.afp.com/misleading-claim-circulates-muslims-ignored-covid-19-curfew-sri-lankan-mosque>accessed12thAugust2021;‘ChinaSpearheadsAnti-MuslimPropagandaCampaignInSriLankaAmidCoronavirusFears’,ColomboTelegraph,(30April2020)<https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/china-spearheads-anti-muslim-propaganda-campaign-in-sri-lanka-amid-coronavirus-fears/>accessed12thAugust2021.

23RangaSrilal,‘HardlineBuddhistsinMyanmar,SriLankastrikeanti-Islamicpact’,Reuters(30Sept.2014)<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-buddhism-myanmar/hardline-buddhists-in-myanmar-sri-lanka-strike-anti-islamist-pact-idUSKCN0HP1RE20140930>accessed12thAugust2021;CharlesHaviland,‘ThedarkersideofBuddhism’,BBCNews,(30May2015)<https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-32929855>accessed12thAugust2021.

24‘SriLankahardlinemonkGnanasarajailedforintimidation’,BBCNews,(14June2018)<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44479610>accessed12thAugust2021;‘SriLankapresidentpardonshardlineBuddhistmonk’,Reuters,(22May222019)<https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-sri-lanka-monk-pardon/sri-lanka-president-pardons-hardline-buddhist-monk-idUKKCN1SS23V>accessed12thAugust2021.

25MeeraSrinivasan,‘Wherethesaffronrobehasthefinalsay’,TheHindu,(28September2019),<https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/when-the-saffron-robe-has-the-final-say/article29543715.ece>accessed12thAugust2021.

26‘Rishad’swifequestionsfailuretoarrestGnanasaraThero’,ColomboGazette,(3May2021),<https://colombogazette.com/2021/05/03/rishads-wife-questions-failure-to-arrest-gnanasara-thero/>accessed12thAugust2021;FaizerShaheid,‘RoleofvariosleadersintheEasterattacksPCoIreport’,TheMorning,(31March2021)<https://www.themorning.lk/role-of-various-leaders-in-easter-attacks-pcoi-report/#>accessed12thAugust2021.

27‘ThreeForeignNationalsChargedwithConspiringtoProvideMaterialSupporttoISIS’,U.S.DepartmentofJusticePressRelease,(8January2021)<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-foreign-nationals-charged-conspiring-provide-material-support-isis>accessed12thAugust2021.

96

Lankancustody,thestatedraggeditsfeetinchargingthem.28Noneappearedonaterrorismfinancing list updated by the Ministry of Defence in February 2021.29 The PresidentialCommissionReportinvestigatingtheEasterattackshasyettobepubliclyreleased,andonly

recently did the President launch an investigation into intelligence links of the suicide

bombers.30Withpressuremounting,on11August2021,theAttorneyGeneral’sDepartmentfinallyfiledanindictmentcharging25individualsunderthePTAwithconspiracyandaiding

andabettingtheEasterattacks.31

Inshort,afterthehorrificEasterSundayattacks,thestatehaslargelyfailedtoinvestigateor

prosecutethoseactuallyresponsible,orhealthelastingscarsbornebyfamiliesofthedead.

Ithas insteadharnessedthePTAandICCPRActtotargettheMuslimcommunityat large

throughdiscriminatorypolicies andmass arrests. Thenumbers are striking—of 7,600

emergencyregulation,PTAandICCPRarrestssinceApril2019,thestatehasinvestigated

only about 300 for links to the Easter attacks, of which 32 are suspected of actual

involvement.32Forthescorestargetedwithoutanyreasonablebasis,thestatehasofferedneitheranapologynorrespitefromdiscriminatorytreatment.

II.PandemicResponseandIncreasingMilitarisation

Almost a year after the Easter attacks, the global COVID-19 pandemic hit. Through its

pandemic response, the Sri Lankan government has exacerbated conditions forMuslims,

dissenters, and minority rights activists. Early on, media reports blamed Muslims for

28Naufarhasbeenlabeledasthe“mastermind”oftheattacks,buttheAttorneyGeneralstatedataMay15,2021pressconferencethatchargescouldnotbefiledagainsthimorotherconspiratorsuntiltheCID’sinvestigationhadconcluded.See‘SriLankaAttorneyGeneralclaims“grandconspiracy”behindEasterattack:report’,EconomyNext,(18May2021)<https://economynext.com/sri-lanka-attorney-general-claims-grand-conspiracy-behind-easter-attack-report-82074/>accessed12thAugust2021;AsiriFernando,‘MPWeerasekaracallsforCIDreportfollowingAG’sclaimsregardingEasterSundayBombingsinvestigation’,DailyFT,(17May2021)<https://www.ft.lk/news/MP-Weerasekara-calls-for-CID-report-following-AG-s-claims-regarding-Easter-Sunday-Bombings-investigation/56-717910>accessed12thAugust2021.

29GazetteExtraordinaryNo.2216/37.25February2021.

30‘Easterbombings:SriLankaprobeschargesagainstspyagencies’,AlJazeera,(16July2021)<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/16/easter-sunday-bombings-sri-lanka-probe-spy-agencies>accessed12thAugust2021.

31‘EasterSundayAttackscase:AG’sDeptFilesPrincipalIndictmentAgainst25Suspects’,CeylonToday,(11August2021)<https://ceylontoday.lk/news/easter-sunday-attacks-case-ag-s-dept-files-principal-indictment-against-25-suspects>accessed12thAugust2021;KrishanFrancis,‘SriLankafileschargesagainst25Easterbombingsuspects’,WashingtonPost,(12August2021)<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/sri-lanka-files-charges-against-25-easter-bombing-suspects/2021/08/11/18c6d75a-fa98-11eb-911c-524bc8b68f17_story.html>accessed12thAugust2021.

32‘Relevantdocumentsoncasesagainst32EasterSundayattacksuspectssenttotheAttorneyGeneral’,ColomboPage,(9March2021)<http://www.colombopage.com/archive_21A/Mar09_1615273035CH.php.>accessed12thAugust2021.

97

spreading the virus, while a social media campaign urged boycotts of Muslim-owned

businessesclaiming‘deliberate’spreadofCOVID-19atMuslimestablishments.Authorities

didnothingtochallengetherampantbaselessconspiracytheoriesscapegoatingMuslims.33

Worse, state policy directly targeted religious minorities. In a controversial move, the

government issued an order prohibiting burial and mandating cremation of actual or

suspected COVID-19 deceased. The forced cremation policy elicited fierce criticism from

United Nations officials and rights groups, who noted that it flouted World Health

Organization(WHO)andpublichealthguidelines.34Nevertheless,thegovernmentrefusedto budge for nearly a year, particularly scarring the collective psyche of the Muslim

communityforwhomcremationconstitutesdesecrationofthedead.SriLankawastheonly

countrytobanburials,andtheforcedcremationpolicyhadtheperverseeffectofmaking

nearly10percentofSriLanka’spopulationfearseekingtreatmentinthemidstofapublic

healthcrisis.WhenthepolicywasfinallyliftedinFebruary2021,thestateinitiallychosea

remoteislandforburialsinTamillands,asifintenttopitminoritiesagainsteachotherina

war-affectedregion.35

ForthosedetainedunderthePTAandICCPRAct,thepandemichasexacerbatedconditions

ofconfinement,withthestatefloutingrulesinthenameofpandemicresponse.Duetothe

pandemic, many detainees were not physically brought before a magistrate within the

required14days.Familiesofdetaineeshavefacedduress,unabletovisittheirlovedones

andgrantedonlyafive-minuteweeklyphonecall.Somefamilieshavelearntthattheirloved

oneshave contractedCOVID inprisons anddetention sites.A17-year-oldwhohas been

detainedforovertwoyearswithoutchargesincetheEasterattackshassufferedamental

breakdown but receives neithermental health treatment nor parental visits. It took ten

months andmultiple letters to authorities for poet Ahnaf Jazeem to gain access to legal

counsel.36Hisprivatemeetingswithcounselwereillegallyrecorded,andhehaslanguishedinappallingprisonconditionswhereratshavebittenhim.AttorneyHejaazHizbullahwas

not produced before amagistratewithin the 90 days required by his detention order.37

33‘OpenWoundsandMountingDangers:BlockingAccountabilityforGraveAbusesinSriLanka’,HumanRightsWatch,(1February2021)<https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/01/sri-lanka-justice-under-attack>accessed12thAugust2021(hereafter“HRWReport”).

34‘SriLanka:‘Forced’cremationofCOVIDvictims’bodiesmuststop-UNrightsexperts’,UNNews,(25January2021)<https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/01/1082882>accessed12thAugust2021;JoannaSlater&PiyumiFonseka,‘InSriLanka,auniquepandemictrauma:forcedcremations’,WashingtonPost,(12February2021)<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/sri-lanka-cremations-covid/2021/02/12/b97719a6-6562-11eb-bab8-707f8769d785_story.html>accessed12thAugust2021.

35‘Covid-19:SriLankachoosesremoteislandforburials’,BBCNews,(2March2021)<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-56249805>accessed12thAugust2021.

36MeeraSrinivasan,‘Year-longdetentionoflawyer,poetsparksconcerninSriLanka’,TheHindu,(6May2021)<https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/year-long-detention-of-lawyer-poet-sparks-concern-in-sri-lanka/article34501745.ece>accessed12thAugust2021.

37HRWReport,supra,22.

98

During his time in a congested facility, he contracted COVID-19.38 As all these examplessuggest, the state hasused thepandemic to deny all judicial oversight andprotection to

detaineeswhohaveyet tobe chargedwithanyoffense.39A recentExtraordinaryGazetteauthorisingdetentionofPTAdetaineesatColombo’sCounterterrorismInvestigationUnit—

anotorioustorturesite—forebodesworsemistreatment.40

Beyond these examples, the COVID-19pandemic has facilitated increasingmilitarisation,

whichinturnwillfurtherdiminishminorityrights.Militarycontrolovernumerousaspects

ofcivilianlifeisreflectedinthepolicingofpublichealth,education,andfooddistribution

and the Ministry of Defence oversees telecommunications, immigration, and non-

governmentalorganisations(NGOs).41Militaryofficers,someofwhomarecrediblyaccusedofwarcrimesandotherabuses,simultaneouslyoccupypowerfulcivilianandmilitaryroles.

Forinstance,thegovernmentconsolidateditspandemicresponseunderthemilitary.Army

Commander Shavendra Silva,who is alleged tobe responsible forwar crimes, heads the

NationalOperationCentreforPreventionofCOVID-19Outbreak(NOCPCO).Hemakespublic

health policies for NOCPCOwith neither public discussion nor judicial or parliamentary

oversight. Severalmilitary personnel serve on the Presidential Task Force on COVID-19

response led by the current Finance Minister Basil Rajapaksa.42 The military overseesquarantine centres,which are concentrated in the alreadymilitarised Tamil andMuslim

areasintheNorthandEast.Itisthemilitarythatenforcescurfews,runscheckpoints,and

makescurfew-relatedarrests.43Themilitaryisalsoengagedintransportingandoverseeing

38ibid.

39TreatmentalsoremainsabhorrentforthoseindictedunderthePTAandawaitingtrial.AriotintheMaharahighsecurityprisonlastNovemberkilled11andinjuredatleast100.Fearingthevirus,inmatesbeggedguardsfortestingaccessandproperquarantiningprocedures.Guardsrespondedbyopeningfire,promptingthePresidenttoreleasesmallnumbersofdetaineesonbailtorelievecongestion.See,MeeraSrinivasan,‘Followingdeadlyriot,spotlightonSriLanka’sprisonconditions’,TheHindu,(10December2020)<https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/following-deadly-riot-spotlight-on-sri-lankas-prison-conditions/article33302053.ece>accessed12thAugust2021.

40GazetteExtraordinaryNo.2230/15,4June2021.

41Seegenerally,ThusiyanNandakumar,‘MyanmarandSriLanka:BoundbyTravails’,TheDiplomat,(27February2021)<https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/myanmar-and-sri-lanka-bound-by-travails/>accessed12thAugust2021.

42‘StatementonthePresidentialTaskForces’,(CentreforPolicyAlternatives15June2020),<https://www.cpalanka.org/statement-on-the-presidential-task-forces/>accessed12thAugust2021.

43BoramJang,‘SriLanka:vulnerablegroupspaythepriceformilitarizationofCOVID-19response’,ICJ,(27October2020)<https://www.icj.org/sri-lanka-vulnerable-groups-pay-the-price-for-militarization-of-covid-19-response/>accessed12thAugust2021;ThusiyanNandakumar,‘SriLanka’smilitarizedcoronaviruscontainmenthasgraveconsequences’,MedAct.org,(16October2020)<https://www.medact.org/2020/blogs/sri-lanka-coronavirus/>accessed12thAugust2021;‘AComplaintloggedagainstGeneralShavendraSilvaforcruel,inhumane&degradingtreatmentinquarantiningFTZworkers’,SriLankaBrief,(19October2020)<https://srilankabrief.org/sri-lanka-a-complaint-logged-against-

99

the burial of the COVID-deceased, coordinating vaccination efforts, and (more recently)

managingCOVIDpatientsingovernmenthospitals.

InapurportedattempttocombatmisinformationaboutCOVID-19,thepoliceannouncedin

April2020thatthosecriticisingthestate’spandemicresponsewouldfacearrest.44Withinamonth,at least17werearrestedforallegedlysharing ‘fakenews’,” includingauniversity

studentwhoseFacebookpostcriticisedBasilRajapaksa’sappointmenttotheCOVID-19task

force, and a youth whose Facebook post critiqued a divisional secretariat’s quarantine

policies.45SevenTamilyouthwerearrestedinTrincomaleebyamilitaryofficer,whosenameismentionedincourtfilings,forpostingaboutthedestructionofawarmemorial—which

suggeststhemilitaryisnowinvolvedinmonitoringsocialmediaactivity.Inrecentmonths,

therehavebeennumerousarrestsofTamilsandMuslimswho‘like,’‘thumbsup’,or‘forward’

picturesorvideosonsocialmediaexpressingfrustrationorcounteringfakenewsoranti-

minoritypostsonFacebook,WhatsApp, Instagram,andTikTok.Court-filedBreports for

thesedetaineesallegethattheypropagatedwarundertheICCPRActand/orrevampedLTTE

(LiberationTigersofTamilEelam)terrorismunderthePTA.

Civil society activism has likewise been quelled in the name of pandemic response.

Authoritieshaveselectivelyshutdownprotestsover the forcedcremationpolicyandthe

globalBlackLivesMattermovement.46Teachersunionandstudentunionleadershavebeenarrestedforprotestingproposededucationpolicies.47Policeattempttosilencetheseleadersbyforcingthemtoundergomilitaryquarantine intheMullaitivuAirForcebase.48All the

general-shavendra-silva-for-cruel-inhumane-degrading-treatment-in-quarantining-ftz-workers/>accessed12thAugust2021.

44‘Asia:BacheletalarmedbyclampdownonfreedomofexpressionduringCOVID-19’,UNOHCHRStatement,(3June2020)<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25920&LangID=E>accessed12thAugust2021;MeenakshiGanguly,‘SriLankaUsesPandemictoCurbFreeExpression’,HumanRightsWatch,(3April2020)<https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/03/sri-lanka-uses-pandemic-curtail-free-expression>accessed12thAugust2021;‘OldGhostsinNewGarb:SriLanka’sReturntoFear’,AmnestyInternational,(17February2021)<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa37/3659/2021/en/>accessed12thAugust2021(hereafter“AmnestyReport”).

45AmnestyReport,supra,8,25-26.

46AmnestyReport,supra,26-29;KalaniKumarasinghe,‘SriLankacracksdownonBlackLivesMatterSolidarityProtest’,TheDiplomat,(11June2020)<https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/sri-lanka-cracks-down-on-black-lives-matter-solidarity-protest/>accessed12thAugust2021.

47AazamAmeen,‘IUSFConvenerandseveralothersarrested’,TheMorning,(6August2021)<https://www.themorning.lk/iusf-convener-and-several-others-arrested/>accessed12thAugust2021.

48‘Tradeunionistsstageprotestatquarantinefacility’,Newsfirst,(11July2021)<https://www.newsfirst.lk/2021/07/11/trade-unionists-stage-protest-at-quarantine-facility/>accessed12thAugust2021;RathindraKuruwita,‘StalinaccusesMinisterWeerasekeraoflying’,TheIsland,(10July2021)<https://island.lk/stalin-accuses-minister-weerasekera-of-lying/>accessed12thAugust2021.

100

while,thestateallowedotherlargegatheringstoproceedtocommemorate‘NationalHeroes’

Day’,MPBasilRajapaksa’sministerialappointment,andacabinetminister’sfuneral.49

SriLanka’smilitarisedpandemicresponsereflectsbroadercurrentsunderway.Lastyear,

President Rajapaksa announced a task force designed to create a ‘Secure Country,

Disciplined,VirtuousandLawfulSociety’.50HeadedbySecretarytotheMinistryofDefenceRet.MajorGeneralKamalGunaratne,whoisalsoallegedtoberesponsibleforwarcrimes,

thetaskforceconsistsentirelyofarmy,navy,airforce,police,andintelligencepersonnel.51Ithasasweepingmandate‘tocurbtheillegalactivitiesofsocialgroupswhichareviolating

thelawwhichisemergingasharmfultothefreeandpeacefulexistenceofsociety’.52‘Anti-socialactivities’ inturnareleftundefined,empoweringstateofficialstotargetthosewho

engageinprotectedpoliticalspeech.WecaninferfromarrestsofTamilandMuslimactivists

andtheTerroristInvestigationDepartment’sharassmentof34localminorityrightsNGOs

that the statewill seek to expand its powers to crush engagement onminority rights.53Similarconcernsaremotivatingongoingprotestsagainstaproposedbillpromotingcivilian

enrollmentattheKotelawalaNationalDefenseUniversityandmilitaryentrytoSriLankan

higher educational system.54 Given broader trends of militarisation, it should perhapssurprisenoonethatSriLankahastakenaweakstanceonMyanmarpost-coupandinvited

theforeignministerofMyanmar’smilitaryjuntatoameetingofAsianforeignministers.55

Inshort,whatbeganpre-pandemichasonlybeenexacerbated.Thegovernmenthasattimes

usedthepandemicasabasis tostripMuslims,dissentersandminorityrightsactivistsof

theirfundamentalrights.Byincreasinglyturningtothemilitary—notonlyinitspandemic

responsebutalsoinpolicing,health,andeducationpolicy—thestateispavingthewayfor

49AmnestyReport,supra,26-29;‘InPictures:12thNationalWarHeroes’DaycommemoratedinSriLanka’,ColomboPage,(20May2021)<http://www.colombopage.com/archive_21A/May20_1621450818CH.php>accessed12thAugust2021.

50‘TwoseparatePresidentialTaskForcestoensureaSecureCountry&forArchaeologicalHeritageManagement’,GoSLPresidentialSecretariat,(3June2020)<https://www.presidentsoffice.gov.lk/index.php/2020/06/03/two-separate-presidential-task-forces-to-ensure-a-secure-country-for-archaeological-heritage-management/>accessed12thAugust2021.

51ibid.

52ibid.

53‘SriLanka:NewlyconstitutedPresidentialTaskForcethreatensruleoflaw’,InternationalCommissionofJurists,(5June2020)<https://www.icj.org/sri-lanka-newly-constituted-presidential-task-force-threatens-rule-of-law/>accessed12thAugust2021.

54DineshaSamararatne,‘TheKNDUBill’,DailyFT,(3August2021)<https://www.ft.lk/columns/The-KNDU-Bill/4-721232>accessed12thAugust2021.

55WarunaKarunatilake&PoppyMcPherson,‘SriLankainvitesMyanmarjuntareptomeeting,deniesendorsingcoup’,Reuters,(10March2021)<https://www.reuters.com/article/myanmar-politics-sri-lanka/sri-lanka-invites-myanmar-junta-rep-to-meeting-denies-endorsing-coup-idUSL1N2L81EM>accessed12thAugust2021.

101

militarisationofcivilianfunctions.Thiswillinturnnotonlyleadtodictatorshipbutafurther

degradationofminorityrights.

III.DeradicalizationRegulations

ActivistshavelongshownthatthePTAfacilitatestorture,enforceddisappearance,andother

grave human rights abuses. In January 2021, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights

MichelleBacheletcriticisedSriLankaforcontinuingPTAdetentions‘despiterepeatedcalls

overmanyyearsbyUnitedNationshumanrightsmechanismstorepealit’.56 RatherthanrepealthePTA,theRajapaksaadministrationnowseekstostrengthenitbytakingacuefrom

China.

Inrecentyears,ChinahasdetainedamillionofitsUyghurs,Kazakhs,andotherMuslimsin

secret‘reeducationcenters’,whichhavebeendescribedasthelargestmass-scaleinternment

ofethnicandreligiousminoritiessinceWorldWarTwo.57Chineseofficialshaveclaimedthata third of Xinjian’s Uyghurs are ‘polluted by religious extremist forces’ and need to be

cleansedoftheirideologyandnotmerelypunishedfortheiractions.58TheUnitedStates(US)andothercountrieshavelabelledChinesepoliciesofforcedinternment,travelrestrictions,

religious suppression, and sterilisation as genocide.59 The US, EU, United Kingdom, andCanadahavesanctionedtheChineseCommunistPartyofficialswhodevelopedthesepolicies

andbarredcertainimportsfromXinjian.60

56ReportoftheOfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRightstotheU.N.HumanRightsCouncil,A/HRC/46/20,paragraph36(27January2021)<https://undocs.org/A/HRC/46/20>accessed12thAugust2021.

57BenMauk,‘InsideXinjiang’sPrisonState’,NewYorker,(26February2001)<https://www.newyorker.com/news/a-reporter-at-large/china-xinjiang-prison-state-uighur-detention-camps-prisoner-testimony>accessed12thAugust2021.

58RaffiKhatchadourian,‘SurvivingtheCrackdowninXinjiang’,NewYorker,(5April2021)<https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/04/12/surviving-the-crackdown-in-xinjiang>

59[UnitedStates]JohnHudson,‘AstensionswithChinagrow,BidenadministrationformalizesgenocidedeclarationagainstBeijing’,WashingtonPost,(30March2021)<https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/china-genocide-human-rights-report/2021/03/30/b2fa8312-9193-11eb-9af7-fd0822ae4398_story.html>accessed12thAugust2021;[Netherlands]‘Dutchparliament:China’streatmentofUighursisgenocide’,Reuters,(25February2021)<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-netherlands-china-uighurs-idUSKBN2AP2CI>accessed12thAugust2021;[Canada]RyanPatrickJones,‘MPsvotetolabelChina’spersecutionofUighursagenocide’,CBCNews,(22February2021)<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/uighur-genocide-motion-vote-1.5922711>accessed12thAugust2021.

60Khatchadourian,‘SurvivingtheCrackdowninXinjiang’,supranote3.

102

SriLankanofficialshave taken theoppositeview,publiclydefendingChina’spoliciesand

modelling proposed new PTA regulations after them.61 On 12 March 2021, PresidentRajapaksaunveilednewregulationsunderthePTAbyExtraordinaryGazette.EntitledDe-radicalization from holding violent extremist religious ideology, they permit the DefenseMinistrytocreate‘reintegrationcentres’designedtorehabilitatethosewhocauseorintend

tocause‘actsofviolenceorreligious,racialorcommunaldisharmonyorfeelingsofillwillorhostilitybetweendifferentcommunitiesorracialorreligiousgroups’.62AswithChina’s‘reeducationcentres,’thesecampsgobeyondpunishingovertactstocriminalisethoughts

and deeds that are far removed from terrorism, on the asserted basis that the state can

predictwhetheranindividualwillcommitanactofterrorism.63

The proposed deradicalization regulations are vague in what they prohibit and open to

subjective enforcement, facilitating overbroad application and denial of fundamental

rights.64 As precarious as things are for minorities now under the existing PTA, newderadicalization regulations will make matters worse if allowed to take effect. Theregulationswouldpermitprolongeddetentionforrehabilitationonnothingmorethanan

official’s subjective interpretation of a detainee’s words or actions. These fears are not

speculative: Commissioner General of Rehabilitation Maj. Gen. Dharshana Hettiarachchi

informed the press that those with “no direct links to the 2019 April attacks will be

rehabilitated,”implyingthatthelargeswathesofMuslimsarbitrarilydetainedwillnowface

rehabilitation.65 Beyondwho they target, thederadicalization regulations are silent as towhat“rehabilitation”meansandwhatprocedureswillbeadoptedtoachieveit.

Inseveralrespects,theproposedregulationsremoveeventheinadequatesafeguardsthat

exist under the PTA. If enacted, police officers may commence an investigation afterarrestingaperson,withoutprovidingthereasonforarrest.WhereasthePTAonlyallows

policeofficerstomakearrests,enterpremises,conductsearchesandseizematerial,thenew

regulations ifpassedwill allow ‘anypoliceofficer,oranymemberof thearmed forces’ toarrestanddetain.66Anypersonotherthanapoliceofficerhas24hourstohandoverthearrested individual to the police, potentially facilitating torture and enforced

61‘LankadefendsChina’streatmentofMuslimsinXinjiangatUNHumanRightsCouncil’,DailyFT,(8March2021)<http://www.ft.lk/news/Lanka-defends-China-s-treatment-of-Muslims-in-Xinjiang-at-UN-Human-Rights-Council/56-714376>accessed12thAugust2021.

62GazetteExtraordinaryNo.2218/68,12March2021.

63AmbikaSatkunanathan,‘Reradicalisationthrough‘deradicalisation’?’,TheMorning,(28March2021)<https://www.themorning.lk/radicalisation-through-deradicalisation/>accessed12thAugust2021.

64ibid.

65ZulfickFarzan,‘RehabfordetaineesnotrelatedtoApril21stAttacks’,Newsfirst,(23March2021)<https://www.newsfirst.lk/2021/03/23/rehab-for-detainees-not-related-to-april-21st-attacks/>accessed12thAugust2021.

66ExtraordinaryGazetteNo.2218/68,supra,atpara.3.

103

disappearance.67 Detainees may be deprived access to counsel or the right to receiveevidencetobeusedagainstthem.IftheAttorneyGeneral’sDepartmentbelievestheperson

suitableforrehabilitation,thatpersonmaybedetainedforayear(withpossibleextensions

of another year)without judicial scrutiny.68Whereas the existing PTA limits pre-chargedetention to 18 months and requires magistrate judges to issue detention orders, the

deradicalization regulations turn judges into rubber-stampers by allowing two years of

detentionwithnomeaningfuloversightofapersonwhohasneverbeenfoundguiltybya

courtoflaw.69

Sri Lanka has a troubled past when it comes to rehabilitation. Anyonewho had been a

memberoftheLTTEforevenaday—forciblyrecruitedorotherwise—wasrequiredto

submittorehabilitationatthewar’sendin2009pursuanttoemergencyregulationsthenin

place.70BycodifyingrehabilitationproceduresunderthePTA,thegovernmentnowseekstoformaliseabusesthatwerepreviouslypossibleonlyunderemergencyrule.

InOctober2009,15,000 ‘ex-combatants’wereplaced instate-runrehabilitationcamps.71Severaldisappeared.72TamilmotherJeyakumariBalendranidentifiedhermissingteenageson inaphotographdepicting state rehabilitationof formerLTTEcadres. Shedemanded

answers,notinghersonwasinstatecustody,andmetwiththen-UNHighCommissionerfor

HumanRightsNaviPillay.ThegovernmentsilencedJeyakumaribyorderingherarreston

unsupportedallegationsthatshehadharbouredacriminalsuspect.73Shespentayear inprisonwhile her teenage daughterwas sent to an orphanage. As her experience shows,

‘rehabilitation’canbeaeuphemismfordisappearance,andfamilieswhodemandanswers

facecompoundinginjustice.

TheTamilexperiencewithrehabilitationalsorevealsacostforthosewhosafelymakeitout.

Women’sgroupsandcommunityactivistsworkedcloselywithrehabilitatedwomencadres

67Id.atpara.5(1).

68Id.atparas.5(4)&7(2)(b).

69AmbikaSatkunanathan,‘Reradicalisationthrough‘deradicalisation’?’,TheMorning,(28March2021)<https://www.themorning.lk/radicalisation-through-deradicalisation/>accessed12thAugust2021.

70Therehabilitationcampshousedthosewhosurrenderedattheendofthewar.Roughly68TamilprisonerswerethereafterdetainedunderthePTA.Some16werepardonedbyPresidentRajapaksainJuly2021.Theotherseitherremaindetainedwithoutchargeorfacesurveillanceifreleasedonbail.

71ErmizaTegal,UnderstandingRuleofLaw,HumanSecurityandPreventionofTerrorisminSriLanka,(Law&SocietyTrust2021),26.

72ReportoftheOHCHRInvestigationonSriLanka,A/HRC/30/CRP.2,atparagraphs341,360-367,429-437;JayashikaPadmasiri,‘SurrenderingandDisappearing–wherearetheynow?’,Groundviews,(5May2012)<https://groundviews.org/2012/05/05/surrendering-and-disappearing-where-are-they-now/>accessed12thAugust2021.

73MisconceptionsondetentionofBalendranJayekumari,GovernmentofSriLankaMinistryofDefence(18March2014),onfilewithauthors.

104

intheNorthandtheEastfrom2010to2019,helpingthemrebuildtheirlivesafterthewar.

Formanywomen, particularly thewar-disabled, conservativeTamil society left themno

place to return to.Having chosenapath that challenged traditional gendernorms, these

women were shunned by the community and struggled to marry, raise children, and

negotiateculturallyacceptedwomen’swork.Rehabilitationpoliciesonlyexacerbatedtheir

challenges.WithformerLTTEwomencadresvisitedatoddhoursbyyoungmilitarymen,the

Tamilcommunityostracisedthesewomenfortheirperceivedpromiscuity,oravoidedthem

tonotinvitefurthersurveillanceuponthemselves.74Thebadgeofbeing‘rehabilitated’sowsmistrust and division within already marginalised communities, further breaking down

familyandcommunityties.

YesterdayTamilswerethetarget;todayitismainlyMuslims.InChina,UyghurAnarSabit

describedhowher familywas labelledas ‘focuspersonnel’ tobewatchedwhile shewas

detainedinChinesereeducationcamps.Herrelativeshadtoentertainofficialswithalcohol

(to show departure fromMuslim norms) and attend weekly flag-raising ceremonies (to

prove their patriotism).After Sabitwas released, former friends and relatives kept their

distance, fearing that anyassociationwithherwouldonly land them there too.75 Similarpatterns are already emerging in Sri Lanka, with the Muslim community shunning PTA

detainees for their perceived ties to religious extremism or avoiding them to ward off

unwantedCriminalInvestigationDepartment(CID)attention.Forexample,inMawanella(in

theKegalledistrict),aroundahundredMuslimshavebeendetainedunderthePTA.Families

therearesufferinginsilenceandisolation.Communitymembersdonotwanttotalkabout

themorshowtheirhomestoanyonewhowantstogatherinformationorassistthem.Inthis

way rehabilitation camps break down not only a detainee but also his or her broader

community. Andwith prolonged detention facilitating disappearance, some families will

foreverbetornapart.

Human rights activists have filed fundamental rights petitions challenging the

deradicalizationregulationsonseveralgroundsbeforetheSriLankanSupremeCourt.76On5 August 2021, a three-judge panel of the Supreme Court issued a temporary order

suspendingthederadicalizationregulationspendingacourthearing.77Until theSupreme

74Women’sActionNetwork,Women’sAccesstoJusticeintheNorthandEastofSriLanka—CEDAWShadow

Report,(August2016),17-18.

75Khatchadourian,SurvivingtheCrackdowninXinjiang,supranote3.

76AazamAmeen,‘FRfiledbeforeSCchallengingderadicalisationregulations’,TheMorning,(10April2021)<https://www.themorning.lk/fr-filed-before-sc-challenging-deradicalisation-regulations/>accessed12thAugust2021.

77AazamAmeen,‘SCissuesinterimordersuspendingapplicationofde-radicalizationregulations’,TheMorning,(5August2021)<https://www.themorning.lk/sc-issues-interim-order-suspending-application-of-de-radicalization-regulations/>accessed12thAugust2021.Theinterimordersuspendedthederadicalizationregulationsuntilthenexthearingdate,setforAugust24,2021.However,thecasewasnotcalledonAugust24thduetonewpandemicrestrictions.

105

Courtissuesitsruling,theregulationswillnottakeeffect.Buttheyhavealreadyhadachilling

effect.Civilsocietyactivistsarebeginningtoself-censorandcurtailtheiractivismtoavoid

being framed for terror financing or other violations and forced into rehabilitation.

Governmentofficialshavereportedlysuggested to familiesofcurrentPTAdetainees that

they should convince their loved ones to ‘voluntarily’ opt for rehabilitation. Some PTA

inmateshavealsobeentoldthatrehabilitationisabetteroptionthanpursuingappealsin

higher courts. For the approximately 300 detainees held in connection with the Easter

attacksinappallingconditionswithdimprospectsofcourtoversightduringthepandemic,

rehabilitationisbeingdangledasachancetogetaway.78Forthegovernment,rehabilitationoffersachancetodismissasmootdozensof fundamentalrightscasesandavoidvisitsto

detention facilities by the International Committee of the Red Cross or Human Rights

Commission of Sri Lanka. In this manner, individuals who have yet to be charged orpresentedbeforeamagistratecanbestrippedoftheirlibertywithcoercedconsent.

In short, the PTA and ICCPRAct are already beingweaponised againstMuslims, Tamils,

dissenters,andminorityrightsactivists. If theproposednewderadicalizationregulations

takeeffect,theywillmakeanalreadydangerousenvironmentfarworse.

IV.RegulationsBanning11MuslimGroups

Proposed deradicalization regulations are only part of the emerging counterterrorism

landscape. On 13April 2021, the President announced newPTA regulations banning 11

organizations on national security grounds.79 In addition to ISIS and Al-Qaeda, variousThowheedhJamma’athgroupsandcharitiessupposedlylinkedtotheEasterattackswere

banned.Someofthesegroupsmayindeedhavelinkstoterrorism,andtheselinksshouldbe

properlyandlawfullyinvestigated.However,withthebanningof11Muslimorganisations,

thereisanimminentthreatthatmanyfollowersofthesegroups(jama’ath)willbesentforrehabilitation.ToputinternationalterrororganisationslikeAlQaedaandISISinthesame

basketaslocalfaithgroupsisatacticforthisgovernmenttodeflectWesternconcernover

growingIslamophobiainSriLanka.

Further,pastexperienceshowsthatthecompositionofthelistcanchangeatwhim.In2014,

the administration of former President Mahinda Rajapaksa banned 16 Tamil diaspora

organisationsand424individualsongroundsof‘financingterrorism’.80Severalnameswere

78Hereagain,thereareparallelswithgovernmentrehabilitationofex-LTTEcombatants.Duringa2017visit,theUNWorkingGrouponarbitrarydetentionwasinformedthatex-combatantsagreedtoundergoonetotwoyearsofmilitaryrehabilitationonlytoescapeprolongedpre-trialdetentionunderthePTA.UNWorkinggrouponarbitrarydetention:preliminaryfindingsfromitsvisittoSriLanka(4to15December2017)<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22541&LangID=E>accessed12thAugust2021.

79GazetteExtraordinaryNo.2223/3,13April2021.

80GazetteExtraordinaryNo.1854/41,21March2014.

106

de-listedbythesubsequentgovernment,onlytoberelistedagainthisyear,witharecently

surfaceddocumentaddingover50Muslimnames for the first time.81Uponproscription,individualshavefewmeansofchallengingtheirban,denyingtheirmembershipofthelisted

groups, or questioningwhether the group indeedhas terrorist links. Their rights of free

movementandassociationarerestrictedwithnojudicialoversight,onlittlemorethanthe

government’sassertionthatbanningthemfurthersnationalsecurity.

Thegovernmenthasapoortrackrecordinlabellingterroristgroups.Whenpeaceactivists

RukiFernandoandFatherPraveeninquiredaboutJeyakumari’sarrestin2014,theywere

themselves detained under the PTA, with then Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa

spuriouslyclaimingthepeaceactivistshad‘TigerLinks’.82FormerHighCommissionerNaviPillaywasmaligned as the ‘Tamil Tigress in the UN’.83 Today, with journalists choosingbetween exile and self-censorship and investigators and judges under attack,84 it seemsforeseeablethatbroadproscriptionpowerswillbeusedto furtherstifledissent.Withno

mechanism to challenge a group’s proscription, or alleged membership in a proscribed

group,recentregulationsinviteasweepingabuseofpoweranddiminishmentofbasiccivil

rights.

V.ReformthePTA?

While the state appears impervious to domestic pressure, international pressure is a

differentstory.In2017,theEUreinstatedpreferentialtradestatustoSriLanka(whichhad

beenstrippedin2010onhumanrightsgrounds)ontheexpressconditionthatitrepealand

replace the PTA.85 With the current government instead moving to strengthen the PTA

81EaswaranRutnam,‘Tamildiasporagroupsbanned’,DailyMirror,(29March2021)<http://www.dailymirror.lk/breaking_news/Tamil-diaspora-groups-banned/108-208756>accessed12thAugust2021;GazetteExtraordinaryNo.2216/37,25February2021.

82‘Gotaorderedtodeletethelibelousstatementonactivists’,SriLankaGuardian,(19March2014)<http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2014/03/oops-gota-ordered-to-delete-libelous.html>accessed12thAugust2021.

83‘OpeningremarksbyUNHighCommissionerforHumanRightsNaviPillayatapressconferenceduringhermissiontoSriLankaColombo’,OHCHR,(31August2013)<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13673>accessed12thAugust2021.

84‘EliseBakerandNushinSarkarati,EscalatingAttacksonJournalistsinSriLankaDemandNewTackfromHumanRightsCouncil’,JustSecurity,(17February2021)<https://www.justsecurity.org/74759/escalating-attacks-on-journalists-in-sri-lanka-demand-new-tack-from-human-rights-council/>accessed12thAugust2021.

85EuropeanUnion,EUAnnualReportonHumanRights&DemocracyintheWorld:2019CountryUpdates,(2019)227.;PaneethaAmeresekere,‘RepealingPTA,regainingGSP+,connected-EU’,CeylonToday,(22June2020)<https://ceylontoday.lk/news/repealing-pta-regaining-gsp-connected-eu>accessed12thAugust2021.

107

throughproposedderadicalizationregulations,theEUParliamentpassedameasureon10

June2021urgingsuspensionofSriLanka’sGSP+status(meaningbillionsinannualtrade).

The strongly worded resolution proclaimed that the PTA ‘breaches human rights,

democracy,andtheruleoflaw’anddescribedhowitsoverreachandapplicationviolated

internationalstandards.86

The potential loss of GSP+ seems to have caught the administration’s attention. A

commission created by President Rajapaksa to investigate recent human rights abuses

issuedaninterimreportrecommendingthatthePTAbereformed(butnotrepealed)tobring

itinlinewithlawsinplaceinothercountries,includingtheUK.87JusticeMinisterAliSabryannouncedinJunethatapanelofexpertswouldassesswaystoreformthePTA.88Amongotherthings,hesuggestedthatunderrevisedlegislation,magistrateswouldberequiredto

visitpolicestationsandotherdetentioncentres toascertain that thedetaineesarebeing

properlytreated,andheftierfineswouldbeleviedfortortureundertheConventionagainst

TortureActof1994(CAT).On25August2021,PresidentRajapaksaappointedanAdvisory

Boardtoadvisehimoninvestigation,release,andbailofthoseimprisonedanddetainedin

connectionwithallegedterrorism.89

ButfewinSriLankabelievethesereformstobeanythingmorethanaface-savingmeasure.

Tamil National Alliance (TNA) MP M.A. Sumanthiran described the Justice Ministry’s

proposedamendmentstothePTAandCATasmere ‘windowdressing’.90Exceedinglyfewprosecutionsexistunderexistinglawsdespiterampantandwell-documentedincidentsof

torture.Magistrates are already required to visit prisons under the PrisonOrdinance; it

simplyneveroccurs.TheproposedPTAamendmentshavenomechanismtoensurethese

visits, nor open access to detention facilities. Offering presidential pardons is a meagre

responsetoabrokensystem,andthosewhoreceiveapardonorcompleterehabilitationwill

foreverbe labelledand treatedas terroristswithouteverhavingaday incourt. Inshort,

86‘EuropeanParliamentresolutionof10June2021onthesituationinSriLanka,inparticularthearrestsunderthePreventionofTerrorismAct(2021/2748(RSP))’,EuropeanParliament,(10June2021)<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0290_EN.html>accessed12thAugust2021.

87‘PTA:PCOIwantsitbroughtinlinewithlawsinothercountries,includingUK’,TheIsland,(22July2021)<https://island.lk/pta-pcoi-wants-it-brought-in-line-with-laws-in-other-countries-including-uk/>accessed12thAugust2021.

88‘MohammadRasooldeen,SriLankamullschangestocontroversialanti-terrorlawasEU,UNstepuppressure’,ArabNews,(24June2021)<https://www.arabnews.com/node/1882226/world>accessed12thAugust2021;PamodiWaravita,‘PTAtobereformed:Sabry’,TheMorning,(23June2021)<https://www.themorning.lk/pta-to-be-reformed-sabry/>accessed24thAugust2021.

89‘AdvisoryBoardappointedtomakerecommendationsonsuspectsdetainedunderPTA’,DailyMirror,(25August2021)<https://www.dailymirror.lk/latest_news/Advisory-Board-appointed-to-make-recommendations-on-suspects-detained-under-PTA/342-218999>accessed12thAugust2021.

90M.A.Sumanthiran,‘AmendingTortureAct:MinisterOfJustice,ThisIsWindowDressingForTheEU!’,ColomboTelegraph,(9July2021)<https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/amending-torture-act-minister-of-justice-this-is-window-dressing-for-the-eu/>accessed12thAugust2021.

108

given theabsenceof a commitment to changing current ground realities thatperpetuate

abuse,proposalsforreformorband-aidpardonsmerelyservetoplacatetheinternational

communitywhilemaintainingstatusquo.

SriLankahastriedreformingthePTAbefore,withthepreviousgovernmentputtingfortha

draft Counter Terrorism Act (CTA) to replace the PTA. Although this bill never moved

forward,thedraft languageisilluminative.TheproposedCTAprovidedbettersafeguards

againstadmittingcoercedconfessionsasevidence,shiftingtheburdenofprovingthatany

confessionwasvoluntary fromthesuspect to thestate.But inotherways, it fell short.Itcontinuedtoallowprolongeddetentionwithoutcharge,theveryconditionfacilitatingchronicabuse.91 It likewisegavethemilitarythepowertoarrestandsetnotime limit inwhich detainees had to be produced before a magistrate, meaning a detainee could be

broughtbeforeanymagistrate after someundefinedperiodof time, rather thanbroughtimmediatelybeforethemagistrateinthejurisdictionofarrest.

Weknowfromhistorythatanyproposedreformeffort thatpermitsprolongeddetention

andnarrowsjudicialoversightwillleadtohumanrightsabuses.SriLanka’sexperiencewith

‘counterterrorism’isoneoftortureandenforceddisappearanceatthehandsofthestate.

Becauseofthisreality,confessionsmadetothepolicecannotbeadmissible;preventative

detention can only occur for short periods with judicial oversight; and detainees must

receivepromptandperiodichearingsbeforemagistrate’scourtssittinginthejurisdictionof

arrest.Moreover,intheSriLankancontext,wemustaskwhetherWesterncounterterrorism

frameworksareworthemulating.WithdraconianlawsbeingabusedthroughoutSriLanka’s

post-colonialhistorytotargetTamils,Muslims,andcivilsocietyactivistsofallcommunities,

anycounterterrorismlawthatgrantssweepingdetentionpowerswillhugelyharmminority

communities.AndSriLankawillseektotapintoglobalIslamophobiatogainapprovalforits

‘reforms’,claimingtotheUNandtheworldthatitscounterterrorismlawsarenodifferentto

theWest’s.

As human rights activists, we abhor all violence and terrorism. But a regime of

counterterrorismlawsthatallowanincreasinglymilitarisedethnonationaliststatetoinflict

terroronitsminoritiesoffersnoanswer.SriLankaisonadraconianpath,seekingtoemulate

Myanmar’s militarisation and China’s forced internment to persecute Muslims, Tamils,

dissenters,andminorityrightsactivists.

RepealingthePTAisasmallbutessentialsteptochangethetide.SriLankamaybefeeling

theEU’sheat,afraidtoloseGSP+withitseconomyintatters.Butitsactionsindicatethatany

reformeffortsnowunderwayarenothingbutaploytoplacatetheinternationalcommunity.

91‘LockedUpWithoutEvidence:AbusesunderSriLanka’sPreventionofTerrorismAct’,HumanRightsWatch,(29January2018)<https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/01/29/locked-without-evidence/abuses-under-sri-lankas-prevention-terrorism-act>accessed12thAugust2021;‘CounteringTerrorismattheExpenseofHumanRights’,AmnestyInternational,(31January2019)https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa37/9770/2019/en/accessed12thAugust2021.

109

Meanwhile,itisSriLanka’sminorities—particularlyMuslimsandTamils—whoaremade

tosufferandsacrificetheirbasiccivilliberties.

110

ShiftingbetweenDesperationandRejection:

SriLankanMuslims’RelationshipwithDemandsforJusticeandAccountability

Dr.FarahMihlar

MuslimsinSriLanka,asareligiousandethnicminoritygroup,havedemonstratedacautious

andcomplexrelationshiptohumanrightsbasedapproaches,especiallyregardingclaimsfor

justiceandaccountabilityforgrossviolationstheyhavesuffered.Thisisnotbecause,asthis

publicationaimstoprovethattheyhavenotbeenvictimsofsuchviolationsandatrocities;a

perspectivesometimesassociatedwiththegroupandbasedonthehistoricalmisconception

thatMuslimswerenot affectedby the country’s threedecadeold armed conflict.On the

contrary,throughoutthewarandinitsaftermath,Muslimsatvariousdifferentlevelshave

facedorganisedandsystematichumanrightsviolationsandeverydaydiscrimination.Yet,

they remain on the margins of negotiations, discussions and analysis in justice and

accountabilityprocesses.Moreover, justiceandaccountability rarely featureasdominant

demandsamongMuslimswhoseresponsetoviolationsandattacksbythestatehasbeen

largelyplacidandreconciliatory.

ThisarticlewillassesstherelationshipbetweenMuslimsinSriLankaandrecentdemands

forjusticeandaccountabilityforconflictrelatedandotherhumanrightsviolations.Justice

and accountability here are not necessarily limited to judicial processes or criminal

prosecution,butratherencapsulateabroaderframeworkofrecognisingandaccountingfor

violationsandcrimesby investigatingandholdingperpetrators toaccount, through legal

and othermeans, and seeking redress primarily through a human rights approach. The

analysisof this relationship is constructed in threephases: justice forviolations suffered

duringthearmedconflict,particularlyfocusingontheforcedevictionofMuslimsfromthe

North; engagementwith the state-run 2015 transitional justice process; and justice and

accountabilityforreligiousattacksandprogrammesagainstMuslimssince2009.Itargues

that the heterogeneity of theMuslim ‘community,’ their precarious group identity, their

historicalpoliticalcultureofpanderingtothemajorityandtheirbroaderdeprioritisingof

humanrightsapproachhasshapedthisrelationshipwithjustice.

ThecontentionsofMuslimidentityandmaledominanceofthecommunity,unfortunately,

remainatthecoreofpoliticalandreligiousdevelopmentandtherebymustformthestarting

pointofthisarticle.ThatMuslimgroupidentity,especiallyastheMoorethniccommunity,

wasexclusivist,fraught,genderedandweaklyestablishedbyeliteMuslimsinresponseto

growing Tamil nationalism has been well established by Muslim scholars.1 The

1M.A.Nuhman,SriLankaMuslims:EthnicIdentitywithinCulturalDiversity,(Colombo:InternationalCentreforEthnicStudies2007);FarzanaHaniffa,'PietyasPoliticsamongstMuslimWomeninContemporarySriLanka'(2008)42(2-3)ModernAsianStudies347-375;Qadri Ismail, ‘Unmooring Identity:TheAntinomiesofElite

111

reverberationsof thisproblematic identityhavehauntedMuslims fordecadesbyplacing

themuncomfortablyasthethirdlargestethnicgroupbehindtheSinhaleseandTamilswho

havebeenlockedinconflictformostpartofSriLanka’spost-independencehistory.Scholars

havealsodemonstratedhow,straddledwiththisunconvincingdistinctionasanethnicgroup

anduncomfortablyplacedvis-à-vistwoconflictingnationalisms,SinhaleseandTamil,this

identityhasshapedandaffectedMuslimpoliticsandreligion.2Genderisalsocriticaltotheframing of this article. Muslim community leadership structures, unfortunately, remain

heavilymale dominant and the relationship to justice reviewed in this article is largely

confinedtomen,asMuslimwomenhaveengagedwithandusedhumanrightsandjustice

approachesthroughanumberofdifferentprocesses.Thearticlerefrainsfromusingtheterm

‘leaders’asmanyofthemeninpowerfulpositionsintheMuslimcommunityhardlydisplay

qualitiesofleadershipnoraretheynecessarilyselectedtothesepositions,borrowingfrom

Ismail (1995) theyare therebydescribedaselites. It repetitively refers toa corebaseof

‘southern’Muslimcommunityandreligiouselites,whoaremostoftenColombo-based,but

suchcategoriescanbeproblematicandthereforemustbereadasapositionalstandpointas

muchasanindividualmass.3Understandingthishistoricalandcontemporarycontextmustprecedeanyanalysisofthegroup’srelationshipwithjusticeandaccountability.

MuslimPositioningintheArmedConflict

MuslimslivinginSriLanka’sNorthandEastwereseverelyanddifferentlyaffectedbythe

armed conflict. In the early stages of the war Muslims were sympathetic and at times

supportiveofTamilmilitancy.Thispositionchangedinthe1980s,mainlyintheEastastheir

allegiance,cooperationandsupportbecamedividedbetweentheSriLankanmilitaryand

TamilTigers,whichledtoincreasedtensionbetweenTamilandMuslimcommunitiesand

neighbourhoodsandculminatedininter-ethnicattacksofeachother’svillages.4TheturningpointforMuslimscamein1990whentheLiberationTigersofTamilEelam(LTTE)ethnically

cleansedtheNorth,forciblyevictingitsentireMuslimpopulation.Over75,000Muslimswere

forcedintodisplacementacrossthecountry,withamajoritytakingtemporaryshelterinthe

MuslimSelf-RepresentationinModernSriLanka,’inUnmakingtheNation:ThePoliticsofidentityandhistoryinModernSriLanka,(Colombo:SocialScientists'Association1995).

2DennisMcGilvrayandMirakRaheem,MuslimperspectivesontheSriLankanconflict,(WashingtonDC:East-WestCenterWashington2007)andFarah Mihlar, ‘Religious change in a minority context: transforming Islam in Sri Lanka’(2019)40(12) Third World Quarterly.

3Thispointcutsacrossthearticle.Therehave,forinstance,beengroupsofMuslimsacrossthecountry,especiallyintheEastwhohavepursuedjusticeclaimsforviolations,includingonlandissues.ThecritiqueinthearticlerefersmoregenerallytoMuslimmaleelitepositionality.

4ThiswaspartlyduetothepoliciesofthegovernmenttoarmandcreatehomeguardunitsamongMuslimsintheEast.ForaccountsonMuslimsexperienceofarmedconflictintheNorthandEastseeInternationalCrisisGroup,SriLanka’sMuslims:CaughtintheCrossfire,AsiaReportNo.134.(ColomboandBrussels:InternationalCrisisGroup2007)andFarahMihlar,Comingoutofthemargins:JusticeandreconciliationforconflictaffectedMuslimsinSriLanka(ICES2018).

112

north-westerntownofPuttalam.Thisyearalsosawtwoothermassatrocities;thekillingof

103worshippers inamosque inKattankudyand theslaughterof130villages inEravur.

Followingtheseevents,relationsbetweenbothgroupsreachedanadirandMuslimsinthe

East also became targets of LTTE attacks and atrocities resulting in frequent cases of

enforceddisappearance,abduction,landacquisitionandextortion.

Thoughfrequentlyframedonlyasvictims5fewMuslims,particularlyintheEast,werealsoresponsibleforviolenceandattacksagainstTamilsthatcontributedtothissituation.Inthe

earlyyearsof thewar,someMuslimyouthwere involvedwithgroupssuchastheEelam

Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) and Peoples Liberation Organisation of

TamilEelam(PLOTE)whichwereinvolvedinattacksagainsttheLTTEandTamilcivilians,

including contributing to displacement of Tamil communities.6 Tamil villagers in borderareasoftheconflictzonehavealsoreportedofattacksbyMuslimvillagerswhichcontributed

to tensions between communities and were repeatedly exploited by national political

leaders.7

The general lack of concern demonstrated by Colombo based Muslim political elites8regardingthearmedconflicthadinspired,inthe1980s,thecreationoftheSriLankaMuslim

Congress (SLMC), whichmaintained some focus on the situation of north east Muslims,

though this too was limited from a justice and accountability approach.9 The wider‘community’ response to the violations faced by Muslims was based on development,

peacebuildingandpoliticalinclusionapproachesratherthanhumanrightsand/orjustice.

Oneofthelong-standingandentrenchedgrievancesofnorthernMuslims,whoseveryname

embodiesitspredicament,10hasbeentheirneglectandexclusioninconflictrelatedpoliticaland humanitarian responses. Successive governments and international aid and donor

5FarzanaHaniffa,CompetingforVictimStatus:NorthernMuslimsandtheIroniesofSriLanka’sPost-conflictTransition,(Stability:InternationalJournalofSecurity&Development2015).

6RajanHoole,DayaSomasundaram,K.SritharanandRajaniThiranagama,TheBrokenPalmyra–TheTamilCrisisinSriLanka:AnInsideAccount,(SriLankaStudiesInst1992);andUniversityTeachersforHumanRights(Jaffna),‘Theplightofchildconscripts,socialdegradationandanti-Muslimfrenzy’,(July2002)SpecialReportNo:14.

7ibidandMarisaDeSilva,NilshanFonsekaFarahMihlar,Theforgottenvictimsofwar:abordervillagesstudy,(Colombo:NTT2019). 8ThisarticlemakesarepetitivedistinctionbetweenMuslimslivingintheNorthandEastandthoseinotherpartsofthecountryattimesreferredtoas‘southernMuslims.’Thesearenotfixedgroups,theyhaveamongthemmuchinterconnectivitythroughmarriage,business,religiousaffiliation,etc.GeographyisnottheonlydividingfactorforMuslims,theyarealsodiverseinreligiouspositioning,formsoflivelihood,incomeandeducationlevels.

9DennisMcGilvrayandMirakRaheem,MuslimperspectivesontheSriLankanconflict(WashingtonDC:East-WestCenterWashington2007)providesagoodanalysisonthepoliticaldividebetweensouthernandnortheasternMuslimpoliticalelitesandtheformationoftheSLMC.

10SharikaThiranagama,Inmymother’shouse:CivilwarinSriLanka(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress2011).

113

agencies provided piecemeal support to northern Muslims but there was never a

comprehensiveprogrammeaimedatinvestigatingorredressingtheinjusticestheysuffered.

ColombobasedMuslimcommunityelitesandpoliticians in thetwomainpoliticalparties

showednosignificantinterestindemandingastatelevelresponsetothisatrocity,noteven

in efforts to return or resettle the displaced. Maintaining apparent neutrality and

independencefromthearmedconflictwasconvenientfortheseMuslimselitesasitserved

theireconomicinterests11,providedasafetynetwiththestate,andaffirmedtheirdistinctionasaseparateethnicentity;onethatwasnotonlydifferentfromTamilsbutwasinfactbeing

targetedbyTamilmilitants.ThedireeconomicrealityofthenorthernMuslims,whohadfew

income generation and livelihood opportunities and faced tensions when competing for

themwiththelocalsinPuttalam,partlyinfluencedthedevelopmentalapproachtakenbythe

SLMC and civil society activists and groups from the North and Colombo. Many of the

activities of civil society organisations such as the Vavuniya based Rural Development

Foundation(RDFalsobasedinPuttalamandMannar)andPuttalambasedCommunityTrust

Fund(CTF),werefocusedonmeetingshelter,sanitation,educationalandlivelihoodneeds

oftheevictedcommunity,withconsequentlylessemphasisonhumanrightsorjusticeclaims

During the course of the armed conflict, oneof themost significant steps taken towards

accountability fornorthernMuslimswas the acknowledgement andapurportedapology

from theLTTEduring the2002peaceprocess.Havingnotbeennamedasaparty to the

conflict and thereby sidelined in peace talks, the Norwegians who were facilitating the

processarrangedameetingwithaMuslimdelegationledbyRaufHakeem,headoftheSLMC,

andtheLTTE,ledbyVelupillaiPrabhakaran.ThemeetingwassignificantforMuslimpolitics

asitprovidedsomerecognitiontotheSLMCandnotedtheadverseimpactoftheconflicton

thecommunity.AtthetimetheLTTE’smainideologueAntonBalasinghampubliclystated

thathe‘madeanapology’toHakeem,buthissubsequentcomment“Letusforgetandforgive

the mistakes made in the past” arguably undermined the seriousness of the crimes

committedagainstMuslims,especiallyconsideringethniccleansingandforcibledeportation

areseriouscrimesininternationallaw.12Priortothis,inaninterviewwiththeBBCin1994,LTTEleader,VPrabhakaran,tooexpressed‘regret’andacknowledgedthatJaffnaisalsothe

homelandofMuslims.However,expressingregretisnotanapology.13

11ThereisadearthofpublishedinformationontheeconomicpositionofMuslimsinSriLankabutitisgenerallywellknownwithinandoutsidethecountrythatColomboMuslimsyieldsignificanteconomicprowessastheyownandleadsomeofthebiggestcompaniescontributingtoGrossDomesticProduct(GDP).

12FordefinitionsofethniccleansingseetheUNCommissionofExpertsappointedtolookintoviolationsofinternationallawinformerYugoslavia,http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/un_commission_of_experts_report1994_en.pdf;forcibledeportationisconsideredacrimeagainsthumanityundertheRomeStatute,seehttps://www.icc-cpi.int/resourcelibrary/official-journal/rome-statute.aspx.

13‘MuslimsinJaffnamark28yearssinceexpulsion’,TamilGuardian,(31October2018).<https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/muslims-jaffna-mark-28-years-expulsion>accessed1July2021.

114

Hakeem,thoughcarefulinhislanguage,wasquicktoforgivewithoutadvancinganymajor

claim for justice, accountability or criminal liability. The latter could have been a strong

possibilityintheInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC)oranyotherfutureinternational/hybrid

tribunal.“Wehavetoldthemunequivocallythatwearepreparedtoforgiveandnotforget

(thepast)...Wehavebittermemoriesofthepast.Butitistimewecontendedwiththeground

realities.Thatwouldmean that theLTTEalsohas to lookatMuslimsand their separate

politicalidentityassomethingthathasbecomequitepronouncedoveraperiodoftime.”14

Ground realities have always been a mitigating factor in the pursuit of accountability.

Muslims livescatteredacross thecountry,sidebysidewithSinhaleseandTamilvillages,

whichinconjunctionwiththeirpoliticalcultureofpleasingthedominant-other,resultsin

them prioritising co-existence and peacebuilding over other factors. This is notable in

Hakeem’sposition, togetherwith the community’s resolute seekingof adistinct identity,

politicalrecognitionandinclusivenessonthebasisoftheformer.

Beyondthesethemesthough,weseeverylittleeffortbytheSLMCtoarticulatetheviolations

Muslims suffered through a human rights framework and/or claim criminal justice,

reparation(notjustcompensation),memorialisation,commemoration,etc.Itisnoteworthy

that theSLMC’spositionwastakenduringapeaceprocesswherepressuretomaintaina

cease-fire, build peace and ensure a political solution acceptable to Muslims trumped

demandsforjusticeandaccountability.Moreimportantly,forthepurposesofthearguments

inthisarticle,thislimitedpositionwaschampionedbyconflictaffectedMuslimsandgroups

representing them,with little interest shown on the part of Colombo based or southern

elites.

2015TransitionalJusticeProcess

In2009theGovernmentofMahindaRajapaksadeclaredthecountry’sthreedecadewarwas

overaftermilitarilycrushingtheLTTE,withallegationsofwarcrimesandcrimesagainst

humanity attached to the military campaign. The ensuing months were marked by

devastation, displacement, dispossession, suffering and trauma among hundreds of

thousandsofTamilswhohadfamilymemberskilledand/ordisappearedandweretrapped

inthelaststagesoffighting.

Muslimswereagaindividedattheendofthewarin2009.ManyMuslims,particularlythose

livingintheNorthandEast,wererelievedbythedefeatoftheLTTE,butthetriumphalist

andmajoritarian framingof the ‘victory’was cause for concern. In the subsequent years

majoritarian,Buddhist,nationalist,extremistforcesbegantosystematicallytargetMuslims,

14‘MuslimsinJaffnamark28yearssinceexpulsion’,TamilGuardian,(31October2018).<https://www.tamilguardian.com/content/muslims-jaffna-mark-28-years-expulsion>accessed1July2021.

115

whichslowlyledtoashiftintheresponseofsouthernelites.Priortodiscussingthis,Iwant

toconsidertheroleofMuslimsinthe2015transitionaljusticeprocess.

In the post-war years, the rule of Mahinda Rajapaksa and his family grew ever more

authoritarian and repressive with increasing violations taking place coerced by state

impunityanddisregardtotheruleoflaw.Thegovernmentstaunchlydeniedanyviolations.

The failure to investigate wartime atrocities coupled with the worsening human rights

context led to two United Nations (UN) investigations that were heavily critical of the

Rajapaksa administration. The investigations found credible evidence of violations of

international humanitarian and human rights laws, includingwar crimes.15 The surprisechangeingovernmentin2015immediatelyreflectedashiftinpolicyasthenewgovernment

co-sponsoredaUnitedNationsHumanRightsCouncil(UNHRC)Resolutionwhichpromised

arangeoftransitionaljusticemechanismstodealwiththecountry’slegacyofhumanrights

violations.16Theseincluded,aspartoftruthseeking,atruthandreconciliationcommission(TRC); anOffice onMissingPersons (a judicialmechanismwith prosecutorial powers to

ensurejustice);anOfficeofReparations;andaseriesofreformprocedures,constitutional,

institutional and security sector to guarantee non-repetition.17 Sri Lanka’s transitionaljusticeprocesswasbroughttolife,notinresponsetovictimdemandsbutaspartofaUN

process, and though ambitious and comprehensive in design, it immediately received

criticism for having isolated victims in its conception. The government responded by

appointing a civil society Consultation Task Force (CTF) that, through a community led

mechanism consisting of Zonal Task Forces (ZTF), began an extensive process of raising

awarenessoftransitionaljusticeandconsultingwarvictimsandsurvivorsontheproposed

mechanisms. Despite a number of limitations, the ZTF has been internationally and

nationallyacclaimedasalandmarkcommunityframeworkthatprovidedanopportunityfor

effectiveandempoweringvictimparticipationinthecountry’stransitionaljusticeprocess.

ThismechanismhadstrongMuslimrepresentationintheformofwell-knownandrespected

communityactivistswhohad legitimacyandcredibilitywith local communities.Through

theseactivistsaconsiderableamountofworkwasdonetocreatethespacefordiscussionon

conceptsoftruthseeking,justice,accountability,redressandnon-repetitionamongconflict

affectedMuslims,toraisetheirawarenessontheproposednationalmechanismsandother

internationalmodelsandseektheirviewsontheirownjusticeandaccountabilityclaims.

15ReportoftheUNSecretaryGeneral’sPanelofExpertsonAccountabilityinSriLanka(NewYork:UnitedNations2011);UNOfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRights(OHCHR),ReportontheOHCHRInvestigationonSriLanka(Geneva2015);WarcrimesinSriLanka,AsiaReportNo191(Brussels:InternationalCrisisGroup2010).TheUNHumanRightsCouncilalsopassedresolutionscallingforaccountabilityagainstSriLankain2012,2013and2014.

16ResolutionadoptedbytheHumanRightsCouncilon1October2015,30/1Promotingreconciliation,accountabilityandhumanrightsinSriLanka,(October2015)UNHRCThirtiethSession.

17FordetailsonthestatetransitionaljusticeprocessseetheintroductioninBhavaniFonseka,TransitionalJusticeinSriLanka:lessonssofarandthelongroadahead,(CPA:Colombo2017).

116

Quiteearlyintotheprocess,ZTF’sMuslimmembersreportedthatconflictaffectedmembers

oftheMuslimcommunitywereunawareoftheprocessandweredisengagedwithit.They

askedforincreasedfunding,resourcesandtimetodomoretargetedworkamongMuslims,

but with the CTF working to a tight deadline and declining government interest in the

process;thisproposalwasnotrealised.WhilstMuslimvoices,throughtheZTFprocessmade

itintotheCTFreportwheretheiruniquepositiononjusticeandaccountabilitywasclearly

noted,18thecommunity’sinvolvementandengagementwiththeformalprocessandwiththelanguageofjusticeandaccountabilitywaspoor.

Inmyownresearch,I foundthatmostMuslimsI interviewedintheNorthandEastwere

unawareoftheformalprocessandweredisinterestedinit,thoughsomeofthemhadwell

developedideasofjustice,accountabilityandredress.19DuetospacelimitationsIwilllimitmyanalysisheretofindingsfromonlythenorthernMuslimcommunity,who,tosummarise,

demandedtruthseekingmainlytoensurethattheirnarrativeoftheconflictbecamepartof

themainstreamandtoinvestigatecasesofdisappearancesaswellasredressneglectand

marginalisationbythestateduringandaftertheireviction.EventhoughtheLTTEhadbeen

defeated they considered it necessary tohold accountable througha judicial process the

remaining leadership, including those working with the government.20 The need forreparations, mostly compensation, was strongly articulated, particularly recognising the

significant dip in economic and educational status faced by northern Muslims.

Memorialisation, commemoration and non-repetition, the latter through reforms in

education, were also strong demands. Despite the fervent efforts of a small number of

activists,thenorthernMuslimswereunabletoadvancethesepositionseffectivelywithinthe

framework, and compared to Tamils in theNorth and East, theywere considerably less

organised,withminimalvictimsupportgroupsandsocialmovementsforjusticeandhardly

anycapacitytoarticulatetheirgrievancesandclaimsthroughahumanrightsframework.

MuslimvoicesreachedtheUNandotherinternationalinvestigativeandadvocacyreports

throughtheworkofafewnationallevelactivists,butontheground,Muslimsstruggledto

bepartofthetransitionaljusticeprocess.

Therewereanumberofreasonsforthisthatmustbeviewedinthelargercontext,noting

thatthestateruntransitionaljusticeprocesswasnotvictimcentred,hadverylittlepublic

buyin,ownershiporappeal.GroundrealityandMuslimspositioningvis-à-visthedominant

otherwasonceagainafactor.AfterthewarmanynorthernMuslimswantedtoreturnto

theiroriginallandsintheNorth,butconsiderableareahadbeentakenoverbyTamilsand

18FinalReportoftheConsultationTaskForceonReconciliationMechanisms(17November2016)<http://war-victims-map.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/CTF-Final-Report-Volume-I-Nov-16.pdf>accessed8September2021.

19FarahMihlar,Comingoutofthemargins:JusticeandreconciliationforconflictaffectedMuslimsinSriLanka(ICES2018).

20TheLTTE’sformerEasterCommanderVinayagamoorthyMuralitharan,orColonelKaruna,wasagovernmentministeratthetime.

117

anentiregenerationofTamilshadgrownupunawarethatMuslimshadlivedintheNorth.

ThereforeMuslimswereunderpressuretobalancerelationshipswithTamils.Littleefforts

weremadebynorthernTamilpoliticalandcommunityleaderstowelcomeMuslimsbackto

theNorthortoenabletheircollectivereturn.Muslims’justiceclaimswerealsointension

with Tamils; for theMuslims themain perpetratorwas the LTTE,who the Tamilswere

defensiveof,whileatthesametimeTamilswantedtoholdthemilitaryaccountableforthe

serious crimes the latter continues todeny.FewMuslimswere sympathetic to theTamil

position but struggled with their resistance at the everyday level to acknowledge the

criminalityoftheLTTEandfailuretorecogniseMuslimsasvictims.21Acceptance,inclusionby Tamils and having to co-existwith themwere prioritised bymany over pursuing an

elusivejusticethatthegovernmentdidnotseemcommittedto.

ThepoortechnicalcapacityofnorthernMuslims,theirleadersandcivilsociety,inhuman

rightsapproacheswasalsoapparent inthiscontext.Duringthecourseofthetransitional

justice process the northern Muslim community elites and activists began to organise

themselvesbettertoformumbrellarepresentationalbodiessuchastheNorthernMuslim

Civil Society (NMCS) and Northern Muslim Forum (NMF), but remained lagging in the

technicalknowledgeandexperiencetoengagewiththehumanrightslegalframework.

Muslim political representatives were actively involved in constitutional and electoral

reformbutshowednointerestinthetransitionaljusticeprocess.“TransitionalJusticeisvery

muchpartofouragenda,sincetheGenevaresolutionwehavebeenspeakingandthinking

aboutit,”Hakeemstatedinaninterview,buttheSLMChadnoformalpolicyontransitional

justiceanddidnotengagewith theCTF.22RishadBathiudeen, fromthenorthernMuslimcommunityandwho thenheldacabinetposition in thegovernment,wascontroversially

seentochampionMuslimrightsoftenintensionwithnorthernTamils,butdidnotusethe

formalprocesstopressforjusticeandaccountabilityfornorthernMuslims.BothHakeem

andBathiudeenwerepartofthegovernmentteamthatin2012advocatedinGenevaagainst

theUNHRCresolutioncallingforjusticeandaccountability.Theirrepeatedpreference,for

personal and political reasons, was to stand by both the Rajapaksa and the Sirisena

governments,which(asexplainedbelow)becameimpossibletodoso.EvenMuslimpolitical

eliteswhowereconcernedbytheeffectoftheconflictweremorefocusedonarticulating

grievancethroughneedsratherthanrights,andonensuringMuslims’politicaldistinction

wasmaintainedthroughconstitutionalandelectoralreformoverjusticeandaccountability

forvictims.

21SeeFarzanaHaniffa,’CompetingforVictimStatus:NorthernMuslimsandtheIroniesofSriLanka’sPost-conflictTransition’,(2015)4(1)Stability:InternationalJournalofSecurity&DevelopmentandFarahMihlar,Comingoutofthemargins:JusticeandreconciliationforconflictaffectedMuslimsinSriLanka(ICES2018),foraccountsofthis.

22FarahMihlar,Comingoutofthemargins:JusticeandreconciliationforconflictaffectedMuslimsinSriLanka(ICES2018).

118

TheTurningPoint

TheareawherenationalmaleMuslimselites,especiallyfromthesouth,didengagewiththe

transitional justice process and the international human rights framework has been in

response to Buddhist, nationalist, and violent extremist attacks againstMuslims. Having

defeatedtheTamils,triumphalistmilitantmajoritarianismneededanewenemyandthey

turnedontheMuslims.From2010targetedattacksagainstMuslimreligiousandbusiness

establishments,includingmobandarsonattacks,begantoberecordedsystematicallyacross

the country. Thiswas combinedwith awell organised hate campaign targetingMuslims

makingfalseclaimsregardingpopulationgrowthandreligiousextremism.23Ihavearguedelsewhere that Muslims’ initial response was passive and submissive; rather than

challengingandcallingouttheattacksandhatecampaignstheyturnedinwardsandbegan

to scrutinise and change their behaviour, aspiring to further their position as the ‘good

minority.’24However,astheattacksincreased,intensifiedandwereevidentlysupportedbythestate,Muslimsoutherncivilsocietyelitesslowlybegantoshowinterestinthehuman

rightsandjusticeframework,seekinginternationalattentionandaction.Importantly,apart

fromabriefreprievebetween2015andearly2017,Buddhistnationalistextremistreligious

violence against Muslims was enabled and encouraged by two different governments,

includingwhilethecoalitiongovernmentwaspursuinganaccountabilityandreconciliation

process. The 2019Easter Sunday attacks,whennine suicide bombers targeted Christian

worshippersandColombohotelskillingmorethan250people,wasawatershedmomentfor

Muslimpolitical,religious,culturalandlegalexistence.ThoughMuslimcommunityactivists,

especiallyintheeastofSriLanka,hadwarnedthecountry’ssecurityestablishmentabout

thegrowinglevelsofviolentextremism, includingreportingthe leaderoftheattacks, the

Muslimcommunityasawholepaidaheavypricefortheabjectgovernmentalandsecurity

failurethatledtotheattacks.25AlmostovernightMuslimeducational,culturalandreligiouspracticesandinstitutionsweretargeted, includingbylegalmeans, forattackandclosure;

racism and discrimination against Muslims became overt as the entire community was

labelled extremist and transgressive.26 The then government enabled and supported

23SeeMohamedFaslanandNadineVanniasinkam,FracturingCommunity:Intra-grouprelationsamongtheMuslimsofSriLanka(InternationalCentreforEthnicStudies2015);AyeshaZuhair,DynamicsofSinhalaBuddhistEthno-nationalisminPost-warSriLanka(CentreforPolicyAlternativesApril2016);andA.R.M.ImtiyazandAmjadMohamed-Saleem,‘Muslimsinpost-conflictSriLanka:understandingSinhala-Buddhistmobilisationagainstthem,’(2015)16:2AsianEthnicity186-202.

24FarahMihlar,‘Religiouschangeinaminoritycontext:transformingIslaminSriLanka’(2019)40(12)ThirdWorldQuarterly.

25SeetheParliamentarySelectCommitteereportontheEasterSundayattacksthatidentifiesthesecurityfailures;SriLankaParliament,‘ReportoftheSelectCommitteeofParliamenttolookintoandreporttoParliamentontheTerroristAttacksthattookplaceindifferentplacesinSriLankaon21stApril2019’,(October2019)<https://www.colombotelegraph.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Easter-Sunday-attacka-PSC-report-en.pdf>accessed5August2021.

26AmbikaSatkunanathan,‘SriLanka:MinorityRightswithinShrinkingCivicSpace’inSouthAsiaStateofMinoritiesReport(SouthAsiaCollective2020).

119

Buddhistnationalist extremisthate campaigns that soonculminated in theworst caseof

religiousviolencethecountryhaseverwitnessed.Mobsattackedanddestroyedhundreds

ofMuslimneighbourhoodsacrossnorthwesternandcentralSriLankawhilestate forces

offeredvirtuallynoprotectiontoMuslims.27

UnlikewhenMuslimsintheNorthandEastwereattacked,thereligiousviolenceintheother

parts of the country saw greater mobilisation by Colombo-based Muslim community

representativesforsomeformofjustice.Heretoothoughthepositioningwasfragmented.

Institutionally and formally themain organisations, under the umbrella of the Sri Lanka

MuslimCouncil,attemptedtoworkwiththegovernment,eveninthefaceofclearevidence

ofthelatter’ssponsorshipandsupporttotheviolence.SouthernMuslimlawyerstookup

casesinlocalcourts,soughtjusticeforsomecrimesandattemptedtogainredress,atleast

throughcompensation.28AsabodytheCouncilitselfprioritisedengagementwiththestate;they avoided criticism in order to keep communication channels open and negotiate

governmentresponsestotheattacks.Theyclaimsomesuccessesincludingorganisingthe

initialmeetingthatsubsequently ledtotheresignationofallMuslimcabinetministers in

2019.Thisjointresignationwasinresponsetothescapegoatingbythegovernmentoftwo

Muslim politicians for the Easter attacks and the government’s lack of response to the

widespreadandseriousthreatfromBuddhistextremiststoMuslimsacrossthecountry.29Amidstthisbroaderpolicy,afewColombomalecivilsocietyelitesandmediacommentators,

includingfromtheMuslimCouncil,begantopubliclycritiqueandattackthegovernmentin

mediacommentsandarticles,whichprovidedsomecontrasttotheprevioussoft-peddling

approach.

Ironicallytheveryforcesthatthethengovernmentunleashed(includingthroughpardoning

andfreeingthenotoriouslyhardlineanti-MuslimBuddhistmonk,GnanasaraThero,inthe

hopeofgainingthemsomecredibilityamongthemajoritypopulationensuredtheirdefeat

and the return of the Rajapaksa family. The victory of Gotabaya Rajapaksa in the 2019

Presidential election and the subsequent appointment of former President Mahinda

Rajapaksa as PrimeMinister in 2020, saw a return to autocratisation, the closure of the

formaltransitionaljusticewindowandtheacutethreateningofhumanandminorityrights.

Muslims were inextricably linked to this obscurantist political development; having

constructedMuslimsasathreat,theRajapaksasandtheSriLankanmilitaryweredeemed

essentialtodefeat,controlandmanagethem.Theyvalidatedthisby,amongotherthings,

27ibid.

28OnesuchlawyerHejaazHizbullahwasarrestedanddetainedbythegovernmentwithoutchargesforoverayear;'AYearOn:HejaazHizbullahStillImprisoned'(SriLankaCampaignforPeaceandJustice,14April2021)<https://www.srilankacampaign.org/a-year-on-hejaaz-hizbullah-still-imprisoned/>accessed8September2021.

29DharishaBastiansandMujibMashal,‘All9ofSriLanka’sMuslimMinistersResign,asBombingBacklashIntensifies’,TheNewYorkTimes,(3June2019)<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/03/world/asia/sri-lanka-muslim-ministers-resign.html>accessed8September2021.

120

exploiting the global pandemic to enforce a policy of forcibly cremating Muslims who

contractedCOVID-19orweresuspectedofhavingthevirus.

The forcible cremation policy,more than any other discriminatory policy,mobilised the

Muslimcommunitytowardsseekingahumanrightsapproach.30ColombobasedcommunityeliteswhohadpreviouslymockedanddisassociatedfromtheGenevabasedinternational

human rights framework sought to desperately lobby institutions and actors demanding

internationalactionagainst thegovernment.Yet,havingneglected thisarena fordecades

theylackedthenecessaryexpertiseandcontactstosuccessfullyengage,leavingtheadvocacy

to a few seasoned international andnational human rights activists.Nevertheless, at the

national level, through a justice and human rights framing, pressure was concerted,

sustained,andmultipleacrossalldifferentsocialclasses.Thisnationaleffortcombinedwith

forcefulinternationalcritique,includingfromtheSecretaryGeneraloftheOrganisationof

IslamicCooperation(OIC)resulted,tenmonthslater,inapolicychange.

TheforciblecremationpolicystruckattheheartofMuslimculturalandreligiousbeliefas

burial is a non-negotiable rite for the religious group and therefore the government’s

decision was seen as a symbolic act of state terror as it terrorised Muslims who were

petrifiedoffacingcremation.ItalsoposedaveryrealpublichealthcrisisasmanyMuslims

becameafraidoftestingorseekingmedicaltreatmentforthevirus.Previousstatesponsored

attacks, threatsanddiscriminatorypolicies, includingthosetargetedatreligious freedom

suchasbanningtheniqab(faceveilwornbysomeMuslimwomen)orclosureofreligiousinstitutions,didnotaffectMuslimcommunityelitesasmuchtheforciblecremationpolicy

did.Arguably,theshiftoccurredonlywhenanuncontroversial,fundamentalreligiousright

where the entire community, not part of it, was targeted. This suggests that justice and

humanrightsapproachesremainthelastresortforsouthernMuslimcommunityeliteswho

preferothermethodsofdealingwithgrievanceandviolations.

This appeal for human rights still remains selective. Muslim national religious and

community elites are principally against campaigns by Muslim women activists to fully

reform theMuslimMarriage andDivorceAct (MMDA).31 They continue to quote archaicculturalinterpretationsinthenameofreligionandholdontopracticessuchaspolygamy,

30ForargumentsontheracistanddiscriminatorynatureofthispolicyseeFarahMihlar,‘Forciblecremationisnotaboutpublichealth,itisracialdiscrimination’,TheDailyFT,(15January2021)<http://www.ft.lk/columns/Forcible-cremation-is-not-about-public-health-it-is-racial-discrimination/4-711633>accessed5February2021.FordetailsontheeffectsofthepolicyonMuslimsseeShreenSaroor,‘Deadbodypoliticsandracism:aprayerfor2021’,Groundviews,(31December2021)<https://groundviews.org/2020/12/31/dead-body-politics-and-racism-a-prayer-for-2021>accessed25January2021.

31TheAllCeylonJamiyyathulUlama(ACJU)whoclaimstobethehighestreligiousbodyamongMuslimscontinuestoobjecttoaspectsofreformoftheMuslimmarriagelawssuchasreformsonpolygamy.TheseobjectionshavebeenrebukedbyMuslimwomencampaigners,see‘WhatistheMuslimandMarriageDivorceAct(MMDA)1951’(MuslimPersonalLawReformActionGroup)<https://mplreforms.com/aboutmmda/>accessed8September2021.

121

which feminist groups have effectively dispelled through Islamic interpretations and

examplesfromotherMuslimcountries.Similarly,campaignsagainstracismrarelyaccount

fortheexperienceofnorthernandeasternTamilswhohaveahistoryoffacingracismand

discriminationfromsomeTamils.Theincreasedfocusofanti-racistargumentsbyMuslims

isshapedbyasouthernperspective,wherethisisseenasanewphenomenonandisblamed

entirelyonBuddhistnationalistextremism.

What appears to be a turn towards pursuing human rights and justice byMuslimmale

communityelitescouldbeasignificantone if it issustainedandbecomes inclusiveofall

segmentsofthecommunity.

Conclusion

This article traces the changing relationship betweenMuslim national community elites,

includingpoliticalandreligiousones,tohumanrights, justiceandaccountability,through

three particular phases. It explains how, for various different reasons including being

weigheddownbyadominantpoliticalcultureofpleasingorappeasingtheethnicother,most

oftenSinhalese,Muslimeliteshavehesitatedtopursuejusticeandaccountabilityandhave

preferred to steer the community towards development, political inclusion and

peacebuilding. Their geographical and class disparities have not helped; throughout the

conflictsouthernMuslimsdidlittletofightfortherightsofconflictaffectedMuslims.Overall,

asmuchas the community is cautious about taking such an approach, they are also less

equippedtodosowithlimitedunderstandingandtechnicalcapacityonhumanrights.

The return to power of the Rajapaksas and with them, the power of themilitary as an

appendagepresentsaworryingfutureforSriLanka,onethathaslittlespaceforprinciples

offairness,equality,respect,ruleof law;whereimpunity,corruptionandnepotismreign.

Even if this is not a lasting phenomenon, the embedding of militarisation, racism and

authoritarianism will take many decades to dislocate and dismantle. Human rights

protectionthenbecomescriticallyimportant.Applyingitsframeworkswillbeessentialfor

allSriLankans,eventhosewhoarenotinagreementwiththepoliticsofinternationalhuman

rights.ForMuslims,nowestablishedasthe‘newenemy’thiswillbeimperative.

Discarding parochial leadership structures, moving beyond the geographic and class

distinctions,maintainingourdistinctidentityconstructively,andchallengingourhistorical

politicalcultureareurgentlynecessary.

Thisarticlebeganwithaqualifierthattheargumentsinitalmostentirelypertaintomenas

womenremainonthemarginsofMuslimcommunityleadership.Itscriticalfocushasbeen

thedominantstandpointtakenbyreligious,politicalandcommunitymaleelites.Thereare

anumberofmen,atthenationalandcommunitylevelwhohaveandcontinuetocampaign

onhumanrights.IrrespectiveofthemaleleadershippositiontherearealsoseveralMuslim

women,oftenfacinginternalandexternalbarriers,whothroughahumanrightsperspective

have fought forequalityand justice for thecommunity.Somehavereached international

122

acclaimfordoingthis.Thisarticledoesnotunderminetheirefforts,butintendstoanalyse

andchallengethedominantstandpointwithinthecommunity,whichiselitemaledrivenand

persistentlyattemptstosubjugateMuslimwomen.

This is undoubtedly the major barrier that hinders the advancement of human rights

protectionwithin thecommunityand to theoverallwellbeingofMuslims.Reforming the

patriarchalorderandstructureswithintheMuslimcommunityalsobecomesimperativeto

securehumanrightsandmeetthenewanddemandingchallengesofbeingaminorityinthe

post-warpredominantSinhalamajoritystateofSriLanka.

123

WalkingonaTightrope

FathimaNabeelaIqbal

ThisarticleisanaccountofayoungMuslimwoman’svolunteeringexperienceinSriLanka.

Even if the narratives appear selective, they reflect on the travails of working within a

conservativeminoritycommunitygroup.

ThesestoriesareimportanttodispelthecommonmisconceptionsthatMuslimwomenare

‘notasengaging’or‘backward’insocialwork,becausetheingrainedstructuralandcultural

barriers are needed to be taken into consideration when understanding these realities.

Muslimwomencarrymorethanareligiousidentity,theyareimportantstakeholdersinour

society.Weoughttoaddressthequestionofifwehavefailedtocreatespacestoinvitethem

intoengagement.Havewebeenusingthemmerelyastokensinourworkordotheyfeel

isolatedbecausetheyareconstrainedfrombeingidentifiedinthisspace?

IsChangeMakingaTrend

Thecurrentyouth‘advocacy’landscapeisfullofyoungpeoplemainlyfromColombowho

areabletousetheirresourcesforpublicgood.Thisisnotalwaysrealadvocacyoractivism;

the issue is that there is a rewarding system put in place by colleges, universities and

institutionsthatrecogniseone-offactionsof‘change’byyoungpeopletogainentrance.

So, community dialogues become projects, grassroots service become just visits to the

‘underprivileged’andtakingaccountabilitybecomes‘corporatesocialresponsibility’(CSR)

initiatives.Thisisallmisleadinganddoesnotgiveachanceforyoungpeopletoconnectwith

diversecommunitiesandcreatefriendshipsandmeaningfulleadership.

AyoungpersondoingleadingworkintheircommunityfromoutsideColombowillnothave

thesameaccesstofundingopportunitiesorbenefits.Manyorganizationsdon’tspendtime

fundraisingororganisingfundsandoverworktheirvolunteersbecausetheywillworkfor

freewiththeaimofgainingexperience.

Whatisunhelpfulinthecurrentyouthlandscapeinchangemakingistheloweringoftheage

criteriaforgroupsacrosstheworldwhenitcomestofundingoraccessingcapacitybuilding.

Young people in Sri Lanka take more time to engage in community work as gaining

experience toachieve credibilitybecomesmore timeconsumingdue to, forexample, the

educationsystem'sdelays.Consequently,althoughtheSriLankanactivistsstilldoremain

young,theywillbecompetingagainstteenageactivistsfromelsewhereforthesamefunding

opportunities.Thisraisesthequestion,isthedevelopmentsectorfarmoreconcernedtotick

theboxesinthechecklistovertheultimateobjectiveofsteeringthechange?

124

UsingSocialMediainActivismtoInfluence

Intoday’sage,itisdifficulttounderestimatetheimpactthatsocialmediatendstomake.I

startedbloggingveryrandomlyonmake-uptutorials,teadrinking,andcomedysketchesfor

asmallaudience.Overaperiodofthreeyearsthisaudiencegrewcloseto11,000regular

users.Eventhoughthisfollowingwasnotlargewhencomparedtoother‘influencers’inthe

field, it was very substantial. With confidence, I was able to share my volunteering

experiences with my audience and give them a glimpse into what Sri Lankan youth go

throughandthedifferentrealitiestheyface.Thishashelpedmetellmysideofthestoryand

createaninteractivenarrativewithmyaudienceoffollowers.

Theexperiencecanbeamixofemotionsbecausethereisbothsupportanddisagreement.In

2020whenSriLankabannedthesingingofthenationalantheminTamil,Ispokeaboutthis

inashortvideo,givingabriefhistoryandimportanceofthebilingualanthem.Thisdidnot

gowellwith‘nationalists’and‘patriots’andtherewerealotofmisogynistic,sexist,andracist

remarkshurledatme.EvenwiththediscussionontheMuslimMarriageandDivorceAct

(MMDA)1 reforms onmy profile,manyMuslimmen andwomen personally attackedmeonlinebecausetheybelievedIwaspaintinganegativeimageofthefaith.

HavingapublicsocialmediaaccountlikethisisdifficultbecausesometimesIcannotshare

thecreditofamovementwithalltherealplayersbehinditforprivacyreasons.Eventhough

Icanmanagetogetbywithlessscratches,mentioninganother’snamewillnothelpthem

publicly. At the same time, it also places my personal life at risk and in the spotlight;

especially being a young Muslim girl in her mid-twenties. There are expectations that

relativesplaceonme,somewhowouldinvariablybeunhappywithmetalkingaboutsuch

causesoradvocatingchange.

Oftenmostoftheyoungwomenweworkwithprefernotgoing‘public’becausetheirfamilies

arelookingforprospectivegroomsthroughmarriageproposals.Beingaccessibleonlinecan

be equaled to notoriety and can reduce your chances of being seen as ‘respected’ in the

religiouslyconservativeeyes.

ItisalsoimportanttonotethattheMuslimcommunityisverytightknit.Weknoweveryone

fromeverywhereandlookoutforeachother,beitforthegoodorthebad.Anexampleof

this is when my uncle received video clips and photos of our campaign against forced

cremations throughhis schoolWhatsAppgroupandwasable to identifyme through the

pictures.IreceivedmessagesofencouragementfromSriLankanMuslimfamiliesresidingin

theUnitedKingdom,wheretheywereabletoaccesstheseimagesandeasily identifyme.

Thishasitsprosandcons,butIliketothinkthatthesetightconnectionshelpouractivism,

becausemessagescanfindsolidarityfast.

Howdoesourcommunityrespondtotheuseofsocialmediaforawareness?Ifthesubjectis

genderbasedoronwomen’srights,thenitisnotalwaysappreciated.Whenspeakingabout

1MuslimMarriageandDivorceAct,No.13of1951.

125

MMDAreforms,suddenlyIam‘notMuslimenough’tocarrythisconversationwithothers.

However, if it is the issue of forced cremations, then it is the question of ‘why am I not

amplifyingthismessageasaMuslimwithaplatform?’Thesamepeoplewhobelittleyouand

trytosilenceyouformessagesbasedonequalrights,appreciatetheworkyoudowhenit

comestoamoreconservativetopic.Thereisanelementofpolicingbythecommunityitself

whenitcomestothecontentwecreate.

Usingsocialmediaalsohasitsbenefitsbecauseinternationalgroupsandorganisationscan

seeyourworkandtheimpactitiscreatingontheground.Thisbringsinthecredibilityand

supportweneedtokeepourworkgoing.Althoughactivistsinothercountriesreceivemuch

more benefits from being online, such as having verified accounts and better privacy

managementtools,etc.,weoperatewithabareminimumoftheseresourcesandstillwedo

getmoreworkdone.

Eventhoughsocialmediaisapowerfultool,itisalsoheavilymonitoredbytheState.Iused

tothinkthathumourwastheperfectmodetodriveanideathroughtoanaudience.Butwill

thisbe seenasa jokeorbean insult to someoneelse?Regardlessof the intentionmany

content creators have, the impact of their content can always be misinterpreted or

controlled.Activistsmustprioritisetheirsafetywhentheirmainformofengagementisvia

socialmedia.

MuslimMenandWomen

Sri LankanMuslimmen andwomen are two different classes of citizens in the country.

Culturally and socially different rules are applied to them, let alone the systemic

discrimination.TheyouthlandscapeoftheMuslimcommunityhasmorerepresentationof

men.ThisisquitedifferentfromyouthmovementsintheChristianfaithwherebothgenders

worktogetherintheplanningandexecutionofsocialwork.

Back in 2019, a friend of mine received an invitation organised by a ‘Muslim youth

organisation’ for a conference event for volunteers. For background context, she is non-

MuslimandherorganisationalsoworkspredominantlywithSinhalaBuddhistethnicities.

She askedwhy youngMuslimwomen in this spacewere not invited to events like this,

especiallywhen theevent is representedbymembersof theMuslimcommunity.Ashort

peekintothesocialmediaaccountsoforganisationslikethiswillgiveyoutheanswer.The

websites and links will all direct you to organisational structures composed of all male

members.Ifwomenareinvolved,theyareinsecretarialpositionsworkingforaman.Similar

organisationslikethisseeninuniversitygroupsandsuchwillhavewomen’simagesblurred

orshownasanonymouswhiletheyoungmenallhavephotographshighlightedwiththeir

organisationtitles.

So,whoare thesewomenandwhatabout their identities?Onemight argue thatwomen

themselves request for this anonymity,which is understandable. However, can it be the

decisionofallMuslimwomen?Somearguethatthecultureofuniversitiesissotoxicthatit

126

isanadvantagetobehiddenfromplainviewintheorganization.Dowomengettomake

thesedecisions?Whyarewenotworriedaboutthewaylearnedyoungmaleundergraduates

aremisogynistic to their own female colleagues? In the issue of universities specifically,

there is more representation of Muslim women than men pursuing higher education.

However,thisisnotreflectedintheirleadershipaswomenarebarelyencouragedtotake

part.

ThispatternoferasingouridentitiesisappliedtounveilingMuslimwomentoo;theniqabbanwasneverdiscussedinconsultationwithMuslimwomenwhowearit.2Whyareweasasocietyobsessedwithwhatwomencanandcannotwearandjustifythiswithalinktoour

overallsecurity?IfpoliticiansliketoexposeusandMusliminfluentialleadersliketohideus,

themediachoosesadifferentroute.Whenwecomehomeattheendofthedayandswitch

on the local news channels,Muslimwomen are either a threatwith their appearance or

oppresseddamselsindistress.Howtheyseeuseventuallybecomeshowweseeourselves.

True,ourcommunityinmorethanonewayhasfailedus,butwearenotpowerlessbeings

whoseonlypurposeinlifeistobesavedorprotected.

HowWeCreatedaYoungMuslimWomen’sOrganisationUsingtheInternet

In 2019, I saw a flyer for an event organised by aMuslim youth organization for young

people. The flyer showed panelists who were all male, and especially from the Muslim

representatives,therewerenofemalespeakerspresentattheevent.Theeventinquestion

washostedinthenameof‘inclusivity’, ‘representation’,and‘youth.’Howcanyouachieve

anyofthatwhenyoungMuslimwomencannotbeseenasequalparticipantsatanevent?I

hadbeenstrugglingwiththisissueforalongtimewithmycolleaguesandfriendsfromwork

and university, where nobody wanted to actually engage Muslim women in equal

participation.EspeciallyMuslimyoungmenfrominfluentialspaceshaveshownaparticular

disinterest in includingus intheconversation. If Ibroughtthistoattention, theresponse

wouldalwaysbe:

“Aiyoyoudon’thavetoworryaboutthis,themenwillfigureitout.”

“The resource personwas surprised to find out that youwere aMuslim girl. He told us inconfidence that a girl was really interested in creating interfaith opportunities. It neveroccurredtohimthatyouwerealsoaMuslimbecauseyoudidn’tlooklikeone.Pleasedon’tfeelbadaboutthis.”

So,when I saw this flyer, it felt like the strawon thecamel’sback— Ihadamomentof

weakness(orstrength,Iamnotsure)andspokeaboutthisonmysocialmediaaccount.I

2InApril2021,SriLanka’sCabinetapprovedabanonthewearingoftheniqab(full-faceveils)inpublic.‘SriLankacabinetapprovesproposedbanonburqasinpublic’,AlJazeera,(28April2021)<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/28/sri-lanka-cabinet-approves-proposed-ban-on-burqas-in-public>accessed4September2021.

127

spokeabouthowthepresentMuslimcommunitylivesinabubbleandlikestostaysheltered

fromconnectionsthatweareencouragedtohaveinourreligion,withotherMuslimswho

are different from us and communities belonging to other faiths. This was not a smear

campaign to say that our community does not face racial discrimination or negative

stereotyping,butawake-upcalltoreallyunderstandthatwecandomore.

Thevideogotmixedreviews.ManyquestionedwhyIdidnothaveahijab(headscarf)onbeforeIcriticisedpeopleofmysamefaith.Othersagreedandmentionedthattheywerealso

inthedarkaboutmanythingsinourcommunity.Oneofthemostprevalentthemesinthe

socialmediavideowasthequestionoffamilylawreformsandwhyweareallowingMuslim

women to be treated as second-class citizens of Sri Lanka. Many women themselves

complainedthattheydidnotknowaboutthediscriminatoryprovisionsintheMMDAand

saidthattheywouldliketolearnmore.

Myinboxstartedfillingupwithmixedresponses.IrealisedthatmostMuslimmendidnot

understandtheirplaceofprivilege.Theyhadquestionsastowhyitwasnecessaryto‘shout’

aboutthisormakesuchafussinsteadofhavingadiplomaticdiscussionaboutit.Thecruxof

alltheseissuestousisthatwomendonothaveaseatatthetable,letaloneindiplomatic

discussions.Thenwemostprobablymustcreateaspaceofourown.

Mostwomenrespondeddifferently;Igotmanymessagesaskingwhethertheycouldmeet

me or my colleagues to learn and understand more about issues women face in the

community.Theyallkeptaskingforasafespacefordialoguetolearnmore.

Aftergoingbackandforthaboutorganisingameeting,myfriendsandIfinallymadetime,

satdown, createda forum,and finally createdadatabase comprisingnearly100Muslim

women. Muslim women who were already engaged in this sector, whether it was in

charity/socialservicesorasvolunteershelpedmobilisemoreyoungwomenfromColombo

towardsthismeeting.A friendofferedtohost thisgathering foraneveningdiscussionof

coffeeandshorteats.Closeto30(Muslimandnon-Muslim)womenattendedandluckily,we

alsohadanactivistjoininginandshewasabletosharewiththegroupthemeaningbehind

theMMDAprovisionsandhowtheyharmwomeninthecountry.

Thewomen also discussed their experience as volunteers andwhat sort of barriers and

challengestheyhavetofaceintheirowncommunitieswhenbeinginthisspace.Mostofthem

hadsupportiveparentswillingtooverlookrelativeswhospokebadlyofthem,sayingthat,

‘thiswillnothelpthemgetmarriedyoung’or‘shewillturnoutlooseliketheothers’.One

participantsharedherexperienceasafacilitatorcarryingoutall-islandworkshopsonpeace

andreconciliationforschoolstudents.Herparentsjoinedheronthetourbusalongwiththe

otheryoungfacilitators,justsotheycankeephercompanyandhavea‘mahram’closetoher.

In the Sri Lankan Muslim community, a ‘mahram’ is a close family member or relative

allowedtoescortanunmarriedwomanifshedoesnothaveahusbandtodothisforher.

Girlsareseenas‘provocative’iftheytravelalonewithoutoneor‘indangerandatrisk’if

theydonothaveanescort.TheMuslimgirlisinconstantneedofbeingsavedorprotected

bythecommunity.

128

One of the attendees was a Muslim lady who started her own non-profit organisation

workingtoprotecttherightsofadopteesandorphans.Thestoryofhercareerincludedthe

obstaclesofdelayingthetraditionalcustomofmarryingearlybylyingtoherfamilyabout

herjobforyears.Sheworkedinanon-profitcapacitywhilefalselytellingherparentsthat

sheworkedatabusiness.Fortunately,bythetimethetruthcameto light,shehadmeta

supportivepartnerandwasmarriedwiththeblessingsofherfamily.Foreverysuccessful

storyamongMuslimwomen,whetherinfamilylifeorcareer,thereisathemeofsomeone

being ‘supportive’ in her life. We are not unaware of the women who do not get this

advantageandwhattheirliveslooklike.

Whenweendedthisfirstmeeting,Ipersonallythoughtthatwewouldalljustgohomeand

create aWhatsApp group to sustain this network and connect ourselves to volunteering

opportunities. But surprisingly, that is not what happened. The women asked for an

organization—agroupwheretheycanhavemoreofthesediscussions.Afterthesuccessof

theColombomeeting,whathappenednextwasthatthroughsocialmedia,youngwomenand

girlsfromtheKandydistrictwantedthesameexactdiscussionreplicated.Formerstudents

fromareputedMuslimgirls’schoolinKandyspoketotheirschoolPrincipalandarranged

theirschoolhallforus.

A team of girls travelled to Kandy and spoke to nearly 40 participants and facilitated

discussions onmenstrual hygiene, community taboos, career challenges, andwhat being

identifiedasaSriLankanMuslimwomanmeanstous.Thesemeetingswerehostedbefore

thepandemic,sowewereabletoengagemorecloselyandempathisewitheachother.Once

this event concluded we made plans to visit known grassroots networks in Matale,

Sainthamaruthu,andGalle.Unfortunately,thepandemicbrokeoutandwehadtocoverour

workonline.ManyoftheladieswhoattendedourKandyworkshopreachedbacktousfor

adviceondomesticviolenceanddivorce issues.ManyMuslimwomen,regardlessof their

levelofprivilege,wereunawareoftheirbasicrightsorthelackthereof.Forexample,even

in2020,manyofthemdidnotknowthattherewasnominimumageofmarriageforMuslims

under theMMDA or that the bride’s signature or formal consentwas not required. It is

difficulttomoderateconversationswithinthecommunitybecausetheMuslimcommunityis

sodiverse.Therearepre-constructed judgementsbefore theyattend these sessions, and

theyleavethevenuewithabetterlevelofunderstandingabouteachother.Thisisthestory

of how Sisterhood Initiative was born; A young Muslim women’s network with the

participationofnon-Muslimalliesworkingtowardscreatingsafespacesfordiscussionand

learning.

CyberbullyingandSocialMediaPressure

Thedownsidetosocialmediaistheonlinehateandbullying.Thereisnowayarounditand

especiallyspeakingupforminoritycommunitiesbringsoutanaddedbacklashfromracist

andsupremacistgroups.TheotherfactorbeingfemalemeansIbecomeaneasytargetas

well.Formanyhategroups,mygenderistheeasiesttargettopickon,becauseothermen

129

whohave thesesameconversationsareneverpoliced.Thegender-basedharassmentmy

colleaguesandIfaceonlinebecomessonormalisedthateventuallywearenumbtoit.

Theonline spacehasno rules, anyone can sayanythingwithno consequences.After the

EasterAttacksin2019,ourownnamesonourNationalIdentityCard(NIC)becamealiability.

Whileotheryouthgroupscandiscussmeetingsandeventsarounddifferentthemes,wemust

be cautious. Especially as an unregistered group, we need to take special measures to

maintaintransparencyeventhoughwecarryoutworkforsocialgood.

If your posting ismostly onwomen’s rights or issues faced byminorities, therewill be

pressuretoalsospeakupforotherissues(mostlybecausetheyareblamedonMuslims).For

example,inthelastcoupleofyears,themonthofAprilhasbeenveryscary.Therewillbe

hatemessagesaskingwhythereisnotenoughworkdonetobringjusticetovictimsofEaster

Attacks,because ‘thebombingwascommittedby theMuslimpeople.’ Inanothercontext,

whenyouprotestagainstforcedcremations,thecomebackwillbe,

“TheseMuslims only talk about their rights, but do not care about their role in the EasterAttacks…”

Itisadifficultpathtotreadon,becauseyouwillalwaysbedisappointingsomeone.

OnagrowingonlinespacesuchasInstagramorTikTok,anewaccountcanbeopenedwith

just a username and a password. This means anyone can create a fake account to stay

anonymousandabuseyouronlinespace,withabsolutelynoconsequences.Mostofthetime

these are carriedoutby either Islamophobes, racists, or extremists trying topolice your

onlineactivity.

DuringtheMMDAreformcampaignscarriedoutonline,weusedTikTokvideostoshowthe

absurdity of the current law: such as the bride being unable to sign her ownmarriage

contract,womennotbeingabletobeappointedasQuazijudges,etc.Thiswastoexperimenthow the online spacewould react to such an accessible socialmedia tool being used to

portray somethingas controversial as these reforms.The resultswereeffective, creating

morethan17,000 impressions in lessthan24hours.Thebacklashwasalsoserious,as it

angeredcertaingroupsfor‘givingtheMuslimcommunityabadname’or‘encouragingracist

conversation’and‘disrespectingIslamiclaw’andsoon.Therewasalsoevidenceofignorance

in the community on these issues and a misunderstanding between the accurate

interpretationofthereligionagainstharmfulnarratives.Ayoungwomanoncetoldme,

“Sister,Ireallywanttofightforhumanrights,butifitcomesagainstIslam,thenIcannotdothat.”

Itisworryingthattheveryfaiththatwasbuiltontheprinciplesofjusticeisnotunderstood

asitshouldbe.WespendalotoftimearguingthatoneiscultureandtheotherisIslam,the

religion.However,itisnotreligionagainstculture,becausecultureissupposedtobeautify

religion. According to Yaqeen Institute that works to demystify religious stereotypes,

130

religionservesasafilterandwhateverispurifiedisanimportantbodyoflivedknowledge

thatenrichestheglobalMuslimcommunity.

Aseasyasitistocreatecontenttoincreaseawareness,itisalsoeasytousethesechannels

todiscreditthecontentcreatorsandcauseconflict.Theapproachwassuccessfulbecauseit

wasabletoreachmanyMuslimwomenwhofeltdiscriminatedagainstduringtheirmarriage

registrationandmenwhowereunawareofthegravityoftheseissues.

BeingpresentonlineasaMuslimcomesatacost.Yourprivacywillbedisturbedtofindfault

withthewayyoubehavewithfriendsorfamily.Thereareunattainableexpectationsputon

tobeappropriate, ifnot,youractionswillbecorrected,and thosemistakesmadepublic.

When this pressure is continuous, it causes severemental exhaustion and harm to your

emotionalwellbeing.

Getting‘Cancelled’fromtheCommunity

Pressurefromracistgroupsistough,however,thisisnotall;theMuslimcommunityitselfis

keepingwatchandwilltrytoattackanonlineaccountbydiscreditingthepersonbehindthe

profile.Ihavebeencalledakafir(non-believer),adaughterwhosefatherdidnotraiseherwell,harami(slangforengaginginnon-permissiblethingsinIslam)andmanyotherinsults.

Thepattern is very simple— it is tomake it seem like a religiousduty for other online

accounts to discredit or slander the account in which I use to amplify messages of the

marginalisedandoppressed in activism.Because I donotwear ahijabmymessages areimmediatelynotheardbymainstreamcommunitiesbecauseitishighlyprobablethatIama

‘badMuslim’andfollowingmyadvicewouldbethedownfalltothecommunity.Theworst

kindofbullyingiswhentheyactuallyacknowledgethatIdohelppeople,butthenarrativeis

that,regardlessofmyactions,myfaithisnotuptotheirstandard,henceImustbe‘cancelled’,

treatedasanoutcast.

Thisisanexampleofapublictweetthatwaspostedonline:

“Justbecauseasisterhelpsotherpeopleinthecommunitydoesnotmeanshe’sagoodMuslim.Whocares?Shedoesn’twearahijab.”

In2020amidstthepandemic,therewasacampaignofhatemessagesagainstmeonTwitter.

In one specific event, an anonymoususer created a virtual pollwhere other users could

submithatemessagesagainstmebymentioningwhattheydislikeaboutmethemost.There

was no surprise that a lot of these accounts belonged to Muslim men, but it was also

unsurprisingthatthereweremanywomenwhofeltthesame.Oneofthereasonstopublicly

discreditanotherfemale’sprofile istogaintheattentionandpraiseofothermisogynistic

men.ThewholepremiseforthisistostopaMuslimpersonalityfromleadingotherusers

astrayinthenameofreligion.

131

Asmuchasitiseasyforanyonetoprofileandspewhatecommentsonaprofile,itisequally

difficulttochallengethisandreportthisbehaviour.Hatespeechinthesespecificscenarios

isnoteasilyrecognisedbymonitoringgroupsduetotheslangandlanguagepreferences.

MuslimpolicinggroupswilluseArabicaddedtotheirEnglishtextsandsometimeshavebad

spellingwhileracistgroupswillusecursewordstypedinSinhalafontetc.

Audiencesinlargegroupscanmakeorbreakyourmessaging.Itisimportanttothinkabout

functioninginasystemwheresometimesyourcredibilitydependsonwhatpeopleperceive

ofyouonline.Itishardwheneveninfluentialscholarswilltrytousetheirplatformstoshow

yourworkinabadlight.Istilldonotknowthecompleteanswertothis,butpeopleneedto

feellikealliesorpartofamovementforthistowork.Itisusuallyalevelofunderstanding

betweengroupsthatwillhelptoclosethisdistance.

Intra-faithDiscussionswithintheMuslimCommunity

As a country, we like to boast about ourselves as a multi-ethnic society. The ‘interfaith

dialogue’trendthatisinevidenceatmanydiscussions,completelynegatesthefactthatour

faithsarediverseinthemselves.TheMuslimcommunityhasmanyraceswithinit;Malay,

Moor, Bohra, Memon, etc. From province to district each community speaks Tamil

differently, prepares rice porridge (kanji) differently and even prays Friday prayers

differently.Therearecultureswehavecreated forourselveson this island.For instance,

whenmynephewwasbornourfamilyrecited‘ThalaiFatiha’.3Itisproofthatourhistoryinthis country is so diverse and complex, as opposed to the stereotypical wattalappan(traditionaljaggerypudding)sharingneighbourthatthemedialikestoportray.

Intheaftermathofthecivilwar,ayouthmovementwascreatedinhopesofreconciliation

acrosstheisland.Iwasalsoamemberofthisgroupandwetouredallprovinceswithagroup

ofdiverseyoungpeoplefromdifferentpartsoftheislandtoschoolstoconductworkshops

and host assemblies. Something I noticedwhenwewere in the Eastern Province is that

clothingissymbolic.MyteamwaskickedoutofaMuslimschoolbythestaffbecauseIwas

wearingtheorganisationT-shirtandjeansalongwithahijab.Iwasasked,“areyouaboy?Whyareyoudressedlikethat?”whileMuslimwomeninColombocanwraptheirhijabsasturbansandwearjeans,womenintheEasternProvincewearashalwarandcovertheirpantswithalongtunic.AsimilaritywasseeninBadullawhenwewereataBuddhistschoolwhere

we were advised to wear long skirts instead of pants. Of course, these examples are

misogynisticbecauseit’sallaboutamaleprincipalpolicingwomen’sattire,butitalsoshows

howeveninthesamecommunity,peoplebehaveandlivedifferently.

Thisiswhyitissoimportantforcommunitiesthemselvestoreflectinwardsandhaveintra-

faithconversations.Weneedtobeabletotalktoeachotherwhileandbeforewetalktoother

3ThalaiFatihaisacompilationofverseswritteninArabicscript,butthelanguageoftheversesisTamil.ItisacharacteristicrecitationusedbyMuslimfamiliesfromdownSouth,whereTamilversesarewritteninArabicandrecitedwithauniquerhythm.

132

groups.This lackofunderstandingbetweenmembersof the same faith is the reasonwe

cannotcometoaconsensusonanything.

PickingBattles

Beingabletocarryoutactivismsolelyonthecausethatimpactsyouisaprivilege.Wehave

tobemindfulofourlabelsbeforewestartanycommunitywork.Whenthepublichasheard

toomuchof‘onelaw,onecountry’itisdifficulttobringoutissuesintheMMDAthataffect

Muslim women, because then it becomes a challenge to answer ‘why Muslims have a

separatefamilylaw’.ThisresultsinradiosilenceonMuslimwomen’sissuesforalongperiod

oftimeifthecommunityhastofightothertargetedissues.Duringthemandatorycremations

policyenforcedinthecountry,itwasmanyofthewomenactivistswhousuallyengagein

women’s rights includingMMDA reforms that were also bearing the flag for families of

victimsthathadtoundergocremations.Thisalsocreatesasevereburnoutonthecommunity

leaderswhentheydonotgetarestperiodinbetweencampaigns.Theyhavetoliterallypick

issueswheretheycoulddeploytheirenergiesmosteffectivelyandsavetheirtimeforwhat

needsthemostattention.Thiswasseenduringthepandemicwhenactivistsdidnothave

time to engage in MMDA reforms because it was more important to make sure

underprivileged communities with high COVID-19 risk received dry rations and other

resources during the lockdown. Also, they found any such reform related campaign or

activismcanbecounterproductivetoanalreadyseverelysufferingcommunity.

Thecampaignscreatedwithincommunitiesagainstthemandatoryforcedcremationsalso

broughttheMuslimcommunityclosertogether.Inmypersonalexperience,menwhohad

givenusahardtimewhenwespokeonMMDAreforms, lateron, followedourworkand

amplified them. It allowed them to see the spectrumofwork that is included inMuslim

women’s activism in Sri Lanka. That it is not just ‘women’s issues’ thatwe fight for, but

communityissues,donewiththesupportofallSriLankans.Thereisasenseofsolidaritythat

womenareabletobringaboutwhichwasevidentinthe#stopforcedcremationscampaigns

duringthepandemic.Itforcedcommunityleaderswithdifferentopinionstoworktogether

andcreatedspaceforrespect.

AwarenessisOverwhelming

In thenetworkofyoungwomenthat Iworkwith,a lotof themarenewandengaging in

activism for the first time. Preparing ourselves for new knowledge on the topicswe are

engaged in can sometimes be overwhelming. For example, since wework in amajority

Muslimwomencommunity,manyvolunteerswantedtolearnaboutfemalegenitalcutting

(FGC)that takesplace inthecountry.Thisawareness feltveryprivate,andat thetime,a

feelingsharedbyeveryoneelse.Itfeltgoodtoknowthatwewerenotaloneandatthesame

timeawkwardthateachofusfeltthisbetrayal.Onethingwasforsure,itwasthatactivism

isgoingtogetpersonaltoeachvolunteer.Itwasnolongeraboutspeakingupabouttopics

133

thatwereshieldedfromusbecauseofprivilege,thisallbecameaboutmakingsurenoother

girlchildwillgothroughwhatsomeofushadtoendure.Thiscreatedawayformembersin

our teamtogo throughtraining ingenderandsexualandreproductivehealthandrights

relatedsubjects.Thiswaythereisastructuredpathforthemtoinfluenceanotheronthese

matters.

Especially when it comes to sensitive issues like FGC, the body will still remember the

trauma,eventhoughyoumightnothaveamemoryofitinyourhead.Thereisafeelingof

beingviolatedandbetrayedbyyourowncommunitybasedonthemisguidedinterpretations

ofyourownfaith.

In the year 2020, I was part of a youth collective requesting grant funding through a

governmentministryworkingtowardsadolescenthealthandwellbeing.FGCwasoneofthe

topicswewantedtoworkonbycreatingconversationswithwomenatthegrassroots.The

panelwehadtoimpresswereallqualifiedmedicalexpertsandpracticingdoctorsatnational

hospitals.The levelofawarenessandunderstandingamongthemonthisparticular issue

wasverydisappointing,however,theywereeagertobepartofthesolution.Manyofthem

werecynicalatfirst,worriedthatitwouldappearracistiftheyonlysupportedaprojectwith

atargetaudienceofMuslimwomen.Butwewereabletoconvincethemoftheimportance

andtheuniquepositionthisissuebringstothesewomen.Attheendofmypresentation,I

was asked, “Was this done to you?” It made sense that they were not aware of the

sensitivities;thesearenottopicswespeakaboutopenly,andhopefully,withtimethisshould

beabletochange.

Ateammemberfromourgroupsharedwithmethatwhenitwastimeforherniece’shair

shavingritual,sherefusedtoallowanyonetocarryoutthe‘cutting’onherniece.4Forheritwasanemotionaleventbutbreakingthischainofuglytraditionsmadeherfeelitwasgoing

tobemuchbetterforthecommunity.Workinginthisfieldandhavingtheseconversations

everydayoftheweekmakesyouthickskinned,butstillvulnerable.Awarenessstartswith

usandbecausethisisoverwhelming,itisimportanttocreateboundariesforourselves.

TheRealityofthePandemic

Thevisiblenetworks thatwerecreatedbefore thepandemicwentundergroundwith the

lockdown.Theonlypersonswewereabletoconnectwithwereonline,throughphonecalls

andtextmessages.Thenumberofforcedandunderagemarriagesincreased,anditbecame

increasinglydifficulttotrackorconnecttheaffectedyoungwomentoresourcesforhelp.The

services that were able to penetrate into these communities were not women’s rights

friendlyandoftentriedtoreconciletheabusedbackwiththeabuserinthenameofreligion.

InthemonthofSeptemberin2020duringthelockdown,wewerenotifiedofagirlwhowas

4InsomeMuslimcommunities,youngbabiesgothroughahairshavingritual40daysafterbeingborn.Sometimes,FGCisundertakenduringthistime.

134

forciblymarriedatsunset.Shewasonlytoldaboutherownregistrationat4pm;justtwo

hoursinadvanceofoneofthebiggestmomentsofherlife.Thetimewewerealertedtothis

throughherfriends,wehadonly30minutestospeaktoherandtellhertofileapolicereport

thenextdayoraskthepolicetointervenebecauseitwastakingplacewithoutherconsent.

Unfortunately, shewas alsoput in touchwith a counselling service runby a faith group

knownforamorespiritualandtraditionalapproachtosolvingissuesratherthanbyholistic

means.Asaresult,weneverheardbackfromherandherphoneconnectionwascut.Isthis

therealityofayoungMuslimgirlwithouttheusualprivilegesofclassormoneywiththe

addedchallengesthepandemichasbroughtintothesystem?

Oneofourvolunteerswhoalsoworksatawomen’ssheltermentionedhowtheemergency

teamisunawareofloopholesintheMMDA,andwhentheyreceiveafemaleMuslimclient,

theywillsendherbacktothepoliceorQuazicourtbecausetheydonotknowhowtohelpher. The increasing racism and ignorance when it comes to the Muslim community

negativelyimpactthewayMuslimwomenaretreatedbysocialworkersandmostofthetime

discouragethesewomenfromgettingthehelptheyneed.

So,whosejobisittohelptheMuslimwoman?Muslimwomenthemselveswillarguethat

thesehardshipsarenotfeltbythemandthereforedonotexist.Thatifwomenweremore

piousandvirtuoustheseissueswillnotbefallthem.Thatitsurelymustbethewoman’sfault

forsomethingtohavegonewronginthemarriageorfamilyinthefirstplace.

The pandemic was able to reveal these issues and yet keep them in the dark. Forced

marriages,childmarriages,FGCanddomesticabusekepthappeningandarguablyincreased.

Buttheseincidentsalsowentundergroundandunmonitored.

Privilege

Humans in general do not acknowledge privilege because it is associated with shame.

RegardlessofwearingthetagsofayoungMuslimwomanfromaminoritycommunity,not

being fromColombo, I still benefit from lots of privileges. This is very noticeable in our

activismwhenweconnectwithgroupsnationally incampaigns.Thebacklashwehaveto

bearisrarelyphysical,mostlyemotional.Eveninthecaseofsurveillance,itiseasiertoaccess

safetyandassistance,but this isnot thesame forallourcolleaguesacross thespectrum.

Navigatingthisisalsohardbecausewhenweuseourvoicewecannotputothersindanger.

Mostofthetime,wetakeeveryprecautionwecanthinkof,butstill,makeinadvertenterrors.

Thisisnottosaythatevenmoderatelyprivilegedactivistsareimmunetochallenges;the

challengesarestillthere,buttheireffectsaredifferent.

BacktotheTightrope

Inmyfamily,Ihaveacousinsisterofthesameage.Theonlydifferenceisthatshegrewup

intheUnitedStatesofAmericawhilemyfamilyandIstayedhere.Shewearsahijab,follows

135

thefaithmuchbetterthanIdo,andwastaughttheinterpretationsofIslaminamoreholistic

sense.Inuniversity,shewasabletojoinMuslimyouthmovementswhichmeetinthelocal

mosqueandhavesessionsonsocialjusticeandworktobreakdownnegativestereotypes

withinthecommunity.Shewillbeabletosignhermarriagecontractthedayshedecidesto

do so and will not have to worry about protecting future daughters from harmful FGC

practices.

However,asaSriLankanMuslimwoman,tome,herlifeisaluxuryandsomethingIwillnot

beabletohaveformyselformyfellowsisters.Here,theMosqueonlyopensthewomen’s

wing for prayer during religious festivals andmostly themen inmy familywill get the

opportunitytoengageindiscussionswiththecommunityandmakedecisionsaboutme.

Muslimwomenare the stereotypeof second-class citizens in this country, the scapegoat

whensituations inthecommunitybecometoughand, ifatall, the lasttobeconsultedon

decisionsconcerningourownlives.Whetheritisaboutourbodies,attire,marriageorcareer,

thereisalwayssomeoneelsecallingtheshots.

Themedia likestoportrayusasoppressedandbackward,Muslimmenwanttoownour

agency, politicians decide on our clothing with the aim of ‘national security’, the list is

endless.Allthesestakeholdersneedusinsociety,butnotasequalbeings.Wearehere,but

notheard,likepropsinaplay.Thechallengeswefacewithinourcommunitiesaremetwith

racismandsexismineverydaylife,soweneedtonavigateallthistocarryoutourwork.

Toendthiscollectionofevents,IwanttoquoteMalcolmXwherehewasabletoexplainthe

tensionhefeltwhenworkinginhiscommunity,

“For theMuslims, I’mtooworldly.Forothergroups, I’mtooreligious.Formilitants, I’mtoomoderate,formoderatesI’mtoomilitant.IfeellikeI’monatightrope.”

ThatisexactlyhowIfeel.Wehavetopersonallyandprofessionallywearmanyhats,labels

and identities while our values remain the same. There is a tug of war even with your

colleaguesbecausetheydonotfacethesamerealitiesyouconfrontwhendoingthesame

work.Therefore,itisimportanttoliveeverymomentasanopportunitytoself-reflectand

bringcommunitiestogethertodothesame.

136

MuslimMarriageandDivorceAct:TheStruggleforReform

AmeerFaaiz

“Nostrugglecaneversucceedwithoutwomenparticipatingsidebysidewithmen.

Therearetwopowersintheworld;oneistheswordandtheotheristhepen.

Thereisathirdpowerstrongerthanboth,thatofwomen.”

—MalalaYousafzai

1.Introduction:TheMuslimCommunityandLawinSriLanka

ThepresenceoftheMuslimcommunityinSriLankacanbetracedbacktothepre-colonial

era.Accordingtoarchaeologicalevidencefoundinvariouspartsoftheisland,Sinhalaand

Tamil communities in Sri Lanka engaged in trade with Muslims from Middle Eastern

countries.Duringthecolonialperiod,SriLankaservedasboththeconduitfortradeaswell

asthesourceoftradeattheintersectionofmercantileactivityinAsia.SriLankathusbecame

hometoasignificantnumberofMuslimcommunities1.MerchantsconstitutedasignificantsegmentoftheMuslimpopulationatthattime.

Thisprovides thebackdroptoanunderstandingof thecrucialroleplayedbytheMuslim

communityininternationaltradeinvolvingSriLanka,therebymakingcommercialactivity

in the country prosper and thrive. During the Portuguese period, however, Muslim

merchantswereseverelyaffectedbyrestrictiveanddiscriminatoryeconomicpoliciesand

conditions adopted by the imperial powers. The circumstances becameworsewhen the

DutchtookovereconomicactivitythroughtheDutchEastIndiaCompany(theVOC).This

period saw the Muslim community maintain its existence in Sri Lanka as an integrated

communitydespiteconstraintsplacedupontheirpursuitoftrade.Evenastheyfacedodds

intheirsocio-economiclife,theyadheredtotheirculturalandreligiousethosandpractised

theirreligiousbeliefswithinfamilyandcommunitylife.

Animportantdevelopmentthattookplaceduringthisperiodwastheintroductionofthe

NewStatutes ofBatavia of 1766 in1770which encompassed rules onMuslimmarriage,

divorce, andother relatedmatters.2 By the time theBritish took control of theMaritimeProvinces of Sri Lanka, the Muslims were an integrated community and were able to

negotiatetermswiththeBritishgovernment.Consequently,formalacceptanceandstatutory

1M.M.MMaharoof,‘IslamiclawinSriLanka:Theformalandinformalaspects’(1990)29(1)Islamicstudies77-90.

2Hon.JusticeSaleemMarsoofPCetal,ReportoftheCommitteeappointedtoconsideramendmentstotheMuslimMarriageandDivorceAct,(January2018).

137

formulationofMuslimlawinSriLankawasgivenundertheBritish.3Thegovernor’sdecreewassubsequentlycalled,“TheMohammedanCodeof1806”.

IntroductionoftheMuslimMarriageandDivorceLaw

The Mohammedan Code of 1806 made a considerable contribution to the Muslim and

Marriage and Divorce Act. Although the Codewas a compilation of theMuslim law and

practiceofJavaandotherislands,itisalsobelievedtheCodeincludedasetofrulespractised

bytheMuslimsofColombo.4TheCodealsodealtwithinheritanceandotherrelatedmatters,Muslimmarriageanddivorceproceduresandtheirconsequences.

Inpost-independentSriLanka,TheMohammedanCodeof1806remainedthemainsource

ofMuslimmarriageanddivorcelaw.TheCodewasamendedundertheMuslimMarriage,

DivorceRegistrationOrdinance1929butthepreceptsoftheCodewereretaineduntilthe

MuslimMarriageandDivorceAct(MMDA)wasdraftedbyagroupofmenandpassedbythe

legislaturein1951andbecameoperativeinAugust1954.5

2.PersonalLawsinSriLanka

SriLankahasinitslegalregimeafewpersonallawsthatdealwithissuesrelatingtodifferent

communities.Theyusuallydealwithmatters involvingmarriage,divorce,maintenanceof

spouseandchildren,properties,placesofworshipandpropertiesbelonging to themand

theiradministration.

Currently, Sri Lanka has Kandyan law, Thesawalamai law andMuslim law that apply to

Kandyans, JaffnaTamils and allMuslims respectively. These personal laws have allowed

differentcommunitiestoretaintheirdistinctnorms,customs,andreligiouspractices.

KandyanlawmainlyencompasseslawsandcustomsthatwereinforceundertheSinhalese

kingsintheKandyanKingdomsinceaboutthe16thcentury.Itisidentifiedasaterritoriallawby some experts as it also applies to Hindus and Europeans domiciled in the Kandyan

territory.Kandyanlawcontainsanancientsetofregulationspertainingtomarriage,divorce,

3Maharoof,‘IslamiclawinSriLanka:Theformalandinformalaspects’(1990)8.

4ibid.

5Hon.JusticeSaleemMarsoofPCetal,ReportoftheCommitteeappointedtoconsideramendmentstotheMuslimMarriageandDivorceAct,(January2018).

138

succession,andcustody.Certainpracticessuchaspolygamyandpolyandryrecognisedby

Kandyanlawhavesincebeenprohibited.6

Thesawalamai law that applies to theMalabari inhabitants of the province of Jaffna is a

codificationofthecustomarylawthatgovernedintestatesuccession,propertyinheritance

andcertainproprietaryrights.Thesawalamailawhasbeenrecognisedasapersonallawin

SriLankathatappliestoanyJaffnaTamildomiciledinanypartoftheisland.

MuslimpersonallawsinSriLankaareinthestatutesoftheMuslimMarriageandDivorce

Act(No.13of1951),MuslimIntestateSuccessionOrdinance(No.10of1931)andMuslim

MosquesandCharitableTrustsorWakfsAct(No.51of1956).Ofthesethreestatutes,the

MuslimMarriageandDivorceActhasbeensubjected togreaterattentionanddebate for

being both discriminatory and inconsistent with fundamental rights enshrined in the

Constitution.

3.ControversialFeaturesoftheMMDA

Almostsincetheinceptionofitsimplementation,theMMDAhascourtedcontroversyona

rangeofissuesoverwhichithadjurisdiction.

Marriage

TheMMDAprovidesfortheregistrationofMuslimmarriages.Section17oftheActbestowsthedutyofregisteringmarriagesunder theActonthebridegroom, thewali (guardianofmarriage)ofthebrideorthepersonconductingthenikah(wedding)ceremony.However,itdoesnotmakeregistrationmandatoryforamarriagetobevalid(section16).Consentofthe

brideisnotarequirementforavalidMuslimmarriage.Section18oftheMMDAprovides

thateventhebride'spresenceatthetimeoftheregistrationisnotrequiredastheinterest

ofthebrideisrepresentedbythewali.

Thishasresultedinmanymarriagesnotbeingregistered.Thereareinstancesofgirlsbeing

marriedoffwithouttheirconsent.Therequirementofwalibeingentrustedtothe‘sect’towhichthebridebelongs,entitlesadistantmalerelativetoadornthatmantleintheabsence

ofthefatherorbrotherattheexpenseofthemotherwhowouldhavetoiledhardinbringing

upthechild.Thishasresultedinmanycasesofabuse.Thenon-compulsorynatureofthe

marriage registration has subjected spouses and children to much abuse and injustice,

particularlyinpolygamousmarriages.

6M.H.M.Firdous,‘SriLankanpersonallawsbetweenjusticeandfreedom–Avaluebasedperspective’,Groundviews,(12January2016)<https://groundviews.org/2016/12/01/sri-lankan-personal-laws-between-justice-and-freedom-a-value-based-perspective/>accessed20August2021.

139

Minimumage

Unlikethegenerallawonmarriagewhichrequiresthatthecouplebeatleasteighteenyears

ofageforamarriagetobevalid,theMMDAdoesnotrecognisetheconceptofminimumage.

This allowsMuslimmarriages to be contracted betweenminors (who cannot consent to

marriage),subjecttotheapprovaloftheQuaziinthecaseofgirlswhohavenotattainedtheageoftwelve(section23).

ThebenefitofthispaucityisoftenreapedbyMuslimmenwhomarrywomenwhohavenot

attainedtheageofcapacitytomarry.Consequently,manyMuslimgirlsandyoungadultsare

deprivedofeducationandtheirrighttoanormalchildhood.Ithasalsobeendiscoveredthat

in many instances young Muslim brides are abandoned, divorced, or compelled into

polygamousrelationshipsafterbeingmarriedasminors.7Further,atthetimeofnikah,theaccuracyofthebride’sageisnotverified.Theregistraracceptsthewordofthewaliwhichleavesroomforerror.

In2014,14percentof all registeredMuslimmarriages inKattankudywerewith abride

below18yearsofage.Inthefollowingyear,thefigureincreasedsignificantlyto22percent.8InresearchconductedbytheUnitedNationsChildren’sFund(UNICEF)intheyear2018,it

wasrevealedthatatleast12percentofthegirlsinSriLankaaremarriedbeforetheageof

18and2percentamongthemaremarriedbytheageof15.Inanarticlesubmittedbythe

AtlasCorpsinfurtheranceofthisresearch,theMMDAofSriLankahasbeenidentifiedasone

ofthemainreasonsforthishighnumberofunderagemarriages.9

Polygamy

The MMDA provides for polygamy, allowing a man to contract four valid marriages

concurrentlyprovidedthathehasthefinancialmeansandcapabilitytofulfilmatrimonial

obligationsequallytoallfourspouses(section24).Therehasnotbeenamechanismtoverify

either the said capacity or the number of marriages already contracted. The non-

compulsoriness of the registration is abused to contract more than four polygamous

marriagesatagiventimeandtoabandonspouses.Thishasalsoresultedindifficultiesin

obtainingbirthcertificatesforchildrenofsuchmarriages.Thisinturncanpresentaserious

obstacletogainingadmissionstoschools.Inmostcases,thehusbandsareunabletoprovide

adequatemaintenance andQuazis do not order sufficientmaintenance due to perceived

7SabraZahidandHyshyamaHamin,‘LongOverdue:BreakingdowntheminimumageofmarriageinSriLanka’,Groundviews,(15July2019)<https://groundviews.org/2019/07/15/long-overdue-breaking-down-the-minimum-age-of-marriage-in-sri-lanka/>accessed20August2021.

8HyshyamaHamin&HasanahCeguIsadeen,UnequalCitizens:Muslimwomen’sstruggleforjusticeandequality,(TheObservatoryontheUniversalityofRightsOctober2016).

9GayathriRajeevan,‘ChildMarriageinSriLanka’,(Atlascorps,30May2018)<https://atlascorps.org/child-marriages-srilanka/>accessed20August2021.

140

obligations of polygamous marriages and the resulting numbers of children. There is

abundantevidenceofhowdetrimentalthispracticehasbeentomanyMuslimwomenand

children,youngonesatthat,withintheSriLankanMuslimcommunity.Further,anyonewho

claimsthatthepermittedpracticeofpolygamyhaseradicatedorpreventedadulterousand

extra-maritalrelationshipsorthattherearenoconcubinesissurelyoutoftouchwithreality.

PolygamyisnotmandatoryinIslam.Norisitapreferredoption.Therearedifferencesof

opinion, even amongst jurists, as to the permissibility, acceptability, and applicability.

MuslimsclaimthatIslamrestrictedpolygamynearly1440yearsagowhentherewasnolimit

on the number. Hence, it befits theMuslims to apply ijithihad (independent/intellectualreasoning)andactinthepublicinterestand/orgeneralgood(maslahahmursalah)—both

principlesareintegralpartsofIslamicjurisprudence.

Divorce

TheMMDAprovides fourmaingroundsofdivorce.Namely,mubarat (divorceonmutualconsentofbothparties),talaq, fasahandkhula.Talaqpermitsthehusbandofanexistingmarriage to divorce his wife by simply pronouncing it without a permissible reason. In

practice,often, thishappensbehindthebackof thewife. Incontrast,where thewifeofa

subsistingmarriagedesirestoobtainadivorcefromherhusband,sheisrequiredtofollow

acomplicatedprocedureprovidedinthethirdscheduleoftheMMDAincludingproviding

corroborationoftheallegedfaultbytwomalewitnesses.Ifsheintendstoeffectdivorceon

thegroundofkulah(unhappinessinmarriage)shewillbecompelledtopaycompensation.

Quazis(judges)

AQuaziisaquasi-judicialofficerappointedforaspecificgeographicalareavestedwiththejurisdiction to administer the MMDA. This office was established under the Divorce

RegistrationOrdinance1929.10Section12oftheMMDArecognisesit.Quaziswereinitiallyappointed by the Minister of Home Affairs but after an amendment in 1965, they are

appointed by the Judicial Service Commission. The eligibility criterion for a Quazi issomewhatunconventional.Section12(1)oftheMMDAonlyrequiresthecandidatetobea

Muslim male and of good character. In addition, five Sri Lankan Muslim males of good

character and suitable attainment are appointed to theBoard ofQuazis. Themajority ofQuazishaveproventobeanythingbutmenofgoodcharacter.

QuazisexerciseawiderangeofauthorityoverMuslimsinSriLanka,includingauthorisingan underage female child formarriage to decide on childmaintenance. Decisions of the

Quazis are often not recorded or made public. Lack of competence, absence of legal

10JusticeSaleemMarsoof,‘TheQuaziCourtSysteminSriLankaanditsImpactonMuslimWomen’,(2011)MuslimWomen’sResearchandActionForum(MWRAF).

141

representationandoversighthasallowedQuazistodeliverdiscriminatory,capricious,andwrong decisions.11 Throughout history, women have been subjected to discriminationthroughthissystem.

TheQuazisystemitselfhasbeenacknowledgedtobethefountainofallillsforlong.Ithasbeenagraveyardforjustice.Thereareamplestatistics,casereferences,researchfindings

andtestimoniestosubstantiatethis.Infact,manyMuslimsagreethattheQuazisystemisbeyondredemption.Thesystemisrottentothecore.ItviolatesthefundamentalsofIslam:

equalityandfairtreatment.IthasbecometheantithesisofIslam.

TheinstitutionoftheQuazihasstoodoutsidethemainstreamoftheadministrationofjustice.Ithasnoproperinfrastructure,physicaloradministrative.TheQuaziandtheBoardofQuazi,function only on Saturdays. Yet this institution is the exclusive repository of the vast

jurisdictionofallMuslimmarriages,divorces,andmaintenance.Thesystemhasnotbeen

upgraded. Worse, the state has been a silent observer, facilitator, and funder of this

discriminatorysystem,arguablyinviolationofequalityprovisionsanddirectiveprinciples

of theConstitution.The statehas shownno remorse in sustaining such adiscriminatory

structurewithtaxpayers’money.

4.AnalysisoftheProblems

Muslims want Sri Lanka to be a pluralist state that respects democracy and diversity.

Muslimsnowclaimthattheirsisnolongerthetradingcommunitythatitwasbefore.The

communityhasnowdiversifiedandreached intoeveryspectrumof thesociety including

professions, corporate sector, business, trade, agriculture, manufacturing, and public

service.Wewanttobetreatedasequalcitizens.Thatisfairandright.Yetwewanttoenjoy

unequalormorethanequalprivilegestoo.Inthatcontext,shouldnotMuslimsproactively

promote some issues that could show their community in a better light and promote

pluralismasopposedtoindulginginarmtwistingandsubtleintimidation?

ProgressivereformofthelawispossiblewithintheveryframeworkoftheshariahowingtothedynamicnatureofIslamicfiqh,meaning‘deepunderstanding’or‘fullcomprehension’andthemethodologyofijtihad,which is knownasusul al-fiqh. They certainlydonotoppressand/ordiscriminateagainstwomen.

Justice Weeramantry12, in his seminal treatise ‘Islamic Jurisprudence: An InternationalPerspective’, has traced the Islamic fundamental tenets as the founding base for the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The declaration remains at the core of all other

treaties including in particular the International Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Justice Weeramantry goes on to trace how Islam paved the way for, and ensured the

11SafanaGulBegum,‘Isequaljusticepossible?’,(2015).

12C.G.Weeramantry,IslamicJurisprudence:aninternationalperspective,(PalgraveMacmillanUK1988).

142

protection of, equal rights betweenmen andwomen at a timewomen and children had

virtually no rights.He quotes verses from theQuran extensively in drawing attention to

directivesthatensurethatmenandwomenareequal.JusticeWeeramantryisnottheonly

juristtohavereiteratedthatIslamicjurisprudenceisthepredecessorandtheforerunnerto

thecurrent internationallyacceptedhumanrightsnorms.NisrineAbiad13, inher treatise‘ShariaMuslimStatesandInternationalHumanRightsTreatyObligation’,outlinesseveral

areaswhere Islambrought positive changes, contributing to the improvement of human

rights.

ManyMuslimmajoritycountrieshaveraisedtheminimumageofmarriage.Thisisgenerally

trueofmostrichGulfIslamicstatesandincludesAlgeria,Afghanistan,Pakistan,Bangladesh,

Egypt, andMorocco.Women are appointed as judges andQuazis in Indonesia,Malaysia,Afghanistan,Bangladesh,Pakistan,Tunisia,Egypt,Sudan,andMorocco.Similarly,inkeeping

withtheQuranicinjunctions,Malaysiahasimposedstringentpreconditionsinthecaseof

polygamous marriage and further in progressively interpreting the Quran, Turkey

criminalisedpolygamyin1926andTunisiabanneditin1956,bothpredominantlyMuslim

states.

However,withinSriLanka,therehasbeenaclaimbyasectionofthecommunitythatitis

time thecommunity looked inward,particularlyafter theEasterSundaycarnage inApril

2019 to address issues of exclusivism and isolationism and promote coexistence and

integrationasapartof theSriLankanmosaic.EvenMMDAreformwas lookedat in that

perspective.

Incontrast,thosecampaigninginsecrecy,mobilisingsupportagainstreformareseekingthe

endorsementoftheclaimthattheQuazisystem,polygamy,andmarriageexclusivelyundertheMMDAwithoutanyotheroptionarethepreserveofthe‘Muslimidentity’andthatthe

community must rally round to protect them. To even suggest that these patriarchal

embodimentsareintegraltothe‘Muslimidentity’isnotonlytodefylogicbutisalsoaninsult

totheintelligenceofthesocietyatlarge.

Whenconfrontedbymajoritarianbulliesand/orwhenitsuitsthemthecommunityelites

and the so-calledmullahs (religious leaders) readily compromise, negotiate, and giveup.They agreed to reform themadrasa (religious teaching school) system, compromised onhalal(permissible)certification,requestedwomentoremovefacecoverandchangefromblackintocolouredabayas(alongdress/robewornbysomeMuslims),andcompromisedonthefundamentalrighttoburythedead.Buttheyhavenocompunctionwhenitcomestothe

rightsoftheirownwomenandchildren.

Thepresenceofanexclusivesystemtoadministerjusticehasalsohadadditionalnegative

impacts.ThestatelettheMMDAcontinuewiththesystemofQuaziswithhardlyademandon theExchequercompared to theadministrationof justiceoverall.Bureaucratsand law

13NisrineAbiad,ShariaMuslimStatesandInternationalHumanRightsTreatyObligation:AComparativeStudy,(BIICL2008).

143

enforcementauthoritiesarewillingtodiscourageMuslimsfromaccessingtheregularjustice

system.AcaseinpointistheusualreluctanceonthepartofthepolicetoactwhenMuslims

wishtoseekredressundertheDomesticViolenceAct.Insteadofacceptingthecomplaint

andprosecutingtheydiscouragethecomplainantandadvisethemtohaverecoursetothe

Quazi.14

Hadthewomen’scallforreformsbeenheededprudentlyintimeboththelawandsystem

couldhavebeenbroughtuptoreasonablespeedtobeajustandequitablesystemthatmay

havewithstoodthetestoftime.Whatisneedednowisacompleteoverhaulofthesystem

together with reforms compatible with today’s societal needs, forward-looking, able to

withstandfuturechallengesandconstitutionallycompliant.

5.TheSocio-EconomicFallout

The ill-effects of the MMDA include directly marginalising women and children. Early

marriages and childbearing cost them their education, employability, financial

independence,andaccesstolivelihood.Manysuchwomenarelaterabusedandabandoned.

Theyandtheirchildrenbecomedestitute.Cumulativelythesecontributetostrengthening

the vicious cycle of abject poverty.Many of the poverty-stricken children seek solace by

enrolling in madrasas that can provide food, shelter, and teach only the Quran. It isconservativelyestimatedthatnearlyathousandyoungadultspassoutof thesemadrasasannually facing the challenge of finding employment. The lack of such opportunities for

employment, as well as poverty and social ostracisation, ensures frustration. These

conditionscanprovideafertilegroundforradicalisation,thelastthingthatthecommunity

wants.

6.PastAttemptsatReforms

As with any law, when adverse impacts were felt by the implementation of the MMDA

demands for reform started emanating from several quarters, particularly fromMuslim

women.InacknowledgementthattheMMDAneededreform,governmentsofthedaysetup

differentcommitteesin195615,198416,199017and200918toproposereforms.Tothismustbe added two independent initiatives. These are the Muslim Law Research Committee

headed by retired Registrar-General Dr. H. M. Z. Farouque, appointed in 1972 and the

14ShreenAbdulSaroor,OurStruggles,OurStories,(2014)208.

15MarriageandDivorceCommissionheadedbyMr.A.R.H.Canakeratne.

16MuslimPersonalLawReformsCommitteechairedbyJusticeWanasundera.

17MuslimPersonalLawReformsCommitteechairedbyDr.A.M.M.Shahabdeen.

18CommitteeAppointedtoConsiderAmendmentstotheMMDAchairedbyJusticeSaleemMarsoof.

144

IndependentCommitteeforMuslimPersonalLawReformsinitiatedbytheMuslimWomen’s

Research and Action Forum (MWRAF). All these committees deliberated, consulted

stakeholders, andmade recommendations. Some of their recommendationswere known

publicly,butnonetakentotheirnatural fruition.Althougha fewamendmentstoaddress

some of the procedural shortcomings were introduced, the last one being in 1975, no

substantivereformhasbeenmadetotheMMDA.

Muslimwomen’sdemandforreformoftheMMDA

IndividualsandgroupsthatwerecallingforreformsintheMMDAwerebroughttogetherin

theearly1980sbytheMWRAFwhichsincethenpioneeredtheadvocacyforthereformof

MMDAforalongtime.MWRAFattemptedtoreachouttowomenintheperipheriesintheir

efforttobringouttheissues.Itevenmanagedtogetitsnomineesinacoupleofcommittees

thatwere appointed to propose recommendations19 for reform, in addition to launchingtheir own independent initiative. The MWRAF believed that its research, findings,

publications, and advocacywould convince the so-called ulamas (religious scholars) andinfluentialmeninthecommunitytoreformtheMMDA.Butitisthoseverysamemenwho

havecontinuedtofailthemandthecommunity.

Since about 2014/5 Muslim women have broadened their advocacy. Affected women,

victimsofsystemicabusesbyQuazisweremobilisedbyafewcommittedandsenioractivistsandwomenactivistgroupsandorganisationsthatworkdirectlywithandsupportwomen

on the ground and grassroots. These included theMuslimWomen’s Development Trust

(MWDT), Islamic Women’s Association for Research and Empowerment (IWARE) and

Women’s Action Network (WAN). In 2016 they made series of representations to the

Constitutional Assembly appointed Public Representations Committee on Constitutional

ReformsheadedbyLalWijenayake.Theypointedouttheadverseeffectsofarticle16ofthe

Constitutionandcalledforitsrepeal.20ThiswasinadditiontothedemandforacompletereformoftheMMDA.

Thesewomen’srightsactivistsandaffectedwomenalsomadeaseriesofrepresentationsto

thechairandseveralmembersoftheJSMCommittee,toseniorMuslimPoliticians,theAll

CeylonJamiyyathulUlama(ACJU)andthePrimeMinister’sOffice.Theyalsomadeseveral

individualandgroupsubmissionstotheSub-committeeonFundamentalRightsestablished

under the auspices of the Constitutional Assembly which held consultations and made

recommendationsfornecessaryamendmentstotheConstitution.Inlateryearsacoupleof

activistsfromtheMuslimPersonalLawReformActionGroup(MPLRAG)workedwiththese

women rights’ activists and provided some advocacy support. Additionally, some young

19WomenClaimingRightsandSpaces:ActivismtoReformMuslimPersonalLawsinSriLanka,EditedbyFaizunZackariya&ChulaniKodikara,(MuslimWomen’sResearchandActionForum2014).

20LalWijenayakeetal,ReportonPublicRepresentationsonConstitutionalReform,(May2016)95-96.

145

activists effectively brought out some important issues hitherto unspoken for public

discourseanddebateinseveralsocialmediaplatformsthathelpedbroadenawarenesson

theneedforreformoftheMMDA.

Theabovecollective,particularlytheaffectedwomenleadingtheadvocacyefforts,brought

the MMDA issues to public attention and drew solidarity from fellow citizens. In their

representations and submissions, these groups brought to public attention first-hand

testimonies and other evidence of the lived realities and experiences of unfairness,

discrimination,marginalisation,arbitrariness,abuse,indignity,abandonment,andviolence

causedbytheilleffectsoftheprovisionsoftheMMDA.Theycalledforimmediatereforms

thatwouldrectifytheseinjuriousprovisions.Thesedetailsshockedtheconscienceofall—

withtheexceptionoftheMuslimmaleswhohadtheauthoritytomakesuchdecisions.

Article16:acharterofservitudeforwomen?

Article16oftheConstitutionofSriLankaprotectsanywrittenandunwrittenlawpassedby

thelegislaturedespiteitsinconsistencywiththefundamentalrightschapter.Italsoprovides

the legislaturewith an opportunity to bring discriminatory provisions in such laws into

compliance with the Constitution gradually. No attempt has been made by the Muslim

communityoritsrepresentativestodothat.IncontrasttotheMMDA,theKandyanMarriage

and Divorce Act No. 44 of 1952 (KMDA) has been subjected to amendments tomake it

consistentwith the general law onmarriage and the Constitution.Many discriminatory,

unethical practices recognised by the KMDA were further amended through the 1995

Amendment Act. However, attempts to rectify the anomaly posed by article 16 during

constitutionalreformprocesseshavebeenresistedbyMuslimrepresentatives.21

Thecallfortherepealofarticle16intheConstitutionistheculminationofthelongstanding

frustrationover the failure tomake right thewrongsmetedout towomenand children.

Thosewhoarebentonperpetuatingdiscriminatorypractices,takingcoverbehindarticle16,

arguethatthegovernmentisseekingtochangethelawinordertoevokereligiousfeelings

amongsttheMuslims.Theyaretryingtomakeitlookthatthecallfortherepealofarticle16

isintendedtorepealtheentireMuslimpersonallaw,notjustthediscriminatorypartsofit.

JusticeSaleemMarsoof’sCommitteeappointedin2009(JSMCommittee)

Compelled by the demand from within the community and in acknowledgement of the

imperativeneedforanurgentreview,acommitteewasappointedinJuly2009bythethen-

Justice Minister MilindaMoragoda to consider and propose reforms to theMMDA. This

21ConstitutionalAssemblyofSriLanka,ReportoftheSub-committeeonFundamentalRights,(24August2016),4,11and17.

146

committeewasinitiallycomprisedof17memberschairedbyJusticeSaleemMarsoof.22Thecommitteeheldwide-rangingconsultationswithdiversesegmentsandstakeholdersofthe

communityandreceivedsubmissions.Itfinaliseditsreportin2018.

The committee considered recommendations that included enhancing the status of the

QuazisbybringingthemintothemainstreamoftheSriLankanjudicialsystem,appointingattorneys-at-lawasQuazis,ensuringadequaterepresentationformenandwomenasQuazisbyremovingthedisqualificationof femalesfromholdingoffice,minimising intersectional

disparities,fixingaminimumageofmarriageforMuslims,makingregistrationmandatory

foramarriagetobevalid,incorporatingstringentrulesonpolygamyincompliancetothe

stipulationsintheQurantotheMMDA,empoweringQuazisandintroducingacompensationmechanismforwivesunjustlydivorcedbythehusbandsandpermittinglegalrepresentation

bychoice.It furtherproposedthatifreformswerenotadopted,Muslimsshouldhavethe

optionofregisteringmarriagesundertheMarriageRegistrationOrdinance.23

The committeewas not unanimous. Thosewanting to stymie reforms opposed all these

proposalsinadissentingopinion.ThisdivisionputpaidtoanyhopeofreformingtheMMDA.

Muslimwomen’sadvocacypost-2019

Undaunted,womencontinuedtheiradvocacydemandingthattheMMDAbefullyreformed.

Severalwomen’sgroupsmetthecurrentMinisterofJustice.Theirdemandsforreformwere

premisedonthestate’sresponsibilitytoensureequality,non-discrimination,andjusticefor

all,includingMuslimwomen.Asthosemostaffected,womenshouldbegivenanopportunity

torepresenttheirinterestsinreformcommitteesandplayakeyroleinreforminitiatives.

Furthermore, they argued, the diversity (heterogeneity) among Muslims should be

respected.ThereareseveralsectsofMuslimslivinginSriLanka.Thelawsstipulatedinthe

MMDAaffectthemdifferently.Thus,theinterestsandpeculiaritiesofallsuchsectsshould

be recognised and respected in reforming the law. Ensuring equality for women and

upholding Islamic values are not essentially antonymous to each other. Islamic

jurisprudenceshouldbeunderstood,applied,andpropagatedinitspropersense.

ACollectiveofMuslimcivilsocietyorganisationsworkingintheNorth,North-WestandEast

continued theirMMDAreformadvocacy. Inamemorandumsubmitted to theMinisterof

Justicein2020byseveralMMDAreformactivistgroupsincludingMWDT,IWARE,Eastern

SocialDevelopmentFoundation(ESDF)andHumanElevationOrganisation(HEO)andWAN,

stressedthenecessitytooverhaultheQuazisystem.Theyarguedthatitshouldbereplacedwithaprofessionalisedfamilycourtstructure,thatthelawshouldallowwomentoexercise

22Hon.JusticeSaleemMarsoofPCetal,ReportofthecommitteeappointedtoconsideramendmentstotheMuslimMarriageandDivorceAct,(January2018)AnnexureA.

23Hon.JusticeSaleemMarsoofPCetal,ReportoftheCommitteeappointedtoconsideramendmentstotheMuslimMarriageandDivorceAct,(January2018)30-52.

147

theirautonomyinmarriage,thatthereshouldbeminimumprofessionalqualificationsfor

Quazis(whoshouldbemadeaccountablethroughanoversight),thatpolygamyshouldberegulated and permissible only under exceptional circumstances and with specific

conditions including financial capacity, the consent of present spouses and court

authorisation prior to contracting a subsequent marriage. They also argued that where

prenuptialcontractscontainedwishes formonogamousmarriages,polygamyshouldbea

groundfordivorceandthatthereshouldbestringentconditionsandreasonablegroundsto

enabletalaqandfasahdivorces.24

Principaldriversagainstreform

The demands of Muslim women have often been neglected, misinterpreted, or

misunderstoodbymisogynistmenwhoconsiderthemselvessuperiortowomen.

TheACJU,foundedin1924,whichclaimstobetheumbrellabodyofMuslimtheologiansin

SriLanka,isthemain(in)visiblehandbehindthecampaignagainstreformingtheMMDA.It

falselyallegesthattheMMDAisshariahandthuscannotbeamended.TheheadoftheACJUstatedin2017whileservingontheJSMcommittee,thattheMMDAisperfectinitspresent

state.Hisstatementcausedsuchanuproarhewascompelledtobacktrack.25EvenwhentheMuslimparliamentarians,afterlongandarduouspersuasionagreedtoafurtherwatered-

downreformthatofwhatwasproposedbyJusticeMarsoof,theylatersuccumbedtoACJU

pressureandfurtherwateredthemdown.26Thus,despitemanyacommittee,todate,thesemenhaveensuredthatnomeaningfulreformismadetotheMMDA.

PrivateMembers’Bills

ItmustbeacknowledgedthatMuslimpoliticiansduringthepastthreedecadesonallsides

simplydidnotwanttogoaheadwiththereform.Theyusedtheirpoliticalleveragepurely

forpatronageandnottoadvancetherightsofcitizens.ItistimethatMuslimpoliticiansand

so-calledreligiousleadersjoinedfellowcitizenstoworktoimprovedemocracy,ruleoflaw

andequalitycollectivelywithoutbeingexclusivistandparochial.Theyshouldavoidaiding

and abetting the condemnation of the community to the abyss of darkness and

backwardness.

24Women’sActionNetworketal,ConsolidatedrecommendationsforMMDAreformfromMuslimcivilsocietygroupsworkingontheground,(August2020).

25‘ACJUandtheMMDA–Astatementofclarification’,(ACJUApril2017)<https://acju.lk/en/news/acju-news/item/1108-acju-and-the-mmda-a-statement-of-clarification>accessed20August2021.

26ShreenAbdulSaroor,‘TheReformoftheMMDA&theRoleoftheUlamas’,ColomboTelegraph,(2August2019)<https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/the-reform-of-the-mmda-the-role-of-the-ulamas/>accessed20August2021.

148

Having witnessed first-hand the sufferings of Muslim women throughout the island,

persuaded by them and realising thatmeaningful reform of theMMDA is a non-starter,

former parliamentarian, and medical practitioner Dr. (Mrs) Thusitha Wijemanne, in

December2019,presentedthreeseparateprivatemember’sBillstosetacommonminimum

age formarriage, to allowMuslims the choice tomarry under theMarriageRegistration

Ordinance (MRO) and the choice of the district courts or theQuazi to have recourse todissolveamarriage.ThoseBillscouldnotbepassedintolawowingtotheearlydissolution

ofthethenparliament.Inthecurrentparliament,memberforMataleMr.PremithaBandara

TennakoonwhileacknowledgingtheearlierattemptbyDr.ThusithaWijemannesubmitted

similarprivatemember’sBillstoachievethesameobjectives.Theirfirstreadingtookplace

in December 202027 and none of these Bills, past and present were challenged in theSupremeCourtbyanydefenderof the currentMMDA.They couldbepassed into lawas

appropriately. The content, ambit, and scope of these types of Bills are such that their

passageintolawcannotbeobjectedtoorblockedbyanyparliamentarianbeitaMuslimor

otherwise.Thecommunityelite’scontinuedobstinacynottoreformtheMMDAhadafforded

opportunitiestonotsosavouryelementstoattempttoabolishitaltogetherthroughaprivate

member’sBill.

7.ReformsAgreedandtheEffortstoThwartThem

TheAdvisoryCommittee,appointedinDecember2020bythecurrentMinisterof Justice,

handedoveritsrecommendationsonthe21stofJune2021.Inastatement,thecommitteestated that, inApril 2021, the cabinet ofministers had approved reforms toMMDA.The

reformswillmake18yearstheminimumageforlawfulmarriage,mandatethebridetoplace

hersignatureonthemarriageregistrationcertificate,banpolygamyandabolishtheQuazisystem.28

The earlier committees including the JSMCommittee carried out extensive consultations

withbroadsectionsofthecommunityandreceivedrepresentationspriortofinalisingtheir

reports.Against thatbackdrop, thecurrentclaimbythosemenspearheadinganti-reform

propaganda, thatanyreformmustcome fromwithinandafterdueconsultationwith the

community,issolelytostallpossiblereform.Therealityisthatforyears,demandforreform

has come from within the community and not from outside. Further, for these men,

‘community’ means men only. They conveniently and maliciously block women— who

27Parliament.lk,ParliamentaryDebates(Hansard),(December2020),<https://www.parliament.lk/uploads/documents/hansard/1608718318030320.pdf>seecolumns1559&1560.

28MohammedRasooldeen,‘AdvisoryCommitteeonMuslimLawReformssubmitsMMDAreport’,DailyNews,(29June2021)<http://www.dailynews.lk/2021/06/29/local/252678/advisory-committee-muslim-law-reforms-submits-mmda-report>accessed20August2021.

149

constitute more than 50 percent of the community— from participating in community

consultations.

Theseunrelentinganti-reformchampionsaremisleadingtheunsuspectingmassesunderthe

guiseofmysticbeliefs.Theyalsohavenoremorseinunconscionablydeclaringopenlythat

theyareagainstallowingMuslimstoexercisetheirfundamentalhumanrightofchoiceunder

whichlawonewantstomarry.Thus,demonstratingamindsetthatdesiressubjugationas

opposedtoinformedandjudiciousdecisionmaking.Thatalsomanifeststheextenttowhich

the unethical and immoral pursuit and determination of elements with vested interests

couldgotoretainthestrangleholdandoppressionoftheMuslimcommunity.Therecould

absolutelybenocommunityinterestatheart.Additionally,thisisanadmissionontheirpart

thatgiven theoption,manyMuslimswouldchoose to register theirmarriagesunder the

MROiftheMMDAisnotadequatelyreformed.

8.OptingoutoftheMMDAisaFundamentalRight

TheSriLankanstatehasnotonlyaidedandabettedtheperpetuationofthediscriminatory

Quazisystem,butalsoproactivelydiscriminatedMuslimsfrombeingtreatedequallytotheircounterparts. Muslims were not permitted to marry and/or divorce under the General

Marriage Registration Ordinance nor could they have recourse to regular courts for

matrimonial actions. To date Muslims of Sri Lanka, should they choose to marry, are

compelledtomarryonlyintermsoftheMMDA.

This has caused embarrassment and placed the government in awkward situations.

Responding to a query related to MMDA at a UNHRC-Treaty Body session in 2016, the

government,perhapsunwittinglyand towriggleoutofahumiliatingsituation,misstated

facts thus: “…Their application was not automatic, but rather a personal choice by theconcernedindividuals….”29.Therefore,thegovernment,shouldwithoutfurtherdelaybringinamendmentstogenerallaws,removethebarthatdoesnotpermitMuslimstomarryunder

theMarriageRegistrationOrdinanceandaffordthatchoicetoMuslimsasthosegovernedby

Kandyanlawareentitledto.

AscitizensofSriLanka,anyMuslimhasaninherentandaconstitutionalrighttoopt-outof

theMMDAifs/hechoosestodoso.Noone,noteventhestate,coulddenythat.Itisthestate’s

dutytoundothediscriminationperpetratedhithertoandensureequalprotection.

29‘CommitteeontheEliminationofRacialDiscriminationconsidersreportofSriLanka’,(OHCHR2016)<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20381&LangID=E>accessed20August2021.

150

9.Conclusion

TheMuslimwomen’s call is premisedon the state’s duty to ensure equal treatment and

protectionofitscitizens.Anycallforpreferentialtreatmentcoulddilutethat.Bearingthisin

minditbehovesallMuslimstosubscribetotheproposaltodoawaywiththeQuazisystemand ensure that a reformed MMDA is administered through the mainstream judiciary,

namelythedistrictcourts.Thatisthesurestwaytosustainandsafeguardpersonallaws.

FurtherabolitionoftheQuazisystemisnotanendinitselfnorisitgoingtocauseanyharmto theMuslimcommunity.Wehavewitnessed fairadministrationof justice inmattersof

succession,custodyofchildren,allciviltransactionsbarringthoserelatedtomarriageand

divorce, financial transactions and disputes, and criminal jurisdiction. All of these are

administered through our normal courts. In some areas, Muslim specific statutes and

principles are applied. The abolition of theQuazi systemwill also immediately restore acertaindegreeofdignityandrespectofthelitigantsandspaceswherejusticeisadministered

but also providemuchmore decorum and a safer and neutral space forMuslimwomen

seekingjustice.

Itcouldbearguedthatproceedingsindistrictcourtscouldtakelonger.ItisnotthatQuazisdispensed justice expeditiously to all. The ‘laws delay’ is a national issue. It is time that

Muslims too joined the larger society in collectively advancing law reforms, including

personallaws,democraticgovernance,andtheruleoflawandbetter,expedited,andeasier

accesstojustice.

ThegoalistogetthestatetoelevatethejurisdictionofMuslimmarriageanddivorcesothat

it isbrought into themainstreamof theadministrationof justice, thusprovidingamore

secure,dignifiedandlevelplayingfield.Thisislongoverdue.Itisneededtoensureequaland

dignifiedtreatmentforall,professionaladjudicationforeverycitizen,andaccountabilityby

thestate.

TheclaimforreformoftheMMDAdatesasfarbackas1956,longbeforeequalityprovisions

cameintoourConstitutionin1972.Weneedtoownupourlapsesinnotmakingprogressto

bringdiscriminatoryprovisionsuptospeedwithourConstitutionifwearetoclaimthatwe

are a law-abiding, quintessential set of citizens contributing to the welfare and social

advancement of the country in which we live. Nobody should be allowed to scuttle or

underminethisnationalresponsibility.

ThecurrentMinisterofJusticehastakentheinitiativetobringinthelong-overduereforms

to theMMDA. Itmustbe laudedand supported.Thegovernmentand the cabinet should

standfirm.Theymustnotcompromisejusticeforpoliticalexpediency.Thesereformsmust

enter into lawas soon aspossible. Theywill emancipate theMuslims andprovide equal

accesstojusticeforall.

151

OfContinuingInjusticesandContinuingConversations:Women’sCollectiveSupportAcrossEthnicitiesinBatticaloa

AneesaFirthous,SaralaEmmanuelandPonniArasu

Sharingdarkhumourisakeyelementinworkingincontextswherediscrimination,violation

ofrightsandviolencearecommonplace.Suchhumourhoweverissharedonlyamongtrusted

friends.Towards theendofour interview, for thisarticle,withAneesaFirthous, founder

director of Islamic Women’s Association for Research and Empowerment (IWARE), a

women’sorganisationbased inKattankudy,we—Aneesa,SaralaandPonni—aMuslim

womanandtwonon-Muslimwomenwhowereallfriends,sharedsuchamoment.

TwodaysaftertheEasterbombsAneesatoldusofhervisittoanorganisationinBatticaloa

townwithregardtoadomesticviolencecaseshewasdealingwith.Asshewalkedinoneof

their staffmembers, a Tamilwoman, hurriedly left the building.WhileAneesa had lived

throughit,thetwoofusfeltexhaustion,frustrationandrageatsuchracism.ButI,Ponnisaid

“DidyoutakeabackpackAneesa?”,referringtothebomberswhowalkedintochurcheswith

backpacks.We shared a chuckle andwent on to say how side shoulder bags are better

anyway!

Thismoment tous isdefiningof the trustbetweenus,builtover someyearsofworking

together and more recently from not shying away from connecting with one another,

immediately after the Easter attacks. During a time when the communities of this area

spewedhatredtowardsoneanotheropenlyandconsistently,wecounteredthishatredwith

conversation,sharingofoneanother’spainandtheoccasionaldarkjokes!

Aneesabeganourconversationthatdaywithabeautifulstory.

Lastweek,agroupofmonkscametovisitKattankudyandtheymetherandothersontheir

trip.AmongthemwasthebrotherofVen.AthuraliyeRathanaThera.1Aneesahadrelatedthestory of her friendship with Shantha Nandha and Vijitha Nandha, Bikkunies based in

Panadura,tothisgroup.

“WevisitedduringtheSinhala/TamilNewYearandspenttimewiththechildrenfromRamaKrishnaMissionwhohadcomeforthenewyearfestivaltothetempleinPanadura.ShanthaNandhaandIbecamefastfriends.ShesaidshewantedtovisitmeinKattankudy.IimmediatelywonderedwhereIcouldbookforhertostay.Shemadeitclearhoweverthatshewouldstaywithmeinmyhouse.Thisfilledmewithafeelingofdeepandhonestwarmthandfriendship.Shepassedawayofdenguebeforeshecouldvisitme.VijithaNandhaandIarestillintouch”.

1Ven.AthuraliyeRathanaTheraisaparliamentarian,presidentialadvisorandprominentnationalistmonk.

152

LaterVen.RathanaThera’sbrothertoldherthatbothBikkunieswerehisstudents.

This is a typical story forAneesa.Herwarmth, friendship, and desire to engagewith all

people with integrity comes through in this story. This too is an integral part of the

foundationsofourrelationships.

IWARE:TheBeginningsandHistory

WebegantotracethehistoryofIWARE.Forher[Aneesa]itallbeganwhenshegotherfirst

appointmentasateacherinaschoolintheeconomicallymarginalisedareaofKattankudyin

1997.Sheobservedthattheschoollackedstructureanddisciplineasmanyofitsstudents

werefromhomeswherethemothershadgoneabroad.Marriedwomeninthiscommunity

hadbegungoingabroadtoearnalivingasmigrantdomesticworkersinthe1980s.Thegirl

childrentheyleftbehindathome,hadto,fromaveryyoungage,beresponsiblefor,orhelp

alotwithrunningthehousehold.Theseconditionsalsomeantthattheirnutritionalintake

wasfarfromideal.Asawholetheycamefromconditionsthatwerenotconducivetotheir

education.

Aneesa began to take interest in these children and through them got to know the

community.EventhoughinformallyAneesa’scommunityworkbeganatthistime,thefirst

formalIWAREwomen’sgroupwasformedinacoastalvillageinKattankudyin1999.This

wasagroupofwomenfromthefishercommunitywhowereunderimmensesocio-economic

hardship.Womeninthiscommunitywere,however,didnotgoabroadforwork.

Duringthisperiod,IWARE,withoutanymajorfunding,begantobecomefamiliarwith,and

organisegroupsindifferentpartsoftheKattankudy.Anothersuchgroupwasthewomen

whohadlostmalefamilymembersinthemosquemassacreof1990.2Eventhoughtheywereunderenormouseconomicduress, theyweredeeply focusedonasking for justiceat that

time.

“Weworkedwiththemtohelpthemfeedtheirfamiliesthroughsmallentrepreneurialactivitieswhilealsocontinuingtheirmovementforjustice.Weheldamemorialeveryyearonthedayofthemassacre.Thiswasthefirstofitskindasthemenheldthememorialinthemosqueaspartof theprayers,whichwomencouldnotattend.This thenwasthe firstremembrance forthewomen,bythewomen,”Aneesasaid.

Meanwhileintheschool,shecontinuedtofocusonnutritionandhealth.

IWAREsawnumerouscasesofbrutaldomesticviolence.Theprevailingmatrilinealsystem

in Kattankudy society, just as with many communities in eastern Sri Lanka meant that

2UniversityTeachersforHumanRights(Jaffna),ReportNo.(7),TheClashofIdeologiesandtheContinuingTragedyintheBatticaloaandAmparaiDistricts(8May1991).

153

groomscametothebride’shome.3Thehomethatwasoftengivenbythebride’sfamilyasdowrywastheirplaceofresidence.Evenwomenfromwealthyfamilies,feltdeepresentment

atbeingdisrespected,mistreatedandharmedphysicallyandsexuallyafterhavinggivenso

muchtothegroomasdowry.Allthiswhilelivingintheirownhouse.4

ManyShadesofIslamicEducationinKattankudy

WhiletraveltotheMiddleEasterncountriesforworkfromKattankudyhadalreadybegun

withworkingclasswomenin1980s,anewrouteoftravelbeganinthe1990s.Menwent

with scholarships to be educated in international madrasas (Islamic teaching schools).EarliertherewereonlytwomainmadrasasinKattankudy,oneamongthemwasforwomen.TheyweremostlyfollowingtheversionofIslamiceducationthatemergedfromSouthAsian

Islamicschools.Thesemadrasaswerenotfocusedonacriticallearningandengagementonsocialandreligiousissues.Womenwereparticularlytaughthowtobegoodhousewivesand

bringupchildrenwithinIslamicprinciples.

Thenewmadrasas set upby the foreign-madrasa educatedmenweredifferent. Someoftheseinstitutionsprovidedreligiouseducationalongwithothereducationduetowhichthey

producedanalim(Islamicscholar)whowasalsoalawyeroranengineer.Theyweremoreprofessional institutions and attractive to parents and young people alike. Largely they

exposedtheMuslimsofKattankudytoIslamicthoughtandeducationatthe international

levelandtheyremainedlargely ‘progressive’ intheirthinking.Theyencouragedreligious

educationtoenablethecreationofagoodmoralfibreamongtheyounginsociety.5

However,thereweresplitsamongthesegroupsinKattankudyandthatledtotheformation

ofmoreandmoremadrasasaffiliatedwithdifferentmosques.6However,allofthemmostlytaughttoleranceofdifferencesanddiversity—ofideasandofpractices.Theytaughttheir

ownbeliefsbutdidnotclaimthatthoseweretheONLYwaytolive.7

3SitralegaMaunaguruandSaralaEmmanuel,Penkalinnilam:astudyonwomen'slandrightsinthepost-TsunamiresettlementprocessinBatticaloa(Batticaloa:SuriyaWomen'sDevelopmentCentre2010).

4AbdulRaheemJesmil,KaaththankudiyinVaralaarumPanpaadum;MathathThooimaivaathathinPinpulam(KumaranPublishers,Colombo/Chennai2020).

5ibid.

6ibid.

7InterviewwithAneesaFirthousbySaralaEmmanuelandPonniArasu,IWAREOffice,Kattankudy,(July2021).

154

TheEmergenceofZaharan,HisViewsonWomeninSocietyandConfrontationswith

IWARE

M.C.M.Zaharanemergedfromonesuchinstitutionaround2013/14.Hehadnotcompleted

hiseducationandhadchangedschoolsmanytimes.Hepreyeduponexistingdislikesand

disagreements,alreadyprevalentinKattankudysociety,likethatagainsttheSufimosquesanditsleaders.Hebeganpointingouttheirpracticesandthatofothersas‘mistakes’andthat

theywereall‘strayingawayfromIslam’.Hiscampaigngainedfootingonsocialmedia,and

hegainedfollowersamongtheyouthinthecommunity.8

Interestingly,heprovidedspaceforwomenandwhatheclaimedtobeaspaceforwomen’s

rights.Hemadeprovisionsforwomen’sIslamiceducation,urgedhusbandstopubliclyreturn

the dowry as he declared dowry to be haram (forbidden) and he didn’t encourage facecoveringamonghisfollowers.Hemediatedinfamilydisputesandfound‘solutions’.Allthis

howeverhadoneunderlyingcondition—womenMUSTalwaysbeunderthecontroloftheir

husbands.Zaharan’smeetingsandgatherings invitedwomento joinwiththeirhusbands.

HisspeechescirculatedasCDs.Hedeclaredgold,earpiercingetc.,tobeharam,andwomenpubliclydonatedtheirgoldtothemosque.9

Astheygaveawaythegoldthattheyhaddirectaccessto,thehusbandsreturningtheirdowry

meantthattheygainedcontrolofthefamilyunit.Forexample,thereweremanyrestrictions

onwomengoingtowork.Theycouldn’tworkwheretherewereothermenintheworkplace.

Schoolswerefindingithardtomaintaindisciplineasperruleslaidoutbytheschoolsfor

themselves. For instance, in public speeches studentswere toldnot to standup to greet

teachersandgrowingabeardwasencouraged.Thisimpingedontheautonomyofschoolsto

runtheirinstitutionastheysawfit.

Meanwhile, women, including among those who were married to Zaharan’s followers,

withouttakingdowry,hadtofacefamilydisputes.SomeofthesewomencametoIWAREfor

assistance.Further,atIWAREallwomenwerewelcomedindependentlytospeakwithother

womenabouttheirissues.Zaharan’sresponsetoIWAREwasnothingseriouslynoticeable

8SriLankaParliament,ReportoftheSelectCommitteeofParliamenttolookintoandreporttoParliamentontheTerroristAttacksthattookplaceindifferentplacesinSriLankaon21stApril2019,ParliamentarySeriesNo.183<https://www.parliament.lk/uploads/comreports/sc-april-attacks-report-en.pdf>accessed10/08/2021;TomLasseterandShriNavaratnam,“‘Blacksheep’:TheMastermindofSriLankaEasterSundayBombs”,Reuters,(26April2019)<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-blasts-mastermind-insight-idUSKCN1S21S8>accessed10/08/2021;InternationalCrisisGroup,AfterSriLanka’sEasterBombings:ReducingRisksofFutureViolence,ReportNo.302/Asia,(27September2019);DBSJeyaraj,‘LeaderofNationofTawheedJamaatZahranHashimAlias“AbuUbaida”’,DailyMirror,(27April2019)<https://www.dailymirror.lk/opinion/Leader-of-Nation-of-Tawheed-Jamaat--Zahran-Hashim--alias--%E2%80%98Abu-Ubaida%E2%80%99/172-166048>accessed10/08/2021.

9InterviewwithAneesaFirthous2021.IWAREofficeKattankudy.

155

even though it included many hurtful barbs on Facebook against IWARE and Aneesa

personally,andsometimesherfamily.

Aneesaclearlystatesthat“Ifhewantedtoattackushecouldhavegatheredthemob”.10

Amongother things, let’snot forget,Aneesawasa teacher tomany inKattankudy.Asan

educatorinhercommunity,AneesaviewedZaharanandyoungmenlikehim,tosimplybe

engagedinmakingthemselvesknowninsociety.Shedidn’treadmuchelseintohisactivities

beyond this perception. In 2016 however, IWARE released a statement against outside

interventioninschoolfunctionswhenZahranandhisgroupattackedadanceshowby5thgradegirlstudentsat theschool.His ‘pure Islam’madedancingandsingingharam.Evenstanding up for the national anthem was haram. He publicly criticised the girls in thesecondarylevelfortheirparticipationinsportsandmusicalprogrammes.IWAREopposed

thisandmadeapublicstatementinresponseastheyfeltthatthiswasapropagationofa

versionoffundamentalistIslamthatwasblindtothelaws,traditions,practicesandeveryday

livesinKattankudy.11

ThisledtomanysuchaltercationswithIWAREandwithAneesa’sschool.Oneofthemain

attackersonFacebookwasNiyas,amemberofZaharan’sgroup.DuringthistimeIWAREwas

tryingtoconductresearchonexperiencesandopinionsamongthecommunityonreforming

theMuslimMarriagesandDivorcesAct.12SomeofthoseinvolvedinZaharan’sgroupstartedattackingthisworkonsocialmediasayingthatthiswasagainstIslam.Theyhadevenposted

thequestionnairethatwasusedfortheresearchonline.Theywrotelongarticlescriticising

thereformprocessandindividuallyattackingthestaffatIWARE.13Governmentofficialsatthedivisionallevelfeltpressuredandurgedthattheresearchbestopped.Finally,IWARE

wasonlyabletocontinuetoworkwiththeapprovalofthegovernmentagent.14ThisleadIWAREtomakeaformalpolicecomplaintwhichresultedinacourtcasein2016.Thecase

continuedintheMagistrate’sCourtofBatticaloaforsixmonths,andfinallythejudgewarned

NiyasandtoldhimtosignabondfortwoyearstonotwriteanythingaboutIWAREonsocial

media.15

In September 2017, this same Mohamed Niyas launched another campaign attacking a

woman lawyer from Kattankudy working for Suriya Women’s Development Center, a

10ibid.

11ibid.

12UnpublishedReport,IWARE2016.

13IWARE,'“நியா%ன்(ற்றசச்ாட்,க்கள்ெபாய்யானைவமாத்5ர7ன்89ஷமத்தனமானைவ;மா(ம்”IWAREெபண்கள்அைமப்>ன்ப?ரங்க9ளக்கம்'(YourKattankudy,22July2016)<https://yourkattankudy.com/2016/07/22/iware/>accessed10/08/2021.

14InterviewwithAneesaFirthous2021,IWAREofficeKattankudy.

15MagistrateCourtBatticaloa40719/MISC/2016.

156

feministorganisationinBatticaloa(SaralawasheadingSuriyaduringthistime).Hemade

baselessaccusationswithregardstoherwork-relatedactivities.SheattendedaSouthAsian

trainingprogrammeonwomen’srights.Theaccusationwasthatshewastravellingtosuch

aprogrammewithoutherhusbandandthatthetrainingprogrammeitselfwasimmoral.The

postswererelentlessandwerepostedon11th,12thand16thofSeptember2017.Hispoststhatattackedboththelawyerindividually,andSuriyaWomen’sDevelopmentCenter—the

institution,unleashedmoreabusiveandthreateningcommentstargetingboth.

SuriyamadeaPolicecomplaintattheBatticaloaPolicestationandthecasewastakenupat

theMagistrate’sCourt16,referredtotheCriminalInvestigationDepartment(CID)andaftersomemonthsdischargedbystatingtherewasnospecificevidenceandwitnessestofilea

caseagainstMohamedNiyas.

ThisperiodofattackscoincidedwithanincreaseinZaharan’sdeclarationsofviolenceasthe

meanstotakeforwardhisideas.17Asthesecallsincreased,womenbegantobackawayfromhisgroupandhesurroundedhimselfwiththug-likepersonswhofeltcomfortwithviolence

ratherthananaveragepersonwhomayhaveattendedhismeetingsearlierbutwasn’tas

comfortablewithallthistalkofviolence.In2017,Zaharandisappearedcompletelyfromthe

publicsphereinKattankudy.18

AneesaandhercolleaguesmeanwhilecontinuedtoworkinKattankudyinlinewithawish

theyincludedintheirpublicresponsetotheattacksonthem:

“By the graceofGod,mayourwork continue till theday that the rights andprotections

bestowedbyIslambringsanewdawntothelivesofwomen!InshahAllah”.19

OlderFeministSolidarities,theirReemergenceasaCollectiveSupportStructure

Intheeveningof21stApril2019,Aneesaandseveralotherwomenactivistsmetinthehouseofoneof theTamilactivists inBatticaloa town.Themeetingwascalled to talkabout the

horrorofwhathadhappenedandwhatwecoulddoasaresponse.Thisledtotheissuingof

an importantstatementbythegroupof feminists, includingAneesa.Thiswasoneamong

16Magistrate’sCourtBatticaloaB/1271/17.

17On10thMarch,2017therewasanattackonfollowersoftheSuficlericAbdulRauffZainbymembersoftheNationalTawhidJamaat,whichwasfoundedbyZaharan.InternationalCrisisGroup,AfterSriLanka’sEasterBombings:ReducingRisksofFutureViolence,ReportNo.302/Asia,(27September2019).

18ibid.

19IWARE,'“நியா%ன்(ற்றசச்ாட்,க்கள்ெபாய்யானைவமாத்5ர7ன்89ஷமத்தனமானைவ;மா(ம்”IWAREெபண்கள்அைமப்>ன்ப?ரங்க9ளக்கம்'(YourKattankudy,22July2016)<https://yourkattankudy.com/2016/07/22/iware/>accessed12thAugust2021.

157

veryfewstatementsthatcameoutfromtheEastsignedbythosefrombothcommunitiesand

allfaiths.

Thisstatementnotedthat-

“Whateverourethnicidentitymightbe,wecanallunderstandanddeeplyempathisewiththedevastatedheartsofallthosewhohavelosttheirchildren,brothers,sistersandparents.WeknowthehistoryofthebloodthathasflowedontheEastCoastsincethe1980s.Becauseofthislong-standing experience, we have no reason to invest our faith in anti-terror laws thatpropagateviolenceandrepressionasasolutiontosuchbrutality.Westronglybelievethatthelastingsolutiontosuchhatredareourfundamentalhumanrelationshipsandsupportthathaswithstoodthebrutalitiesofwarfordecades.Itisallourresponsibilitytoworktogethertomakesurethatthereisnoroomforthere-emergenceofethnicconflict,disruptionstoeverydaylifeandlossofpeaceandharmonyintheEast.

Towardsthisend,wewouldliketoplacebeforeyouthefollowingdemands:

-TorememberandexpressourdeepestcondolencestothosewhohavelosttheirlivesorwereinjuredinthebombingsintheSouthandtheEast.

-Tocommittoprovidingunwaveringsupporttothefamiliesofthoseaffectedbythisbrutalviolence.

- To commit to building inter-ethnic relations and to come together to fiercely protect ourlongstandingtraditionofdeephumanrelationshipsacrossdifferentcommunities.”

—WCDM23rdApril201920

Followingthis,aspartofourlong-standingworkamongMuslimandTamilcommunities,we

startedvisitingsomeofthefamilieswholostlovedonesandwhowereinjuredinthebomb

blast.Wetriedtoconnectoverthephoneandsometimesinpersonwithcommunitylevel

Muslimwomen’s rights activistswhowere devastated bywhat had happened andwere

findingithardtoevenspeak.Wetriedtoexplaintochildreninourlives,whathadhappened

andwhy, ingentleways.Wewrote inpublic, individuallyandcollectively.21AsmoreandmoresweepingarrestsweretakingplaceinKattankudywetriedtoreachouttosupportthe

familiesofthosewhowerebeingtaken,asweknewfromexperiencethatthePreventionof

TerrorismAct(PTA)wasadraconianlaw.Weknewthatinpractice,withactionstakenunder

20‘“LetusShareourAnguishandComeTogethertoEnsureStrongRelationshipsamongCommunities”,StatementofWomen’sCoalitionforDisasterManagement–Batticaloa’,(SouthAsiaCitizensWeb21April2019)<http://sacw.net/article14080.html>accessed14/08/2021.

21SaralaEmmanuel,‘ReflectionsintheAftermathoftheEasterSundayAttacks’(November2019)28PravahiniNewsletter,Women'sEducationandResearchCenter;Ellipses,‘WhoistoBlamefortheSerialBlastsinSriLankaandWheretoFromHere’,SriLankaBrief,(2May2019)<https://srilankabrief.org/who-is-to-blame-for-the-serial-blasts-in-sri-lanka-and-where-to-from-here-ellipses/>accessed12/08/2021.

158

this law, torturewas inevitable andenforceddisappearancewaspossible.22 In the initialmonthswecouldn’tgetourselvestotellwomenthatitwasgoingtobeyearsbeforethey

wouldseetheirlovedonesagain.Wewerealsotryingtoholdontoshredsofhopethatthose

takenunderthePTAwillbereleasedsoonerthistime,especiallythoseagainstwhomthere

was little tonoevidenceof any crimeunder thisor anyother law.We tried to convince

ourselvesofthisabouttheyoungboywhowasstillinschoolandwastakenalongwithhis

olderbrother;aboutthemanwhohadboughtamotorcyclefromoneofthekeypersonsin

thebombingsashewasadealerinsecondhandmotorcycles;ofthemanwhosoldabus

tickettooneofthegroupmemberswhodidthebombing;ofthosewhowerecalledfora

shramadanaatthemosqueandendedupinagroupphoto.23

Meanwhile,manyTamilwomeninourgroupalsostruggledwiththeoverwhelmingracist

rhetoricthatwasbeingspewedandwaseasytoholdontowhilegrievingsuchhorrificloss.

Meetings involved navigating complex emotions and parsing through facts and rumours

(rumourswhichbecamethemainvehicleofhatred).Meetingsalsomeanthonestsharingof

moments where Tamil women had given into racism of varying degrees and also other

momentswheretheysupportedaMuslimwomanasshefacedeverydayracisminthepublic

sphere.Wemovedthroughpainofdifficultconversationsthebestwecouldwhilesharing

tears,fearsandalotofsilence.Ourmeetingsbecametheonlyplace,forallwomenacross

ethnicities, to express themselveshonestlywhen they couldn’twithmostpeoplebothof

theirownandtheotherethniccommunity.

Intheinitialmonthswealsotriedtoshareourexperiencesfromthewaryearsofsupporting

somanyTamilwomenwhoselovedonesweretakenunderthePTA.Theseconversations

wereheartbreakingasreallytherewasnogoodnewstoshare.OftenMuslimwomenwould

say, “but our loved ones are completely innocent!Why don’t they finish the investigationsquicklyandreleasethem?”Wecouldn’talwayssaythattheuseofthePTAwasmostlydrivenby‘suspicion’basedonracismandrevengeandhasalwaysbeen.Wedidn’thavetheheartto

divulgethatoften itwasthroughconfessionsundertorturethat thecasesunderthis law

22HumanRightsCommissionofSriLanka,PrisonStudybytheHumanRightsCommissionofSriLanka,(2020);ErmizaTegal,UnderstandingRuleofLaw,HumanSecurityandPreventionofTerrorisminSriLanka,(LawandSocietyTrust,Colombo2021);MarisaDeSilva,PTA:TerrorisingSriLankafor42years:Socio-economicandpsychologicalimpactonfamiliesofPTAdetaineesfollowingtheEasterSundayAttacks,(LawandSocietyTrust,Colombo2020);WATCHDOG,‘PTAdetainees:IgnoredunderYahapalanaya?’,Groundviews,(09May2015)<https://groundviews.org/2015/09/05/pta-detainees-ignored-under-yahapalanaya/>accessed12/08/2021;AmbikaSatkunanathan,‘FalsePromises:TheMythofSecurityandthePreventionofTerrorismAct’,Groundviews,(2021)<https://groundviews.org/2021/07/14/false-promises-the-myth-of-security-and-the-prevention-of-terrorism-act/>accessed13/08/2021;HumanRightsWatch,‘LockedUpWithoutEvidence:AbusesunderSriLanka’sPreventionofTerrorismAct’,HumanRightsWatch,(29January2018)<https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/01/29/locked-without-evidence/abuses-under-sri-lankas-prevention-terrorism-act>accessed12/08/2021.

23Storiesthatweresharedwithuswhensupportingwomenwhowerestrugglingtomanagetheirlivesandnavigatethelegalprocess,aftertheirlovedoneswhohadbeenarrested.

159

were upheld. Or that it had often been used, primarily, to instil collective fear and

punishmentonallwhoheldtheethnicidentitythatwasbeingtargeted.24

Wefocusedonpracticalaspects,suchasprisonvisits,gettingaccesstomedicines,sometimes

evenschoolbooks.Wehelpedwomentoputinordertheirdocumentsandwritedowntheir

ownstoryofthearrestsanditsaftermath.Wedidthisbecauseweknewfromexperience

thatastimewentby,familymembersforgottheimportantdetails.Itwasimportanttowrite

themdown.Wemadesuretheyhadawrittencopyoftheirstories,andwesubmittedacopy

totheHumanRightsCommissionofSriLankaforsafekeeping.

Forsomeofthewomen,itwasthefirsttimetheyhadevenlefttheirhometown,Kattankudy.

They were coming every week to the courts, to the prison and to the Human Rights

Commission.Theyhadtolearnlegallanguagereallyfasttounderstandwhatwashappening

totheirlovedones.Theywerenotallowedintothecourtandoftenjuststoodoutsidethe

gate,waitingfortheprisonbustopasstocatchaglimpseoftheirlovedone.Somewomen

hadtopaylawyersreallyhighrates,andslowlygotintodebtasthemonthspassedby.

Economically and financially, women became dependent on other family members

overnight.Thiswasinthecontextwherefamilymembersdidn’twanttobeintouchorbe

seenwiththosearrested,astherewassomuchfearinthecommunitythattherewillbemore

arrestsonsuspicion.Militarypresencebecametheeverydayrealityinthetown.Intelligence

officersandmilitarypersonswithheavyweaponswouldregularlyvisit thesehousesand

questionthewomenagainandagain.

Onewomansharedwithusabouthowsheaskedthemenwhocametoherhometotakeher

husband: “Where are you takinghim?Whyare you takinghim?”.She told themhewas achronically illman and that they shouldn’t physically assault him toomuch. She herself

wonderedaloudtousaboutwhereshegotthecouragetospeakup,withsomanyarmed,

Sinhalaspeaking,uniformedmeninhersmallhomethatshehadbarelyleftformostofher

life.Weaskedallthosewhomwemetaboutthereceipt—thattheyhadtherighttoaskfor

thereceiptwhichstatedwhowastakingthem.Unlikethewaryears,thistimereceiptshad

beengiven,eventhoughoftenenoughthedateonthereceiptwaslaterthanthedatewhen

themanwastaken.

Asthemonthswentbywomenhadtostartearning,andmanystruggledfortheirfoodand

tosupporttheeducationofthechildren.Oneelderlywomanhadstartedbeggingtosupport

herdaughterandgrandchildren.Somehadtoselltheirassets.Manywerepushedintodaily

paidworkandhome-basedworksuchasmakingfishingnets.Needlesstosay,thepandemic

exacerbatedallofthis,whichrequiresitsownarticleandanalysistofullycapture.

Astrustwasbuiltwithregularmeetings,womensharedexperiencesofsexualharassment

by knownmen, bymen in uniform,menwho called themselves intelligence officers and

unknownvoicesoverthephone.Whatgavethemstrengthandsupportwasthattheycould

24Ref.footnote22.

160

atleastmeetaswomeninasafespace,onceinawhile,suchasintheIWAREoffice.Women

couldtalkaboutthelegalcases,problemsathome,withchildrenandthestigmatheywere

facingwithinthecommunity.Therewasacreationofspacesofsupportoutsideofthestrong

normative family unit forwomen, bywomen. Sometimes these safe spaceswere among

womenwhowerefromdifferentethniccommunities—TamilandMuslim.Eachonegave

courageandstrengthtotheother,aswomen.

Onedaywevisitedahomeofawoman,whowaslivingwithheryoungdaughterandson.

Shewashappytoseeus,andshesaidnoonewouldvisitherortalktoherasthemilitary

wasregularlycomingtoherhouse.Herdaughterwasingrade9andthereweresciencenotes

pastedalloverthewall.Shesoftlysharedwithusaboutherolderdaughter,whowasnow

dead. Shewaskilled in theblast inSainthamaruthu inApril2019.25Hermotherwas tooafraidtoevenwhisperherdaughter’sname.Thisyoungwomanwasmarriedofftoamember

ofthegroupresponsibleforthebombings.Shemayevenhavebeenpossiblyinvolvedinthe

attack.Nevertheless,thefactthatherdeathandthedeathofherlittlechild,couldnoteven

bemournedbyherownmotherwasdeeplysaddeningforus.Shedidn’thaveaphotoofher

daughter,asphotoswereharaminthereligiousgroupshewasaffiliatedto.Shedidhaveonephotoofhergrandchildwhichsheshowedtous.Shecouldn’tperformanyfuneralritesand

never saw the bodies. Many months later she too was arrested and taken away. We

wonderedaboutherotherdaughter—the15-year-oldandhersciencenotesonthewall.Is

shestillabletocontinueherschooling?Howissheandherlittlebrotherdealingwithallthis

loss?

Inourconversations forthisarticle,wenotedthat thesocio-culturalcontexts forwomen

livingintheEast,andparticularlyinKattankudyhavechanged.Eventhoughtherewasstill

bitterdistrustamongtheTamilsandMuslimsintheEast,thecollectiveofwomenactivists

has continued to meet, challenge and support each other. Women across ethnicity are

participating in thevibrantdebates thatare takingplaceon thereformsproposed to the

GeneralMarriage andRegistrationOrdinance and theMuslimMarriage andDivorceAct.

Theselawstouchwomen’sintimatelivesandothersphereswhichareoftenonesofeveryday

struggleforwomen.Smallgroupsofcross-ethnicwomensurvivorshavecometogetherfor

several yearsnow, to remember themassacres inTamil andMuslimcommunities in the

1990s.ThesegroupsarenowgatheringtocollectivelyremembertheEasterbombingsas

well.Theseprocesses,even ifquieter,havebeenmuchmoreconsistent thanmeetingsof

mainstreamsocietyandmalemembersacrossethniccommunities.Thisyear,forinstance,

wasthefirsttimethatmalereligiousleadersfromdifferentfaithsgatheredattheKattankudy

25AlasdairPalandShriNavaratnam,‘Father,twobrothersofsuspectedSriLankabombingsmastermindkilledingunbattle’,Reuters,(28April2019)<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-blasts-bomber-idUSKCN1S405L>accessed14/08/2021;and‘15bodiesincludingchildrenfoundatblastsiteinSainthamaruthu’,AdaDerana,(27April272019)<http://www.adaderana.lk/news/54693/15-bodies-including-children-found-at-blast-site-in-sainthamaruthu>accessed15/08/2021.

161

mosque,fortheremembranceofthemassacrethattookplacetherein1990.Whiletheyhave

justbegun,wehavedonethisatleastforthepast3-5yearsinhomesandsmallpublicspaces.

Towardstheendoftheconversationforthisarticle,SaralaaskedAneesa,“DoyouthinkweshouldorcouldbecomingtogetheraswomenandmoreexplicitlyconnectingandstatingthesimilaritiesinourexperiencesunderthePTA?Thesharedhistoriesofviolenceasadominantmarkerofour identitieswithinourcommunities?The state repression that stigmatisesandbrutalisestheentirecommunityinthenameof ‘punishing’theseviolentgroups?Thestorieshavemuchincommon,no?”

“Yes.Theydo.Idon’tknowifwehavehadsuchconversationsyetSarala.Perhapswemust,”Aneesareplied.

Athoughtfulquietfollowed.Thereisalongwaytogoforjusticeandtosecureadifferent

worldandfutureforourselvesandourchildren.However,women,whooftenbearthebrunt

ofdecisionsandactionsofstateandnon-statehegemons,willkeeptalkingtooneanother

acrossdifferences.Wewillshareourpainandtheoccasionaljoy.Wewillsharethelabourof

thatwhichneedstobedoneimmediatelytofulfilfundamentalneeds,ourownandthatof

ourchildren.Wewillbuildtrustevenduringtimeswhenitisthehardestthingtodo.Wewill

havehardconversationswithvulnerabilityandstrength.Wewillholdeachother’shands

andheartswithallthestrengthwecanmuster.Weknowwewillbecausewealwayshave.

Thisisn’ttheeasypath,butithasbeenoursandwillremainso.

162

“Theydidnothing”:MuslimsandaHostileandViolentState

AmbikaSatkunanathan

“PoliceandHQIcamebuttheydidnothing”.1

“Thearmywaspresentbuttheydidnothing”.

“Theyarrestednoone.”

“ThecurfewisonlyforMuslims.”

“Isawthepolicecreateapathforthemobtoattackthehotel”.

MuslimsintheNorthWesternProvince,14May2019

Ethno-religiousviolenceisnotnewtoSriLanka.ViolenceagainstMuslimsisalsonotnew.

Yet,whentheyahapalanaya(goodgovernance)regimewaselected,therewassomehopethatminoritieswouldnothavetoliveinfearofviolence.Thiswasprovenwrongbyvarious

spouts of violence, which were incited by Sinhala Buddhist nationalist groups. The

government’sfailuretotakepreventiveaction,failuretotakeadequateactionwhileviolence

wasongoingandfailuretotakeactionpost-violencetoholdthoseresponsibleaccountable,

entrenchedimpunityandvalidatedthebeliefthatanti-minoritybigotryandviolencewould

betolerated.

The election of Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who campaigned on a Sinhala Buddhist nationalist

platform, as President in November 2019 created a climate of fear and an environment

conducivetodiscriminationagainstandharassmentofMuslims.

TheContinuumofDiscrimination

Following the end of the armed conflict in 2009, Sri Lanka has experienced increasing

Sinhala-Buddhistmajoritarianism,bothexplicitlyandimplicitlysupportedbythestate.This

coupled with the militarisation of civilian administration in the former conflict-affected

areasandtheencroachmentofthemilitaryintostateactivitiesandcommercialenterprises

in other parts of the country, have undermined democratic institutions and restricted

politicalfreedoms.

In2013,religiousintolerancefuelledbyagroupofmostlymilitantBuddhistsreferringto

themselves as theBoduBala Sena (Buddhist PowerArmy-BBS), theSinhalaRavaya andRavanaBalayawastargetedagainstMuslims.Thesegroupsbasedtheiranti-Muslimrhetoric

1HQIreferstoHeadquartersInspector.

163

onthesupposedlyrapidgrowthofthebirthratesofMuslims.TheBBSbecamevisiblevia

theirprotestagainsttheresultsofthelawentranceexaminationinearlyFebruary2013at

whichthemajorityofapplicantswhobecameeligibletogainentrancetoLawCollegewere

Muslim.Atthetime,thethenSecretaryofDefenceGotabayaRajapaksagaveassurancesto

Muslim theologianswhohadreportedlyexpressed theiralarmat thesituation.However,

despitehisassurances,theoutcomewasthattheLawCollegereducedthecut-offmarkofthe

lawentranceexamination,therebyincreasingtheintaketo551from309.

TheBBSusedsocialmedia,suchasTwitterandFacebook,whichatthetimehadevenfewer

controls than they do now, to spread intolerance and instil a fear psychosis among the

Sinhalapopulation.Inmid-February2013duringthelaunchoftheircampaigntoendthe

processofhalalcertification,whichtheyclaimedwasanexampleofgrowingIslamification,theBBS alleged that theAll Ceylon JamiyyathulUlama (ACJU)was engaged in separatist

campaigningtodividereligiouscommunitiesintheisland.GnansaraThero,theSecretaryof

theBBS,isquotedsaying,“TheBoduBalaSenawillgofromstrengthtostrength;wehave

thesocialcapitaltodothat.Andwhethertheyareinthegovernmentortheopposition,all

thosewhoattacktheSinhaleseandBuddhistswillbegroupedtogetheranddefeated.”The

governmentdidnotcurtailtheactivitiesofBBS.

TheBBSalsocalledforSriLankanlawstobechangedtopermitaSinhalamantowedfive

women to propagate the Sinhala race. The fear psychosis with regard to Muslims

overpowering Sinhalese in numbers, reportedly led to a government communiqué being

issued to government hospitals preventing all forms of consensual irreversible family

planningmethodsfrombeingadministeredunlessitwasdoneformedicalpurposes.Non-

governmentalorganisationsworkingintheareasofcontraception,sexualhealthandfamily

planningreportedbeinginstructedbythegovernmenttoceasetheiroutreachworkinthis

regard.

InthecontextofhistoricalrightsviolationsandorganisedstateviolenceagainstbothTamil

and Muslim communities in Sri Lanka, for which perpetrators have rarely been held

accountable, the yahapalanaya government’s failure to hold those responsible for evenrecentincidentsofanti-Muslimviolence,suchasriotsinDiganaandAluthgama,accountable,

entrenched and normalised impunity. This further encouraged continued harassment,

discrimination,andtheuseofviolenceagainstMuslims,suchasduringtheperiodafterthe

Easterattackson21April2019.2

TheterrorattacksonEasterSundaythattookplaceinsixlocationsinthecountryon21April

2019causedaconsiderableshiftinthesocio-politicalcontext,bothintermsofcivicspace

andtherightsofminorities.Theattackscreatedanatmosphereforthestatetotakeaction

2‘SriLanka:MuslimsFaceThreats,Attacks’,HumanRightsWatch,(July32019)<https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/03/sri-lanka-muslims-face-threats-attacks>accessed23February2021.

164

thatrestrictedcivicspace,suchasdeclaringastateofemergency,andalsoforthestateand

societytoengageinandjustifyanti-Muslimacts.

ThedeclarationofastateofemergencybyPresidentSirisenaon22April20193aftertheEaster attacks and thepromulgation of emergency regulations under thePublic Security

Ordinanceimpactedtherightsofminoritiesadversely.Althoughthedeclarationofastateof

emergency for a short period due to the Easter attacks could be said to be justified, the

promulgation of emergency regulations that clearly and disproportionately impinged on

civicrightssignalledareversiontocreatingaclimateinwhichtheexecutiveoverreachand

curbsoncivicrightswerenormalised.

Theyahapalanayagovernmentnotonlyfailedtobeproactiveinidentifyingandaddressingtherootcausesofanti-minorityrhetoricbutalsothroughitsaction,suchastheniqab4ban,aswellasinactionincounteringanti-minoritysentimentandaction,madediscrimination

againstMuslimstobeperceivedaspubliclyacceptable.Thisconsequentlycreatedasenseof

impunityandemboldenedsectionsofthepublictoopenlyengageinbigotedbehaviour.The

outcomewastheunderminingoftherightsoftheminoritiesandincreasedandvirulentanti-

minorityactionbybothstateandnon-stateactors.

TheElephantintheRoom:TheEverydayManifestationsofBigotry

Anti-Muslimattacksarenotnew,asthepropagationofhateandincitementtoviolence,by

bothstateandnon-stateactors,hasoccurredthroughoutthehistoryofSriLanka.

InSriLankamisinformationanddisinformationwerespreadandevenrepeatedbycertain

religiousleadersandpoliticalactorstoportrayMuslimsasthe‘other’,acommunitythatdoes

notalignitselfwiththerestoftheSriLankanpopulationbutratherpledgesallegiancetothe

globalMuslim community. The notion that theMuslim community behaves and dresses

differentlyandfollowsadifferentsetofrulesandlegalregulationsundertheSharialaw5insteadofconforming to thebeliefsandbehaviouralpractices thataredeemed tobe ‘Sri

Lankan’ by the Sinhalese community has been used to question their patriotism and

connection to the country. This ultimately has the effect of demonising the Muslim

community by insinuating they have ulterior motives and an agenda to ‘takeover’ a

predominantlySinhalesenationbymainstreamingIslamicbeliefsandpracticesviaSharia

law.

Suchpropagandaindicatestheexistenceofdeep-seatedcommunalsentimentandprejudice,

within state structures and society, which remain unacknowledged. Instead, violence is

discussedandunderstoodasanaberrationorastheworkofa‘fewbadapples’.Thefailure

3GazetteExtraordinaryGazetteNo.2120/5of22April2019.

4Agarbworntocoverthewholeface,withorwithouttheeyesconcealed,inpublicspaces.

5Islamiclaw/legalsystem.

165

toaccept thedeep-rootedsystemicnatureof anti-minority sentimenthas resulted in the

failuretodealwithitinameaningfulway.Thefailuretodealwithitindicatestothepublic

thatthepoliticalleadershipwilltoleratebigotryandevenviolenceagainstminorities.

The deep-seated social prejudice is illustrated by the reactions of various social groups

following the Easter attacks, whereby the acts of individuals were posited as a crime

committedbytheMuslimcommunity,forwhichtherewasbacklashagainstthecommunity.

ExamplesincludelawyersrefusingtorepresentpersonswhowerearrestedaftertheEaster

attacksastheywerenotdeemeddeservingoflegalrepresentation.

InsomeBarslawyersalsoattemptedtointimidateotherlawyersappearingfordetaineesin

an attempt to prevent them from representing detainees, such as at theMarawila Bar.6AlthoughtheHumanRightsCommissionofSriLanka(HRCSL)wrotetotheBarAssociation

ofSriLanka(BASL)basedoncredibleandverifiedreportsithadreceivedfromthefamilies

ofdetaineesandlawyerswhoappearedforthedetainees,theBASLrespondedthatthere

havebeen‘noformalresolutionsbyanyidentifiedregionalbranchresolvingtorefrainfrom

representingsuspectsarrestedinrelationtotheterrorattackson21stApril’7anddidnotinitiate a formal inquiry into the matter. The BASL’s response illustrates a lack of

understandingofanti-Muslimsentimentsprevailingatthetime,aswellasofthemannerin

whichinformalsocialpracticesimpactlegalrightsandtheabilityofdetaineestoenjoytheir

dueprocessrights,especiallytoafairtrial.

Seniorstateofficialspostedanti-MuslimmessagesontheirFacebookaccountswhileothers

circulatedWhatsAppmessages callinguponpeople to boycottMuslimbusinesses.On24

April2019,thePuttalamAdditionalDivisionalSecretary(ADS),whosupposedlyhadalways

spokenoftheneedtobantheabaya8andhadahabitofwritingracistpostsonFacebook,saidthatif400of‘theirpeople’diedthen1000Muslimsshouldbekilled.Whenpersonswho

hold positions of power and responsibility inmany state andprivate institutions openly

expressandpracticebigotry,bigotrywillbetaught,eitherintentionally,orthroughspeech

andactiontochildreninthesefamiliesandthroughthemspreadtoothersocialspaces.

Privatecommercialentities,suchasbanks,alsoengagedindiscriminatoryaction,suchas

refusingtoallowwomenwearinganabayaorhijab(headcovering)toentertheirpremises,promptingtheHRCSLtowritetotheFederationofChambersofCommerceandIndustry9reiteratingtheneedtoensurenon-discrimination.

6‘LetterfromtheChairpersonoftheHumanRightsCommissionofSriLanka,Dr.DeepikaUdagama,tothePresidentoftheBarAssociationofSriLankaMr.KalingaIndatissa(PC),’HumanRightsCommissionofSriLanka,(25July2019)<http://www.hrcsl.lk/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/HRCSL-Response-to-Bar-Association-of-Sri-Lanka.pdf>onfilewithauthor.

7ibid.

8Arobethatcoversthewoman’sentirebody.

9‘LetterfromtheChairpersonoftheHumanRightsCommissionofSriLanka,Dr.DeepikaUdagama,toTheFederationofChambersofCommerceandlndustryofSriLanka,TheCeylonChamberofCommerce,andThe

166

Anti-Muslim sentiment regarding the success ofMuslims in entrepreneurship is also not

new. It has existed fordecades. I recall complaintsofMuslims inKurunegala,more than

fifteenyears ago, that their successwas resentedby Sinhalese, as a result ofwhich they

experienced indirect forms of discrimination. For instance, they found it difficult to rent

premisesfortheirbusinesses.Suchindirectactionevolvedintoopenbigotryovernightafter

theEasterattacksasdescribedbymanybusinessmenImetduringmyvisitstotheNorth

Western Province in themonths following the anti-Muslim violence inMay 2019. These

businesspeople had to close their businesses due to various forms of discrimination,

harassmentandintimidation.

InWennapuwatheheadofthetraders’association,whowasalsotheheadofthePradeshiya

Sabha (local government authority) and amember of the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna

(SLPP)instructedMuslimshopowners—14shopsinall—nottoopentheirshopsandtold

them to leave in threemonths. Building ownerswere instructednot to rent toMuslims,

although someMuslims had shops for around forty years in the locality. Two important

elementsshouldbenoted;theinvolvementofpoliticiansinbusinessaftertheyareelected

topublic office and the influence theyexert on thebusiness community as a result of it.

Secondly,theethno-nationalpoliticsoftheSLPPthatisfoundedonanti-minoritysentiment

andbigotrywhichpermeatesallspheresoflife.

Thefearthat‘somethingwouldhappen’ifMuslimscontinuedtoengageinbusinessinthe

locality was created with the aim of preventing the public from frequenting Muslim

businesses.ThiswasvalidatedbytheWennapuwapolicewhoinformedtradersthatshops

had to be checked before re-opening, and after checking, although nothing untoward or

illegalwasfound,theyweretoldtheycouldnotopentheshopsyetasthe‘timewasnotright’.

Businesspeoplesaidtheyhadnotbeenabletoconducttheirbusinessproperlysince21April

2019andhadtograduallyopentheirshopsbynegotiatingwiththetraders’association.For

instance,atfirst,theywereallowedtoopenforhalfadayonaSaturday.

Certain businesspeople said they were not allowed to become members of traders’

associations,suchasinKatuneriya.ThoseinWennapuwahadsimilarexperiencesandsaid

whilethetraders’associationhadnoqualmsaskingthemfordonationsforcommoncauses,

theywere not allowed to becomemembers and hence felt ‘Sinhala Traders Association’

would be amore appropriate term for the association. InMadampe, therewas a public

campaignagainstMuslimshops,wherebypeoplewerethreatenednottobuyfromMuslim

shopsandweretoldthattheywouldbemonitoredtoensuretheyadheredtotheboycott.

NationalChamberofCommerce,’HumanRightsCommissionofSriLanka,(21May2019)<https://www.hrcsl.lk/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/HRCSL-writes-to-Chambers-of-Commerce.pdf>onfilewithauthor.

167

TheViolentStateanditsFootSoldiers:Anti-MuslimViolenceon13May2019

“TheyknewtheMuslimhouses”

ThreeweeksaftertheEasterattacks,anti-Muslimriotsoccurredon13May2019incertain

Muslim-majority towns,mainly in theNorthWestern Province and in some areas in the

WesternProvince.Thisresultedindamagetopropertyandthedeathofanindividual,Fouzul

Ameer,acarpenter,whowashackedtodeathathisdoorstep.10

Personsfromareas,suchasKottaramullaiandThummodaraintheNorthWesternProvince,

saidtheyhadheardofrumoursofapossibleattackthepreviousnightandhadcontactedthe

police and state authorities numerous times requesting protection, which never

materialised.11 An interviewee showed aWhatsAppmessagehehad receivedon12MayfromaSinhalafriendtellinghimtotakecarebecausetheywereexpectingtroubleon13May.

Therewere thosewho said thedayprior to the riot they sawSinhalese youngmen in a

celebratorymoodintheirvillageshouting,‘apiogolantahondatadei’,i.e.theyweregoingto‘giveittothem’,whichisunderstoodincolloquialtermstomeanhitting/assaulting.

Animportantpointhastobemaderegardingreportsofswordsorknivesfoundinmosques

andusedas justification to arrestpersons. People said theyhadknives to sacrifice cows

duringHaj12,andswordsforprotectionduetotheincreasinginsecurityandfearofviolenceagainstMuslims.SincetheEasterattacks,duetoconcernsthiswasbeingusedasanexcuse

tomakearbitraryarrestsofMuslims,manyMuslimsdepositedtheirknivesandswordsat

thelocalmosqueforsafekeepingontheassumptionitwouldnotbethoughtofasuntoward

ifitwaskeptatthemosque.

Maikulam

On14Maywhilethecurfewwasstillinplace,IsetouttotheNorthWesternProvince.We

firstwenttoMoorStreetJummahmosqueinMaikulam,oneofthemanymosquesthatwere

attackedintheProvince.Thosecleaningthedebrisatthemosquestatedthattheprevious

night large crowds had gathered at the local pansala (temple) at Maikulam. Given theprevailing anti-Muslim sentiment and tensions at the time,Muslims feared the gathering

couldturntoviolenceagainstthelocalMuslims.Hence,theyhadcalled119buttheircallwas

notanswered.Thereafter,theycalledtheOfficer-In-Chargeofthelocalpolicestationwho

saidhewould‘lookintoit’.Theysawapolicejeepdrivebythepansalabutitdidnotstop

10‘Policestoodbywhilemobsrampaged:HRCSL’,SundayObserver,(26May262019)<http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2019/05/26/news/police-stood-while-mobs-rampaged-hrcsl>accessed28May2021.

11Randev,‘HRCSLprovidesguidelinestoactingIGP’,TheMorning,(28May2019)<https://www.themorning.lk/hrcsl-provides-guidelines-to-acting-igp/>accessed1June2021.

12HajisthereligiouspilgrimageperformedbyMuslimseveryyear.Duringthisperiod,Muslimsalsosacrificeananimalaspartoftheirrites.

168

andaskwhythepeopleweregatheredatthepansaladuringcurfew.Aroundtwentyminutespastmidnight,sixteenvehiclesleftthepansala.

Thefollowingday(Sunday)themosqueandtheshopnexttoitwereattacked.Ataround

12.45 pm around 100 persons were seen roaming around the area attacking Muslim

properties.Aroundfifteenpersonscametothemosqueandfirstthrewstonesatthemosque.

The attackers then entered the premises and threw flower pots through windows. The

upstairswindowsandtwoCCTVcameraswerealsodamaged.TheMuslimvillagersphoned

119whentheyheardabouttheincident,butthepolicecameonlytwentyminutesafterthe

incident.TheincidentwasrecordedontheCCTVcamerasthatescapeddamage.

Thepeoplebelievethosewhoattackedthemosqueandshoparefromthelocalityandnot

personsfromanotherlocality.Theyfeltthatsincethegroupwasmovingfromlocationto

location carrying out attacks the police could have stopped them. The shop next to the

mosquewasnotinsuredandtheownersaiditwouldcosthimRs.150000torepairandre-

stock.Despitethedamage,heartbreakingly,peoplerepeatedlysaidtheyweregladnoone

washurt.

Kottaramulla

Many fromKottaramullasaid theybelievedtheviolencewasperpetratedbypeople from

outsidewhowereguidedbylocalSinhalese.Around5.30/5.45pm150menonmotorbikes,

withtwopersonsoneachbikewithswordstuckedintotheirtrouserswereseenonthemain

road. People said thepolice and the armywerepresent along their route and the group

passed them on theirway to Kottaramulla. The first shop in Kottaramullawas attacked

around 6.30 pmwhile the army and police were present in the area. The shop owners

reportedlyapproachedthepoliceandarmyandpleadedforhelpbutwerechasedaway.At

thesametime,thepolicetooknoactiontopreventtheattacksorapprehendtheattackers;

theyaresaidtohaveonlytoldthemenwhowereattackingtoleavesaying,‘yandamalli’(gobrother).

Thepeople inPahalaKottaramulla toosaidtheyhadan indicationof impendingviolence

whenon13May,inNattandiya,around50personsshoutedatMuslimstoclosetheirshops

around4.15pm.Atthetimetherewereonlytwopolicemenintheareaandawhilelatertwo

morearrivedwithguns.However, insteadof telling themen intimidating theMuslims to

leavethearea,thepoliceinstructedtheMuslimstoleave.Thepeopleoftheareabelievethe

samepeoplecarriedouttheattacksinThummodara.

AccordingtopeopleinIhalaKottaramulla,themenonbicyclesfirstwenttoMorokaleand

lefttheirbikesatthelocalpansalaandtravelledonfoottotheMuslimhouses.Themenweresaid to have had petrol and petrol bombs and knew which houses were inhabited by

Muslims.OnMorokaleroadpeoplesaidtheyrequestedthepoliceandarmytoallowthemto

douse the fires in many houses but were not allowed to do so. When narrating with

emotionalanguish the lossofpersonaldocumentation in the fires,all thosewithwhomI

169

spoke were particularly upset about children’s medical documents and educational

certificatesbeingdestroyed.

WedroveintoFouzulAmeer’shousejustasthemagistratewasleaving.Acommunityleader

metusathishouse,whichwasclosetoAmeer’shouseandhadalsobeenattackedbuthad

notsustainedmuchdamage.Thereweremanypeoplemillingabouttheareawhogathered

aroundtodescribetheirexperiencesofhidingtoescapetheviolencethepreviousnight.

WewerethereaftertakentoAmeer’shouse;therewasapoolofdriedbloodatthegatewhere

hehadbeenattackedandthroughthegatewecouldseetheeffortsofhisbeautifulcarpentry

work,whichwasintheworkroomattachedtothehouse.

Ameerandhisfamilyhadbeenhidingbehindthehouseofthecommunityleader.Whenthey

thoughttheattackershadleft,Ameerhadlefthisplaceofhiding,walkedtohishouseand

calledouttohiswife.Atthatpointhewashackedtodeathathisowngate.AlthoughAmeer’s

vehiclewassetonfire,thecommunityleaderhaddousedthefireanddrivenhimtohospital

inthevehicle.Ontheway,thevehiclehadcaughtfireagain,buthedroveitwithoutdousing

thefireallthewaytoMarawilaashehadbeendesperatetosaveAmeer’slife.

Thummodara

TheviolenceinThummodaraisofapatternsimilartotheviolenceinKottaramulla.Locals

saidaround300personswearinghelmetsattackedhomesandthemosqueforoneandahalf

hours.InThummodaratootherewasafeelingtheSinhalesedidnotprotectthevillagebut

insteadeitherhelpedidentifyMuslimhousesorparticipatedintheviolence.

OnefamilysaidtheyhidinthehouseofaSinhalesewhosesontheyfeltparticipatedinthe

violence.TheMuslimwomansaidthatwhenshecameoutoftheroominwhichtheywere

hiding,shesawthewifeoftheSinhalesefamilyphoninghersonandpleadingwithhimto

returnand‘notgetinvolved’.Theyheardthesongoingoutofthehouseandreturningseveral

timesandreassuringthemotherhewasnearby.Themothercontinuedcryingandphoning

her son and pleading with him to return. The father stood outside and shouted to the

attackersnottoattackthehousesbecausetheybelongedtoSinhalese.

Anotherresidentdescribedhisfamily’sexperienceasfollows.Thegatesoftheirhouseswere

closed.Around7pmtheyheardloudnoisesandrealiseditwaspersonsbreakingthegate.

Theeightmembersofhisfamilyhidinanotherhousebuthereturnedtothehousetocheck

whatwashappening.Whilehidinginthegardenhesawtheattackersbreakingthefrontdoor

afterswitchingthelightsoninthehouse.Hesawaroundfifteenmenbreakingthingsinthe

houseastheyswitchedthelightson.Themenwereinsidethehousefortwenty-fiveminutes.

Whenhetriedtorunbacktothehousewherehiswifeandchildrenwerehiding,hewasseen

bythreemen,oneofwhomchasedhimwithasword.Hejumpedoverthewallandmanaged

toescape.Hethensawthemlightthehouseonfireandleave.Hesaidthemob,inadditionto

having petrol, also had swords and knives. He said he saw no police or army. The navy

arrivedaftertheviolenceendedaround8pmandleftintheeveningon17May2019.

170

AnothermanwhohadarrivedhomefromColomboonthedayoftheriotsaidtheysenthis

mother to his elder brother’s house because he heardpeoplewere coming to attack the

village.He heard a commotion and came out of the house and sawpeople attacking the

mosque. Themen hadweapons. Hewent to the rear of the housewhen themob began

attackinghishousebuteightmenwhoworehelmetscameintothekitchenandfourpersons

carriedhimoutsidetotheroadandhithimwithapole.Hewasdealtaroundfiveorsixblows

onhishead,backandlegs.Whenhepushedthemandran,theygavechaseandhithim,but

hepushedthemagainandmanagedtoescape.Hehidintheforestandreturnedonlywhen

themobhadleft.

ManyMuslims,suchasamanwhowasinthearmyandwhosewifelivedalonewiththeir

child,saidtheynolongerhavefaithintheirSinhaleseneighbours.Themansaidthatpriorto

the riot hiswife lived alonewhile hewas away, although his housewas in themidst of

Sinhalesehousesinthevillage,becausetheyfeltsecure.However,sincetheEasterattacks

the Sinhalese stopped speaking with them as they think all Muslims are ‘ISIS’.13 He feltperhapshishousewasnotattackedbecauseheisinthemilitary.

Therewasdeepdisappointmentandangerthatlocalinter-faitheffortshadfailedbecause

themosquetrusteeshadreportedlyaskedtheBuddhistmonktoprotectthevillagewhen

theyhadheardofviolence inotherareas.Although,at the time,hehadassured themhe

wouldworktopreventviolence,theyfelthedidnothing.

NiqabBan:theGatewaytoDiscrimination

EmergencyRegulation32Abanned‘anygarment,clothingorsuchothermaterialconcealing

thefullfacewhichwillinanymannercauseanyhindrancetotheidentificationofaperson’

frombeingworninapublicplace.SincetheRegulationmeantthatMuslimwomencouldnot

weartheniqab14,theresultoftheRegulationwastocurbtherightofMuslimwomensincethey are the soledemographic group topractice face-covering inpublic at all times as a

matterofchoice.

Variousfactionsofthemajorityethniccommunityarguedthatsuchabanwasnecessaryin

lightofthestateofemergency,despitethecounterargumentthatnoneofthepeoplewho

were involved in theEasterattackshadbeenwearinganiqab oreven thehijab.Asanti-Muslimsentiment, fannedbymainstreamand socialmedia, increasedwithin society, the

RegulationonlyservedtoexacerbatetheharassmentfacedbyMuslimwomenwearingthe

13IslamicStateofIraqandSyria(ISIS)

14HillaryMargolis,‘SriLanka’sFace-CoveringBanaWrongheadedResponsetoEasterBombings’,HumanRightsWatch,(2May2019)<https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/05/02/sri-lankas-face-covering-ban-wrongheaded-response-easter-bombings>accessed20May2021.

171

hijabwithoftennodistinctionbeingmadebetweentheniqabandthehijabbycitizensorevenstateofficials.

Thisactedasagatewaytodiscrimination,harassmentandintimidationofwomenwearing

the hijab or abaya. For instance, on 3 May 2019, the Karuwalagaswewa AdditionalGovernmentAgent (AGA) called ameeting at lunchtime to announce the issuance of the

circularandsaidhewashappyithadbeenissued.Indicatingheknewwhathewassaying

wasunacceptable,heaskedeveryonetoplacetheirphonesonhistablesotheywouldnotbe

able to recordwhathewas saying.At themeeting, theSinhala staff reportedly said they

shouldthankZahran15sincetheyhadachievedthis‘victory’becauseofhim.Atthesametime,thePradeshiyaSabhaChairmanwhowasalsoinvitedtospeaksaidKaruwalagaswewawas

sacredBuddhistgroundandpeoplelivingthereshouldadheretoSriLankanculture.

As a result of the Regulation, Muslim women became the targets of gender specific

harassmentanddiscriminationinpublicandsemi-privatespaces.Forinstance,womenwho

worethehijab,i.e.,onlycoveringtheirheads,wererefusedentryoraskedtoremovetheirhijabandevenshowthesecurityattheentrancethattherewasnothinghiddenundertheirhijab at public as well as private establishments. In Karuwaralagaswewa only womenwearingabayaswerebodycheckedbycivilsecurityofficers.

Therewerenumerouscomplaintsofhospitalsrefusing to treatwomenandturningthem

awayiftheyworeahijaborabaya.WomensaidtheywereinsultedandforcedtoremovetheirheadscarvesattheWanathuvilpolicecheckpoint.TheMarawilahospitalsupposedly

refused to treat women who wore abayas. The same is reported to have happened inMadampewherewomenweretoldnottowearanabaya,orweretoldtowearcolouredandnotblackabayas.SenanayakehospitalinMadamperefusedtovaccinatechildrenifwomendidnotwearcolouredabayas.AtthePuttalamhospitalthesupportstaffwassaidtohavereferredtoMuslimbabiesas‘ISIS’.

Womenreportedthattheyweresubjectedtodiscriminatorytreatmentevenbycolleagues,

neighbours,andacquaintances,who insistedtheyremovethehijabandabaya.16 Inmanyplaces in the North Western Province, such as Kalptitiya, Puttalam, Mundal,

Karuwalagaswewa,district anddivisional secretariats, officialsusedderogatory language

and treatedwomendisrespectfully.Onewoman said, “they can’t seem to stand thehead

cover”whennarratinganincidentofastateofficialtellingMuslimwomenthatiftheycame

toworkinabayashewouldcomedressedinonlyhisunderwear.AnotherwomansaidwhenshewenttotheKalpitiyaDivisionalSecretariatofficeandaskedtheDivisionalSecretary(DS)

15ZahranHashimisreportedlythemastermindofthesuicidebombersoftheEasterSundayattacks.

16AmraIsmail,‘HarassedMuslimwomencomplaintoHRC’,DailyMirror,(14May2019)<https://www.dailymirror.lk/Front-Page/Harassed-Muslim-women-complain-to-HRC/238-167044>accessed21May2021.

172

foraserviceletterforaninterviewforteachersshehadtoattendthefollowingSaturdaythe

DSrefusedtogivetheletterduetothefactshewaswearinganabaya.

StaffofthePuttalamDSofficepostedoffensive,anti-MuslimpostsonFacebook.Althoughthe

District Secretary/GA reportedly tried to prevent such behaviour it was said that the

divisionalsecretariesdidnotabidebyhisinstructions.Manywomenfearedtheywouldbe

attackedforwearingthehijaborabayaandwereemotionallydistressedthatpersonstheyknew and had worked with for years treated them in a discriminatory and demeaning

mannerovernight.

At ameeting I hadwith around fortywomen from fiveDS offices in theNorthWestern

Province, they detailed many instances of discrimination, harassment, use of abusive

language by senior officers and beingmarginalised by colleagueswithwhom they have

workedformanyyears.TheystatedthattheyweretoldtowearasareeandtheotherstaffprotestedthattheywouldcometoworkdressedinskirtandblouseifMuslimwomenwore

abayas.On18May2019thePuttalamDSofficehadannouncedviathepublicaddresssystemthat all staffhad towear sarees. Sinhala staff also convenedpocketmeetingsand incitedotherstaffagainstMuslimwomenwearingtheabaya.InKalpitiya,theAdditionalDivisionalSecretary(ADS)summonedeveryonetoameeting,instructedthemtowearsareeandsaidthathe‘hasthepeninhishand’andhencecoulddoanything(totheirjob).

The harassment and fear of being arrested forwearinghijab resulted inMuslimwomenrefrainingfromleavingtheirhomes,whichviolatedtheirfreedomofmovement,madethem

prisoners in their homes, and dependent on their male relatives for all their needs.17Although the ban was lifted after four months when the state of emergency was lifted,

scrutiny and harassment of Muslimwomenwho resumedwearing the niqab continued,indicatingdeeplyingrainedsocietalprejudicesthatwereopenlyexpressedwhenpeoplefelt

thelawvalidatedtheirprejudicialactions.18

17“OnMay15,17-year-oldZavahirRimashawenttohaveherphotographtakenforhernationalidentitycard.Shewaswearingahijab,whichcoveredherhair.ZavahirRimashawaseight-monthspregnantwithherfirstchild,andwhileshewasatthestudioshewasreportedlyovercomebyamomentofnausea.Whenshecoveredherfacewithherhandkerchief,anothercustomercomplainedthatshehadcoveredherface,andthencalledthepolice.ShewasarrestedundertheEmergencyRegulationsandheldincustodyforoverthreeweeksuntilJune7,whenshewasgrantedbail.”‘SriLanka:MuslimsFaceThreats,Attacks’,HumanRightsWatch,(3July2019)<https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/03/sri-lanka-muslims-face-threats-attacks>accessed21May2021.

18‘LocalsconfrontaMuslimwomanwearingaBurqa(video)’,NewsHub,(21September2019)<https://newshub.lk/en/2019/09/21/locals-confront-a-muslim-couple-wearing-a-burqa-video/>accessed21May2021;‘“WhyAreYouCoveringYourFace?”|MuslimWomanInNiqabConfrontedByExtremistInSriLanka’,DOAMuslims,UploadedonFebruary62020,YouTube,3:15min<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MJJtegEwfzg>accessed21May2021.

173

EnablingBigotryandDiscrimination:IndividualandInstitutionalComplicity

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, bigotry, discrimination and violence against

minoritiesarenotnewinSriLankaandnationalsecurityhasbeenhistoricallyusedtojustify

suchdiscriminationandviolence,particularlyviaemergencyregulationsandthePrevention

ofTerrorismAct(PTA).Thejudiciarytoohasmostoftendeferredtotheexecutiveincases

involvingnationalsecurity.Theresponse,or lackof it,ofstate institutionsandthepublic

followingtheEasterattacksisacontinuationofthispattern.AnexampleistheHumanRights

Commission’sacceptanceofEmergencyRegulation32Abanningtheburqa,whichactedasagatewaytodiscriminationagainstandharassmentofMuslimwomen.

Thefailureofthestatetotakeactionfollowingtheviolenceof13May2019toholdthose

accountableisanotherillustrationofstateentitiesfailingtoprotecttherightsofMuslims.

Althoughmorethan70persons19werearrestedfortheviolence,therewereallegationsthatmanywhowereresponsible,especiallythosefromwithinthecommunitywhoparticipated

intheviolenceinKottaramullaiandThummodara,werenotarrested.Iwitnessedthisfirst

handwhenaseniorpoliceofficerImetduringvisitstotheNorthWesternProvincetoldme

thattheywerewaitingforthesituationto‘calmdown’beforetheymadearrests.Policeare

reportedtohavesaidtherewouldbereprisalsandattacksagainonMuslimvillagersifthey

arrestedpersonsinvolvedintheviolence.

ThosewhowerearrestedwerenotdetainedundertheICCPRActforincitementtoviolence,

whichwouldhavepreventedthemfrombeinggrantedbailintheMagistrateCourt,butunder

thePenalCodeandweregrantedbailwithinafewweeksofarrest.Whilebailshouldbethe

norm and not the exception, this example is being used to illustrate that the ethnic and

religious identitiesofpersonsseemtobeakeydeterminantofwhothestatearrestsand

underwhichlawitdetainsthem.Thisleadstodiscriminatoryandarbitraryoutcomes.For

example,aseventeen-year-oldpregnantMuslimwomanwearingahijabwasarrested forallegedly covering her face when she covered her mouth with a handkerchief while

experiencingamomentofnausea,andwasnotgivenbailfornearlytwomonths.

Todate,thereisnoknowncaseofprosecutionofperpetratorsoftheMay2019anti-Muslim

violence.Theaforementioned inactionandactionofvariousstateentitiesraisequestions

abouttheirimpartialityandprimafaciepointtopossibleanti-Muslimprejudicesembeddedwithintheseinstitutions.Suchstateinactionhascreatedasenseofimpunityamongstthe

publicand,thereby,emboldenedpeopletoengageinanti-Muslimacts.

19‘SriLankaextendsnationwidecurfewafteranti-Muslimriots’,BBCAsia,(15May,2019)<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48269240>accessed21May2021.

174

Conclusion

“Wehavetolookafterourownsafety—towhomdowetell?”

ManyMuslimssaidtheyfeelabandonedbythestate,whichtheyviewasanaggressorand

possibleviolatoroftheirrightsandnotasaprotectoroftheirrights.This,alongwiththe

narratives of many Muslims in this chapter, also illustrate there is increasingly default

mutualmistrustbetweennotonlyMuslimsandthestatebutalsoSinhaleseandMuslims,

whichhasbeenexacerbatedbytheabuseofpoliticalpowerandlackofrespectfortherule

oflaw,whichinturnhaveledtotheerosionofpoliticaltrust.

Initsrhetoric,policyandaction,thegovernmentisgivingimportancetoreligiousideology

inmappingpathwaystoradicalisationanddevisingstrategiestopreventandcounter,what

itterms‘violentextremism’.Yet,thisislikelytohavelimitedsuccessbecauseitisbeingdone

attheexpenseofaddressingtherootcausesthatcoulddrivepersonstoholdextremistviews.

Itshouldbenotedthatresearchhasshownthereisalackofempiricaldatatosupportthe

assumptionthatreligiousideologyleadstoterrorism.Instead,studiesrevealthatexperience

orperceptionofabuseandviolationsbygovernmentauthoritiesaredeterminingfactorsthat

contributetoalevelofvulnerability,toviolentextremism,orresiliencethereto.

175

LivingRealitiesofSriLankanMuslimWomen

ToCoverorNot?TheGenderedIslamophobiaintheAftermathof21/04

MuqaddasaWahid

Context

Itwasnearlyadecadesincethelastbombwentoff,nearlyadecadesincethecountrywas

declaredfreefromthescourgeofterrorism.WhentheEasterSundayattacksoccurred,ithad

beenadecadesincethelastactofterrorismhappened.Therefore,itwasnosurprisethatthe

entirecountrywasinshockwhenithappened.The21stofApril2019wasnotonlyafestiveSunday,butitwasalsoaweekaftertheSinhalaandTamilNewYear.Thismeantitwasthe

last day of holidays for most of the school-going children. While most Christians and

Catholicswenttochurchestopray,manyothersdecidedtospendtheirSundaysattheEaster

buffetsathotels.

TheseriesofbombblaststhatwentoffinvariouschurchesacrossSriLankaandhigh-end

hotelsintheheartofColomboclaimedscoresoflivesandinjuredmany.Itwaslateevening

when the identity of the perpetrators was revealed, but most Sri Lankans had already

suspectedthattheperpetratorbelongedtotheMuslimcommunityandthehatespeechon

socialmediaagainstMuslimshadalreadybegunevenbeforetherevelationofthename.

While Islamophobiawasa simmering issue inSriLankawhichhashadahistoryofanti-

Muslimviolence,themostrecentatthetimebeingthe2018anti-MuslimriotsintheAmpara

andKandydistricts,itwasnotuntiltheEasterSundayattacksthattherewasanation-wide

outpourofanti-Muslimsentiments.

TheBanonFaceCovering

On 29 April 2019, under Regulation 32A of Gazette Extraordinary No. 2121/1, the

governmentbannedwearinganygarmentthatconcealedthefullface,includingtheears,in

anypublicplace.1

“32A. (1) (a)Noperson shallwear inanypublicplaceanygarment, clothingor suchothermaterial concealing the full face which will in any manner cause any hindrance to theidentificationofaperson.

1‘CoveringfacebannedbyPresidentSirisena’,ColomboGazette,(28April2019)<https://colombogazette.com/2019/04/28/covering-face-banned-by-president-sirisena/>accessed9September2021.

176

(b)Forthepurposeofthisparagraph-“publicplace”includesanypublicroad,anybuilding,anyenclosedoropenarea,anyvehicleoranyothermodeoftransportation;“fullface”meansthewholefaceofapersonincludingtheears;“publicroad”includesanyroadwayoverapublicbridge,anypavement,drain,embankmentorditchbelongingorappertainingtoapublicroad.”(GazetteExtraordinary2121/1)

Whilethebanseemedtonotspecificallymentiontheniqab(faceveilleavingeyesuncovered)orburqa(alonggarmentcoveringfromheadtofeet,includingthefaceandameshovertheeyes),itdidmeanthatMuslimwomenwhowerepracticingthefaceveilhadtostopwearing

it.Ifmymemoryservesmeright,themaleMuslimreligiousleadersappearedontelevision

askingMuslimwomentonotwearthefaceveilandwearcolouredabayas(longloosedressMuslimwomenwear,usuallyinblack)for‘securityreasons’.

However, the suggestion about coloured abayas has been discussed in the MuslimcommunityyearspriortotheEasterSundayattacks.

In an article, weeks after the attacks, Latheef Farook wrote about how the non-Muslim

communityperceivedtheblackabayaasathreat.2Anexcerpt:

‘As early as September 2006 during a meeting organized by Bakeer Markar Centre forCommunalHarmony,AluthgamaDistrictMedicalOfficerDr.KanchanaMunasinghetoldmethatthegrowingtrendofMuslimwomenwearingblackabayawascausingconcernamongnon-Muslimswhofeelisolated.ShesaidthatthisblackclothisnotsuitabletotropicalclimateslikeSriLankaasitcouldcauseskindiseases.

SeveralleadingSinhaleseintellectualswhoareinterestedincommunalharmonytoldmethattheblackabayaandfacecovercausefrictionbetweencommunitiesandkindlygetyourpeopletostopastheyarenotpartofIslam.‘

Perhaps,asaresponsetothisfear,theMuslimCouncilofSriLankasentsuchanemail in

2014.Belowisanexcerpt:

‘Oneofthemaincausesfortheattackonhijabandniqabhastodowiththehighvisibilityofthe BLACK abhayas — thereby attracting undue attention to themselves. There is also aconcern among some that this is an import of an alien culture.We need to encourage ourMuslim women to reduce their visibility in public places by wearing colored (non-black)abhayasandheadcoveringsetc.,andourcommitmenttomaintainingourSriLankanidentitywouldalsobeemphasized.

Weshouldencouragethosewhousepublictransportlikebusesandtrainsandthree-wheelerstoavoidwearingblackabhayas.’

2LatheefFarook,‘ControversialACJUandDeviatedTableeghBroughtThisHumiliation’,DailyMirror,(4May2019)<https://www.dailymirror.lk/Opinion/Controversial-ACJU-and-deviated-Tableegh-brought-this-humiliation/172-166461>accessed8September2021.

177

While itwasMuslimwomenwhowore theseblackabayas andniqabs; non-MuslimsandMuslimmenalikefeltthatitwastheirdutytotellMuslimwomenwhattowearandwhatnot

to.Theydidnot,foronce,thinktoconsultMuslimwomenfortheiropiniononthismatter.

In response to the face coveringban, theAll Ceylon JamiyyathulUlama (ACJU), the apex

MuslimscholarlybodyinSriLanka,releasedastatementon25April2019.3Followingisanexcerpt:

‘Inparticular,westronglyappealtooursisterstobemindfulofthecriticalemergencysituationnowprevalentinourcountryandthedifficultiesfacedbythesecurityofficersinperformingtheirfunctionsinsituationswheretheidentityofapersoncannotbeascertained.Hence,weadvisethatintheprevailingsituationoursistersshouldnothinderthesecurityforcesintheireffortstomaintainnationalsecuritybywearingthefacecover(niqab)’

Surprisingly,longpriortotheattacks,M.I.M.Rizwe(PresidentoftheACJU)oncestatedthat

thefacecoveringiscompulsory(wajib)inaninterviewwithanewspaper,Navamani.4Butaftertheattacks,thestanceoftheACJUhadchanged,asevidentintheirstatementabove.

Notsurprisingly,theopinionofMuslimfemaleswasnotsoughtinthematterdespitethefact

thatmanyMuslimfemaleswereinpolicy-makingroles. Inthisarticle, Iwillexploretheir

views and different experiences in the post-Easter Sunday attacks context, while men

continuetodefineanddebateaboutaMuslimwoman’sdresscode,andhowmuchsheshould

coveranduncover.

“Noonecaredaboutmychoice”

Zaheeda*,whowas17yearsofageatthetime,hadstartedwearingtheniqabat13.Eventhoughhermother onlywore thehijab (covering of thehead,wornbyMuslimwomen),Zaheeda was inspired by her aunt who also wore the face veil. When the ban on face

coveringswasannounced,shewasangry.“Didtheterroristswearfacecoveringswhenthey

bombedtheseplaces?Didn’ttheywearnormalcasualclothes?What’sthenecessityofthe

ban?”shequestioned.

Whileshequestionedthereasoningbehindthebanandkeptstressingthe importanceof

choiceonhersocialmediaaccount,ZaheedawasfloodedwithmessagesfromherMuslim

peerswhotoldherto“justremoveherfaceveilandnotmakeabigdealaboutit.”“Theytold

metodoitforsecurityreasons.Butwhatsecurityreasons?Sometimebackduringthewar,

3'ImportantMessagewithRegardtoFaceCoverofMuslimWomen'(AllCeylonJamiyyathulUlama,1September2019)<https://acju.lk/en/news/acju-news/item/1739-important-message-with-regard-to-face-cover-of-muslim-women>accessed8September2021.

4LatheefFarook,‘ControversialACJUandDeviatedTableeghBroughtThisHumiliation’,DailyMirror,(4May2019)<https://www.dailymirror.lk/Opinion/Controversial-ACJU-and-deviated-Tableegh-brought-this-humiliation/172-166461>accessed8September2021.

178

therewerewomenwhoweresuicidebombersbutthenthedresscodewasnotatthecentre

ofthenationalsecuritydebate,”sherecalled.Zaheedafeltdisappointed,shefeltthatpeople

withintheMuslimcommunitydidnotunderstandthatitwasawoman’schoicetocoveror

notandwantedwomentouncover.WhileZaheedastoppedwearingtheniqab,shedidn’tfeelcomfortablesteppingoutwithoutit.

Shealsorecalledthatwhenshewasdoingheradvancedlevel(A/L)examinationsinMay-

June2019,therewasrigoroussecuritycheckingasexpected,butwhenitcametoMuslim

femalescladinhijab,thesecurityofficersaskedthemtoremovetheirhijabandthenpattedthemallover,lookingsuspiciously.Whilethesecuritycheckshadalsobeeninplaceduring

herpreviousordinarylevel(O/L)examinations,theyhadnotaskedthestudentstoremove

thehijab.

WhileZaheedahasquitwearingtheniqabnowbecauseshewasworriedaboutanotherbancomingup,shehopesthatshecanwearitsomedayinthefuturewithoutworryingwhether

shewouldhavetotakeitoffagain.

Shealsosharedthatsomeofherfriendsstoppedgoingtothebankbecauseevenafterthe

banwaslifted,banksdidnotallowpeoplewiththefaceveiltocomein.

“DiscriminatedforbeingvisiblyMuslim”

Noora*was19atthetimeoftheattacksandhadstartedwearingtheniqabwhenshewas15.Noorawassomeonewhowassociableandusedtogooutalone,andthisdidn’tchange

even after the attacks. She reluctantly took off her niqab due to the ban but continuedwearingherhijabandabaya.SherecalledanincidentthatoccurredinherA/Lclasses.“ThereceptionisthadcalledoneofmyfriendsandtoldhertotellmethatIcouldn’tcometoclass.

Iinformedmyclasstutorandhetoldmetoattendclass.Iwent.Hemanagedtosortthings

outbuttheformerlyfriendlyreceptionistkeptgivingmeunkindlooks,”shenoted.

NoorafacedhumiliationforwearinganiqabevenbeforetheEasterSundayattacks.Onceonthebus,amanhadcomeuptoherandtriedtomisbehavewithher.Hehadaskedherwhat

shewaswearing,toldhertotakeitoff,andtriedtoinvadeherpersonalspace.“Ifeltvery

uncomfortable.Peoplearoundmewerepretendingnottonotice,theydidn’tevenstepupto

help.Asmallboynexttomegaveapityinglookbutthatwasall,”Noorarememberedcrying

aftertheincidentandsincethenshehadavoidedgoinginthosesmallair-conditionedbuses.

As she hails from Kandy, she had also experienced the anti-Muslim riots in Digana. She

sharedthatafewmonthsaftertheriots,shewasworriedaboutgoingoutlookingvisibly

Muslim,andthereforeshedidnotstepoutforawhile.

Noorahasagainstartedwearingtheniqabanddoesgooutonherown.“IfeelabitscaredbutIknowIamcoveringtopleaseAllahandItrustHimtokeepmeprotectedandsafe,”she

saidaddingthatshewastiredandannoyedthatMuslimwomen’sclothingchoicesarebeing

usedaspawnsofpatriarchyandIslamophobia.

179

“Hadtogetmyhusbandtoaccompanymeeverywhere”

Jazila*asoftwareengineerwhodonsthehijabwithcasualclothingusedtodrivealoneandgo out alone to do her shopping, but after the attacks, she had to get her husband to

accompanyher.“IwenttothisleadingsupermarketstoreinColomboandtheydidnotlet

mecomeinsayingIhadtoremovemyhijab.Isaidthehijabwasnotbannedandonlytheniqabwas.Ieventriedtoshowthemthedifferencebyshowingpicturesonmyphone,butthesecurityandsomeofthestorestaffdidnotletmein.Myhusbandwasinthecar,Itold

himtheissueandhecamewithme—thensurprisinglytheyletmein.Ifacedthisbehaviour

whenever Iwent grocery shopping. I had to take eithermy husband everywhere ormy

uncoveredteenagedaughterorafriendalong(whodidnotwearthehijab,niqaborabaya)—onlythenwouldtheyletmein.”

Jazilaremarkedthatitwasahassletotakesomeonealongallthetimeandtrytocoordinate

theirschedules.Thisalsomeantshehadtoplanhershoppingandcouldn’t justgotothe

store for an emergency if shewas alone. This had continued for a fewmonths after the

attacks.

“Iusedtoalwayswonderthatifthishappenedtomeasamerehijabi(personwhowearsahijab),thosewhowerecoveredmorethanmewouldhavefacedworse.It’ssadthatMuslimwomen’sclothingchoicesarebeingusedtodiscriminateagainstthem,”shestated.

“Ifeltashamed!”

Sakina,aMuslimwomanoftheminorityBohraMuslimcommunityinSriLankawearsthe

Rida,whichisapartoftheBohra’straditionalattireforfemales.IntheBohracommunity,itis a sign ofmodesty.Wearing theRida and going out after the attacks, she said she feltashamed.“EventhoughIwasnotguilty, it felt likepeoplewere lookingatmewithsilent

accusation.Therefore,Ifeltashamed.”

Shealsonotedthattheconstanttalksofaniqab/burqabanareconstanteffortstoaggravateasituation.“Islamophobiaissorealandtheyarereallyjustoutattheniqab/burqabecauseitisaneasytargetandasensitiveissuefortheonespracticing,”shesaid.

“Eventhosewhoaccompaniedmefeltunsafe”

Ayesha*,anundergraduateatthetime,facedanunpleasantincidentwhenaBuddhistmonk

bangedonthecarshewastravellinginandthreatenedher.“Evenwhenmyfamilymembers

accompaniedme,theyfeltunsafeandthreatenedbecauseIwasvisiblyaMuslimwoman.”In

thebeginning,Ayeshadidnotstepoutofherhouseoutoffearanddiscomfortofnotwearing

aniqab.Shealsohadtodependonthemalemembersofherfamilyasshewasunabletowork.Theniqabbanhinderedherfreedomtotravelfreely,studyandwork.Italsotookawayhereconomicindependence.

180

WhileAyeshaworetheniqabafterthebanwaslifted,sheremarkedthathadthebanstillbeeninplace,herfreedomandindependencewouldstillberestricted.

“Ihadtostopmystudies”

Nehla*didnotfeelcomfortabletakingoffherniqabtogoout,becauseforhertheniqabisapartofheridentity.AnA/Lstudentatthetime,Nehlaquitmixedgenderclassesofherown

willandstoppedgoingout.

Khadijah,whowore theniqabalongwith a colouredhijab and clothes like long dresses,kurtha tops and pants, and the shalwar kameez, quit her studying for her degree as shecouldn’t go to university.5 She felt uncomfortable when she saw a huge poster in heruniversitysayingnoniqabis(someonewhowearstheniqab)allowed.Shewasrejectedfromjobsbecauseshewasaniqabi.“Thishurtmealot.Ididn’tstepoutforsometimeaftertheEaster Sunday attacks because my neighbours would look at me angrily like I was a

terrorist.”EventhoughKhadijahtookoffherniqab, shecarried itaroundwithher. “I feltguiltyremovingitbutIcannotkeepremovingitandwearingitoverandoveragain.Oneday,

when Iamable topracticemyreligion freely Iwillwear it. I justwantpeople torespect

everyone’sfreedomofchoicetowearwhattheywant.”

“MyfriendsandIwerecalled‘Zahrangekattiya’”

Haalawhohadworntheniqabforaroundsixyearsatthetimeofthebanfeltheartbrokentohavehadtoremoveit.“Butitwasinfinitelymoreheart-breakingtothinkaboutpeoplewho

hadlostfriendsandlovedonestotheEasterattacks.Withrespecttotheauthoritiesandas

agrievingnation,wefullycompliedwiththeban.”However,shereceivedmanydirtylooks

forsimplywearingahijab. Incertainplaces,shewasnotevenallowedtowearherblackabaya “Thiswasnotasecuritybreach,butratheranexcuseto“punishus further”. IwasaskedifIwashidingbombsinmyclothes.Iandmyfellowhijabifriendswerecalled“ZahrangeKattiya”(Zahran’speople).6 Iadjustedbygrittingmyteethandtoleratingit,educatingpeople when and where I could, telling them that Zahran and his group had grossly

misinterpretedwhatmyreligionactuallyteaches,”sheshared.

“Thesecuritywouldaskusifwewereonourperiods”

Rahmah*whoworkedinaDivisionalSecretariatOfficeatthetimewasharassedbyherboss

overdresscode.HerMuslimfemalecolleaguesandsheweretoldtowearasareetowork.A

5Kurtha/kurta/kurtiisatypeoftunicorlongshirtwornoverpants.Shalwarkameezisatraditionalcombinationdresswornofpantsandatunic/top.

6ZaharanHashimwasoneofthesuicidebombersoftheEasterSundayattacks.

181

yearpriortotheattacks,Rahmahwasaskedbyherbosstoeitherwearasareeorabayaasthesetwoseemedmoreprofessionalthanwearingashalwarkameezwithahijab.Rahmahhadcomplied.“Whenheaskedustochangeourdresscodeagain,Itoldhimthatwecannot

keepchangingourdresscodesasandwhenhewants.ItwasonhisinsistenceIworeabayato work and then he wanted us to wear sarees, where will this end?” Her non-MuslimcolleaguestoostartedpressurisingtheMuslimfemalecolleaguestowearasareeandtheystartedwearingcasualattiretoworkinprotest.“TheyhadsaidthatuntiltheMuslimswore

saree,theywouldbewearingcasualattire.Theyhadalsoinvitedthemediatotheofficeandgave interviews.Wewerefilmedbymediawithoutourconsentwhenwewereworking,”

Rahmahstated.

Thentherewasacircularthatsaidfemalepublicservantsshouldwearsarees.“Iremember

mybosscomingupandtellingusthatitwasanachievementandthatnowwehadnochoice

buttowearsaree,butwedidn’tbackdownsoeasily,”Rahmahsaid,addingthattheDistrictSecretary(DS)wassupportiveofthechoicesofMuslimfemaleofficers.“OnlyfiveDSoffices

werebeingracisttowardstheMuslimfemaleofficersandwantedtomakesareecompulsory.TheotherDSofficerswerecarryingonasusual.Therefore,theDistrictSecretaryunderstood

andrealisedthatthiswasraciallymotivated,”sherevealed.Sincetheissuewasgettingout

ofhandandtherewerethreatsthrownattheMuslimfemalesbytheircolleagues,Rahmah

andherothercolleagues filedacomplaintat theHumanRightsCommissionofSriLanka

(HRCSL).

Rahmahrecalledthattherewereinstanceswherehercolleagueshadplannedtothrowcow

dungattheMuslimfemalecolleagues.“Someofmynon-Muslimcolleaguessupportedour

stance,buttheycouldn’tshowitoutwardlyortheywouldbecornered.Buttheyinformedus

secretlyofthehappeningsandtoldusnottocometotheoffice.”

Inaddition,Muslimfemaleofficershadtogothroughbodycheckswhiletheresthadonly

bagchecksatthesecuritycheck-point.“Thesecuritywouldaskuswhetherwewereonour

periodsiftheydetectedapad.Itwastrulyuncomfortable.Ourcupboardswerecheckedtoo.

Weusedtokeepourprayermatsinthecupboardandthesewerelookedatsuspiciouslyeven

thoughwehavehadthemforyears.”ShenotedthattheMuslimmalecolleaguesdidnotface

anydiscrimination“IrealisedthisdiscriminationwasnotbecausewewereMuslims,butit

wasbecausewewerevisiblyMuslim,”shesaidhintingatthegenderedIslamophobiainher

workplace.ShealsonotedthattheMuslimmalecolleagues,thoughtheydidnotoutwardly

showtheirsupporttotheMuslimfemalecolleagues,hadsupportedtheirstance.

Itwasonlyamonthafterthecircularwasretractedthatthingsreturnedtonormal,butmany

ofherfemalecolleagueswerescarredattheincidentandsomehadlefttheirjobs.Somegot

transferred.Rahmahgotanotherappointment.“Ididn’twanttogobutIcouldn’tstayhere

anymorerememberinghowpeoplewerelike.Howfriendsturnedintoenemiesjustbecause

wewerevisiblyMuslim.”

182

“SomeonethoughtIwasaterroristandinformedthepolice”

Sarah*anotherpublicofficerwasonherwaytoDambullaforatrainingwhenthebusshe

wastravellinginwasstoppedandshewasaskedtogetoutforasecuritycheck.Herbags

were checked thoroughly and she too underwent a body check. In the beginning, Sarah

thoughtthatthissecuritycheckwasforallthepassengersinthebusbecauseitwasafew

monthsaftertheEasterSundayattacks,butthensherealisedshewastheonlyonebeing

checked.Whenshewasquestioned,thepolicetoldherthatsomeonehadinformedthemthat

therewasaMuslimwomanwithtwobagswholookedsuspiciousandcouldbeaterrorist.

While the police apologised to her for the inconvenience, Sarahwas hurt at the blatant

discriminationandIslamophobiapresent.

“JustbecauseIwasahijab-cladwomanwhichmakesmevisibleasaMuslim,peoplethoughtIwasaterrorist,”shesighed.

APetitionwasFiled

Muslim Women Development Trust (MWDT) in Puttalam filed a petition at the HRCSL

againstthediscriminationfacedbymanywomen,especiallyinpublicservicebecausethey

couldn’twearabaya,hijab,orniqab,becausesomewereforcedtoleavetheirjobsbecausetheydidn’twant towear a saree insteadof anabaya, and somewere turned away fromobtainingessentialpublicservicesbecauseoftheirdresscode.

Fathima*,alawyer,statedthatsomewomenworeasareeforthesakeofprotectingtheirjob,butmanydidnotcomplyandwerefired.“Womenwhoworeaniqabfoundituncomfortabletostepoutwithoutit,becauseitisapartoftheiridentity.Butwhiletheniqabwasbannedby law, thehijab andabaya weren’t banned. But, the Public Administration CircularNo.13/2019didnotallowMuslimfemalepublicofficerstowearthese.Theyhadtowearsareeor osariya (Kandyan saree). This also extended to women who accessed governmentservices.Thus,womencouldnotwearwhattheywanted,andwerediscriminatedagainst,”

sheshared.ThisledtothemsigningapetitionandhandingitovertotheHRCSLandmeeting

thecommissioners.

TheHRCSL laterquestioned thecircular calling it ‘irrationalandarbitrary, in violationofequalprotectionoflawguaranteedbyArticle12(1)oftheConstitutionandinviolationofsex-baseddiscriminationunderArticle12(2)oftheConstitution’.7TheHRCSLfurtherwentontonote that complyingwith this circularwill causewomen to incurheavyexpenditureand

unease. It also pointed out that ‘it is not possible to objectively discern how the newlyintroduced dress code enhances or ensures security in government offices. If indeed the

7‘CircularImposingDressCodeIsIrrational,ArbitraryAndViolatesConstitution:HumanRightsCommissionOfSriLanka’,ColomboTelegraph,(5June2019)<https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/circular-imposing-dress-code-is-irrational-arbitrary-and-violates-constitution-human-rights-commission-of-sri-lanka/>accessed8September2021.

183

rationaleisthatbaggyandflowyoutfitscouldposeareasonablethreattosecurity,oneofthepermittedformsofdressformencouldbereasonablyarguedtobesuchaformofdress.’

HRCSLlatermanagedtogetthiscircularcancelled.Theprimeminister’sofficemanagedby

thecurrentMayorofColombo,RosySenanayakehadstatedthatMuslimwomenintheprime

minister’sofficedidnothavetoadheretothiscircular.Thisdecisioncameaftervociferous

oppositionagainstthecircularbyvariouswomen’srightsgroups.

Women’sActionNetwork(WAN)intheirstatementaskedfortherepealoftheemergency

regulationswhicharbitrarilycontrolledwomen’sdress.8

AnexcerptfromtheWANstatement:

“This ban has given a licence to express hate and puts women at risk…Many schools arecompellingMuslimgirlstoremovetheirshawlsandtrousers.Somemothershavebeenforcedtoremovetheirheadcoverswhentakingtheirchildrentoschool.

ThishasledtoparentsremovingtheirchildrenfromtheseschoolsandeitherenrollingtheminMuslim schools or forcing young girls to stay at home. Public health experts worry thatmaternalhealth coulddeclineasMuslimwomen foregohospital careanddeliverbabiesathome.Aswecanalready see, thebanwill furtheralienateMuslimwomen fromSriLankansociety”

Fathima recalled how a pregnant ladywhowas holding a handkerchief to her facewas

arrestedbythepoliceanddetainedundertheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPolitical

Rights(ICCPR)Act.“Shewassevenmonthspregnant,MWDTtookhercaseuptotheHRCSL

andmanagedtogetheroutwithinthreemonths.AcourageousyoungMuslimfemalelawyer

fromPuttalamfoughtthisbattleatcourtwiththehelpofMWDT,”shenoted,statingthatthe

discriminatorybanfurthermarginalisedMuslimwomenandshunnedthem.

TheHarassmentResultedinDepression

Abdul Aziz Halisawhoworked at LankaMineral Sands Limited, Pullmodaiwas the sole

breadwinnerinherfamily.Sheworkedatthecompanyimmediatelyfollowingherhusband’s

demisein2015.Hetoohadworkedthereatthetimeofhisdeath.Halisahadalwaysworn

the abaya and hijab to work and in 2018, she had submitted a letter and hermoulaviacertificatetotheHeadofPersonnel.Inthat,shehadstatedthatsinceshewasamoulavia9,shewould bewearing theabaya andhijab, will not opt towear the saree (which is theuniformofthecompany),andwillnotbetakingtheuniformallowance.

8‘Women’sActionNetwork:StandinginprotestandsolidarityaftertheEasterattacks’,SundayObserver,(30June2019)<http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2019/06/30/women%E2%80%99s-action-network-standing-protest-and-solidarity-after-easter-attacks>accessed8September2021.

9Muslimreligiousscholar.

184

Itwasaroundthat timethatheremployersattemptedto forceherandtheotherMuslim

femaleemployeestowearthesareeinsteadoftheabaya.InDecember2019,theytriedtoreintroducea2015circularthatmandatedthesareebewornbythefemaleemployeesofthecompany.Dueto thecontinuedharassment, in2020,HalisaandtheotherMuslimfemale

employees submitted letters raisingconcerns to theWorkersUnionandMuslimCultural

Society.Followingthis,theWorkersUnion,MuslimCulturalSocietyandotheremployeesof

thecompanyrequestedtheDeputyGeneralManagerandGeneralManagertoallowMuslim

femaleemployeesintheofficetoweartheabaya.However,thisdidnotyieldanyresults.

InFebruary,Halisawassentlettersofwarningwhereitwasstatedshehadtocomplywith

the company uniform, or she would be punished. Halisa did not comply, therefore as a

punishment,Rs.500wasdeductedfromhersalaryforthemonthofFebruary.Theemployers

alsoputinregulationssuchasfemaleswhodonotcomplyandwearthesareecannotworkovertime onweekends and public holidays. Theywere also denied various benefits and

allowancesthatweretheirdue,suchasnotremuneratingtheirovertimework,anddenying

leaveinlieuofworkdoneonweekendsorholidays.InMarch2020,Halisaalongwithher

othercolleagueslodgedapetitionattheHRCSL,Trincomalee.

Againstthisbackdrop,Halisafellillduetothementalandphysicalstressbroughtonbythe

issues.InSeptember2020,Halisawasdeniedentryintoherofficebecauseshewaswearing

theabaya. InherFundamentalRights (FR)petition, shestated that theHumanResourceManagerhadsaidinSinhala,inthepresenceofotheremployees“TherearemanyofZahran’speoplearoundandIwillnotallowanyonetoenterwearinganabaya.Iwillstrictlyenforcetheserules.”Hehadalsoremarkedthatshewillnotbeallowedtowearanabayawhenshereportstoworkafterhermedicalleave.HehadindicatedtotheHeadofPersonneltogive

Halisaasaree.

On the day she had gone to attend tomatters pertaining to hermedical leave and also

intendedtogiveinherresignation,shewassubjectedtoridiculebytheemployees.Onthe

sameday,thePresidentoftheWorkersUnionbroughtforwardhergrievancestotheDeputy

GeneralManagerbuthedidnotaddressthem.Halisaresignedandleft.

InherFRpetition,Halisastatedthatamonth’ssalarywhichwasduehadnotbeenpaidto

herandthatshehadreliableinformationthatthesareewasnotmandatedforthefemaleemployeesofthecompany’sheadofficeinColombo.

Due to theharassmentmetedout toher,Halisa faceddepression, losther livelihoodand

found it difficult to support her family. Her FR petition against her employers

(SCFRA/140/2021)iscurrentlybeingheardattheSupremeCourt.

185

TheResponseoftheACJU

On1September2019,inresponsetothegrievancesfacedbyMuslimwomenevenafterthe

banwastakenoff,ACJUreleasedastatementrequestingMuslimwomentonotweartheface

veilinpublic.Belowisanexcerptfromthestatement:10

‘Inthiscurrentsituation,thereseemstobepossibilitiesthattheMuslimwomenwhoattirethefacecoverpublicly,mayfaceinconveniences.So,atthisuncertainpoliticalsituation,itisourresponsibilitytoensureallpossiblemeanstoavoidpavingthewaytoracialelements.

TheACJUrequestsespeciallytheMuslimwomentoavoidpossibleinconveniencesthatmaybecausedbyattiringthefacecoverinthepublicandtoactinaresponsibleandseriousmannerconsideringthepresentsituation.’

OpinionsofMuslimMen

Rayyan’s*mumisaniqabiandhissisterisahijabi.Rayyandidnotfaceanydiscriminationwhile walking out alone, but when he accompanied his mum after the attacks, he was

subjectedtomanydirtylooks.“WhenIsteppedoutagainafterthat,alone,anyonewhohad

seenmewithmymumwouldgivemediscriminatorylooks.”SincehehailedfromBatticaloa,

herecalledhowatpolicecheckpointswhentheycheckedhisfather’snationalidentitycard

(which shows the address in Batticaloa), the police would become suspicious and start

askingvariousquestions.“SinceZahranwasfromBatticaloa,Isupposetheypresumedwe

couldbeathreattoo.”

Regarding theniqab ban,he statedhewasworriedbecausehismum isaniqabi andshewouldhavehadtocomplywithitandremoveherfaceveilwhichwasuncomfortableforher.

Therefore,shemostlystayedathome,andonlywentoutwhennecessary.

Nasar’s*mumisahijabi,thereforeforhim,theniqabbandidnotmeanmuch.Heopinedthatfacecoveringwasaninnovationinthereligionandthatifwomenwantedtocovertheirfaces,

theyhadtoprovetheirreason.“Ifeellikemanywomencoverbecausetheirhusbandstell

themto.Andthehusbandsdosobecausetheyareinsecure.Inthereligion,thereisnothing

statedwhereitsayswomenhavetocovertheirface,”hesaid.

Abdeen*afatheroffourthoughtthatwomenshouldhavejustcompliedwiththeban.“Itwas

anecessityatthetime.Thecoveringof[the]face,hinderingofidentificationwasasecurity

threat.Idon’tseewhywomenmadeafussofit.”Inhisfamily,nowomencoveredtheirheads

orfaces,soAbdeendidnotfeeldiscriminatedagainstbythis.

10‘MaintenanceofNationalSecurity’(AllCeylonJamiyyathulUlama,25April2019)<https://acju.lk/en/news/acju-news/item/1622-maintenance-of-national-security>accessed9September2021.

186

Tabith*hadtoaccompanyhis17-year-oldhijabicladsistertoclasses.Hehadjuststartedworkingpart-timealongwithhisfinalyearofuniversityandhewastheonlymaleavailable

toaccompanyhissisterashisfatherwasbusyatwork.Inthebeginning,Tabithwasalright

withaccompanyinghissisterbuthefounditannoyingwhenhehadtoworkhisschedule

aroundherclasses.“Iwasfrustratedbecausebeforetheattacksmysisterusedtogooutto

classesaloneandthenwhenIstartedaccompanyingher,attimesherclassscheduleclashed

withmyworkandlectures.SometimesbecauseIaccompaniedher,Iranlatetomymeetings.

ThisfrustrationbecamesobadthatIburstoutatmyparents.”Somehowaftersometime,

hisparentsallowedhissistertogooutalone,buttheycontinuedtobeworried.

AGlobalOutlook

Just a few days prior to the Olympic Games Tokyo, news reports announced that the

Luxembourg based European Union Court of Justice had ruled in favour of a German

companythatfireditsemployeesforwearingthehijab.Thecourtrulinghadstatedthat‘aprohibitionofwearinganyvisibleformofexpressionofpolitical,philosophicalorreligious

beliefsintheworkplacemaybejustifiedbytheemployer’sneedtopresentaneutralimage

to the customersorprevent a social dispute’.11Manynon-Muslims supported this rulingstatingthatMuslimwomenwereforcedtocoverupandwearthehijab.However,whenitcame to the German gymnastic team at the Olympics wearing long unitards against the

‘sexualizationoftheirbodies’insteadofbikini-cutleotards,everyonesupportedthemove.12WhentheNorwegianhandballteamwasfinedforwearingshortsthatweretoolonginstead

oftheusualshorts,manypeoplecriticisedthemovestatingthattheathletesshouldbeable

towearwhattheywant.13

ButwhenitcametoMuslimwomenwhochoosetocoverupoutoftheirownchoice,people

callitbeingforcedtocoverupandthinktheyneedtoliberatetheMuslimwomen.TheWest

linksMuslimwomen’sattiretooppression,radicalisationandmisogynywithintheMuslim

community.ManyrefusetounderstandthatmostMuslimwomenchoosetocoverupontheir

ownaccord.

11‘TopEUcourtruleshijabcanbebannedatwork’,AlJazeera,(15July2021)<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/15/top-eu-court-rules-hijab-can-be-banned-at-work>accessed9September2021.

12ClaireGalafaro,‘GermanyGymanasticsTeamTiredOf‘Sexualization’,wearsUnitards’,AssociatedPress,(26July2021)<https://apnews.com/article/2020-tokyo-olympics-gymnastics-germany-unitard-7f5adad73b0a75d263b5d3f57c2f9bd0>accessed9September2021.

13ChrisJewers,‘Norwaycondemns'ridiculous'€1,500finefortheirwomen'sbeachhandballteamafterpunishmentforwearingshortsinsteadofbikinibottomsisconfirmed’,DailyMail,(20July2021).<https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9806507/Norways-womens-handball-team-fined-1-500-wearing-shorts-instead-bikini-bottoms.html>accessed9September2021.

187

UnveilingasLiberation

Throughouthistory,theveilingofMuslimwomenhasbeenusedtojustifytheinvasionand

violenceinMuslimsocietiesbycolonialrulers.InEgypt,‘colonialfeminism’tooktheformof

extreme concern over the veiling of Egyptianwomen but other issues such aswomen’s

suffrage, employment and education in the colonial society were ignored. In colonised

Algeria,FrenchgeneralsstagedademonstrationwhereAlgerianwomenwereunveiledby

theFrenchwomenpubliclytosymboliseliberationbroughttoAlgeriabyFrance.Eventhe

US-led‘WaronTerror’focusedonliberatingwomenbyunveilingthem,asit isevidentin

howtheyapproachtheissuesinthecountriestheyhaveinvaded,bytouchingonthefeminist

rhetoricoffemaleoppression.14

PhilosopherFrantzFanonin1959describedthefrustrationofFrenchgeneralsregarding

Algerianwomenwhoworetheheadscarf.15

“..thecrystallizationofanaggressiveness,thestrainofakindofviolencebeforetheAlgerianwoman.Unveiling thiswoman is revealingherbeauty; it is baringher secret, breakingherresistance,makingheravailableforadventure...Inaconfusedway,theEuropeanexperienceshisrelationwiththeAlgerianwomanatahighlycomplexlevel.Thereisinitthewilltobringthiswomanwithinhisreach,tomakeherapossibleobjectofpossession.Thiswomanwhoseeswithoutbeingseenfrustratesthecolonizer.Thereisnoreciprocity.Shedoesnotyieldherself,doesnotofferherself…”

Thisclearlydescribesthepresent-dayobsessionofstates,notonlyintheWestbutevenina

countrylikeSriLankathatwantstounveiltheMuslimwomananddepriveherrighttowear

what shewants. And they do it in the guise of national security, oppression, neutrality,

secularityandsoon.

Inthesameway,incertainMuslimdominatedcountriesandinMuslimsocieties,thehijabandveilareforcedundertheguiseofreligion.

AccordingtoMonaEltahawy,“Muslimwomenarecaughtbetweenarock—anIslamophobicandracistrightwingthatiseagertodemonizeMuslimmen,andtothatendmisusesourwordsand thewaywe resistmisogynywithin our communities— and a hard place: ourMuslimcommunitiesthatareeagertodefendMuslimmen,andtothatendtrytosilenceusandshutdownthewaysweresistmisogyny…Ourbodies—whatpartsofthemarecoveredoruncovered,for example— are proxy battlefields in their endless arguments. Itmatters littlewhatwe

14DrNavedBakhaliandNourSoubani,Hijab,GenderedIslamophobiaandtheLivedexperiencesofMuslimwomen,(YaqeenInstitute,17August2021)<https://yaqeeninstitute.org/read/paper/hijab-gendered-islamophobia-and-the-lived-experiences-of-muslim-women>accessed9September2021.

15FrantzFanon,HaakonChevalier,andAdolfoGilly,ADyingColonialism(NewYork:GrovePress1967)43–44.

188

womenthinkbecauseultimately,boththerockandthehardplaceagreeonandareenabledbypatriarchy.”16

TheSikhHeadCovering-TheTurban

OtherthanMuslims,followersofotherreligionstoohavetheirvisiblereligiousexpressions

such as the Sikhs with their turban and kara (steel bracelet).17 According to the Sikhs,wearingtheturbansignifiesbrotherhoodandunityamongthecommunityastheyarevisibly

identifiedasSikhthroughtheirturban.Theyalsobelievethattheskullorthecrownofthe

headisacriticalpartofthebodyandcoveringitisnotonlyasignofreverencetothearea

butitthemanylayersofclothpressuriseandtriggerthepressurepointsintheskullwhich

regulatesbloodcirculationandmentalactivity.Theybelieve that tying the turban tightly

helpsthemindstaygroundedandtheyareabletostayfocussed.EvenSikhwomenadopt

theturbantofosterself-relianceandgenderequality.

TheHabit:ASignofGod

Another religion that adopts the head covering is Catholicism,where the nunswear the

‘habit’whichisadistinctandsymbolicreligiousdresscode.AccordingtotheCatholicCanon

Law,thehabitisthedressofthereligiousandisasigndirectlypointingtoGod.Donningof

thehabitsignifiesanewlifeinChrist.Itisbelievedthatasisterinahabitisarepresentation

ofGodwithHispeopleintheirlives.18

Various religious orders in Catholicism have variations in their habits. The veil is the

distinctive difference between the habit of male and female habits. According to the

Benedictineorder,theveilisthesymbolofanun’sconsecration.Theveilandcoifsymbolise

belongingtoGodandcoversthehairwhichisstatedasan‘adornment’intheScriptures.19Itisbelievedthatbywearingtheveil,thenunisprotectedfromvanityandisareminderthat

shehasgivenherselffullytoGod.Itisalsoasignofmodesty.However,somesocietiesview

theCatholicnun’shabit(whichincludestheveil)asasignofoppression.20

SomeCatholicwomenalsowearathinlaceveilwhentheyattendMassatChurch,thisisdue

tothefactthattheveilisassociatedwithhumilityandmodesty.Itisalsolinkedtothefact

16MonaEltahawy,‘TooLoud,SwearsTooMuchandGoesTooFarin‘It’sNotAbouttheBurqa’’,(2019)4-5

17'WhydoSikhswearaturban?'(TheSardarCo,17April)<https://www.thesardarco.com/blogs/blog/why-do-sikhs-wear-a-turban>accessed8September2021

18ElizabethKuhns,Thehabit:ahistoryoftheclothingofCatholicnuns(1stedn,NewYork:Doubleday2003)

19'Eachgarmentasign,astatement,areminder'(DenverCatholic,9February2015).<https://denvercatholic.org/garment-sign-statement-reminder/>accessed8September2021.

20TranQuyen,'ShouldTheCatholicSistersWearReligiousHabit?'(March29,2017)Academiaedu.

189

that Mother Mary was always seen in a veil and Catholic women adopt it as a sign of

reverence.21 Further in theHolyBible, it hasbeen stated thatwomen should cover theirheadswhile praying and thiswas alsomandated in the Code of Canon Law until itwas

revised in1983.ThecurrentCodeofLawdoesnotmandatewomentocovertheirheads

whileprayinginthechurch.

Hats—aBritishRoyalProtocol

EverytimeyouseeQueenElizabethII,theDuchessofCambridge,orDuchessofCornwallat

aspecialoccasion,youwouldhavenoticed that theywearhats.Evenwhenyoucompare

MeghanMarkle’swardrobefromherpre-royaldaystowhenshewasaworkingroyaland

nowwhensheisnomoreaworkingroyal,youwouldhaveobservedthatwhenshewasa

working royal, shewouldwear hats to special occasions. It is a part of theBritish royal

protocolforafemaleroyaltowearahatorfascinatorforformalevents.Thisstemsfroma

traditional rulewhere it was seen as improper forwomen of the upper class and royal

families toshowtheirhair inpublic.Thehat isalsoa statussymbol that shows thatone

belongstoanelitefamilyandisanintegralpartofBritishculture.22

Conclusion

Eventhoughonlyfacecoveringwasbanned,itwasseenthatwomenwhoworethehijabandabaya toowere discriminated even if theywere not covering their face. Being a visiblyMuslimwomanmadeMuslimwomeneasytargetsforIslamophobia.Itwasnotedthatthere

wasagendered IslamophobiaasMuslimmenrarely faced it as theycouldnotbevisibly

identifiedasMuslim.

WhileMuslimwomenrealisedthatthebanwasdiscriminatoryandbelievedthatwomen’s

clothingshouldbeachoice,notforcedonandoff—incontrast,mostMuslimmenwereonly

worriedaboutthebanifanywomenintheirfamilyorclosecircleswereaffected.Muslim

mendidnotseethebanasaffectingawoman’schoice.Somemerelysawthebanasasecurity

procedure,especiallywhennowomenintheirfamilywasaffected.Thepublicdebateonthis

wasdominatedbytheall-maleACJU,maleMuslimpoliticiansandothercivilorganisations

withzerofemaleparticipation.

21TimsonBernadette,'SpeakingOut:Veilisasignofreverence'(TheCatholicRegister,29July2020)<https://www.catholicregister.org/ysn/youthcolumn/item/31919-speaking-out-veil-is-a-sign-of-reverence>accessed8September2021.

22CherryWilson,‘TheRoyalFamily’sDressCodeUncovered’,BBC,(19July2017)<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-40640634>accessed8September2021

190

Whenlookingatthisunveiling,veiling,forcingitonandoff,itcanbeseenthroughouthistory

asasignof‘liberation’andneedforcolonisation.Backthenandnow,theveilingoftheface

orcoveringoftheheadisnotseenaspurelyaMuslimwoman’schoice.

Recently fewmonths ago, anotherburqa banwas announced—whichhas not yet been

gazettedandHaalaechoesthefollowing:

“Butthatbanhassincebeenlifted,andthemovementtobantheniqabonceagain—thistime,permanently—seemstometobemoreofamovetodepriveusofourreligiousidentityandourrighttowearwhatwewant,anditdoesnotseemtobepurely,orevenremotely,intheinterestofnationalsecurity.Especiallynotinthiserawhereeveryoneiswearingfacemasksanyway.

To those pushing for this ban and justifying it by saying the burqa is limiting to women’sfreedoms—personallyspeaking,thereisnothingthatlimitsmyfreedommorethanthisban.MyburqahasneverlimitedmyfreedomtodoanythingorbeanythingthatI’vewantedto.

Thosewhoadamantlyinsistthatthereisnopossiblewaywecouldhavemadethechoicetoweartheniqabforourselves,andthatwearedefinitelybeingforcedintoit,orbrainwashedintoit—don’tcallyourselveschampionsofwomen’srightsifyoucannotfathomthatweaswomenareintelligentenoughtotakedecisionsforourselves.”

*Nameshavebeenchangedtoprotectidentity.

191

TheEvictionandReturnoftheNorthernMuslimsandtheQuestionofCoexistence

ShreenAbdulSaroorandMahendranThiruvarangan

InOctober1990,some75,000MuslimsintheNorthernProvince(aboutfivepercentofthe

province’stotalpopulationatthetime)wereforciblyexpelledfromtheirhomelandbythe

LiberationTigersofTamilEelam(LTTE).Insomeplaces,therebelsgaveonlyabout12hours

forMuslimsto leavetheprovince.BeginninginChavakachcherionOctober15th,Muslimswereevictedintheirentirety(mass)throughoutMannar,Mullaitheevu,Killinochchi,Jaffna,

andcertainpartsofVavuniyabythe30thofOctober.Familieswereallowedtotakeonly500rupeesandsomeclothes;somewereforcedtofleewithoutanybelongingsatall.Unableto

get transportuntil they reached towns further south,manywalked forupwardsof three

days.Todatethiscommunity’ssufferingshavenotbeenrecognisedofficiallyandtherehas

been no adequate support for return or reparations. Three decades of neglect and

misunderstanding by local residents, government officers, international donors, and

southernMuslimshaveleftnorthernMuslimsfeelingthereisnoonetheycantrust.

TheevictionofMuslimscausedaseriousruptureinthecoexistenceofTamilsandMuslims

in theNorth.TheTamils ingeneral couldnotdissociate themselvesasagroup fromthis

heinousactorcondemnitopenlywhenitwasunfoldingperhapsduetofearofreprisalsfrom

theLTTE.SmallgroupsofTamils,however,pleadedwiththeLTTEtostoptheevictionbut

theirpleasdidnotmove theLTTE.Nowwhena sectionof the evictedMuslims is in the

process of resettling in Jaffna and have begun to stabilise themselves in socio-economic

terms, the doors to a renewed coexistence are slowly opening. A genuine process of

coexistencecanbeginonlyifthemembersoftheTamilcommunityarewillingtointerrogate,

evenbelatedly,theirnarrownationalismandtheirsilenceinthefaceoftheLTTE’smilitarism

whichallowedtheLTTEtocommitanactofethniccleansing.ThecoexistenceofTamilsand

Muslims in the North depends largely on how these two communitieswork together in

addressingthechallengesthereturningMuslimsarefacedwith.Thispieceisanattemptto

reflect upon the question of the return, the social, economic and political challenges the

evictedMuslimsfaceintheirresettlementandtheirimplicationstoethniccoexistenceinthe

North.

Sincethecivilwar’sendinMay2009,northernMuslimshavestartedreturninginsubstantial

numbers. ButmanyTamilswho remained in theNorth havenotwelcomed their return.

PoliticalandeconomicrivalriesbetweenTamilandMuslimcommunitiespersist.Northern

Muslims are disappointed that government authorities pay little heed to the needs of

returningMuslimsandgivepreferentialtreatmenttoresettledTamils.Seniorgovernment

officers,forinstance,aresaidtounder-quoteMuslimreturneenumbers,whichsignificantly

reducestheallocationofresourcesandthedevelopmentsupportrequiredforresettlement.

Whenconfrontedoverthisperceivedbias,governmentofficersintheNorthrespondthat

192

Muslimsarealready‘well-settled’inPuttalam,sothegovernment’spriorityshouldbeonthe

war-affectedTamils.Itiscertainlytruethattheplightofwar-affectedTamilciviliansremains

distressingespeciallyintheVanni.Adecadeaftertheendofthewar,manystilllackland,

housingandotherbasicneedsandcontinuetostrugglefortruthandjusticeinadangerous,

militarisedspace.Theseneedsarecritical,butaddressingthemshouldnotforestallnorthern

Muslims’righttocollectivereturn.Thesufferingthetwocommunitiesexperiencedduring

thecivilwar,insteadofalienatingthemfromoneanother,shouldleadthemtoempathise

withoneanotherandcommitthemselvestopluralisticcoexistence.

Ononeoccasion,when journalistsaskedTamilgovernmentofficersandreligious leaders

aboutclaimsthatreturningnorthernMuslimshavenotreceivedadequateassistance, the

leadersrespondedthattheMuslimcommunityhadnotreturnedinanysignificantwayand

thatonlyafewhadreturnedtoengageintrade.Inadismissive,unsympathetictone,these

leadersstatedthattheMuslimsarekeepingonefootinPuttalamandonefootintheNorth.

WhileitistruethatsomeMuslimsdonotwanttoreturntotheNorth,theirdesiretomaintain

their connections inPuttalam reflects theobstacles that impede their resettlement.With

theirlandsovertakenbyjunglesandmadeuninhabitable,peoplecannotbeexpectedtoleave

completelytheplaceswheretheyhavelivedfor30yearsbeforenewhomesandlivelihoods

canbeestablished.Notonlyistherenobasicinfrastructurebuttheyarealsonotwelcomed

bygovernmentofficersorevenneighbours.MostoftheTamils,after30yearsofseparation,

donotrecognisetheirformerneighbours.Anewgenerationhasgrownupamidstthewar

whichhasnomemoriesof thecoexistencesofTamilsandMuslims in theNorth.The few

(mostlyinMannar)whoreceiveddecentresettlementassistancehavebeenabletoreturn

mainlyowingtothepoliticalpatronageofaformerminister.Fornewfamiliesthatreturn,

accessingtheirlandsandprovidingdecentschoolingfortheirchildrenaredauntingenough,

leavealonethechallengesinaccessinglivelihoodassistanceandjobs.

MistakesUponMistakes

AlthoughtheLTTEfacedheavycriticismfortheiractofethniccleansing,theLTTEleader

VelupillaiPrabhakaranwasconspicuouslysilentontheissueduringthepeacenegotiations

of 2002-2005. At a press conference in 2002 during the peace talks, the late Dr. Anton

Balasingham,thepoliticalideologueoftheLTTE,withtheLTTEleaderV.Prabhakaranon

his side, stated that the LTTE had already apologised to the Muslims for the eviction.

However, Dr. Balasingham’s statement sounded hollow and tokenistic at a time when

MuslimswerefacingsevereobstaclestotheirresettlementintheNorth.Further,noneofthe

partiesengagedintalks—includingtheNorwegianmediators—werewillingtorecognise

therighttocollectivereturnofthenorthernMuslimsasoneoftheprimaryconditionsfor

establishingnormalcyintheNorth.Thiswasthemainreasonforthelowrateofreturnof

expelled Muslims in comparison with Tamil internally displaced persons (IDPs) who

returnedduringthe2002peaceprocess.

193

Wheninternationaldelegationsinquirewiththegovernmentabouttheplightofnorthern

Muslims,theyhavebeentoldthattheevictedMuslimsnolongerwanttoresettleintheNorth

and that theirdesire to return to theNorthnowstems frombusinessopportunitiesora

desiretoselltheirproperties.Afewnon-Muslimreligiousleadersgosofarastosaythatif

all of the expelled Muslims were now to return to the North, it would alter the ethnic

compositionofthearea.TheyspuriouslysuggestthatMuslimsbeingoutsidethewarzone

andthereligiousproscriptionsamongtheMuslimsagainstbirthcontrolhavecombinedto

createaboomintheMuslimpopulationoverthelast29years,thusmakingafullreturnan

unfairburdenonTamilswhoremainedandsufferedthroughthewar.Suchclaimsreeking

ofchauvinismhighlighttheextentofthechallengenorthernMuslimsfaceinseekingjustice.

TheyindicatethatasectionoftheTamilcivilsocietytooisactivelyinvolvedinconstructing

the ‘returningMuslim’ as the over-populating, outsider-Other that poses a threat to the

existenceoftheTamilsintheNorth.

Echoing the government’s refrain, international donors commonly claim that displaced

MuslimsarewellintegratedinPuttalam,sotheirreturnisnotapriority.Theyoftenrelyon

acontroversial2004surveydonebytheUnitedNations’(UN)refugeeagency,theUNHigh

CommissionerforRefugees(UNHCR),whichfoundthatamajorityofthedisplacedMuslims

preferredtobeintegratedintoPuttalamratherthanreturntotheiroriginalhomes.Whatthe

internationalcommunityfailstonoteisthattheLTTEwasactiveatthetimethesurveywas

conducted,meaningfearsaboutreturningwereundoubtedlyrelatedtosecurityrisksand

the possibility of a return towarwith yet another eviction looming on the horizon. The

LTTE’sviolenceagainstTamildissidentactivistsandtheattacksonLTTE-sympathisersby

themilitaryandTamilmilitantgroupsassociatedwith thegovernment,whichcontinued

despitetheceasefireagreement,createdfearamongtheMuslimsandstalledtheirhopesof

returningtotheNorthduringthepeacetalks.

Atthestartofhisfirstterm,inlate2005,PresidentMahindaRajapaksapromisedtoappoint

apresidentialcommissiontoinquireintotheexpulsionofthenorthernMuslims—apromise

he never fulfilled. At an event commemorating the end of the war, President Mahinda

Rajapaksastated:“WhentheinnocentMuslimswereharassedandforciblyevictedfromthe

North by the LTTE, no one came forward to stop this displacement…Now, with my

governmentputtinganendtoterrorism,alleffortswillbemadetoresettletheMuslimsby

May2010.”Thespeechmarkedthefirstoccasionwhenaseniorgovernmentofficialmadea

categoricalstatementontheplightoftheevictedMuslimsandaffirmedtheirrighttoreturn.

However,theformerpresidentfailedtoprioritisenorthernMuslims’rightofreturninhis

rapid,post-warnation-buildingprocess.Duringhissecondtermaspresident,horrificanti-

Muslimviolenceunfoldedinthesouthernpartsofthecountry.Insuchacontextofincreased

hatemongeringagainsttheMuslimswhichthegovernmentinpowerdidnothingtostop,the

northernMuslimslostfaithinthesouthernregimes’promisestoresettlethemintheNorth.

A decade later, with the Easter Sunday attacks stoking anti-Muslim sentiments and

promptingaRajapaksareturn,Muslimsquestionwhetherthereisanypointinonceagain

engagingwiththegovernmentinthehopeofgainingsupportandrecognitionoftheirplight.

194

Government officials and Sinhala nationalist commentators often bring up the plight of

northernMuslimswhencriticisingtheLTTEoritsclaimstoTamilEelam,butfewgenuinely

considerwhathappenedtothoseforcedtofleeandwhatmustbedonetobringrejuvenation

in their lives. Northern Muslims have faced the same hatred as the broader Muslim

community in recent years. For 30 years and counting, onlynorthernMuslimpoliticians

considertheirplight,whileallothersignoreit.Today,somesouthernMuslimpoliticiansare

questioningMuslimnationalismandurgingMuslimstopoliticallyassimilateintotheSinhala

majorityaswereelfromIslamicterror.Theycriticisetheformationsofethniccollectivesin

theNorthandEast.Thereisnosmallironythere.In1990,manysouthernMuslimsportrayed

the expulsionof theMuslims as a punishment for living likeTamils andnot beingpious

enough.ThesethemeswererepeatedduringFridaysermonsatsomemosques,whereimams(leaderofprayersatamosque)claimedthatAllahwaspunishingnorthernIDPsfornotbeing

Muslimenough.WhattheyfailedtounderstandwasthattheTigerswereexpellingnorthern

Muslimsonlyonthebasisoftheirreligiousidentity.NorthernMuslimsnotonlyhavearight

topracticeIslambutalsotoreclaimthenorthernheritagethatcloselylinkedthemtothe

northernTamils;noonehastherighttoforcethemtochoose.

Inthetransitionaljusticeperiodfrom2015to2019,earlyeffortstoredressnorthernMuslim

grievancesthroughtheproposedmechanismswereabandoned.TheOfficialInquiryonSri

Lanka (OISL) Investigation launched by the Office of theHigh Commissioner for Human

Rights,onlyprobedtheperiodfromthe2002Februaryceasefireuntil2011.Thismeantthat

earliercrimes,suchastheLTTE’sethniccleansingofMuslimsfromtheNorth,wereignored.

WhentheSriLankangovernmentcommitteditselftostartingtransitionaljusticeprocesses

through the UNHumanRights Commission Resolution 30/1 in 2015, it likewise did not

commit to addressing earlier events like the eviction of the northernMuslims.Northern

Muslimsnonethelesstookituponthemselvestoplayanactiveroleinthepublichearingled

bytheConsultationTaskforceonReconciliationMechanisms,buttonoeffect.Asaresult,the

currentreparationpolicydoesnotspecificallyrecognisenorthernMuslims’lossinanyform.

Within the Tamil community, only a few voices emphasised that the transitional justice

processes acknowledge the crimes committed against the Muslims and address the

grievancesoftheevictedMuslims.Therewashardlyanycoverageofthesubmissionsmade

by the evicted Muslims during these sessions in mainstream Tamil media. One Tamil

politicianwhotermedtheforcibleexpulsionoftheMuslimsasanactofethniccleansingata

commemorationeventheldinJaffnafacedviciousvilificationfromchauvinisticforceswithin

theTamilcommunity.

Alreadysufferingtheeffectsof30yearsofneglect,northernMuslimshaverecentlyfaced

assaultsontheirbasicdemocraticrights.DuringtheNovember2019presidentialelection,

northernMuslimswhotraveledfromPuttalamtovoteinMannarcameunderattack,with

theirbusesfiredatonthewaytoMannaratTantirimaleearlymorningon16thNovember2019. After voting they were attacked again that evening by Sinhala mobs in

Medawachchiya;manywomenandchildrenwereinjuredbuttodate,noinquiryhasbeen

held (not even an investigation reportwas released by the Election Commission). Their

195

buseswerestoppedatChettikulumpriortotheattackinMedawachchiya,andthepolicekept

them(detained)incustodyforhours.ElectionCommissionerProf.RatnajeevanHoolevisited

thepolicestationandinstructedthepolicetosendthewomenandchildrenhomewitha

policeescort,butofficersrefused.Latethatevening,asthewomenandchildrenmadetheir

waybacktoPuttalam,theywereagainattacked.1Manyinjuredvotersdidnotseekmedicaltreatment,fearingreprisals.Basedonthisviolence,theElectionCommissionagreedtoset

up cluster voting booths inPuttalamwhen these voters participated in the2020August

parliamentaryelection.Over6000Mannarvoterscast theirballots inPuttalamatspecial

pollingbooths.Despitethispositivedevelopment,theAssistantElectionsCommissionerin

Mannarhassinceinstructedthedistrict’sgramasevakas(villageofficers)toonlyregistervoterswhoarepermanentlylivinginMannar.Whenquestionedbycivilsocietyactivists,he

assertedtherecouldbeno‘floatingvoters’:peoplewholiveinPuttalammustregisterand

voteinPuttalam.Thesameassistantcommissionersaidjustbeforethepresidentialelection,

“MannarvoterswhoarelivinginPuttalamarebannedtocomeinhiredprivatebusestocasttheirvotes”.Todate,manyofsuchreturneesareunabletoregisternotonlytovotebutalsoto receive their due share of government assistance in the North due to constant and

unnecessary scrutiny, by politically motivated government officers, of their dual living

places.

Unlikewar-displaced Tamils, who experiencedmultiple displacementswithin the Vanni,

forciblyevictedMuslimswerecompelledtoliveawayfromthewar-tornareaswheretheir

homeswerelocated.ItistruethattheMuslimsweresparedthemassacresandterriblelosses

thattheTamilsofVanniunderwentduringtheheightofthewar.Butthismustnotbeused

todisqualifynorthernMuslimsfromreturningwhenitisviableandclaimingtheirrightful

properties and other rights related to resettlement. To avoid any further suspicion and

distrustgrowingbetweennortherncommunities,itisimperativetorecognisethejustnature

of the northernMuslims’ right to return alongside other resettlement and development

programsthatareunderwayintheNorth.Already,someMuslimswhohavereturnedtothe

Northhavefoundtheirvillageboundarieschanged,resultinginthelossoftheircommunity

rights to land.Whengovernmentofficersalter theboundariesofvillages, theytakeaway

public lands — allocated to build public schools, burial grounds, places of worship,

playgroundsorevengrazinglandforanimals—andredistributethemfornewsettlements.

Forcedtoliveawayfromtheirlandfordecades,displacedMuslimshavehadnosayinhow

thesedecisionshavebeenmadeandhavesufferedadditionallossesasaresult.

IntheMusaliregionoftheMannardistrict,theevictedMuslimswhotriedtoresettleintheir

landsandaccessthelandsthattheyhavehistoricallybenefittedfromforvariouseveryday

purposes were falsely accused of destroying the Wilpattu Forest. The late Prof. S. H.

1‘WasThePresidentialElectionFreeAndFairWhenColomboReturningOfficerCalledSajithPremadasaTheSonOfADonkey,AsksProf.Hoole’,ColomboTelegraph,(28November2019)<https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/was-the-presidential-election-free-and-fair-when-colombo-returning-officer-called-sajith-premadasa-the-son-of-a-donkey-asks-prof-hoole/>accessedJuly2021.

196

Hasbullah’s book Denying the Right to Return (2015) exposes the politics behind thesespuriousallegationsanddemonstratesthatachauvinisticenvironmentalistdiscoursewas

setinmotiontovilifythereturningMuslimsasathreattotheenvironmentandtodenytheir

righttoaccesstheirlandsandthesurroundingeco-systemsfortheirlivelihoodpurposes.

ThisisanewchallengetheevictedMuslimshavebeenbattlingforthepastfewyearswithout

muchsupportfromothercommunitiesandactivists.

WhatCanBeDone?

EvenasahandfulofTamilpoliticiansandfewcommunityanddiasporamembershavebeen

sympathetictotheissue,theTamilpolityasawholehaslongkeptsilentonthe1990Muslim

expulsion. In a September 2009 meeting on minority concerns with then President

Rajapaksa,the TamilNationalAlliance(TNA)forthefirsttimepubliclyraisedtheconcerns

of the northern Muslims. In a powerful gesture towards reconciliation and renewed

coexistence, a group of Tamils, including academics, civil society activists, human rights

activistsandfeminists,putoutastatementin2011condemningtheeviction.2Thestatementstressedtheimportanceofself-introspectiononthepartofTamilsandcalledfordialogue

betweentheTamilsandMuslims.ThisgesturewaslaterreciprocatedbyagroupofMuslim

activistsandleadersinastatementtheyreleasedwhichfocusedontheatrocitiestheTamil

communityhadsufferedduringthewar.SuchgesturesandthecomingtogetherofMuslims

andTamilsascollectives like the JaffnaPeople’sForumforCoexistencekeepour faith in

inter-ethnicdialogueandreconciliationaliveinacontextofincreasingethnicpolarisation.

WhentheTNAwontheNorthernprovincialcouncilelectionsin2013itappointedaMuslim

tooneoftheirbonusseatsasacouncillortodemonstrateitspositiveapproachtowardsthe

MuslimpeopleoftheNorth.EffortsbyasmallnumberofTNAMPstodirectlyaddressthese

issueshavebeenwelcomedandwereseenasanattempttosecurerightsforthecountry’s

twolargestminorities.IntheAugustparliamentaryelection,organisationsrepresentingthe

MuslimsofKillinochchiandJaffnaopenlyendorsedacoupleoftheTNAcandidatesandvoted

fortheTNA.InFebruary2020,theP2PmarchorganisedbyTamilcivilsocietygroupsand

politicalpartiesmadeaclarioncallagainstthegovernment’sdecisiontocrematetheremains

of theMuslimswhodieof theCOVID-19disease.3Despite these laudablepoliticalmoves,mostTamilleadersandintellectualshaveyettodemonstratetheirsolidarityforthecauseof

the expelled northern Muslims. The idea that the North and East are the traditional

homelands of the Tamil people creates a hierarchy of ethnicities within the region and

2‘AnappealtotheTamilCommunityanditscivilandpoliticalrepresentatives’,SriLankaBrief,(6January2012)<https://srilankabrief.org/an-appeal-to-the-tamil-community-and-its-civil-and-political-representatives/>accessedJuly2021.

3The‘PothuviltoPolikandy’rallyor‘P2P’wasafive-daymarchforjusticeheldacrossSriLanka’snorthandeast.MeeraSrinivasan,‘Analysis|AlongmarchinSriLanka—toregisterprotest,forgeanewalliance’,TheHindu,(9February2021)<https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/a-long-march-in-sri-lanka-to-register-protest-forge-a-new-alliance/article33792547.ece>accessed22September2021.

197

discursively denies the Muslims and Sinhalese who live in the region the full rights of

belonging.Thisprocessof ‘othering’ continuesasanexclusivist featureof theTamil self-

determinationproject.ThosewhocallforTamilnationalistself-determinationintheNorth

andEastoftheislandareyettorealisethattheevictionofMuslimsisaconsequenceofthis

dangerousnationalistimagination.InordertobuildaninclusivefutureintheNorth-East,

Tamil nationalism should give way to a new discourse of resistance that places the

coexistenceofmultiplecommunitiesatitscenter.

TheprivationsthattheTamilcommunityexperiencedduringthecivilwarandtheintense

militarisation,displacementandeconomicdeprivationsamidstwhichthenorthernTamils

had to live their lives rendered them an oppressed community. Muslim armed groups

createdbythestateintheEasttodefeatTamilmilitancyturnedviolentagainstTamilsinthe

EasternProvince.TheTamils saw thesegroupsas theparamilitarywingsof theSinhala-

BuddhiststateandcastedoubtsabouttheMuslimcommunity’scommitmenttowardsthe

politicalliberationoftheTamils.However,thesituationintheEastwasmorecomplicated.

ThemassacresofMuslimsbytheLTTEinEravurandKattankudyweretotallyunwarranted.

TheyledtoaseveredeteriorationintheTamil-MuslimrelationsintheEast.Thescarscaused

bythesemassacresandthememoriesoftheinvolvementofMuslimhomeguardsinsomeof

themassacresthattookplaceinTamilvillagesintheEastcontinuetoposeachallengeto

reconciliationbetweenTamilsandMuslimsintheEast.

During the post-war years, leading Muslim politicians defended the government in the

internationalarenawhentheRajapaksaregimefacedallegationsofwarcrimesandgenocide

fromtheTamilcommunity.ThepoliticalleadershipoftheMuslimcommunityfailedtotake

aconsistentstanceagainsttheSinhala-Buddhistcharacterofthestateandtherebyalienated

theTamil community.These factorsdidnot allowmuchpolitical space for theTamils to

reflectupontheplightoftheevictedMuslims.ThereisaneedfortheMuslimcommunityto

understand and empathisewith the trials and tribulations that theTamilswent through

during thewaryearsand introspect into their relationshipwith thestateandsuccessive

Sinhala chauvinist regimes that governed the island. Blaming the Tamil community as a

whole for the eviction will not take the Muslims anywhere on their quest for renewed

coexistenceintheNorth.

Asthingsstand,MuslimsarereturningtotheNorthwithoutexpectingmuchfromanyone,

simplyinthehopeofrestartingtheirlivesfromscratchandco-existingonceagainwiththeir

Tamilbrothersandsisters.Theyhaveadvancedfewdemands,apartfrommodestonesfor

equaltreatment,accesstotheirlands,basiclivelihoodactivitiesandswiftclearanceoftheir

land that has turned into jungles. It is imperative that Tamil government officers and

politicians in the North recognise that evicted Muslims have the right to reclaim their

propertiesandlivelihoodopportunitiesintheirnativeplaces,irrespectiveofwhethertheir

familieschoosetocontinuetoliveelsewhere.Astrustbuilds,morenorthernMuslimswill

feelsafetoreturnandreclaimtheirancestrallandsandculturalheritage.Atthemoment,

however,thereseemstoberesistancetotheirreturn.Thisisasituationthatwillonlylead

to further communal strife between the Muslims and Tamils of the North and benefit

198

majoritarianism,underminingthelong-terminterestsoftheTamilsandtheirlong-sought

political aspirations. It is in the interest of both communities—with the support of the

internationalcommunityandsympatheticSinhalese—toprioritisedeepercooperationand

asustainedefforttoworkthroughtheirseparate—butdeeplyintertwined—grievances

andsuffering.