[A.C. NO. 6288 : June 16, 2006]

MARILI C. RONQUILLO, ALEXANDER RONQUILLO and JON ALEXANDERRONQUILLO, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact SERVILLANO A.CABUNGCAL, Complainants, v. ATTY. HOMOBONO T. CEZAR, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, J.:

Complainants seek the disbarment or suspension of respondent fromthe practice of law for unlawful, dishonest, immoral anddeceitful conduct. They allege that respondent sold them a pieceof property over which he has no right nor interest, and that herefuses to return to them the amount they have paid him for it.

Complainant Marili C. Ronquillo is a Filipino citizen currentlyresiding in Cannes, France, together with her minor children,Alexander and Jon Alexander.

In May 1999, complainants and respondent entered into a Deed ofAssignment.1 For the price ofP1.5M, respondent transferred, infavor of the complainants, his rights and interests over atownhouse unit and lot, located at 75 Granwood Villas Subd., BFHomes, Quezon City. Respondent also obligated himself to deliverto complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell he executed withCrown Asia, the townhouse developer, dated April 19, 1996. Uponfull payment of the purchase price, respondent further undertookto have Crown Asia execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over theproperty in favor of the complainants.

Respondent received from complainants P750,000.00 upon executionof the Deed of Assignment. The balance was to be paid bycomplainants in four equal quarterly installments of P187,500.00each. Thus, complainants issued in favor of respondent fourpostdated checks in the amount ofP187,500.00 each. Respondent wasable to encash the first check dated August 17, 1999.2

Complainants subsequently received information from Crown Asiathat respondent has not paid in full the price of the townhouse

at the time he executed the Deed of Assignment. Respondent alsofailed to deliver to complainants a copy of the Contract to Sellhe allegedly executed with Crown Asia. For these reasons,complainant Marili Ronquillo ordered the bank to stop payment onthe second check she issued to respondent in the amountof P187,500.00.

On March 6, 2000, complainants, through their counsel, wroterespondent, informing him that they were still willing to pay thebalance of the purchase price of the townhouse on the conditionthat respondent work on Crown Asia's execution of the Deed ofAbsolute Sale in their favor. In the alternative, complainantsdemanded the return of the amount of P937,500.00, plus legalinterest, within ten days.3 The amount of P937,500.00 representsthe P750,000.00 down payment and the first quarterly installmentof P187,500.00 which complainants paid respondent.

In a letter dated May 2, 2000, addressed tocomplainants,4 respondent claimed that he was "working now on aprivate project which hopefully will be realized not long fromnow," and requested for "a period of twenty days from May 15,2000 within which to either completely pay Crown Asia or returnthe money at your (complainants') option." The period lapsed butrespondent did not make good his promise to pay Crown Asia infull, or return the amount paid by complainants.

On February 21, 2002, complainants' counsel sent respondent asecond letter5 demanding the return of the amount of P937,500.00,including legal interest, for failing to comply with his promise.The demand was unheeded.

Hence, this administrative complaint6 that respondent engaged inunlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Allegedly,respondent violated his oath under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Codeof Professional Responsibility and he ought to be disbarred orsuspended from the practice of law.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) InvestigatingCommissioner Milagros V. San Juan, to whom the instantdisciplinary case was assigned for investigation, report and

recommendation, found respondent guilty of dishonest anddeceitful conduct proscribed under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Codeof Professional Responsibility. In her Report dated October 9,2003, she recommended that respondent be suspended from thepractice of law for a period of three (3) years. The IBP Board ofGovernors, through Resolution No. XVI-2003-226, dated October 25,2003, approved the recommendation of Commissioner San Juan.

We agree.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, amember of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of thefollowing grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other grossmisconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) convictionof a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of thelawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of asuperior court; and (7) willfully appearing as an attorney for aparty without authority. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility provides that "A lawyer shall notengage in unlawful, dishonest,immoral or deceitful conduct.""Conduct," as used in this rule, does not refer exclusively tothe performance of a lawyer's professional duties. This Court hasmade clear in a long line of cases7 that a lawyer may bedisbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in hisprofessional or private capacity, which shows him to be wantingin moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, orunworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

In the instant case, respondent may have acted in his privatecapacity when he entered into a contract with complainant Marilirepresenting to have the rights to transfer title over thetownhouse unit and lot in question. When he failed in hisundertaking, respondent fell short of his duty under Rule 1.01,Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It cannot begainsaid that it was unlawful for respondent to transfer propertyover which one has no legal right of ownership. Respondent waslikewise guilty of dishonest and deceitful conduct when heconcealed this lack of right from complainants. He did not informthe complainants that he has not yet paid in full the price ofthe subject townhouse unit and lot, and, therefore, he had no

right to sell, transfer or assign said property at the time ofthe execution of the Deed of Assignment. His acceptance of thebulk of the purchase price amounting to Nine Hundred Thirty-SevenThousand Five Hundred Pesos (P937,500.00), despite knowing he wasnot entitled to it, made matters worse for him.

Respondent's adamant refusal to return to complainant MariliRonquillo the money she paid him, which was the fruit of herlabor as an Overseas Filipino Worker for ten (10) years, ismorally reprehensible. By his actuations, respondent failed tolive up to the strict standard of morality required by the Codeof Professional Responsibility and violated the trust and respectreposed in him as a member of the Bar, and an officer of thecourt.

Respondent's culpability is therefore clear. He received a letterfrom complainants' counsel demanding the execution of the Deed ofAbsolute Sale in favor of the complainants, or, in thealternative, the return of the money paid by complainants. Inreply to said letter, respondent acknowledged his obligation, andpromised to settle the same if given sufficient time, thus:

x x x

I am working now on a private project which hopefully will berealized not long from now but I need a little time to fix somethings over. May I please request for a period of 20 days fromMay 15, 2000 within which to either completely pay Crown Asia orreturn the money at your option. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

In no uncertain terms, respondent admitted not having fullownership over the subject townhouse unit and lot, as he has yetto completely pay Crown Asia. Respondent even failed to producethe Contract to Sell he allegedly executed with Crown Asia overthe subject unit, which would show the extent of his right ofownership, if any, over the townhouse unit and lot in question.

To be sure, complainants gave respondent sufficient time tofulfill his obligation. It was only after almost two years hadpassed, after respondent promised to pay Crown Asia or return to

complainants the amount they paid him, that complainants sentrespondent a second letter8demanding solely the return of theamount of P937,500.00, including legal interest. By this time, itwas indubitable that respondent would not be able to perform hisend of their agreement.

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is grantedonly to those of good moral character.9The Bar must maintain ahigh standard of honesty and fair dealing.10 Lawyers must conductthemselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealingwith their clients or the public at large,11 and a violation ofthe high moral standards of the legal profession justifies theimposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension anddisbarment.12

Be that as it may, we cannot grant complainants' prayer thatrespondent be directed to return the money he received from themin the amount of P937,500.00. Disciplinary proceedings againstlawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but ratherinvestigations by the court into the conduct of one of itsofficers. The only question for determination in theseproceedings is whether or not the attorney is still fit to beallowed to continue as a member of the Bar.13 Thus, this Courtcannot rule on the issue of the amount of money that should bereturned to the complainants.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Homobono T. Cezaris SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3)YEARS, effective immediately. Let a copy of this Decision befurnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar ofthe Philippines, and all courts for their information andguidance.

SO ORDERED.

Case Digest

FACTS: ·         Atty. Homobono t. Cezar entered into a Deed ofAssignment for the price of P1.5M in favor of Marili C.Ronquillo, a Filipino citizen residing in Cannes, France hisrights and interests over a townhouse unit and lot and obligatedhimself to deliver to complainants a copy of the Contract to Sellhe executed with Crown Asia, the townhouse developer.

Respondent received P750,000.00 upon execution of the Deedof Assignment and was able to encash the first check ofP187,500.00.

Complainants subsequently received information from CrownAsia that respondent has not paid in full the price of thetownhouse and he also failed to deliver a copy of the Contract toSell he allegedly executed with Crown Asia. Complainant orderedstop payment on the second check of P187,500.00.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Homobono T. Cezar should be disbarredor suspended for deceit and grossly immoral conduct.

HELD:

YES, he should be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for aperiod of 3 YEARS.

·         Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules ofCourt, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on anyof the following grounds:  (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or othergross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4)conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of

the lawyer’s oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful orderof a superior court; and (7) willfully appearing as an attorneyfor a party without authority.

He did not inform the complainants that he has not yet paidin full the price of the subject townhouse unit and lot, and,therefore, he had no right to sell, transfer or assign saidproperty at the time of the execution of the Deed of Assignment.

Respondent’s adamant refusal to return to complainant MariliRonquillo the money she paid him, which was the fruit of herlabor as an Overseas Filipino Worker for 10 years, is morallyreprehensible.

Respondent failed to live up to the strict standard ofmorality required by the Code of Professional Responsibility andviolated the trust and respect reposed in him as a member of theBar, and an officer of the court.

Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at alltimes, whether they are dealing with their clients or the publicat large, and a violation of the high moral standards of thelegal profession whether or not the attorney is still fit to beallowed to continue as a member of the Bar; cannot rule on theissue of the amount of money that should be returned

[A.C. No. 4748.  August 4, 2000]

VICTORIA V. RADJAIE, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE O.ALOVERA, respondent.

D E C I S I O NPER CURIAM:

Atty. Jose O. Alovera, former Presiding Judge of the RegionalTrial Court of Roxas City, Branch 17, faces disbarment for havingpenned a Decision[1] dated January 30, 1995 long after hisretirement from the Judiciary on January 31, 1995 whichultimately divested complainant Victoria V. Radjaie of herproperty in Panay, Capiz.

 In an Affidavit-Complaint[2] filed before the Office of theBar Confidant on April 21, 1997,[3] complainant sought thedisbarment of respondent enumerating the following particulars tosupport her contention that the questioned January 30, 1995decision was prepared after the retirement of respondent:

a)  Almost all orders issued by then Judge Alovera prior tohis retirement bear the stamp "RECEIVED" by Branch 17 ofRTC-Roxas City, with the initial of the one who receivedit for filing with the court-record except the Order ofJanuary 25, 1995 (p. 87 records) admitting, and theDecision dated January 30, 1995 (pp. 88-93, ibid.).

b)  It can also be seen that all the orders issued prior tothe retirement were all type-written in the same type-[writer] except the January 25, 1995 Order (p. 87) andthe Decision (pp. 88-93) and these two (2) documentsappear to have been type-written on the same type-[writer].

c)  It is also a source of wonder why plaintiffs formallyoffered their evidence one year after the last witnesswas presented last December 10, 1993.

xxx  xxx                              xxx

Plaintiffs had until January 20, 1994 to formally offer theirevidence but it took them one (1) year and five (5) days to filesuch a simple pleading.  It goes against the normal humanexperience when plaintiffs who are allowed to presentevidence ex-parte   are usually very quick in having things donebecause there is no opposition but in this case it tookplaintiffs a while to formally rest which was only fifteen (15)days prior to the retirement of Mr. Alovera.  This timing ishighly suspect.

d)  Even plaintiffs' formal offer of evidence showed badgesof fraud.  It was not received by the trial court.  Page67 shows this clearly.  It would not be surprising if thesame was also inserted into the records on a much laterdate and Atty. Alberto Villaruz must be made to explainthis too.

It was dated January 20, 1995 but the date of the ProfessionalTax Receipt (PTR) of Atty. Alberto A. Villaruz, counsel for theplaintiffs, was issued only on January 31, 1995. This is shown onPage 71 of the records.

e)  There is no showing that the January 25, 1995 Order (p.87) admitting the formal offer was even received by aCourt staff for filing with the records.

f)   The same can be said of the January 30, 1995 Decision(pp. 88-93) which was allegedly decided five (5) daysafter the Order admitting the evidence (p. 87) wasallegedly issued.  What a swift action from a retiringjudge.

g)  A copy of the Decision was not even sent to the counselfor the plaintiffs but is shown to have been received byone of the plaintiffs only on August 1, 1995 (p. 93).

h)  Again, it is beyond the normal experience for a lawyersuch as Atty. Villaruz who is a practitioner in thelocality and who is in Court almost everyday that he willnot follow up if there is already a decision rendered ina case where he was allowed to present evidence ex-parteor even be told about it.

i)   The records show that all orders after the retirementof Mr. Alovera bear the stamp "RECEIVED" by the Courtstaff who received them for filing in the court records.

Traversing the allegations of the Affidavit-Complaint aspurely speculative and not based on personal knowledge, therespondent, in his Comment[4] dated August 20, 1997, furtherassailed as simply self-serving complainant's Affidavit-Complaintalleging that a careful scrutiny of the expediente of Civil Case

No. V-6186 would reveal that respondent observed due process whenhe resolved the said case against complainant.[5] It was only whenJudge Julius Abela, who succeeded him in RTC, Br. 17, Roxas City,annulled, through a resolution, the questioned January 30, 1995decision, which ostensibly having become final was also executed,did the matter get out of hand.[6] His said decision, respondentargued, may only be impeached, annulled or otherwise set asideunder three (3) modes,[7] all of which were either not availed ofby complainant for lapse of time, or like an action to annul thejudgment, though still available, should not have been filed inthe same court, which rendered the questioned decision, butshould have been filed, instead, in the Court of Appeals.[8] As tothe absence of stamp "RECEIVED" on the questioned decision,respondent shifted the blame to the then OIC Clerk of Court ofthe said court, Mrs. Nenita Aluad, contending that after thedecision was rendered on January 30, 1995, he lost control of itand he surmised that Mrs. Aluad, who had the duty to receive andrecord the decision, might have lost it "momentarily."[9]

In a Resolution[10] dated October 22, 1997, this Court referredthe instant case to the Office of the Bar Confidant forinvestigation, report and recommendation.  While in the processof investigation, three (3) incidents occurred, namely:

1.  The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), CapizChapter, approved Resolution No. 9, Series of 1997 onDecember 17, 1997, questioning the order, dated November28, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 17, RoxasCity, which ordered the suspension from the practice oflaw of herein respondent and Atty. Alberto Villaruz;

2.  The Court En Banc, in its Resolution of December 22,1997, resolved to issue a temporary restraining order(TRO) in G.R. No. 131505, entitled "Atty. Alberto A.Villaruz vs. Honorable Julius L. Abela," ordering therespondent judge therein to cease and desist fromenforcing and/or implementing his questioned order datedNovember 28, 1997 in Civil Case No. V-6186, which orderedthe suspension of Atty. Villaruz; and,

3.  Respondent Alovera filed a petition for certioraribefore the Supreme Court, entitled "Jose Alovera vs.Victoria Villariez-Radjaie and Judge Julius L. Abela,"under G.R. No. 131768, which, at the time was stillpending, questioning the Order of November 28, 1997 whichordered respondent's suspension from the practice of law.

Thus, necessitated the filing of the Manifestation[11] by theOffice of the Bar Confidant on January 27, 1998, inquiring fromthe Court whether to proceed with the investigation of the casein view of the aforementioned incidents.

On February 18, 1998, the Court directed the Office of the BarConfidant to proceed with the investigation of the instant case.[12]

Judge Julius Abela, Nenita M. Aluad, legal researcher,Teresita V. Bauzon, court stenographer, Concepcion Alcazar,clerk-in-charge of civil cases and special proceedings, all ofRegional Trial Court, Br. 17, Roxas City, Rosa Dapat, courtstenographer of Regional Trial Court, Br. 15, Roxas City and thecomplainant herself testified as witnesses for the complainant.

The respondent presented as his lone witness, Mrs. Rosa Dapat,who merely testified on the January 10, 1993 proceedings insidehis chambers.  Respondent himself did not testify and neither didany other witness testify for him, despite the issuance ofsubpoena ad testificandum on Ireneo Borres and Ludovico Buhat, whoboth failed to appear at the investigation. In lieu of their oraltestimonies, respondent offered and presented their respectiveaffidavits.[13] Complainant chose not to object thereto and evenwaived her right, through her counsel, to cross-examine them.

The established facts, as quoted from the Report datedNovember 17, 1999 of the Office of the Bar Confidant, are asfollows:

On July 2, 1992, the heirs of the late Faustina Borres, SegundinaBorres, Felisa Borres, Micaela Borres, Maria Bores, and SixtoBorres (hereinafter "Borres heirs") through their counsel, Atty.Alberto A. Villaruz, filed an action for Partition andAccounting, docketed as Civil Case No. V-6186, with the Regional

Trial Court, Br. 15, Roxas City, against herein complainant,Victoria V. Radjaie, who was presumably an heir of the lateFaustina Borres. The action sought, among others, thecancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-24150 in thename of herein complainant covering a parcel of land with an areaof 215,777 square meters situated in Panay, Capiz, and thedeclaration of the said parcel of land as property commonly ownedby the Borres heirs.

On July 16, 1993, Br. 17, to which Civil Case No. V-6186 was re-raffled, declared herein complainant in default and ordered theBorres heirs to present their evidence on July 30, 1993.[14]

It was only after three (3) postponements that the Borres heirswere able to start presenting their evidence ex-parte on October8, 1993.  For lack of material time, however, the presentation ofevidence was again reset to November 22, 1993, which again waspostponed and reset to December 10, 1993.[15]

On December 10, 1993, there were several criminal and civilactions scheduled for trial, which commenced at about 10:00 inthe morning, before Br. 17, including Civil Case No. V-6186,which was listed number four in the court calendar.  JudgeAlovera presided over the hearing and Teresita V. Bauzon, courtstenographer of Br. 17, took down notes of theProceedings.  Atty. Villaruz appeared for the accused in acriminal case[16] before Br. 17 at the time.  The court had arecess at 11:10 and resumed at 11:35 in the morning.  After thehearing of criminal cases was through, Civil Case No. V-6186 wascalled at about 11:55 in the morning, but the plaintiffs as wellas their counsel, Atty. Villaruz, were no longer inside thecourtroom.  The session thus adjourned at 11:57 in the morningwithout Civil Case No. V-6186 being heard.[17]

At about 11:30 in the morning of the same date, Atty. Villaruzapproached Rosa Dapat, who was the court stenographer at the timeof RTC, Br. 15, Roxas City, while she was in her office. Atty.Villaruz told her that Judge Alovera was requesting her to assistin the proceedings of Civil Case No. V-6186. At first she washesitant to accede to the request as Br. 17 had also its own

court stenographer. She relented though when told that Br. 17 aswell as the other branches had no available court stenographer.She then went to Br. 17 and saw Atty. Villaruz standing by thedoor of the chambers of Judge Alovera. Atty. Villaruz motionedher to enter the chambers, which is separate from the courtroom.While inside the chambers, she saw Judge Alovera behind his deskand other people whom she did not know. Upon being told that Mrs.Dapat would be the stenographer, Judge Alovera told Atty.Villaruz to start the proceedings.  Following the manifestationmade by Atty. Villaruz, a witness, whom she later recognized tobe Atty. Arturo Agudo, was called.  At that instant Judge Aloverastood up and said, "All right, you just continue," and then went outof the chambers.[18] Judge Alovera would occasionally return tothe chambers in the course of the proceedings, but he would justsit down and listen while Atty. Villaruz was conducting hisdirect examination of the witness and presenting documentaryevidence.[19] The proceedings lasted up to 12:10 in the afternoon,with Judge Alovera making only two rulings in the course thereof,including the one he made at the end when he ordered theplaintiffs to file their written offer of evidence on January 20,1994.[20]

 From this point on, complainant would establish how the January30, 1995 decision of Judge Alovera in Civil Case No. V-6186 cameabout.

Prior to his retirement from the judiciary on January 31, 1995,or on January 5, 1995, Judge Alovera designated his legalresearcher, Mrs. Nenita Aluad, to be the OIC Branch Clerk ofCourt.[21] As part of her functions as such OIC, all decisions,orders and resolutions of Br. 17 would first be received by herfrom the judge, and would stamp them "RECEIVED" and put thereonthe date of receipt as well as her initial or signature.[22]Thisis in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court.[23]

Sometime in February of 1995, Mrs. Teresita V. Bauzon, courtstenographer of Br. 17 since 1993, was asked to type the draftdecision in Civil Case No. V-6186 in Judge Alovera's house. Whenshe inquired if he can still do it, Judge Alovera told her thathe had one  (1) year more to decide cases. With this assurance,

she typed the draft decision on a single bond paper without aduplicate as Judge Alovera was dictating it.[24]

On August 1, 1995 at about 9:30 in the morning, retired JudgeAlovera came to Br. 17, with a man and a woman, later identifiedas the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. V-6186, behind him. While hewas approaching Nenita Aluad, he uttered to the latter, "Receivethis, receive this, " referring to the questioned January 30, 1995decision, which he was holding. As he spread the decision on hertable, he continued, "Because I will defend you even up to the Plaza Miranda.And give copies to these two, pointing to the plaintiffs who were at hisback.[25] Almost instantaneously, Mrs. Aluad replied, " I would notreceive it because it is already August 1, 1995," and she did not argue withhim anymore so as not to embarrass him for being her formersuperior.[26] She then went out of the office while retired JudgeAlovera, as well as the two plaintiffs were still inside.[27]Atabout the same time, Mrs. Concepcion Alcazar, another employee ofBr. 17 and the clerk-in-charge of civil cases and specialproceedings therein, saw Judge Alovera inside the office of Br.17 while trying to have her co-employees receive the questioneddecision.  Nobody, however, received the same because it wasalready seven (7) months after his retirement.[28] A little later,she found the questioned decision, together with the formal offerof exhibits of January 20, 1995 and the order of January 25,1995, on the top of her table. Although she noticed that theserecords were not stamped "RECEIVED" as a matter of procedure, shewent on to attach the said records to the expediente of Civil CaseNo. V-6186.[29] She even gave a copy of the questioned decision toone of the plaintiffs, Ireneo Borres, and to Atty. Villaruz,which was received for him by Ireneo Borres.[30] After keepingthe expediente, she then entered the questioned decision in herlogbook.[31]

The Borres heirs succeeded in having the questioned decisionexecuted when, on January 31, 1996, the lessee of the property,which is the subject matter of Civil Case No. V-6186, surrenderedpossession of the said property in favor of the Borres heirs,[32] Said transfer of possession was made pursuant to the writ ofexecution issued on January 19, 1996 by the Acting Presiding

Judge of Br. 17, Hon. Delano F. Villaruz, through Clerk of CourtSusan Mendoza Arce.[33]

Meanwhile, complainant, who had been working in Japan togetherwith his husband who is employed at the Turkish Embassy in Tokyo,Japan, learned of what happened to her property in Panay, Capiz.[34] She was thus prompted to come back to the Philippines, whichresulted in losing her job in Japan.

Back home, complainant, on March 5, 1996, filed a Petition forRelief from Order, questioning the January 30, 1995 decision andthe January 19, 1996 Writ of Execution.[35] She also prayed "thatdisciplinary and contempt proceedings be taken against thoseinvolved in the perfidious anomaly to tamper with theadministration of justice."[36]

Judge Julius L. Abela took cognizance of Civil Case No. V-6186 ashe was the acting presiding judge of Br. 17 at the time of thefiling of said petition for relief from order.[37] In the courseof the proceedings thereof, he noticed that the Formal Offer ofExhibits purportedly filed by the plaintiffs, i.e., Borres heirs,was dated January 20, 1995, while the PTR of their counsel, Atty.Alberto Villaruz, was issued on January 31, 1995. He concludedthen that the said offer could not have been filed on January 20,1995. When he asked Atty. Villaruz about it, the latter refusedto answer and just kept quiet.[38] He likewise observed that therewas no order in Civil Case No. V-6186 submitting the same fordecision, except for the order made by Judge Alovera on December10, 1993 during the "simulated proceedings" inside his chambers,where he directed the counsel for the plaintiffs to file hisoffer of exhibits.[39] Mrs. Rosa Dapat, who took down notes duringthe said proceedings and who was not a member of the staff of Br.17, was not even acknowledged on the records as the officialstenographer in the course thereof.[40] Thus, in his resolution ofSeptember 25, 1997, Judge Abela granted the petition for relieffiled by complainant and the latter was ordered reinstated to thepossession of the property in question. In the same resolution,Judge Abela declared the January 30, 1995 decision null and void,the same not being filed with the clerk of court and not properly

rendered in accordance with Section 1, Rule 36, Rules of Court.[41]

Prompted by what he considered to be anomalous proceedings,coupled with the prayer of complainant in her petition for relief"that disciplinary and contempt proceedings be taken againstthose involved in the perfidious anomaly to tamper with theadministration of justice," Judge Abela conducted aninvestigation into the said anomaly.[42] After considering thetestimonies of Misses Aluad, Dapat, Bauzon and Alcazar during theinvestigation, together with the documentary evidence presented,he concluded, thus:

From the foregoing facts and circumstances the following factsare established that:

1)  Civil Case No. V-6186 was not tried on December 10,1993. What transpired was a mock or simulated trialinside the chamber of Judge Alovera where only Atty.Alberto Villaruz, the plaintiffs and Mrs. Rosa Dapat, acourt stenographer from another court, were present. NoJudge or RTC Branch 17 court personnel were present asthere was actual court session in open court going on atthat time.

2)  The records of Civil Case No. V-6186 were with JudgeJose O. Alovera and remained with him even after hisretirement on January 31, 1995. He did not return therecord to Mrs. Concepcion Alcazar, Court Clerk III inCharge of Civil Cases.

3)  The record of Civil Case No. V-6186 turned up on thetable of Mrs. Alcazar together with the "Offer ofExhibits" of Atty. Villaruz dated January 20, 1995 andthe "Order" dated January 25, 1995, after the retirementof Judge Alovera. Both the Offer and the Order admittingthe exhibits were not properly filed and do not bearmarkings of having been received by the court.

4)  The "decision" of Judge Jose O. Alovera, though datedJanuary 30, 1995, was filed with the court on August 1,

1995 by former Judge Alovera himself and because he wasno longer a judge his submission was refused.

- CONCLUSIONS -

The "Offer of Exhibits" of Atty. Alberto Villaruz though datedJanuary 20, 1995 bears signature and PTR No. issued on January31, 1995. This simply means that the pleadings (were) ante dated.It is impossible for Atty. Villaruz to affix his PTR No. datedJanuary 31, 1995 or any date prior to its issuance. The Offer ofExhibits could have been made only on January 31, 1995 or later.Because this is so, the Order of Judge Alovera dated January 25,1995 is also ante dated and could have been made only on a datebeyond the filing of the Offer of Exhibits. So also with thedecision of former Judge Alovera dated January 30, 1995.

xxx  xxx                              xxx

The Order admitting the exhibits and the decision were made afterthe retirement of Judge Alovera. He was no longer a judge.

The acts of Attys. Alberto Villaruz and Jose O. Aloveraconstitute deceit, malpractice, serious and grave misconduct aslawyer justifying their suspension from the practice of law andultimately their disbarment.[43]

 Based on the foregoing findings, the Bar Confidantrecommended the disbarment of respondent, declaring that it foundmore than sufficient evidence to sustain complainant's chargeagainst respondent that, indeed, the January 30, 1995 decision inCivil Case No. V-6186, which divested complainant of her propertyin Panay, Capiz, was penned by respondent after his retirementfrom the judiciary on January 31, 1995.

This Court finds the recommendation of the Office of the BarConfidant to be well-taken. Respondent has thus sufficientlydemonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to remain inthe exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession.

In his long years as a lawyer, respondent has forgotten hissworn pledge as a lawyer. It is time once again that the Courtinculcate in the hearts of all lawyers that pledge; thus -

LAWYER'S OATH

" I, x x x, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance tothe Republic of the Philippines; I will support and defend itsConstitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of theduly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood norconsent to its commission; I will not wittingly or willinglypromote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor giveaid nor consent to the same; I will not delay any man's cause formoney or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer according tothe best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity aswell to the courts as to my clients and I impose upon myself thisobligation voluntary, without any mental reservation or purposeof evasion.

SO HELP ME GOD.

This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemnagreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice, isnot a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law[44] to beforgotten afterwards nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, buta sacred trust that every lawyer must uphold and keep inviolableat all times.[45] This oath is firmly echoed and reflected in theCode of Professional Responsibility, the particular provisions ofwhich are applicable to the case at bar, provide, to wit:

CANON 1 -           A lawyer shall uphold the constitution,obey the laws of the land and promote respect forlaw and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activitiesaimed at defiance of the law or at lesseningconfidence in the legal system.

xxx  xxx                              xxx

CANON 7 -           A lawyer shall at all times uphold theintegrity and dignity of the legal profession, andsupport the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct thatadversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,nor should he, whether in public or private life,behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit ofthe legal profession.

xxx  xxx                              xxxCANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to

the court.Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor

consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall hemislead or allow the court to be misled by anyartifice.

All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard ofour legal system. When respondent took the oath as a member ofthe legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so stand by hispledge.[46] In this covenant, respondent miserably failed.

The testimonies of Nenita M. Aluad, Teresita V. Bauzon andConcepcion Alcazar were all quite telling on how respondent actedin a grossly reprehensible manner in having the questioneddecision dated January 30, 1995 come to fore, leading ultimatelyto its execution divesting the complainant of herproperty.  Respondent gravely abused his relationship with hisformer staff, pompously flaunting his erstwhile standing as ajudge.  Respondent disregarded his primary duty as an officer ofthe court, who is sworn to assist the courts and not to impede orpervert the administration of justice to all and sundry.[47] In sodoing, he made a mockery of the judiciary and eroded publicconfidence in courts and lawyers.

This Court has been nothing short of exacting in its demandfor integrity and good moral character from members of theBar.  By swearing the lawyer's oath, an attorney becomes aguardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensableinstrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice -

a vital function of democracy a failure of which is disastrous tosociety.  Any departure from the path which a lawyer must followas demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not betolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority[48] forthere is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministryin which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that oflaw.[49]

Despite the opportunities accorded to respondent to presentsubstantial defense to refute the charges against him, he failedneither to do so nor to offer a valid explanation.  When theintegrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enoughthat he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issueand overcome the evidence against him.  He must show proof thathe still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which atall times is expected of him.[50]

Given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in thiscase, the Court finds as appropriate the recommended penalty ofthe Office of the Bar Confidant in its Report.  Such grossmisconduct of the respondent brings intolerable dishonor to thelegal profession and calls for the severance of respondent’sprivilege to practice law for life.

WHEREFORE, respondent JOSE O. ALOVERA is herebyDISBARRED.  The Office of the Clerk of Court is directed tostrike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys and to inform allcourts of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[B.M. No. 1154.  June 8, 2004]

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEEHARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS ANDFOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINESHARI’A BAR,

ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,

R E S O L U T I O NTINGA, J.:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twinreliefs, one of which is ripe while the other has been renderedmoot by a supervening event.

The antecedents follow.On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez)

filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition[1] todisqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 BarExaminations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinarypenalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclosein his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he hasthree (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Courtin Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely:  Criminal Cases Noa.15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and CriminalCase No.  15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident whichoccurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttereddefamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of mediapractitioners and other people.  Meling also purportedly attacked

and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to thelatter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using thetitle “Attorney” in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayorof Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of theBar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which showsthat Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to havebeen received by the Sangguniang Panglungsodof Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court’s Resolution[2] dated December 3, 2002,Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.

In his Answer,[3] Meling explains that he did not disclose thecriminal cases filed against him by Melendrez because retiredJudge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him tosettle his misunderstanding with Melendrez.  Believing in goodfaith that the case would be settled because the said Judge hasmoral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor inthe College of Law, Meling considered the three cases thatactually arose from a single incident and involving the sameparties as “closed and terminated.”  Moreover, Meling denies thecharges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moralturpitude.

As regards the use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits thatsome of his communications really contained the word “Attorney”as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation[4] dated December 8, 2003, the OBCdisposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling in thiswise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous.  He should have known that only the court of competentjurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor.  In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending.  Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character.  Petitions to

take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.

The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case.  What matters is his act of concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.

In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he isheld by the public in the place where he is known.  Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables aperson to escape the penalty of criminal law.  Good moral character includes at least common honesty.

The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that “a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.”[5]

As regards Meling’s use of the title “Attorney”, the OBC hadthis to say:

Anent the issue of the use of the appellation “Attorney” in his letters, the explanation of Meling is not acceptable.  Aware thathe is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as “attorney” whoever may have typed the letters.

Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is signing his communications as“Atty. Haron S. Meling” knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto.  As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation “attorney” may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.[6]

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowedto take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in theevent that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, itrecommended that Meling’s membership in the Shari’a Bar besuspended until further orders from the Court.[7]

We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of theOBC.  Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 BarExaminations.  This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks toprevent Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Rollof Attorneys, moot and academic.

On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Courtto impose the appropriate sanctions upon him as a member of theShari’a Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’aCourt, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege bestowedupon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who arealso known to possess good moral character.[8]  The requirement ofgood moral character is not only a condition precedent toadmission to the practice of law, its continued possession isalso essential for remaining in the practice of law.[9]

The standard form issued in connection with the application totake the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant to averthat he or she “has not been charged with any act or omissionpunishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge,officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused orconvicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crimeinvolving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case orcharge against him/her.”  Despite the declaration required by theform, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminalcases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done underoath at that.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court todetermine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good moralcharacter of the applicant.[10] The nature of whatever cases arepending against the applicant would aid the Court in determiningwhether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of alawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant

then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimatelyproven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect thegood moral character of the applicant.

Meling’s concealment of the fact that there are three (3)pending criminal cases against him speaks of his lack of therequisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture ofthe privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar.

Moreover, his use of the appellation “Attorney”, knowing fullywell that he is not entitled to its use, cannot gounchecked.  In Alawi v. Alauya,[11]the Court had the occasion todiscuss the impropriety of the use of the title “Attorney” bymembers of the Shari’a Bar who are not likewise members of thePhilippine Bar.  The respondent therein, an executive clerk ofcourt of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City, usedthe title “Attorney” in several correspondence in connection withthe rescission of a contract entered into by him in his privatecapacity.  The Court declared that:

…persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members ofthe Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before Shari’a courts.  While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered “counselors,” in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an “attorney.”  The title “attorney” is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.[12]

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of thecourt, such as Meling in this case.  The solemn task ofadministering justice demands that those who are privileged to bepart of service therein, from the highest official to thelowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated, butlikewise live and practice the virtues of honesty andintegrity.  Anything short of this standard would diminish the

public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to theconstitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.

In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of hismarriage in his application to take the Bar examinations and madeconflicting submissions before the Court.  As a result, we foundthe respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in thepractice of law and suspended him therefrom until further ordersfrom the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks theimposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as amember of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.  Accordingly, themembership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar ishereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, thesuspension to take effect immediately. Insofar asthe Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking theLawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member ofthe Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become mootand academic.

Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Shari’aCourts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 997 September 10, 1979

PILAR ABAIGAR, complainant, vs.DAVID D.C. PAZ, respondent.

 

FERNANDEZ, J.:

On April 27, 1971, Pilar Abaigar filed this administrative case for disbarment against David D. C. Paz, a member of the Philippine Bar.

The verified complaint alleged that sometime in March 1970, the complainant, Pilar Abaigar sought the aid of a legal counsel regarding herdivorce case filed by her husband in the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, U.S.A.; that she called on the telephone the office of Congressman Bagatsing in Manila; that the respondent David D.C. Paz, answered the telephone call and volunteered his legal services; that believing that the respondent had the necessary legal experience, the complainant confided her legal problems to him: that after the terminationof the divorce case, the respondent became exceedingly friendly with the complainant and started to profess his love for her; that at the start, the complainant was hesitant in continuing the cordial relations between her and the respondent but the respondent made her believe that although he was living with another woman, his relations with said woman were no impediment that the respondent convinced the complainant that he had been compelled to contract a civil marriage with the woman and that since it was not a marriage under the church laws, it was no bar for him to get married under the church laws with the complainant; that the respondent proposed marriage to the complainant; that believing in this good faith, the complainant accepted the proposal of the respondent; that sometime in the latter part of November 1970, an application for the issuance of a marriage license to the complainant and the respondent was made and executed: that thereafter, the respondent convinced the complainant that since they were going to get married anyway, they should act as husband and wife; that because of the confidence which the complainant reposed upon the respondent, she reluctantly acceded to said demands; that as a

result of their being together, the complainant became pregnant but due tocauses beyond her control, the pregnancy was lost; that sometime in the third week of April 1971, one Virginia Paz was introduced to the complainant by the respondent; that said Virginia Paz was the woman previously referred to by the respondent as his wife with whom he had contracted a forced civil marriage; that said Virginia Paz, in the course of the meeting, informed the complainant that there had been actually two marriages between Virginia Paz and the respondent, one under the civil lawand one under the church law; that upon being confronted by the complainant, the respondent made no explanation whatsoever and merely keptsilent; that since that time, the respondent had done nothing to make amends for having deceived the complainant and for having taken advantage of her; and that the complainant has no other recourse but to ask for the disbarment of the respondent who is a member of the Philippine Bar and an officer of the courts of justice. 1

In his answer filed on June 10, 1971, the respondent denied having had anyillicit relations with the complainant and alleged that when the complainant called by telephone Congressman Ramon D. Bagatsing, the respondent advised complainant to come to the office; that on the next daywhen the complainant came to the office of Congressman Bagatsing, she was at first referred to Atty. Geronimo Flores of the Legal Assistance Serviceto handle the case; that two or three days thereafter, the complainant requested the respondent to personally handle her case; that on October 30, 1970, the respondent prepared a letter to complainant's husband, Samuel L. Navales, which letter was signed by Congressman Bagatsing; that sometime in the latter part of October 1970, the complainant borrowed fromthe respondent the sum of P200.00 to complete the payment for the hospitalization and treatment of her brother, Eric, at the Makati Medical Center: that as a act of pity, the respondent gave her the loan; that after the election for delegates to the Constitutional Convention in November 1970, the complainant called at the residence of the respondent and asked help in filing a case against the assailant of her brother who was stabbed in Olongapo City; that the wound sustained by complainant's brother was only superficial and he could not Identify his assailant, hence, no criminal case was filed; that after the trip to Olongapo, the complainant requested the help of the respondent to recommend her admission to a hospital because of abdominal and chest pains; that the respondent recommended complainant to be admitted to the Singian Clinic located at General Solano Street, San Miguel Manila; that on December 20, 1970, the complainant caged up the respondent at his residence by telephone and requested him to assist her mother, Mrs. Cecilia Abaigar to file a criminal action against her minor sister, Vilma Abaigar for disobedience; that the respondent prepares a complaint on the same night and a sworn statement of her mother, Mrs. Cecilia Abaigar that he

accompanied the complainant to the Fiscal's Office at Pasig, Rizal and to the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal where Criminal Case No. 23994 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Vilma Abaigar was filed by her mother; that the respondent also helped the mother of the complainant to prepare and file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Rizal; that by reason of said petition for habeas corpus, the mother of the complainant was able to take Vilma Abaigar into her custody although the petition was denied; that the respondent had never informed the complainant that he was compelled to contract a civil marriage with his wife; that the respondent never proposed marriage to thecomplainant; that the respondent has no recollection of the supposed application for the issuance of a marriage license in the latter part of November 1970; that respondent and complainant had never acted as husband and wife; and that the respondent had not deceived complainant nor taken advantage of her. 2

In a resolution dated August 20, 1971, this Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 3

After hearing the parties, the Solicitor General submitted on June 30, 1973 his report and recommendation containing the following findings:

The complaint seeks the disbarment of respondent Paz on grounds that may properly fall under the category of deceit and grossly immoral conduct as found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Assuming for the moment that there had been sexual intercoursebetween complainant and respondent, the first inquiry, we respectfully submit, is whether respondent Paz practiced demotion on complainant by making her believe that notwithstanding their subsisting marriages to their respectivespouses, they could legally get married to each other and based on his promise of marriage, she consented to go to bed with him.

Complainant admitted that during her alleged romantic liason with respondent, she was married to a certain Samuel Navales, also a Filipino, who divorced her in the U.S.A. sometime in the middle of 1970 (par. 2, Complaint; p. 46, t.s.n., November18, 1971). She also admitted that before she submitted herselfto his sexual desires, she was informed by him that, he had a wife with whom he was civilly married but that the marriage was void because it was either fake or 'forced' (sic).

Whether there was deceit hinges on whether complainant actually believed the representation of respondent that they could legally marry. Highly intelligent that she is and with the educational background that she has, it is difficult to accept the proposition that she swallowed hook, line and sinker his supposed assurances that notwithstanding full awareness by both of the existence of each other's previous marriages, no legal impediment stood in the way of their getting married ecclesiastically. It is worthwhile repeating that complainant was a fifth placer in the Board Examinations for Chemical Engineering. She was licensed as a chemical engineer in 1964 or 1965, after which she taught at one time or another in different schools and colleges in Manila. In 1970 or 1971 when she was supposedly tricked into surrenderingher body on a promise of marriage, she was already in her latetwenties. It is improbable that at this age, she was still ignorant of the law regarding indissolubility of marriage. Before jumping headlong into accepting respondent's proposal that they act as husband and wife, she should have pondered upon the serious legal implications and complications of a second marriage for both of them. She could have easily asked a lawyer for advice on the matter. Complainant's own neighbor in Mandaluyong, Rizal is a lawyer by the name of Atty. Paler whose wife testified on her behalf. According to Mrs. Paler, her husband and complainant used to converse (p. 18, t.s.n., November 23, 1971). In these conversations complainant could have asked, perhaps in a casual manner, Mrs. Paler's husband as to the legal effects of a divorce obtained abroad by a Filipino citizen or the effects of a marriage brought about through the use of force and intimidation in order to settle whatever doubts she had in her mind.

The truth however, of the matter is that complainant did not even have to consult a lawyer to know that she could not legally marry respondent. It is of no little significance thatsome persons utilized by complainant as witnesses on her behalf because of their supposed knowledge of her relations with respondent, were themselves aware that divorce is not recognized in this country. Thus Mrs. Paler categorically stated that she knew for a fact that divorce obtained abroad is not recognized in the Philippines (p. 19, t.s.n., November 23, 1971). The same admission was elicited from Fr. Troy de los Santos, another witness for the complainant. Fr. de los Santos who used to be her spiritual adviser admitted at one point of his testimony that divorce obtained abroad cannot be

recognized in the Philippines insofar as state laws are concerned and complainant knew about this (pp. 33-34, t.s.n., November 23, 1971). Thus, the Jesuit priest declared under cross-examination:

Q Do you know that complainant's husband is still alive?

A Yes.

Q Up to the present?

A Yes.

Q Do you know that divorce is not recognized in thePhilippines?

A I know, but the church does not recognize divorce.

Q How about the State, do you know that the State recognize divorce?

A As far as my knowledge, I do not think that our laws permit divorce.

Continuing with his testimony, Fr. de los Santos stated:

Q Did not the fact that complainant's husband is still have and that divorce is not recognized in ' the Philippines be considered an impediment to complainant's marriage to anyone?

A Yes.

Q Did you inform her so?

A She knows about that.

(33,34, t.s.n., Id.)

Again, granting that complainant did not actually comprehend the existence of a legal bar to her remarriage, 'not being steeped in the intricacies of the law'. just the mere realization that both respondent's wife and her own husband

being still have was enough to stir her mind and to impel her to make her own investigation. She could have, for instance, made discreet inquiries as to who was the woman respondent wasmarried to and verified his claim whether he was forced into the marriage. Or, perhaps, she could simply have asked Congressman Bagatsing about respondent's personal status. After all she was competent enough to prepare, without anyone's help her own affidavit, Exhibit 'A', and resourceful enough to make research in the Supreme Court's Library on the subject of disbarment (pp. 63, 89, t.s.n., November 18, 1971).

What conclusion then can a reasonable mind draw from the givenpremises? Either complainant was so helplessly naive as to be beguiled by respondent's blandishments or. comprehending fullythe legal impossibility of the fulfillment of his marriage proposals, she unconditionally laid herself prostrate to his charms, too much enamored of him to care about anything else. For, as philosopher Blaise Pascal has so pithily stated of theprofundity of human love, 'love has reasons that reason cannotexplain.' Since complainant cannot hide behind the camouflage of innocence, considering her intellectual capacity and educational background, no other conclusion is possible 'except that she voluntarily submitted to sexual intimacy withrespondent without entertaining any illusion or hope of sublimating the illicit relations by legal union.

The question is intriguing whether respondent ever made vehement protestations of love and actually made an offer of marriage to complainant. If there was, the evidence adduced does not clearly show. Complainant asserted that she had evidence in the form of love letters and the marriage application form showing respondent's sustained courtship and offer of marriage. However, such purported documents were not presented, complainant making the excuse that respondent tricked her into giving him the envelope containing the evidence. Such explanation, however, staggers human credulity considering that the supposed documents were vital to establish the case. It is simply preposterous that she would easily Dart with the documents and give them to no other than the respondent himself . Be that as it may, if respondent had made an offer of marriage, it is not clearly established that complainant's submission to his sexual desires was not on account of the offer but for the gratification of her mundane human longings.

The next question is whether there was sexual intimacy betweencomplainant and respondent. Complainant testified that she acceded to his proposal that they live as husband and wife andas a matter of fact they had three sexual intercourses that took place in THE TOWER HOTEL  and Singian Clinic in Manila and in the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City. While there is no proof that sexual intimacy took place in Singian Clinic except her testimony, her allegation that they had trysts at the Tower Hotel and Sulo Hotel was supported by the guest cards at said hotels, Exhibits 'A' and 'B'. Notwithstanding respondent's denial that the 'Mrs.' stated in the entry in said guest cardswas a 'good-time' woman, not the complainant, common sense will tell us that complainant could not have known that respondent lodged in said hotels on those particular dates unless she was the woman whom respondent brought there. On this score, we are inclined to believe that evidence has been sufficiently adduced to establish that intimacy between complainant and respondent took place once in the Tower Hotel and once in the Sulo Hotel. As the Honorable Court has stated,when the lawyer's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issues and overcome the evidence for the relator and to show proof that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all times he is expected of him (Quingwa vs. Puno, Adm. Case No. 389, Feb. 28, 1967; 19 SCRA 439). Insofar as this point is concerned, the evidence ofthe complainant as to the trysts they had in the two hotels has not been met and overthrown by respondent. 4

Upon considering the report and recommendation filed by the Solicitor General, this Court, in a resolution dated July 29, 1972, resolved to require the Solicitor General to file the corresponding complaint against the respondent, David D.C. Paz, pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court. 5

On September 4, 1975, the Solicitor General filed the corresponding complaint against David D.C. Paz praying that the respondent be suspended for a period of at least six months from the practice of law, with a warning that similar transgressions in the future win be dealt with more severely.

Meanwhile the complainant sent a verified letter-petition dated March 29, 1974 to the then Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal wherein the complainant asked this Court to look into the suspicious activities of a certain Rodolfo del Prado, who allegedly in connivance with the

respondent, David D.C. Paz, made her sign an affidavit prejudicial to her interest. Among other allegations, the complainant stated in her verified complaint the following.

6. That there never is an illicit relationship between Atty. Paz and me at present because I believed all along that he wassingle and able to marry me. In fact, our relationship is above- board just like any engaged couple.

7. That I was made to understand by the Citizens Legal Assistant Office that the tenor of the affidavit made by Mr. Rudolfo Del Prado is such that the consideration for the illicit relationship was promissory note which to all intents and purposes is immoral and illegal.

8. That I am only after the collection of the loan which Atty.Paz got from me and not revenge for his deception. 6

The foregoing portions of her letter militate against the credibility of the complainant.

In her complainant for disbarment, she pictured the respondent as morally perverse. However, in the aforementioned letter, she states that there never was an illicit relationship between her and the respondent, Atty. David D.C. Paz, and that their relationship was aboveboard just like any engaged couple. And finally, she avers that she was only after the collection of the loan which the respondent got from her and not for revenge for his deception.

It has been held that the power of this Court to disbar a lawyer should beexercised with caution because of its serious consequences. 7 The burden ofproof rests upon the complainant and the case against a respondent must be established by convincing proof. 8

In Arboleda vs. Gatchalian, this Court held:

The Court has held that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant and the charge against thelawyer must be established by convincing proof (Go vs. Candoy,A.C. No. 736, Oct. 23, 1967, 21 SCRA 439; Toquib vs. Tomol, Jr., A.C. No. 554, March 25, 1970, 32 SCRA 156; in re Atty. Felizardo M. de Guzman, A.C. No. 838, Jan. 21. 1974, 55 SCRA 139). The record must disclose as free from doubt a case whichcompels the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary powers.The corrupt character of the act done must be clearly

demonstrated. Moreover' considering the serious consequences, of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, We have consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of either penalty (De Guzman vs. Tadeo, 68 Phil. 554; Lim vs. Antonio, A.C. No. 848,Sept. 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 44). This Court likewise held that where there is no proof that respondent lawyer was guilty of any unethical conduct, harassment and malpractice, the disbarment case against him should be dismissed (Ricafort vs. Baltazar, A.C. No. 661, June 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 418; Delos Santos vs. Bolanos A.C. No. 483, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 763). 9

The evidence adduced by the complainant has failed to establish any cause for disciplinary action against the respondent. As the Solicitor General said in his report, "From all indications, there is little room for doubt that she filed his disbarment case not in redress of a wrong, for there was no wrong committed. It was a voluntary act of indiscretion between twoconsenting adults who were fully aware of the consequences of their deed and for which they were responsible only to their own private consciences."

WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint for disbarment is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme CourtManila

  

EN BANC A-1 FINANCIAL SERVICES,INC.,                                      Complainant,    

     

                   - versus -

       ATTY. LAARNI N. VALERIO,                        Respondent.

      A.C. No. 8390        [Formerly CBD 06-

1641]      Present:      CORONA, C.J.,     CARPIO,     CARPIO-MORALES,     VELASCO, JR.,     NACHURA,     LEONARDO-DECASTRO,     BRION,*

     PERALTA,     BERSAMIN,     DEL CASTILLO,     ABAD,     VILLARAMA, JR.,     PEREZ, and     MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated:

          July 2, 2010

x  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N PERALTA, J.:  

Before us is a Complaint[1] dated January 18,2006  for disciplinary action against respondent Atty.Laarni N. Valerio filed by A-1 Financial Services,Inc., represented by Diego S. Reunilla, its accountofficer, with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBDCase No. 06-1642, now A.C. No. 8390, for violationof Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) and non-payment ofdebt.

 On November 13, 2001, A-1 Financial Services, Inc.,

a financing corporation, granted the loan applicationof Atty. Valerio amounting to P50,000.00. To secure thepayment of the loan obligation, Atty. Valerio issued apostdated check, to wit: Check No. 0000012725; dated April 1,2002, in the amount: P50,000.00.[2] However, upon presentationat the bank for payment on its maturity date, the checkwas dishonored due to insufficient funds. As of thefiling of the instant case, despite repeated demands topay her obligation, Atty. Valerio failed to pay thewhole amount of her obligation.

 Thus, on November 10, 2003, complainant filed a

B.P. 22 case against Atty. Valerio, docketed asCriminal Case No. 124779. Atty. Valerio’s arraignment

was scheduled for August 31, 2004; however, she failedto appear despite due notice.[3] Subsequently, a Warrantof Arrest[4] was issued but Atty. Valerio posted nobail.   On November 22,  2004, complainant sent aletter[5] to Atty. Valerio calling her attention to theissuance of the Warrant of Arrest against her andrequested her to submit to the jurisdiction of thecourt by posting bail. The said letter was received byAtty. Valerio, as evidenced by the postal registryreturn cards.[6] Despite court orders and notices, Atty.Valerio refused to abide.

 On January 18, 2006, complainant filed an

administrative complaint against Atty. Valerio beforethe Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). On January26, 2006, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) required Atty. Valerio to file an answer, but shedid not file any responsive pleading at all.  However,in a letter[7] dated March 16, 2006, respondent’smother, Gorgonia N. Valerio (Mrs. Valerio), explainedthat her daughter had been diagnosed with schizophrenia;thus, could not properly respond to the complaintagainst her.  Futhermore, Mrs. Valerio undertook topersonally settle her daughter’s obligation.

 On September 13, 2007, the IBP-CBD directed Atty.

Valerio to appear before the mandatory conference.Atty. Valerio, again, failed to attend the conference.Subsequently, in an Order dated November 15, 2007, theIBP ordered the parties to submit their positionpapers.  No position paper was submitted by Atty.Valerio.

 

Thus, in its Report and Recommendationdated September 16, 2008, the IBP-CBD recommended thatAtty. Valerio be suspended from the practice of law fora period of two (2) years, having found her guilty ofgross misconduct.

 The IBP-CBD gave no credence to the medical

certificate submitted by Atty. Valerio’s mother, inview of the latter’s failure to appear before the IBP-CBD hearings to affirm the truthfulness thereof orpresent the physician who issued the same.  The IBP-CBD, further, pointed out that Atty. Valerio’s failureto obey court processes, more particularly her failureto appear at her arraignment despite due notice and tosurrender to the Court despite the issuance of awarrant of arrest, showed her lack of respect forauthority and, thus, rendered her morally unfit to be amember of the bar.[8]

 On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors

adopted and approved with modification the report andrecommendation of the IBP-CBD.   Atty. Valerio wasinstead ordered suspended from the practice of law fora period of one (1) year.

 Nevertheless, to provide Atty. Valerio further

opportunity to explain her side, the Court, in aResolution dated December 15, 2010, directed Atty.Valerio and/or her mother, to submit a duly notarizedmedical certificate issued by a duly licensed physicianand/or certified copies of medical records to supportthe claim of schizophrenia on the part of Atty. Valeriowithin a non-extendible period of ten (10) days fromreceipt hereof.

           However, despite the lapse of considerabletime after the receipt of notice[9] to comply with thesaid Resolution, no medical certificate or medicalrecords were submitted to this Court by eitherrespondent and/or her mother. Thus, this resolution.           We sustain the findings and recommendationsof the IBP-CBD.         

In Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,[10] we held that: 

x x x [the] deliberate failure to pay just debtsand the issuance of worthless checks constitutegross misconduct, for which a lawyer may besanctioned with suspension from the practice oflaw. Lawyers are instruments for theadministration of justice and vanguards of ourlegal system. They are expected to maintain notonly legal proficiency but also a high standardof morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealingso that the people’s faith and confidence in thejudicial system is ensured. They must at alltimes faithfully perform their duties tosociety, to the bar, the courts and to theirclients, which include prompt payment offinancial obligations. They must conductthemselves in a manner that reflects the valuesand norms of the legal profession as embodied inthe Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1and Rule 1.01 explicitly states that:

 Canon 1— A lawyer shall uphold theconstitution, obey the laws of the land

and promote respect for law and forlegal processes. Rule 1.01—A lawyer shall not engage inunlawful, dishonest, immoral ordeceitful conduct.

          In the instant case, there is no denial ofthe existence of the loan obligation despiterespondent’s failure to cooperate before anyproceedings in relation to the complaint. Prior to thefiling of the complaint against her, Atty. Valerio’sact of making partial payments of the loan and interestsuffices as proof that indeed there is an obligation topay on her part. Respondent’s mother, Mrs. Valerio,likewise, acknowledged her daughter’s obligation.           The Court, likewise, finds unmeritorious Mrs.Valerio’s justification that her daughter, Atty.Valerio, is suffering from a healthcondition, i.e. schizophrenia, which has prevented her fromproperly answering the complaint against her. Indeed,we cannot take the “medical certificate” on its face,considering Mrs. Valerio’s failure to prove thecontents of the certificate or present the physicianwho issued it.           Atty. Valerio’s conduct in the course of theIBP and court proceedings is also a matter of seriousconcern. She failed to answer the complaint againsther. Despite due notice, she failed to attend thedisciplinary hearings set by the IBP. She also ignoredthe proceedings before the court as she likewise failedto both answer the complaint against her and appearduring her arraignment, despite orders and notices from

the court. Clearly, this conduct runs counter to theprecepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility andviolates the lawyer’s oath which imposes upon everymember of the Bar the duty to delay no man for money ormalice. Atty. Valerio has failed to live up to thevalues and norms of the legal profession as embodied inthe Code of Professional Responsibility.           In Ngayan v. Tugade,[11] we ruled that “[alawyer’s] failure to answer the complaint against himand his failure to appear at the investigation areevidence of his flouting resistance to lawful orders ofthe court and illustrate his despiciency for his oathof office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138 of theRules of Court. 

We come to the penalty imposable in this case. In Lao v. Medel,[12] we held that the deliberate

failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthlesschecks constitute gross misconduct for which a lawyermay be sanctioned with one-year suspension from thepractice of law. The same sanction was imposed on therespondent-lawyer in Rangwani v. Dino,[13] having foundguilty of gross misconduct for issuing bad checks inpayment of a piece of property, the title to which wasonly entrusted to him by the complainant.

 However, in this case, we deem it reasonable to

affirm the sanction imposed by the IBP-CBD, i.e., Atty.Valerio was ordered suspended from the practice of lawfor two (2) years,[14] because, aside from issuingworthless checks and failing to pay her debts, she has

also shown wanton disregard of the IBP’s and CourtOrders in the course of the proceedings.

 WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-647

dated December 11, 2008 of the IBP, which foundrespondent Atty. Laarni N. Valerio guilty of grossmisconduct and violation of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. She ishereby SUSPENDED for two (2) years from the practice oflaw, effective upon the receipt of this Decision. Sheis warned that a repetition of the same or a similaract will be dealt with more severely.           Let a copy of this Decision be furnished tothe Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to thepersonal record of Atty. Valerio as a member of theBar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and theOffice of the Court Administrator for circulation toall courts in the country for their information andguidance.                   This Decision shall be immediately executory.           SO ORDERED.

EN BANC 

 ROBERTO SORIANO,                       A.C. No.6792          Complainant,

                                                        Present:

                                                       

                                                            Panganiban, CJ,

                                       Puno,

                                                            Quisumbing,

                                                            Ynares-Santiago,

                                                            Sandoval-Gutierrez,

                                                            Carpio,

           - versus-                                  Austria-Martinez,                                                            Corona,

                                                            Carpio Morales,

                                                            Callejo, Sr.,

                                                            Azcuna,

                                                            Tinga,

                                                            Chico-Nazario, and

                                                            Garcia, JJ

 

Atty. MANUEL DIZON,                    Promulgated:

            Respondent.                               January 25, 2006

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

 

 

DECISION 

PER CURIAM:

 

Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit[1] for thedisbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed byRoberto Soriano with the Commission on BarDiscipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines (IBP).  Complainant alleges that theconviction of respondent for a crime involvingmoral turpitude, together with the circumstancessurrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 ofRule 1.01 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility;[2] and constitutes sufficientground for his disbarment under Section 27 ofRule 138 of the Rules of Court.[3]

 

Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon tosubmit his Answer to the Complaint,the CBD issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004,informing him that he was in default, and thatan ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June11, 2004.[4]  

After that hearing, complainant manifestedthat he was submitting the case on the basis ofthe Complaint and its attachments.[5] Accordingly, the CBD directed him to file hisPosition Paper, which he did on July 27, 2004.[6]  Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted forresolution. 

 

On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J.Herbosa rendered her Report and Recommendation,which was later adopted and approved by the IBPBoard of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005. 

 

        In his Complaint-Affidavit, Sorianoalleged that respondent had violated Canon 1,Rule 1.01 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility; and that the conviction of thelatter for frustrated homicide,[7] which involvedmoral turpitude, should result in hisdisbarment. 

The facts leading to respondent’s convictionwere summarized by Branch 60 of the RegionalTrial Court of Baguio City in this wise:

 

“x x x. The accused was driving his brownToyota Corolla and was on his way home aftergassing up in preparation for his trip toConcepcion, Tarlac with his wife.  Along AbanaoStreet, a taxi driver overtook the car driven bythe accused not knowing that the driver of the carhe had overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyerand a prominent member of the Baguio community whowas under the influence of liquor.  Incensed, theaccused tailed the taxi driver until the latterstopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and CarinoStreets.  The accused also stopped his car,berated the taxi driver and held him by hisshirt.  To stop the aggression, the taxi driverforced open his door causing the accused to fallto the ground.  The taxi driver knew that theaccused had been drinking because he smelled ofliquor.  Taking pity on the accused who lookedelderly, the taxi driver got out of his car tohelp him get up.  But the accused, by now enraged,stood up immediately and was about to deal thetaxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed himon the chest instead.  The accused fell down asecond time, got up again and was about to box thetaxi driver but the latter caught his fist andturned his arm around.  The taxi driver held on tothe accused until he could be pacified and thenreleased him.  The accused went back to his carand got his revolver making sure that the handlewas wrapped in a handkerchief.  The taxi driver

was on his way back to his vehicle when he noticedthe eyeglasses of the accused on the ground.  Hepicked them up intending to return them to theaccused.  But as he was handing the same to theaccused, he was met by the barrel of the gun heldby the accused who fired and shot him hitting himon the neck.  He fell on the thigh of the accusedso the latter pushed him out and sped off.  Theincident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whosetestimony corroborated that of the taxi driver,the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano.”[8]

 

 

It was the prosecution witness, AntonioBillanes, who came to the aid of Soriano andbrought the latter to the hospital.  Because thebullet had lacerated the carotid artery on theleft side of his neck,[9] complainant would havesurely died of hemorrhage if he had not receivedtimely medical assistance, according to theattending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr.  Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, whichcaused paralysis on the left part of his bodyand disabled him for his job as a taxi driver.  

 

The trial court promulgated its Decisiondated November 29, 2001.  On January 18, 2002,respondent filed an application for probation,which was granted by the court on severalconditions.  These included satisfaction of “thecivil liabilities imposed by [the] court infavor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano.”[10]

 

According to the unrefuted statements ofcomplainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to complywith this particular undertaking, even appealedthe civil liability to the Court of Appeals.[11]

 

        In her Report and Recommendation,Commissioner Herbosa recommended that respondentbe disbarred from the practice of law for havingbeen convicted of a crime involving moralturpitude.

 

The commissioner found that respondent hadnot only been convicted of such crime, but thatthe latter also exhibited an obvious lack ofgood moral character, based on the followingfacts:

 

“1.     He was under the influence of liquor whiledriving his car;

“2.     He reacted violently and attempted toassault Complainant only because the latter,driving a taxi, had overtaken him;

“3.     Complainant having been able to ward offhis attempted assault, Respondent went back tohis car, got a gun, wrapped the same with ahandkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who wasunarmed;

“4.     When Complainant fell on him, Respondentsimply pushed him out and fled;

“5.     Despite positive identification andoverwhelming evidence, Respondent denied thathe had shot Complainant;

“6.     Apart from [his] denial, Respondent alsolied when he claimed that he was the onemauled by Complainant and two unidentifiedpersons; and,

“7.     Although he has been placed on probation,Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfiedhis civil liabilities to Complainant.”[12]

 

 

On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court receivedfor its final action the IBP Resolution adoptingthe Report and Recommendation of theInvestigating Commissioner.

 

We agree with the findings andrecommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, asapproved and adopted by the IBP Board ofGovernors.

 

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules ofCourt, conviction for a crime involving moralturpitude is a ground for disbarment orsuspension. By such conviction, a lawyer isdeemed to have become unfit to uphold theadministration of justice and to be no longerpossessed of good moral character.[13]  In theinstant case, respondent has been found guilty;and he stands convicted, by final judgment, offrustrated homicide.  Since his conviction hasalready been established and is no longer opento question, the only issues that remain to bedetermined are as follows: 1) whether his crimeof frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude,and 2) whether his guilt warrants disbarment.

 

        Moral turpitude has been defined as“everything which is done contrary to justice,modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness,vileness or depravity in the private and socialduties which a man owes his fellowmen, or tosociety in general, contrary to justice,honesty, modesty, or good morals.”[14]

The question of whether the crime of homicideinvolves moral turpitude has been discussedin International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,[15] alabor case concerning an employee who wasdismissed on the basis of his conviction forhomicide.  Considering the particularcircumstances surrounding the commission of thecrime, this Court rejected the employer’scontention and held that homicide in that casedid not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, thecrime would have been violative of the IRRI’sEmployment Policy Regulations and indeed a groundfor dismissal.)  The Court explained that, havingdisregarded the attendant circumstances, theemployer made a pronouncement that was precipitate.  Furthermore, it was not for the latter to determineconclusively whether a crime involved moral

turpitude.  That discretion belonged to the courts,as explained thus:

 

“x x x.  Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitudedepending on the degree of the crime.  Moral turpitude isnot involved in every criminal act and is notshown by every known and intentional violation ofstatute, but whether any particular conviction involves moralturpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on allthe surrounding circumstances. x x x.”[16] (Emphasissupplied)

 

 

 

In the IRRI case, in which the crime ofhomicide did not involve moral turpitude, theCourt appreciated the presence of incompleteself-defense and total absence of aggravatingcircumstances.  For a better understanding ofthat Decision, the circumstances of the crimeare quoted as follows:

 

          “x x x. The facts on record show thatMicosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating andhad his back turned when the victim drove his fistunto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly

rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; thatMicosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attackbut was ignored and that it was while Micosa wasin that position that he drew a fan knife from theleft pocket of his shirt and desperately swung itat the victim who released his hold on Micosa onlyafter the latter had stabbed him several times.These facts show that Micosa's intention was notto slay the victim but only to defend his person.The appreciation in his favor of the mitigatingcircumstances of self-defense and voluntarysurrender, plus the total absence of anyaggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa'scharacter and intentions were not inherently vile,immoral or unjust.”[17]

 

 

 

        The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstancesclearly evince the moral turpitude of respondentand his unworthiness to practice law.

Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, ashe pursued  and shot complainant when the latterleast expected it.  The act of aggression shownby respondent will not be mitigated by the factthat he was hit once and his arm twisted by

complainant.  Under the circumstances, thosewere reasonable actions clearly intended to fendoff the lawyer’s assault.

 

        We also consider the trial court’sfinding of treachery as a further indication ofthe skewed morals of respondent.  He shot thevictim when the latter was not in a position todefend himself.  In fact, under the impressionthat the assault was already over, the unarmedcomplainant was merely returning the eyeglassesof Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shothim.  To make matters worse, respondent wrappedthe handle of his gun with a handkerchief so asnot to leave fingerprints.  In so doing, hebetrayed his sly intention to escape punishmentfor his crime.   

 

The totality of the facts unmistakably bearsthe earmarks of moral turpitude.  By hisconduct, respondent revealed his extremearrogance and feeling of self-importance. As itwere, he acted like a god on the road, whodeserved to be venerated and never to beslighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a

simple traffic incident reflected poorly on hisfitness to be a member of the legal profession.His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness,which was definitely an undesirable trait in anyindividual, more so in a lawyer.  In thetenacity with which he pursued complainant, wesee not the persistence of a person who has beengrievously wronged, but the obstinacy of onetrying to assert a false sense of superiority andto exact revenge.  

 

It is also glaringly clear that respondentseriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility through his illegalpossession of an unlicensed firearm[18] and hisunjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.[19]  

He has thus brazenly violated the law anddisobeyed the lawful orders of the courts.  Weremind him that, both in his attorney’soath[20] and in the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, he bound himself to “obey thelaws of the land.”

 

All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through thisincident that he is wanting in even a basicsense of justice.  He obtained the benevolenceof the trial court when it suspended hissentence and granted him probation.  And yet, ithas been  four years[21] since he was ordered tosettle his civil liabilities to complainant. Todate, respondent remains adamant in refusing tofulfill that obligation.  By his extremeimpetuosity and intolerance, as shown by hisviolent reaction to a simple trafficaltercation, he has taken away the earningcapacity, good health, and youthful vigor of hisvictim.  Still, Atty. Dizon begrudgescomplainant the measly amount that could nevereven fully restore what the latter has lost. 

 

Conviction for a crime involving moralturpitude may relate, not to the exercise of theprofession of lawyers, but certainly to theirgood moral character.[22]  Where their misconductoutside of their professional dealings is sogross as to show them morally unfit for theiroffice and unworthy of the privileges conferredupon them by their license and the law, thecourt may be justified in suspending or removingthem from that office.[23]

 We also adopt the IBP’s finding that

respondent displayed an utter lack of good moralcharacter, which is an essential qualificationfor the privilege to enter into the practice oflaw.  Good moral character includes at leastcommon honesty.[24]

 

In the case at bar, respondent consistentlydisplayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As found by the trial court, he had sought, withthe aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Fariñas, an out-of-court settlement with complainant’s family.[25] 

But when this effort failed, respondentconcocted a complete lie by making it appearthat it was complainant’s family that had soughta conference with him to obtain his referral toa neurosurgeon.[26] 

 The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there.  He

went on to fabricate an entirely implausiblestory of having been mauled by complainant andtwo other persons.[27]  The trial court had thisto say:

 “The physical evidence as testified to by no

less than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty.Dizon] does not support his allegation that threepeople including the complainant helped each otherin kicking and boxing him.  The injuries hesustained were so minor that it is improbable[,]if not downright unbelievable[,] that three peoplewho he said were bent on beating him to deathcould do so little damage.  On the contrary, hisinjuries sustain the complainant’s version of theincident particularly when he said that he boxedthe accused on the chest.  x x x.”[28]

  

 

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moralqualification for bar membership is moreimportant than truthfulness.[29]  The rigorousethics of the profession places a premium onhonesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.[30] Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court orallow it to be misled by any artifice. In alltheir dealings, they are expected to act in goodfaith.

 

The actions of respondent erode rather thanenhance public perception of the legalprofession. They constitute moral turpitude forwhich he should be disbarred.  “Law is a nobleprofession, and the privilege to practice it isbestowed only upon individuals who are competentintellectually, 

academically and, equally important, morally.Because they are vanguards of the law and thelegal system, lawyers must at all times conductthemselves, especially in their dealings withtheir clients and the public at large, withhonesty and integrity in a manner beyondreproach.”[31]

 

The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondentare not merely dishonorable; they reveal a basicmoral flaw. Considering the depravity of theoffense he committed, we find the penaltyrecommended by the IBP proper and commensurate.

 

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment isto protect the administration of justice byrequiring that those who exercise this importantfunction be competent, honorable and reliable --lawyers in whom courts and clients may reposeconfidence.[32]  Thus, whenever a clear case ofdegenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vitalyet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate torid our profession of odious members. 

 

We remain aware that the power to disbar mustbe exercised with great caution, and thatdisbarment should never be decreed when anylesser penalty would accomplish the end desired.In the instant case, however, the Court cannotextend that munificence to respondent.  Hisactions so despicably and wantonly disregardedhis duties to society and his profession.  Weare convinced that meting out a lesser penaltywould be irreconcilable with our loftyaspiration for the legal profession -- thatevery lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth andjustice.

 

We stress that membership in the legalprofession is a privilege demanding a highdegree of good moral character, not only as acondition precedent to admission, but also as acontinuing requirement for the practice of law.Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of theexacting standards expected of him as a vanguardof the legal profession.

        In sum, when lawyers are convicted offrustrated homicide, the attending circumstances –not the mere fact of their conviction – would

demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legalprofession.  In the present case, the appallingvindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonestyof respondent clearly show his unworthiness tocontinue as a member of the bar.

 

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON ishereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDEREDSTRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.  Let a copyof this Decision be entered in his record as amember of the Bar; and let notice of the same beserved on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,and on the Office of the Court Administrator for

circulation to all courts in the country.  

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION 

HUMBERTO C. LIM, JR.,                A.C. No. 5303in behalf of PENTA RESORTSCORPORATION/Attorney-in-Fact of LUMOT A. JALANDONI,                        Complainant,           Present:

 PUNO, J., Chairperson,

                                                        SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

-  v e r s u s  -                          CORONA,

                                                        AZCUNA and                                                        GARCIA, JJ. ATTY. NICANOR V. VILLAROSA,                                  Respondent.            Promulgated: 

June 15, 2006 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - -  x  

R E S O L U T I O N CORONA, J.

          Humberto C. Lim Jr.[1] filed a verifiedcomplaint for disbarment against respondent Atty.Nicanor V. Villarosa on July 7, 2000.[2]  On February19, 2002, respondent moved for the consolidation of thesaid complaint with the following substantiallyinterrelated cases earlier filed with the FirstDivision of this Court: 

1.               Administrative Case No. 5463: SandraF. Vaflor v. Atty. Adoniram P. Pamplonaand Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa;

2.               Administrative Case No. 5502: DanielA. Jalandoni v. Atty. Nicanor V.Villarosa.

         In a resolution dated February 24, 2003, thisCourt considered Administrative Case No. 5463 closedand terminated.[3]  On February 4, 2004, considering thepleadings filed in Administrative Case No. 5502, theCourt resolved: 

(a)               to NOTE the notice of the resolutiondated September 27, 2003 of the IntegratedBar of the Philippines dismissing the caseagainst respondent for lack of merit; and

 (b)               to DENY, for lack of merit, the

petition filed by complainant praying thatthe resolution of the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines dismissing the instant case bereviewed and that proper sanctions beimposed upon respondent.[4]

  

No motion for reconsideration of the aforesaiddenial in Administrative Case No. 5502 appears in therecords.  The Court is now called upon to determine themerits of this remaining case (A.C. No. 5303) againstrespondent.        The complaint read: 

AS FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION  

xxx                   xxx                   xxx 

- II -  

            That respondent is a practicinglawyer and a member of the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines, Bacolod City, Negros OccidentalChapter…. That sometime on September 19, 1997,Lumot A. Jalandoni, Chairman/President of PRCwas sued before RTC, Branch 52 in Civil Case No.97-9865, RE: Cabiles et al. vs. Lumot Jalandoni,et al.  The latter engaged the legal services ofherein respondent who formally entered hisappearance on October 2, 1997 as counsel for thedefendants Lumot A. Jalandoni/Totti AnlapGargoles…. Respondent as a consequence of saidAttorney-Client relationship represented LumotA. Jalandoni et al in the entire proceedings ofsaid case.  Utmost trust and confidence wasreposed on said counsel, hence delicate andconfidential matters involving all the personalcircumstances of his client were entrusted tothe respondent.  The latter was provided withall the necessary information relative to theproperty in question and likewise on legalmatters affecting the corporation (PRC)particularly [involving] problems [which affect]Hotel Alhambra.  Said counsel was privy to alltransactions and affairs of thecorporation/hotel…. 

 - III -

              That it was respondent whoexclusively handled the entire proceedings ofafore-cited Civil Case No. 97-9865 [and]presented Lumot A. Jalandoni as his witnessprior to formally resting his case.  However, onApril 27, 1999 respondent, without due notice prior to ascheduled hearing, surprisingly filed a Motion to withdraw ascounsel, one day before its scheduled hearing on April 28, 1999….A careful perusal of said Motion to Withdraw as Counsel willconclusively show that no copy thereof was furnished to Lumot A.Jalandoni, neither does it bear her conformity….  No doubt,such notorious act of respondent resulted to(sic) irreparable damage and injury to Lumot A.Jalandoni, et al since the decision of the courtRTC, Branch 52 proved adverse to Lumot A.Jalandoni, et al…. The far reaching effects ofthe untimely and unauthorized withdrawal byrespondent caused irreparable damage and injuryto Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al; a highlymeritorious case in favor of his client suddenly[suffered] unexpected defeat. 

 - IV -

                        That the grounds alleged byrespondent for his withdrawal as counsel ofLumot A. Jalandoni, et al. was that he is [a]retained counsel of Dennis G. Jalbuena and theFernando F. Gonzaga, Inc. It was Dennis G.Jalbuena who recommended him to be the counsel

of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al.  It is worthy tonote that from the outset, respondent alreadyknew that Dennis G. Jalbuena is the son-in-lawof Lumot A. Jalandoni being married to hereldest daughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena.  The otherdirectors/officers of PRC were comprised of theeldest sibling of the remaining children ofLumot A. Jalandoni made in accordance with herwishes, with the exception of Carmen J.Jalbuena, the only daughter registered as one ofthe incorporators of PRC, obviously, being theauthor of the registration itself [sic]….Respondent further stated that he cannot refuseto represent Dennis G. Jalbuena in the casefiled against the latter before the CityProsecutors Office by PRC/Lumot A. Jalandoni dueto an alleged retainership agreement with saidDennis G. Jalbuena. [He] likewise representedCarmen J. Jalbuena and one Vicente Delfin whenPRC filed the criminal complaint against them….On April 06, 1999, twenty-one (21) days prior torespondent’s filing of his Motion to Withdraw asCounsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al.,respondent entered his appearance with BacolodCity Prosecutor OIC-Vicente C. Acupan, through aletter expressly stating that effective said date hewas appearing as counsel for both Dennis G.Jalbuena and Carmen J. Jalbuena and VicenteDelfin in the “Estafa” case filed by thecorporation (PRC) against them…. Simply stated,as early as April 6, 1999 respondent already appearedfor and in behalf of the Sps. Carmen and Dennis Jalbuena/VicenteDelfin while concurrently representing Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. inCivil Case No. 97-9865…. However, despite being fully aware thatthe interest of his client Lumot A. Jalandoni [holding an equivalent

of Eighty-two (82%) percent of PRC’s shares of stocks] and theinterest of PRC are one and the same, notwithstanding the factthat Lumot A. Jalandoni was still his client in Civil Case No. 97-9862, respondent opted to represent opposing clients at the sametime.  The corporation’s complaint for estafa(P3,183,5525.00) was filed against the Sps.Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena together with UCPBbank manager Vicente Delfin.  Succeeding eventswill show that respondent instead of desistingfrom further violation of his [lawyer’s] oathregarding fidelity to his client, with extremearrogance, blatantly ignored our laws on LegalEthics, by palpably and despicably defending theSps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena in all thecases filed against them by PRC through its dulyauthorized representatives, before the PublicProsecutors Office, Bacolod City (PP vs. Sps.Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena for FalseTestimony/Perjury, viol. of Art. 183 RPC underBC I.S. No. 2000-2304; viol. of Art. 363, 364,181 and 183 RPC under BC I.S. 2000-2343, PP vs.Carmen J. Jalbuena for viol. of Art. 315 … underBC I.S. 2000-2125 and various other relatedcriminal cases against the Sps. Dennis andCarmen Jalbuena)….

AS SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION  xxx                  xxx                   xxx

 - I -

 xxx                   xxx                   xxx  

            There is no dispute that respondentwas able to acquire vast resources ofconfidential and delicate information on thefacts and circumstances of [Civil Case No. 97-9865] when Lumot A. Jalandoni was his client …which knowledge and information was acquired byvirtue of lawyer-client relationship betweenrespondent and his clients.  Using the saidclassified information which should have beenclosely guarded … respondent did then and there,willfully, unlawfully, feloniously conspired andconfabulated with the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J.Jalbuena in concocting the despicable andfabricated charges against his former clientsdenominated as PP vs. Lumot A. Jalandoni, PamelaJ. Yulo, Cristina J. Lim and Leica J. Lim forviol. of Art. 172 of Revised Penal Code due to aboard resolution executed by the corporationwhich the Sps. Jalbuena, with the assistance ofherein respondent, claimed to have been madewithout an actual board meeting due to analleged lack of quorum, [among otherthings].  Were it not for said fiduciaryrelation between client and lawyer, respondentwill not be in a position to furnish hisconspirator spouses with confidentialinformation on Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC, operatorof Alhambra Hotel.

  

- II -              Adding insult to injury, respondentopted to deliberately withhold the entire case

file including the marked exhibits of theCabiles case for more than three (3) monthsafter his untimely unilateral withdrawaltherefrom, despite repeated demands from [his]client.  On July 26, 1999, capitalizing on hisknowledge of the indispensability of saiddocuments particularly the marked exhibits,which deadline to file the formal offer ofexhibits was continually impressed upon the newcounsel by the court, respondent suddenlyinterposed an amount of five thousand(P5,000.00) pesos as consideration prior to orsimultaneous to the turnover of said documents….[On] July 29, 1999, left with no otheralternative owing to the urgency of thesituation, PRC issued Check No. 2077686 forP5,000.00 in payment thereof.  This was dulyreceived by respondent’s office on the samedate…. Such dilatory tactics employed byrespondent immensely weakened the case of LumotA. Jalandoni eventually resulting to (sic) anadverse decision against [her]….             Further demonstrating before thisHonorable Court the notoriety of respondent inrepresenting conflicting interest which extendedeven beyond the family controversy was hisimproper appearance in court in Civil Case No.99-10660, RE: Amy Albert Que vs. Penta ResortsCorp., this time favoring the party opponent ofdefendant who is even outside the familycircle.  During the pre-trial hearing conductedon May 5, 1999, while still [holding] exclusivepossession of the entire case file of his clientin Civil Case No. 97-9865, respondent brazenly

positioned himself beside Atty. Adoniram P.Pamplona, counsel of plaintiff [in] a suitagainst his client Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC,coaching said counsel on matters [he was privyto] as counsel of said client.  Facts mentionedby said counsel of the plaintiff starting fromthe last par. of page 25 until and including theentire first par. of page 26 were the exactwords dictated by respondent. The entireincident was personally witnessed by hereincomplainant [who was] only an arms length awayfrom them during the hearing…. However, theparticular portion showing the said irregularacts of respondent was deliberately excluded bythe court stenographer from the transcript,despite her detailed recollection andaffirmation thereof to herein complainant. Thisprompted the new counsel of Lumot A.Jalandoni/PRC to complain to the court why Atty.Nicanor Villarosa was coaching Atty. Pamplona insuch proceedings…. Said corrections were onlyeffected after repeated demands to reflect theactual events which [transpired] on said pre-trial….[5] (emphasis ours)  

        In an addendum to the July 4, 2000 complaint,Lim also pointed to certain acts of respondent whichallegedly violated the Rules of Court ― perpetration offalsehood and abuse of his influence as former publicprosecutor. These supposedly affected the status of thecases that Lim filed against the clients of respondent.[6] 

               In a motion to dismiss dated October 30, 2000,respondent claimed that the complainant violatedCircular No. 48-2000 because, in his verification, Limstated: 

3. That [he] prepared this instant complaint fordisbarment against Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa,read its contents, the same are alltrue andcorrect to [his] own personal knowledge andbelief.[7] (emphasis ours)

         Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Courtexplicitly provides that:

             SEC. 4. Verification. – Except whenotherwise specifically required by law or rule,pleadings need not be under oath, verified oraccompanied by affidavit. (5a)             A pleading is verified by anaffidavit that the affiant has read the pleadingand that the allegations therein are true andcorrect of his personal knowledge or based onauthentic records.             A pleading required to be verifiedwhich contains verification based on“information and belief” or upon “knowledge,information and belief,” or lacks a properverification, shall be treated as an unsignedpleading. (As amended, A.M. 00-2-10, May 1, 2000.)(emphasis ours)

   

While the Rules provide that an unsigned pleadingproduces no legal effect,[8] the court may, in itsdiscretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if itappears that the same was due to mere inadvertence andnot intended for delay.[9]  We find that Lim was notshown to have deliberately filed the pleading inviolation of the Rules.                    In his comment dated December 1, 2000,respondent, reiterating his ground for the dismissal ofthe complaint, added:

  [that] complainant Humberto C. Lim, Jr. has notonly violated the Rule on Civil Procedure but hewas/is NOT duly authorize[d] by the PentaResorts Corp. (PRC) nor [by] Lumot A. Jalandonito file this complaint against [him].  Neither[was Lim] a proper party to file thiscomplaint.  This fact is an additional ground tohave his case dismissed because Humberto C. LimJr. exceeded whatever authority was granted tohim as embodied in a resolution and the SpecialPower of Attorney allegedly granted to him bythe complainants.[10]

  

        To bolster his assertion that the complaintagainst him was unfounded, respondent presented thefollowing version in his defense:

 FACTS OF THE CASE

  

xxx                   xxx                   xxx              That Mrs. Jalandoni has two sons-in-law, namely Dennis G. Jalbuena married to herdaughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena, and Humberto C.Lim Jr., the herein complainant married to herdaughter, Cristina J. Lim.                       That Mrs. Lumot Jalandoni organizeda corporation namely the Penta ResortsCorporation (PRC) where she owned almost ninetyseven percent (97%). In other words, in reality,Penta Resorts Corporation is a singleproprietorship belonging to Mrs.Jalandoni.  That the only property of thecorporation is as above-stated, the AlhambraHotel, constructed solely through the effort ofthe spouses Jalbuena on that parcel of land nowclaimed by the Cabiles family.             That sometime on the year 1997 thecase above-cited (Civil Case No. 97-9865) wasfiled before the court against the sisters.

That [he], being RETAINED counsel of thespouses Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena

was RECOMMENDED by the spouses to the sisters toanswer the complaint filed against them.

  

II. 

             That as counsel to the sisters, [he]filed a Motion for Extension Of Time To FileAnswer … and ultimately, [he] filed an AnswerWith Counter-Claim And Prayer For Issuance OfWrit Of Preliminary Injunction….             That reading the Answer … it isclear that the defense of the sisters totallyrest on public documents (the various titlesissued to the land in question because of theseries [of changes] in ownership) and thesisters’ and their parents’ actual occupationand possession thereof.  xxx xxx xxx             Mr. Lim[’s] accusation against [him]in the light of the above-facts is the bestevidence of Humberto C. Lim, Jr.’s penchant forexaggeration and distortion of the truth.  Sincethe defense of the sisters to retain ownershipof the land in question is basedonPUBLIC documents, what delicate and confidential mattersinvolving personal circumstances of the sisters allegedly entrustedto [him], is Mr. Humberto C. Lim, Jr. talking about in paragraphs Iand II of his Complaint? What [privity] to all transactions andaffairs of the corporation/hotel is he referring to? Whatevertransactions the corporation may have beeninvolved in or [may be getting involved into],

is totally immaterial and irrelevant to thedefense of the sisters.             There was nothing personal [aboutthe] circumstances of the sisters nortransactions of the corporation [which were]discussed. The documents being offered asevidence, [he] reiterate[s] for emphasis,are public; the presumption is that the wholeworld knows about them….             That [he] [also] vehemently den[ies]another distorted allegation of Mr. Lim that[he] represented Mrs. Jalandoni [in]theentire proceedings of [the] case.  [Lim]himself attested that [he] [filed] [his] Motionto Withdraw As Counsel, dated April 26, 1999… ,before the trial court, sometime on April 27,1999. How then could [he] have represented Mrs. Jalandoni for[the] entireproceedings of the case? Further, Mr. Lim intentionally hid from thisHonorable Court the important fact that [his]Motion to Withdraw was APPROVED by the trialcourt because of the possibility of a conflictof interest.  xxx xxx xxx. [11]

  Respondent discredited Lim’s claim that he

deliberately withheld the records of the cited civilcase. He insisted that it took him just a few days, notthree months, to turn over the records of the case toLim.[12]  While he admitted an oversight in addressing

the notice of the motion to withdraw as counsel to Mrs.Totti Anlap Gargoles instead of Mrs. Jalandoni at HotelAlhambra, he maintained that it was the height ofhypocrisy to allege that Mrs. Jalandoni was not awareof his motion to withdraw[13] since Mrs. Gargoles is Mrs.Jalandoni’s sister and Hotel Alhambra is owned by PRCwhich, in turn, actually belongs to Mrs. Jalandoni.Respondent also argued that no prejudice was sufferedby Mrs. Jalandoni because she was already representedby Atty. Lorenzo S. Alminaza from the first hearingdate.[14]  In fact, respondent contended, it was he whowas not notified of the substitution of counsels.[15]          As to the bill of P 5,000, respondent stated:

 That Mr. Lim begrudge[s] [him] for billing

Mrs. Jalandoni Five Thousand (Php5,000.00)Pesos. Mr. Humberto C. Lim Jr.conveniently forgets that the net worth of theproperty together with its improvements, underlitigation in that Cabiles, et al. vs. Gargoleset al. case, is a minimum of THIRTY MILLION(Php30,000,000.00) PESOS then, and more sonow.  [He] cannot find any law which prohibits acounsel from billing a client for services inproportion to the services he rendered.[16] 

          In view of these developments, respondent wasadamant that:

 the only real question to be answered in thiscomplaint is why Mr. Lim so consistently [determined] toimmerse the Jalandoni family [in] a series of criminal and civilsuits and to block all attempts to reconcile the family byprolonging litigations, complaints and filing of new ones in spiteof the RESOLUTION of the corporation and the UNDERTAKING ofthe members….[17]

        

On June 18, 2001, the Court resolved to refer thecomplaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines(IBP) for investigation.  Commissioner Lydia A. Navarromade the following report and recommendation:

 xxx                   xxx                   xxx

  

            After going over the [pieces ofevidence] submitted by the parties[,] theundersigned noted that from the onset, PRC had acase wherein respondent was its counsel.  Lateron, complainant had a case against spousesJalbuena where the parties were related to eachother and the latter spouses were represented bythe respondent as their retained counsel; afterrespondent had allegedly withdrawn as counselfor the complainant in Civil Case No. 97-9865.              Being the husband of one of thecomplainants which respondent himself averred inhis answer, it is incumbent upon Humberto Lim

Jr. to represent his wife as one of therepresentatives of PRC and Alhambra Hotel in theadministrative complaint to protect not only herinterest but that of the [family’s].             From the facts obtaining, it isevident that complainant had a lawyer-clientrelationship with the respondent before thelatter [was] retained as counsel by the SpousesJalbuena when the latter were sued bycomplainant’s representative.             We cannot disregard the fact that onthis situation for some reason or another thereexisted some confidentiality and trust betweencomplainants and respondent to ensure thesuccessful defense of their cases.             Respondent for having appeared ascounsel for the Spouses Jalbuena when charged byrespondent’s former client Jalandoni of PRC andAlhambra Hotel, represented conflictinginterests … in violation of the Canon ofProfessional Responsibility.                       As such therefore, the Undersignedhas no alternative but to respectfully recommendthe suspension of the respondent from thepractice of law for a period of six (6) monthsfrom receipt hereof.             RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.             Pasig City, June 20, 2002.[18]

 

         The IBP Board of Governors (Board), however,reversed the recommendation of the investigatingcommissioner and resolved to dismiss the case on August3, 2002.[19] Lumot A. Jalandoni filed a motion forreconsideration (MR) on October 18, 2002 but the Boarddenied the MR since it no longer had jurisdiction toconsider  and resolve a matter already endorsed to this Court.[20]

         Before delving into the core issues of thiscase, we need to address some preliminary matters.          Respondent argues that the alleged resolutionof PRC and the special power of attorney given by LumotA. Jalandoni to Humberto did not contemplate the filingof an administrative complaint.[21] Citing the Rules ofCourt, respondent said that:

 [s]uch complaints are personal in nature andtherefore, the filing of the same, cannotbe delegated by the alleged aggrieved party toany third person unless expressly authorized bylaw.

  

We must note, however, the following: 

SECTION 1. How instituted. – Proceedings fordisbarment, suspension or discipline ofattorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motupropio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines(IBP) upon the verified complaint of anyperson. The complaint shall state clearly andconcisely the facts complained of and shall besupported by affidavits or personshaving personal knowledge of the facts thereinalleged and/or by such documents a maysubstantiate said facts.             The IBP Board of Governors may, motupropio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or bya Chapter Board of Officers, orat the instanceof any person, initiate and prosecute propercharges against any erring attorneys….[22] (emphasis ours)

  

Complaints against members of the Bar are pursuedto preserve the integrity of the legal profession, notfor private vendetta.  Thus, whoever has such personalknowledge of facts constituting a cause of actionagainst erring lawyers may file a verified complaintwith the Court or the IBP.[23] Corollary to the publicinterest in these proceedings is the following rule:

 SEC. 11. Defects. – No defect in a complaint,notice, answer, or in the proceeding or theInvestigator’s Report shall be considered assubstantial unless the Board of Governors, uponconsidering the whole record, finds that such

defect has resulted or may result in amiscarriage of justice, in which event the Boardshall take such remedial action as thecircumstances may warrant, includinginvalidation of the entire proceedings.[24] (emphasis ours)

  

Respondent failed to substantiate his allegationthat Lim’s complaint was defective in form andsubstance, and that entertaining it would result in amiscarriage of justice.  For the same reason, we willno longer put in issue the filing at the onset of amotion to dismiss by respondent instead of an answer orcomment.[25]         

The core issues before us now are: 

1.               whether there existed a conflict ofinterest in the cases represented andhandled by respondent, and

2.               whether respondent properly withdrewhis services as counsel of record in CivilCase No. 97-9865.

 CONFLICT OF INTEREST 

        Petitioners alleged that as an offshoot ofrepresenting conflicting interests, breach of attorney-client confidentiality and deliberate withholding ofrecords were committed by respondent. To effectivelyunravel the alleged conflict of interest, we must lookinto the cases involved.          In Civil Case No. 97-9865, respondent representedLumot A. Jalandoni and Totti Anlap Gargoles. This was acase for the recovery of possession of propertyinvolving Hotel Alhambra, a hotel owned by PRC. 

In BC I.S. No. 99-2192, Lim v. Vicente Delfin, Spouses Dennis andCarmen Jalbuena, respondent was counsel for Delfin andthe spouses Jalbuena. In this case, plaintiff CristinaLim sued the spouses Jalbuena and Delfin on the basisof two checks issued by PRC for the construction ofHotel Alhambra.[26]  The corporate records allegedlyreflected that the contractor, AAQ Sales andConstruction (AAQSC), was already paid in full yet AmyAlbert Que of AAQSC still filed a collection caseagainst PRC for an unpaid balance.[27] In her complaint-affidavit, Cristina averred:

 11. That it was respondent Carmen J. Jalbuena,who took advantage of [her] signatures in blankin DBP Check Nos. 0865590 and 0865591, and whofilled up the spaces of the payee, date and

amount without the knowledge and consent of anyofficer of the corporation and [herself], afterwhich she caused the delivery of the same checksto her husband Dennis Jalbuena, who encashedwithout [their] knowledge and consent, andreceived the proceeds of the same checks… (asevidenced by his signature in receipt of paymenton the dorsal side of the said checks) with theindispensable participation and cooperation ofrespondent Vicente B. Delfin, the Asst. VicePresident and Branch Head of UCPB….[28]

  

Notably, in his comment, respondent stated: There was a possibility of conflict of interestbecause by this time, or one month before [he]filed [his] Motion to Withdraw, Mrs.Jalandoni /Penta Resorts Corporation, Mr. Lim,through his wife, Cristina J. Lim, by anothercounsel, Atty. Lorenzo S. Alminaza, filed acriminal complaint against the spouses Dennisand Carmen J. Jalbuena on March 26, 1999… underBC-I.S. Case No. 99-2192.[29]

  

 Similarly, in BC I.S. Nos. 00-1370, 2000-2304, 2000-2343, 00-

2125, 00-2230, 00-880, respondent positioned himself againstPRC’s interests.

 And, in Civil Case No. 99-10660, a collection case

against PRC, Atty. Alminaza of PRC was alarmed by the

appearance of respondent at the table in court forAAQSC’s counsel.[30]

         Canon 15 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility (CPR) highlights the need for candor,fairness and loyalty in all the dealings of lawyers with their clients. Rule15.03 of the CPR aptly provides:

             Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall notrepresent conflicting interests except bywritten consent of all concerned given after afull disclosure of the facts. 

 It is only upon strict compliance with the

condition of full disclosure of facts that a lawyer mayappear against his client; otherwise, hisrepresentation of conflicting interests isreprehensible.[31]Conflict of interest may be determinedin this manner:

There is representation of conflictinginterests if the acceptance of the new retainerwill require the attorney to do anything whichwill injuriously affect his first client in anymatter in which he represents him and alsowhether he will be called upon in his newrelation, to use against his first client anyknowledge acquired through their connection.[32] (emphasis ours)  

        The rule on conflict of interests covers not onlycases in which confidential communications have beenconfided but also those in which no confidence has beenbestowed or will be used.[33]

 Another test of the inconsistency of interestsis whether the acceptance of a new relation willprevent an attorney from the full discharge ofhis duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty tohis client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulnessor double-dealing in the performance thereof,and also whether he will be called upon in hisnew relation to use against his first client anyknowledge acquire in the previousemployment.  The first part of the rule refersto cases in which the opposing parties arepresent clients either in the same action or ina totally unrelated case; the second partpertains to those in which the adverse partyagainst whom the attorney appears is his formerclient in a matter which is related, directly orindirectly, to the present controversy.[34]  (emphasis ours)   

        The rule prohibits a lawyer from representingnew clients whose interests oppose those of a formerclient in any manner, whether or not they are partiesin the same action or in totally unrelated cases. Thecases here directly or indirectly involved the parties’connection to PRC, even if neither PRC nor Lumot A.

Jalandoni was specifically named as party-litigant insome of the cases mentioned.

 An attorney owes to his client undividedallegiance.  After being retained and receivingthe confidences of the client, he cannot, withoutthe free and intelligent consent of his client,act both for his client and for one whoseinterest is adverse to, or conflicting with thatof his client in the same general matter…. Theprohibition stands even if the adverse interestis very slight; neither is it material that theintention and motive of the attorney may havebeen honest.[35] (emphasis ours) 

         The representation by a lawyer of conflictinginterests, in the absence of the written consent of allparties concerned after a full disclosure of the facts,constitutes professional misconduct which subjects thelawyer to disciplinary action.[36]

         Even respondent’s alleged effort to settle theexisting controversy among the family members[37]wasimproper because the written consent of all concernedwas still required.[38]  A lawyer who acts as such insettling a dispute cannot represent any of the partiesto it.[39]

 WITHDRAWAL AS COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97-9865

 The next bone of contention was the propriety of

respondent’s withdrawal as counsel for Lumot A.Jalandoni in Civil Case No. 97-9865 to fulfill analleged retainership agreement with the spousesJalbuena in a suit by PRC, through Cristina Lim,against the Jalbuenas and Delfin (BC I.S. No. 99-2192).  In his December 1, 2000 comment, respondentstated that it was he who was not notified of thehiring of Atty. Alminaza as the new counsel in thatcase and that he withdrew from the case with theknowledge of Lumot A. Jalandoni and with leave ofcourt.             The rule on termination of attorney-clientrelations may be summarized as follows:

 The relation of attorney and client may beterminated by the client, by the lawyer or bythe court, or by reason of circumstances beyondthe control of the client or the lawyer.  Thetermination of the attorney-client relationshipentails certain duties on the part of the clientand his lawyer.[40]

  

Accordingly, it has been held that the right of anattorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other

than for sufficient cause is considerablyrestricted.  Canon 22 of the CPR reads:

 Canon 22 – A lawyer shall withdraw his servicesonly for good cause and upon notice appropriatein the circumstances.

          An attorney may only retire from a case eitherby written consent of his client or by permission ofthe court after due notice and hearing, in which eventthe attorney should see to it that the name of the newlawyer is recorded in the case.[41] A lawyer who desiresto retire from an action without the written consent ofhis client must file a petition for withdrawal incourt.[42] He must serve a copy of his petition upon hisclient and the adverse party at least three days beforethe date set for hearing, otherwise the court may treatthe application as a “mere scrap of paper.”[43] Respondentmade no such move. He admitted that he withdrew ascounsel on April 26, 1999, which withdrawal wassupposedly approved by the court on April 28, 1999. Theconformity of Mrs. Jalandoni was only presumed by Atty.Villarosa because of the appearance of Atty. Alminazain court, supposedly in his place.

 [A client] may discharge his attorney at anytime with or without cause and thereafter employanother lawyer who may then enter his

appearance.  Thus, it has been held that aclient is free to change his counsel in apending case and thereafter retain anotherlawyer to represent him.  That manner ofchanging a lawyer does not need the consent ofthe lawyer to be dismissed. Nor does it requireapproval of the court.[44] 

        

The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact was noteven to substitute for respondent but to act asadditional counsel.[45] Mrs. Jalandoni’s conformity tohaving an additional lawyer did not necessarily meanconformity to respondent’s desire to withdraw ascounsel. Respondent’s speculations on the professionalrelationship of Atty. Alminaza and Mrs. Jalandoni findno support in the records of this case.       

Respondent should not have presumed that his motionto withdraw as counsel[46] would be granted by the court.Yet, he stopped appearing as Mrs. Jalandoni’s counselbeginning April 28, 1999, the first hearing date.  Noorder from the court was shown to have actually grantedhis motion for withdrawal. Only an order dated June 4,1999 had a semblance of granting his motion:

 When this case was called for hearing Atty.Lorenzo Alminaza appeared for thedefendants considering that Atty. NicanorVillarosa has already withdrawn his appearance

in this case which the Court considered it to beapproved as it bears the conformity of thedefendants.[47] (emphasis ours) 

         That Mrs. Jalandoni continued with Atty.Alminaza’s professional engagement on her behalfdespite respondent’s withdrawal did not absolve thelatter of the consequences of his unprofessionalconduct, specially in view of the conflicting interestsalready discussed. Respondent himself stated that hiswithdrawal from Civil Case No. 97-9865 was due to the“possibility of a conflict of interest.”[48]

         Be that as it may, the records do not supportthe claim that respondent improperly collected P5,000from petitioner.  Undoubtedly, respondent providedprofessional services to Lumot A.Jalandoni. Furthermore, there is no evidence that thedocuments belonging to Mrs. Jalandoni were deliberatelywithheld. The right of an attorney to retain possessionof a client’s documents, money or other property whichmay have lawfully come into his possession in hisprofessional capacity, until his lawful fees anddisbursements have been fully paid, is well-established.[49]

       

Finally, we express our utter dismay with Lim’sapparent use of his wife’s community tax certificatenumber in his complaint for disbarment againstrespondent.[50] This is not, however, the forum todiscuss this lapse.           WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondentAtty. Nicanor V. Villarosa is hereby foundGUILTY ofviolating Canon 15 and Canon 22 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility and isSUSPENDED from thepractice of law for one (1) year, effective uponreceipt of this decision, with aSTERN WARNING that arepetition of the same or similar acts will be dealtwith more severely.

         Let a copy of this resolution be entered intothe records of respondent and furnished to the Officeof the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant,the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courtsin the Philippines, for their information and guidance.       

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

 ROLANDO B. PACANA, JR.,

Complainant,           

                    - versus-        ATTY. MARICEL PASCUAL-LOPEZ,

Respondent.

A.C. No. 8243 Present: PUNO, C.J.,QUISUMBING,YNARES-SANTIAGO,CARPIO,CORONA,CARPIO MORALES,CHICO-NAZARIO,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,BRION,*

PERALTA, andBERSAMIN, JJ.       Promulgated: July 24, 2009

 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

  

DECISION                                          PER CURIAM:

 This case stems from an administrative

complaint[1] filed by Rolando Pacana, Jr. against Atty.Maricel Pascual-Lopez charging the latter with flagrantviolation of the provisions of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility.[2] Complainant alleges that respondentcommitted acts constituting conflict of interest,dishonesty, influence peddling, and failure to renderan accounting of all the money and properties receivedby her from complainant. 

 On January 2, 2002, complainant was the Operations

Director for Multitel Communications Corporation (MCC).MCC is an affiliate company of Multitel InternationalHoldings Corporation (Multitel). Sometime in July 2002,MCC changed its name to Precedent CommunicationsCorporation (Precedent).[3]

 According to complainant, in mid-2002, Multitel was

besieged by demand letters from its members andinvestors because of the failure of its investmentschemes. He alleges that he earned the ire of Multitelinvestors after becoming the assignee of majority ofthe shares of stock of Precedent and after beingappointed as trustee of a fund amounting to ThirtyMillion Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank.

 Distraught, complainant sought the advice of

respondent who also happened to be a member of theCouples for Christ, a religious organization wherecomplainant and his wife were also active members. Fromthen on, complainant and respondent constantlycommunicated, with the former disclosing all hisinvolvement and interests in Precedent and Precedent’s

relation with Multitel. Respondent gave legal advice tocomplainant and even helped him prepare standardquitclaims for creditors. In sum, complainant aversthat a lawyer-client relationship was establishedbetween him and respondent although no formal documentwas executed by them at that time. A RetainerAgreement[4] dated January 15, 2003 was proposed byrespondent. Complainant, however, did not sign the saidagreement because respondent verbally asked for OneHundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as acceptance feeand a 15% contingency fee upon collection of theoverpayment made by Multitel to Benefon,[5] atelecommunications company basedin Finland.  Complainant found the proposed fees to beprohibitive and not within his means.[6]  Hence, theretainer agreement remained unsigned.[7]

  After a few weeks, complainant was surprised to

receive a demand letter from respondent[8] asking forthe return and immediate settlement of the fundsinvested by respondent’s clients in Multitel. Whencomplainant confronted respondent about the demandletter, the latter explained that she had to send it sothat her clients – defrauded investors of Multitel –would know that she was doing something for them andassured complainant that there was nothing to worryabout.[9]

 Both parties continued to communicate and exchange

information regarding the persistent demands made byMultitel investors against complainant. On theseoccasions, respondent impressed upon complainant thatshe can closely work with officials of the Anti-MoneyLaundering Council (AMLC), the Department of Justice

(DOJ), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), theBureau of Immigration and Deportations (BID),[10] and theSecurities and Exchange Commission (SEC)[11] to resolvecomplainant’s problems. Respondent also convincedcomplainant that in order to be absolved from anyliability with respect to the investment scam, he mustbe able to show to the DOJ that he was willing todivest any and all of his interests in Precedentincluding the funds assigned to him by Multitel.[12]

Respondent also asked money from complainantallegedly for safekeeping to be used only for his casewhenever necessary. Complainant agreed and gave her aninitial amount of P900,000.00 which was received byrespondent herself.[13] Sometime thereafter, complainantagain gave respondent P1,000,000.00.[14] Said amountswere all part of Precedent’s collections and salesproceeds which complainant held as assignee of thecompany’s properties.[15]

 When complainant went to the United States (US), he

received several messages from respondent sent throughelectronic mail (e-mail) and short messaging system(SMS, or text messages) warning him not to return tothe Philippines because Rosario Baladjay, president ofMultitel, was arrested and that complainant may lateron be implicated in Multitel’s failed investmentsystem. Respondent even said that ten (10) arrestwarrants and a hold departure order had been issuedagainst him. Complainant, thereafter, received severale-mail messages from respondent updating him of thestatus of the case against Multitel and promised thatshe will settle the matter discreetly with governmentofficials she can closely work with in order to clearcomplainant’s name.[16] In two separate e-mail messages,

[17] respondent again asked money fromcomplainant, P200,000 of which was handed bycomplainant’s wife while respondent was confined inSaint Luke’s Hospital after giving birth,[18] andanother P700,000 allegedly to be given to the NBI.[19]

 Through respondent’s persistent promises to settle

all complainant’s legal problems, respondent was ableto convince complainant who was still in the US toexecute a deed of assignment in favor of respondentallowing the latter to retrieve 178 boxes containingcellular phones and accessories stored in complainant’shouse and inside a warehouse.[20] He also signed a blankdeed of sale authorizing respondent to sell his 2002Isuzu Trooper.[21]

 Sometime in April 2003, wary that respondent may

not be able to handle his legal problems, complainantwas advised by his family to hire another lawyer. Whenrespondent knew about this, she wrote tocomplainant via e-mail, as follows:

 Dear Butchie, Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if Ishocked you but I had to do it as your friendand lawyer. The charges are all non-bailable butall the same as the SEC report I told youbefore. The findings are the same, i.e. yourcompany was the front for the fraud of Multiteland that funds were provided you. I anticipated this, that is why I really pushedfor a quitclaim. Rolly is willing to return the

Crosswind, laptap (sic) and [P]alm [P]ilot. MannyCancio really helped. Anthony na lang. Then, Iwill need the accounting of all the funds youreceived from the sale of the phones, everyemployees and directors[’] quitclaim (includingyours), the funds transmitted to the clientsthrough me, the funds you utilized, andwhatelse (sic) is still unremitted, every centavomust be accounted for as DOJ and NBI can havethe account opened. I will also need the P30 M proof of deposit withReal [B]ank and the trust given [to] you. So wecan inform them [that] it was not touched byyou. I have been informed by Efie that your family islooking at hiring Coco Pimentel. I know him verywell as his sister Gwen is my best friend. Ihave no problem if you hire him but I will behands off. I work differently kasi. In thiscases (sic), you cannot be highprofile (sic) becauseit is the clients who will be sacrificed at theexpense of the fame of the lawyer. I have towork quietly and discreetly. No funfare. Justlike what I did for your guys in the SEC. I haveto work with people I am comfortable with. EfrenSantos will sign as your lawyer although I willdo all the work.He can help with all hisconnections. Val’s friend in the NBI is the oneis (sic) charge of organized crime who is theentity (sic) who has your warrant. My lawpartner was the state prosecutor for financialfraud. Basically we have it covered in allaspects and all departments. I am just trying to

liquidate the phones I have allotted for you sana (sic) for your trooper kasi whether we like itor not, we have to give this agencies (sic) to makeour work easier according to Val. The funds withMickey are already accounted in the quitclaims (sic) as attorneys (sic) fees. I hope he willbe able to send it so we have funds to workwith.As for your kids, legally they can stay here butrecently, it is the children who (sic) the irateclients and government officials harass andkidnap to make the individuals they want to comeout from hiding (sic). I do not want that tohappen. Things will be really easier on my side. Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make itall disappear. But if you hire Coco, I will givehim the free hand to work with your case. Pleasetrust me. I have never let you down, have I? Itold you this will happen but we are ready andprepared. The clients who received the phoneswill stand by you and make you the hero in thisscandal. I will stand by you always. This is myexpertise. TRUST me! That is all. You have anangel on your side. Always pray though to thebest legal mind up there. You will be ok! Candy[22]

 On July 4, 2003, contrary to respondent’s advice,

complainant returned to the country. On the eve of hisdeparture from theUnited States, respondent called upcomplainant and conveniently informed him that he hasbeen cleared by the NBI and the BID.[23]

 About a month thereafter, respondent personally met

with complainant and his wife and told them that shehas already accumulated P12,500,000.00 as attorney’sfees and was willing to give P2,000,000.00 tocomplainant in appreciation for his help. Respondentallegedly told complainant that without his help, shewould not have earned such amount. Overwhelmed andrelieved, complainant accepted respondent’s offer butrespondent, later on, changed her mind and toldcomplainant that she would instead investthe P2,000,000.00 on his behalf in a business venture.Complainant declined and explained to respondent thathe and his family needed the money instead to covertheir daily expenses as he was no longer employed.Respondent allegedly agreed, but she failed to fulfillher promise.[24]

Respondent even publicly announced in theirreligious organization that she was able to help settlethe ten (10) warrants of arrest and hold departureorder issued against complainant and narrated how shewas able to defend complainant in the said cases.[25]

 By April 2004, however, complainant noticed that

respondent was evading him. Respondent would eitherrefuse to return complainant’s call or would abruptlyterminate their telephone conversation, citing severalreasons. This went on for several months.[26] In oneinstance, when complainant asked respondent for anupdate on the collection of Benefon’s obligation toPrecedent which respondent had previously taken chargeof, respondent arrogantly answered that she was verybusy and that she would read Benefon’s letter only whenshe found time to do so.

 On November 9, 2004, fed up and dismayed with

respondent’s arrogance and evasiveness, complainantwrote respondent a letter formally asking for a fullaccounting of all the money, documents and propertiesgiven to the latter.[27]  Respondent rendered anaccounting through a letter dated December 20, 2004.[28] When complainant found respondent’s explanation tobe inadequate, he wrote a latter expressing hisconfusion about the accounting.[29] Complainant repeatedhis request for an audited financial report of all theproperties turned over to her; otherwise, he will beconstrained to file the appropriate case againstrespondent.[30] Respondent replied,[31] explaining that allthe properties and cash turned over to her bycomplainant had been returned to her clients who hadmoney claims against Multitel.  In exchange for this,

she said that she was able to secure quitclaimdocuments clearing complainant from any liability.[32]  Still unsatisfied, complainant decided to file anaffidavit-complaint[33] against respondent before theCommission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar ofthe Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment ofrespondent.

 In her Answer-Affidavit,[34] respondent vehemently

denied being the lawyer for Precedent. She maintainedthat no formal engagement was executed between her andcomplainant.  She claimed that she merely helpedcomplainant by providing him with legal advice andassistance because she personally knew him, since theyboth belonged to the same religious organization.[35]

 Respondent insisted that she represented the group

of investors of Multitel and that she merely mediatedin the settlement of the claims her clients had againstthe complainant.  She also averred that the results ofthe settlement between both parties were fullydocumented and accounted for.[36] Respondent believesthat her act in helping complainant resolve his legalproblem did not violate any ethical standard and was,in fact, in accord with Rule 2.02 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility.[37]

 To bolster her claim that the complaint was without

basis, respondent noted that a complaint for estafa wasalso filed against her by complainant before the Officeof the City Prosecutor in Quezon City citing the samegrounds. The complaint was, however, dismissed byAssistant City Prosecutor Josephus Joannes H. Asis forinsufficiency of evidence.[38] Respondent argued that on

this basis alone, the administrative case must also bedismissed.

 In her Position Paper,[39] respondent also questioned

the admissibility of the electronic evidence submittedby complainant to the IBP’s Commission on BarDiscipline. Respondent maintained that the e-mail andthe text messages allegedly sent by respondent tocomplainant were of doubtful authenticity and should beexcluded as evidence for failure to conform to theRules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC).

 After due hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner

Patrick M. Velez issued a Report andRecommendation[40] finding that a lawyer-clientrelationship was established between respondent andcomplainant despite the absence of a written contract.The Investigating Commissioner also declared thatrespondent violated her duty to be candid, fair andloyal to her client when she allowed herself torepresent conflicting interests and failed to render afull accounting of all the cash and propertiesentrusted to her. Based on these grounds, theInvestigating Commissioner recommended her disbarment.

 Respondent moved for reconsideration,[41] but the IBP

Board of Governors issued a Recommendation[42] denyingthe motion and adopting the findings of theInvestigating Commissioner.

 The case now comes before this Court for final

action. We affirm the findings of the IBP.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professionalresponsibility provides:

 Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not representconflicting interests except by written consentof all concerned given after full disclosure ofthe facts.  This prohibition is founded on principles of public

policy, good taste[43] and, more importantly, uponnecessity. In the course of a lawyer-clientrelationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connectedwith the client’s case, including its weak and strongpoints. Such knowledge must be considered sacred andguarded with care. No opportunity must be given to himto take advantage of his client; for if the confidenceis abused, the profession will suffer by the lossthereof.[44]  It behooves lawyers not only to keepinviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoidthe appearance of treachery and double ─ dealing foronly then can litigants be encouraged to entrust theirsecrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in theadministration of justice.[45]  It is for these reasonsthat we have described the attorney-client relationshipas one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.[46]

 Respondent must have known that her act of

constantly and actively communicating with complainant,who, at that time, was beleaguered with demands frominvestors of Multitel, eventually led to theestablishment of a lawyer-client relationship.Respondent cannot shield herself from the inevitableconsequences of her actions by simply saying that the

assistance she rendered to complainant was only in theform of “friendly accommodations,”[47] precisely becauseat the time she was giving assistance to complainant,she was already privy to the cause of the opposingparties who had been referred to her by the SEC.[48]

 Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of

such relationship by arguing that no written contractfor the engagement of her services was ever forgedbetween her and complainant.[49] This argument all themore reveals respondent’s patent ignorance offundamental laws on contracts and of basic ethicalstandards expected from an advocate of justice. The IBPwas correct when it said:

 The absence of a written contract will not

preclude the finding that there was aprofessional relationship between theparties. Documentary formalism is not anessential element in the employment of anattorney; the contract may be express orimplied. To establish the relation, it issufficient that the advice and assistance of anattorney is sought and received in any matterpertinent to his profession.[50] (Emphasissupplied.)                         Given the situation, the most decent and ethical

thing which respondent should have done was either toadvise complainant to engage the services of anotherlawyer since she was already representing the opposingparties, or to desist from acting as representative ofMultitel investors and stand as counsel for

complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both becausethat would amount to double-dealing and violate ourethical rules on conflict of interest.

 In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,[51] we explained the concept

of conflict of interest, thus:              There is conflict of interest when alawyer represents inconsistent interests of twoor more opposing parties.  The test is “whetheror not in behalf of one client, it is thelawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim,but it is his duty to oppose it for the otherclient.  In brief, if he argues for one client,this argument will be opposed by him when heargues for the other client.” This rule coversnot only cases in which confidentialcommunications have been confided, but alsothose in which no confidence has been bestowedor will be used. Also, there is conflict ofinterests if the acceptance of the new retainerwill require the attorney to perform an actwhich will injuriously affect his first clientin any matter in which he represents him andalso whether he will be called upon in his newrelation to use against his first client anyknowledge acquired through their connection.Another test of the inconsistency of interestsis whether the acceptance of a new relation willprevent an attorney from the full discharge ofhis duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to

his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulnessor double dealing in the performance thereof.[52]

 Indubitably, respondent took advantage of

complainant’s hapless situation, initially, by givinghim legal advice and, later on, by soliciting money andproperties from him. Thereafter, respondent impressedupon complainant that she had acted with utmostsincerity in helping him divest all the propertiesentrusted to him in order to absolve him from anyliability. But simultaneously, she was also doing thesame thing to impress upon her clients, the partyclaimants against Multitel, that she was doingeverything to reclaim the money they invested withMultitel. Respondent herself admitted to complainantthat without the latter’s help, she would not have beenable to earn as much and that, as a token of herappreciation, she was willing to share some of herearnings with complainant.[53] Clearly, respondent’s actis shocking, as it not only violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9of the Code of Professional Responsibility,[54] but alsotoyed with decency and good taste.

Respondent even had the temerity to boast that noMultitel client had ever complained of respondent’sunethical behavior.[55]This remark indubitably displaysrespondent’s gross ignorance of disciplinary procedurein the Bar. As a member of the Bar, she is expected toknow that proceedings for disciplinary actions againstany lawyer may be initiated and prosecuted by the IBPBoard of Governors, motu proprio or upon referral by thisCourt or by the Board of Officers of an IBPChapter[56] even if no private individual files anyadministrative complaint.

 Upon review, we find no cogent reason to disturb

the findings and recommendations of the IBPInvestigating Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP Boardof Governors, on the admissibility of the electronicevidence submitted by complainant. We, accordingly,adopt the same in toto.

 Finally, respondent argues that the recommendation

of the IBP Board of Governors to disbar her on thegrounds of deceit, malpractice and other grossmisconduct, aside from violation of the Lawyer’s Oath,has been rendered moot and academic by voluntarytermination of her IBP membership, allegedly after shehad been placed under the Department of Justice’sWitness Protection Program.[57] Convenient as it may befor respondent to sever her membership in theintegrated bar, this Court cannot allow her to do sowithout resolving first this administrative caseagainst her.

 The resolution of the administrative case filed

against respondent is necessary in order to determinethe degree of her culpability and liability tocomplainant. The case may not be dismissed or renderedmoot and academic by respondent’s act of voluntarilyterminating her membership in the Bar regardless of thereason for doing so. This is because membership in theBar is a privilege burdened with conditions.[58] Theconduct of a lawyer may make him or her civilly, if notcriminally, liable to his client or to third parties,and such liability may be conveniently avoided if thisCourt were to allow voluntary termination ofmembership. Hence, to terminate one’s membership in the

Bar voluntarily, it is imperative that the lawyer firstprove that the voluntary withdrawal of membership isnot a ploy to further prejudice the public or to evadeliability.  No such proof exists in the present case.

 WHEREFORE, respondent Attorney Maricel Pascual-

Lopez is hereby DISBARRED for representing conflictinginterests and for engaging in unlawful, dishonest anddeceitful conduct in violation of her Lawyer’s Oath andthe Code of Professional Responsibility.

 Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the

respondent’s record as a member of the Bar, and noticeof the same be served on the Integrated Bar ofthe Philippines, and on the Office of the CourtAdministrator for circulation to all courts in thecountry.

                                               

          SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 1372.  June 27, 2002]

SPOUSES LIRIO U. RABANAL AND CAYETANO D.RABANAL, complainants, vs. ATTY. FAUSTINO F.TUGADE,respondent.

D E C I S I O NMENDOZA, J.:

This is an administrative complaint filed bycomplainant spouses Cayetano and Lirio Rabanal againstAtty. Faustino F. Tugade.  It is alleged that respondent,as counsel for complainant Cayetano Rabanal, did not filethe appellant’s brief in the Court of Appeals, as aresult of which the appeal filed by Cayetano wasdismissed and the decision of the then Circuit CriminalCourt of Tuguegarao, Cagayan became final and executory.

It appears that complainant Cayetano Rabanal was one ofthe accused-appellants in Criminal Case No. CCC-I-150,entitled “People of the Philippines v. Marcelino Rabanaly Ibañez, et al.,” of the Criminal Circuit Court ofTuguegarao, Cagayan.[1] He was found guilty of homicide andthe case was appealed to the Court ofAppeals.  Complainant terminated the services of hisprevious counsel and engaged the services of respondentAtty. Faustino F. Tugade as new counsel to prosecute theappeal.[2] However, despite the extension of time grantedto him totalling 60 days, Atty. Tugade failed to file theappellant’s brief, resulting in the dismissal of theappeal.[3] Cayetano filed a motion for reconsideration, but

his motion was denied.[4] Complainants alleged that theypaid P1,000.00 to respondent as attorney’s fees and, inaddition, the amount of P1,400.00 for the preparation ofthe appellant’s brief.[5] Complainants sought thesuspension from the practice of law or the disbarment ofrespondent attorney.[6]

In his comment dated October 24, 1974, respondent saidhe did not want to accept complainant’s case due to hisbusy schedule, but that he was nonetheless prevailed uponby the latter, who is his “kababayan,” to sign theappellant’s brief to be filed in the case.[7] Cayetano gavethe transcripts of stenographic notes (TSN) pertaining tothe case to respondent, and the sum of P600.00 aslitigation expenses, after which respondent asked anotherlawyer to prepare the appellant’s brief.  However, on May11, 1974, Cayetano informed respondent that the Court ofAppeals had dismissed his appeal for failure of counselto file an appellant’s brief. Respondent alleged he thenentered his appearance as counsel for Cayetano and fileda motion for reconsideration with the Court of Appeals,for which he was paid P800.00.[8] The motion was, however,denied and Cayetano served sentence from 1974 to 1979,when he was released on conditional pardon.[9]

In a resolution, dated November 4, 1974, the Courtreferred the administrative case against respondent tothe Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) forinvestigation, report, and recommendation.[10] The OSGconducted hearings on February 5, 1976 and November 27,1976, during which the spouses Rabanal testified insupport of their complaint.[11] On January 24, 1979,Cayetano was released from the New Bilibid Prisons onconditional pardon.[12] A few years later, the Committee onBar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines(IBP) assumed jurisdiction over the administrative case.

[13] After each of the complainants had testified, the IBPCommissioner set the hearing for reception ofrespondent’s evidence on June 26, 1992 with warning thatthe case would be considered submitted for resolution ifrespondent failed to present his evidence.[14] Three noticesof the hearing sent by registered mail to respondentwere, however, returned unclaimed.[15] Accordingly, the IBPHearing Commissioner, upon motion of complainant LirioRabanal, considered the case submitted for resolution.[16] On May 8, 1993, the IBP Board of Governors recommendedto the Court the suspension of respondent from thepractice of law for at least one (1) year.[17]

On July 15, 1993, the IBP Commission on Bar Disciplinetransmitted the records of the case to the Office of theBar Confidant (OBC).  Later, however, the transcripts ofstenographic notes (TSN) were lost.[18] In any case, on May20, 2002, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) adoptedthe findings of the IBP and recommended the suspension ofrespondent from the practice of law for one (1) year.[19]

After a review of the records of this case, the Courtfinds no basis for reversing the findings andrecommendation of the IBP and the OBC.  Theirrecommendation is affirmed with the modification that thepenalty imposed is reduced from one (1) year to six (6)months.

Respondent claims that he was not the counsel ofcomplainant Cayetano Rabanal prior to the filing of amotion for reconsideration before the Court of Appealsand he could not be held responsible for the dismissal ofcomplainant’s appeal for failure of counsel to file theappellant’s brief.  We disagree.

The absence of a written contract does not preclude afinding that there was a professional relationship which

merits attorney’s fees for professional servicesrendered.  A written contract is not an essential elementin the employment of an attorney; the contract may beexpress or implied.  To establish the relation, it issufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorneyis sought and received in any matter pertinent to hisprofession.[20] Thus, in Villafuerte v. Cortez,[21] the Court heldthat the admission of respondent lawyer that he receivedpayment from complainant is sufficient evidence toestablish a lawyer-client relationship.  In this case,complainant sought and received legal advice fromrespondent Tugade, who admitted that he agreed to signthe appellant’s brief to be filed and that hereceivedP600.00 from complainant spouses.  It istherefore clear that a lawyer-client relationship existedbetween the two.

It is immaterial that respondent Tugade assistedCayetano in the case as a mere friend or “kababayan” ofthe latter.  In Junio v. Grupo,[22] respondent also denied theexistence of a lawyer-client relationship, stating thatcomplainant was a close personal friend whom he helped ina personal capacity.  Nonetheless, it was held:

To constitute professional employment it is not essentialthat the client should have employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. . . It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for: neither is it material that theattorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had.  If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or

acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established. . . .

In this case, Cayetano consulted respondent Tugade inhis professional capacity in order to obtain adviceconcerning his appeal.  Respondent agreed,  as shown byhis acceptance of the payment to him, his receipt of theTSNs of the case, and the fact that he signed theappellant’s brief. His claim that he merely acceptedpayment but that he asked another lawyer to prepare thebrief is an obvious subterfuge.  He has not even namedthe lawyer assuming that the latter is real.  It is hardto see why respondent should personally accept paymentand the transcripts of stenographic notes fromcomplainant if he did not intend to prepare theappellant’s brief. Moreover, the fact that respondentfiled a motion for reconsideration after the dismissal ofthe appeal only confirms that he was indeed Cayetano’slawyer.

The records clearly show that respondent Atty. FaustinoF. Tugade was remiss in the performance of his duties ascounsel of complainant Cayetano Rabanal. He was given bythe Court of Appeals an extension of time totalling 60days within which to file the appellant’s brief, but hefailed to file the same.  He thus violated the Code ofProfessional Responsibility which provides:

RULE 12.03.  A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.

RULE 18.03.  A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

What this Court said in another case is fitting:

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.  He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion.  Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client’s rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied.  This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law ofthe land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.  If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, andto the public.  A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.[23]

Indeed, a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of hisclient.  He should be mindful of the trust and confidencereposed in him, remembering always that his actions oromissions are binding on his clients.  In this case, thefailure of respondent to file the appellant’s briefresulted in the dismissal of the appeal.  As aconsequence, the decision in the trial court findingcomplainant guilty of homicide became final and executory

and he was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment.  Ashas been held:

An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.  (Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159)  A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part.  (People vs. Villar, 46 SCRA 107)  The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice. (People vs. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People vs. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).[24]

It should likewise be noted that respondent failed tonotify the IBP of his change of address, thus delayingthe resolution of this case.  Service of notice and otherpleadings, which must be furnished to the parties, mustbe made at the last address on record.  If the partiesare represented by counsel, such notices shall be sentinstead to the counsel’s last given address on record inthe absence of a proper and adequate notice of a changeof address, unless service upon the party himself isordered.[25]

In Resurreccion v. Sayson,[26] the Court attributed the delayin the resolution of an administrative case to respondentlawyer, after finding that “The 27-year delay in theresolution of this case was, to a large extent, caused byhis failure to appear before the Office of the SolicitorGeneral and to inform the IBP of his change of address, afailure that also indicated his lack of regard for thevery serious charges brought against him.”  Similarly,respondent Tugade likewise showed a disregard of thecharge against him, and the IBP properly made itsrecommendation solely on the basis of complainants’testimonies and the documentary evidence.

In Galen v. Paguirigan,[27] the Court, taking into accountthat it was a first offense, suspended for a period ofsix (6) months a lawyer who failed to file a brief. Atty.Faustino Tugade showed lack of due care for his client’sinterest and willful neglect of his duties as an officerof the court, thus warranting the imposition of the samepenalty on him.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty.Faustino F. Tugade is SUSPENDED from the practice of lawfor six (6) months effective upon finality hereof withWARNING that a repetition of the same negligent actcharged in this complaint will be dealt with even moreseverely.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5280.  March 30, 2004]

WILLIAM S. UY, complainant, vs. ATTY. FERMIN L.GONZALES, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

William S. Uy filed before this Court an administrativecase against Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales for violation ofthe confidentiality of their lawyer-clientrelationship.  The complainant alleges:

Sometime in April 1999, he engaged the services ofrespondent lawyer to prepare and file a petition for theissuance of a new certificate of title.  After confidingwith respondent the circumstances surrounding the losttitle and discussing the fees and costs, respondentprepared, finalized and submitted to him a petition to befiled before the Regional Trial Court of Tayug,Pangasinan. When the petition was about to be filed,respondent went to his (complainant’s) office at VirraMall, Greenhills and demanded a certain amount from himother than what they had previously agreedupon.  Respondent left his office after reasoning withhim. Expecting that said petition would be filed, he wasshocked to find out later that instead of filing thepetition for the issuance of a new certificate of title,respondent filed a letter-complaint dated July 26, 1999against him with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutorof Tayug, Pangasinan for “Falsification of Public

Documents.”[1] The letter-complaint contained facts andcircumstances pertaining to the transfer certificate oftitle that was the subject matter of the petition whichrespondent was supposed to have filed.  Portions of saidletter-complaint read:

The undersigned complainant accuses WILLIAM S. UY, of legal age, Filipino, married and a resident of 132-A Gilmore Street corner 9th Street, New Manila, Quezon City,Michael Angelo T. UY, CRISTINA EARL T. UY, minors and residents of the aforesaid address, Luviminda G. Tomagos,of legal age, married, Filipino and a resident of Carmay East, Rosales, Pangasinan, and F. Madayag, with office address at A12, 2/F Vira Mall Shopping Complex, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, for ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, committed as follows:

That on March 15, 1996, William S. Uy acquired by purchase a parcel of land consisting of 4.001 ha. for theamount of P100,000.00, Philippine Currency, situated at Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan, from FERMIN C. GONZALES, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed by the latter in favor of the former…; that in the said date, William S. Uy received the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-33122, covering the said land;

That instead of registering said Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-33122, in the Register of Deeds for the purpose of transferring the same in his name, William S. Uy executed a Deed of Voluntary Land Transfer of the aforesaid land in favor ofhis children, namely, Michael Angelo T. Uy and Cristina Earl T. Uy, wherein William S. Uy made it appear that hissaid children are of legal age, and residents of Brgy. Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan, when in fact and in truth,

they are minors and residents of Metro Manila, to qualifythem as farmers/beneficiaries, thus placing the said property within the coverage of the Land Reform Program;

That the above-named accused, conspiring together and helping one another procured the falsified documents which they used as supporting papers so that they can secure from the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tayug,Pangasinan, TCT No. T-5165 (Certificate of Land OwnershipAward No. 004 32930) in favor of his above-named children.  Some of these Falsified documents are purported Affidavit of Seller/Transferor and Affidavit ofNon-Tenancy, both dated August 20, 1996, without the signature of affiant, Fermin C. Gonzales, and that on that said date, Fermin C. Gonzales was already dead… ;

That on December 17, 1998, William S. Uy with deceit and evident intent to defraud undersigned, still accepted theamount of P340,000.00, from Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales, P300,000.00, in PNB Check No. 0000606, and P40,000.00, in cash, as full payment of the redemption of TCT No. 33122…knowing fully well that at that time the said TCT cannot be redeemed anymore becausethe same was already transferred in the name of his children;

That William S. Uy has appropriated the amount covered bythe aforesaid check, as evidenced by the said check whichwas encashed by him…;

That inspite of repeated demands, both oral and in writing, William S. Uy refused and continue to refuse to deliver to him a TCT in the name of the undersigned or toreturn and repay the said P340,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned.[2]

With the execution of the letter-complaint, respondentviolated his oath as a lawyer and grossly disregarded hisduty to preserve the secrets of his client.  Respondentunceremoniously turned against him just because herefused to grant respondent’s request for additionalcompensation. Respondent’s act tarnished his reputationand social standing.[3]

In compliance with this Court’s Resolution dated July31, 2000,[4] respondent filed his Comment narrating hisversion, as follows:

On December 17, 1998, he offered to redeem fromcomplainant a 4.9 hectare-property situated in Brgy.Gonzales, Umingan, Pangasinan covered by TCT No. T-33122which the latter acquired by purchase from his(respondent’s) son, the late Fermin C. Gonzales, Jr..  Onthe same date, he paid complainant P340,000.00 anddemanded the delivery of TCT No. T-33122 as well as theexecution of the Deed of Redemption. Upon request, hegave complainant additional time to locate said title oruntil after Christmas to deliver the same and execute theDeed of Redemption.  After the said period, he went tocomplainant’s office and demanded the delivery of thetitle and the execution of the Deed ofRedemption.  Instead, complainant gave him photocopies ofTCT No. T-33122 and TCT No. T-5165.  Complainantexplained that he had already transferred the title ofthe property, covered by TCT No.T-5165 to his childrenMichael and Cristina Uy and that TCT No. T-5165 wasmisplaced and cannot be located despite efforts to locateit.  Wanting to protect his interest over the propertycoupled with his desire to get hold of TCT No. T-5165 theearliest possible time, he offered his assistance probono to prepare a petition for lost title provided thatall necessary expenses incident thereto including

expenses for transportation and others, estimatedat P20,000.00, will be shouldered by complainant.  Tothese, complainant agreed.

On April 9, 1999, he submitted to complainant a draftof the petition for the lost title ready for signing andnotarization.  On April 14, 1999, he went tocomplainant’s office informing him that the petition isready for filing and needs funds forexpenses.  Complainant who was with a client asked him towait at the anteroom where he waited for almost two hoursuntil he found out that complainant had already leftwithout leaving any instructions nor funds for the filingof the petition.  Complainant’s conduct infuriated himwhich prompted him to give a handwritten letter tellingcomplainant that he is withdrawing the petition heprepared and that complainant should get another lawyerto file the petition.

Respondent maintains that the lawyer-clientrelationship between him and complainant was terminatedwhen he gave the handwritten letter to complainant; thatthere was no longer any professional relationship betweenthe two of them when he filed the letter-complaint forfalsification of public document; that the facts andallegations contained in the letter-complaint forfalsification were culled from public documents procuredfrom the Office of the Register of Deeds in Tayug,Pangasinan.[5]

In a Resolution dated October 18, 2000, the Courtreferred the case to the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines (IBP) for investigation, report andrecommendation.[6]

Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ordered bothparties to appear on April 2, 2003 before the IBP.[7] On

said date, complainant did not appear despite due notice.There was no showing that respondent received the noticefor that day’s hearing and so the hearing was reset toMay28, 2003.[8]

On April 29, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maalareceived a letter from one Atty. Augusto M. Macamdated April 24, 2003, stating that his client, William S.Uy, had lost interest in pursuing the complaint he filedagainst Atty. Gonzales and requesting that the caseagainst Atty. Gonzales be dismissed.[9]

On June 2, 2003, Commissioner Villanueva-Maalasubmitted her report and recommendation, portions ofwhich read as follows:

The facts and evidence presented show that when respondent agreed to handle the filing of the Verified Petition for the loss of TCT No. T-5165, complainant had confided to respondent the fact of the loss and the circumstances attendant thereto.  When respondent filed the Letter-Complaint to the Office of the Special Prosecutor in Tayug, Pangasinan, he violated Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which expressly provides that “A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated.”  Respondent cannot argue that there was no lawyer-client relationship between them whenhe filed the Letter-Complaint on 26 July 1999 consideringthat as early as 14 April 1999, or three (3) months after, respondent had already terminated complainant’s perceived lawyer-client relationship between them.  The duty to maintain inviolate the client’s confidences and secrets is not temporary but permanent.  It is in effect perpetual for “it outlasts the lawyer’s employment” (Canon 37, Code of Professional Responsibility) which

means even after the relationship has been terminated, the duty to preserve the client’s confidences and secretsremains effective.  Likewise Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility provides that “A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with the full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.”

On 29 April 2003, the Commission received a letter dated 24 April 2003 from Atty. Augusto M. Macam, who claims to represent complainant, William S. Uy, alleging that complainant is no longer interested in pursuing thiscase and requested that the same be dismissed.  The aforesaid letter hardly deserves consideration as proceedings of this nature cannot be “interrupted by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, orfailure of the complainant to prosecute the same.  (Section 5, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court).  Moreover, in Boliver vs. Simbol,16 SCRA 623, the Court ruled that “any person may bring to this Court’s attention the misconduct of any lawyer, and action will usually be taken regardless of the interest or lack of interest of the complainant, if the facts proven so warrant.”

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. FerminL. Gonzales to have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and it is hereby recommended that he be SUSPENDED for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS from receipt hereof, from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and member of the Bar.[10]

On June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines issued Resolution No.XV-2003-365, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex “A”; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws and rules, andconsidering that respondent violated Rule 21.02, Canon 21of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fermin L. Gonzales is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.[11]

Preliminarily, we agree with Commissioner Villanueva-Maala that the manifestation of complainant Uy expressinghis desire to dismiss the administrative complaint hefiled against respondent, has no persuasive bearing inthe present case.

Sec. 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that:

….

No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of thecomplainant to prosecute the same.

This is because:

A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiffand the respondent lawyer is a defendant.  Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.  They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare.  They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them.  The attorney is called to answer to

the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.  The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.[12]

Now to the merits of the complaint against therespondent.

Practice of law embraces any activity, in or out ofcourt, which requires the application of law, as well aslegal principles, practice or procedure and calls forlegal knowledge, training and experience.[13] While it istrue that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for anymisconduct, whether in his professional or privatecapacity, which shows him to be wanting in moralcharacter, in honesty, probity and good demeanor orunworthy to continue as an officer of the court,[14] complainant failed to prove any of the circumstancesenumerated above that would warrant the disbarment orsuspension of herein respondent.

Notwithstanding respondent’s own perception on thematter, a scrutiny of the records reveals that therelationship between complainant and respondent stemmedfrom a personal transaction or dealings between themrather than the practice of law byrespondent.  Respondent dealt with complainant onlybecause he redeemed a property which complainant hadearlier purchased from his (complainant’s) son.  It isnot refuted that respondent paid complainant P340,000.00and gave him ample time to produce its title and execute

the Deed of Redemption.  However, despite the periodgiven to him, complainant failed to fulfill his end ofthe bargain because of the alleged loss of the titlewhich he had admitted to respondent as having prematurelytransferred to his children, thus prompting respondent tooffer his assistance so as to secure the issuance of anew title to the property, in lieu of the lost one, withcomplainant assuming the expenses therefor.

As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyervoluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation of a person, who inrespect to a business or trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view ofobtaining professional advice or assistance.  It is not essential that the clientshould have employed the attorney on any previous occasion or that anyretainer should have been paid, promised or charged for, neither is it materialthat the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about whichthe consultation was had, for as long as the advice and assistance of theattorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession.[15]

Considering the attendant peculiar circumstances, saidrule cannot apply to the present case.  Evidently, thefacts alleged in the complaint for “Estafa ThroughFalsification of Public Documents” filed by respondentagainst complainant were obtained by respondent due tohis personal dealings with complainant. Respondentvolunteered his service to hasten the issuance of thecertificate of title of the land he has redeemed fromcomplainant.  Respondent’s immediate objective was tosecure the title of the property that complainant hadearlier bought from his son.  Clearly, there was noattorney-client relationship between respondent andcomplainant.  The preparation and the proposed filing ofthe petition was only incidental to their personaltransaction.

Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibilityreads:

Canon 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.

Rule 21.01 – A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences orsecrets of his client except:

a)             When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;

b)             When required by law;

c)             When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by judicial action.

The alleged “secrets” of complainant were not specifiedby him in his affidavit-complaint. Whatever facts allegedby respondent against complainant were not obtained byrespondent in his professional capacity but as aredemptioner of a property originally owned by hisdeceased son and therefore, when respondent filed thecomplaint for estafa against herein complainant, whichnecessarily involved alleging facts that would constituteestafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon21.  There is no way we can equate the filing of theaffidavit-complaint against herein complainant to amisconduct that is wanting in moral character, inhonesty, probity and good demeanor or that renders himunworthy to continue as an officer of the court.  To holdotherwise would be precluding any lawyer from institutinga case against anyone to protect his personal orproprietary interests.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XV-2003-365 dated June 21,2003 of the Integrated Bar ofthe Philippines is REVERSED and SET ASIDEand the

administrative case filed against Atty. Fermin L.Gonzales, docketed as A.C. No. 5280, is DISMISSED forlack of merit.

SO ORDERED.