Knights of the Realm:Thailand's l\{ilitary and Police,

Then and Now

Paul Chambers, Editor

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Contents

IntroductiorrPaul Chambers ......... vi

Chapter IKhaki veto Power: The organization of rhailand,s Armed ForcesNapisa Waitoolkiat and paul Chambers ......... I

Chapter 2

A Short lJistory of Military Influence in ThailandPaul Chambers i09

Chapter 3

A Brief l{istory of the Thai ioliceEric Haanstad 447

Chapter 4

A Histor_v of PoliceArisa Ratanapinsiri

Reform in Thailand

499

Chapter 5

Thailand's Security Scctor and the Southern Insurgencv

Appendi,:es

Srisoinpob Jitpiromsri )+l

583

Index

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restructuring

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Chapter 5

The Nerv Challenge cf Thailand,s Securifi'

Forces in the Southern Frontiens

Srisompob Jitpiromsri

For more than eight years, Thaiiand's deep south provinces have suffaed

. trrough varied, indeterminate circumstances of conflict. Many people l;;ri.e:been killed in the violence. Deep South watch's statistics havsshown uiat

between January 2004 andMay i0l2 there were 11,754 incidenls of violeicercsulting tn 14,343 deaths and in-iuries. That 5,206 individuals were kiilec b1.

tlrc enduring violence proves the uruetlled mar k of deep conflict in the regr -',n. l

ln general. the incidents of iolence have declined. If u,e cons,jerthe situation in June 2007 as:: turning poinl, the nurnbcr of vio.:niincidents lrad begun to decrease, follorving a certain pattern. In s--ireof this apparent abatement, from 2008 onward there rvere attemp-rs atinsurgency usin-u methods that *,ould sustain the goals of the struf:ie.and that u'ouid ratchet up the iension at intervals. The unrest in :::esouthem frontiers has begun to lollorv a reguiar pattern u,iti-r occasic:.1;ispikes of tension, projecting an image o1'a never-ending conditio: lfviolence. The nature of conflict is thus characterized by the unsta:ieand dyna:nic violence. The dvnamic violer"rce also has a strong inr;."cion the le-eirirnacy of thc Thai srate in the deep south, in the tong ru:.

iri-- i

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The sitLr.i:. 'r'r iirr. ,ier oli.',.1 inr(\ rr-()trACted corrflict cluc r,rtir.,rin, ^:- , i,.lor.,-,. ,-',o,-., ,-l'-.. ,:r \,-. ,e....r1- ^-^ I 'f thgCoiltilltlin' oi i iglg11g.' trver\ dl..\'. e \ Cr\ rlopth. a,d e vg;,,,

, i"i."..'; # :, ;; ;;;;";.,,r,, ;'i:. ; ; ;,*;;; ;;;il:?.iill Ii:,rrvvLrr!E QL urr r!r Lrlr yruLllrJ ur lJguple gOlllg about

ll:,. 9,1] ll= . l=* ll.' l:ll i. I r.1_ :

a n d amack i n g in di v i duu r_tu,e.i,

"]1" -1l.,slrte otficials: attackiir-e the bases of the,rnilit..v, pori..,?,ro--^--^J, ,r"rrUtr, and

) -.'l' :lll"::': l : lld :1 i 1 s::s

11,'i''r .c-:'-- r as h e s d u ri n g rh e " s urroun d,

:'i::'l .1i1, -'*ll 'i'9: or 1]1te

oincials, against the in".e.ri,,often rcsultir: i, tlie killing oi irroceirr i,cii.,,iduals. Such inciilentstiequentlr' El.:. jlrr in Tliailand's national news reports.

Diagrarn 1: Monthly lncidents of Violenc€ in the Deep SouthThailand: January 2OO4-May 2012

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+,Monthly Casualties (Deaths and !nluries)in Pattani vala, and Naraitiwat

January 2004 to May 2012

_ie to the\ ear. The,ing aboutra1 targets

rlice, and

surround,rsurgents,

incirients

\ii':'..'. '-- :,ie prou'",'ted violence iras hacl a real impact on tire ii'esoi p:o:.: -:- :rt' dccp s.:uth. N,lonthlr. statistics of deaihs and ii.-rur.ics6,rnr ihe -;...-st harc':.uctlrated more than the repofted numl,ers Ofinciiieris. ::s;.rlti,s iir .l patte,i in lvhich the nionthl, nu,rber ofinci.ierrs ,. ,.'iier than lhe nro,thly casuarties. This is an exanri.,ic o1.''quaiii:tir i '. ir)lence"i ',i11s1g2r the number of incide,ts appeaicd toderline r;.'.:. li)08 o,r',lrd, the nu*bers of deaths anci injiriies tior-rthe ui]:.-s- :-,''" becll ii-.:tive11, Stablc or, in Some rnonti-rs. high.-:.thandi.' rlu::-,'i..'- ; -'incide'nis rrI unrest.

Diagranr i: \lonthly Deaths and lnjuries Comparedtr'ii: lncidents of Violence in the Deep South

January 2004 to May 2012

The li:::,.ru signs o: ihe gro*'ing sophistication ol the insurg:ncr\\'ere ri-\.:.r: trn ir'1ai;..31.2012. on tirat day. insurgerrts st,gcdth: i:..s: ::,:.., coorci...:red attacks in years, t<itting ia*peopi! inciiiirii::,: : ---- ihan r[i- rvitrr car bombs that targeled shopp;_. iir\:la P:,:'',:---- :nd a h:-i..-rise lroter fi-cquented b1, fbreign touris-.. i.sor-s.i.r.: i::i -. ini-'e. The ..rst explosive. planted inside a parked pi.-riupin.ick- rlr:.: i:rough ail:rea of restaurauts and shops in a busy a:--a or\ai:'s cis::--- --apital. A'iout tr,enry niinutes rater, a second car b"mb

j-11

cxploded, causing ihe ur;,.',:itr t-rf casuai,ies. The subsequenr reportreverled that 11 petrple ri:.: killc.tl ancl ll,rq,opncled b' tie blasts. eblast also occured.r a po:--...ir hot.-l in th: .-ity of Hat yai. in s.,ngttliuPro'ince. It was initiall'a:::,buted to a g:s leak, but authorities rornJa ser erely damaged sedan ::..i a hore creaied by the exprosion's i*pu.iin the underground car pari.. ihe erplosion kiiled 3 people anci causedabout 230 injuries. ntostfi .]rrr1 Srroke ilit:latiop.2

N1arch 2012 broke rhe rl--.',rds. becomirs the montli u,ith the highestnumher of injuries in nrc,:: than eight i ears of southent r rolence.ob'iously, the decrease ir: :e nu*ber oi incide,ts has ,o siguificantconelation

"vith the number..: casualties on i daiiy and moirthly basis. In

other rvords, policr,-based creratio.s and d:-escalatory measures usingmilitary forces during that tine had an effeci in diminishing the fi.equencyof incidents of unresi. \r,itht.rur si_snificantl-r. altering thJrate of deathsand injuries in each monrl,.: The qoventnent has utilized successfultactics in this regard by rear::neing its milirrn.structure to cope ri.ith theviolence and restore sofire i:i.asure of securry in the southern riontier.Hou'ever, the lack oi a bene: approach to svstematically improl.e andreform political structures is becoming obr ious. Military stratesies andeconomic straiegies are disr..rnected and lacking in muiual support. Inthe dcep south, po'erty i'r?.-. i.rt been sicirii.rntly allci,,iated. and thequaliii' of life has .ot -seil-.:ir'r\ irnprorec. Fuflher,orc. trrc peopreof thc region are dissatisfie: i, ith Ba*gk.',.-'s developrre.t prr)grams.leadin's to societal and ps1'c::ir'isical probl.-lr. l'he most se.ious socialproblern is substance abuse ::r.rn-u the youirter generation, highlightingrhe fail,re of socioeconomi: ::r eropnre,r i:,rhe regiorr. Sinc.i009. thepeop)r-'s trust and confider.:.:n securitv ai:ncies s,ch as thc rrilitan,a,dp.rlice ha,e reachecr a..',,. ebb. Howcr-:.. during the sccord half of2009. nrorc southenr people - :.-?*c- a\\rare t: and aciptecl the niiiitary'srole in the area of socioecor,--::,ic developn:ent.

The irnplication is trrar rl,; :ftbrts by tht ;niritary to pacify cir iriansdid not succeed in u'inning ri: hearrs and nrinds of raaray.ruruslirns. The

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feeling -rf being strbjectr-c to iniustice still runs deep. Many obsen'ers

lilo have ri'itnessed the c:rlttrral distance betrveen the authorities and

the people consider that i'=rceived tniscarriages ofjustice are a major

reason for southem violen.:e. because allthe components of racial and

religious injustice are present. such as the maltreatment of Muslims by

authorities. violence tou'ard local peopie in generai by officials, and an

abusive approach perpetr:ted by the state tirroughout the region. Most

observers feel that govenl:Ient officials are llore likely to be alienated

by the local people than e:nbraced bv thetn.

The aforementioned s;ltistics sen,e as fatal evidence for Thai

oolicymakers and strategis:s. From previous experiences of ethnic and

ieligious violence itt manv cottntries around the world, it commonly occurs

thaideeply embedded, sophisticated, and protracted conflicts tend to reach

a ,,plateau," to becorne "tmpped in a repetitive pattem of interaction-

usuaily involving the exchrnge of vioient or coercive behaviors-that

Seems dynamic, yet stable.'" If the trend of southern violencc holds to

this pattem. it is clear that tlil conflict has become self-perpetuating. Such

perpetuation of violence has become a feature in most conflict zones

arouind the u,orld. Following a complex process, many conflicts lose sight

oftheir original causes and br-come trapped in an extended action-reaction

sequence. in u'hich toclar''s conflict behavior on one side is a response

to yesterdar,'s beliaviot' br i.te ach/ers.lla,. Over time. the conflict evoives

into an enduring process. I: ihe process is allorved to cont:n,.te u'ith each

ncw incident a respoltsc tr. x previous incident. the positive shcft-terr,r

feedback fi'ont each violcn: i-\,eltt ovenvhelnls the original causes oftheconflict. cventullly leadirts :.t ntassive societal breakdown.' f

To the TItai authot'itics. thereflcre. sottihcrll violence constitutes a

rnajor challenge to the sc:-ii-ity of Thatland, because the insurgency'

has tire potential [o uproc: and desiro..' the po*'er anC legitimac]/ ofrhe Thai state in the deep south provinces. as a "re','olutionary \\'ar

against tlie Siarnese State ."- This i: a gra\/e nerv ciraiietige to ThailanC's

security forces in the post-Cold War era.

5.+5

The Formation of \ational Securi{' Policy Concerning theSouthern Conflict

The security is.ii.' underpinning southem violence ltas been a criticalfoundation for sribsequent policy fonrtation in successive Thaigovenxnents. The priman issue concenrs the legitimacv ofthe Thai state

in governing the \{uslim \lalay provinces in the lar south. The conflict isessentially a political struggle "conceming the extent to ii'hich Bangkokcan exercise legirinrate authority in tlte 'Patani'region. that is, the nlodernThai provinces oiPattani. \ala, Naratltiu'at, plus four adjoining districtsof Songkhla."' The characteristics of tlte southem conflict and relatedsecurity issues heve shour that the legitimacy problem has evoired intandem rvith the evolr ing siruation on the ground.

Before 1969. secrritv policies regarding the southern borderprovinces rvcrc rrt.ri rea.onably integrated or systematic. In 1966, therewere policies regarding "Pondok schools" and education of the "ThaiMuslirns" in the tbur soutirern provinces;s however, southeffr students

were rncre likell' to seek higher education in Jeddah or Cairo thanin Bangkok. Un.ioubtedh. the Thai state was very concerned aboutthe loyalt-v of pe,rple in the region. A "National Securitl, Policv in theSoutirem Borde : Pror inc.'s" rvas formulated and issried for the firsttime in 1969. l:,"r'as aiso:iie first time that Thai authorities retinedthis region as t:.: "stir:iirtr:r borcier provinces," a pitrase that ri'as tobe officially anc. *'ideiv u-ied later. To the securitl, e\pefis, this rvas

the beginning o: policv linkages betri,een the militan'and educationaldinrcnsions of cintrol ii: ri,e dcep souih. conccntraLillu on supprcssion,deveiopment. a:.i educaii,rno. National policy in the southern b.rrderregion during ::.e 1969-,r73 period had bcen characterized as an

attempt to give;::r'Thai-\luslim identitr a more inciusive role il theexercise of Th:.i citize::si,ip, rvhile developing the local cconcmy,strppressing ins.-i:gencres. and prolectlng rl:c regirn frorn foreigninfl ltration and iestabi liza:ion.

546

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fut Ho$'evct- after I 969. the securin siftratitln becatne llltrr. colnPliu--.iji1

and dpanric. Three distinct national securitv policies \\'rrr'pl-oil1ulg-':.'.i

in the south betu,een I 974 and I 977. in reslronse to lvlalar sian comnl'::.rsl

ilsurgents, southern Thai communists, and N4uslim separatists. ::.ifocus of the policies was on the categorical suppression of insur-eert:i :\increasing rnilitary and police presence in the south. persuading sr:te

leaders of the insurgent mo\/ements to surrender. and nesotiatins '.',i-h

foreign countries that u,ere syrnpathetic to the insurgencv. persu;:::.L

them to ccase their activities in Tirailand. Significanti'". a centrali:-:.g

strucftrre u'as established in 1975 tirat directed all a.uthci-ities-mili:::-'.

police, and civilian officials-operating in the southem h.rrder provi;---::.

This structure was an early model ol*'hat developed into the Sour-:nBorder Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) and the lnter.rlSecurity Operations Command (ISOC) in later years.

The basic function of the policies was then stateci: the suppres:..'n

of the insurgents, as articulated in the "Policy about Insur-eencr,'ir :.eSouthern Border Provinces" issued bi, tlie National Securitv Coi:::.'ii

in 1975:

[A]nanging an uncompromising suppressron ia ordcr to rcSr'ive thc imm: ''::tprohlcms: otherwisc, thc long-tcrm proSlcrtrs rior.tld not bc tr,.-i.icd: ... incr:- :lmilitarl forces including additional jc,i:r: opcr;:ions *itlt tirc :.,,iice and c,', ,-.:,

govemmcnt officials: ... [and] subjecti:rg Ilhe;.rilitan,forces.:-'ihe comtr-- -.r

the director of internal security of thL- soirlhcm border provi:.;es. lncreesii,.- :.-budget to make availablc resources to soi,,'e the problern of :.:rick of s'ea:,:r:'.

militarl' harcirvare, r,ehiclcs. and Isutlcient] stip:ntis for tlt'ilc::.. ..r" ;

For those soutlierners rvho hai conr::ritted u'rongdorng anc :'jsurendered, the security policy u'as ir:iendeC to r: lenierti. - :govemment instructed the director of internal securitl,it-, ir€at thos: ,' -lcooperated rvith the arrthorities lightlr': if tney had bee: arrested u:.::rwarrarts. the authorities rvould try to reduce the char-ses a:d punishrn:::s.

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n border)66, therelhe "Thaistudents

airo tiraned about.cy in thethe firstrefered

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fbreign

P-..-e irlinister K,krit P.amol elaborated this security policy, whichi;: reen ;31gloped trr cr-ubr)dy the uniq, of the statc. Kirkl.it affimej*..: Thail,:nd *'as a uiritary kingdo,r, ,rilitary forces in the south werJre--pr-ra5iug for peacekeepi,-e. protecting territorial integnty, und, to besu:.-. safeguarding ror ai supremacy. He $,as adamant tirat tliere wouldbe io military ri'ithdrarial fi'onr the deep south.

F ukrit's policy remained in force u,tir l9ll. After that yeaqne'.i policies \\'ere developed to more finnly integrate ttre puuticadlinistrarion oithe securitr apparatus, u,hire broadening its content.Tiit security policy of 1978 continued to rely on military force tosuppress the insurgency, bur devised neu,roles for Thai Muslirns toparricipate in resolutions, economic growth projects, and infrastruchrede'elopment. On January 20, 1981, the new premier, premTin:ulanonda, signed Prime Minister's order no. gl2524 defining twola1'ers of securifv policy structure in the southern border provinces: anupItr level under the prime minister, who would direct the NationalSecuriry Council (NSC) to coordinate national policy administration,anci a regional level, which rvould rargely be the responsibiiity oithe commander of 4th Army Region, centered in southern Thailand.The Southern Border Provinces Administrative center (SBpAC) wasmca:ru,hil,-' established to deal rvith civilian affairs and coordinateri'ii: civilian agencies in the region. At the same time, the civilian_Pol-.-e-Military .loinr Headquarters 43 (cpM-43) was established tococ:dinate befg'een various agencies and military operations. Theforenost niission of the joint forces remained the suppression of allforr,_. of insurgency.

P:em sought io replicate his success i, rvinning over the cornmunisrins'u:genci in Th:iland's nofiheastem region. His principal adjutant*'as cenerai Han Leelanond, u'hom he later appointed to be 4th A.mi,cori,::anCs:. Han Lrtilized a rvell-known strateg!. tni t.ottt 1,eru (the southin tL: cool shadel. a mix of de'elopment projects and pubticrelatio;rsiniti;rives. Han r,,'as one of the architects of the SBPAC.il

548

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During the 1980s, a decade of- policy implementation, ruany

obsen,ers ctrnsiciered that thc. SBPAC and CpM-43 had achieved

outstandin-t rcsults in facilitating coordination amorlg governntent

agencies u'orking on the ground. indeed, the SBPAC proved crucial

in involving local religious and academic leaders in developmentprojects and conflict resolution. To address the problcrtr of lcgitinracy,

security policy in the south lor vears had concentrated on encouraeing

the use of the Thai la;iguage alrlong Musiim Thais, u,hile suppolringthe "comn-ron understanding of all groups about different cultures."

Nevertheless. ihr: "counrou understanding" or the "unity of ideas"

afiong go\Iernrnent officials from various agencies developed into

an altogether different problem.r2 There continued to be coordinationproblems among agencies as u'ell as conuption and prejudice ar,ongofficials, all of rvhich threatened southern security and staie legitimacy.

These critical problems could not be solved by the southern pubiicadministration. Tire positive inrpact of Prem's new initiatives was thus

undermined b1' tl':e transfer into the southern provinces of corupt and

inept offici;ls fiom other regions. However, according to researchby the nonprofit NGO Intemational Crisis Group, violence droppedoffsignificantly during the 1980s aird early i990s and membershipin armed organizations dropped as nlany insurgents took up amnesryoffers, abandoning the ir fight to participate in development programsorjoin the Thai arrny. Besides, erowine political openness in Malay,siahad lured sor:re N4alaysian expatriates living in Thailand to returnhome. Some lormer insurgents joineci Thailand's security sector;others took pcsitions in local adnrinistrations (e.g., as subdrsFictchiefs and hcadrnen) or establisiied Porrdok schools. As policymakershad arrticipatc'd, the initiatir es led to sonte fbnns of cooperation, aitdMusiim political participation increased. undercutting suppo( forarmed strugrlc'. '

In 1996, the siructure of thc soutirem secrrrity administration uasagain adjusted. As the lntemal Security Law had been tenninated with

5.19

tite decline of communist insurgency, the -lth Army commandel's';

legal jurisdiction over regional intemal security accordingly;ifr

became ineffective. The cabinet tirereupon issued Prime Ministerial':il

Order 2612537, redefiniirg the southern regional administration by :

separating the civilian administration under the supervision of SBPAC lfrom the militan, operations directed by CPlt'l-43.ra The policy also

focused more on econotnic development, inr-estment, and economic l

coordination arnong Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia under the '

Irrdonesia, Malavsia, and Thailand Growth Triangle project. The '

government belier,ed tliat socioeconomic development could lead to '"jtancible rewards and benefits for the local \{uslims. Unforturrately, r

hou,ever, the regional economic crisis in 1997 strongly debilitated

all three countries and slowed dorvn cross-border coordination. The

insurgency, also, slowed down, although it persisted.

In 1999, national security poiicy in the southern provinces

encouraged a more participatory process. The newly formulated

policy stated that "... All people in the southem border provinces

should have peaceful lives based on cultural and religious identities, ""

and, particularly, the Thai Muslims rvho are the majority should live '

their lives as Muslims in Thai sociefy."r5

To cope witli the underlying niistrust and alienation of the local

Musl ims towar,-l the Thai state, the neu' pol i cv for the fi rst tirne mentioned

the "r,alues of inulticuiluralism," a tactic that rr,'ould be beneficial in

bringing about securitl,. peace, and sustainable development. and

that rvould help build constructive ellgagement and developmental

cooperation betri,een neighboring countries and the locai i\{uslirn

conrrnunities.r(' But the root cause of the insttrgency-the lack of local

confidence in the Thai state-remained intact. Although governmellt

prosrams fairly improved soutltem Muslirus' econornic u'elfare and

public parlicipation, tu'o major problems pcrsi:ted. First, official. anci

especially police, comrption remaineci pen'asiv3, and second, political

integration poiicies stiil contained Thai-centric elements. Moreover,

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.hp nreiudices of go\ enlment offlcials working on the ground stiii ran

;;*." Indeed. nranr. officials continued to equate cultural d('mands

relating ro expresslons of Malay identity with political demands for

,rpuruiit*, and their response was to suppress that identity'

The government continued to strongly endorse the Thai language

6rrough education and the media. For instance, teaching at the primary

,nJ rJ.onaury levels identified local Muslims as Thai Muslitns rather

,n* f*ufu, Muslims and used Thai as tire only medium of instrtrctiotr'

S*a.nrr did not haYe the option to choose Malay as a second la:ruuagc

.i *aV, only English. French, German, and Arabic rvere ar ailabie

,, *Uj..tr oi study. The government also changed street and r.illage

nur., r.o* Malay to Thai, and people were encouraged to adopt Thai

nur.r. The government succeeded in implementing this "Thainess"

"ofir* as "almost all Malay children norv speak Thai, but they

tg.r.i*.d a backlash against what was widely perceived as an attack

In Malay language and culture."rT

It is noteworthy, that, during the 1990s, the govemment also

succeeded in splitting an<i weakening the insurgent groups, but the

frilur. of this earlier generation of rebels also le<i to the emergence of

u n.ry g.n..ation of niiitants. This was significant because it in"licated

that although repression had stiffed the rebellion, its underlying car-rses

had not yet been adequately addressed'

In the climate of reduced violence, tire state adopted 3 more

pfagmatic polic,y torvard the south. Articulated as the National

b..-u.ity Policy on the Southern Border Provinces of 1999. tlre

new nteasltres retllained in elfect ;ntil 2003, u'ilctl an csqalaticl

of violence lccl to signilicant changcs in the sccttrity situatlorl' It't

2004. tlrc cetrtral srrvcrlllrlellt in Bangkok felt corllpelled :o take

over responsibilitl, for secLrrity policy in the south from tile \SC in

respo.nse to thc grou ing crisis. The 'lhaksin Shinau'atra go\'ernment

refused to take the aclr'ice of tlie NSC regarding sotrthern s3cLirit)'

issues, ne\rer once entertaining the NSC's opinions during :ts tirnc

-551

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":3p{C-'- ---. also. :::'ltOmiC_:ier the

.:,tect. Theuld lead to,'brnrnately,debilitatedration. The

provlncesformulatedprovincesidentities,

;hould live

f the localmentioned:neficial inntent, and

:loprnentalll Muslimck of localoverntnent'elfare and

fficiaI, and

d. politicalMoreoveq

im rffice. Instead- the qovernnrent deyised southern policy froni itsc-:n: concerns. isntrring the traciition of relying on long-term policvgii:Jance generate.l br the [rurr'aucratic statT agenc],. rs The context ofthis policl.' transitirrn u as hichly, political.

The variant oi southe,r policy from 2004 onrvard reflected thedrnamics of Bangkok polirics. Rather than just addressing the iocalsituation as had been done in the past, tlie new policl, related directlyto Thaksin's polirical mori'es. Thaksin Shinawatra rose to power asa ctrnSeQUence of the econonric crisis and new constitution of 1991 .

His govemment "epiromized nerv polirical forces unhappy with theresidual influence of netu'c'rrk monarchr'."re This network involvedacti\.e interventions in the political process by the Thai king andhis proxies. The key' actor in this nefq,ork u,as prem Tinsulanonda,chairman of the Privy council. a retired general, and fonner prirneminister. Thaksin sought to challenge prem's political network whiletrying to dismantle netu.ork monarchy.

Duncan Mccarso, *'lio coined the phrase "network monarcliy,,'observes that the netu'ork ha-i _grown and gained influence over the1'ear-s but has never achieved total politicai domination. Therefore,"the palace u'as obli-ued to .r:ork with and through other politicali nstirutions. primari h' the elecied parl i arn.'nt. ":, 1,,1r. southern borderoroi'inces. netu-ork monarch' had steacil). grown by generating anerri'ork of Budcihisi _qoven'lmrnt officials and 4th Anny officers u.iththe political suppo:-i of the Deniocrat part),, anci a smaiier number ofleading Muslirrs g'ho are lor"al ro the Thai state. The critical process oiundermining netrr'o:k nonarci:r undeftaken b1' Thaksin u,as,iherefore,directly associared','..ith sourhern politics and. consequently, tlie shakysouthern securin' :olic1'. A:::mpting to inc-olporate tlie southernborder provinces i;::o his o* ri network and displace the Demccrat-ied rierrvork monarc.n' that co:i:r.-,llecl tiie region, Thaksin transfonrredsecurirv arrangemen'ts in mid-l002by placing the police in cha.rge oflau.and order, ri,hile abolishine the SBPAC.:r

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rcers r.l'ith

rumber ofrrocess oftherefore,the shakysouthern

)emocrat-

nsfonledcharge of

Neri ideas about southem security policy cierive fiom Thaksin's

political fratr-ieii'ork dLrring his first tenn of adniinistration, tirat is, the

perspective that e\isting bureaucrirtic and adninistrative arrangelllents

i er. unm,tnvorthv and unreliable. having been created for the benefit ofold system, namelv network monarchy. Accordingly, he believed that he

could solve the problerns in the south by thinking new and acting ne\\'.

by making the right decisions r ery quickly, bv transfening officials

and puning tlie right person in the right job, and by strengthening lau'

enforcemettt. Based on thc'se principles, Thaksin led people to believe

drat he could quickly resolve the southem conflict in his o\\'n wa\'-

The SBPAC u'as iiis flrst target. as it was the centerpiece of network

governance that Prem had forged and directed for the preceding

flvo decades. Prem had developed key elements of the nettvork bt'

determining appointments and setting policy, making the militarythe leading actor in southern security, promoting a prominent role

tbr the palace, and boosting the political influence of the Democrat

Parfy.tt On the other haud, Thaksin assessed tlie southem situation

and concluded that separatism \\'as no longer an issue; instead, he

believed that disputes aniong disgruntled interest groups, includingu'ithirr and among the security services, were driving tl:e violence-

He underestin.rated the volatilitl. o{'the situation, belicving that the"soonei the securiry situation \\'as nontlalized, tlre quicker these

problems would be resolved." On May l, 2002. he decided to dissoh'.-

the SBPAC and CPM-43 by printe n-rinisterial order.:lThis was the first significant transformation in the securirr

manas.rnent of the southern border provinces since 1978. Under ti:e

ne\\r arrangement. a "nonnal adnrinistration," specifically integrated

management led b1' a "CEO-goven)or," *'ould replace the special

agencies. The SBPAC's cir:ties uere assigtred to individual orovinciaisovernors, and the suppression of the insurgency and banCitry.

including "internal peacel<eepins." was relegated to Police Commanci

Region 9. The role of the 4thAnny was restricted to "regular" border

),'_.

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i-- j r.-:r'--.r:. j:rense.:j TIre end resulis oi this policy transformation: - :' : - *:ir't-prrrdttctive. SintplV put, the s:iurity S),stem on the ground

i. :: --Lrrituse,J [., the political change.H', porheticallv and realisrically, the S3p.{c and cpM-43 had been

;: i;e top of an important inteliigence n:il'opft, and SBpAC officialsia,j had good links u,ith community leaders, providing a channei:or local people to express their grier:nces. More importantly, asthe security svsiem had been managed :r the two agencies for fwodecades, they had leanred liou, to besi n-r:intain a delicate balancebetu'een tire security and intelligence asrrcies operating in the south.As the police \\'ere now in charge, "the .r'heels began to come off interms of order and security throughout thr region." The InternationalCrisis Group believed that the new secrsin'structure weakened thegovernment's ability to handle the escala:ion of violence after z0o4.z5

The January 4,2004, raid on the Royal ThaiArmy,s 4th EngineeringBattalion in Cho-airong district, Narathiw,at province, was th;beginriing of the spiraling upsurge in s,--ruihern violence. Southemsecurity policy at that moment rvas under_rr-ring an extremely confusedand inconsistent transformation.

The army camp raid on Januar.r 4, in u iicn the insurgents rnade offrvith large amounts of fireann-:. rvas deen-,:c l profoundry disgracefulevent for the Thrri anlv. The qovemnrenl ::r:.rsed martial lau, in eightdistricts of the three southcrnlnost provincts. snd later extended ma(ialla'uv to cover the tliree provinces cornple:er,. Incidents of violencefurther escalated. pamicularh' in April lirr-iJ at Kme Se Mosquein Pattani Province and in n-iani, locatic:,. ir yara province, r.vhichresulted in 107 deaths.6 in-jLrries. and 17 i:r.:SiS among the insurgents.ri'hile govemulent forces sLrlfered 5 cieatirs.:: r5 injuries. Then camethe u'idely reported Tak Bai (Narathirvat) i: --.;:nt of October 25.2004,in r,r'irich at least 85 insLrrgents u,ere kili=:.::-rostly by suffocation intrucks lvhere thev had been bound and srlc!..i on rop of each other fortransporl. In 200-i. the violence greatly cxr::.ied, parlicurarly in April

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Mosque. u,hichrrgenLs,

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ation intirer iorin April

-o

and May. u,ith attacks in Yala City resulting in 2 dead police officersand23 injured civilians, and the sabotage of pou,er plants sen,ing Yala

with electricity leading to blackouts of the entire city. Follori'ing this

wave of violence, the Thaksin government enacted the Royal Decree

on Administration Under the State of Emergency B.E. 2548 (2005).

The Thaksin administration typically responded to the violence

with harsh measures. The Southern Border Provinces Peace-Buiiding

Command (SBPPBC) was established under Order oftlie Prime li Iinisterp.6912547 on March 24,20A4, allowing fbr extraordinary oversigirt

to the problem. Additionally, the National Reconciliation Cornmission

NRC) u,as established on March 28, 2005, as an independent

commission sfudying the root causes and structural problems of the

southern unrest. However, Thaksin's policy is best characterized byiB use of force in suppressing the unrest, u'ith emphasis on open and

cianticsiirte poiice actions, resulting in greater intensity of violenceduring the 2004-2006 period. The level of violence in the deep

south peaked fcur tirnes during this period: in Aprii 2004 (trir-h 272

incidents), I'{ay 2005 (with a record 344 incidents), June 2005 iwithas marly as 313 incidents), and August 2006 (with 236 incidents). The

most infamous of the incidents were those at the Krue Se Mosque and

at Tak Bai.:6

Most violent incidents during 2004-2006 were coordinated, multipie-site attacks. Foi exampie. in June 2006" there u,ere sirnultaneouscarpet attacks bv militants in 54 locations in all three provinces ofthe deep south. Most of the altacks rverc. conducted by setrins offsmall, improvised explosive devices (lEDs), r.r,ith the aim to createdisturbances in a variery of target areas. L)uring this particLrlar!-serie s

of attacks, the violence continued for a l'eu, da1,s. ln Augusi 100(r,disturbances occun-ed in nrore than 122 lacations in the three deepsoutli pro,.'irrces plus Songkhla at nearly the same time, inciudingbornbings, arsoll, punct'Jre nail scattcrings, and tire burnings. And inSepternber 2A06, there were bombings of residential ard tourisr areas

555

"------.+-t-

ei,4'{6

G ftr{m. ir.rcadons in the center of Hat Yai. Songkhla's biggest city,

muft irs,j*aths and more tlian sixty individuals injured. This incident

,o'.g";r:31j on September 16, 2006, three da1,s before the coup d'6tat in

3mgirok that overthreu' the Thaksin govemment'

To sum up, the southem conflict embodies a security deficit that

;{.esents a grave challenge to Thailand's secttrity establishment. Thelnenyork monarchy" that had dominated security policy in the south

for tu,o decades u,as replaced in the earil" 2000s by a new prime

minister rvho was n'rotivated more by personal political and business

interests, leading to a chaotic transfonnation on the ground exacerbated

by the growing effectiveness of the insurgency in challenging Thai

legitimacy. Two major policy tools were used to cope with the crisis:

the imposition of martial law and the enactment of the Royal Decree

on Administration Under the State of Emergency B.E. 2548 (2005),

known as the Emergency Decree. The widespread abuse of these two

special pieces of legislation only served to make the situation worse.

Sinci then, various security policy tools have been applied in

different times and situations in response to the continuing violence.

These tools include martiai law (applied variously since 2004), the

Emergency Decree (enacted and applied variously since 2005),

"surround and search" ntilitary operations (since 2008), the new

SBPAC legislation (applied since 2011), and the NSC's new securily

policv (enacted in 20 12).

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nixgrant -1: \lonthlr \trtttbcr of lncidents of Yiolence and tltc

i:.il_ poti., Dl,nanrics during Each Government lrom Januen'

ioor ro N{ar 2ol1

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rated

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). the005),ne\ /

:urity

SecuritY Enforcemeni since 2004

Despite the sensitivitv and conficlentiality in which statistics abont the

arr,redfcrcesinthesoutharehelcl,sonlereliablestudiesanddoctlheatsaboutsoutheiisecuritr.operationsareavailable.Atthecoreofsecu:it}'enforcement are the urriea forces, co'rposed of the military, poiice'

paramilitarl'- ,nO u*tJ civilians or defense volunteers' Thc secu::r1'

forcesmobilizedtccoperr'iththesotrtherncrisishar,eincreiseddrasticaliy since 2004 ii ZOO+' amid urgent demands to deal u'ith the

i -,:7

r +,..a.i

* ::. South.rn Froiltiers

, . -:Lert situatiori, the Thaksilt govellulent seut niore than 30,000::---ir-it' personnel, rncluding police and soldier-s. to the southern::':der pror inces, establishing the Soutliem Border Provinces peace-

tsuilding Contmand to coordinate betri'een the nrilitary, police, andcivilian forces, lbllowed by the establishment of the Board of polilcytrn Southerr Border Provinces Peace Building.2?

In the process, there were many changes in the southern securitytbrces in tenns of both quantity ar,d quality. Interestingl.r'. withineigirt years from 2004 to 201 1, the conrmander ot'the 4th Arnry wasfrequently transferred. lndeed, seven i]ersons filled this posr duringthis time period: Generals Pongsak Ekbannasing (2003-2004), pisanWattanawongkiri (2004-2005), Khwanchat Klahan (2005), OngkornThongprasom (2005-2006), Wirot Buacharoon (2006-2008), pichetWisaijorn (2008-2010), and Udomchai Thammasarorat (2010_present [2012D. The southern frontiers, therefore, have become themost decisive testing ground for the competence of Thai military andother securiw forces.

After 2004, the structui'e of military operations in the deep southpro"'inces initially came under the supen,ision of the Frontline Sectionof the internal Security Operations Comrnand (ISOC) Region 4,officially Ied by the cornmander of 4th Army u,irh assistance fromthe ci..,il-Police-Military Joint Conrnrand (cpM). placing rhe militaryat the iorefr-ont of tlie struggle against ilre insurqents. The militarycornponent $'as divicied into trvo substructures. the Srisunthornand Santisuk Forces. srisunthonr was rhe main fighting force andcomprised Task Force I (in Yala Provincc), Task Fcrce 2 (pattani),Task Force 3 (Narathir.r,at), and Task Force 4 (Songkhla). In 2005,*'hen Major Gencral Sarnret Srirai u'as rhe cornmander of the cpMand directly comr-nanded tlie Srisuntirorn lorces at the sarne time,Srisunthonr had abor-rt i4,800 soidicrs allocatcd to diltbrent areas ofPattani, \'ala. liarathirval, and four drstricts of Songkhiars. The forcesincluded troops from the regular arm1,. the marines task force, the

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recome therilitary and

deep south

ine SectionRegion 4,:ance fromhe militaryre military;ris.':nthorn

force and, (Pattani),

. In 2005,the CPM

anrt time,rt aleas offl:e l-crces

force, the

' : Jecurlty l-',ntOrCement Smce 2004

borrder patrol police, the Ranger., u ."r"*" corps, and a rocal militiacommanded by professional soldiers.2e The core duties of these soldierswere manning checkpoints, guarding temples, protecting monks, andescorting teachers on their way to and from schools.30

Santisuk forces were responsible for sociopsychological campaigns,competinr rvith insurgenrs to win the hearts and minds of the peopie.They were organized into special warfare units numbering around1,000 soldiers each. The soldiers who had trained with the Specialwarfare command, Lopburi province, were capable of conductingps),chological warfare and working with local people. The indiviclualoperational units comprised l2 soldiers, operating in the vicinity ofrnosques, r'illages, and local schools, making friends and der.elopingpersonal relations in order to win the people over and also to inr"estigatitheir behavior. The special warfare units were divided into threesubunits: those involved in psychorogical warfare and communityrelations, those involved in espionage, and elite commando unitsconducting mi litary operations.3 I

InAprii 2a05, the cabinet approved the army,s plan to creat€ a newinfantry di'ision, originally calred the Develop*.nt and proteoion ofNahrral Resources Division. The army later renamed the unit InfantryDivision I-i. composed of three regiments and tasked with providingsecurity in the sourhern border nrovi n ces ancl put Maj or General SamretSrirai in charge. Initially, the com;:randers of thc ilii-ee battaiiuri: werethe respecti\ie commanders of the individual provincial task forces:Thsk Force Pattani, Task Force yala, and rask Force Narq,rhirvat.A temporary headquarters was rocated at Hua Hin, pracrrrup rH.iKhan Proi'ince, *'hich was later moved to Inkhayut Militan. Base,Paftani.s2 The neu'division was intended to have i:.ooo troop-r. rvith30 to 40 percent of stafi officers to be recruited from arnon.l localMuslims in the southern border provinces, but the developrnent of thisinfanrri' di'ision has been i,effective. In Novemb er z0'll, yingluckshinawatra's Phuea rhai government approved the new ceiling

559

--...+t-:

l:

I:I

m =e Southern Frontiers

:-cget to expand the stnrcrure of Infantry Division Fifteen from 16:rllion to 18 bilrio, baht, enabring expansion of the divisio,. Mosttri the new fundirg was used for infrastructure construction, but thehuman resources and capacity development of the division remainsmediocre.33

on November 23,2010. the ISoc decided ro dissorve the cpM, asa result of the neu, SBpAC legislation, which separated the authority ofciviiian and military agencies.3a The Srisunthorn and Santisuk forces*'ere also dissolved. Tlie Frontline Section of ISoc Region 4 wouldhenceforth be directry in charge of all units of securitf il..", on theground.According to statistics gathered by the Isra News center in2011,

up to 34'625 sordiers are deployed in ISoc Region 4, made up of23,704 regular soldiers and, r0,92r p.angers (Thahan phran).r5 These,umbers include the soldiers in the Anothai Task Force, the Explosiveordnance Disposal (EoD) units. Nonmilitary forces in ISoc Region4

^include i6,91 8 porice, g,23g civilians, g02inteiligence officers, 333officers connected with the peace Center, 1,9g6 officers working inthe development sector, and 1,573 advisers. overalt, a+,zlq security

forces personnel are deployed in ISOC Region 4.16As of 2012, miritary deproyments iir the three southeramost

provinces principally comprised the three aforementioned task forces,_\'aia

Tasr Force (TF r ), pattani Task Force (TFz),and Nararhiwat Taskforce €F3).sotdrers depioyed in the yala and pattani Task Forcesamount to a brigade each (with two regiments, or six battalions, perbrigade), while the Narathiu'at Task Force amounts to a division (thieeregiments, or nine battalions). in addition, there is the Songklla TaskForce with smaller units, plus tr.vo additicnal task forces, th-e renewedSantisuk (involved in special rvarfare) and Anothai (engaged insuppor-ting and technical activities).

Meanwhile, )nore army Rangers lrar,e also beerr deproyed in thedeep south. On May 3, 2Ali, the cabinet approved a pioposal hy

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!:. \lirlistrr' o1'Delense to add five rnore Ranger regiments in 2012

,id 2013. At present. there are seven Ranger reginrents deployed inne deep south. With the additional deployments, the current 10.9i1

fi.lngers in the deep south u'ould grorv to some 18.000 Rangers in

r*-elve regiments. plus five fernale platoons.3T The total number ofriiilitary personnel in ISOC Region 4 would then surge to more thanjLi.000 soldiers by the end of 2012. The reputation of the Rangers

in Thailand is not good. With inadequate military training of at most

sis months and sometimes as little as forty-five dar s. most Rangers

lsck sufficient discipline and professionalism. By the late 1990s, the

Ranger force u'as being phased out of the southern provinces, but as

riolence escalated, they were again deployed.'8

A more alarming trend is the use of armed civilians. Some

researchers estimate that more than 30,000 civilians have been trainedto help the anned forces. The Volunteer Defense Corps (Or Sor), forlnstance, is armed with U.S.-made M-16 and German-made HK-33assault rifles. Firearms .rf various sorts are readily available in more

&an 2,000 viiiages throughout the deep south. \{ilitary strategy

e$courages thc strengthening of civilian armed groups; in special

operations, soldiers rvill provide weapons iraining of up to ten davs

for villagers. Boih men and \\'omen are taught how to use shotguns.E ch village has been equipped r.vith about fifteen rifles, to be used

li''r daily guard duty, and it is estimated that each village force has at

least 50 civilian security personnel. More than 100.000 civilians. or:.7 percent of the total population of Pattani, Yala. and NarathiriatP;ovinces. paflicipate in these forces. And with at leasr fifteen shotq{nsa:d rifles 'oe ing distributed to each villase force, some 10,750 fireaimsa:: no\v officiallr,circulating anlong civiiians in the rxee deep sourhp:.,.r'inces. ie

The army itself clainrs that it has plenty of supporting armeCcii'ilian forces. composed of 15,000 r,illage protection rolunteers (OrRrr Bor). 48.000 self-defense voiunteers (Chor R.or Bor), and 8,000

Ft

P\1. as

oriry of: forces.wouldon the

n 2011,:upof5 TheseplosiveRegion:rs, 333

king in,ecurity

:rnmostforces,

'at TaskForces

Ins, perr (threeia Task

:neu'ed.ged in

I in the

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El-rrr(rluersF;!'rE* of spocial de'eropme,t pro-jects. The NGo Nonuiot.n*.ffhrairr.el South East Asia estirnates higher numbers: 3,299 i,r;;;rrtbtnnteer Defense corps, 24,763 village protection ,'olunt...r, .d I6o,(m self-defense ,olunteers. The i\{inistry of Interior .onhill ,.that there are about 7,000 volunteer Defense corps ,.n u.irl ,,.consequenth', each village force is estimated to have at least io ricivilian security personnel, namely 5 r'illage headman ,rrlrtuntr, s

"oi ii

6 volunteer Defense corps members, 30 self-defense r-olunre..r, un-o "*20 village protection volunteers. Eacli of the 2,050 r.illages m ilr. irrr.l ..isouthernmost provinces are equipped * ith their ori.n security for.es.i tlr

In short, the tough enforcement of security arran_qements in the deep .south provinces has led to large-scale military mobirization and extensivi ,

militarization of the region during the eight years of counterinsurgency.The overall number of people working for the security forces, boihprofessional and civilian volunteer, are as many as 163.400, includinjprofessional soldiers and staff, paramilitaries, civilians, and militias] rProfessional rnilitary and police number40,5c0; par,rnilitaries including iRangers and or sor, about 25,}}a;and the militias, aii volunteer defensl .$

villagers, chor Ror Bor anc or B.or Bor. nearly g5,000. Therefore, the .loverall active forces are about 150,350 peopie, or 8.2 percent ora total :population of 2 million in the three provinces. It is regretfully evidentfrom more than eight years of conflict that the use of military force hasbecome a major strategy of the Thai state to bring about peace in thedeep south. Si vis pacem, para bellurn.

562

| :_r:r' i I-iOC Region .{

R:ngcr: rThahan Phran)

Or Sor'1\blunteer Defense Corps)

Cir rlian .{gents

Orlrer Mi l:rery Personncl

Or Ror Bor {\zillage protection Volunteers)

Chor Ror Bor lSell-Defense Volunteers)

Total

Chor Ror Bor(5elf-Defense

Volunteers),

Other lv"lilitar,,,

Pe rson n el,i -7a4

, ,_ - - . , !rrrvr !rrlluuL su-lgE ZUU+

Structure of Forces

Numtrer of People

23,704

16,91 8

19,000

7,000

8,238

q,)iga

24,768

60,000

163,422

Or Sor

(VolunteerDefense Cc -ps),

Civilian Agents,7,0a3

8,238

56i

::-. :,:aes.-,: rh. deep

ci extensive

insurgency.

orces, botht, includingrd militias.s including3er defense)refore, the

rt of a totallly evidenty force has

)ace in the

m T]lu SrultlrT f - .:,:r:ilrruug':um 5: i ,.i,mp'inrnts of -{ctive Forces in the Deep Southir'r'u*T1* lni *:+r"l perSonncl

Consequences: Effective or Counterproductive?

Duncan lvlcCargo, rvho has conducted exhaustive field research in the

deep south, concluded that "the Thai rnilitary were someu,here belweerrmediocrc and incomDetent at the best times, but the situation in the

South ri'as foi thcm the rvorst of tirnes ..."4r The intenrationai CrisisCrouir also higirlights the inabilitl' of the police ar,d reguiar miiitaryto cope rvith thc n.iounting insurgency' in the south, suggesting that,

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564

Number of Peoplc

Professionai

Paramilitaries 25.000

urh

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behl'een;n in the

a1 Crisisniilitan,ing that.

=----]---=lI

--l

although tlie use 1-':ramiiitaries i, trie foreseeabie fuhiie.is i,er itable,the Tirai goverrlnt.nt lnust begin a ma,aged process of r:ro'instori'ard rncre proii-ssionar and accountabie secur ity arran-.ge,rr.;;.r:The competence o; the military iras become increasingly testec. rvithconstant mobiliza:i.rns and troop rotations froln ot.-h.. ,ag,on, ,osouthern battregrouads. As anny battalions potate o*ongrh. country,sfour rnilitary regions, an' one battarion wi, no,nalry"sfeno oniy ayear i. the south lRegion 4). and, gi'en the need to aOapt to r. neu.organizational culnire in the south, performance is often lacklusrer.a3

There are man' sig,s of i,coi,petence, including discipiinaryproblems among tii-'rank and fire. The soldiers,sexuar behar,ior hasoften dra*'n consi<ierabre atte,tio,; in Janu ary 2012, a video r,,,asleaked in rvhich cLrnscripts raped a Muslim u,oman.aa In cri ilianaffairs, soldiers har'"' scmetimes resorted to lori.-lever harassmentof community leaders. The deficiencies of military discipline ha,ebeen plainly visibre in such routine acti'ities as jatroliirig an,J theoperation of crreckpoinr-. Some miritary officers huu. u...pted thatthe camp raid on January 4.2004, denronstrated the soldiers, inabilityto adequately defentl themserves. at thc end of the cay, sordiers havefound themselves on the defensive u,hire sen,ing *iit in ,rr.;r owncountry. The essenrialpoint is that the limited corn-petence of the Thais.ecuriq' forces, coupred rvith the troubresome and unfamiliar taci:cs ofthe militants, have p.rt these security forces in a ven.difficurt siruaiion.And thrs difficultl has been compounded by the s..r.i! ft,rces,mishandline of se'erar major incidents, most prominentry t-he arackon Krue Se Mosqur on April 29,2004, and the disgracerul ir,. ;;;rncident later that veil.r.rj

Faced * ith rough treatment by the security forces, mosl .ccalpeople in the deep soutir ha'e becoine more arienated and frusrrted.{ccordins ro sun'e\s. .roSi Southerners believe that the Emer.=ncyDecrc.' has si'en uniimited power to the authoritie:. The decree :rsoallo*'s militan'and "o'crnment officiars much reeri.ay rvith the iaw.

, .''{.

*' ' t{.#.E

ofren granting immunitr. in cases of rvrongdoing. Uuder the EmergencyDecree. people's dailv Ii'es are inconrenienced; innocent

"lt,itiun,are often u'ronglv anested or detained for interrogatior-r, bascd onmisinformation.r6

Moreover, most people considered that the enforcement of theEmergency Decree had a direct effect on their feelings toward the Thaistate, particularly those u,ho did not understand the law procedures andtherefore believed that the',. ivere simply being abused by the authorities.Most people thus disagreed with the enforcement of extraordinary lawssuch as the Emergency Decree and rnartial law. They tended to thinkthat using other laws, such as the Internal Security Law, would bemore appropriate to resolve the unrest. Southem Muslims in particularfully supported the rvithdrawal of military forces from the deep southprovinces. Almost 62 percent of the respondents disagree or stronglydisagree with the government's rnilitary solution to the problems inthe southern provinces.al

Diagram 6: Attitudes ton'ards the government,s method tcmoLrilize armed forces to solve the problems in the southernprovinces

Do you agree with the government's method to mobilize the military tosolve the prob!erns in the southern provinces?

strongly agree1,t%

C

p

tt

p

re

inp(is

sLl

ha

gc

CO

af(

thtsulcoltha

agreeL3%

strongly disagree28%

566

hr5tatGtdUysin

qftrffibyOreau&rorities to winthe hearts and mindsttHftns in the far southern pro'inces for almost nine years. the

F fril-E of the securiry forces has had the opposite result, leadingrps&r misrnrs toward state agencies. In az0ll survey about thepcrfumence of security forces, particularly the military and police,rcspmdens expressed less confidence in the military and police thanin any other agencies or authorities. The military claims that the localpople are supportive of state authorities; the evidence shows that thatis not the case, at least not for military authority. According to rhesurvey. local religious leaders and the provincial Islamic commifieeshave eamed the greatest confidence of the civilian population. Thegovernment authorities who rank the highest in terms of publicconfidence are public health and education workers, none of u,homare related to security activities.a8 The military's low score repeatsthe pattern of an early 2009 suney.o,As has often been observed insurveys, Buddhists in the southern provinces show significantly moreconfidence in the security services, specif,caily the military and police.than do Muslims..

561

-*-t__:--

I

,r.. ',,.i.1i-it:1,', q,.,r..ii:: .:'.S:ili:!:

- 1-: : - --:,-'-: ll-ill[lc-iS

D.::i-:r. -: Cc ntdencti: ih. Derp St,urit: Sut'

r Highe-it Score:S ):'r

lhou t Org:rnizations andr c.r of Southern People's

GroupS of people

Attitudes in 20ll

'€r€r:u l€.ders

aeachert

dfx.nc M,ac health

Pe,..q lAmia lFfritees

6ij- ato.nY

tud..: lne-ffent

,rrve.nor

'erdm€n

58PAC

udemii

rig64$c .no.ny

d@'6o6ca{

b Eti*ians

'.i?vLionHtre rtnB ffirsion

..dio

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l!.!_.r cenier

lscc a

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MP

k;: o: s.{Dl IrE:iaatcn

9\a:'r-c.r(11

t6G

toliac

_rtirl

i

I

iC

T

As seen iiom th: s.rr-vey date. tltc police forces are stnrggling in public

estimetion as u'e-.. This involr'es the deeper issue of the entire criminaljustice S\,r13p-,.::: police 3re seen as a cirilian's iriitial contact \\ithii're crinri;ri jus..:e system. and shen a poiice of1icer fails in his

periorma:--;e. ti-:-- ',rhole s\::cm i,s seen to have iailed. N4oreover,

poii;e ni..ions - :rnrtniiiri' affair:-. ri c;e judged br the sLu ;' tc be

ulsr-,.---ess::1. cc.-.::ring un='.t-rab, ' :i c:-: r', itl r the ltlilitarr,'.\ ci.' rlian

afiairs niissions'

(

ir

2r

ItSr

nt

th..

sel

titr-)-

cir',

an(

buiintrancl

l

ihc

mis

'l

I

l1

Ii

#sth-n[dfrtbfr*a bordcrporhtdm is urt€n tu ldlqFhthe decisive factor .-."2 Thc gErcret bcficrca iiin the contest with the insurgents beause, at fte mmdprejudice, he has developed a sense of forgiveness, and he is gpmildcurious about his opponents' cultural context. Yet this ideal approa;hhas yet to be adopted by rank-and-file soldiers.

Challenges and Prospects of '6Southern" National Securirv*

In March 2012, the government approved a new Policy on rheAdministration and Development of the Southern Border Provinc:s.2012-2014, drafted and arranged by the National Security Councii.j-'It had been several years since the issuance of the prior Natio::elSecurity Policy on the Southern Border Provinces in 1999. For almo.tnine years, political chaos and violence have been unabated, ruin:::the 1999 security policy and underminine the legitirnacy of the state:osensibly govem the deep south. out of nine objectives articulateci :r,'the neu, policy, the keywords are clearlv present in Objectives 8 a::d9. Tiicsc siaie that the govemment will attempt to create appropnj:ecircunrstances conducive to diaiogue in order to end the conlr:.-tand ensure the participation of all concerned parties in the peaj:-buildin-e process. At the same time, it airns to ensure the systenfa:.,-.integrated, efficient, participatory and u'ell-informed administfii:-:,and development of the southern border provrnces.5a

It might be rvishful thinking that the civilian governmenr z:jthe NSC can rearrange the securify policy in the south throush r:._s

neu, docurnent without the consent of the military. But tu,o lacii .might contribute to the gradual success of the new securify poi:--_.

35

licral

nh

ris

-1.

-.---:n & Sffimjlmmtlier!,Tf1fl1lM':!W[Ttm[$ ]iu lir-":'iiir-i i]'- lll'ltrI - *-:.

t'] I'i. -." -*--:_r;f11,:l18inr.i*:!ll lillll.r lr'.'".,1n.i 'lt ;t ,T'{,,Lt:lr i t"--: -.t-. - - __----[T1.fi&llr..]r', .'' .,-: ri;i,- . 1 .lirl r. -"' l.-'.: -- :--::- : --:-- i!+ -,jLh.rrf : : - -u:-: --",].: *:-:'. .r--: *t _--t-.

-. -,-:S-:::. :: --: l,:1: -. -::: ::: i:-: :.-:! t. :r-: -::-:::: ..-:.

::- Cil:,-a:3::::::-:::.:'. :.:::-:-i::-:. -.:::-::-:: :.:l=.-:-:_::-::..-{n arrnv co]olel e\i:i::3C:hal lhe ni.--::rr!'s;-:-:--r ,: t- :-::.c.ethe violence ria "polit:cs leading milita.. oFei-a:1,-'::- :.:--:'.." i: i:ivillages and comntunities. \\rhereas i;:-.'lediate. .-.::: '.i...ence ishandled tacticalli'. latent. political conflici r-an be ensased br the \SC.the SBPAC, and academic and other instir.itions. Thus. a nlo-pronged-multilayered policy is required. The cojonel further srated that themilitary should go after the insurgents' political establishments inthe villages (not the cells of the Runda Kumpulan Kecil, rvhich areinsurgent military wings), to destabilize the structures rhat support theinsureency at the grass-roots level.

And, he continued, if possible, the miiiiary shouici anempt to arrestthe insurgents individuall,v, not collectively, thus minimizing politicalconsequences and isolating local ceil leacers from the population. Atthe sarne time, civilian agencies should cai{v on with political reforms.decentralization. and the peace dialog to solve the prr'rblem of latentconflir;t over the long term. When the niilitary and civiiian tacticalrlo'.'ernents are linked, rvorking in parallei to each other. much of ihepopulation will raliy around the peace effr.rt, with diminishing risk ofcounterattack from radical groups.

What if you have a peace dialog or ta-k about decentralization in

ilrocess, and, suddenl.v, there are bomb ar.cks in Phuke ilr Your u'ho1:poiitical process ri'ouid collapse. You neei to have the nanagement ofsecurity and poiitrcal processes r,"orking :: geiher ..."::

ir

b

o

n

SE

mwrhrviofrel

rolpciis :

reian(

1(

tl

t(ir.

o_

rl.

IN

apI

thc::.-(. 1.\

''ofarl)thaitrie

The c.rrrent arnrv chiei Pray'uth Chai-.-:cha,situation that tl:c nilitan' practices conc-:ted

riOYr 91g55sd b_'' the

the last have been jI

t

I

.t

ri.rft, ,.*

:t";lE

I irreiltciir e . flie coionel Ljeiieves that Prayuth is beginring to r:ke a

brprtder r icu ol southern r iolence and that tiiis presents a "u'i:itlow

sf t)pportlinitr,." The 4th Antry's ongoing operations have bec..nre a

flasco. When asked if nrilitary ot{icers might efi-ectively imp}ement

ideological campaigns, tlie colonel replied that the nature oi the

military organization is verl' centralized, so it is betier workin= in a

top-down manner. Convincing and persuading the army's comminderin chief is tlie best way to change the attitudes of the lower-ra:,king

officers. Once thc top comtrtander accepts the new ideas, the bo.s can

then order his suborciinates to tnake changes accordingly.Thc legal separation of the ISOC and the SBPAC is considrred a

serious problen-r. When the SBPAC operates, the military does not

move. And when the military moves, the SBPAC is unable tt1 iICt.

When the 4th Army commander meets with top civilian agenci:s on

the ground. only vicc governors or assistants are sent to the me:iing.rvhereas the secretary general of the SBPAC can count on the atteniance

of provincial govemors u,henever hc cails a meeting. Se curin :.ctorrefoi-ms are imperative lor a better peace-bLriiding process.

The second factor for a successfitI security policy involves fire h:Jden

role of the olci institution. tlie "netx'ork rnonarchy," iit supportiig the

peace proccss. Thc returrt of National Security' Council partici::tiortis a key factor. Better coordination bctrveen the NSC and the SBPAC

represents a reconciliation between Thaksin's supporting inst:::tionand tire "network rnonarchy" that Thaksin attempted to niarg::-:lizein 2004. The SBPAC's secretan,-general, Thawee Sodsong. has

approved a strategy to follou' the nei,r' policy set by the NSC.J'.'.'o ofthe most significant agendas oLrtlined tn the NSC policy are supp- rirtudiscussions about deep south autonomy or decentralizatio:. an,j

"opening space" for Deace talks. A h.igh-ranking NSC officer c.:arlrariicLrlatcs that "thc securitY secior Irhe niilitary] has ncver ?uiirtecthat the nrilitary approach failed lo subdue the insurgency. \\'e ha.''c

tried to convince thern that they have to cirange their attitudes th:')ugh

'oirected

tsequent

;sllre on

militanontiation.I handle

i' in the

lence ishe NSC.rronged"

that the:ents in:ich are

rport the

to arresipoliticalrtion. At'eforms.

rf latenttacticalh of the

r risl; of

ation in.r u,holement of

-i'^'. +--

r e been

\

ti7l

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in the Southern Frontiels

olrr rle\/ policy and strategies." He also reircrated: "lt's a matter ofhow you see huntan beings. It is a mltter of u'hether you look at thenras human or not."56

The NSC and the SBPAC are creatinc circunistances that areconducive to political solutions. As such. ernphasis is increasinglybeing placed on the aforementioned "opening space," the first timesuch wording has been so clearli, articulated in national securitypolicy. Officials in these agencies believe that, with this "open space,,policy statement, the radical u,ing of the insurgent movements willcome around to bargaining tlirough peaceful means.

Commander in Chief Prayuth appears to be quite knowledgeableabout the complications of the southern insurgency. In a statement to thepress, he said that the government u,ould look to three administrativepillars to drive forward southern policy. The first is the ISOC, r,r,hichhe himself will oversee on behalf of the prinie minister. The secondpillar is the SBPAC under the leadership of Secretary-General ThaweeSodsong. And the third pillar is cornposed of functional agencies,the ministries and departments u,orking on the ground, which areclosely monitored by General Yutthasak Sasiprapa, the depr-rty primeminister. These three pillars of administraticn must freely consuit witheach other regarding any need for policy ad-justntents or changes inoperational strategy.

For the first tirne, an army leader has said that the southem conflictcannot be resolved by implernenting only a single dimension, the use

of force, but rather rnust rely on a multidirnensional approach. "Today,the authorities rvorking in the ficld knorv rvith rvhont tltey are frghting,and they are going after these people by using existing lau,s, whilebeing nell au,are of international la''r,s. \\'e have knorvn abor-rt thecariscs of the separatist llo',/eutent. uhich is a dornestic affair that has

cnrerqed from a histc.r]'of ethnic diltrc:rces .{nd u'e I',ave to intproveand re solve our tactical probienrs tc-, be r.itorc S3CLlre- anC se lf-defended.not merely,being behind the proble ms."it The messase is cle ar: to cope

ti

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a

S

L

p

r,

Ir

a

f{

F+ltr

1

\a

L

t

jatter ofat them

hat are:asingly:st time;ecurityspace"

nts will

lgeablert to thestrative

, whichsecondfharvee

;enc ies,

ich arer prime.rlt withnges in

;onflictthe use'Today.

ghting,

, whiiecut thehat has

nprovelended,to cope

silh ilr rFr eacrrt-cha@ $roCIg but delicate securit-y reforrxand a political ryroech stould be the central strategy.

ultimatelr'. political solutions coupled with security reforms arethe critical factors to gradually improve the situation in the deepsouth. Political dialo-rue and decentralization are the keywords fora political approach that can solve the problem of legitimacy. Forsecurity reform, a crucial issue is effective coordinatior betweencivilian and military agencies in the security administration. Anothercritical concept is the "managed process of moving toward moreprofessional and accountable security arrangements." Ultimately,resources and efforts must be spent on "rationalizing and consolidating

[security forces] and professionalizing and strengthening the regulararmed forces and police."s8 Simply put, this means training locallyrecruited regular soldiers and police officers to be more professionaland competent, while phasing t-rut iire depioyment of undisciplined,wasteful, and risk-organized paramilitaries and militias. Two majorentities, Infantry Division l5 of the 4thAnny and the Southern BorderProvinces Police Operations Center, should be the primary focus ofthe professionalization and strengthening of security management inThailand's deep south.

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' '1,::: in the Southera F:lqae:s

. siudiesl, no. 9l ('APrii ZOi t)'

surin Pitsuu,an. "lslarn and MalaY Nationalism: .A. case Sn$'of dre Malsr-!fru:;ums

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University, June 1982'

Thai Pttst. March 14, 2009'

Notes/

:r 20i1

.ng nai

lng\\,al

ion on

inces].

,ers it1,',

Years

,nc.2

Phon

Chat/

mlang

g and

ri the

rolice

rltural

rntll0t

18 to

idaen

Ienc)'n tlie'enter

rrsitr'.

rated

,v inurit)

Gr,*,r1fi Jitpironisril'Muea Khaokarn \ueng Roi Duean Khong Satha-'lakan

Jangu,at Chaidaen Tai Rao Kamlang ja Pai Thang Nai" [After passing one hundred

monthsortheviolentsituation,rvhereare\\'eheading?],DeepSouthwatch.avaiiable

at rvww. deepsoutwatch'org/node/3 3 54'

? Sumeth Panpetch, ..Bombs in Southei-n Thailand Kill l l, Wound 110,'' Associated

Press, March 31,2012'l Deep South Watch,

..The protracted violence arnid the Unstable Political Situation

after 20 I i Elections," October 5, 201 I '

I Chrisropirer R. N'litchell, "Conflici' Social Change' and Conflict ^Resoiution:

An Enquiry," in Sot'ia! Cl'aug' and Cotilict Transformation' Berghof Handbook

Dialogue Series, ed. David dloomfield. \{artina Fischer, and Beatrix Schreelzle

(Berlin:BcrghofResearclrCenterforConsiructiveConfliciManagement.]006),p.15.: Derrnis J. D. Sandolc . Capruring rha Cotl,rrexirt of Confic't; Dealing f;ith i--olent

Ethnic Cortficls o.f thc Posl*Cotd lllat'Era(London: Frances i;inter' i999)' p 101'

6 Surachar.t Barnrungsuk, "Kanko Khri'arrrmaisangop Phak Tai" [lnsurgec'"-"" in

soutlrern Thailand]. rn Julasan Kittrarrint,.tttkhortg Strekta [Journal of slurity

srudiesl. no. 91 (april 20ll). p' 5' As a [-ading security expert in Thai a7c:mia'

Surachrrt also iricntiiics thc sourhem insurgenc-v as the "protracted war." fe[s.'r ing a

model olrevolLttionary $,ar in i,!ao Zedong's $ariare theory' Ibid'' pp 39--1i'

'Srisomp.'b Jipirornsri and Duncan irlcCl:go"'The southern Thai Coni':: Six

\'earsort:insttrgettcr'.NotJustCrirlle...Ctltttettiporar.l,souIheas!,4ti.:]]:o.2(Augrrst 2C10), P. l-<7'

spondok schools are religious boarding schools for instructing youn3 mer:n the

'.-'---

:' ,,.:;,:1.1 -:r:

__:1",.:;d.+'-.- .i.*tt=-_ lj

l

1rr 11ls O9Utilclll alUlltlCi5

precepts ol'Islaii',. .:'r thr- fio\,inccs ol Paltani, \'ala, ar:i i'\arathiu,at in Thailand,s

dccp south, thc' pi,..,Jok instiiutior.rs havc bccorne a sli:rbol ol'tirc ir,luslinrs' pride

in their lslaniic id:.ls and the realization ol'these ideals. See a clcar definition oftraditional Pondti, schools in Surin Pitsuwan, "lslanr and Malai,Nationalism: ACasc Study of tlie 1.1:lay-\luslirus olSouthenr fhailanti" 1Ph.D. iiisscrtation fpartiallulfillnrentl. Han::j Unir ersity, June 1982), pp. I 77-l -9.q

Mark Tanithai a.-J Sonrliii Boonchu, "Nayobai Khrianlnankhong C--hangu,at

Chaidaen Phak T:: Priapti:ilp nai Rop 30 Pcc" [Natronll securitv of the soLrthern

border provincu'S: -: .. \'cars .onrparison], in Phuendin Chintanokutr Imagined land],

ed. Chaiu'at Satha-.:and (B.rngkok: Matichon Publisliins. 2008). p. 71.Io rbid., p. 79.L Duncan McCarg--. "Thaksin and the Resurgence of \:iolence in the Thai South,''

in Rethinking Thc;,and's Southent Violence, ed. Duncan McCargo (Singapore:

National Universir ,.lSingrpore Press, 2007), p. 39.l2 Mark and Somki:.. ":r-a1,1r5"1 Khwanrrnankhong Changrar Chaidaen Phak Tai," p. 90.ll Internatior.ral Cn.rs Grcrup. "southcrn Thailand: insursencr,. Not Jihad." AsiaReport no. 98, Ir{ar i S, 200:. p. i l.li

-.'' The pnme mirri:::':i.rl orrir.r brotrght the SBPAC uncier the ciirect controi of theIntcrior hIinistry. u:rlc. CP\l-43 rcrnained under tlie contrcl ol'4rh Ariny Region.i5 N{ark and Sontir:,:. "Nar..bai Kh'-vantntankhong Chansriat Chnirlacn Phak Tai."n ()ir'-'i" Ibid.. p. 95I Irlternalional Cr:s-: Croui- "iortlhenr Thrilan{: InsLrrl::t:y'." ;: 12.:s it'Iark and Somk:.:. "Narrrai Khrvantntankliong Chanovat Chaidaen Phak Tai."pp.94-95.

'o Mccarso. "Tliak.l'r Duncan \'lcCa;-.Puci/ic'Rer rel lS. :

li Duncan \{cCa:-.

Tltuilarci r.lthaca: Cll \1cCa,co. "Thaks

:. lnd ti..' Rcsurgencc of Vioicrtr:c," p ,i9."\g1','.-rp!' \,1cinarch1, an<i Legitim.rcl, Crrs.-s in Thailand.''

, i (D:,-enrbcr 2005). pp. a99 519.

. T,,tt.ri-..11trrt-l !lta Lottd: [;i,trrt tr;,: Lc,gitititttct itr Sortlltern

-.':ll U:.i r'isitv Press. 200ri). p. 9.

- .::rJ t.-.: I(csurqeuce of Viclcnie." p +1: scr- also ibld., p. 9.

i73

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ingwat,utherl

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apore:

p. 90.

Asia

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.on.

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rurd,"

lrcrn

9.

! !1 I l14l1q1fu J ^.trvv(+f tri r !+svJ

in the Soutliern Frontiers

2l Inlernationel Crisrs Cfrrup. "Southenr Thailan.i: Insurgencl'." p. 3.1.

2a Mark and Sonrkiat. "\avoblr Kh* anrnrankhrng Changu at Chaidaen Pha.i Trii."

p.99.25 International Crisis Group. "South.-rn Thaiirurd: Insurgency," p. 34. I:: this

anall,sis. the ICG ider:tifies that the u'cakest link in securitl' mana-qemenl ::, the

southern provinces is irtelligence. ri'hich is collected by tetr separate agencie.26 Srisornpob Jitpironrsri. "The Protractcd \/ioience anridst the Unstable Pc.iilcai

Situation afler 2011 Elections." Deep South \\'itch, October 5,2011. avail:-:.e rthttp:iirvwu.deepsouth\\'rltch.orginodei23-13. For details, sce International t:isisGroup, "southern Thailand: insurgenct'." pp. I l--il.27 Rungrau'ee Chalemtsripinyorat, "Kankatlucak lae Kanpathibat Nathi l::rhan

Taniruat kap Panha Kanlamoet Sitthimanutsalachonnai Sam Changwst Ch;rj:len

Phak Tai" [Recruitntent and perfonnances of police and military officer. and

problems about the violaiion of human rights in three southern border provi:.'es],

in Phaenclin Chintanakan fimagined land], ed Chaiwat Satha-anand (Bar:gkok:

Matichon Publishing. 3008). p. 179.

28 Ibid., p. 184.

2e Mccargo. Tearing .4part the Land, p.99.The term "Ranger" is translatec iiom

Thahan Phran.30 Pit lo* !ruat khon, torig jul truat, khum khrong khru, dulae phra, "to surrou',:. and

search. set up checkpcints, escort tcachers, and protect monks," are catchp:.:escs

commonly cited amons ordinarv soldiers.31 While conducting research in 2007, I *'atched

to teach a local religious schcol's pupils to sing

planting a flagpole in front of their school.l2 Ma3or Gcneral Samrel Srirai, intervieu'. lssara News Center, September6. :r,107,

available at http://south.israneri's.org/cms/inclex.php?option=com-content&u..i.:vi

ew &id:25 44&lter nid= i S.

i3 in 201 1 . the re \\'ere fr. o camp raids b-r'' nrilitanrs t:rgeted at Division I 5 units : R.a-

ngae district. \arathi'.va: A local obsen e r conciuued that the units u'ere undeftl.ied,

unqualificd. anC undersl.rffed. In bc-,th raids, the militants could get close enc--::i to

the soldiers to cause casualties. Chaiyong Maneepiloek, "Chaiyong Manee;:ioek

)19

a Santisuk unit trying pa:-:"Ily

the Thai national anthem 'ihile

l

,lrrt Llrc )ouL[enl f loillrer:

KIui Prasa Chao Tai," Siarrg i: Jr'ri /r , April l5' 201 I

34 Isra Nervs Cenler, Novetnbe: ::' 2010'

35 On the rvhole. senysnIienai r.:.iiary forccs. not included thc Rangers' collstitutes

a military strucnrre of t\\,enn -i,:.: inlantry battalions. equiYaient to seven infantry

regiments by mv informal eslii:l:::"rt'36 Isra News Center, Januarr' lt. 1,,i I i se e also KrLtngthep Thur'tkil's report at http:i/

u'ww.bangkokbiznews.conr l-' t'::": Jetail/politicslanalYsis'

3? Isra News Center, October i' - : i I '

3s International Crisis Group. "Sl -.:ir.'nl Thailand: The Problem ri'ith Paramilitaries."

Asia Report no. 140, octoter:-:. 1007, p.5; see also a detailed anal),sis of Thahan

PhraninDesn.rondBal|,T}tt'6..'-.iltBlack:ThahanPhran(Rangersl,Thailand,.gParamilitary Borrler Guards 18::gkok: White Lctus' 2004)'

3e Estimates b1, Diana Sarosi ar,d Janjira Sombutpoonsiri, "Rule by the Gun:

Armed civilians and Firearms Proliferaticn in Southern Thailand," Nonvioience

Intemational Southeast Asia. \{:" 2009, p. 15; Manvaan Macan-Markar"'Licence

to Arm civilians against l\,lusli=. Insurgency," Inter Press Sen'ice Neri's Agency,

Septernber 18, 2009.ao Thai posr, March 14,2009 toionel Parinya chaidilok, spokesnran for ISOC

Region 4, pror,ided statistics abc.:: anned forces in the southern border provinces.

His nurnbers are compared $ili: S'rrosi and Janjira, "Rule by the Gun"'pp' 12-16;

see also Khana Thamgnan \uni.:r:l Santiwithi [working group on peace strategy],

..Raingan Khronekan Yutthas:i S,::irr,ithi Sanrrap Sangkhom Thai nai Sattawatthi

21 RuIang yutthasat chatkan K: ..,.:::.,runracng chang$.at Chaidacn Phak Tai, 2004-

201 l '' [Project report concemii: :.ace Strategy for Thai societr, in tlre ] l stcenfury.

on conflict resolution Strateg} i:, :.1: soutirern border provinces. 2004-201l], Deep

South Watch, lr4arch :, ZOlf . i' i' available at http://wwu''deepsouthwatch'org/

node/1593#. Starisrics about thc \. -'.-:nteer Dcfcnse corps fron: Atclouo, "Botkhrvam

Chiwit or Sor Raksa DindaL-n"':js3)'about life in thc \blurrtccr Dcfcnse Corps]'

available at http: atcloud.conl s:::::s 9l3J I '

ar Mccargo, Tearing Apart th'' *':'-:' p l08.

a2 Intemational Cn:is Group.r. "S: -::.:rn Tlrailand: The Problenr rtith I'ararllilitaries.''

p. 2s.i, Colon.l pimonphan L-rkoskri. ".,1,':rthanaiharn ongkan khong Nua' Thahan nai

l

(

:

IIS

Cl

E

S

p.1,

6

2rrf

580

. - *--':--'J.^::."..'ii""l

in the Southern Frontieis

Phumiphak rais Tanq Thi N{: Phtrn to Kankaepanha Khu,ammaisangop nai Sarn

Chan-es'at Chaideen Phak Tai" L)rsanizational culture of the regional army and its

impact on resoiutions of unres: in three southem border provinces]. in phaendin

chintanakan ilmagined land-. ed. chai*'at Satha-anand (Bangkok: MaiichonPublishing. 200S), p. 125.4 The Bangkoi: Post. in repo::ing on rhis rape case, revealed that crosscurrural

relationships in'olving soldiers Jre not uncommon, despite the army's "iron r';le"fbrbidding thenr. Bnngkok Posi. \farch 9. l0ll.a5 Duncan \{ccargo has cornpileJ rhe mcst e\lensive field data about the perfonlrance

of Thai securin ttrces currentl'" a'ailable. See McCargo, karing Apart the Land,pp. 98-l 15.

a6 Srisompob Jirpiromsri, et al-. "Kansueksa Wijai Pramoen Phonkrathop khongPraratchakamnor Kanborihan Rarchakan nai Sathanakan chukchoen Pho So 2548to Kanchatkan lae Kankaekai Parha Khrvamrunraeng nai changwat chaidaen phak

Tai Pho So lj-<l IEvaluation anr impact anal'sis of the entergency decree of ]005on the adminisvation ard conil.'t managenrent in thc southem border protincesin 2009]. Cenie: for Crnflict S;-rdies and Cultural Diversitl,, prince of Son,eklaUniversitl', Pattani campus, 20 I 0. pp. 7 4*7 5 .

47 ibid., p.83. This research appl::,C a sysremaric sin.rple randorn sampling of peoplein the three southemmost pro\itces of Patrani. Y'ala, and Narathiu,at and tburdistricts of Sonekhia. The sampi: is 2.000 pr'r1ple.a8 Srisompob -li?iromsri. et al.. "!.hrongkan \\'ichai puca Tittam lac Pramocn phon

Kanpatibat \gzn khong Sun P.::ibatkan Santnakgnan Tarlruat Haeng Chal SunPatibatkan Tamruar Changrvat Cl--:idaen Phak Tai lae Kong Karnlang Tamruat Pi pho

So 2553 (Rop ll duean)" fProje,-l tor rrroniroring and evaluating the performancesof the Frontline Operarions Ce;-.::: of the Ofhcc of rlic Naticnal Police/SounernBorder Police Cenrer and the pol::: tbrccs in l(-) l0 ( l2 Months)]. Center fur $naictStudies and Cul::rral Dirersitt,. P:.:;e of Sonckla University, Pattani .un.,pu.l:,.,11.pp. 62*63.a9 See the repon i:r Snsompob Ji::i:.rmsri. "Fivr Years. Five Monrhs: Analysrs o: lhe65 Ir{onths oi L.:.iest in tirc Sou:-.:ar Borde: Provinces," Deep South \Vatch, .iune26,200950 Srisonrpob. "i-iuongkan Wicha: puea Tittam lae Pranioen Phon Kanpatibat Ng,n."

rtutes

lantry

tttp:ll

ries."rahan

andb

Gun:lence

)ence

!'ncy,

SOCIrcCS.

1- l6;eg)'1,,atthi

004-rturyDeep

.otgwam,rps],

ies,"

r nai

_i8 i

II

/

.fin'the,southern Frontiers

p. 62.The sur\/ev rvas conducted by a rnttltistage sampling of people at different

levels of districts, subdistricts. and viilages in the three southernmost provinces of

Pattani, \ala, and Narathiwat, and four districts of Songkhla; the sample is l-500

people.st tbid., pp.66-17.52 Lieutenant General Samret Srirai, inten,iew by author, Sirindhorn Military

Encampment, Pattani Province. January 11 ,2012sl National Security Council. "I.layobai Kanborihan lae Kanphatthana Changwat

Chaidaen Phak Tai, Pho So 2555-255'7" [Policy on the administration and

developrnent of the southem border provinces. 2012-20141, Office of the National

Security Council, Office of Prime Minister.20l2'54Ibid., p. s.55 Personal inten iew with an anonymous colonel of the 4th Army, Songkhla, April

9,2012.56 Anonyrnous National Security Council official, informal comments made at a

meeting.si Matichon, Apnl 20, 2012.5E The keyr*,ords are drawn from International Crisis Group, "Southem Thailand:

The Problem with Paramilitaries," p. 25.

582

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